DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCE:
NATIONALIST/ISOLATIONIST PERIOD FROM THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO
WORLD WAR II
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - HISTORY
United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068
MASTER OF MILITARY
STUDIES
AY 1994-95
Title: DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF
UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCE:
NATIONALIST/ISOLATIONIST PERIOD
FROM THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO
WORLD WAR II
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for
the Degree of
Master of Military Studies
Author: MAJOR RAYMOND P. GANAS, USMC
Date: 5 June 1995 Approved: ___________________
DR. H. W. GHOLSON
___________________
DR. D. F. BITTNER
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Howard W. Gholson, Lieutenant Colonel
Michael H. Vernon, and Committee on Masters
Program Standards (COMPASS)
Subj: M.M.S. Paper Proposal
1. Essential Information:
a. Submitted by: Major Raymond P. Ganas, USMC, Conference
Group 10
b. Proposed Topic: Domestic Opposition to the Use of United
States Military Force: Nationalist/Isolationist Period from the
American Revolution to World War II
c. Master's Paper Committee
1. 1st Mentor: Dr. Howard W. Gholson
2. 2nd Mentor: Dr. Donald F. Bittner
d. Problem statement: I propose to define the arguments
used to articulate domestic opposition to US military
intervention. The definitions will be organized according to
their types and patterns. The study will include an analysis of
the origins of the arguments and the context of the arguments in
relation to the progress of society during the 164 year pre-world
War II period of US isolationism and how that establishes them as
fundamental values and beliefs within American society.
The study will not pass judgment on the arguments as valid or
invalid, or whether they are in the majority or minority of
opinion. The purpose of the information is to gain insight to
points of view that were in the mainstream of public thought for
the greater period of US history and which may retake that
position if the end of the Cold War reveals that the short 50
years of internationalism and interventionism were only a
temporary abberation necessitated by the superpower conflict.
e. Proposed Research Question: What are the arguments which
were used to oppose US military intervention, and how did they
exist within American cultural values and beliefs?
2. Research Design
a. Methodology: I intend to conduct a review of available
historical and social literature on domestic opposition to US
military intervention during the period from the American
Revolution to World War II.
b. Preliminary Research: My preliminary research has
centered on three areas. The first is classifying the various
arguments that existed against military intervention. The second
is to identify how these arguments were represented in personal
beliefs in American culture. The third main effort is
identifying the structure, means, and objectives of groups and
individuals in the US who used those arguments.
c. Sources: The initial search for reference material has
focused on books available at the Research Center. Those books
cover the historical and social material for this study.
d. Milestones
(1) Initial Bibliography: Submitted
(2) Topic Outline: 24 May 1995
(3) Initial Draft: 30 May 1995
(4) Final Submission: 6 June 1995
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF UNITED STATES MILITARY
FORCE: NATIONALIST/ISOLATIONIST PERIOD FROM THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO WORLD WAR II
Author: Major Raymond P. Ganas, USMC.
Thesis: During the Nationalist/Isolationist period from the
American Revolution to World War II, opposition arguments to the
use of military force existed within the mainstream of public
thought.
Background: The period of US history from the American
Revolution to World War II generated a nationalist/isolationist
view concerning the use of US military force. This view
originated from opposition stances that mirrored mainstream
public thought and opinion throughout the period. Mainstream
public thought and opinion focused on concerns as to the cost of
military intervention, the authority to intervene, the national
will to intervene, and the size, composition, and restrictions
imposed on the military.
Recommendation: An analysis of this period of US history and
corresponding thoughts on the use of military force provides
insight to future US military involvement. This analysis emerges
as an especially valid tool if the fifty years of the Cold War
period of internationalism/interventionism proves to be a
temporary anomaly caused by the superpower confrontation.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER I: THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE BY THE UNITED STATES . . 5
SECTION 1: THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE WITHIN THE UNITED
STATES AND ON ITS BORDERS . . . . . . . . . . . 5
SECTION 2: THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE BY THE UNITED STATES
IN OVERSEAS INTERVENTION . . . . . . . . . . . 9
SECTION 3: DEBATING THE REASONS FOR WAR . . . . . . . . 11
CHAPTER II: OPPOSITION ARGUMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES' USE
OF MILITARY FORCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
SECTION 1: IS WAR WORTH THE COST? . . . . . . . . . . . 13
SECTION 2: IDENTIFYING THE OPPOSING IDEOLOGIES . . . . . 17
SECTION 3: THE RANGE OF VIEWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
SECTION 4: LIMITS TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
SECTION 5: THE PUBLIC: OPINIONS AND NATIONAL WILL . . . 34
SECTION 6: THE MILITARY: LIMITS TO THE MISSION . . . . . 40
SECTION 7: THE MILITARY: LIMITS TO MILITARY CAPABILITY . 46
CHAPTER III: CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
TERMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
CHRONOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
BIBILIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF UNITED STATES
MILITARY FORCE: NATIONALIST/ISOLATIONIST PERIOD FROM THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO WORLD WAR II
Americans have had a peculiar ambivalence toward war. They have traditionally
and sincerely viewed themselves as peaceful, unmilitaristic people, and yet
they have hardly been unwarlike.
Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense
THE PERIOD OF NO FOREIGN MILITARY ALLIANCES: 1776 TO 1939
An analysis of the causes of war is incomplete without
consideration of the opinions expressed for not going to war.
Examining the opposing positions also serves to explain the
dichotomy noted in the quote from For the Common Defense. The
modern US perspective of an internationalist/interventionist
world has relegated former mainstream nationalist/isolationist
beliefs to a place in the storage closet. The post-World War II
"Baby Boomer" generation is gradually assuming the mantle of
leadership from persons who were raised in an era before nuclear
weapons, international military alliances, and an American policy
of deterrence. As the pre-World War II first-hand experience is
lost to the passage of years, the generations raised after World
War II must study history to learn the nationalist/isolationist
arguments debated by their parents. The arguments might seem
outdated, but are not necessarily invalid and may once more gain
popularity in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Before the first US military alliance, occasioned by World
War II, the United States dealt with the issue of the use of
military force in three categories: inside its borders, on its
borders, and overseas. The arguments for and against the use of
military force in the three categories shared basic elements, but
the level of disagreement heightened at each step. Within the
borders, there has always existed fierce opposition to the use of
military force as a means of enforcing civil law against the
nation's own citizens. Despite the opposition, federal military
forces were used to suppress such civil unrest as Shays'
Rebellion, the Whiskey Rebellion, the Fries Rebellion, slave
escape and rebellion, the Nullification Crises of 1832-1833, the
Dorr Rebellion, labor unrest, riots, and vigilantism.1 Little
dissent existed to the use of federal military for internal
security to remove Indians or defend against foreign armies,
although the form and size of the force was contested.
Considerably more debate arose when it came to use of the
military in connection with expansion of the borders of the US,
especially if the direction favored one side of the argument over
slavery. The issue reached its zenith when deciding the value of
US military force in foreign conflicts, where the threat was to
American freedoms around the world, or expansion of US territory.
Isolationism and noninterventionism can become confused terms
when considering the frequency of naval punitive expeditions to
such places as Algiers and Sumatra, amongst others, where foreign
casualties attest to the aggressive responses to perceptions of
the US being wronged. Isolationism seems an inappropriate label
for US interests in Guam, Hawaii, and the Philippines. The key
to understanding is US nationalism. It should be understood in
terms of preserving freedom of action solely for the US, with no
obligations to assist any nation's pursuit of similar or other
goals. Freedom of action remained policy even in World War I,
when Americans fought alongside, but were not in a committed
alliance with, Britain and France.2
During the nationalist/isolationist period from the American
Revolution to World War II, opposition arguments to the use of
military force centered on determination as to whether a threat
existed, the potential for the misuse of federal military forces
against US citizens, the cost to the nation of a war, justifying
military objectives, expressing the broad range of views,
determining authority and responsibility, and achieving a clear
public consensus. Additional considerations dealt with
determining the size and composition of the military, and ways to
impose restrictions on its use.
This study provides insight on the views regarding the use of
military force that represented the mainstream of public thought
for the major portion of US history by indicating the period of
origin and providing context in relation to the American society
that existed at the time. This analysis proves especially useful
if the end of the Cold War reveals that the fifty years of
internationalism/interventionism which followed World War II was
only a temporary aberration necessitated by the superpower
conflict.
CHAPTER I
THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE BY THE UNITED STATES
SECTION 1
THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
AND ON ITS BORDERS
For the first century of existence of the US, the main focus
for debate on military force was within its borders and on its
borders as it expanded. The secondary focus was on the use of
military force outside its borders to protect American interests
and freedoms. All attention was on the available land in North
America, facing competition from Spain, France, Britain, Mexico,
and the native Indians.
The geography of the US, with its east and west coasts
protected by vast ocean distances, was often cited as the main
element of isolationism, but that was somewhat misleading. The
fledgling US was not physically isolated from threats to its
frontiers on the north, south, and west. The oceans were a
barrier to a European threat only.3 The main reason the US
looked inward was that, as a new nation, it was not powerful. It
did not have the dense population or the economy to support a
military force equal to European standards, nor did it really
need one. Strong enough to throw off Britain's occupation, but
not large enough to pose a threat to European powers, the US as
it existed after the Revolution could be safely ignored. The
birth of the new nation was also fortunately timed with a
peaceful period between the European powers.4 Europeans also
learned the lesson of Napoleon in Russia during 1812, that, as
Clausewitz stated, "...an Empire of great dimensions is not to be
conquered."5 The vast distances in the US must have made it
appear similar to the Russian steppes.
The religious origins of the US immigrant population was
often cited as contributing to early beliefs against the use of
military force. The reality was that only a small minority of
religious immigrants practiced beliefs of pacifism. The vast
majority accepted the need for militias, especially while the
threat of Indian attacks and slave rebellions was literally at
the doorstep. Opposition to a standing army was not primarily a
religious belief, but the result of concern that it would be the
instrument of oppression of a federal government against its own
citizens.6
The second main reason for US isolationism was the
continental focus of the new nation in pursuit of its manifest
destiny. The expansion of the population into the interior of
the continent required most of the available resources of men
and money. The men whose goal was the expansion and settlement of
the country were first and foremost farmers, which did not leave
much time left over for other causes. The US success dealing
with the Spanish, French, and Indian occupation of lands in the
direction which the US was expanding, and the competition with
Britain for the Oregon Territory, was part effort and part good
timing.7 Fortunately for the US, the British takeover of
Florida from Spain in 1763 permitted colonists to settle there,
so that when Florida was ceded back to Spain in 1783, the numbers
of US citizens made Spain willing to negotiate transfer of lands
they knew would be an inevitable loss.8 In addition, the
Napoleonic conflict prompted the opportunity for the Louisiana
Purchase, which removed a significant barrier and eliminated a
major European interest from further consideration.9
The continental expansion and the use of the military to
secure that goal was not wholly agreed upon. The War of 1812
showed disagreement on adopting a policy of attacking Canada with
the limited goal of negotiating a favorable law of sea accord, or
a policy of invading Canada with the intent of annexing it and
driving Britain entirely off the continent. Poor military
strategy nullified the question as US forces were driven off and
it was all the US could do to protect its northwest border from
the renewed threat by the British and Indians.10 The Mexican
War, which secured huge new territories for the young nation, was
another example. Many years after the conflict, retired General
and former President Ulysses S. Grant wrote of the Mexican War in
his memoirs, "Generally the men were indifferent... but not so
all of them. For myself, I was bitterly opposed... and to this
day regard the war... as one of the most unjust ever waged by a
stronger against a weaker nation. It was an instance of a
republic following the bad example of European Monarchs, in not
considering justice in their desire to acquire additional
territory."11 The Mexican War was opposed by abolitionists who
saw an expansion of slave territory. Pacifists opposed the war
as not just. The Whigs accused the Polk Administration of
imperialism.12 General Grant's memoirs stated his belief that
the Civil War was an outgrowth of, and punishment for, the unjust
Mexican War.13 There was also debate over the forcible removal
of Indians in order that the lands be opened to immigrant
settlers. The initial plan was to remove the Indians east of the
Mississippi to an Indian Territory. West of the Mississippi was
then referred to as the "Great American Desert," and eventual
settlement by whites was not foreseen. When settlers grew to
such numbers that expansion west began in force, and the lands
were found to be richer than previously understood, any
understanding of Indian rights was ignored by all but the most
pure moralists.14 In the case of incursions into both Mexico
and the Indian Territory, the rights of white settlers carried
more weight than the moral arguments of the rights of the peoples
of those lands.15
For the US, the military debate for the first century was
about North America. There was no request made for the US to
ally itself with forces engaged in wars on other continents, and
no reason for the US to look for the acquisition of land overseas
when it still had land to secure on the continent. The US first
had to secure its interior, expand its borders, and defeat a
threat that divided the nation. The nation achieved its manifest
destiny with only limited engagements against overseas forces.
Only then, with a bigger population, and the power and resources
of industrialization, did the US have the reason or ability to
look elsewhere.
SECTION 2
THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE BY THE UNITES STATES
IN OVERSEAS INTERVENTION
International trade and the necessity of maintaining
political relationships which support that trade has been a basic
tenet of US existence from its beginnings through today and for
the foreseeable future. Because the US had economic interests
throughout the world, its political foreign policy always took
into consideration the protection of those assets. If war is an
extension of politics by other means16, then military
intervention always existed as an option for protecting the US'
international position. But for the first 164 years of its
existence as a nation, the US adopted a policy towards the use of
military force that was characterized as principally nationalist
and isolationist. During that period, the nation never committed
to a military alliance with a foreign nation. That policy of
freedom of action for nationalist purposes was the reflection of
mainstream personal values and beliefs held by the public.
International intervention came only after the Civil War, the
huge increase in population from immigration, the realization of
manifest destiny as the US completed occupation of the land from
coast to coast, and the industrial age. These events
dramatically thrust the US into a position as a global economic
power. From that point on, the US would find itself debating the
use of military force beyond its borders for other reasons than
the pursuit of freedom of the seas and the isolated punishment
expeditions which characterized military actions outside US
borders until the Spanish-American War in 1898.
SECTION 3
DEBATING THE REASONS FOR WAR
"American tradition in war is first to declare, then to
prepare."17 This statement by historian Maurice Matloff in
Makers of Modern Strategy is wrong. It is wrong because at best
it is only one third of the story. The context of the quote
refers to the levels of armament, men, and training at the
beginning of each major conflict up to the Korean War; it has
forgotten Clausewitz' trilogy of the people, the government, and
the military, and has not included national will.18 What
Matloff does not address is the preparation of the public and
political will which leads to a declaration of war. This study
will examine the opposing arguments to the use of US military
force within the context of that trilogy.
No nation has ever fought a war without a purpose. There was
a great range of disagreement as to what were valid reasons.
Some of the stated caused included: acquisition of territory,
extension of religious or political beliefs, defeat an aggressor,
or protection of trade interests. Essentially, all debate over
the issue was one of cost versus benefit. If the benefits tipped
the balance to outweigh the costs, according to the standards of
the decision makers, nations went to war. An appreciation of the
standards is key to an understanding of the causes of war and,
equally important, reveals why some wars were never fought or
were fought with limited means and for limited goals.
Cost is best analyzed by examining the criteria. Two persons
purchasing homes may have the same amount of money to spend, but
desire entirely different features: one may want a large yard,
the other a location close to work, both may want more than one
bathroom. Or they might both have ideas which closely resemble
the other, but for one the acceptable price in dollars may be
less than what the other is willing to pay. Similarly, there
were criteria by which the cost to a nation of military conflict
was evaluated. The resources within the criteria were common to
business decisions, although the outcome had more serious
consequences: PEOPLE, MONEY, MATERIALS, TIME, AND SPACE. The
most precious of those commodities, people, included a moral
judgment on the worth of their sacrifice that was not attached to
other costs. Generally, the price of a life was to protect lives
or the freedoms that made living worthwhile. The cost of
physical items had no equivalent moral base. An argument against
the spending of money for war, though, was that it can be related
back to people. An example is that spending money to buy a
transport truck for the Army is not a moral decision, unless it
is considered that the money could be spent on food for the
hungry or shelter for the homeless.
The arguments which opposed military intervention were
focused primarily on the cost and on providing alternatives to
conflict. Arguments which considered the use of military force
centered on the benefits and on the inability of alternative
actions to resolve the conflict. The following chapter presents
the standards of opposition argument which developed in the US
during its nationalist, isolationist period from the Revolution
to World War II.
CHAPTER II
OPPOSITION ARGUMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES' USE OF MILITARY FORCE
SECTION 1
IS WAR WORTH THE COST?
Americans before the Cold War considered peace to be the
normal state. Military conflict was an aberration. The cost of
conflict was defined as the change in conditions and amount of
commodities expended above the level of consumption of peacetime
activities. The most obvious cost of war was in persons. Even
before the first bullet was fired in any battle, the mobilization
of persons from their peacetime occupations to soldier changed
society. Soldiers' lives changed and the lives of the people in
their communities were altered. The concept of Social Darwinism
exemplifies the way that a single idea can result in opposite
conclusions. "Survival of the fittest," coined in 1852, was seen
by many as justifying the use of force and war as a natural state
between nations; the strong were intended to eliminate the weak.
The counter argument was that war sacrificed the best young men
in society, leaving less able persons to fill their places.
Peace was the normal state in which the strongest would assume
their rightful place.19
There was the loss of the joy of living a full life, the loss
to friends and families of that person, and the absence of that
person's contributions to mankind. How many Salks, Einsteins,
Beethovens, and Mother Theresas were asked to sacrifice
themselves for war or were noncombatants caught in a battle and
killed? War maimed as well as killed. The wounded needed not
only the cost of medical care, but may have been forced to live
the remainder of their lives with disabilities which affected
their occupation, recreation, personal relationships, and ability
to productively contribute to society. The absence of physical
wounds might not readily show the pain of disturbing memories
which changed how a person thought or acted.
Feeding, clothing, equipping, and training an army took
money. The public bore the cost in taxes and increased prices of
goods. Money that might otherwise have been available for
positive activities, such as education, medical care, food and
shelter, had been diverted. The loans obtained to finance the
federal budget for debts above revenues continued to burden the
public for many years after a conflict was resolved.
The economy suffered. The Great Depression has been partly
attributed to the tremendous destruction and cost of World War I.
Material for war meant less available for consumption for other
purposes. The resulting scarcity of some resources contributed
to inflation, rationing, a decline in quality, and a halt in many
peaceful scientific advances. These were sacrifices that at
times the public appeared willing to suffer. When the causes of
war were not sufficient to consent to deprivation, the sacrifices
quickly become a point of contention between the people and the
government.20 There was a reverse cycle in that recessions and
depressions constrained the federal budget so that the monetary
cost of military forces weighed against the decision to enlarge
or improve them.
War was the destroyer of homes, farms, roads, towns, dams,
and factories. When that occurred, the persons who lived there
were displaced, giving up nearly all their physical possessions.
They were then forced to seek food and shelter elsewhere. The
refugees suffered. Those who found themselves inundated by
refugees were burdened by the cost and effort to sustain those in
need.
The US functioned on two basic principles, democracy and a
market economy. Rules meant to aid military goals were viewed by
some as the loss of personal liberties and the ability to earn a
lawful living as one saw fit. Personal travel was restricted,
protests were viewed as subversive instead of protected free
speech, and businesses were regulated by excess profit laws,
embargoes, and denial of access to vital resources. As a
traditionally maritime nation, restrictions on private overseas
trade or the risk of loss to war of that trade were essential
considerations of the nation's economy and affected the lifestyle
of many of its citizens.21
The intangibles that changed had a lasting impact. The
relationship of the US with the remainder of the world evolved in
some manner after each war. Personal peace of mind was lost
because it was impossible to plan for the future. The
corruption, self-interest, and opportunism of some persons during
wartime diminished the sense of community and national pride as
well as added to the monetary cost.22 It would be difficult,
however, to say that it was any more or less than what existed in
peacetime. The future that might have been was lost forever; an
effort after the conflict to resurrect that future could never
achieve the exact same results because too much had been changed
and lost.
With the terrible destructiveness of war as the cost, the
consequences of not going to war had to clearly be understood as
worse. Another way to express it other than cost versus benefit
is cost versus cost. Is war worth a thousand soldiers' lives
sacrificed if it were believed that it would save a hundred
thousand lives of the citizens of the nation? Then there is the
question whether the sacrifice of a thousand soldiers is worth
saving one innocent woman or child, or worth gaining new lands?
Is it appropriate to use numbers in what is essentially a moral
argument? It becomes less tangible when the reason for one
thousand dead is not to preserve lives, but the freedoms of the
people. It appears to become harder yet to justify the loss of
American lives to save the lives and freedoms not of the US, but
of other lands. The opposition arguments were made to ensure
that the reasons for going to war showed that the war was about
preserving what was important to society, not destroying. No
person in the 20th Century would justify an invasion of Canada
for the additional territory it would add to the US, but in 1812
this was a common, if not majority, opinion.
SECTION 2
IDENTIFYING THE OPPOSING IDEOLOGIES
The foundation issue of this study is that of military
intervention. Isolationism, imperialism, internationalism, and
pacifism and other arguments provided fundamentals that
contributed to the decision to intervene. Adherence to one or
the other doctrine did not predetermine a person's formation of
an opinion on military action. As an example, isolationism may
have meant to one person to possess no political, military, or
trade connections outside of the US. This doctrine was once
referred to as an "Old Isolationist." One Old Isolationist may
not have wanted any army or navy that might serve to provoke
another nation to attack the US. The idea of a unilateral arms
reduction falls within this area. Another Old Isolationist may
have seen the need for forces sufficient to defend the US borders
from invasion. He would then have to argue whether the force
should be a navy, coastal forts, regular army, state militia, or
volunteer militia. A "Neo-Isolationist" desired international
economic exchange, but with little or no political connections
and no military action beyond the US borders.23
Separate from both Old and Neo-Isolationists were those
nationalists who, in a form of isolationism, wanted the world to
leave the US alone. They saw the use of force beyond the border
as the best means to physically isolate the US from the conflict.
A few of those people believed that providing money and arms to
one of the belligerents was a way to prevent the US from the need
to contribute its own men. And yet another nationalist saw the
need to send men as well as money and arms to forward positions
in order to defend the US. All those variations can be argued as
being isolationist. The difference between them was the degree
of intervention in a conflict.
Isolationists could be totally neutral towards the status of
belligerency between other nations. If the conclusion was that
the interests of the US were unaffected or not significantly
affected to warrant action, then the outcome of the foreign
conflict was a matter of little or no concern. Isolationists who
saw the conflict as potentially spreading to where it would hurt
US interests then looked first to US self-defense. Beyond self-
defense, there was no rule that said an isolationist couldn't
consider preemptive unilateral action, a collective security
arrangement with other non-belligerents, or a security agreement
with one or more of the belligerents. These were acknowledged
only as increasing levels of response to the threat, and not the
preferred outcome.
Overseas intervention required that the US view the acts of a
belligerent as worth changing the US peacetime position of
neutral diplomatic status and free trade relationships. This
change of US position occurred in a manner that altered the
balance of military power. It was not necessary to apply
physical force to change the balance of military power in a
conflict. The desired end state determined the level of
intervention. The extreme of intervention, seeking unconditional
surrender, was not invoked during the period being studied.
Changing the conditions of political status or trade, such as an
embargo or other sanctions, if they created conditions
unfavorable to one of the belligerent's ability to wage war, was
the other extreme24. The first use of a US embargo occurred in
1807 when President Thomas Jefferson persuaded Congress to
prohibit all US trade with France and Britain. This embargo
focused on stopping both nations from seizing US ships, over five
hundred of which had been seized by the British alone. Neither
targeted nation changed their actions in the least. The damage
that occurred was to US business which depended on foreign trade,
even when at high risk. US federal forces, regular and militia,
had to be used to suppress unrest in the US and to enforce the
embargo at US ports.25 Between the two extremes of total war
and economic war was the range of use of limited military means
for limited goals to achieve a negotiated peace with an enemy of
the US. A negotiated peace sought to persuade the opponent to
sue for peace on terms favorable to the US.
Like isolationists, internationalists could be found with a
broad spectrum of views on the issue of military intervention.
An internationalist believed first in US political cooperation
and trade with all or most nations. At a minimum, it required
cooperation between nations. At the maximum, internationalists
were willing to give up certain freedoms of the US to act
unilaterally. They accepted instead the authority of an
international law, an international organization, or, in the
extreme, a world government and/or court. The doctrine of
arbitration, world courts, and treating conflicts as case law to
be dealt with by a judge came to be known as legalism.
Internationalists could be selective. Some groups expressed
a policy of desiring ties only with nations with which it shared
trade advantages or similar ideologies. Considerations included
whether the nation was a democratic state or within a perceived
sphere of influence, based on the Monroe Doctrine. In terms of
seeing intervention as a cost versus benefit equation, some
internationalists first considered the worth of the other nation
to the relationship. Other internationalists argued that it was
necessary to give equal status to all nations to make the system
work, regardless of the element of worth. In between were the
internationalists who worked to achieve a common ideology.
Normally that common ideology already existed within the US,
although American communists were internationalists who sought to
convert the US to a Soviet style government with a close or even
a subservient relationship to the Soviet Union.
Whereas isolationists consistently viewed the possession of
overseas territories as contrary to US interests,
internationalists looked at imperialism with two views. The
first suggested that US imperialism, such as the occupation of
the Philippine Islands following the Spanish-American War, was an
unlawful and immoral occupatio. They felt that this occupation
was contrary to the recognition of sovereignty essential to
international cooperation. The other view of internationalists,
though, was that the US could act in a beneficial manner by
assisting in the development of the land and by promoting
democracy. In that fashion, some US internationalists envisioned
a manifest destiny that went far beyond the original continental
understanding of the term.26 Since World War I, though, the US
adhered to a firm policy of no territorial gain as a result of
war. The US viewed such gains by other nations as an act of
aggression regardless of arguments over which nation started the
war.27
Internationalism encompassed ideologies from absolute
pacifism to aggressive deterrence. In fact, the idea that
international trade was so important that it made war unthinkable
became an idealist state known as "business pacifism."28 The
reality of trade was that imbalances and the possibility of a
successful war to improve trade status were often a source of the
causes of conflict.29 Internationalists considered the use of
collective security agreements, intended to act as a deterrent by
maintaining a balance of power or advantage of power. The US,
like many nations, frequently debated the advantages of
unilateral action or collective action in determining its foreign
policies.30
Arms limitations fell within the sphere of internationalist
arguments because of the need to coordinate the action, such as
the Washington Conference of 1922. This confernece resulted in
agreement of US and British naval parity and a US 40 percent
advantage over Japan.31 A unilateral arms reduction proposed by
internationalists was more intended to be a gesture than a
commitment. It anticipated a reciprocal effort by the other
national powers. This contrasted with isolationists' desire for
unilateral disarmament without having expressed any such
anticipation.32
In conflicts between nations in which the US was not involved,
the US public and political leadership were generally quick to
achieve a decisive majority that favored one side. The majority
of sympathy quickly went to France and Britain in World War I,
long before the issue of involvement of the US.33 There were
exceptions, such as the conflict between Britain and France
during the Napoleonic era, where US foreign policy on restricting
trade with the two belligerents was perceived by Britain as
favoring France. This was one of the causes which led to the War
of 1812 between Britain and the US, despite a large part of the
public which saw US policy as wrong.34
In a conflict in which the US was not yet committed, the US
could favor one of the belligerents while maintaining a desire to
avoid providing assistance, such as the period of the Neutrality
Acts before World War II. A second option was to engage against
one of the belligerents without specifically forming an alliance
with the other nation or nations opposing the same foe. The US
was less reluctant to consider fighting the Japanese because it
had the option to fight unilaterally, whereas involvement in the
European theater meant an alliance. A third option was to join
forces with a nation against a common enemy, such as eventually
occurred in World War I.35 The issue of alliances was avoided
in the US by its refusal to commit itself to the military cause
of another nation, until it began taking Britain's side in 1939
by providing material support while withholding the same to the
Germans.
There were opinions in the US which supported the potential
enemy of the US. The German-American Bund in the 1930's, before
US involvement in World War II, was firmly against going to war
with Germany. Many Irish-Americans viewed Great Britain as an
occupying aggressor, and if they may not have been sympathetic to
the Germans, neither did they necessarily support Britain.36
After war was declared, there were German-American US citizens
who desired to see Germany win even at the expense of the goals
of the US. The public and government fear of such allegiances
was apparent in the relocation of Japanese-Americans to
concentration camps during World War II, although the actual
numbers of persons who might have been actively subversive was
never proved. The reality was that public perception believed
that the presence of Japanese-Americans was a security threat.
The most difficult measure of cost during the decision-making
process in conflicts where the US was not involved at the onset
dealt with morality. Moralists placed a value on life beyond
that which a nation could measure in terms of trade or balance of
power. Morality made it difficult for both isolationists and
internationalists to remain neutral. The sympathy was generally
for the belligerent seen as the victim of aggression, although
sympathy for the civilians and even the soldiers of all the
belligerents was a consideration for some. Pacifists normally
elected to provide humanitarian aid to the soldiers and
noncombatants, although some pacifists saw even such aid as
supporting the continuation of the conflict.37
An additional difficult measure of cost was that of the
reputation of the US. An internationalist proponent of democracy
was expected to expand the concept to the rest of the world.
This had the effect of taking sides in a conflict without any
other national interest being involved. The US ability to
achieve its policies in trade was seen as predicated on the
perception of the other nation that the US was a friend. Then
the issue became one of what a friend was expected to do in a
conflict, even where no formal arrangement existed. The concern
became that of predicting the nature of the relationships that
would form following the conflict depending on whether or not the
US intervened.
The decision for the intervention of military forces was
argued along ideological lines. Within both the government and
the public, groups of isolationists, internationalists,
pacifists, and anti-imperialists strove to persuade others toward
a particular view of alternative action, unilateral intervention,
neutrality, or alliance. Each ideology was convinced that it
stood on the higher moral ground. Eventually, it would be
changes to the conditions of the crisis, much more than words,
that would move public opinions in one direction or the other.
SECTION 3
THE RANGE OF VIEWS
For the majority of conflicts from the Revolution to World
War II, the US debated the costs of intervention in order to
achieve a consensus. Onnly then did the US commence the buildup
of forces to go to war. Section 2 of this chapter dealt with the
myriad of arguments that exist within the debate. It is
important to recognize that not only was there a range of
arguments, but within each argument existed various levels or
views of understanding and commitment. The opinions varied from
active to passive, and optimist to pessimist. The range of views
within an argument is crucial to understanding the difficulty
with which the nation achieved a consensus.
Some citizens were permanently active in the pursuit of their
goals by the government. Others became active only for selective
issues. The issue of military intervention was so important that
it remained in the limelight both in peacetime and crisis.
Active citizens had a strong opinion and sought to persuade the
government and others towards their views. Passive citizens may
or may not have had an opinion on the issue of military
intervention. Even when passive citizens possessed a strong
opinion, it had little effect beyond a single vote or a private
discussion, if that.38
Both active and passive citizens could range from radical
extremists to moderates. The person who demanded war at the
first drop of blood squared off in debate against the pacifist
who rejected any aggression as a reason for the use of force,
neither actually listening to the other. The moderate existed
somewhere in the middle, possibly listening to the extremist
arguments but more likely not. Extremists tended towards an
idealistic ideology, and were unwilling to compromise. Some
moderates were able to understand the limitations of their point
of view and even accept the positive aspects of opposing points
of view. The most active debate occurred principally within the
moderate range. Debate outside the moderate range certainly
existed and often received media attention and some other
interest, but the maximum potential for a shift in national
opinion was within the moderate range.
The pessimist believed that the outcome of US intervention,
should it occur, would be unfavorable. For the purpose of this
study, it makes no difference as to whether the pessimist was
capable of making an accurate assessment of the problem or other
criteria. The bottom line was that the pessimist could not
envision a set of circumstances occurring that justified military
intervention. Within that context, every absolute pacifist was a
pessimist about the potential for success, because to be
militarily involved was of itself failure. The optimist saw the
end state of the conflict, should the US intervene, as a positive
balance of costs versus benefits. This did not commit the
optimist to that course of action if there existed alternative
actions short of the use of force which were also favorable.
A person of any doctrine could, at some point, arrive at the
conclusion that US military involvement was inevitable and could
not or was unlikely to be prevented by any foreseeable
circumstances. This was a point at which many persons who
opposed intervention altered their actions towards supporting the
inevitable, in order to achieve the best possible outcome of a
negative event. The person who believed that US military
involvement was not probable or was preventable by actions short
of war might have been pleased or disappointed by that prospect.
The election of Woodrow Wilson to the presidency enhanced
expectations that the US would be able to stay out of World
War I and avoid a major confrontation with Mexico. Those who,
before the elections, held deep beliefs that the US should be
involved, definitely in the minority at the time, perceived the
outcome of the vote negatively.39
On any subject there existed various degrees of knowledge.
The debate on the use of military force extended beyond political
discourse to the news media, social acquaintances, books,
campuses, soap box oratory, and even entertainment media. Though
there were always sources of facts on the debate, not everyone
had equal access to them, owing to educational deficiencies, lack
of physical access because of distance, time to access the
information, or inclination to do so. As a democratic nation
that looked to its public for participation in the decision on
military force, it possessed only a few that knew a great deal,
some who knew nothing or next to nothing, and the majority who
had some but never all of the facts. Possessing an opinion was
not dependent on possessing all of the facts or even possessing
accurate facts, but it must certainly have affected the decision.
To understand how access to information affected debate on
military force, each conflict must be reviewed for how news was
passed. In the earliest period of the nation, small bits of news
were relayed by mail or carried long distances to be read to a
largely illiterate population. In the 1930's, over a million US
servicemen had traveled overseas to World War I. Overseas
business and pleasure travel numbered in the thousands annually.
Newspapers, radio, and books were available to a mostly literate
population, though a substantial number still did not have
electrical power. Where Lincoln made speeches to hundreds from
the back of a train, President Franklin D. Roosevelt made
speeches to millions via press conferences and radio talks. Each
side of the various arguments was challenged in a race to get out
the most information to the most people using the methods at
hand.40
Complicating the analysis of opinions on the use of military
force is that what people said was not always consistent with
what they believed or how they acted. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt was credited with portraying himself both ways to the
public. Voters wanting to keep the US out of World War II voted
for him in their belief that he would keep his word to accomplish
that objective. Voters committed to US intervention believed
that FDR was moving in that direction despite what he may have
been forced to say publicly, and so they also voted for him.41
Although FDR is the most prominent example for comparing words
against actions, such dichotomies existed at all levels of the
debate in all eras.
The policy of the US in debating the use of military force
was to achieve public consensus before the political leadership
took action. That was the necessity forced by a small standing
army and the need to obtain Congressional authority to fund
increases and call out the militias. The differences in access
to information, predisposition towards a way of perceiving the
information, and the differences in how they acted on that
information, fractured single arguments into many sub-arguments,
even within similar ideologies. The bottom line was that not
only were there a myriad of arguments for and against military
intervention, there was a huge range of opinions within each
argument such that an infinite number of choices were possible.
Although it would seem nearly impossible, the debate worked
towards merging those choices not just into a majority, but a
single, overwhelming consensus. It is therefore not surprising
that the debate often extended beyond the time that many believed
action was due.
SECTION 4
LIMITS TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
The government possessed authority to act with military force
in a crisis without first consulting the public, although it was
subject to criticism if it acted contrary to the public will.
For major issues which required significant time and effort on
the part of its citizenry, the communication between the
political leadership and its constituency preceded a final
decision. Both sides, the political leadership and the public,
sought to inform and learn, although not always with an open
mind.
The authority of Congress to declare war was written into the
constitution to provide a balance against the authority of the
President as the Commander-in-Chief of military forces to direct
the application of military force. Many of the US conflicts were
undeclared, however, seemingly leaving the decision in the hands
of one person. However, as the standing forces of the US were
intentionally insufficient to prosecute major conflicts, the
President was forced to seek approval from Congress to expand the
military and to fund the expenses of war. Thus, a check to
presidential powers existed even without the declaration of war.
In this manner, a small, limited standing army provided an
essential element of the check to the President's powers.42 An
example is the War of 1812 where, after a narrow 19 to 13 vote in
the Senate and 79 to 49 vote in the House, limits on funding
prevented the army from enlisting more than half the number of
men authorized. An example of a check that was never adopted was
the proposal by internationalists which required the US to give
its power to declare war to an international body.43
Limits on the military leadership's access to the political
structure were intended to prevent a military dictatorship or
undue influence. The concern was that a combination of political
and military power created the possibility of a military despot.
Expansion of the military to deal with a crisis was seen as risk
to the misuse of the military. There was a concern as well with
former military men assuming the presidency, to the point where
proposals existed to prevent military officers from seeking
political office. An editorial in the Washington National
Intelligencer following the election of Andrew Jackson as the
second general, after Washington, to the presidency, stated,
"...[objected] to placing a military man in the chief authority
because, having once tasted of the pleasure of absolute command,
as in the field of battle, he may retain a relish for it, and is
too likely, in the exercise of public duties, to substitute for
the injunctions of law, or the suggestions of policy, his own
sovereign will and pleasure."44 This argument would surface
each time a military officer ran for the presidency. Despite the
objections, officers frequently sought election. General George
B. McClellan campaigned for the presidency in 1864 during the
Civil War, while still on active status. He did not resign his
commission until after he lost the election.45
There appeared to be a great deal of mistrust on the issue of
exercising authority over the military. Add to the distrust the
desire of the political parties not in power to use any issue for
gain if possible. The Mexican War generated opposition rhetoric
within Congress, but some of that was arguable because of the
perception that President Polk's popularity increased as a result
of the success of the conflict.46
The greatest degree of mistrust was from anarchists. They
opposed any government control or authority and rejected entirely
the supposition that a government could order a citizen to risk
his life in a conflict or face imprisonment. Fortunately,
anarchists were never in sufficient numbers to destabilize the
government, although the occasional actions of one, such as the
assassin of President William McKinley, had an impact. Quakers
recognized the need for government but not for militias or an
army, and resisted and distrusted a government that insisted on
maintaining such a force at the expense of taxpayers. Mennonites
generally refused to recognize the authority of any civil
government, but the social order within their society substituted
for civil law, as opposed to the anarchists who recognized no law
or government. As opposed to mistrusting government, they
virtually ignored it, to the extent of not ensuring their own
interests were considered.47
With the innumerable opinions and the interaction between the
people, the legislative branch, and the executive branch, a
common proposal emerged calling for a referendum. The referendum
required the President to receive a majority vote from the public
before asking Congress to declare war. Variations on the
proposal included a referendum before increasing the size of the
military or before tax increases which would pay for increasing
the military. This proposal reached the peak of its popularity
in the waning days of the US isolationist, nationalist period
before World War II. Noting again the demarcation between eras,
observe that with the post-Korean War policy of a larger standing
military force and the shorter reaction time to crises, the
referendum approach has not been seriously considered since.48
The debate over authority for the nationalist/isolationist
period was prompted by issues of influence, mistrust, and the
risks created by the potential for abuse of power. The systems
of checks and limits were created to ensure that the control of
power, especially over the military, was shared by the people and
the government. The government also sought to share the control
between the executive and the legislative branches. Not until
the internationalist/interventionist era was the military granted
much of a say in the argument, in order to suppress undue
influence and prevent a military dictatorship.
SECTION 5
THE PUBLIC: OPINIONS AND NATIONAL WILL
In previous eras more than today, a person raised by Baptist
parents was likely to adhere to the Baptist religion in life.
Farmers raised their children to farm, though some followed
another road in life. Similarly, individual opinions regarding
the employment of military force generally, but not always, fell
within larger patterns of groups which shared common
characteristics. Groups served a significant function in this
regard. They often acted as an intermediate step to communicate
the opinion of the individual to the political leadership. It
was impractical for an elected official to seek out each person
for a conversation, but a large enough group could be a source of
information as to what the average person was thinking. The
groups empowered individuals by providing a louder voice.
However, on any issue, it was wrong to assume that all persons of
one group shared the same orientation or would arrive at similar
decisions. Ethnic background, gender, age, religion, occupation,
education, and regionalism all played a role in determining
public opinion and national will.
The US did not have a homogeneous population. From the
beginning, the pattern of immigration and settlement dictated
that racial and ethnic attitudes and beliefs would be somewhat
concentrated. This also allowed for the retention of inherited
characteristics by partially insulating groups from differing
traditions of other groups. The US was more like a smorgasbord
than a melting pot. The eastern Irish-American population
influenced the national debate for both World War I and World War
II by their attitudes of distrust and dislike for the British,
whom they historically saw as aggressors. African-American
opinions were essentially discounted as the population was
largely disenfranchised, lacking access to economic clout,
education, and the vote. Because of segregation, African-
American service in the military was limited to a minor role
until after World War II. German-Americans often had conflicting
loyalties between their ancestral home and their adopted home.
The settlement of Germans, Poles, Scandinavians and other western
European groups in the Midwest was the principle source of the
most concentrated isolationist attitudes in the nation during the
period between the World Wars.
Differences of opinion regarding the use of military force
existed between men and women. For a large part of the period of
US nationalism and isolationism, women were like African-
Americans, disenfranchised from the vote, limited in
opportunities to obtain formal education, and generally
disregarded as being intellectually able to participate in
political discourse. Nonetheless, many women made themselves
heard through protests, women's groups, and family interactions.
Women, despite being protected from conscription and therefore
not subject to a soldier's hardships or risks, generally voiced
much stronger noninterventionist opinions than men. During the
interwar period between World War I and World War II, their votes
added significantly to the swing towards neutrality and
isolationism.49
Age provided a different pattern of attitudes towards war
than what logic would suggest. Young men were the ones at risk
during a conflict, and yet they were overwhelmingly quicker and
more likely as a group to lean towards military intervention.
Older men, some tempered by military service in past conflicts,
gravitated towards using more time in an attempt to exhaust
alternate solutions.50
Religion could be considered in terms not only of the moral
codes it brought to the argument, but in the way that it
functioned very much like ethnic grouping. The pacifism of the
Quakers and Mennonites was an example where moral codes from
theology had obvious implications in the formation of opinions on
the use of military force. An example of religion as an ethnic
group was the international association formed by Catholicism.
This association was evident in the tightrope that President
Roosevelt was forced to walk during the Spanish Civil War, where
the rebels were supportive of Catholicism while the loyalist
government was leaning towards suppression of the Church. Before
Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the US maintained a
relationship intended to keep the Soviet Union from swinging
towards supporting Hitler. The Catholic Church was torn on the
issue of the US relationships with the Soviet Union, given that
nation's official atheism and suppression of all religions.
Jewish peoples were treated as an ethnic group as well as a
religious group. This affiliation was a factor of most religions
which had associates in multiple nations.51
Religious groups did not have a monopoly on moral positions
against the use of force. Nonsectarian moralists that derived
their philosophies based on ideals of human conditions as opposed
to divine interpretation were a consideration in the formation of
opinions on military intervention. Legalists who looked to
international law as a solution to the problem of conflict, and
other secular institutions, were more likely to be found in the
nonsectarian arena.52
Occupation served as a grouping where similar attitudes
towards military intervention could be found. Farmers, blue
collar, white collar, and professionals tended to view the
economic aspects of conflict according to how it would impact
their ability to keep their jobs and obtain adequate pay with
which to provide for their families. Farmers tended to prefer
land forces over navies and coastal cities strongly preferred
naval defenses.53 The government legislated some differences as
well, often by exempting certain occupations from
conscription.54 An important consideration when reviewing how
occupations affected the formation of opinions of a particular
conflict was what stage of development the US was in at the time.
Although agrarian for much of the nationalist/isolationist
period, the advent of industry, and faster communication and
transportation were just a few of many differences which changed
demographics as the population evolved into new career patterns.
Generally speaking, the higher the education level, the
greater the resistance to the idea of the use of military force
as a policy. There were a number of interacting factors within
this group. The higher the level of education, the greater the
age, which has been shown to be a consideration. Also, better
educated persons were more likely to be well informed on the
facts, and were trained to consider alternate solutions. Persons
with a higher education sensed they had more to lose in a war as
they tended to be in a better economic class than the uneducated.
This caused them to have a conservative approach with an eye
towards preserving that status.55
Regionalism was a major factor in the debate on military
force, in large part because of its significant impact on the
electoral process. Regionalism in the US was partially affected
by the pattern of immigrant settlement. It was also affected by
factors which determined the basis for area economics, such as
weather, water, transportation, distances, and population sizes
in the towns, cities, and rural areas.56 As a result,
regionalism was intricately connected with race and ethnic
origins, occupation, education, and social status. Regional
attitudes were partly caused by differences in age and gender
demographics. As the frontier of the US moved westward, the
population of those areas had significantly higher populations of
men. Those men tended towards being young, with older men and
children staying mostly in already settled areas. The proximity
to a military threat shaped opinions. The peaceful border with
Canada along the north, once guarded by a series of forts while
the British threat seemed strong, later had little or no military
presence as a result of the Rush-Bagot agreement.57 It was
quite different in the south and west, where the expansion into
Florida and Texas territories, and areas of greater resistance
from Indians created regional conflict which undoubtedly
influenced attitudes about the use of military force.58
Although regionalism was important in evaluating the
formation of opinions regarding military intervention,
consideration must be provided for minority groups within a
region. The opinions of minority groups, when added to the voice
of their group residing elsewhere, proved to be a significant
factor. Isolationists in the south and east might have been in
the minority in their respective areas during the inter-war
period leading up to World War II, but their votes added weight
to the concentration of isolationist attitudes in the Midwest.
The same can be said for any minority groups that shared common
characteristics with persons outside of their region, such as
economic status, religion, or ethnic background. A group that
was in the minority everywhere, such as African-Americans, could
not be discounted if their collective opinion was shared by other
groups of different characteristics.
Comprehending the diversity of backgrounds which were crucial
to the early formation of group opinions is necessary to
understanding the origins of many of the arguments for and
against the use of military force. The concentration of opinions
for particular arguments, which correlated with such
characteristics as race, religion, education, gender, and age,
was a powerful factor in the political process. It required that
many separate lines of communication be established between the
government and the people in order to comprehend the sum of
opinion. It was not necessary, however, to have elements in
common in order to reach the same conclusion. It was the
cumulative effect of the same conclusions which drove the US
system, not the effect of just one group or the other.
SECTION 6
THE MILITARY: LIMITS TO THE MISSION
Whenever the issue of the use of military force arose,
opinions always existed as to the appropriate composition and
mission of that force. Military force has been used to fight a
revolution, subdue an insurrection within the country's borders,
clear the indigenous population, expand its borders, defend its
borders, and fight beyond its borders. The military has been
used to internally suppress strikes, protests and riots, collect
taxes, occupy territory within and outside of the nation, and
protect citizens' rights. The military was also an essential
part of the exploration of the nation and constructed much of its
early transportation routes. The mission of deterrence as it was
later understood in combatting communism was not defined during
the period dealt with by this study, but adds to the modern
argument. Limits on the use of the military must be understood
in terms of the military's form, cost, and quality. These
factors must be balanced against the capability desired of the
military, the time available for buildup, identification of a
viable threat, and the variety of missions to be performed.
From the earliest arguments on whether to create a standing
military or maintain a militia system, the form of the military
was enmeshed within the argument over its use.59 Whether or not
to have a coastal navy, deep ocean navy, a Marine Corps, a
separate air force or one within the army provided different
levels of defensive and offensive capability. Proponents of
pacifism desired no military, believing that it was only a
provocation and a temptation. Advocates that defense was not
justified beyond responding to a threat at the border argued that
a small army backed up by a militia was adequate, with only
limited need for short range naval vessels. International
traders who believed that trade routes, private property, and US
citizens required forcible protection overseas advocated a
military mission requiring a sizable naval force capable of
deploying beyond US waters on little notice. Initially, free
transit on the oceans was important, then conducting punishment
expeditions to nations which interfered with US trade, such as
Algiers and Sumatra. In the 1890's, the mission shifted towards
acquiring overseas territory. A later shift was indicated by
arguing that the employment of US naval force against Germany
during World War I was justified as moral retribution.
Possessing a military required money. A larger and more
capable military required more money. It became largely a matter
of what the nation was willing to afford, countered by arguments
as to whether what existed was sufficient to meet the
requirements of the mission.
Most individuals would agree that fair pay and adequate
conditions are essential to obtaining quality soldiers and
maintaining their morale and capability. Obtaining a consensus
of what is fair, capable, and adequate is as complicated as the
issue of military intervention itself. What expectations does
the government have of the military personnel? Are those
expectations different in any way from the public's ideas or of
the ideas of the soldiers themselves? Were they comprised of
non-English speaking immigrants who couldn't find other
employment, such as half of the army and navy in the 1840's, or
those persons who couldn't afford to buy a replacement during the
Civil War, or the sons of the politically connected in World War
I? Would the army and navy have been able to meet recruitment
quotas with high quality men during the 1930's without the Great
Depression making the prospect of employment at any wage
desirable and therefore competitive? Regard must be given to
specific eras such as the Mexican War, when a regular peacetime
standing force, state militia, and volunteer militia combined to
form an army to fight a war.
There was no unit of measure for a military force's
capability, other than an estimate of the likelihood of success
over the enemy and the damage it would sustain during that
campaign. Success was measured by the outcome of the goals,
from unconditional surrender to negotiated peace. The measure of
capability was different depending on whether it was intended
that the US act completely unilaterally, in coordination with
another nation with a common enemy, or fully integrated with the
forces of another nation. The military could be a source of
material and expertise to aid the defense of a neighbor, or
provide the same support to augment the offensive capability of a
neighbor. Assisting the defense of a non-belligerent posed
different considerations than for a belligerent. The balance of
military power between the belligerents could decide the issue by
itself. Had Great Britain and France clearly possessed the
ability to defeat Germany without assistance, an argument to keep
the US out of World War I probably would have been successful,
even though there were those who wanted to participate in order
to have influence in post-war Europe.
Time was an essential element of the argument over military
means. There was more time to prepare when the means of
transport across the oceans was sail powered vessels as compared
to when Japan sailed a fleet of aircraft carriers to the Hawaiian
islands. It took time to build an army or a navy, if greater
force was needed. Estimates of time varied even between experts,
and the public perception was what drove political effort.
The issue was even more vague during peacetime than during
the days after a crisis has been defined. Was there a clearly
identifiable threat or was the threat unknown? What was the
correct mission and composition of forces against a future
unknown threat? The Navy, in the early interwar period between
World War I and World War II, could point to Japan as an ominous
threat. The Army had no such enemy for which to plan an overseas
land campaign. They maintained a mission of continental defense
at a time when the continent was not under threat of invasion.
As a result, Congress was more amenable to requests for increases
in the size of the Navy than for the Army.60
The military was capable of missions short of the use of
force, such as enforcing an embargo. Even an embargo unenforced
by naval vessels had militaristic overtones, as it would have the
effect of potentially altering the balance of military power in
the conflict. The argument against using the military in such
roles was from the concern that it would act as a provocation
or be involved in an incident which increases the level of
hostilities. When an embargo was used, the issues had to be
resolved as to its nature. It involved all the issues of trade,
such as material and finance, or a restriction to munitions and
war material. It could be an embargo of all belligerents such as
against France and Britain during the Napoleonic wars, which was
generally the isolationist and neutral view, or it could be
applied to the nation determined to be the aggressor, such as
Germany in World War I, which had the effect of taking sides in
the conflict. "Cash and Carry" during the 1930's restricted
armaments and munitions, but permitted sales of non-military
goods to any nation that would assume the risk of transporting
across the ocean during war. As Britain controlled the Atlantic,
the Germans were de facto unable to purchase non-military goods
from the US. It cannot be overestimated as to the effect a
policy of embargo had on the US public, with a tradition of
independent rights to conduct trade with anyone, anywhere. An
embargo had to have the support of a consensus of the people in
the same way that the use of military force was required to be
supported.
A concern with the issue of an embargo was the authority to
enforce it. Who held that power, the Congress or the President?
Would that authority have discretionary power to enforce the
embargo selectively or would the policy be written such as to
effectively direct when and where it will be used? President
Roosevelt invoked the Neutrality Act with its embargo features
during the Spanish Civil War. He intentionally withheld the Act
from the Chinese-Japanese conflict at the same time, with obvious
impacts on the military balance of power in both instances.61
Who was the arbitrator if interpretations of the policy differed?
Were there preconditions established under which the policy would
be expanded or withdrawn? The complexity of such issues which
affected military power, even those short of the use of force,
defied easy answers.
Opponents of the use of military force used limits for two
purposes, to cause a delay in order that an alternative course of
action would be adopted, or to provide limits in order that the
extent of involvement was minimized. The issues of mission and
capability, together with a plan of use, such as a unilateral
power or an alliance, were elements that went into determining
the form and quality of the force. Dollar cost could be a
significant factor for both proponents and opponents of force,
acting to limit the size of forces. Ultimately, the limits
placed on the strength of the military were a reflection of the
public consensus of what they were willing to risk in the
conflict.
SECTION 7
THE MILITARY: LIMITS TO MILITARY CAPABILITY
Section 6 illustrated that limiting the strength of the
military was an effective way to cause a delay in order to review
other options and also served to limit the extent of involvement.
This section deals with the arguments that were presented which
had the effect of limiting the military option.
After dealing with the infinite variations by which a person
or group could reach the conclusion that an aggressive military
posture was not appropriate to the circumstances, a determination
had to be made as to how that person or group would act. Actions
could include concepts of antimilitarism, antipreparedness, and
avoidance of training and conscription.
Antimilitarism was defined as opposing aggressive military
preparedness, which leaves a great deal of room for debating what
was aggressive and what defined preparedness. It was also
potentially inaccurate to label someone as antimilitaristic if
their opposition position was situational. Under different
circumstances they would readily have agreed with an increased
build up of military force with the intent of using it.
During the nationalist/isolationist period, if the effort to
persuade the US leadership against the use of military force did
not appear to be successful, opponents of the issue looked to the
elements of military preparedness. Limiting the strength of the
military restricted the government's ability to use force or
caused them to rethink the cost/benefit considerations.
Antimilitaristic groups looked at military training outside
of the actual standing forces and militias as leading towards a
predisposition to resort to military force. Compulsory universal
military training, in which every eligible male would receive
instruction even before volunteering or being called up for duty,
was traditionally rejected since the end of the frontier days
when the local militia was a necessary security measure in a
hostile environment and required every able bodied man. As late
as the inter-war period between the World Wars, proposals were
made but never enacted for universal service, in which every
eligible citizen would serve on active duty for a minimum period
of time; universal training, in which basic training would have
been required for every eligible citizen; and training of other
available groups of young men, such as the Civilian Conservation
Corps during the Depression. Voluntary military training, such
as the Reserve Officers Training Corps, was unsuccessfully
attacked as forceful indoctrination of young minds, and an
inappropriate expenditure of government funds.62
The premise of anti-preparedness groups was essentially one
of not being able to use what didn't exist. Anti-preparedness
advocates saw the creation or build up of military forces as a
provocation and a temptation as well as an unnecessary expense.
There were levels within this argument. There were anti-
preparedness advocates who accepted what they believed to be a
justifiable defensive build up, but who opposed the US possessing
a force capable of deploying outside its borders in an offensive
mission. Anti-preparedness advocates within the strict pacifist
camp believed that to build any defensive forces was a
provocation.63
Beyond opposing a build up, extreme anti-preparedness
advocates supported unilateral disarmament, confident that an
unarmed US posed no threat to others and therefore would not be
threatened in return. A more moderate position was to suggest
making a small unilateral reduction and to wait for voluntary
reciprocal action by the other nations before enacting further US
cuts. The most conservative plan was for the support of
bilateral or multilateral disarmament treaties.
Antipreparedness groups normally viewed militias, such as the
National Guard, as less of a temptation for abuse by the US
political leadership, and better suited to a defensive mission.
Restrictions on the use of militia and the National Guard outside
the borders existed in law throughout the nationalist/
isolationist period. The standing army was viewed as too
available for a quick decision by the leadership without the
support of the public.
The argument considered US national policy towards non-
belligerents and potential allied belligerents as well. The
belief was that any support to other nations committed the US to
accept the responsibility and consequences of acts on their part.
Showing why the period from 1939 to 1941 is a break in major
policy and marks the end of the nationalist/isolationist period
were the Lend-Lease Act, Destroyers for Bases deal, occupation of
Iceland by U.S. Marines, and other actions which were perceived
as a departure from strict neutrality and which constituted a
military commitment.64
Conscription was a necessary element of rapidly expanding the
military forces of the US in preparation for a conflict. The
exception is the Mexican War, when the regular army was only
slightly enlarged and the difference was made up with volunteer
militias and to a lesser degree state militias. Prior to World
War I, antipreparedness advocates attacked conscription at every
level, from proposing conscientious objector laws so broad as to
make conscription voluntary to administrative measures. These
measures included lobbying to keep the period of service as short
as possible in order to minimize the expansion and capability of
the military.
Selective service was intended to be the fairest method of
meeting necessary manpower levels, but less than conscription of
every eligible male. This was accomplished through
categorization, prioritization, exemption, and lottery.
Exemptions, in particular, were subject to complaint since the
earliest days of the nation. The objections were that the rules
favored the rich and powerful at the expense of poor men who were
required to fight in their stead. The practice of permitting the
purchase of a substitute, in particular, which was extremely
common during the Civil War, was the most obvious abuse of the
system and was formally discarded by the time of build up for
World War I.65
With the exception of mandatory participation in a few of the
local and state militias during the early days of the nation, the
US accepted the concept that a man should not be forced to serve
in the military if he genuinely possessed a moral standard which
made it a sin. This was expanded during World War I to include
men with religions other than the traditional pacifist churches.
Efforts to further expand this to morals based on personal
beliefs were not successful until court rulings after World
War II. Pacifism to some meant that any use of force for any
reason was a sin. To others, pacifism meant prohibiting the
aggressive use of force; that to defend oneself or another was
permitted. The idea of selective pacifism required an
examination of the reasons for the conflict to establish whether
it met the standard of a just war. An argument existed that a
man's status for conscientious objection should be based on a
determination of whether the conflict in question met his just
war criteria.66 Selective objection to service in the military
was never accepted by the US as a legitimate excuse; the US
required that the applicant meet the standard of objection to
service in any war.
Within the system of selective service was the issue of
alternate service. Alternate service required men granted
conscientious objector status to perform labor in lieu of service
in the military. Normally, conscientious objectors would work at
jobs such as an ambulance driver, medical orderly, farm laborer,
or construction laborer, usually at wages lower than military
service pay or without wages. A conscientious objector who
viewed alternative service as contributing indirectly to the
support of the war, in violation of his personal beliefs, was
subject to the same penalties as men who refused to report for
the draft.67
Naturally, those persons who objected to forcible
conscription and alternate service objected to the penalties
imposed for refusing to serve. Throughout US history, the
punishment for refusing service has evolved from severe physical
punishment such as whipping, branding, and ear cropping, to
imprisonment and/or fines. The application of punishments,
especially before the Civil War, varied greatly from area to
area. The unequal application of the laws generated additional
resentment.68
Henry David Thoreauwas the most famous example of refusing to
pay taxes to support the government because of its prosecution of
the Mexican War. As the tax system did not break tax amounts
into separate categories, the tax resister normally refused to
pay any and all taxes. As a practical matter, this never
accomplished much beyond making a protest statement, as
confiscation laws generally obtained the tax due, plus potential
revenues from fines.69
Within various religions, mostly the extremist pacifist
churches, there were persons who believed that contributing
charitable aid which supported military personnel contributed to
the war as directly as paying taxes or serving in the military.
For the most part though, charitable contributions from even
pacifist churches significantly increased during a military
conflict.70
Basically, the means of opposing military force dealt
principally with two courses of action. The first was to stall
employment in order to continue the debate and persuade the
leadership to find solutions short of military force. The second
was to limit the ability of the US to marshall military force.
As the military was created, funded, and assigned a mission by
law, lobbying for laws which affected training, conscription,
disarmament, base locations, alliances, and funding were means of
putting physical limits on the military strength. The lesser
military strength was believed to limit the military option.
CHAPTER III
CONCLUSIONS
This study did not intend to establish a correlation between
the opinions of persons and groups who objected to creating or
increasing the military structure for the purpose of military
intervention and the resulting actual size and composition of
that force. Such a study of a cause and effect relationship is
beyond the scope of this paper and the program of which it is a
art. This was an analysis of past conflicts to identify the
arguments reflecting the mainstream of public thought which were
used for the major part of US history. These arguments focused
on the use of military force by the US within and on its borders
and on foreign shores. An analysis of opposing arguments reveals
underlying factors allied against the use of military force and
provides insight as to their origins. These factors included the
cost of military intervention, the fundamentals of the decision
to intervene, and the authority of the political leadership to
commit US military forces. The full range of views reflected in
public opinion and national will affected these factors by
serving to limit the strength of the military and restrict its
use as a political option.
As there were many opinions on the subject of the use of
military force itself, there are likely many ways these arguments
could have been organized. As a minimum, though, they represent
a list which is worthwhile reviewing for any historical treatment
or analysis of the events leading up to a US military
intervention through 1939. For any argument supporting military
intervention, an inability to respond to these issues in a
rational manner is indication that the cost of the conflict will
be greater than initially estimated. Lastly, these beliefs
represent an enduring element of US culture. Aspects of
determining the use of military force, such as pacifism or
isolationism must not be viewed as obstruction, ignorance, or
folly, but legitimate considerations within American debate.71
The arguments must be viewed within the context not of guns,
ships, and planes, but of the risk to the men who man them and
the effect on the populations of the nations in conflict.
The history of American military intervention can be divided
into three major policy eras: nationalist/isolationist pre-World
War II, internationalist/interventionist post-World War II, and
single superpower post-Cold War, which is still an evolving
policy. Prior to World War II, the US raised an army as each
major crisis formed and then drastically demobilized the military
following the end of the conflict. The country refused to engage
in mutual defense treaties and rarely engaged in anything but
unilateral military action. The US renounced participation in
world organizations. After World War II, the US began to align
itself internationally as a principal founder and member of the
United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the
Organization of American States, and many other commitments which
included agreements on the use of military force. These
commitments included maintaining a sizable military presence
overseas, a huge standing force within the US which planned and
had the capability for deploying overseas, and physical as well
as monetary assistance to the armed forces of other nations.
In addition to a change from nationalism to internationalism,
the pre-World War II pattern shifted from obtaining a consensus
to fight a particular war and then preparing for that war to a
post World War II pattern of being prepared for an unknown
conflict and then afterward obtaining a consensus of whether or
not to fight a conflict as it arose. Since the Korean War, the
US has maintained a large standing military, forward deployed and
ready at short notice for a major conflict.
A question posed for further research is to analyze the
dramatic policy changes between the two periods and determine
whether the fundamental beliefs regarding the use of military
force changed, or whether those beliefs remained intact, but
arrived at a different decision because of the new threat created
by a nuclear, super power divided world. Knowing whether the
underlying public beliefs on military intervention that existed
prior to World War II have remained intact or changed is
necessary to understanding the present debate on post-Cold War
policy. Did Americans genuinely change their values from
nationalist/isolationists to international/interventionists or
did they remain nationalist/isolationists forced by circumstances
to temporarily enact internationalist/interventionist policies?
If the latter, will the demise of the Soviet Union cause a
reversion or will the major regional threats necessitate a
continuation of Cold War military policies, to include the
maintenance of a large standing military?
TERMS
activist--an individual or view that uses means of vigorous action or
involvement to participate in the political process to gain endorsement of a particular cause or interest. See also passive.
anti-imperialist--an individual or a view, based principally on memories or
observations of European colonial exploitation, that the US should
relinquish possession of its overseas territories and trusts. See also imperialist.
anti-militarist--an individual or view opposing the maintenance of a large
military establishment and a policy of military preparedness. See also anti-preparedness; pro-preparedness.
anti-military training in schools/Civilian Conservation Corps--a view that
opposes compulsory military training in school, in the belief that if unchecked, it will lead to military despotism in the US. See also pro-military training in schools/Civilian Conservation Corps.
anti-preparedness--a view that maintenance of a military force or establishment
is possibly immoral, unnecessarily expensive, and serves as a provocation to others and a temptation to those possessing it. See also anti-militarist; unilateral disarmament; disarmament treaties; pro-preparedness.
unilateral disarmament--a belief in an extreme form of anti-
preparedness, focused on the confidence that an unarmed US poses no threat to other nations and is in turn not threatened by them. See also anti-militarist; disarmament treaties.
disarmament treaties--formal agreements that embody the belief that
military forces and/or establishments as a whole are a provocation and a temptation. These treaties focus on an reciprocal reduction of military force, capability, or establishment between or among the consenting nations. See also anti-militarist; unilateral disarmament.
anti-referendum--a view that opposes the referendum approach, seeing it as an
abrogation of duties by the political leadership and/or an unnecessary delay that disadvantages the US. See also pro-referendum.
conflict of interest--the situation in which an individual's self interests are
pursued at the expense of the interests of the general welfare of the
many.
conscientious objector--an individual or view objecting to military
conscription, training, and forcible service in the military by reason of morally opposing war in any form. See also non-resistance pacifist; pro-conscription. Categories of conscientious objectors include: a. alternative service conscientious objector--an individual who is granted
conscientious objector status and is required to perform in lieu of service in the military. Normally this labor includes work at such jobs as ambulance driver, medical orderly, farm laborer, or construction laborer. Such labor is usually performed either without wages or at wages lower than that for military service. b. refuse service conscientious objector--a conscientious objector who views alternative service as contributing directly to the support of the war, in violation of his personal beliefs. c. status granted conscientious objector--an individual who applies, screens, and is granted conscientious objector status. d. status refused conscientious objector--an individual who applies, but who fails to screen and is denied conscientious objector status. This individual must elect to serve in the military service or be subject to laws and regulations governing conscription, to include those enforcing the draft and draft evasion laws.
cost--in terms of war, the amount of men, material, and monetary assets diverted
away from more positive activities and any resulting changes in environmental, economic, and social conditions such as loss of freedom..
embargo--a governmental restriction placed on commerce that includes all issues
regarding trade, finance, sanctions, authority to impose (Congress or the President), and degree of embargo (e.g., partial embargo against munitions and war material only). Authority to impose an embargo is either discretionary (as seen fit) or mandatory (based on certain preconditions). Types of embargo include: a. pro-embargo of all belligerents-an isolationist or neutral-based embargo that restricts the provision of munitions and materials to all parties in a conflict in order to discourage and contain further hostilities and preserve US neutrality. See also isolationist; neutral. b. pro-unrestricted trade to all belligerents--an internationalist-based embargo reliant upon strict US neutrality and complete maintenance if US independent rights to conduct trade with whomever it pleases. See also internationalist. c. pro-embargo of aggressor(s) only-an interventionist-based embargo that supports US allies while still maintaining neutrality or at a minimum, US freedom of action. See also interventionist.
idealist--an individual or view seeking perfection, seeing events and
circumstances as they should be, rather than as they are in reality. This individual or view is usually unwilling to compromise or even listen to opposing viewpoints and arguments. See also realist.
imperialist--an individual or view supportive of the pursuance of imperial
interests, that is, the extension of a nation's rule over foreign countries and the acquisition and holding of colonies and dependencies. Usually used in a negative context by those who feel that the US should confine its interests to affairs within its traditional borders. See also
anti-imperialist.
informed--an individual or view possessing a sufficient knowledge of the facts
to form an opinion and participate in an intelligent discourse in a particular matter. See also uninformed.
internationalist--an individual or view supportive of US trade with all or most
nations, a view requiring cooperation among nations at a minimum, or a world government and/or court at a maximum. See also pro-unrestricted trade to all belligerents.
interventionist--an individual or view supportive of US support to one side of
the belligerents or who believes that the inevitability of US involvement makes US interests best served by proactive actions before the US is attacked. See also pro-embargo of aggressor(s) only. The types of interventionists include: a. unconventional surrender interventionist--an
interventionist who believes that the threat to the US must be completely destroyed. b. negotiated peace interventionist--an interventionist who believes that the use of military force by the US might persuade the opponent to sue for peace on terms favorable to the US and its allies.
isolationist--an individual of view supportive of the belief that the US can
best function by avoiding political and military engagement and interaction with other nations. See also pro-embargo of all belligerents. The categories of isolationists include: a. old isolationist--an individual or view supportive of restricting politics, military and trade to issues within the US. b. neo-isolationist--an individual or view supportive of maintaining foreign economic exchange without political or military actions outside of the US.
nationalist--an individual or view that places the interests of the US above the
mutual interests of other nations.
neutral--an individual or view that favors no particular side in a conflict and
focus in maintaining a position that prevents US participation in the affair. See also pro-embargo of all belligerents. Two types of neutrals include: a. US unilateral independent) action--a neutral individual or view favoring neutrality towards both belligerents and non-belligerents. b. collective security agreement of non-belligerents--a view that neutrality is best achieved by persuading the belligerents that involving one neutral in a conflict would result in the involvement of many more.
nonsectarian--legalist or humanist philosophies derived from personal beliefs
and based on law or amelioration of substandard human conditions. See also religious.
not in my back yard--an individual or collective view of indifference so long as
an action does nor affect a local group or community. Politicians dependent on votes from this area are particularly susceptible to this type of group. See also please not in my back yard.
optimist--an individual of view that sees US involvement in a war resulting in a
favorable outcome. See also pessimist.
pacifist--an individual or view that proposes the moral argument that the use of
any and all military force is evil. The categories of pacifists include: a. non-resistance pacifist-an individual or view of extreme pacifism that precludes the use of military force even in self defense in the face of known harm.. See also conscientious objector. b. self defense pacifist--an individual or view of moderate pacifism that allows the use of military force in self defense. c. selective pacifist--an individual or view that advocates involvement based in the "just war" philosophy, but resists serving in the military if reasons for US involvement in a particular war are insufficient. d. business pacifist--an individual or view that rejects the use of military force as outmoded in the international business world where war proves impractical because no incentive exists to interrupt essential trade.
passive--an individual or view that may profess an opinion but does not actively
participate in the political process. See also activist.
pessimist--an individual or view that believes US involvement in a war will
result in an unfavorable outcome. See also optimist.
peace movement--a self designation assigned by members of groups to identify
those organizations opposed to the use of military force as a political solution.
please keep it in my back yard--an individual or collective view desiring to
reap the economic benefits if the military forces or industry located in their area. Politicians dependent on votes from this area are particularly susceptible to this type of group. See also not in my back yard.
pro-Allied--support for Allied forces to be victorious in the war. Allied is a
term most often related to World War II, but the concept is applicable to other conflicts. See also pro-Axis. Levels of pro-allied support include: a. US unilateral (independent)action--a view desirous of Allied victory, but without willingness to commit the US to support. b. collective security agreement--a view of willingness to commit US military force in an organized alliance with the Allied cause.
pro-Axis--support for the Axis forces to be victorious in the war. Axis is a
term most often related to World War II, but the concept is applicable to other conflicts. See also pro-Allied.
pro-conscription--an individual or view in favor of the means of conscription to
rapidly expand the military as a preparedness measure. See also conscientious objector; anti-preparedness; pro-preparedness. Categories of pro-conscription include: a. universal training/service--the requirement for every citizen meeting military service requirements to serve in the military. b. selective service--a conscription, accomplished
through categorization, prioritization, exemption, and lottery, of less than the total available qualified citizenship into military service.
pro-military training in schools/Civilian Conservation Corps--a view that
supports the idea of those favoring universal military service as a means of providing training before that military service commences. See also anti-military training/Civilian Conservation Corps.
progressivist--an individual or view that favors active means, usually
legislative, to advance social goals of providing basic human requirements and eradicating racism sexism, crime, etc.
pro-referendum--a view that supports the Presidential requirement for a majority
vote from the public to consider asking Congress to declare war. See also anti-referendum.
pro-preparedness--a view that supports the maintenance of a military force or
establishment sufficient to deal with a pending crisis in which the US may become involved. This view includes opinions on how best to achieve readiness. See also anti-preparedness. Two basic categories of pro-preparedness include: a. defensive capable--the preparedness of
the US military for defense against invasion. b. offensive (overseas) capable--the preparedness of the US military to engage the enemy outside of the US.
radical/extremist--an excessive individual or view characterized by
incompatibility with reason or compromise.
realist--an individual or view that sees events and circumstances as they really
are, and recognizes the limitations of a point of view and considers the merits of other points of view. See also idealist.
religious--moralist philosophies derived from religious affiliation and beliefs.
See also nonsectarian.
Social Darwinist--an individual or view that opposes war because the best young
men are sent to fight and die. This view is contrary to a natural design of survival of the fittest because it leaves lesser qualified men alive and prospering.
tax-resister--an individual who refuses to pay taxes which support the use of US
military force or military aid to another nation, As the US tax system does not break the tax amount into separate categories, the tax register normally refuses to pay any and all taxes.
uninformed--an individual or view possessing no knowledge or insufficient
knowledge of the facts or wrong information on which to form an opinion, This status does not preclude the possession of an opinion, but it limits the practicality of a reasonable discourse. See also informed.
CHRONOLOGY
This is not a historical chronology in that it does not,
indeed could not, list every event in which important decisions
were made on the use of military force. Rather, it is to show
the approximate time that various arguments entered into the
arena of debate:
1776 The American Revolution. Compulsory militia duties
required in frontier areas. Religious affiliation is the basic
source of anti-war reasoning. Beginnings of the every citizen is
a soldier militia myth; only one in ten white males of military
age fought in the Revolution.
1783 Constitutional arguments over control of the military.
Congress debates size and form, in particular the issue of
standing army vs. militia. Geography of the new nation is a key
factor in determining military issues. British, French, Spanish,
and Indian threat. Two party political system develops which
contributes to the noted duality of argument in the US.
1790'S The US is tested at sea by attacks against its merchant
shipping and impressment of American sailors by both Britain and
France.
1807 President Jefferson proposes and Congress enacts first
embargo against belligerents whose activities are preventing free
trade. Embargo causes more harm to US interests than good.
1815 Post War of 1812 saw significant increase in importance
of foreign trade. Nation looks at the North American Continent
and begins debating extent of Manifest Destiny. Nonsectarian
social causes begin to replace religion at the forefront of anti-
war arguments. Removal of Indians from east of the Mississippi
to the "Great American Desert" commences. First indications of
internationalist argument.
1817 Rush-Bagot Agreement effectively eliminates British
competition from military use arguments.
1830'S Standing military forces begin developing
professionals. This adds to reducing the effectiveness of
militia, by making them less capable in comparison.
1840 Mexican War stimulates anti-imperialist arguments.
Increasing immigration pushes settlers beyond the Mississippi
into Indian Territory.
1850 The issue of slavery complicates anti-war argument as
advocates of social issues and religious organizations swing
towards viewing inevitable war as a just cause.
1852 Social Darwinism becomes a popular concept.
1860 The beginnings of the Civil War make determining the
worth of war the national debate.
1861 The first large scale conscriptions result in debate
over fairness; there are many riots and desertions.
1863 Humanizing the battlefield comes of age. The U.S. Army
publishes rules of engagement regarding treatment of prisoners,
wounded, and non-combatants. First Geneva Convention. Red Cross
formed.
1865 Military occupation of the South renews arguments about
the use of federal military forces to enforce civil law.
1870'S Industrial age advances US foreign trade interests and
creates potential for the US to be a world power. The increase
in international trade adds weight to the internationalist camp.
1890'S The US completes its Manifest Destiny by settling the
continent coast to coast. New vision of manifest destiny looks
to overseas acquisitions, sparking anti-imperialist movement.
1910'S Legalism. Lawyers assume leadership role in
nonsectarian internationalist ideology. They look to world
courts and treaties as solutions.
1915 Conflict in Europe generates anti-preparedness effort
in the US to prevent US involvement. Myriad of arguments and
uncertainty of the direction the US is headed creates first
significant call for a referendum approach to the declaration of
war.
1919-1939 A return to isolationism. Refusal to join the League
of Nations. Disillusionment with the results of World War I.
Social issues rise over legalism as basis for arguing against
war. Zenith of organized religion.
1920's The US begins policies of negotiating military issues
such as comparative strengths and basing, but refuses to seek any
collective security arrangements, maintaining freedom of action.
1929 The Great Depression begins, believed by many to be the
result of World War I. The US concern with economics is focused
internally.
1933 First of the neutrality acts which restricted US
freedoms in an effort to avoid confrontations with belligerent
nations.
1938 Marks the high tide of the referendum issue with the
narrow defeat of the Ludlow Amendment.
1939 Active support of British cause moves the US forward to
its first military alliance, ending the nationalist/isolationist
period.
1989 Post Cold War. Status of internationalism and
deterrence?
NOTES
1. Robert W. Coakley, the Role of Federal Military Forces
in Domestic Disorders, 1789-1878 (Washington, DC: Center of
Military History, United States Army, 1988), 4, 28, 43, 94, 119,
128.
2. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common
Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (New
York, NY: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1984),
328.
3. Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign
Policy (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.,
1950), 3.
4. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History
of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, IN:
University Press, 1977), 40-41.
5. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Mattituck, NY: Aeonian
Press, Inc., 1968), 295. Von Kriege was first published in 1832.
The English translation for this reference was published in 1908.
6. Peter Brock, Pacifism in the United States: From the
Colonial Era to the First World War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1968), 21-25.
7. Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935-1941
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), 13.
8. Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. 11 (Danbury, CT: Grolier
Incorporated, 1982) 425.
9. Robert W. Coakley, , Paul J. Scheips, and Emma J.
Portuondo, Antiwar and Antimilitary Activities in the United
States, 1846-1954 (Monograph. Office of the Chief of Military
History, Department of the Army, 1970), 3.
10. Weigley, 47.
11. Coakley, Scheips and Portuondo, 11.
12. Millett and Maslowski, 141, 142.
13. U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, Vol. One (New York NY:
The Century Co., 1903), 34. Punishment can be interpreted two
ways as Grant used the term. One would be as the natural
consequence of expanding slave territory and fueling the fires of
that argument. The other way is as divine retribution for waging
an unjust war.
14. Robert M. Utley, "The Contribution of the Frontier to
the American Military Tradition," in The Harmon Memorial Lectures
in Military History, 1959-1987, Harry R. Borowski, LtCol, USAF,
ed. (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, United Stated
Air Force, 1988), 525-538.
15. Charles DeBenedetti, The Peace Reform in American
History (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980), 4-7.
16. Clausewitz, 119.
17. Maurice Matloff,"Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945,"
in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear
Age, eds. Peter Paret and others (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1986), 679.
18. Clausewitz, 243.
19. Coakley, Scheips, and Portuondo, 45-46.
20. Jonas, 28-30.
21. Wayne S. Cole, The Battle Against Intervention, 1940-
1941 (New York, NY: Octagon Books, 1953), 4-5.
22. Ernest C. Bolt, Jr., Ballots Before Bullets: The War
Referendum Approach to Peace in America, 1914-1941
(Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1977), 155.
23. James N. Rosenau, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy
(New York, NY: The Free Press, a Division of Collier-Macmillan,
Limited, 1967), 53.
24. Merle Curti, Peace or War: The American Struggle, 1636-
1936 (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1936), 15-16.
25. Millett and Maslowski, 101.
26. DeBenedetti, 60.
27. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The World
Crisis of 1937 and American Foreign Policy, vol. 1 of The
Challenge to Isolation (New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers,
1952), 16.
28. Coakley, Scheips, and Portuondo, 45-46.
29. Norman Angell, The Great Illusion 1933 (New York, NY:
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933), 67.
30. Robert A. Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent: American
Entry into World War II (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
1979), 6.
31. Ronald Spector, "The Military Effectiveness if the U. S.
Armed Forces, 1919-1939." In Military Effectiveness, Vol. 2.,
Millett, Allen R. and William Murray, eds. (Boston, MA: Allen &
Unwin, 1988), 72.
32. DeBenedetti, 112.
33. S. L. A. Marshall, World War I (Boston, MA: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1964), 165. "From the beginning, the majority
of Americans favored the Allies, though the Teutonic cause had
its supporters."
34. DeBenedetti, 29-30. DeBenedetti indicates that the
public found the policy wrong for moral purposes, while a more
realistic interpretation is that is deprived US merchants of
trade.
35. Jonas, 23.
36.Mark Lincoln Chadwin, The Hawks of World War II
(Kingsport, TN: Kingsport Press, Inc., 1968), 11-12.
37. Charles Chatfield, For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in
America, 1914-1941 (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee
Press, 1971), 53.
38. Henry E. Eccles, RADM, USN (Ret), Military Power in a
Free Society (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1979), 24.
39. Divine, 18.
40. Langer and Gleason, 11.
41. William H. Chamberlin, America's Second Crusade
(Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Company, 1950), 124.
42. Arthur Ekirch, The Civilian and the Military (New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 1956), 24-26.
43. Bolt, 12.
44. Ekirch, 75.
45. Charles Van Doren, ed., Webster's American Biographies,
Springfield, MA: G. C. Merriam Company, Publishers, 1975), 663,
927, 1024. In addition to McClellan, Zachary Taylor ran and won
the presidency in 1848 while still onactive, unattached duty.
General Winfield Scott ran for the presidency in 1852, while
still on active duty, and remained active into the Civil War.
46. Ekirch, 84.
47. Brock, 86.
48. Bolt, 12-15.
49. John E. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion
(New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973), 149.
50. Cole, 9.
51. Jonas, 186-190.
52. DeBenedetti, 83.
53. Weigley, 41.
54. V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy
(New York, NY: Random House, Inc., 1961), 138-152.
55. Key, 335. There is the possibility of
overgeneralization here across eras. Modern academics do
indeed seem to lean towards a liberal, antiwar ideology, but this
is not necessarily the case in the 18th or 19th centuries, where
strict educators lashed out at students who criticized the
policies of elders. It may also be a factor by nation, and other
nations may have evolved differently.
56. Key, 138-152.
57. Almond, 131.
58. Curti, 33.
59. Ekirch, 20.
60. Spector, 70-98.
61. Divine, 44.
62. Almond, 190. This has persisted through every era to
some degree. It was a very forceful argument during Vietnam. As
recently as May 1995, the Washington Post published a letter to
the editor from a woman whose son was in JROTC. She contradicted
the brainwashing claim, but others still hold to that idea.
63. Divine, 9-10.
64. Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of
the War, 1941 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1948),
113,443. In addition to public movement towards alliances, FDR
sanctioned a meeting by British and American naval officers which
opened in Washington on 29 January 1941. The "ABC-1" report
established a "Germany first" strategy. The secret conference
could not affect public opinions, but those government and
military persons who were aware of the meeting understood that a
step towards a military alliance had been firmly taken.
65. DeBenedetti, 23.
66. DeBenedetti, 71. The courts have expanded the
definition of conscientious objector to be interpreted more
broadly than written in law. Objection to a particular war
though, continues to be unacceptable. It was attempted by
several servicemen and women during the Gulf War, some on the
basis of refusing to fight fellow Muslims, but was rejected in
all courts.
67. Curti, 253.
68. DeBenedetti, 71.
69. Coakley, Scheips, and Portuondo, 9.
70. Chatfield, 53.
71. Jonas, viii.
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