Mobility For The Soldiers Of The Sea
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting
MOBILITY FOR THE SOLDIERS OF THE SEA
by
Major T. B. Galvin
USMC
Military Issues Paper submitted to the Faculty Advisor
Conference Group 5, Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia 22134
FINAL PAPER
10 APRIL 1995
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Mobility for The Soldiers of The Sea
Author: Major T.B. Galvin, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: The Marine Corps requires a new multi-role armored
surface mobility system to close a significant gap in MAGTF
tactical and operational mobility in order to facilitate
movement and maneuver. The solution to this mobility gap is
the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Fast (AAAV(F)).
Background: The United States Marine Corps possesses the
perfect instrument; the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF),
and war-fighting doctrine; maneuver warfare, at a time when
the 1995 National Military Strategy requires these very
attributes. Maritime focus on littoral regions, forward
presence missions and power projection as a tool of national
policy, requires a credible and flexible force. The Marine
Corps' ability to accomplish these missions is rapidly
diminishing due to the decline of tactical surface mobility
means. Left unchecked, this decline in capability will
degrade the combat power credibility of the MAGTF. Since 1989,
a system has been available to solve this mobility problem;
the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV). Lack of
consensus within the Marine Corps concerning procurement
priorities, deployment and employment concepts, and fiscal
austerity, pushed the development decision for the AAAV into
1994. In 1995, renewed budget cutting has started an erosion
of development funding for the AAAV. As the highest cost
Marine Corps procurement program, a professional debate has
started yet again regarding the need for the AAAV. Wavering of
institutional support for the acquisition of the AAAV places
the program in jeopardy and the Marine Corps' future
operational relevance in question.
Recommendation: The Marine Corps should secure full funding
from Congress for the development, procurement, and fielding
of the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Fast (AAAV(F)) in
order to retain tactical mobility for the MAGTF and capitalize
on the potential of a fully integrated capability of
operational maneuver from the sea.
CONTENTS
Section Page
1. A STRATEGY BASED ON MOBILITY 1
Amphibians are The Answer,1
A Short History,2
Current Technology, 3
2. HOW MOBILITY FITS IN THE MAGTF 4
Mobility Requirements, 5
The Mobility Gap,6
Amphibious Operations, 7
Mechanized Operations, 9
Maritime Operations, 10
3. WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES 11
Slow Speed Amphibians,12
High Speed Amphibians,12
Non Amphibians,13
Non Vehicles,15
4. THE MOBILITY SOLUTION 15
Functional, 17
Survivable, 17
Sustainable, 17
5. THE CHALLENGE 18
The Pay Off,19
Credibility of The Force,19
Bibliography 23
MOBILITY FOR THE SOLDIERS OF THE SEA
A STRATEGY BASED ON MOBILITY
The whirlwind of change, both realized and approaching,
in the structure and focus of the United States military, has
presented each of the military services with challenges and
opportunities. Successful responses to the challenge of down-
sizing and reorientation on new less well-defined threats may
fundamentally alter the level of the Marine Corps'
contribution to the national defense. Emphasis on compact,
flexible and credible force packages as the response choice of
the National Command Authority raises the utility of the
Marine Corps' capabilities to a new high.
The foundation for the Marine Corps' success in this new
national security environment is the fully integrated combined
arms team, the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).
Expeditionary in character, this flexible forward deployed
force achieves strategic and operational mobility by embarking
in the ships of the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) of the Naval
Expeditionary Force (NEF). Tactical mobility in support of
tactical maneuver is provided by the Corps' organic surface
and air delivery systems. Decreasing capabilities in tactical
surface mobility; block end of service life and anti-armor
technology improvements, will degrade the MAGTF's ability to
conduct maneuver warfare. The end result of this creeping
degradation is a MAGTF which is a less than credible modern
force.
Amphibians Are The Answer
In recognition of a new and maturing naval strategy
contained in Forward...From The Sea, and as a response to the
service challenge to provide relevant and credible MAGTFs in
this new environment, the Marine Corps requires a new multi-
role armored surface mobility system to close a significant
gap in MAGTF tactical and operational mobility in order to
facilitate movement and maneuver. The solution to this
mobility gap is the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Fast
(AAAV(F)). This system will deliver credible lethality,
survivability, fit within reduced maritime strategic lift, and
expand the options of the commander for deployment and
employment of expeditionary forces along the world's littoral
regions. The AAAV(F) has the technology base, capabilities
and designed-in flexibility to provide the mobility on land
and in the water that fills the Corps' mobility requirements
for the Twenty-First Century. Resolute commitment of
resources, in spite of the institutional risks in a time of
budget cutting, is mandatory if the Marine Corps is to retain
tactical mobility and operational relevance.
A Short History
Since the inception of mechanized warfare the Marine
Corps has grappled with seemingly unreconcilable requirements.
Mechanized warfare is characterized by mass formations of
armored vehicles and an extensive logistical structure that is
required to sustain these formations. The unique maritime
environment from which the Marine Corps achieves strategic and
operational mobility places a premium on vehicle, equipment
and logistics density. Balancing of these competing
requirements is the key to the Corps' past success as a
credible amphibious expeditionary force.
Innovation in equipment, tactics, and doctrine during the
1930s produced a vehicle, the Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT),
and an offensive amphibious philosophy, doctrine, and tactics
used in World War II. Success in combat, coupled with
continued innovation and refinement in equipment, tactics and
doctrine, has built a credible capability which capitalized on
maritime strategic and operational mobility. The LVT provided
the critical bridge from amphibious surface assault to armored
mobility ashore. The multi- role characteristics of the LVT
reflected the unique maritime requirement for adaptable
systems to meet a spectrum of deployment and employment
environments.
Current Technology. The Assault Amphibian Vehicle 7A1
(AAV7A1) is the current family of amphibian vehicles providing
the Marine Corps with armored tactical surface mobility for
the MAGTF. This family of vehicles was introduced into the
Fleet Marine Force in 1970 as the Landing Vehicle Tracked 7
(LVT7). LVT7 vehicle systems and capabilities are based on
1960s technologies addressing the anti-armor threats of that
period. The design of the LVT7 was based on a ten-year service
life. The mission profile of the LVT7 had a stated requirement
for eighty percent of operating time in water and only twenty
percent of operating time on land.1 In 1977 the LVT7 was
renamed the Assault Amphibian Vehicle 7 (AAV7) and the mission
profile for the vehicle was reversed; twenty percent of the
operational time in water and the remaining eighty percent in
land operations.2 In the 1980s the AAV7 underwent a major
service life extension effort since a new replacement vehicle
was not available. This extension of service life was followed
by a product improvement program which tried to address some
of the most critical tactical vulnerabilities and deficiencies
of the vehicle. These improvements were intended to extend
service life ten to fifteen years. The improved AAV7 was
designated the Assault Amphibian Vehicle 7A1 (AAV7A1) .3
Retirement of the AAV7A1 from the Fleet Marine Force is
scheduled to commence in 2005.4
In the modern battlespace, the AAV7A1 suffers from
antiquated technology and concept of design. At the time of
scheduled retirement from service, tactical surface mobility
for the MAGTF will have been provided by a vehicle system that
is over thirty years old. The mission of this vehicle is
completely opposite the design criteria used for its
development. Lethality of modern anti-armor weapon systems
and their universal availability are a significant threat to
AAV7A1 survival in combat. Recent Marine Corps and Navy
procurement of modern armored weapon systems and tactical
transport systems with capabilities superior to the AAV7A1,
raises significant deployment and employment issues. These
differences in capabilities are exacerbated by adoption of
employment concepts for the MAGTF and the NEF that are outside
the AAV7A1 performance envelope. The net result of this
situation is a MAGTF lacking the surface mobility to exploit
its' current technological advantages and unable to
effectively execute its warfighting doctrine.
HOW MOBILITY FITS IN THE MAGTF
Evolution of the national security strategy in the post
Cold War era can be characterized as a shift in focus and the
threat from global to regional. Steep decline in resources
allocated for force structure and force maintenance are part
of this new environment. Reorientation of the military on
regional crises has challenged the validity of the traditional
missions of some services. The Navy-Marine Corps team's
response to this evolving environment is based on the
relevance and credibility of the forward deployed combined
arms team as an integral part of a NEF.
Department of the Navy (DON) strategy for the new
security era was published in September of 1992 in the White
Paper " ...From The Sea". The concept presented was one of
focus on littoral regions, power projection and forward
presence.5 Publication of the new DON White Paper
"Forward...From The Sea" refines the 1992 strategic concept by
placing further emphasis on the strategic imperative of
credible and capable forward presence, crisis response, and
effective utilization of forward deployed MAGTFs as an
enabling force to exploit littoral battlespace.6 Execution of
this naval strategy is based on the operational concepts of:
Operational Maneuver From The Sea, Power Projection, Ship To
Shore Maneuver, and Sustained Operations Ashore.7
Mobility Requirement.
The Marine Corps derives its purpose and mission from
Title 10, United States Code:
The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained and equipped
to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together
with supporting components, for service with the fleet in
the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for
the conduct of such land operations as may be essential
to the prosecution of a naval campaign...
Clearly, the new naval strategy supports the mission assigned
in public law. Review of this strategy reveals a requirement
for a force that can provide swift response to crises in
distant lands. Inherent in this response capability is the
requirement for the means to build power ashore and sustain
this power for extended periods once there. This robust
capability is the central element of our nation's forward
presence and crisis response. The key concepts that are the
essence of the application of this strategy are Operational
Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) and Power Projection. OMFTS can
be described as the application of the tenets of maneuver
warfare to amphibious operations using sea, air, and land as
one maneuver space.8 Power Projection is the capacity to
develop sustained and lethal power rapidly at the time and
location of our choosing.9 Both concepts demand a force that
is structured for and capable of rapid adaptation to the
requirements of the mission. Imperative to success in this
environment is a force which is strategically, operationally
and tactically mobile; the means that facilitate a style of
warfare based on movement and maneuver.
The Mobility Gap
The premise of the argument for a new armored surface
mobility system is based on my belief that the MAGTF requires
this type of mobility as one of a number of capabilities with
which maneuver warfare can be executed. Review of post World
War II military history makes a compelling argument for the
use of surface and air mobility systems to achieve maneuver
and movement on the modern battlefield. Mission Area analysis
of current surface mobility systems in the Marine Corps
identified this area as deficient.10 The question then becomes
what capability and from what system(s) does the Corps require
to correct this deficiency?
Amphibious Operations. Strategic mobility for the MAGTF
is provided by the amphibious ships of the ARG. These ships
are one of the means by which the commander achieves
operational mobility within the Amphibious Objective Area when
the mission requires power to be projected ashore.
Maneuver and movement of the MAGTF from a sea base to the
shore; an amphibious operation, is based on tactical surface
and air delivery systems. Assault echelons are sent ashore in
helicopters and in AAV7A1s. The relatively short operating
range of the AAV7A1 dictates a short stand-off distance from
the shore for the ARG. Slow water speed equates to a slow
closing speed for the assault waves in AAV7A1s. Poor
waterborne performance exposes both the ARG and the assault
echelon to direct and in-direct fire weapon systems on the
beach. Lethality of these weapon systems poses a significant
risk to the MAGTF and the NEF in an amphibious operation if
the assault is directed against a hostile defended shore.
The effect of the performance and capability gap in MAGTF
surface mobility during the assault causes the related problem
of combat power build-up ashore. Power projection in an
amphibious operation means the placing of power, combat power,
in an area where none had previously been located. Building
combat power up from zero becomes a function of throughput;
the size of the force, its capabilities and the time that is
required to accomplish this action. Time as the key component
governing combat power build-up ties the surface assault
forces to the speed of the AAV7A1, 6 to 8 knots, and the size
of the force carried in the assault echelon. The size of the
force carried in each of the waves of the assault echelon is
limited by the number of AAV7A1s employed. The maximum number
of AAV7A1s used in the assault is dictated by the type and
number of amphibious ships in the ARG and the size of the
MAGTF.
The Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) and other surface
craft of the ARG provide other means to land the surface
assault. Both of these options fail to provide ballistic or
NBC protection to the embarked force. Mobility provided by
these craft stops at the high water mark of the beach; leaving
the issue of mobility for the unit left ashore to be
addressed. LCAC waves used to deliver artillery and tanks to
the beach would be delayed until the assault wave had returned
for back loading. This scenario costs time; the key component
in the equation for building combat power ashore, and acts as
an obstacle to synchronization of combined arms at the
decisive point and time. Assigning additional missions to LCAC
will delay the echelonment of force infrastructure and
sustainment throughput ashore.
High transit speeds and extended operating ranges of the
LCAC provide this craft a level of security and survivability.
The pay load capacity coupled with speed and range make the
LCAC an essential mobility system for delivery of combat power
multipliers such as tanks and artillery to the beach. The two
limiting factors in the use of LCAC in amphibious assaults
are; the small number of LCACs in service, and the large space
claim they take when embarked aboard amphibious shipping.
Given the parameters of limited numbers and sea lift
footprint, transport of the assaulting infantry is not the
high payoff result sought in the exploitation of this valuable
asset.
Mechanized Operations. Traditionally, the Marine Corps
has created mechanized forces by cross attaching infantry
mounted in AAV7A1s with tank units. Procurement of the M1A1
tank has raised the lethality and mobility potential of the
Corps' mechanized force. This state of the art weapon system
is, however, dependant on the support of the other vehicles in
the mechanized force to develop the synergy of an integrated
force. The other component of this force, AAV7A1 mounted
infantry, is limited by the AAVs land speed, cross country
mobility, and ballistic protection. The AAV7A1 substantially
under performs the M1A1 in all areas of land combat vehicle
performance. These different levels of performance degrade the
key mobility advantages of the M1A1 when both of these
vehicles operate together as part of a mechanized force.
The AAV7A1 is the only vehicle organic to the MAGTF that
can provide a true mechanized infantry force. Motorization of
infantry as a means of achieving increased surface mobility
cannot be accomplished with the organic assets of the MAGTF.
Motorized infantry do not have the cross country speed,
mobility, or survivability of the AAV7A1. Light armored
wheeled vehicles in the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
(LAR BN) do have the speed, mobility and agility that is
comparable to the M1A1. However, these vehicles are not
configured to carry infantry units and are primarily tasked
with essential security missions. Survival of these light
armored vehicles depends upon their speed, agility, mobility,
and tactics rather than ballistic protection. This condition
makes these vehicles a marginal means to transport infantry
as part of a mechanized force.
Maritime Operations. The ships of the Maritime
Prepositioning Squadrons (MPS) coupled with airlift support
from Transportation Command provide strategic mobility to the
MAGTF for rapid buildup of forces using facilities in a benign
environment for the build-up of combat power. Deployment of
MAGTFs, using the Maritime Prepositioning Force, provides a
unique flexible and responsive strategic mobility option. Two
methods are used to off-load of MPS, pier side and in-stream.
The AAV7A1 does add flexibility to in- stream off-load because
of its amphibious capability. Once the shift from deployment
to employment of the MAGTF is made, the same tactical surface
mobility limitations are present. Subsequent amphibious and
mechanized operations of the MAGTF are constrained by the same
performance characteristics of the AAV7A1.
A style of warfare; maneuver, and an institutional ethos
of flexibility and adaptation that support a military strategy
of credible and sustainable forward deployed combined arms
forces, are relevant only insofar as strategy can be
translated into tactical and operational success. Mobility is
the foundation for maneuver and movement in the modern
battlespace. The AAV7A1 is the system that provides surface
mobility to the MAGTF in order to facilitate maneuver and
movement. Clearly, the AAV7A1s limitations are so significant
that it no longer supports the style of warfare, nor the
military strategy that sets the parameters for employment of
the MAGTF.
WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES
What systems can the Corps use to close the mobility gap
in MAGTF capability? The first step in the process to
determine a new mobility system took place on 21 March 1994,
when the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps approved the
Operational Requirements Document for the Advanced Amphibious
Assault Vehicle (AAAV) (NO. MOB 22.1).11 Approval of this
latter document was based upon a series of Cost and
Operational Effectiveness Analyses (COEA) conducted to
determine the most effective way to accomplish surface
mobility for the MAGTF.12 Twelve possible alternative
mobility systems were evaluated. Essential in this evaluation
was the sea lift space claim (footprint) of each candidate.
This footprint was based on moving equivalent numbers of
Marines ashore as part of the assault wave.13 The reason why
foot print is a key determinant in this evaluation is the
overall reduction in, and configuration changes, to the
composition of the ARG caused by fiscal pressures.
Alternatives which require procurement of additional
amphibious shipping are not viable. COEA analyses centered on
four general types of systems: slow speed amphibian vehicles,
high speed amphibian vehicles, non amphibian vehicles, and non
vehicle systems.14 The following paragraphs summarize the
capabilities and limitations of each of these systems.
Slow Speed Amphibians
Three slow speed candidates were evaluated. These
amphibians included the AAV7A1, a conceptual vehicle
identified as the AAV7A2(S) which is an enhanced AAV7A1, and
the AAAV Slow (AAAV(S)) which is a slow water speed variant of
the AAAV. All of these candidates suffered from the same
limitation; extended time for waterborne transit and short
waterborne operating range, due to slow water speed. Limited
ballistic protection is a shared limitation for the AAV7A1 and
AAV7A2 (S). The AAV7A2 (S) does have increased firepower over
the AAV7A1; a 30 mm canon vice two machine guns. The AAAV(S)
has the same mobility and speed ashore as the AAAV(F) .15
These vehicles do not require an increase in the
inventory of amphibious shipping since they use the existing
footprint of the AAV7A1 and carry the same number of infantry,
eighteen combat loaded Marines. Slow water speed amphibians
place the assault echelon and amphibious shipping at risk
during the assault. Their performance in the water does not
support the concept of over the horizon amphibious assault or
operational maneuver from the sea. The AAV7A2 and AAV7A1 have
essentially the same deficient levels of performance on land
and in the water. AAAV(S) is the most capable system of these
candidates once ashore in terms of survival, mobility and
firepower on the modern battlefield.
High Speed Amphibians
Two vehicles were evaluated for the high speed amphibian
solution to the mobility problem. The AAAV Fast (AAAV (F))
and the AAV7A2 Fast (AAV7A2 (F)). These vehicles use the same
power plant and drive systems to attain high water speeds;
twenty to twenty- five knots. High transit speed and extended
operational range, due to water speed, facilitate the use of
over the horizon employment concepts for the amphibious
assault. Both the AAAV(F) and the AAV7A2(F) use the same
weapon systems as those in the slow speed versions of these
vehicles. The AAV7A1 hull, with performance enhancements, is
used for the AAV7A2 (F). As a result of this design compromise
troop carrying capacity is reduced; down from eighteen to nine
Marines. This reduction in troop lift requires more vehicles
to lift the assault wave, or a longer period of time to
complete the assault because multiple trips are necessary.
More vehicles in the assault wave raises the issue of more sea
lift foot print.16 The AAAV(F) does carry eighteen combat
loaded Marines. Mobility of the force once ashore is of
equal importance. The Marines left on the beach by the AAV7A2
awaiting the landing of the remainder of the assault wave are
left foot mobile. Once the assault is complete only a portion
of the assault force can be mechanized for continuing
operations. The AAAV(F) land performance characteristics are
similar to those of the M1A1.17 The AAV7A2 does not match
this performance which negatively impacts the mobility of the
force.
Non Amphibian Vehicles
Five non amphibian vehicles were evaluated. Movement of
the assault wave mounted in these vehicles requires they be
embarked on LCACs in order to achieve rapid build-up of combat
power ashore. Four of the candidates considered are tracked
vehicles; APX, M113A3, M2A2, and the Future Infantry Fighting
Vehicle (FIFV). The fifth candidate considered was the light
armored wheeled vehicle, LAV 25 of the LAR BN 18.
The APX is a concept vehicle with the same land
performance as the AAAV.19 The M113A3 is a tracked armored
personnel carrier that has been used by the US Army for over
thirty years.20 M2A2 is the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle
(IFV) which is a heavy tracked vehicle used by the US Army for
more than twenty years.21 FIFV is a concept vehicle which is
part of the Army's Armored Systems Modernization program.22
All five of the non amphibian candidates require more
vehicles than the AAV7A1 in order to lift the same number of
Marines. This increase in vehicles has a direct impact on sea
lift footprint of the force. Related to the issue of
mechanization is unit integrity of the force.23 The AAV7A1
carries the eighteen combat loaded Marines of the infantry
squad; the basic infantry tactical unit. These candidates are
not configured to carry an infantry squad which raises issues
of unit cohesion. Using the Army Weighted Effectiveness
Indices/ Weighted Unit Values, the FIFV and M2A2 are
identified as having the greatest effectiveness once ashore.24
However, relative combat power build-up ashore takes much
longer for both of these vehicles than for the AAAV(F) .25
Both the M2A2 and FIFV require five hundred seventy-four LCAC
loads to move the force ashore.26
Non Vehicles
Two Non vehicle systems were evaluated; LCAC and
helicopters. The LCAC appraisal focused on assault wave
transport using a Marine Corps Expeditionary Shelter System
(MCESS), which carries one reinforced infantry rifle
company.27 Air delivery was based on the CH 60 helicopter, a
potential medium lift replacement candidate.28 Use of the
LCAC or CH 60 as the principal means of mobility for the
surface assault has a negative impact on overall MAGTF
capability and structure. First, they fail to provide a
platform to facilitate mechanization once ashore. Secondly,
the current primary use of both these systems is for mobility
of other weapon systems, equipment and/or force sustainment
throughput. Using them for assault echelon mobility delays
execution of the other missions assigned to these platforms.
Third, both systems require additional amphibious shipping or
radical reconfiguration of existing shipping to accommodate
them with increased footprint. Finally, the CH 60 requires
ninety-six sorties and one hundred ninety LCAC loads to move
the assault force and its' equipment ashore. The AAAV(F) moves
the same force ashore with one hundred eighty-six LCAC
loads. 29
THE MOBILITY SOLUTION
Operational Maneuver From The Sea is the operational
concept that the NEF uses for forward presence and power
projection missions. Mobility for strategic, operational and
tactical maneuver and movement is the capability that
facilitates this strategy of forward presence and power
projection, and provides credibility to its conceptual basis;
Operational Maneuver From the Sea. The critical link in this
strategic equation is the mobility of the force that
establishes the presence and projects power. The discussion
surrounding MAGTF mobility afloat and ashore has highlighted
the growing performance gap in surface mobility and presented
an array of potential systems that could be used, with varying
degrees of success, to close this gap. Other areas and
systems which provide essential mobility to the force afloat
have been significantly upgraded. Use of LCAC and the
decision to procure the MV 22 aircraft will dramatically
expand the operational reach of the MAGTF commander in the
projection of power ashore. Both of these systems reduce the
time, the key component for build-up of combat power, while
increasing the range from which power is projected. Having a
surface mobility capability that supports this extension of
operational reach is a logical step in alignment of
capability.
Aside from service pride in procuring a capable and
unique Marine Corps weapon system, why should the Corps buy
the AAAV(F)? The M2A2 and the FIFV both have significant
survivability and firepower systems that allow them to operate
with tanks. The LCAC has superior speed and range. The MV 22
operates over water and land with equal speed and range. What
specific capability does the AAAV(F) give the Marine Corps
that these other systems do not? The answer is in the
requirement for a highly flexible system that fits within
tight lift, logistics, and system cost parameters but is
adaptable to a multitude of environments and provides the
commander employment options. AAAV(F) delivers in one system
three vital capabilities; functional mobility, survivable
mobility, and sustainable mobility, that the MAGTF requires.
Functional
Linking the operational level of war; movement and
maneuver, to the tactical level is what the AAAV(F) delivers.
Self-deploying once in the amphibious objective area, the
AAAV(F) links maneuver of the NEF to the maneuver of the MAGTF
in one seamless operation. Transition from the high water mark
on the beach face to the inland objective area becomes one
continuous flow of combat power that builds tempo as the force
progresses. With one lift the entire assault wave maneuvers
from the sea to inland objectives. The range of the AAAV(F)
grants freedom to the MAGTF commander in terms of maneuver
options by exposing more littoral area within the objective
area to amphibious penetration.
Survivable
The range and speed of the AAAV(F) furnish protection to
ships of the ARG since they remain over the horizon during the
amphibious assault. The Marines in the assault wave are
protected from fire from shore by the speed and low visual
signature of the AAAV(F). Speed, firepower and ballistic armor
protect the mechanized force as the beach is cleared and link-
up with M1A1 tanks, delivered to the beach by LCACs, is made.
Swift, decisive maneuver by this mechanized force culminates
with dismounted infantry assaulting in- land objectives under
direct fire support from AAAV(F)s and M1A1s.
Sustainable
The AAAV(F) is a sustainable mobility system because it
places no new or additional requirements on the; MAGTF
commander, NEF commander, or on the institutional resources of
the Marine Corps. AAAV(F) uses the same amphibious sea lift
footprint as the AAV7A1. Therefore, additional sea lift is not
required in order to deploy a MAGTF equipped with this
vehicle. As a true amphibian, the logistical structure for the
AAAV(F) remains at the current level. Other mobility systems
require a logistical structure that supports two distinct
systems to match the AAAV(F)s operational reach; one
waterborne system and one land system. Finally, personnel
structure and training and support establishment
infrastructure are already present to support the fielding and
maintenance of the AAAV(F).
THE CHALLENGE
Since 1980 the Marine Corps has needed a new more capable
surface mobility system to replace the AAV. Strategy,
doctrine, technological risk and professional consensus did
not mature to the point that a positive development and
procurement decision on a surface mobility system could be
made until 1990. Declining budgets, uncertain force
structure, and competing procurement requirements have raised
the level of institutional risk for the AAAV(F) program and
the Marine Corps. Approved by the Commandant of the Marine
Corps as the Corps' number one ground procurement program, the
AAAV program has already been cut funding for its development
phase. Producing state of the art weapons system technology
that is functional and sustainable can not be done on the
cheap. Near term savings on the development of a new weapon
system is a gamble when this system represents the surface
mobility means for the MAGTF. The AAAV program represents a
significant expansion of the MAGTF's mobility and power
projection capability in littoral warfare.
The Pay Off
The Navy's on-going efforts to revitalize their shallow
water mine capability will significantly expand access to
assailable littoral regions in spite of potential measures to
deny entry. The LCAC and the MV 22 Osprey provide the MAGTF
commander with the operational reach to exploit forward
presence. AAAV(F) is the logical system to meet the surface
mobility need. These three systems form a capability tripod
which the MAGTF of the Twenty- First Century exploits in order
to achieve operational and tactical maneuver and movement. The
revolutionary dimension of this unprecedented mobility
translates into a seamless projection of power by linking
maneuver of the NEF and the MAGTF in amphibious operations.
Credibility of the Force
Relevance of the Marine Corps as a significant
contributor to the national defence is based on a credible
expeditionary presence. Forward deployment of the MAGTF as an
integral component of the NEF requires flexibility and
credibility in deployment and employment options. Failure to
maintain the mobility and survivability of the ground force
diminishes the Corps' tactical and operational impact in
modern warfare. Capitalizing on strategic lift and operational
mobility from the sea loses meaning if force projection
extends only to the high water mark on the beach. A MAGTF
without a mechanized capability ashore, but to heavy for
traditional light infantry roles, is a redundant force which
lacks the flexibility that modern battlespace demands.
Procurement, operations and maintenance budget austerity
leave little doubt as to the logical answer to the question of
how to achieve tactical surface mobility for the MAGTF.
Integration of operational concepts of maneuver and power
projection with the overall military strategy mandates the
requirement for the MAGTF to have tactical surface mobility.
The question that remains to be answered is whether the Marine
Corps has the resolve to stay the course and develop the
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Fast. Reconciliation of
the amphibious lift paradox was answered in the 1930s with the
LVT, revolutionary doctrine and evolutionary tactics. The
answer for the Twenty-First Century surface mobility
requirements for the MAGTF remains an amphibian, the AAAV(F),
and the revolutionary concept that maximizes this platforms
capabilities is Operational Maneuver From The Sea. Failure to
ensure the success of the AAAV(F) maybe a loss of capability
that the Corps might not be able to recover from in an era of
scrambling for roles and missions.
NOTES
1. David Brenner and George Akst, Advanced Amphibious Assault (AAA)
Program Cost and Effectiveness Analysis (COEA): Ship-to-Shore
Analysis, Center For Naval Analyses, CRM 90-96/ July 1990, 1.
2. Ibid, 1.
3. U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC)
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT (ORD) FOR THE ADVANCED
AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE (AAAV) (NO. MOB 22.1) (Quantico, VA:
U.S. Marine Corps MCCDC, 24 March 1994), 2.
4. ORD FOR ADVANCED ASSAULT VEHICLE, 6.
5. John H. Dalton, The Honorable, J.M. Boorda, Admiral USN, and
Carl E. Mundy, General, USMC, Forward...From The Sea,
(Department of the Navy, Washington D.C., October 1994),
foreword.
6. Ibid, 1.
7. Ibid, 2 - 8.
8. Terry Pierce, Commander, USN, "Operational Maneuver From The
Sea", Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1994, 31.
9. Naval Doctrine Command, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval
Warfare, 64.
10. ORD ADVANCED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE, 7.
11. Ibid, cover.
12. Brenner and Akst, 1.
13. Ibid, 3.
14. Ibid, 5.
15. Ibid, 10.
16. Ibid, 11.
17. U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Direct Reporting
Program Manager Advanced Amphibious Assault, "ADVANCED
AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE (AAAV) OPERATIONAL MODE
SUMMMRY/MISSION PROFILE, 1-3.
18. Brenner and Akst, "Ship-to-Shore Analysis", 13.
19. Ibid, 12.
20. Ibid, 13.
21. Ibid, 13.
22. Ibid, 14.
23. George Akst, Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, Research Development and Acquisition," COEA Update
Briefing", Center For Naval Analyses, (CNA) 94-1235/ 27 June
1994, 1.
24. Brenner and Akst, "Ship-to-Shore Analysis", 32.
25. Ibid, 27.
26. Ibid, 19.
27. Ibid, 15.
28. Ibid, 15.
29. Ibid, 19.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Akst, George, Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, Research Development and Acquisition, (CNA) 94-
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Brenner, David, and Akst, George, Advanced Amphibious Assault
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Operational Handbook (OH) 6-11 DRAFT, Mechanized Operations.
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