Military

Making A Better Reserve

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Manpower

 

 

 

                        MAKING A  BETTER RESERVE

 

 

                                 OVERVIEW

 

      In its first real test, the Gulf War validated the key concepts underlying the

 

Total Force Policy which was formally adopted by the United States Department of

 

Defence (DoD) in 1973 as the cornerstone of its military defense policy. However,

 

events leading up to Operation Desert Shield/Storm also discredited the combat

 

readiness and thus the ability of the Army National Guard (ARNG) brigades--the

 

ARNG being the primary provider of Reserve Component (RC) combat forces to

 

the Army--to be deployed early in battle. As a result, RC combat units will now

 

serve as merely an augmentation and reinforcement pool for the Active Component

 

(AC) combat units, marginalizing their previous co-equal role under the "roundout"

 

concept.1  This paper attempts to show that this is unwarranted and that the

 

traditional rivalry between the Army and the ARNG as well as the former's

 

overriding need to preserve its force structure may have been the true underlying

 

reason for the leaving behind of the three ARNG "roundout" brigades. It points out

 

that should two near simultaneous major regional contingencies occur, RC combat

 

forces may have to deploy on short notice and operate at brigade and larger

 

formations because of a downsized U.S. military.  This paper suggests that the

 

combat readiness standards set for RC combat forces may be unnecessarily stringent

 

given the U.S.'s overwhelming military technological advantage and air supremacy

 

as was amply demonstrated by the rout of the Iraqi land forces in under 100 hours!

 

It proposes that the ARNG should adopt some of the staffing and training practices

 

of the USMC Reserves (USMCR) to minimize the need and duration for post-

 

mobilization training. This paper also attempts to show parallelisms between the

 

USMCR and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) models, both being forces with proven

 

track-records, to strengthen the case for the proposals. Finally, it suggests that the

 

ARNG has adequately addressed its previous shortcomings and should be given a

 

fair chance to prove itself.

 

 

 

                           BACKGROUND

 

      The Three ARNG Brigades Debacle

 

      In the Gulf War, the Reserve Component played a major and crucial role in

 

the successful prosecution of the war. About 245,000 Reservists were ordered to

 

active duty in support of the crisis, with about 106,000 actually deployed to

 

Southwest Asia where they accounted for nearly 20 percent of all U.S. forces

 

deployed in the Gulf. Thus, the Total Force Policy had seemingly been validated

 

--except for the unfortunate fact that none of the Reserve combat units which were

 

mobilized actually joined in the fighting of the war! Although there were numerous

 

mitigating circumstances, by the time the three Army National Guard (ARNG)

 

combat brigades--Georgia's 48th Infantry Brigade, the Mississippi's 155th Armor

 

Brigade and the Louisiana's 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized)-were certified

 

combat ready or were on the verge of being so, the Gulf War was already ending!

 

 

 

      Thus when the first test came, the Reserve Component (RC) combat forces,

 

which were led to believe that they would deploy together with their Active

 

Component (AC) sister units and to fight alongside them under the "roundout"

 

concept were soon disabused of it. Unfairly or otherwise, this has given rise to the

 

false public perception that the Reserves "cannot cut it as combat maneuver units"

 

and are best assigned only combat support and combat service support roles.

 

Although not articulated as such, the quiet reorganization of the Army's active

 

divisions into "filled" divisions from the previous "roundout" concept structure would

 

indicate this to be also the Department of Defense's (DoD) position.

 

 

 

      Total Force Policy Aid The Roudout Concept

 

      When General Creighton Abrams was appointed Chief of Staff of the U.S.

 

Army late in the Vietnam era, he was determined not to repeat the mistake of

 

failing to gain the support of the American people in fighting a war abroad.

 

Entrusted with the responsibility for reshaping the U.S. Army after the Vietnam War,

 

he set about reorganizing the Army's structure in such a manner that it could not be

 

committed to sustained combat without mobilizing the reserves--the cornerstone of

 

the Total Force Policy.2  Concomitantly introduced with that policy was the

 

"roundout" concept which, in effect, made the RC coequal partners to the AC. The

 

dropping of the "roundout" concept signals another evolution in the role of the

 

Reserves: from the traditional expansion and sustainment base role in total and

 

prolonged mobilization (up to the Korean War era) to the quick response/surge base

 

role for use in the successive "massive retaliation" and "flexible response" security

 

strategies of the U.S.3 and finally to the present situation where, to paraphrase

 

Lewis Sorley,"... Reserve forces will in the main, go back to being just that--forces

 

held in reserve, to be committed to supplement active forces when the scope or

 

duration of combat exceeds the regulars' unreinforced capabilities .... with the

 

exception that selected combat support and combat service support forces will be

 

committed early on to provide capabilities .... not economical or necessary to

 

maintain in the active component."4

 

 

 

      An Army Conspiracy?

 

      As can be expected, the ARNG resisted the changes and raised charges of a

 

conspiracy on the part of the military leadership to leave behind the "roundout"'

 

brigades so as not to weaken the AC's position in the impending post-Cold War

 

armed forces downsizing. This may not have been without basis--a general officer

 

on Pentagon duty was quoted as saying of General Colin L. Powell and General Carl

 

E. Vuono, "The Chairman and the Chief are of one mind on this. If we give up

 

force structure to the Reserves and they prove that they can do the job, then we'll

 

lose that structure to them."5 The Army, which was assigned the task of validating

 

the readiness of the "roundout" brigades, had taken a position that since these

 

ARNG brigades were not as yet urgently required in the theater; they could be made

 

to undergo a ".... period of deliberate readiness improvement."6 In the end, the post-

 

mobilization training program conducted by the Army at the National Training

 

Center to prepare them for deployment in Operation Desert Shield/Storm ".... did

 

add substantially more training days than planned for...."7. Furthermore, the after

 

action investigations established that no transportation plans were being made to

 

move the three ARNG brigades to the Gulf.  Not surprisingly, this raised the

 

traditional institutional rivalry between the Army and the ARNG to an almost

 

adversarial distrust.

 

 

 

      Therefore, while there might have been legitimate reasons for not deploying

 

the Army National Guard (ARNG) "roundout" brigades to the Kuwaiti Theater of

 

Operations, there is also reasonable evidence to suggest that the military leadership's

 

decision may have been influenced by the institutional rivalry between the Army and

 

ARNG. Certainly, had the ARNG brigades joined in the fighting and proved their

 

mettle, the Army's position would have been weakened in the impending post-Cold

 

War force downsizing bargaining.

 

 

 

      Reasons For Delay: Were Quite Legitimate

 

      Closer to the truth, there were legitimate reasons why the "roundout' brigades

 

could not achieve combat-ready certification in time. First, they were called to

 

active duty late--only after the 180 days statutory time limits on the use of the

 

Selected Reserves units which imposed artificial constraints on their employment was

 

temporarily extended by Congress.8 Second, the selective call-up for Operation

 

Desert Shield/Storm--for which prior mobilization plans failed to address9--resulted

 

in administrative chaos and delayed the commencement of post-mobilization training.

 

Some of these problems include lacking the authority to cross-transfer personnel and

 

equipment--which under a normal partial mobilization would have been

 

automatically granted--having personnel without proper dental fitness reports and

 

having personnel administratively assigned to military operational specialties (MOS)

 

within the affected units before having them properly qualified.  Finally, the

 

Secretary of Defense had decided to increase the readiness standards required of

 

combat units deploying to the Gulf War, neccessating even more training to meet the

 

new and higher requirements.

 

 

 

MARGINALIZING THE RC COMBAT FORCES IS SELF-DEFEATING

 

      I venture that discounting the value of the ARNG is both fool-hardy,

 

potentially dangerous and self-defeating.  Firstly, the Army National Guard and

 

Army Reserves, less combat ready as they may be, are an integral part of the Total

 

Force Policy concept.  With the current military downsizing, the increased

 

importance of the RC to the Army in all contingencies should have been obvious.

 

According to the 1995 report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and

 

Congress, detailed analysis of the possible future MRCs suggests that the U.S. will

 

require 5 Army divisions, 10 Air Force fighter wing equivalents, 100 Air Force heavy

 

bomber, 4-5 Navy aircraft carrier battle groups, 1-2 Marine Expeditionary Forces and

 

Special Operations forces to win just one MRC10. Current plans list the U.S. Army

 

as having 10 AC divisions, augmented by 15 enhanced readiness ARNG combat

 

brigades as a ready land force.11 This means that fully one half of the Army's AC

 

divisions will be required to tackle just one MRC! Surely, the Army can see that

 

without calling up the Reserve combat forces, it will be already be hard-pressed in

 

tackling just one MRC, what with having to still fulfill its overseas presence

 

obligations. A two MRC situation would therefore, in all likelihood, overstretch it

 

 

 

      Secondly, a dismissive attitude undermines the RC combat forces' commitment

 

to maintaining a high state of force readiness as it sends out a wrong signal that

 

Reserve combat forces are unlikely to ever deploy as first-line forces and therefore

 

will still have plenty of time to do post-mobilization training. The leaving behind of

 

the "roundout" brigades in Operation Desert Shield/Storm and the apparent

 

dropping of the "roundout" concept has undoubtedly been making it difficult for the

 

ARNG leaders to motivate their combat units to train and to maintain a high level

 

of combat readiness. The Enhanced Readiness Brigade concept12 which replaced the

 

previous "roundout" concept just does not generate the same enthusiasm especially

 

after the left-behind ARNG brigades debacle--"It was a devastating blow!

 

Commanders who had urged their soldiers on stressing that the active force could

 

not get by without them in any future conflict suddenly found themselves completely

 

undermined."13

 

      Finally, relegating the RC combat forces to being just strategic reserves

 

weakens the Reserves' roles as the link between the military establishment and the

 

American people--General Abrams' original intent in formulating the Total Force

 

Policy. While some may argue that the continued AC dependence on RC combat

 

support and combat service support forces necessary for projection of any sizeable

 

U.S. military force abroad fulfills this role, I would argue that the inherent lesser risk

 

that such forces face as compared to combat forces, dilutes this.

 

 

 

      In any case, with the filling out of the Army's previous "roundout" concept

 

divisions with active brigades, one wonders how the Enhanced Readiness Brigades

 

would be integrated, if they are finally called up and actually deployed. LtCol Mark

 

F. Cancian, in his Marine Corps Gazette article14, suggests that they will be used

 

mainly for augmentation of Army AC divisions or be given as second-choice

 

supporting units to active Marine and coalition forces. Is the Army passing the buck

 

and side-stepping the crucial responsibility of "bringing them up to speed"? Cynically

 

speaking, the AC has little incentive to improve the readiness of the RC combat

 

forces. To do so would undermine the AC's position in the constant battle for a

 

bigger piece of the defense budget.

 

 

 

                       ARE COMBAT-READY REQUIREMENTS FOR

                        THE RC UNNECESSARILY STRINGENT?

 

      The U.S. is the only superpower left in the world with unchallenged air-

 

supremacy and an overwhelming edge in military hardware and technology.  A

 

survey of the potential enemies that it could go to war against in the near future will

 

reveal them to be third-world regional powers such as North Korea, Iraq or Iran.

 

This is not to suggest that we should underestimate the military potential of third

 

world countries but rather that we do not overestimate them and impose unnecessary

 

requirements of friendly forces. The point being that after all the hullabaloo about

 

the combat-readiness of the ARNG brigades, the ground offensive turned out to be

 

a "piece of cake"s and took only 100 hrs! Perhaps it is time to reassess the combat-

 

ready requirement standards and to set them more realistically on a case-by-case

 

basis in future conflicts. I am confident that at the least, the ARNG is prepared to

 

trade-off the risks involved for a chance to get into the action. This is not to suggest

 

that bravado should be allowed to prevail over sober logic but unless you are

 

prepared to use the RC combat forces, you will lose them-in fighting spirit at the

 

least.

 

 

 

      Although it is preferable that all components of the Reserve maintain a high

 

standard of readiness at all times, the relatively short total annual training time

 

available to RC units are serious impediments to this, especially for the combat

 

maneuver units. The typical RC unit has only 39 days a year available for collective

 

training.15 Generally this is sufficient for RC combat service support units which

 

perform functions such as transportation, medical, civil engineering and stevedoring

 

as often their members do very much the same in their everyday civilian lives.

 

However, the combat maneuver and combat support units need more time and

 

intensive training to get combat ready due to the complexities of combined arms

 

fighting and maneuver warfare.  Furthermore, the ARNG combat forces are

 

expected to accomplish the same individual, crew and collective training Army

 

Training Evaluation Package (ARTEP) standards required by their wartime missions

 

as that for active units who have about 240 days to do the same. It is not surprising

 

that with their longer, progressive, sequential and repetitive program, the AC forces

 

are generally more combat ready. Is the current training program for RC really

 

necessary or realistic?  I would venture otherwise and will elaborate on this

 

subsequently.

 

 

 

                     THE NEED TO MAINTAIN RC COMBAT FORCES

                               AT HIGH-READINESS

 

      Despite the problems mentioned, the Reserves still have to be maintained at

 

a relatively high level of readiness for the following reasons:

 

 

 

      They Are An integral Part of Total Force Concept

 

      The Reserves bring force generation, sustainment and most importantly, the

 

support of the nation with them. The Gulf War enjoyed mainstream America's

 

support because the mobilization of the Reserves, ".... focused the minds of `Main

 

Street America' on its sons and daughters who were deploying, not only in the active

 

components but from local armories, air bases and reserve centers.16   It has been

 

widely accepted that the war could not have been won without the help of the

 

Reserves who supported, augmented, reinforced, backfilled and fought alongside

 

their AC brethren. Another point often overlooked is that while the ARNG brigades

 

were late in getting combat ready, they had either been certified as combat ready or

 

were just about to be so, soon after ground operations commenced17. These units

 

would have proven to be invaluable for the sustainment of the offensive had the war

 

gone on for much longer or if the casualty rates had been as high as was originally

 

anticipated. In Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the U.S. fought a ground war against

 

an enemy that had been decimated beforehand by overwhelming U.S. air-power.

 

The U.S. military believes that this formula will continue to be successful for all its

 

wars in the near future. I suggest that we consider a scenario where American

 

hostages/ prisoners of war are deliberately used as human insurance/ shield to

 

protect them from air-power--quite plausible given the situation in the Korean

 

Peninsula. It is not unreasonable in such a case, to expect U.S. troops to have to

 

"slug it out" the old fashioned way, supported by tanks and artillery. The importance

 

of having a large pool of ready reserves then becomes obvious.

 

 

 

      Reserves May Have To Deploy With Little Warm-up Training

 

      The Bottom-Up Review suggests that the U.S. must be prepared to fight and

 

win two major regional conflicts (MRCs) "-nearly simultaneously"'.18 The two most

 

likely scenarios proposed are:  a) in an effort to use force to unity the Korean

 

Peninsula, North Korea launches a surprise strike against South Korea and b) Iraq

 

re-emerging once again to threaten the oil-fields of Saudi Arabia.  Robert L.

 

Pfaltzgraff suggests a third possibility-that Iran and not Iraq is clearly the emerging

 

regional power of geo-strategic importance based on its efforts to modernize its

 

conventional warfare capabilities and its potential of controlling the Straits of

 

Hormuz, through which much of the world's oil is shipped.19 A 1992 Joint Military

 

Net Assessment crisis response study showed that if the U.S. had to respond to two

 

nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, mobilization of National Guard or

 

Reserve force will be necessary.20  It would be irresponsible, therefore, not to

 

ensure and insist that the Reserve Combat Units be more combat ready. Those who

 

believe that RC combat forces cannot rise to the challenge and perform well as first-

 

liners should take a look at the widely publicized sterling performances of the U.S.

 

Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR) combat units in the Operation Desert Storm or

 

even the Israeli Defense Force. It may prove insightful to examine what gives the

 

USMCR system its strength and hopefully adopt some of the findings in the ARNG

 

system.

 

 

 

                     LEARNING FROM THE USMC RESERVE SYSTEM

 

      When he was Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney admitted that the

 

Department of Defense had unrealistic expectations about how rapidly they could

 

"...bring maneuver brigades of the National Guard on line21." Yet, interestingly, the

 

USMC Reserve ground combat units which were activated at about the same time

 

as the U.S. Army's, were certified ready for combat well on schedule and their

 

success during Operation Desert Storm has been well publicized. Why the huge

 

difference?

 

      Training as You Expect To Fight

 

      Firstly, the mobilized USMCR units were used for augmentation and

 

reinforcement at the battalion and company level--unit levels at which they had been

 

routinely training at--rather than fielding them as larger all Reserve formations.

 

However, the ARNG tried to deploy brigade-size units and failed. Although these

 

ARNG units were designated as brigades, they rarely trained as such, and more

 

importantly, their staff lacked experience. In one of the ARNG brigades, less than

 

10 percent of the officers had extended active duty experience.22 The lesson to be

 

drawn is not that Reserve units can only operate at battalion and below unit levels

 

but rather that ARNG units should be more rigorously and frequently trained as unit

 

formations at which they are expected to fight.

 

 

 

      Capitalizing On Experience And Commonality Of Training

 

      Secondly, the Marine Reserve is better trained, has more active duty

 

experience, is kept updated on current doctrine and receives training alongside active

 

units as much as possible. In his recent article in the Marine Corps Gazette, LtCol

 

Mark Cancian best summed it up: "All Marine reservists come through the same

 

training pipelines that the regulars do.... Indeed, all officers serve a minimum of 3

 

years on active duty with an average of 6 years. ...[Marine] Reserve units substitute

 

experience for the fact that they do not train daily. Furthermore, full-time support

 

comes mainly from active forces, ensuing common doctrine, experience and

 

standards."23

 

      Therefore, two things stand out in the comparison: Marine Reserves do two

 

things that the ARNG does not do: first, it practices the way it expects to fight-

 

familiarity and confidence which led to successful performance. Second, it uses

 

experienced leadership at all levels to overcome the lack of training practice. We

 

can trace the lower combat readiness of Army National Guard and Army Reserve

 

as compared to Marine Reserve to the differences in their recruitment, training and

 

organizational setup.  To reiterate, Marine Reserves are recruited directly from

 

former active duty Marines, all of whom have had at least three years of active duty

 

service.  The majority of personnel in the Army Guard have never served on

 

extended active duty apart from their initial active training of between four and

 

eighteen months when they first sign up with the National Guard, depending on their

 

military occupational specialty (MOS). Also, unlike the USMCR, their full-time

 

support staff have little connection with active forces, which prevents them from

 

obtaining updates on current doctrine and traning. This impediment is only recently

 

being addressed in the recent FY95 National Defense Authorization Act which

 

permits the integration of 3,000 AC soldiers to the ARNG as Resident Training

 

Detachments (RTD) or Reserve Training Teams (RTT) to enhance the readiness

 

posture of the early deploying ARNG units. These findings are supported by the

 

somewhat parallel experiences of another respected military organization, the Israeli

 

Defense Force (IDF).

 

                           THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE

 

      The IDF is a people's armed forces and depends on its citizen-soldiers to

 

defend its territory from without and its national security from within. Historically,

 

despite being a largely civilian militia, the IDF has time and again achieved

 

spectacular military successes despite tremendous odds.  I believe that, beside the

 

vital intangibles of courage, patriotism, survival instinct, etc. the IDF's strength

 

comes from the manner in which their combat forces, particularly their reserve

 

forces are raised. The Israeli Defense Service law requires all Israeli Jewish, Druze

 

and Circassian male citizens to serve at least three years fulltime in the standing

 

army and in the reserve army up to age 54 years.24 Most draftees train and serve

 

in the same unit or its parent formation throughout their active duty and reserve

 

service. The parallelism here with the USMCR is that its reserve units comprise

 

former active-duty personnel.  The IDF further identifies, selects and trains its

 

outstanding commanders and staff on a full-time basis before releasing them to hold

 

the more senior appointments in their reserve units. They then build cohesive and

 

well battle-drilled units around these men. Finally, they try to keep the commanders,

 

staff and units together throughout their obligatory military service or careers--some

 

commonality with ARNG units which should be exploited further. The experience

 

and well-trained staff and commanders provide the leadership, knowledge and

 

expertise to fight and win battles while the men focus on maintaining their

 

battlefield drill skills. Ironically, in the IDF, it is the active units' primary mission

 

to delay and hold the enemy until the Reserves can be brought into action.

 

                POST-GULF WAR OPERATIONAL READINESS INITIATIVES

 

      Since the debacle of the three "roundout" brigades in Operation Desert

 

Shield/Storm, the ARNG has not been indifferent or resigned to the problems of

 

combat readiness amongst it units.  It has successfully lobbied Congress to pass

 

legislation to remove legal impediments to early deployment of Guard forces in the

 

fighting of future wars, including making the RC more accessible by allowing

 

deployment of elements rather than full units and raining their general combat

 

readiness.  In addition, Congress has extended the previous 90 days, with the

 

possibility of another 90 days, statutory limit on the duration of Selected Reserve

 

call-ups, to a single 270 days period--a reason previously cited by the military

 

leadership for not calling up the Reserve combat brigades earlier. Clearly, advocates

 

of the Reserve have been busy tag action to deny the military leadership any

 

excuse for not using the ARNG combat units the next time a conflict arises and U.S.

 

forces are sent in response. Other initiatives include:

 

 

 

      Title IV: Army National Guard Readiness Reform Act of 1992

 

      This is a Congressional legislation that establishes 18 initiatives aimed at

 

improving the readiness of the National Guard and thereby permitting them to be

 

deployed early into battle in response to major crises. Its primary aim is to remedy

 

previous National Guard administrative, organizational, manning and equipping

 

practices, and oversights that were barriers to a speedy combat certification--the

 

reasons which ultimately resulted in the leaving behind of the three ARNG

 

"roundout" brigades.25 Some of the more significant directives include increasing

 

the percentage of prior active duty personnel in the ARNG to 65 percent and 50

 

percent for officers and enlisted respectively.  This will alleviate some of the

 

problems of a lack of experienced staff in ARNG units. Next, it establishes a Non-

 

Deployable Personnel Account (NDPA) and places all non-deployable personnel

 

under it. Previously, such personnel had to be put under the fighting strength of

 

some ARNG units for administrative purposes, thus artificially lowering their combat

 

readiness. The Act calls for annual medical and dental screening of personnel. It

 

also requires the DoD to monitor and improve mission essential equipment

 

compatibility between the RC and the AC. The readiness rating system is also to

 

be modified to provide a more accurate assessment of the deployability and the

 

shortfalls of ARNG units.  Finally, it directs an increase in the use of combat

 

simulators.

 

 

 

      Project Standard Bearer

 

      This was a DoD initiative authorizing priority of resources to ARNG

 

Contingency Force Pool units (Enhanced Readiness brigades) and to ARNG units

 

identified for early deployment. This removes some of the obstacles to the pooling

 

of some of the limited 65 percent equipment inventory allowed the RC.  The

 

inactivation of several Army active units as part of force drawdown has made

 

significant quantities of equipment available to the ARNG and this has resulted in

 

an improved ARNG. Given all the above, I would venture that the ARNG has done

 

almost all it can to prepare itself to fight in future U.S. wars and should be allowed

 

to do so.

 

 

 

                       POST-GULF WAR POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

 

      In the wake of the left-behind ARNG brigades debacle, the ARNG combat

 

forces have had their roles marginalized.  Under the old CAPSTONE strategy,

 

Reserve combat units were affiliated to AC divisions which themselves were aligned

 

to specific war plans and theaters. Thus the RC combat units were somewhat co-

 

equal in status to AC units. This has been done away with. To better face the

 

current post-Cold war "new world disorder" situation, a new CAPSTONE strategy

 

was implemented which emphasizes strategic agility.  Under the new plan, a

 

CONUS-based Army corps will be designated to tackle the various contingency

 

operations. The most operationally ready AC and RC combat support and combat

 

service support units will be selected to form a Contingency Force Pool (CFP).

 

From this CFP, units may be selected to support whichever Army Corps is activated.

 

Sadly, the ARNG combat forces' role in all this has been reduced to providing

 

fifteen Enhanced Readiness brigades to serve as an augmentation and reinforcing

 

pool for the AC units!

 

 

 

      On a more heartening note, the Offsite Agreement26 was recently signed.

 

This agreement underscores the Army Reserve as the primary supplier of combat

 

support and combat service support to the Army and affirms the Guard's role as the

 

primary provider of combat forces to the Army. This will better define and stream-

 

line the roles and responsibility of the various Reserves arms and service as well as

 

facilitate their training.

 

 

 

      PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER IMPROVING READINESS

 

      Operation Desert Storm showed that it takes at least four months of intensive

 

training to get a U.S. Army Guard brigade combat ready. General Colin Powell

 

said, "It will take about a year to bring one of the Guard Divisions up to any

 

reasonable level of combat readiness to put against a force, the kind which we were

 

facing in Operation Desert Storm".27 Both these observations are reflective of the

 

complexity of larger formations such as brigade and divisions whose missions require

 

extensive synchronization, integration and coordination of continuous fire, maneuver

 

and support operations in order to achieve victory in today's rapid and fluid

 

battlefield. The DoD Joint Staff report on Conduct of the Gulf War suggested that

 

the low state of readiness of the "roundout" Army Guard brigades was attributable

 

to the difficulty of achieving "[t]he complex, collective combat skills required... of

 

armor and mechanized infantry brigades .... who receive limited training each

 

year.28 Yet, we have seen that there is still a need for ARNG units to operate as

 

combat ready brigades at short notice, and this is entirely possible if the lessons

 

learnt from the USMCR and IDF are intelligently applied. Title IV and the other

 

readiness initiatives have laid the groundwork for improving combat readiness. We

 

need to exploit these and more. As a start we should try and incorporate facets

 

from the USMCR's and IDF's systems that gives them strength. Some possibilities

 

include:

 

 

 

      Build Cohesive Units Aroud Experienced Commanders and Staff

 

      The common denominator has been the use of former active-duty personnel.

 

The ARNG Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 has facilitated this by increasing

 

the percentage of prior active duty personnel in the ARNG to 65 percent and 50

 

percent for officers and enlisted respectively by 30 Sep 1997 amongst other equally

 

significant changes.  The recent Offsite Agreement, with the transfer of Army

 

Reserve combat units to the ARNG, further offers a pool of former Army active

 

duty personnel which can be exploited to fill the more crucial leadership posts. We

 

should begin by building strong and effective Reserve brigade and division HQs, if

 

necessary by filling critical staff billets with active duty personnel. They should be

 

made to undergo frequent training exercises with and without troops, and even to

 

be independently evaluated so that ultimately they are comparable to their AC

 

counterparts. An effective and well drilled HQ acts as the nerve center of the

 

brigade and thus frees the lower echelons to focus primarily on battle-drills and

 

integration. As a general rule, reservists should be trained and kept together as

 

integral units as far as possible through their service. Effort must made to expose

 

all reserve units as much as possible to current doctrine, development and main-

 

stream training. Lastly, directly recruited Guard officers should be encouraged to

 

volunteer for attachments to Army AC units for hands-on training.

 

 

 

      Progressive And Integrated Battle-Oriented Training

 

      The Army Guard's training schedule--one weekend a month and two weeks

 

of summer training-although short, will be adequate provided its training scope is

 

modified. Units should concentrate on progressive, integrated and battle-oriented

 

training such as practicing battle-drills, map-planning exercises, tactical exercises

 

without troops and such. For example, the first summer's training could focus on

 

section up to platoon, company and battalion drills. Then during the next summer,

 

practice battalion attack and defence missions within the framework of a

 

simultaneous brigade map-planning exercise, etc. While these measures do not make

 

the units combat qualified, it could certainly reduce the time needed to bring them

 

to combat readiness when called to active duty.

 

 

 

      Improved Training Methods And Administration

 

      Many battle skills such as gunnery and calling for fires are perishable. It

 

would be too expensive to conduct live-firing practices all the time, but training

 

simulators offer cost-effective alternatives. With today's information highway, it is

 

possible to develop professional military education packages with real-time

 

interaction. This would also allow RC commanders to be kept abreast of main

 

stream doctrinal developments and changes as well as allow a freer exchange of

 

ideas between RC and AC. The Rand report, Post-Mobilization Training of Army

 

Reserve Component Combat Units, showed that during much of the 39 days available

 

to the typical RC combat unit, a substantial amount was used for travel to training

 

sites and drawing, cleaning maintaining and returning equipment.29 Perhaps the

 

legal and financial limitations of calling up the Reserves should be reexamined and

 

modified by some minor legislation so that the monthly drills session could be

 

combined into three or four longer training sessions.

 

 

 

      Confidence Building Measures Between ARNG And Army

 

      The distrust between the ARNG and Army is fairly visible.  Rather than

 

continue in this adversarial fashion, perhaps the DoD should implement a

 

guaranteed "GO!" scheme for the best ARNG brigades. Under this scheme, ARNG

 

brigades will compete amongst themselves in terms of overall combat readiness. The

 

top 15 ARNG units would be designated as Enhanced Readiness brigades. The best

 

three ARNG Enhanced Readiness brigades will be made to undergo an externally

 

umpired test. Those meeting the requirements win than be guaranteed a "GO!"

 

status valid for tentatively 9-months thereafter i.e. they are guaranteed clearance and

 

inclusion in the line-up of U.S. forces being deployed in response to contingencies

 

requiring the involvement of major U.S. ground forces where they will be employed

 

as an integral unit and not as an augmentation/reinforcement pool. The trigger

 

point size and involvement level of U.S. forces should be predetermined and clearly

 

declared beforehand. Such a scheme would encourage the ARNG combat units to

 

strive for excellence yet be non-threatening to the Army. It also has the advantage

 

of testing out the viability of the Enhanced Readiness Brigade concept.

 

 

 

                                  CONCLUSION

 

      The contentious debate on the best way of restructuring the U.S. military

 

seems to have been more or less played out. Although General Abrams formulated

 

the Total Force Policy with the intent that the Reserve serve as a link between the

 

military establishment and the American People, economic considerations have

 

guaranteed that it will continue to be the cornerstone of the U.S. military force

 

structure. However, the Army's reluctance to use Reserve combat forces--believing

 

that it will lead to further loss of its force structure or to a cut in budget allocation-

 

coupled with the ARNG's fear of being "led up the garden path" just to be left

 

behind once again, will continue to undermine the synergy of the Total Force Policy.

 

Traditional rivalries should be reined, if necessary by Congressional pressure, for the

 

mistaken perception that the RC combat forces will only be "fillers-in" can prove

 

costly in future wars involving the U.S.

 

 

 

      Despite the laudable ARNG-inspired Title IV initiatives to increase

 

operational readiness, the RC combat forces still face tremendous challenges in

 

meeting the 90 days post-mobilization combat certification dateline due to the nature

 

of their makeup and training program. Adopting the recommendations made will

 

undoubtedly facilitate it in fulfilling its continually evolving and vital role.

 

 

 

                                     NOTES

 

 

1          A standard US Army division is supposed to have three brigades under its command.  Under

the "Roundout" concept, Army divisions were only have two active brigades in peacetime plus a third

brigade from the reserve component affiliated to it.  The third RC brigade is meant to "roundout" the

division's full complement.  This concept was centered on fighting the Soviet hordes invasion of Europe

scenario prevailing during the Cold War era where a quick-response reserve was vital.

 

2          For greater insight see Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active Integration in Wartime."

Parameters, XXI no. 2 (Summer 1991), 35-50.

 

3          Martin Binkin, U.S. Reserve Forces:  The Problem of the Weekend Warrior".  (The Brookings

Institution, 1974.  Washington, D.C.), 19-20.

 

4          Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active Integration in Wartime."  Parameters, XXI no.

2 (Summer 1991). 49.

 

5          Lewis Sorley, "National Guard and Reserve Forces." in 1991 - 1992 American Defense Annual.

Ed. Joseph Kruzel, 198.

 

6            Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces:  Effectiveness of Total

Force Policy During the Persian Gulf Conflict.  A Rand Report (Santa Monica, CA:  Rand Corp.,

1992), 64-65.

 

7          Ibid, 64-65.

 

8          Ibid, 31-34.  Under Title 10, Section 673b of the US Code then, the President was to call up

the Selective Reserves for 90 days with a possible 90 day extension up to a maximum of 200,000

reservists.  On November 5, 1990, Congress temporarily amended this to allow Selected Reserves

combat units to serve for 180 days with a possible extension of another 180 days, removing one of

Secretary Cheney's stated reasons for not activating the three ARNG "roundout" combat brigades when

their affiliated divisions were activated -- the original time limitation would have imposed artificial

constraints on their employment.

 

9          United States General Accounting Office. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness,

Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.  Operation Desert Storm:  Army had

Difficulty Providing Adequate Active And Reserve Support Forces.  March 1992. GAO/NSIAD-92-67,

31-36.

 

10         William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress.

February 1995, 28.

 

11         William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress.

February 1995. 171

 

12            National Guard Bureau, 1995 Posture Statement, 13.  In place of the previous "roundout"

arrangement, the ARNG will now provide 15 Enhanced Readiness Brigades -- separate brigades "...

able to deploy worldwide to reinforce active Army combat units with less than 90 days post-

mobilization training."

 

13         Lewis Sorley, "National Guard and Reserve Forces." 191.

 

14         LtCol Mark F. Cancian, USMC.  "Depend on the Marine Reserve."  Marine Corps Gazette.

March 1994, 18.

 

15         The 39 days training time is divided into two categories, called Inactive Duty Training (IDT)

and Annual Training (AT).  IDT is normally conducted during weekends, with units training one

weekend a month for an annual total of 24 days.  The AT is a 15 day training session usually scheduled

in the summer during which the RC units practice the collective skills.  In addition to these, an RC

combat unit is allotted an additional three days to allow crews to use the Conduct of Fire Trainer

(COFT), a simulator for tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicles crew.

 

16         Reid Beveridge,  "Force Structure/Force Mix:  The Rand Study Still Leaves Open-Ended

Questions."  National Guard (April 1993), 52.

 

17            Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces:  Effectiveness of Total

Force Policy During the Persian Gulf Conflict.  A Rand Report (Santa Monica, CA:  Rand Corp.,

1992), 67.

 

18         Les Aspin, Secretary of Defence, "The Bottom-Up Review:  Forces for a new Era."  Department

of Defence, 1 September 1993.

 

19         Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr, "Dimensions of the Post-Cold War World."  Strategic Studies Institute,

US Army War College.

 

20         "Crisis Response:  Minimal Maneuvering Room" Based on chapter 9 of the 1992 Joint Military

Net Assessment.  Defense   92.  Publication by Department of Defense.  Washington D.C.:

November/December  1992, 14-21.

 

21         Dick Cheney and Colin Powell. Edited excerpts of press inquiries that followed Pentagon press

briefing, March 26 1992. Defense 92.  (Publication by Department of Defence.  Washington D.C.:  May

1992), 7.

 

22            Reserve Component Forces.  "Conduct of The Persian Gulf War."  Department of Defence,

April 1992, Appendix H, 480.

 

23         LtCol Mark F. Cancian, 18-19.

 

24         Louis Williams, Israeli Defense Forces - A People's Army.  Ministry of Defense Publishing

House, Tel Aviv.  1989, 33.  For a flavor and better understanding of the makeup and character of the

Israeli Defense Force see the same: 7-32.

 

25         For a summary of these problems and barriers see Reid Beveridge,  "Force Structure/Force

Mix:  The Rand Study Still Leaves Open-Ended Questions."  National Guard (April 1993), 52.  Reid

Beveridge, 48-52.

 

26         The Offsite Agreement was essentially an agreement to shift 14,000 present Army Reserve

positions, mostly in the combat arms and aviation, to the Guards while transferring 10,000 Guard

positions, mostly in combat support and combat service support forces to the Army Reserve.  It was

named so because it was signed in Hawaii,  "offsite" to the Pentagon where most of the other force

restructure studies were made.

 

27         Dick Cheney and Colin Powell, 6-7.

 

28            Reserve Component Forces.  "Conduct of The Persian Gulf War."  Department of Defence,

April 1992, Appendix H, 480.

 

29         Thomas F. Lippiat, J. Michael Polich and Ronald E. Sorter, "Post Mobilization Training of

Army Reserve Component Combat Units."  A Rand Report. (Santa Monica, CA:  Rand Corp., 1992),

4-10.