Military

"USMC Close Air Support Must Be Complementary, Not Competitive"

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Aviation

 

 

 

 

 

                         Executive Summary

 

 

 

Title:  "USMC Close Air Support Must Be Complementary, Not Competitive"

 

Author:   Lieutenant Colonel Mark J. Gibson, USMC

 

Problem:  The Marine Corps has traditionally viewed close air support (CAS) as a solely

fixed-wing endeavor, and has neglected the capabilities of the attack helicopter to assist in

the CAS mission. Current CAS training involves segregated, vice integrated CAS attacks.

 

Discussion: The Marine Corps trains and equips its forces to perform CAS with

distinction because it must have CAS to win on the modern battlefield. Both recently and

traditionally, Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) have come to the battlefield

from the sea. As a seaborne "expeditionary" force, they are organically lacking in

firepower in the form of armor, long-range artillery, Multiple Launch Rocket Systems,

tactical missiles and other weapons systems found in the U.S. Army. Marine Air

compensates for this shortfall. Both fixed and rotary-wing aircraft deploy with MAGTFs

to provide the commander with the tools to shape his battlespace. Employed separately

they are not as effective as the ground commander needs them to be. Weather, geography

and threat make single-platform or segregated CAS insufficient. The White Commission

on Roles and Missions is currently evaluating the demands of the CAS mission, the

capabilities of all the Armed Services' various CAS delivery platforms, to include both

fixed and rotary-wing, and several provocative proposals purportedly aimed at optimizing

the end product -- close air support. New ways must be found to maximize USMC CAS

synchroneity. The bottom line is to discern what is best for the Marines on the ground.

 

Conclusion: The historical evolution of CAS, its current direction and the latest

initiatives of our "Sister Services" unmistakably point to a Marine Corps future

(1995-2005) served by both fixed and rotary-wing aircraft operating in an integrated,

"complementary" system. Marine Hunter-Killer (MarHuk) teams of F/A-18s and

AH-1Ws in sufficient numbers should perform integrated, complementary CAS for

Marines over the next decade.

 

                                   CONTENTS

 

                                                                                Page

 

Executive Summary                                                                ii

 

Contents                                                                         iii

 

List of Tables                                                                   v

 

List of Figures                                                                  vi

 

CHAPTER 1: FORWARD                                                               1

 

CHAPTER 2: PURPOSE                                                               4

 

      Background                                                                 4

 

      CAS and Congress                                                           6

 

      Evolution Vs. Revolution                                                   9

 

      Every Marine a Rifleman (Even Aviators)                                    13

 

CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF THE AIR FORCE                                             16

 

      JFACC Vs. MEF Commander?                                                   17

 

      The Single Battle                                                          18

 

      Deep and Close -- Inseparable Parts of the Single Battle                   21

 

      Air Force A-10s Cannot Replace Marine F/A-18s                              28

 

CHAPTER 4: LESSONS FROM THE NEAR PAST                                            32

 

      The MAGTF and CAS in the `90s                                              33

 

      Precision-Guided Munitions                                                 38

 

      Blast Vs. Lethality                                                        40

 

                                                                                Page

 

CHAPTER 5: THE BEST PLATFORMS FOR COMPLEMENTARY CAS (1995-2005)                  42

 

      Best "Bang For the Buck"                                                   42

 

      Fratricide                                                                 43

 

      The Attack Helicopter                                                      44

 

CHAPTER 6: JOINT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT                                               50

 

      Jointness and Control Measures                                             53

 

      How Deep Is Deep?                                                          56

 

      Non-Linear Battlespace                                                     58

 

      The Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS)                          62

 

      The Threat (1995-2005)                                                     66

 

CHAPTER 7: COMPLEMENT, NOT COMPETE                                               71

 

      Complementary CAS                                                          71

 

      Marine Hunter-Killer Teams (MarHuk)                                        73

 

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION                                                            81

 

NOTES                                                                            83

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                     92

 

                                LIST OF TABLES

 

 

Table                                                                           Page

Table 1. Service Refinements to the Joint Definition of CAS                      2

 

Table 2.  Summary of Special HASC CAS Committee Findings (October 1965)          7

 

Table 3.  The Six Functions of Marine Aviation                                   45

 

Table 4.  AH-1W Gulf War "Boxscore"                                              47

 

Table 5.  USMC CAS Aircraft Inventory (current 22 March 1995)                    68

 

 

                                LIST OF FIGURES

 

Figures                                                                          Page

 

Figure 1.  Notional JFC/Marine Component Commander's Area of Operations (AO)     55

 

Figure 2.  Proposed British Battlefield Layout                                   57

 

Figure 3.  Potential Urban AO                                                    61

 

Figure 4.  Current USMC CAS Request System                                       63

 

 

                "USMC Close Air Support Must Be Complementary,

                                Not Competitive"

 

 

                                   CHAPTER 1

 

                                    FORWARD

 

 

       Part of the reason the Services view CAS differently is due to their disparate

 

interpretations of a common definition. For the purpose of this thesis, the JCS Pub 1

 

definition of close air support (CAS) will be used. It defines CAS as:

 

       "air action by fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft against hostile targets which

       are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed

       integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces."1

 

       While predominantly a tactical level operation, CAS is closely connected to the

 

operational level of war through the Commander-In-Chiefs (CINC's) joint apportionment

 

process.2 Though every United States Armed Service recognizes the same joint definition

 

listed above, each further refines it to more adequately reflect its own particular view of

 

CAS. Understanding these differences is critical in the context of this thesis. In the

 

following descriptions of CAS, extracted from various Service publications, several

 

examples of this practice are highlighted in Table 1:

 

United States Marine Corps

 

       "The Marine Corps fights using maneuver warfare through the application of

       combined arms. CAS is fully integrated with other supporting arms to support the

       Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander's plan. The MAGTF

       commander uses CAS at the decisive place and time to achieve local combat

       superiority or take advantage of battlefield opportunities. CAS is employed for

       operational effectiveness and is used to weight the main effort."3

 

United States Navy

 

       "CAS supports amphibious and land operations with massed firepower, requiring

       detailed integration with the ground scheme of maneuver. CAS requires close

       coordination during tasking, planning and execution. CAS is a force multiplier,

       enabling the supported commander to mass combat power decisively.

       Traditionally, the Navy has been a provider of CAS, but can be a recipient of

       CAS as well, in support of naval operations."4

 

United States Army

 

       "CAS supports land operations by providing the capability to deliver massed

       firepower at decisive points and attacking hostile targets in close proximity to

       friendly forces with pre-planned or immediate attacks. CAS can surprise the

       enemy, create opportunities for the maneuver or advance of friendly forces

       through shock action and concentrated attacks, protect the flanks of friendly

       forces, blunt enemy offensives, and protect the rear of land forces during

       retrograde operations. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps aviation may be

       required to provide significant air support to Army forces during the entry stage

       of force-projection operations."5

 

United States Air Force

 

       "CAS is the application of aerospace forces in support of the land component

       commander's objectives. At times, CAS may be the best force available to

       ensure the success or survival of surface forces. Since it provides direct support

       to friendly forces in contact, CAS requires close coordination from the theater and

       component levels to the tactical level of operations. CAS should be massed to

       apply concentrated combat power, and should be planned and controlled to reduce

       the risk of friendly casualties."6

 

United States Special Operations Forces (SOF)

 

       "Air Force SOF (AFSOF) AC-130s train extensively for CAS in support of special

       operations direct action missions. Also, AC-13Os may provide CAS in support of

       other component commanders. Special operations helicopters provide limited

       CAS to SOF land and maritime units."7

 

          Table 1. Service Refinements to the Joint Definition of CAS

 

       Each of these highlighted phrases is key to understanding the evolution of CAS and

 

charting a course for its Marine Corps future. While all the Services are charged with

 

providing CAS and agree with the joint definition, it nevertheless means different things to

 

the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. How these differences have and will continue to

 

impact the future of CAS in the Marine Corps are addressed in this thesis.

 

                                   CHAPTER 2

 

                                    PURPOSE

 

 

       The Marine Corps has been pursuing close air support for more than 50 years.

 

During that time, the platforms have changed and their targeting and delivery have become

 

both more accurate and more difficult to successfully accomplish. A dichotomy has

 

developed between the highly volatile and mobile needs of the ground forces and the

 

abilities of the aircraft that support them. CAS has become an intricately woven tapestry

 

of threat and weather dependent support, tightly bound by a cumbersome, fratricide

 

conscious command and control system. This thesis proposes a team concept of fixed and

 

rotary wing aircraft best suited to provide the optimal close air support for the Marine

 

Ground Combat Element (GCE) over the next decade (1995-2005). Along with a look at

 

its present status in the Marine Corps, a historical review of the roots of CAS is critical to

 

show the evolution of the "solution" each Service has deduced in providing its version of

 

the most effective CAS possible.

 

 

 

Background

 

 

       Close air support has been the hallmark, the defining factor of Marine Aviation

 

since the first hand-held bomblet was dropped from a biplane in support of ground

 

Marines in the "Banana Wars" of the 1920s.8 Fixed-wing CAS is a singularly "Marine"

 

endeavor. No other U.S. Armed Service has its own fixed-wing aircraft dedicated to

 

support its own troops in the close battle. The adage that "necessity is the mother of

 

invention" may have originated in the Marine Corps as well, for it certainly is valid in the

 

CAS arena. The use of aviators as Forward Air Controllers (FACs), collocated with

 

ground units within small, mobile, communications-equipped tactical air control parties

 

(TACPs), are all Marine innovations.

 

       Ever since the bitter infighting between the Army and the newly borne Air Force

 

intensified during the Korean War over whether CAS or deep interdiction held primacy,

 

there has been an undercurrent of mistrust between the two services. Even today, despite

 

the overwhelming success of the Gulf War, many of the rank and file of the United States

 

Army question whether, when push comes to shove, the Air Force will fulfill its CAS

 

requirements. This explains why for the past 30 years the Army has planned and built

 

fleets of modern attack helicopters that rival the CAS capability of many Air Force

 

fixed-wing craft, and has, in effect, created a "hip-pocket CAS" capability for its

 

commanders.9 This is clearly evident in the two Services' CAS investment plans over the

 

next five years (FY95-FY00). The Air Force plans to spend only $.6B on CAS upgrades

 

(no new aircraft types), while the Army forecasts $44.9B on both upgrades and new

 

aircraft (RAH-66 Comanche).10 When combined with the firepower of the Multiple

 

Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), it is

 

clear the Army does not intend to have to learn the air support lesson the hard way. As

 

has often been the case, the Marine Corps is paying close attention to how the "other"

 

land Service, the Army, intends to ensure it gets the CAS it needs to win on the

 

battlefield.11 This includes doctrinal and procurement initiatives that do not necessarily

 

meet with Air Force approval, such as the Comanche -- an advanced attack helicopter

 

designed to function as a battlefield "general," directing the fires of the Army's principal

 

CAS aircraft of the future, the AH-64D Longbow Apache.12

 

 

 

CAS and Congress

 

 

 

       "...we feel that (the Air Force) in its magnificent accomplishments in the wild blue

       yonder, it has tended to ignore the foot soldier in the dirty brown under."13

 

       The problems the Army had with securing enough effective CAS is chronicled in

 

Congressional testimony, from which the above quote is extracted. From 22 September

 

through 14 October 1965, the Close Air Support Special Committee of the House

 

Armed Services Committee, chaired by Congressman Otis Pike (D-NY) represented the

 

first unclassified testimony and report on the effectiveness of CAS during the infant state

 

of the war in Vietnam.14

 

       These proceedings set the stage for continued controversy between the Army and

 

the Air Force over the role of each in CAS, and their impact was not lost on the

 

Department of the Navy. The Navy/Marine team had foreseen these requirements much

 

earlier, demonstrating the various capabilities in Korea, then carrying them forward into

 

South Vietnam. The war saw the first USAF transport aircraft configured for CAS in

 

limited support of Marines with AC-47 "Puff" and AC-130 "Spectre" gunships,

 

Korean-vintage prop-planes pulled out of mothballs, new Forward Air Controller

 

(Airborne) (FAC(A)) aircraft designed (OV-10 Bronco) and finally, the birth of the attack

 

helicopter. The length of the Vietnam War allowed the Services time to try many

 

innovative concepts -- some effective and some not. In South East Asia, necessity was

 

indeed the mother of invention.

 

       Some key findings of the proceedings are included in Table 2:

 

       1) The incompatibility of communications equipment prevented Army units from

       talking to either the Air Force aircraft or the command and control agencies that

       sent them to perform close air support. This resulted in delays from 20 minutes to

       several hours before "bombs on target."15 Throughout the war, the only agency

       that could consistently communicate with ships and aircraft on Yankee Station,

       USAF, USA and Republic of Vietnam (RVN) aircraft was the Marine Air Control

       Squadron at Marble Mountain.

 

       2) The Air Force owned no aircraft suitable for FAC(A) at the outset of the war,

       even though the requirement was clearly documented during the Korean Conflict.

       (They ended up "borrowing" Army L-19s to do the job.)16

 

       3) The Air Force owned no aircraft suitable to perform the CAS mission itself at

       the time then-President Kennedy committed US troops into the war. (Hence the

       "borrowing" of Navy A-1s.)17 When the F-4s were modified for the CAS mission

       most of the A-1s were transferred to the RVN.

 

       4) The bottom line in the report was that the committee determined that the Air

       Force had failed in its appointed mission to provide CAS to the Army, and what

       support it did give was too little, too late and with "make-do" equipment (as of

       1965).18 The result was radical changes in aircraft design and mission capability

       for the Air Force. From 1966-70 modifications and updates to aircraft such as the

       F-100 and F-4 proved them to be much more adept at the close air support

       mission.

 

      Table 2. Summary of Special HASC CAS Committee Findings (October 1965)

 

 

       Vietnam also saw the birth of the helicopter gunship and its subsequent baptism

 

under fire. The world's first true attack helicopter, the AH-1G Cobra, was developed and

 

fielded by the Army specifically for the Vietnam conflict. Though the Corps designated

 

the attack helicopter mission as Close-In Fire Support (CIFS) to distinguish it from the

 

more understood fixed wing CAS, the Marines received close support from their own

 

Cobras (borrowed from the Army) for the first time in 1965-66. During the 1983

 

Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada, underpowered Marine AH-1Ts got their baptism

 

by fire, suffering grievous casualties in gallant support of ground forces with outdated

 

tactics.19 Though a hard lesson to learn, Marine attack helicopter tactics changed virtually

 

overnight in the early 1980s from the Vietnam-vintage high altitude diving fire to terrain

 

flight involving Army-pioneered nap-of-the-earth techniques, due to the demonstrated

 

vulnerability of the former. In 1989 Army AH-64s, though brought to Panama in part to

 

make a political statement, acquitted themselves as lethal night CAS platforms during

 

Operation JUST CAUSE.

 

       The development of conventional CAS continued however, unencumbered by this

 

quiet rotary wing revolution until the first AH-64 Apache raids and AH-1W SuperCobra

 

CIFS missions of DESERT STORM. It was primarily due to the resounding success of

 

these two aircraft in that conflict that the term CIFS was discarded at the direction of

 

General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Joint Pub 1-02. The

 

Marine Corps quickly followed suit when and the definition of CAS in FMFM 5-1 was

 

broadened to include the operations of attack helicopters (Rotary-Wing CAS). These

 

definition "adjustments," combined with the groundwork laid by the attack helicopter from

 

Vietnam to DESERT STORM, helped further the case for AH-1Ws as partners in the

 

author's proposal of complementary CAS.

 

Evolution Vs. Revolution

 

 

 

       The evolution of close air support proceeded along predictable paths, beginning

 

with 5 lb. bombs hand-dropped from biplanes over the trenches of WWI and ending with

 

the first true rotary-wing CAS (RW CAS) missions of Operation DESERT STORM. The

 

desert environment, coupled with emerging changes in the philosophy of prosecution of

 

the Deep battle, the role of the JFACC, and indeed, of Marine Air itself seems to dictate a

 

branch or sequel in traditional CAS thinking.

 

       Though not specifically close air support, the revolutionary insights of early

 

proponents such as Octave Chanute, Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell provided the

 

development of the theory and practice of Airpower in general, and it was from these

 

roots that CAS evolved. The earliest form of CAS flown by Marines took place in 1932

 

in the jungles of Nicaragua, but the truly Marine form of CAS had its genesis in the South

 

Pacific Campaigns of WWII. Here F-4G Corsairs, freed from their marginal performance

 

aboard aircraft carriers, performed truly close air support literally at the foot of Marine

 

positions during operations on Guadalcanal, Palau, Saipan, Iwo Jima and other islands in

 

the Pacific campaigns. It was during the Bouganville campaign in 1943 that Corsairs

 

under the command of Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon supported ground forces for the

 

first time under the control of a Marine Forward Air Controller (FAC). Unlike the Army

 

Air Force's practice of using a large "support air party" with an observer or a glider pilot

 

on the ground, McCutcheon developed small "air liaison parties" around fighter/attack

 

pilot FACs, who proved to be better equipped to understand the ground commander's

 

needs.20 There have been Marine aviator FACs with Marine ground troops ever since.

 

Marine CAS reached its zenith during both the Philippine Campaign, where air liaison

 

parties and four Marine Aircraft Groups performed CAS to perfection - albeit for their

 

Army brethren,21 and the Okinawan Campaign, where, as John Glenn writes, "the only way

 

to employ it closer and more effectively was to put bayonets on the wintips."22

 

       Continued refinements in tactics and capabilities were born in the Korean Conflict

 

with F9F Banshees, the first Marine jet aircraft, providing some of the support. The

 

Vietnam War provided a test bed for increasingly accurate and timely CAS development

 

that eventually saw radical changes in altitudes and tactics when the first SA-7 Surface

 

to-Air Missiles (SAMs) were employed with brutal efficiency later in the war. In the early

 

years (1963-66), the Air Force struggled over what type of aircraft fit the CAS profile

 

best, causing them to "borrow" propeller-driven A-1 Skyraiders from the Navy, outfit the

 

A-37 Dragonfly jet trainer into a CAS platform and embark on the original "AX" program

 

-- from which the A-10 was born.23 The Corps' use of the popular Skyraider was a

 

success because of the venerable aircraft's long loiter time, heavy payload capability and

 

the willingness of its pilots to "mix it up" with the battle below.24

 

       The battle over who owned Marine Air in joint combat has been a case of history

 

repeating itself. Whether in 1951 in Korea, 1968 in Vietnam or 1990 in the Persian Gulf

 

the question of control of the Corps' air assets was always bitterly contested. During the

 

Vietnam War, the Commanding Generals of III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) (future

 

Commandant of the Marine Corps Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr.) and Fleet

 

Marine Force Pacific (FMFPac) (Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak), waged a

 

hard-fought battle with the Air Force over Marines getting first crack at Marine Air. As

 

was the case in Korea, the battle was mostly in vain. In February 1968, General

 

Westmoreland directed a shift to the "single manager" system. Even after months of

 

meticulous documentation by the Marine Corps which proved that the new system was

 

not only less efficient, it was too complex, not "consumer" oriented, and simply did not

 

provide the Marines timely air support, they never regained the control they sought. Then

 

Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford tried to assuage the Commandant's fears by

 

characterizing the new system as a temporary one which would be rescinded "once the

 

tactical situation eased."25

 

       On the other hand, the Marine Corps has historically enjoyed its own "air force" in

 

Marine Air, with fixed-wing attack aircraft carving the load for over 50 years. Indeed,

 

the primary reason for the existence of these aircraft is to provide that support. Yet

 

today's ongoing White Commission on Roles and Missions has CAS (all services) as

 

one of its central issues. Marine Tactical Air (TacAir) is in serious jeopardy, with the

 

Corps itself facing perhaps the greatest challenge to its integrity since the roles and

 

mission crises of 1947-1952, where behind closed doors in both the White House and

 

Congress the very need for a Corps was debated.26 Its very survival binges upon the

 

premise that Marine Air is an integral, irreplaceable part of the Marine Air-Ground Team,

 

and that Marines provide the best CAS for themselves. Marines are committed into harm's

 

way on a routine basis, more than any other Service in U.S. history, but only, in the form

 

of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force, or MAGTF. This Marine team is task-organized to

 

successfully perform its mission as a self-contained package of maneuver force, firepower,

 

air support, lift and sustainment.

 

            The Marine Corps believes that the substitution of Navy or Air Force TacAir for

 

Marine is not a one-for-one equation.  This was proven unequivocally after the Chinese

 

intervention in Korea in 1951, when Major General Gerald C. Thomas, Commanding

 

General of the 1st Marine Division, furious at the delays, lack of USAF support and

 

increasing fratricide told the Air Force-run theater Joint Operations Center (JOC) that he

 

wanted Marine Air providing CAS for his Marines or no air at all.  His case revolved

 

around the incidents in late 1951, when the 1st Marine Division found itself fighting two

 

well-equipped North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) divisions in the "Punchbowl."  Of the

 

182 CAS missions called for by Marine FACs, only 127 arrived, and only 24 of those

 

came quickly enough to have optimal impact on the tactical situation.  To make matters

 

worse, the average delay time in receiving CAS on station was two hours, with some

 

nearly four.27

 

            At the root of the problem was the Air Force's unwieldy and unresponsive close air

 

support system.  Major General Thomas's concerns were shared by the Eighth Army as

 

well.  Though he argued for both the exclusive use of Marine Air and a change in the

 

direction of the war, his concerns were never fully alleviated.28  Ironically, it was the

 

Army staff back in Washington that delivered the coup de grace.

 

            "The Army officially agreed with the Air Force that interdiction took priority over

            close air support.  Furthermore...the Marine Corps had probably used poor

            statistical analysis to make its case and had a different mission (amphibious

            warfare) that warped its understanding of close air support.  In any event, the

            Army and the Air Force could not wage tactical air war Marine-style since the Air

            Force could not provide sufficient TACPs and fighter-bombers for a mass army.

            In all likelihood, almost all targets within a mile of troops should be attacked with

            heavy artillery, not air.  Certainly, the Army did not need operational control of

            dedicated air sorties or require on-station fighter-bombers.29

 

Still, the Army's 25th Infantry Division became spoiled with the quick reaction and

 

devastating accuracy of MAG-33 Corsairs, in direct support of the 25th and the Marines'

 

5th Regimental Combat Team on the Naktong River front for four straight weeks. As is

 

recorded in the USAF Korean Evaluation Report, "Commanders' Quotes: Close Air

 

Support:"

 

       "More than half of the Marine sorties came against targets only a half a mile from

       the frontlines. It was the kind of close air support Marines expected, but it came

       as a revelation to the Army officers who shared the experience."30

 

 

Every Marine a Rifleman (Even Aviators)

 

 

 

       The tireless USMC adage that "every Marine is first a rifleman" stands at the point

 

of the Corps' argument for organic air. Historically, every male (and now female) Marine

 

completes the same course of instruction in basic rifleman skills. Young enlisted Marines

 

learn to follow orders, shoot and function as a team under duress. Long before they are

 

trained to command a platoon of Marines, young second lieutenants learn how to be fire

 

team members, then fire team leaders. Whether the second lieutenant is to be a lawyer, a

 

pilot or a motor transport officer, there are no exceptions to this rule. This principle is the

 

rock upon which the Corps is built. For ground Marines it is only the entry level routine

 

of their training regimen. For those in aviation it is the basic skill level that is re-infused

 

with every visit to 29 Palms, every "frag" mission flown in support of ground Marines.

 

That foundation is further reinforced later on in the career of many Marine aviators when

 

they perform FAC and/or Air Officer (AO) duty. Every Marine learns the age-old bottom

 

line -- unless the infantry takes the ground and holds it, the battle is not won.

 

       After gaining credibility and flight hours in the cockpit, many officers are chosen to

 

serve with their ground counterparts for 12 months as battalion, regimental or division Air

 

Officers. While the receipt of such "out-of-the-cockpit" orders is dreaded by some, nearly

 

all aviators look back on a completed "ground" tour with pride and satisfaction. These

 

tours represent more than just sitting in a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle

 

(HMMWV) and "calling in air." They are a "refresher course in Grunt," a total immersion

 

into the world of the ground Marine. During these tours, Marine aviators are fully

 

integrated into the ground unit, with many of them holding key billets of high

 

responsibility, in addition to their air control duties. In the field, the AO lives, eats, sleeps

 

and fights with his unit. He climbs the same hills, eats the same dust and, under fire,

 

crouches behind the same rock as his ground brethren. This is what makes him different

 

from the Navy F/A-18 aviator, or the Air Force F-16 pilot. He understands what it's like

 

"down there," he knows the terrible ramifications if a careless pilot drops a bomb or fires a

 

rocket "a little short," or fails to take the time to discern friends from enemies. Not

 

coincidentally, it is these same AOs who often make the best CAS instructors when they

 

return to their flying duties.

 

       As part of this fabled Air-Ground Team, Marine Air is as essential to the

 

commander as his ground combat element or any other part of the MAGTF. This is not

 

necessarily the case with an Army unit. The Table of Organization and Equipment

 

(TO&E) and dedicated fire support that an Army unit of battalion or greater size takes

 

with it into battle is radically different than any equivalent-sized Marine unit. The greatest

 

disparity is in long-range firepower. It is Marine Air that makes up for this serious

 

shortfall.

 

       Though task organized for many eventualities, the Marine Corps is not "heavy,"

 

nor a "second land army" for the United States. Each of the three Marine Expeditionary

 

Forces (MEFs) has a Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) assigned as its Aviation Combat

 

Element (ACE). Though there are periodic initiatives to strip the Marine Corps of its

 

TacAir, this cannot be done. Clearly the very expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps

 

makes that a moot point for all but the most obstinate naysayers. The Corps cannot be the

 

"Nation's 911 Force" if it isn't ready to answer that call with a full "kit bag," anywhere,

 

anytime. Whoever is called must be in the immediate vicinity already. That's why the

 

MAGTF is a "total package," why there are Marine Expeditionary Units afloat among the

 

world's trouble spots 365 days a year and why Marine Air must always answer the call

 

with its ground brethren. In a December 1994 lecture to Command and Staff College

 

students, a senior Marine Corps general officer stressed that when testifying before a

 

congressional committee and asked to compare USMC TacAir to that of other Services,

 

he emphasizes that:

 

       "The Marines specialize in CAS. We can do strike and other missions, whereas

       for the Air Force, it is the opposite -- they can do CAS, but specialize in other

       missions such as interdiction and the deep fight."31

 

       That being said, the Corps has stagnated in its pursuit of new and more efficient

 

ways to specialize in CAS. Marine Air does provide the requisite fires the MAGTF

 

Commander requires -- but not solely on the fixed-wing side. As will be evident in later

 

chapters, the case for adding rotary-wing combatants to the CAS equation has been

 

adequately made by demonstrated performance.

 

 

                                   CHAPTER 3

 

                            THE ROLE OF THE AIR FORCE

 

 

       The U.S. Air Force has felt threatened, or at least uncomfortable, with the

 

diversity and capabilities of USMC TacAir since the Air Force's inception. By doctrine

 

and DoDD 5160.22 Change 1 the prosecution of the "Air Battle" is the Air Force's

 

domain.52 The Air Force feels that Marine Air, and the Corps' self-proclaimed CAS

 

requirement are at the least an overstatement, at most an unnecessary duplication of a

 

service adequately provided by both the Navy and the Air Force. DoDD 5160.22 was

 

codified for the purpose of defining Service responsibilities primarily on a large-scale,

 

World War II-type battlefield that was comprised of Army and Air Force men and

 

equipment. The issue was complicated by the National Security Act of 1947, as

 

amended in 1951-1952, in which the Marine Corps' status, configuration and mission were

 

written into Public Law 416 (Douglas-Mansfield Bill).33 By authorizing "three wings of

 

aircraft" to support its ground forces, a degree of autonomy was wrested from Air Force

 

control, and they have been trying to rectify that situation ever since. It is an interesting

 

side note that the Air Force terms the use of its air as "Airpower," while the Army draws a

 

distinction between USAF and USA air by calling the Army's "Aviation." In the Marine

 

Corps vernacular "Air" is either Marine Air or Marine Aviation, but never "Airpower."

 

JFACC Vs MEF Commander?

 

 

 

       The most recent attack is in the form of a debate concerning both who controls the

 

Joint Force Commander's (JFC's) TacAir, and how much authority the Joint Force Air

 

Component Commander (JFACC) should exercise in the theater of war. Though an

 

answer was codified in the 1986 Omnibus Agreement,34 the debate is not nearly put to

 

rest. In a 1994 lecture at the Marine Corps Command & Staff College, a retired USAF

 

general officer who had served as the JFACC during a recent conflict reiterated the Air

 

Force's true position on the issue by heaping scorn on the Marine Corps' "interpretation"

 

of the terms in the Omnibus Agreement. His statement made it clear that the Air Force

 

will not accept the "excess sortie" arrangement, terming it "a joke," and stating that since

 

the Marine Corps did not have the capability to suitably control the airspace, that mission

 

should rightfully go to the Air Force, along with (JFACC) control of every Service's

 

aircraft in order to prosecute the JFC's battle.35 Service parochialism aside, the reality is

 

that the Air Force comes best equipped to do just that. The issue is a larger one for the

 

Corps, however, and revolves around both the sanctity of the MAGTF and the

 

Congressional mandate that the Corps have its own aviation arm to provide the fire

 

support essential for the MAGTF's success.

 

       When the Services briefed the independent White Commission in September

 

1994, this parochialism was never more apparent. The Special Assistant to the USAF

 

Chief of Staff for Roles and Missions, Major General Charles D. Link, stated:

 

       "What we're concerned about now is disconnecting air power from the land

       force commander's vision in a way that permits it to be employed, not

       independently, but in a more direct support of a joint force commander's war

       winning objectives." He added, "the Army's notion of jointness is: `what's ours is

       ours, what's yours is joint." 36

 

Major General Link's statement names the Army specifically, but could just have easily

 

targeted the Marine Corps. It is a throwback to the age-old fight between the Army and

 

Air Force on whether the preponderance of airpower should be employed in deep

 

interdiction or in the close battle. It has not changed significantly since the days of the

 

pre-Kasserine Pass Tunisian Campaign in WWII when Major General Lloyd R.

 

Fredenhall, US Army II Corps Commander, bitterly contested the issue with Major

 

General Carl A. Spaatz, USAAF, Commander All-Allied Air Forces in Tunisia and

 

Algeria.37

 

 

 

The Single Battle

 

 

 

       As recent as January 1995, the planners at HQMC (PP&O) were locked in joint

 

combat with the Air Force over the makeup of the deep battlefield/battlespace. By virtue

 

of this decision, the placement of the FSCL and control of fires (CAS included) in its

 

proximity were at issue. The Air Force would like to strip the deep battle from the MEF

 

Commander's "single battle concept" altogether, turning it into "JFACC Deep" territory.

 

Neither the Army nor the Marines would have to be concerned with shaping that part of

 

the battlespace, as it would de facto become the domain of the Air Force. This concept is

 

derived from the notion that the JFACC should be the senior Air Component Commander

 

with the preponderance of aircraft and the ability to exercise airspace control and

 

coordination. Since that is foreseen (at least in Air Force thinking) to be routinely an Air

 

Force responsibility, it should follow that control of the JFC's Deep Battle should be

 

coordinated (Marine Corps leadership reads that as "controlled"38) by the Air Force. This

 

would eliminate the Service-partisan arguments over targeting priorities, sector and

 

airspace control and allocation of sorties within either the Army or Marine Corps' deep

 

battlespace. Since it all "belonged" to the same entity, the JFACC could prosecute an

 

unbiased deep battle without the petty concerns over ground issues that (perhaps)

 

pervaded the Gulf War.

 

       Presumably the definition of this deep battlespace would include everything beyond

 

the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL). The Air Force has proposed that all weapons

 

fired beyond 50km from the FSCL should be controlled by them.39 If this is so, there are

 

several implications that this notion surfaces. First, the ownership of the ground-launched

 

weapons that impact/operate routinely beyond the FSCL, such as the Army's MLRS and

 

ATACMS -- which by Letter of Agreement (pending) could be attached in support of the

 

MEF Commander, and even Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) could be affected.40 The

 

Air Force's solution, of course, is that ATACMS, at least, should revert to their

 

ownership. Obviously, both the Army and the Marine Corps are adamant about retaining

 

control of these weapons. Specifically, they are invaluable at providing fire support when

 

weather or non-availability might preclude aircraft strikes.

 

       The FMFM 5-42 definition says Deep Air Support (DAS) is "air action against

 

enemy targets at such a distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each

 

mission with fire movement of friendly forces is not required."41 That definition changes

 

if the airspace beyond the FSCL is no longer a "coordination-free" zone. Since anything

 

flying in JFACC-controlled airspace would now need to be coordinated, it is not

 

inconceivable that the Air Force could require permission for penetration of that airspace.

 

This is a bigger concern than it seems at the surface.

 

       Single Service ownership of all its aircraft/airpower is unique only to the Marines.

 

The Corps' battlespace was not traditionally one in which the commander spent much time

 

with the deep battle. His was not a strategic fight; operationally he had to win the close

 

battle and push it forward as he went. Other Services -- specifically the Navy and the Air

 

Force, fought deep for him. As was the case in the Gulf War (and continues today), the

 

Marine Corps has no doctrinal agency, physically or on paper, that can control or

 

communicate with aircraft prosecuting the MEF Commander's Deep Battle. The Direct

 

Air Support Center (DASC) is consumed with the Close Battle, and rightly so. Neither

 

the Tactical Air Command Center (TACC), where the ACE Commander's Command and

 

Control (C2) operation is located, nor the Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC), where

 

the Anti-Air Warfare battle is controlled have the assets or ability to run the deep war.

 

The Air Force, on the other hand, could make a case that its Airborne Battlefield

 

Command & Control Center (ABCCC), perhaps in combination with a Joint Surveillance

 

and Target Acquisition Radar System (JSTARS)-equipped aircraft has the capability in the

 

form of platform, communications equipment and controllers to do the job. This is

 

certainly a possibility. On the targeting issue one thing is clear and is a lesson the Marine

 

Corps must learn if it wants to play successfully in the joint arena. In short, it is not so

 

much the nature of the target or where it lies, but how the target impacts on the CINC's

 

objectives that is his overarching concern. Though difficult to swallow at times, (such as

 

the MEF Commander's valid concern over the proximity of Iraqi artillery to the Marines'

 

FLOT in DESERT STORM), the Services must logically subordinate their concerns to the

 

overall mission of the JFC.

 

 

 

Deep and Close - Inseparable Parts of the Single Battle

 

 

 

       The future of the Deep Battle is important to the choice of future CAS aircraft and

 

tactics because it helps define the geometry of the battlefield, through the critical

 

demarcation between two parts of the MEF Commander's "single battle" concept. Where

 

the line between close and deep falls helps influence range, endurance, time on station, and

 

the location of Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs) and Forward Operating

 

Bases (FOBs) for CAS aircraft. The MEF Commander must concentrate on all legs of the

 

battlespace tripod he is charged with, for if any one of the three is removed, his role

 

borders on irrelevancy. He needs to influence the deep leg to set up his killing fields in the

 

close battle, and a lack of concentration on his own rear area would jeopardize the

 

sustainment of his warfighting abilities everywhere else.

 

       Two key phrases in the JCS Pub. 1 CAS definition are: "air action by fixed and

 

rotary winged aircraft" and "in close proximity to friendly forces and which require

 

detailed integration..."42 In Vietnam the term "close" could mean within tens of meters of

 

troops in contact.43 During DESERT STORM the distance was stretched to include

 

targeting an enemy unit or piece of equipment that could range a friendly ground position

 

or maneuver element (Iraqi artillery) -- several thousand meters in any case.44

 

            The connection between the deep and close battles is even more visible in the

 

USAF/USA arena. Just as the deep battle can be waged on either side of the FSCL, so

 

can the close battle be fought beyond it. A case in point is the use of aircraft called in by a

 

deep reconnaissance or SOF team to cover its withdrawal, or perhaps extricate themselves

 

when caught in a situation when they find themselves outgunned or outmanned. Though

 

not a routine occurrence, it nevertheless has happened. The most recent case was during

 

DESERT STORM, when Air Force F-16s and A-10s provided CAS in support of two

 

separate SOF extractions beyond the FSCL.45 As stated in emerging doctrinal format in

 

(Proposed) Pub 3-09.3, Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures For Close Air Support:

 

       "CAS can be conducted at any place and time friendly combat forces are in close

       proximity to enemy forces. The word "close" does not imply a specific distance;

       rather, it is situational."46

 

       Such missions would be a challenge to any concept of integrated CAS in the

 

Marine Corps. Though jets would have no difficulty ranging the target area, attack

 

helicopters may. The use of extended range fuel tanks might give them the "legs," and

 

night operations would decrease the risk factor, but it still may be wiser in the long run to

 

make such "deep" missions the sole responsibility of the attack jet.

 

       Former USAF Chief of Staff General Merril McPeak, an outspoken proponent of

 

change in the status quo, recommended midway through his tenure that the responsibility

 

for CAS missions should be transferred to the Army. He suggested the Air Force transfer

 

its aging fleet of A-10 "Warthogs" to the Army to assist in that mission adjustment. The

 

Air Force position on CAS was clearly stated by Major General Link during his September

 

1994 interview with Jane's Defence Weekly, where he stated that once the Air Force

 

transferred primary CAS responsibility to the Army, not only could AH-64s and A-10s be

 

used, but perhaps also "USMC AV-8B Harrier jets."47 The fact is that the Air Force

 

considers the A-10 questionable, if not downright vulnerable, in a high threat air defense

 

artillery (ADA) environment against a smart, sophisticated enemy. The mission, at least in

 

that aircraft, is no longer desirable to the Air Force. Among other rather blunt

 

observations, it is clear that General McPeak coveted the Army's ATACMS and High and

 

Medium altitude Air Defense (HIMAD) weapons systems. In verbalizing his Service

 

Chief's views, Major General Link recommended that the Air Force be given:

 

       "...programmatic and operational control over such Army... assets as HAWK,

       Corps-SAM, Patriot and the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)

       system."48

 

       In General McPeak's view, the Air Force should rightfully control all "deep fires."49

 

This would be controlled by a stronger, more potent JFACC. He is also quick to point out

 

that the second "C" in JFACC stands for "Commander," not "Coordinator." When

 

General Ronald Fogleman replaced General McPeak, the focus shifted from what was

 

widely perceived as an Air Force "power-grab" to a more conciliatory tone of

 

cooperation and joint training between the Army and the Air Force. He sees his mission

 

as a means of achieving a "unity of effort," though perhaps at the expense of "unity of(Air

 

Force) command." General Fogleman rightly concluded that his predecessor's apparent

 

intent to abandon the CAS mission would add fuel to the age-old "lack of support"

 

mentality of the Army, and assured General Gordon Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff; that the

 

Air Force "would retain primary responsibility for fixed-wing CAS rather than transfer it

 

to the Army." 50 Interestingly enough, both the Army and the Air Force currently believe

 

that the requirement for fixed-wing CAS will be reduced in the years ahead.51 Such a

 

belief has not been articulated in the Marine Corps, presumably for previously mentioned

 

reasons surrounding force makeup.

 

       Perhaps not surprisingly, there is a movement within the Army that would allow

 

the Air Force to abandon all but two CAS applications: pre-planned and in-extremis

 

(immediate). The feeling is that the proper use of Air Force fixed-wing is to have them

 

attack concentrations of targets -- targets found in abundance in the deep interdiction

 

mission, lined up on roads or stacked in tank parks -- not in the camouflaged, fast moving,

 

tangled battlefield where CAS requirements reign. Presumably the CAS battle would be

 

waged primarily by the Apache and artillery. Without equivalent numbers of AH-lWs,

 

artillery and tactical missiles, the Marine Corps cannot walk this road with the Army,

 

however. As Army Lieutenant Colonel William Welch, a member of General

 

Schwartzkopfs "Black Hole" staff writes:

 

       "The technological advances in artillery and attack helicopters over the last 15

       years make these the systems of choice for fire support of ground troops. No

       aircraft in the Air Force inventory can match the Apache helicopter in providing

       support to ground troops... Bringing in Air Force aircraft to perform close air

       support destroys the tempo of ground operations. Everything has to stop, perhaps

       even back up, to avoid the fratricide problem. Artillery has to be suspended to

       avoid hitting aircraft.... Losing tempo means losing the initiative... U.S. ground

       units and weapons systems do not need the backup of (fixed-wing) close air

       support."52 (emphasis added)

 

       While Welch's comments may or may not reflect the acknowledged mainstream of

 

Army thought, they nevertheless cannot be dismissed out of turn. Otherwise, the Army

 

would not continue to attempt to field six different types of attack helicopters over the

 

same relative timeframe (AH-1F, AH-6, AH-64A, AH-64D [Longbow], OH-58D and

 

RAH-66). Clearly, the role of the attack helicopter bears serious scrutiny for the fixture of

 

CAS in both U.S. land Services.

 

       The key difference between USMC and Army artillery fire support coordination is

 

that the Army is inclined to shut down artillery in favor of air, while the Marine Corps will

 

go to extraordinary lengths to work them simultaneously. In any case, based on some of

 

the previous comments by General McPeak, little ardent Air Force opposition to the basic

 

tenets of Welch's proposal should be expected.

 

       Not surprisingly, a viewpoint similar to Welch's, (though more antagonistic to the

 

Air Force), can be found in the Marine Corps. Lieutenant Colonel Barry Ford, a combat

 

veteran of both ground and air venues describes his vision of war in the near future:

 

       "It is the war of the grunt, the sniper and the long-range reconnaissance patrol. It

       is air support so close and personal that no jet can deliver it. It is not strategic air

       interdiction, or "presence" provide by B-2 bombers an ocean away, or (FW) CAS

       from 10,000 feet. For air power, the future is the war of the attack helicopter."53

 

       While these represent similar views on the close battle, all is not smooth sailing in

 

the deep arena. The Army's Roles and Missions Director, Brigadier General John Costello

 

was quoted in January 1995 stating that "there are some factions in the Air Force still

 

interested in controlling all "deep fires," but that he did not "think they would ultimately

 

prevail."54 The Air Force surely has this foremost on its mind, if only to better wage its

 

campaign to prove unequivocally that it has the (air)power to make interdiction the way

 

for the JFC to achieve "operational paralysis" of the enemy before the first ground

 

skirmish takes place. In the Air Force view, (not held by any other Service), if interdiction

 

is done properly, it should convince the enemy that further resistance would be futile, thus

 

"single-handedly" winning the JFC's war for him.

 

       The shortage of long-range fires in the Marine Corps arsenal elevates the

 

importance of CAS to a higher level than that in any other Service. The Corps simply

 

does not have sufficient organic fires to fight the close battle without CAS. It is a "force

 

multiplier" in the truest sense of the words. During the DESERT STORM "air war" itself,

 

this became less of a problem than it could have been. Indeed, early on it was a very big

 

USMC issue, primarily because the Corps did not understand (or at least did not utilize)

 

the joint target nominating and confirmation process as well as it should have.55 While

 

Marine TacAir serviced the targets in the MEF's Area of Operations routinely, it took the

 

personal involvement of both the MEF Commander (General Walter Boomer) and his

 

ACE Commander (Major General Royal Moore) meeting with General Schwartzkopf and

 

his JFACC (Lieutenant General Charles Horner) to iron out some of it, particularly

 

concerning adequately targeting the MEF's deep battle targets. On another instance all the

 

I MEF generals complained to General Schwartzkopf that:

 

       "the Air Force simply was not interested in the Kuwait battlefield... the JFACC

       was ignoring Kuwait; and we had not received the B-52 support that we

       wanted to employ to try to convince the Iraqis to quit the battlefield before we had

       to attack into Kuwait. General Schwartzkopf said he would fix the situation and

       would direct the JFACC to focus on Kuwait. For two days after he left, we

       received a couple of Air Force B-52 sorties in Kuwait. After that initial burst, the

       B-52 sorties went elsewhere along with the JFACC focus."56

 

       The chief concern of the Marines was the Iraqi artillery, while General

 

Schwartzkopf's was the Iraqi Republican Guard and armor units.57 The importance of this

 

in relation to CAS becomes apparent when one realizes that prior to now, no rotary-wing

 

CAS aircraft/missions appear on the Air Tasking Order (ATO) -- it is solely reserved for

 

fixed-wing. However, with the definition of CAS changed to include rotary-wing, it is

 

possible that the JFC could legally strip the preponderance of Marine TacAir by the terms

 

of the Onmibus Agreement, while still leaving the MEF Commander with sufficient CAS

 

sorties available -- primarily rotary-wing. Unfortunately, for the firepower reasons stated

 

above, complete reliance on one type of aircraft, whether fixed or rotary-wing, is not the

 

solution the Corps requires. The Marine Corps must be vigilant in stifling any attempt by

 

the Air Force to make that ATO change.

 

       The Marine reliance on CAS is all the more interesting when one considers that

 

General Fogleman concurs with his predecessor's stand that the need for CAS (Army and

 

Marine) will be less prevalent in the future, especially with the level of success Army

 

Apaches and long range artillery demonstrated in the Gulf War. In what appears to be a

 

case of one-way recognition of the irony involved, the Air Force finds it hard to

 

understand why it should divert F-16s from the deep battle when Army Apaches (that

 

could do the same job) are bypassing the CAS mission in favor of the deep battle. (This,

 

of course, is a reference to the CINC's deep employment of Apaches on Day 1 of the Gulf

 

"Air War," though their performance was nearly flawless and highly effective). Brigadier

 

General Costello said the Army views CAS "as the epitome of joint operations," and

 

reflects the Army's unwillingness to relieve the Air Force from their fixed-wing CAS

 

responsibilities.58

 

       Indeed, in a war where the roles and missions of the weapons systems themselves

 

were a blur, this interservice disagreement on what aircraft should perform CAS is

 

understandable. During DESERT STORM long range bombers -- even B-52s, performed

 

(reasonably) close support missions against front line troops, while short range fighters

 

and attack aircraft went deep to destroy oil refineries and the like. Army Apaches struck

 

critical air defense C2 sites while ship-launched Navy cruise missiles -- designed for the

 

nuclear role, carried modified payloads to strike at Saddam's command hierarchy.59 The

 

point is that the platform (or combination of platforms) that are best suited for the mission

 

at hand should be the one(s) chosen to perform it. Instead of spending millions of dollars

 

on upgrading non-CAS aircraft to be able to accomplish limited CAS, the Marine Corps

 

should concentrate on which aircraft do it best. Those aircraft are the F/A-1 8 and the

 

AH-1W.

 

 

 

Air Force A-10s Cannot Replace Marine F/A-18s

 

 

 

       The roles and missions debate has a laser beam focused on the choice of aircraft to

 

fill certain missions, not the least of which is CAS. In a program decision memorandum

 

(PDM) signed, ironically enough, on the 1993 Marine Corps Birthday, the Office of the

 

Assistant Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), tasked the

 

Department of the Navy (DON) to assess two issues. The first was to capture the cost

 

and effectiveness impacts of additional TacAir integration (following the transfer of

 

USMC A-6 Intruders to the Navy), by transferring all Marine F/A-18s to the Navy. The

 

second task was to assess the feasibility and implications of doctrinal integration of Air

 

Force A-10s with MAGTFs (to compensate for the loss of the F/A-18s).60 The results

 

were generally favorable for the Navy, but concerned HQMC a great deal. Aside from the

 

assessment that the DON could save over $700 million by not buying new aircraft and

 

standing up new squadrons, the study reported that:

 

      "*  Integration fills the CV (carrier) decks for peacetime forward presence

          operations.

 

       *  Integration fills the decks for crisis response or wartime operations when no

          land-based facilities are available.

 

       *  Integration is a force structure and capability reduction. Integration reduces

          sortie-generation capability in one Major Regional Conflict (MRC) by about

          20 percent, and significantly reduces the DON contribution to theater strike.

 

       * With full integration (or even partial integration), the CVs may be required to

         provide increased MAGTF support. This could tether the CV to Marine Corps

         operating areas and thus limit the CVs flexibility to the theater CINCs for other

         required operations.

 

       * Progressive integration will limit the ability of the USMC to maintain forward

         presence to Iwakuni (Japan)."61

 

       The ramifications for the Marine Corps in this scenario are staggering. As far as

 

CAS is concerned, the keys to this part of the report are two-fold. First, the loss of a

 

strike aircraft capability ashore is assured. The first priority for the Navy's F/A-18s is

 

defense of the fleet. Any CAS priority the Marine F/A-18s previously held would be

 

stripped along with the Marines logo on the side of the aircraft. The expected decrease in

 

sorties available to the JFC could result in a decrease in sorties available to support

 

Marines ashore. The Marines cannot tolerate a decrease in fires available of any kind.

 

Second, though the Navy is trying to increase its littoral focus, the CV's "tether" to the

 

MAGTF would be stretched to the breaking point if it had to weigh supporting competing

 

regional CINCs and/or supporting a lowly MAGTF. This scenario is too reminiscent of

 

World War II, when Admiral Jack Fletcher withdrew the carriers from USMC support at

 

Guadalcanal, to be of much interest to the Corps.

 

       The second part of that report tried to assess what, if any, doctrinal contribution

 

the A-10 could make to the six functions of Marine Air, and could it be integrated

 

effectively and efficiently into the Corps. CNA found that the A-10 would fit only one of

 

the six functions, and that:

 

       "the A-10's greatest attribute is its ability to furnish sustained and accurate close air

       support (CAS) in a low threat environment. The A-10's large payload, long loiter

       time, and simple but accurate weapon delivery system are invaluable for the CAS

       mission.  But the A-10 has virtually no applicability to the other missions of

       Marine aviation. Integration of the A-10 into Marine operations might permit the

       AV-8B aircraft to do less CAS and concentrate on other missions such as deep air

       support (DAS) or low-threat antiair warfare, but neither the A-10 nor the

       remanufactured AV-8B is an effective substitute for the F/A-18.

              "Doctrinal integration of the A-10 into Marine operations would be

       difficult because the A-10 is not a naval aircraft, has not demonstrated an

       expeditionary capability, and A-10 pilots do not train to interface with the Marine

       aviation command and control system. The training problem could be overcome,

       but the A-10 would still be limited in its ability to deploy and operate with naval

       forces."62

 

       Taken out of context from the first set of findings, there might be some advantages

 

to adding the increased payload, time on station and survivability that the A-10 brings to

 

the table in comparison with the AV-8B. Unfortunately, the disadvantages far outweigh

 

them. These include the lack of "marinization" of the airframe, to include carrier arresting

 

gear, and sacrificing the Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) and night attack

 

(FLIR) capabilities that comes with the Harrier. Yet even on that basis the pros and cons

 

do not balance. The key is that the Corps does not need another aircraft to do the same

 

mission as the AV-8B (not to mention the AH-1W), and neither the A-10 nor the Harrier

 

can perform the F/A-18's mission satisfactorily -- even with the AV-8B's multi-million

 

dollar "remanufacture" upgrade. The A-10 was not designed, nor has it ever functioned in

 

a sustained expeditionary environment. It has no night attack capability, and is so slow it

 

is extremely vulnerable to ground fire. A good example is its performance in the Gulf

 

War, where 15 A-10s were damaged and 6 were lost to enemy fire.63 When both findings

 

are taken together, proponency for such a transition would be difficult to find. However,

 

once the surface gloss is peeled away, the cost to marinize the A-10 and tether CVs to

 

"grunts" would likely prove unaffordable. The bottom line to this section is that no other

 

existing aircraft in any Services' inventory can perform the Marine CAS mission better

 

than a combination of two they already have -- the F/A-18 and the AH-1W.

 

 

                                   CHAPTER 4

 

                          LESSONS FROM THE NEAR PAST

 

 

       The experiences of the Gulf War, though fresh in the memory of most, have a

 

tendency to become ever more lustrous while basking in the afterglow of victory. As

 

such, an effort must be made to qualify and quantify the lessons learned in light of the

 

situation. It is highly unlikely that the Corps will ever again face an enemy willing to grant

 

us six months to prepare to fight him, then abandon both the offensive and the skies over

 

the battlefield, thereby granting us air supremacy by default. Nor should we expect to

 

enjoy an environment in which night operations and high altitude tactics are solely our

 

domain. In spite of the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, the sophistication of unfriendly

 

air and counter-air arsenals continues to grow throughout the world. Few nations will fail

 

to glean insights from Saddam Hussein's unpublished treatise How Not to Fight The

 

United States (fictional). The problem with unparalleled success, exquisitely documented

 

by CNN down to the last detail, is that it chronicles in bold print for your enemies just

 

where your strengths, your weaknesses and your warfighting technological thrusts lie.

 

Ultimately the Marine Corps must be able to say; yes, at that time in history, in that kind

 

of terrain, against that type of enemy and scenario, these tactics, techniques and

 

procedures worked to this degree. Conclusions based on the Gulf War should be

 

tempered and tested to ensure that their worth is not overstated for future wars.

 

The MAGTF and CAS in the 9Os

 

 

 

       The MAGTF Commander has several other methods of delivering fires upon the

 

enemy; CAS is but one of them. Marine artillery is accurate, responsive and

 

well-coordinated, though of limited range. Its counter-battery capability is credible as

 

well. Unfortunately, many of the threats we face can not only outgun our 155mm

 

howitzers, but can outrange them as well. The M-198 towed piece can only be moved by

 

a five ton prime mover or a CH-53E, which places severe limits on its "expeditionary" and

 

rapid-deployable status. Both the M60A1 and M1A1 tanks offer maneuverability, shock

 

value and an antitank capability. However, in keeping with its "light" image, the Corps

 

only has two active duty battalions of tanks. Many MAGTFs deploy without any tanks at

 

all, choosing the versatility of the Light Armored Infantry/LAV-25 detachments instead.

 

The newer amphibious ships (LHA and LHD) have the room to bring their CAS with them

 

in the form of a six-plane detachment of AV-8B Harriers. None leave behind their rotary-

 

wing CAS. What does CAS give the warfighting commander that other fires cannot?

 

Some of the answers lie in the Service-specific rhetoric at the beginning of this paper.

 

CAS gives the commander the ability to mass heavy, accurate fires at the decisive point in

 

his operational scheme to shape his immediate battlefield in a readily exploitable manner.

 

If properly used, CAS can be weaved into the fire support plan in a way that complements

 

the other supporting arms so that the enemy has little chance to engage in battle on his

 

own terms, if at all. Speed, maneuverability and flexibility are the hallmarks of CAS.

 

       The Marine Corps has become heavily dependent upon its fixed wing air arm. Any

 

MAGTF called to deploy into any but the most benign of Operations Other Than War

 

(OOTW), though not impotent by any means, would be severely hamstrung without its

 

accompanying TacAir package. Nothing gets the indigenous population's attention like a

 

flight of jets booming through town at low level, and a case can be made that sometimes a

 

sonic boom has greater effect on its "target" than a string of rockeye cluster bombs would.

 

Earlier in this decade, the attempted Philippine coup on then President Corazon Aquino,

 

thwarted in part by the loud presence of U.S. fighters is a great example of that. Even in

 

the early stages of the operations in Somalia such a demonstration was effective. But

 

once the mission escalates above that level, once the threat becomes more virile and

 

aggressive in nature and OOTW turns into open combat, the greater the CAS requirement

 

becomes. The higher the threat, the greater the need.

 

       Modem combat has become increasingly hostile to aviation; especially fixed-wing

 

aircraft in the close battle environment. Intricate scenarios of suppression and airspace

 

coordination have increased the complexity of the mission to the point where it is often

 

just the aircrew's and FAC's combined will to succeed that enables mission

 

accomplishment. Whether continued emphasis on training for this type of sophisticated

 

"worst case" surface-to-air missile (SAM), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and electronic

 

warfare (EW) scenario is warranted is questionable. The axiom throughout the author's

 

19 year aviation career has always been to train to the level of the greatest threat; that if

 

that could be mastered, successful combat in any less hostile environment would be a

 

given. Even during DESERT STORM the JFC forced attack jets to yield the low altitude

 

battle to the defender, performing CAS missions from altitudes in excess often thousand

 

feet -- anything but "close."  This was a decision made through his JFACC, and held firm

 

for the duration of the conflict.  Though this altitude restriction did not apply to USMC,

 

USN and British fixed wing aircraft in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO), (USMC

 

A-6s and F-/A-18s were limited to five thousand feet) the vast majority of USMC missions

 

were flown above ten thousand feet until very late in the "air war."  To the attack pilots'

 

credit, they eventually flew at whatever altitude was required to get the job done, at least

 

until the oil smoke made CAS untenable.64  High altitude ordnance delivery complicates

 

everything involved in running a CAS mission.  Target acquisition, identification and

 

fratricide avoidance, even the initial identification of the CAS aircraft by the ground FAC,

 

becomes exponentially more difficult during high altitude attacks.

 

            Even with the "mid-altitude sanctuary,"  U.S. fixed-wing aircraft casualties (from

 

all missions) totaled 20 aircraft damaged and 14 destroyed.  The AH-1W suffered no

 

damage or loss to enemy fire.65  In all fairness, this is not an apples to apples comparison.

 

Many fixed-wing missions were flown into the teeth of air defenses far in excess of that

 

which the SuperCobra faced.  Still, the capabilities the AH-1W brings to the battlefield

 

must be maximized by using both fixed and rotary-wing platforms in a complementary

 

role.  Such synchroneity should decrease the risk factor for both aircraft.

 

            In terms of control, current doctrine still requires the FAC to clear the attacking

 

aircraft "hot," after confirming it is pointed at the right target, unless the JFC/MAGTF

 

Commander institutes a high-risk procedure called "reasonable assurance."66  The former

 

is exceedingly difficult for an individual on the ground to do, especially while under fire, in

 

less than optimum conditions, while the latter is a high-risk judgment call designed to

 

allow CAS missions to complete the final phase of the attack. Even in combat "reasonable

 

assurance" is meant to be the exception, not the rule, for fratricide reasons.67

 

       The high altitude drops in support of ground troops were not a first in DESERT

 

STORM. A classic case of how they can work with extreme effectiveness was in the

 

defense of the Marines of the 26th Regimental Landing Team at Khe Sanh during the

 

Vietnam War. It was described in a 1970 article in the Armed Forces Journal:

 

              "Formations of three B-52s each were scheduled to arrive over Khe Sanh

       every 90 minutes around the clock. This provided 48 sorties daily, each carrying

       30 tons of bombs. Under ground radar control the B-52s dropped their ordnance

       as close as 500 meters from the Marine perimeter... General Westmoreland

       estimated in assessing the impact of the B-52s, that they were equal to four

       divisions of ground forces in terms of firepower and mobility."68

 

       Many other aircraft and types of attack profiles were flown in support of the

 

Marines at Khe Sanh as well. Historian Roswell Freeman called Khe Sanh "the episode

 

that publicizes the phenomenal effectiveness of close air support more than perhaps any

 

other in the annals of warfare."69 Yet truly close air support operations at altitude require

 

weather conditions to be extremely benign. Arguably, F/A-18s bombing from 1-2 miles

 

above ground and B-52s at 5-6 miles high are not identical. The point is that when close

 

air support is measured in miles instead of meters, the stakes are unquestionably raised for

 

the ground troops. In any case, high altitude strikes are much more successful when

 

supporting an easily identified ground unit in the defense. As such, the Khe Sanh

 

bombings represented nearly ideal conditions. But Marines are rarely on the defense.

 

       During the ground war of DESERT STORM, for example, the ground units

 

moved with such alarming speed that in many instances the coordination required for CAS

 

was too time consuming. The TacAir solution was to use a concept called "Push CAS,"

 

where sections of fixed-wing aircraft would check in every eight minutes for immediate

 

use by the ground FAC or FAC(A). Though there is some disagreement over whether it

 

was the Air Force or the Marine Corps that developed the procedure, the fact is that the

 

formidable weather conditions forced the majority of these aircraft to "push" beyond the

 

FSCL and search 30 mi2 "kill boxes" for targets of opportunity.70 The original intent, of

 

course, was to "push" CAS down to the ground units at regular intervals to improve

 

responsiveness and keep up with the pace of the battle.

 

       Prior to the oil fires the Corps' new F/A-18D Hornet Strike Fighter, a two-pilot

 

version of the F/A-18C, would perform TAC(A) and "FASTFAC" duties for the Push

 

CAS scenario. While this resulted in many CAS missions becoming interdiction instead,

 

the FASTFACs generally achieved a high degree of success. Operating with near

 

impunity above the remaining Iraqi threat envelope, the "D" would take advantage of the

 

extended loiter time gained through auxiliary fuel tanks and orbit the prearranged deep

 

"kill boxes" in search of targets that it could designate and hand off to the fixed wing

 

sections as they arrived.71 Unfortunately, by G+2 the oil fires virtually obscured the

 

battlefield to the extent that neither the FASTFAC nor the CAS jets could acquire the

 

targets, and it remained that way for the duration of the ground offensive. Rather than

 

taking an operational pause, ground commanders were forced to find other ways to

 

destroy what were historically CAS-type targets. One of those alternatives was the

 

AH-1W, which was able to reach the battlefield (often only with the aid of a pathfinder

 

FLIR-equipped UH-1N Huey leading it) and perform what was essentially the same CAS

 

mission that the attack jets would have done.72

 

       This was not a case of insufficient fixed-wing assets to accomplish the CAS

 

mission. In fact, during the entire ground war the Marines tasked all their TacAir sorties

 

for support of Marines -- the JFACC tasked no sorties at all.73 Rather, the situation was a

 

tactically and environmentally-driven capability mismatch that precluded use of traditional

 

fixed-wing CAS. This (and to a greater extent) the "push CAS" scenario account for the

 

apparent disconnect between mission reports stating that 70% of all USMC TacAir

 

missions were CAS, when only 14% were actually flown short of the FSCL (145 out of

 

1035 sorties).74 Army and Air Force records indicate a similar pattern. The use of Air

 

Force fixed-wing CAS dropped from a high of 32% in WWII to a low of only 6% during

 

DESERT STORM.75

 

 

 

Precision-Guided Munitions

 

 

 

       Dependence on LASER-guided munitions can become a liability when the bomb's

 

view of the laser spot is obstructed. In the case of poor weather and low ceilings, the

 

CAS pilot aces a difficult choice of how to accomplish his mission without futilely

 

endangering his own life. Even though the "smart" bomb received its share of

 

awe-inspiring journalism during the Gulf War, in fact only 7% of all ordnance dropped by

 

coalition forces was precision-guided munitions (PGMs).76 Predictably, the Gulf War Air

 

Power Survey analysis showed that PGMs were twelve times more effective than

 

non-precision ordnance.77 In spite of the success of PGMs, of all the bombs dropped

 

during both the "air" and "ground" wars, the Coalition was lucky if one bomb in fifteen

 

found their mark.78 The standard CAS ordnance load was not PGMs, but rather a

 

multi-mission mix of rockeye cluster munitions and 500 lb high explosive bombs.79

 

       During the first two weeks of the "air war," the accuracy of the bombing was

 

inadequate to meet the CINC's goal of a 50% attrition of Iraqi armor prior to beginning

 

the ground phase. The attrition "lag" was primarily due to the high altitude delivery of

 

"dumb" bombs, so the decision was made to transition to a greater percentage of

 

LASER-guided PGMs. This was an unplanned development, as these weapons were

 

primarily intended for strategic targets.80 The results were impressive, nonetheless. If

 

tactical, meteorological and logistical conditions were to permit such large-scale usage,

 

the case could be made that all that is really required is the time necessary to attrite the

 

enemy to an "acceptable" level. Clearly, the future of air-dropped ordnance lies in the

 

precision-guided arena, but the future cost of such dependence may be prohibitive. One

 

lesson Saddam Hussein taught the rest of the world is that if you "smoke" the battlefield,

 

artificially obscuring visibility and lowering the ceiling in extreme fashion, you can

 

effectively neutralize the fixed wing component in the CAS role. Though U.S. pilots were

 

trained to operate under such conditions, it became clear that training and combat were

 

two different scenarios. In an interdiction role, this is not as prohibitive, for the

 

capabilities of the F/A-18D, for example, allow highly accurate "radar" bombing of targets

 

through such obscurants. The close proximity of friendly forces that is inherent in CAS

 

tends to minimize this asset, unfortunately. There are, of course, other CAS choices open

 

to the ground commander in such an eventuality.

 

 

Blast vs Lethality

 

 

 

       In a 1993 Research and Development proposal for U.S. CENTCOM, Mr. Earl

 

Rubright made some interesting observations about the relationship between weapon

 

size-weight and probability of hit (Ph). The smallest munition carried by a fixed-wing

 

attack aircraft today weighs 500 pounds (the MK 82 "dumb" bomb). Yet during

 

DESERT STORM, for example, over 60% of the attack sorties were flown against targets

 

that could have been destroyed by 5 pounds of explosives.81 Incredible as it may seem, the

 

bulk of those targets (armor, bunkers, vehicles, missile launchers, etc.) were such that a

 

precision-guided shaped-charge of only 5 pounds would have sufficed. Obviously there is

 

a disconnect here, and that lies in the error involved in delivery and target location. Since

 

the accuracy of air-delivered weapons revolves around those two errors, the logical

 

solution would be to reduce them to the point that a smaller weapon could be dropped to

 

achieve the desired results. Unfortunately, the cost of doing so is precisely the reason why

 

large, high blast weapons have traditionally been used. If it could be done, Mr. Rubright

 

suggests that not only could the size of the bomb be reduced, but so could the associated

 

lift requirements for transporting the ordnance to theater. Theoretically one could also

 

reduce the number of sorties required to kill a target, thus saving fuel costs, reduce the

 

number of ordnance handling personnel, thus saving personnel costs, and finally realize a

 

reduction in time required for planning, executing and reconstituting strike/CAS

 

packages.82 The cascade effect could logically infer that the culmination of these savings

 

would allow a reduction in fixed-wing force structure of a significant amount. Having

 

made the case that the Corps cannot afford to give up its precious CAS assets, the author

 

does not mean to imply that the latter reduction would be a wise course to follow.

 

Sufficient numbers of both fixed and rotary-wing attack aircraft must be available to meet

 

requirements.

 

       On the contrary, while an increase in lethality would be welcomed in every Marine

 

Corps community, it may not be worth the Research and Development/Production

 

programmatic price tag that would run into the hundreds of millions of dollars and last

 

nearly a decade. The answer lies not in decreasing force structure, but in maximizing the

 

capabilities of existing aircraft through logical, complementary means. For example, both

 

of the point-target weapons that are carried on the AH-1W (TOW IIA and HELLFIRE)

 

weigh less than 100 pounds, with shaped-charge warheads weighing 10 and 20 pounds,

 

respectively. Without getting into classified Ph, from the numbers provided in Table 1

 

alone it is clear that the 90-95 hit percentage is better than the one in fifteen demonstrated

 

by fixed-wing-delivered 500 pound (and above) munitions. There are several procurement

 

initiatives underway to attempt to correct this shortfall. As Secretary of Defense William

 

Perry states in his 1995 Annual Report to the President and Congress:

 

       "Free-falling weapons released from medium altitude tend to have limited

       effectiveness. Moreover, neither free-fall nor current (fixed-wing) precision

       weapons can be guided to their targets in adverse weather. To close this gap, a

       variety of more effective weapons -- such as the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW),

       Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), and Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser

       (WCMD) -- are being developed. The guidance systems used in these munitions

       will provide accuracies not heretofore possible in operations round the clock and

       from standoff ranges."83

 

The key is to use the right ordnance, or combination thereof, that meets mission

 

requirements.

 

                                   CHAPTER 5

 

 

                   THE BEST PLATFORMS FOR COMPLEMENTARY CAS

 

 

                                  (1995-2005)

 

 

 

Best Bang For the Buck

 

 

 

       In a Marine Corps whose aviation hierarchy has historically been dominated by

 

fixed-wing aviators, overlooking the potential of attack helicopters for CAS is not

 

unusual; nor is it necessarily inappropriate, at least to date. Attack helicopters have simply

 

not kept up with the technological and capability improvements that their fixed-wing

 

brethren have. Still, when discussing the fixture of CAS, perhaps the more fundamental

 

question involves choosing the aircraft that provides the most "bang for the buck." The

 

oft-overlooked player in the Marine CAS scenario is the attack helicopter, as has been

 

previously mentioned. While historically it has been the fixed-wing side of the house that

 

competed for the lion's share of procurement dollars, recent initiatives to upgrade the

 

rotary-wing community have provided dramatic improvements in capability, especially for

 

the Corps' AH-1W SuperCobra. The AH-1W is rapidly evolving into an able,

 

multi-mission, combat-proven warrior that has only recently joined the ranks of aircraft

 

providing CAS. Attack helicopters are cheaper to procure, operate and maintain and have

 

proven in combat that they have both the stamina and the firepower to do the job. But

 

questions remain over whether they can do it as well as an attack jet. Perhaps certain

 

CAS missions are better suited for one platform over the other. A perfect example would

 

be "the hordes" of Soviet-style armor and infantry waves pouring through the plains of

 

Europe scenario. Sufficient attack helicopters are ideally suited to kill a great portion of

 

the armor, but they are not capable of attriting the infantry sufficiently. This is an easy

 

mission for a fixed-wing aircraft with suitable large-detonation explosives. But other than

 

the Korean contingency, large scale missions such as this may have outlived the reality of

 

the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Iraqi Army.

 

       Whether in a high or a low attack profile, in all but the most benign environments,

 

the attack jet must have the time to do essential (indeed mandatory) target

 

recognition. Even with FASTFACs orbiting a "kill box" at medium to high altitudes with

 

relative impunity to the threat, acquiring and marking the correct target is still a

 

challenging, time consuming task. As Lieutenant Colonel William Welch, an Army

 

artillery and CAS employer said:

 

       "The "eyes on target" requirement inside the Fire Support Coordination Line

       (FSCL) of (the Army's sector) of DESERT STORM was designed to prevent

       fratricide, but it opened up huge areas for enemy maneuver. Multi-division forces

       can hide in areas of that size. This cure might kill the patient."84

 

 

Fratricide

 

 

 

       The increased aircraft survivability at high speed and high altitude demonstrated

 

during DESERT STORM may have severely hampered the prosecution of true close air

 

support for the fast-mover. Ironically, close air support aircraft operate in the area where

 

the enemy is best prepared to deal with them. Unfortunately, the friendly side is least

 

prepared to deal with the possibility of blue-on-blue casualties in the same area. Even in a

 

war that claimed the lives of a nearly unbelievable .006% of the friendly combatants, the

 

"friendly fire" issue continues to receive extremely high attention. There have been at least

 

eighteen "friendly fire" incidents since the height of the Vietnam War; eight of those came

 

in the 100 hours of the Gulf ground war. Six of those eight were done by fixed-wing

 

aircraft (Marine and Air Force), one by an Army Apache and one by a Marine Light

 

Armored Vehicle (LAV).85 All took place short of the FSCL. Of the seven aviation

 

incidents, all but one was attributed to long-range target engagements (high altitude or

 

long slant-range) and lack of ability to perform adequate IFF (Identification, Friend or

 

Foe). Though a few of the original missions the aircraft launched on were not intended to

 

be CAS, the fact that they engaged ground forces short of the actual FSCL places them

 

within the close air support category. This underlines the criticality of having that

 

"eyes-on-target" capability that a FAC or FAC(A) provides, especially at night, with

 

medium to high altitude fixed-wing attack profiles. It is a big key to eliminating fratricide,

 

yet still achieving the highest probability of kill (P_k).

 

 

 

The Attack Helicopter

 

 

 

       The oft-forgotten player in the Marine CAS scenario is the attack helicopter.

 

Although chronically underfunded throughout most of their history (and therefore

 

laughably unsophisticated) compared to TacAir platforms, Marine attack helicopters are

 

becoming increasingly more capable. They are now a viable option in rounding out the

 

ground commander's CAS void. While historically it is the fixed-wing side of the house

 

that competed for the lion's share of procurement dollars, recent initiatives to upgrade the

 

rotary-wing community have provided drastic improvements in capability, especially for

 

the Corps' AH-1W SuperCobra.

 

       Doctrine divides the traditional functions of Marine Air into six categories:

 

 

       Offensive Air Support (OAS) -- where CAS, DAS (Deep Air Support --

       defined as air interdiction and armed reconnaissance) reside,

 

       Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) --where both surface-to-air and air-to-air offensive and

       defensive operations can be found,

 

       Assault Support -- the traditional home of helicopters and KC-130s,

 

       Air Reconnaissance -- once the home of the RF-4B; now without a dedicated

       aircraft for the mission,

 

       Electronic Warfare (EW) -- home to the VMAQ squadrons of EA-6B Prowlers,

       and,

 

       Control of Aircraft and Missiles -- home of air traffic control.

 

                Table 3. The Six Functions of Marine Aviation86

 

       Until recently the only aircraft in OAS were fixed-wing attack jets. The attack

 

helicopter's migration from Assault Support to Offensive Air Support may entail or require

 

new roles and missions, though its main contribution will be in the area of close air

 

support. One relatively new role the Cobra is expected to perform is that of visual combat

 

air patrol, or "VisCap."87 This entails operating as a picket to provide surveillance and

 

interdiction of aggressor aircraft in terrain not suitable for Marine fast-movers. More

 

importantly, this switch in functions is not just a recognition of the platform's capabilities,

 

but is perhaps representative of the Service's desire to expand the options open to the

 

ground commander in prosecuting the warfighter's battle. This was not an overnight nor

 

an easy transition for the SuperCobra, as it literally had to prove itself in combat to gain

 

the same degree of acceptance from the ground Marine that the AH-1F Cobra and

 

AH-64A Apache earned from the Army.

 

       The AH-1W is an able, multi-mission, combat-proven warrior that has only

 

recently joined the ranks of aircraft performing CAS. A good example of this, as

 

chronicled in the Marine Corps Gazette, is the 24 February 1991 rescue of the lead

 

elements of then-Brigadier General Mike Myatt's 1st Marine Division task force:

 

             "The highly successful air war is over. Saddam Hussein's order to ignite

       the Kuwaiti oil fields in a desperate attempt to delay the advancing Coalition forces

       nearly achieves its goal. Fixed-wing pilots, practically untouchable in their aircraft,

       find that they can no longer see their targets from a safe altitude; nor can they get

       low enough to fly under the dense, unnatural cloud cover the oil smoke has

       created. A-10s, F-16s, F/A-18s and AV-8s alike are helpless to provide the

       desperately needed close air support that the Marines of I Marine Expeditionary

       Force realize is not going to come. As the lead elements of a 1st Marine Division

       task force (with only light armored vehicles and some TOW HMMWVs)

       encounter a column of Iraqi T-72 tanks bearing down on them, a scene that is to

       replay itself several times over the next four days occurs. A flight of AH-1W

       SuperCobras, led by a lone forward looking infrared (FLIR)-equipped pathfinder

       UH-1N breaks out of the smoke -- as in the scene from the movie Apocalypse Now

       -- and roars over the besieged ground Marines with "TOWs on the wire" and

       20mm high-explosive incendiary (HEI) rounds rattling the hulls of the surprised

       Iraqi tankers. It is not surprising that the SuperCobras decimated the armored

       column -- Close In Fire Support (CIFS) is one of their missions. What is amazing

       is that the attack helicopters were able to get to the fight at all. Marine

       SuperCobra pilots flew to the edge of their capability and found their way to the

       battlefields, time and time again, coming through for their ground brethren. Flying

       on night vision goggles at high noon, virtually air-taxing along fresh tracks in the

       sand, nosing forward, hovering in the paths of fuel trucks to achieve some

       ingenious refueling, they were there when it counted. The mere thought of not

       "being there" when needed is so anathema, so distasteful to Marines that merely

       trying wasn't good enough. Semper volens, semper potens -- always willing,

       always able."88

 

       While the above quote represents a somewhat stylized version of the events of that

 

day, it is nevertheless factual. For Marine attack helicopters alone the Gulf War tally was

 

impressive:

 

Click here to view image

 

       The dilemma for attack helicopters is why, if they performed so well in our last

 

war, are they continuously underutilized or overlooked in the "FAC School" classroom

 

environment at Landing Force Training Command (Pacific & Atlantic), Combined Arms

 

Exercises (CAXs), field training scenarios at MCAGCC and in funding priority at HQMC?

 

This is especially curious, considering Marine AH-1Ws had the highest reported vehicle

 

kill ratio per number of aircraft employed of any platform that performed the CAS mission

 

in the war.90

 

       Marine Aviation has long fought to educate ground commanders on the

 

capabilities of air assets. Commanders who do not avail themselves of every weapon in

 

their arsenal, or worse, who are ignorant of the capabilities of the tools at their disposal

 

are destined to take unnecessary risks to accomplish the mission.

 

       The bottom line is rather than increasing the cost, complexity and inevitable

 

vulnerability of the fixed-wing and its munitions, perhaps what may be more cost effective

 

in the long run is to increase the number of AH-1Ws available to perform this mission

 

using ordnance and delivery capabilities that are already fielded. This does not mean

 

the Corps should transition responsibility for the CAS mission to attack helicopters alone.

 

Certainly the inherent danger there is the possible forfeiture of TacAir assets. The latter is

 

totally unacceptable. In the US Army's experience with attack helicopters, they found that

 

by treating them as solely CAS platforms, the helicopters were left out of the battle

 

planning process. Matthew Allen states in his book, Military Helicopter Doctrines of the

 

Major Powers, 1945-1992: Making Decisions About Air-Land Warfare, that this forced

 

their employment to be as a "last resort," -- essentially immediate CAS only.91 No matter

 

how decisive their actions may have proved, the fact is that they did not participate in

 

planning or "shaping," only in reacting. This was one factor that led the Army into

 

investigating the employment of their attack helicopters as a maneuver arm, accepted in

 

today's Army as a fact. Once considered a heretical concept, the idea of attack

 

helicopters giving the ground commander another maneuver element, even "controlling"

 

key terrain is now in the infant stages of being embraced by the Marine Corps as well.92

 

       Clearly the attack helicopter brings a variety of assets and capabilities to the CAS

 

table that complement, augment and even surpass, in some cases, those of some of the

 

Corps' fixed-wing attack aircraft. The time for these to be overlooked and underutilized is

 

past. Rather than have to justify the existence of either the AH-1W or the F/A-18 in the

 

Marine Corps, a detailed investigation into ways to make them even more capable of

 

complementary CAS is warranted.

 

                                   CHAPTER 6

 

 

                            JOINT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

 

 

       Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Strain, USAF, takes a different tack on the CAS

 

issue, writing that the answer is to move away from the idea of close air support and

 

consider the genre merely close support. His rationale, which is representative of Air

 

Force thought on the subject, is that if the U.S. force has sufficient "indigenous lethality"

 

from a broad spectrum of weapons systems, the need for immediate CAS should prove to

 

be a rarity. He states:

 

       "With the development of improved guidance and fire control systems, support to

       forces engaged close-in can be accomplished just as easily with new forms of

       artillery, both air and surface-launched stand-off weapons that dispense cluster and

       anti-armor munitions, and emerging non-lethal technologies."93

 

       For the Army the statement above is closer to the truth, but the Marine Corps

 

could only hope to approach such in a joint scenario. Such a concept would require

 

pre-planned and on-call supporting fires (MLRS, cruise missiles, Naval Surface Fire

 

Support [NSFS]) readily available from the Army and Navy both, for reasons previously

 

discussed. Unfortunately the potentially rapid pace of modern battle makes the

 

preponderance of CAS requests likely to be of the "immediate" variety, as was the case in

 

SouthWest Asia. This obviously makes LtCol Strain's vision a bit more difficult to

 

achieve. Still, jointness is a major "plus" for the Corps when we can benefit from the fires

 

of other Services. However, if a MAGTF must "go it alone," such as in a MEU(SOC)

 

scenario, it simply must have that indigenous lethality -- all the fire support it needs to get

 

the job done right the first time. The key then is to find a way to weave the existing

 

systems into a deadly mix of interlocking, mutually supporting fires.

 

              "Among military men it is commonplace that interallied and interservice

       operations inescapably pose grave difficulties in execution. Differences in

       equipment, in doctrine, in attitude and outlook stemming from past experience all

       inhibit and complicate harmonious interaction. Past successes, however, have

       shown that these difficulties can be overcome where determination is present and

       effective procedures have been applied by properly trained troops. Experience

       also shows that armed forces...have been slow to hammer out the necessary

       procedures. Often corrective steps have been achieved only after many failures in

       battle. In no area of interservice operations has this phenomenon been more

       pronounced than in the matter of close air support.94 (emphasis added)

 

       Joint CAS is a requirement, not just a recommendation in a proposed publication.

 

It means Marine aircraft supporting other Services and vice versa. Also, the future of

 

Marine close air support means more than just the types of aircraft that it employs. For all

 

the Services to be able to achieve a seamless transition to true jointness in this endeavor,

 

three areas must be addressed: Training, C2 and equipment. This is not a new idea.

 

There have been numerous seminars and joint conferences between all the Services in an

 

attempt to make significant headway on this topic.95

 

       Training. Each CAS-providing Service should attend the same course in tactics,

 

techniques and procedures -- at least in the classroom. Ideally this could be expanded to

 

include live fire scenarios in joint exercises (of any scale) at the Marine Corps Air Ground

 

Combat Center (MCAGCC), the Army's National Training Center (NTC) and the Air

 

Force's "Flag" exercises at Nellis AFB. This would include pilots, FACs, TACPs and

 

planners.96

 

       Command and Control. The Gulf War brought the CAS mission and its inherent

 

complexities into direct focus for the Department of Defense. As General Colin Powell,

 

former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated:

 

       "Command and control systems and associated terminology vary greatly across

       service and [unified command] lines. These procedural differences, spread

       throughout the command and control system, magnify doctrinal differences and

       contribute to misunderstanding about service commitments to and effectiveness of

       CAS."97

 

       Having a single entity in charge of airspace coordination will help, but not fix this

 

issue. The myriad doctrinal differences between Service air control agencies make this a

 

tough nut to crack. Both the structure and the procedures must undergo a

 

"standardization overhaul" that will, at the very least, bring terminology and

 

mirror-function agencies. The difficulty, of course, is that what works for the

 

Navy/Marines may not tickle the fancy of the Army/Air Force.

 

       Equipment. Joint interoperability must proceed down one of two paths in the area

 

of equipment. Where it is incompatible, interface/translator systems for tactical air

 

control, direction and terminal guidance can be designed and procured, or preferably, the

 

former would be an interim fix while joint procurement focuses on joint requirements and

 

compatibility. In the truest sense, this applies not only to radios and "9-line CAS briefs,"

 

but to the aircraft, its weapons systems and ordnance as well. Historically such

 

requirement fusion -- on nearly any level -- has been a nearly impossible task to achieve.

 

The requirements generated by seabased, expeditionary aircraft are generally not palatable

 

to the Army and Air Force due to what they consider to be excessive cost. If we are

 

serious, however, the joint procurement trail for at least systems and their associated

 

interfaces must be traveled. This is being explored to some extent in the Joint Advanced

 

Strike Technology (JAST) program. This is a DoD-sponsored initiative focusing on

 

defining the family of aircraft that will evolve into Service variants of a common

 

technology (airframe).98

 

 

Jointness and Control Measures

 

 

              "The Gulf War not only marked a watershed in modern joint and combined

       operations, but also ushered in another, new type of warfare that is influenced by

       the course of emerging technology and the pace of world events. Like

       changes that have followed the development of new weapons throughout military

       history, doctrine and strategy are undergoing a revolution in the wake of

       greatly enhanced stealth, precision, and lethality of fielded systems. As a result,

       commanders can anticipate that operations will almost always be joint, that

       distinctions between the strategic and tactical levels will blur, that new centers of

       gravity will emerge, and that the combat area will be more complex and difficult

       to delineate. These changes require redefining campaigns and campaign phasing,

       interdiction, maneuver, close air support, and other time-honored terms."99

 

       Post-DESERT STORM Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) now face the

 

responsibility of controlling a battlespace that is more fluid, amorphous and quick to

 

change than any current control system can keep astride. The lessons learned from that

 

conflict point out the degree to which control measures can become constrictive before

 

they ever serve their intended purposes. The VII Corps' attempt at "rolling" Fire Support

 

Coordination Lines (FSCLs) ahead of them during their celebrated "left hook" was

 

responsible to a good degree for allowing a large portion of Iraqi Republican Guards to

 

safely withdraw across the border, while Coalition air elements were attempting to gain

 

approval to strike them within the FSCL. Nearly 800 tanks managed to escape back into

 

Iraq during that "sanctuary" period.100 This was a major source of friction between the

 

JFACC and the Army's VII and XVIII Corps commanders both during and after the war.

 

The frustration generated was principally because the forces that escaped were the very

 

Republican Guard units specifically targeted for destruction by the CINC. As a result,

 

though the GCE commanders were acting in accordance with valid doctrine, their

 

unilateral establishment of FSCLs effectively subverted the CINC's theater priorities.101

 

            Perhaps what is needed is not more control measures, but less. The need to

 

prevent fratricide is unquestioned; certain restrictive measures will always be necessary.

 

Perhaps the Air Force's notion of dividing up battlespace responsibility could be adapted

 

to enable maximum flexibility without sacrificing overall CINC control. For example,

 

Figure 1 illustrates a notional battle area where the three legs of the single battle are under

 

"flexible control" by various commanders.

 

       One issue is the placement of the FSCL, particularly in terms of where Air Support

 

must coordinate with the GCE and where they need not. For purposes of discussion, the

 

FSCL is determined in this instance by the range of Forward Observer (FO)/FAC/Air and

 

Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) - controlled artillery/Naval Gun

 

Fire/organic weapons, and all air support missions flown within that coordination line,

 

under control of a FAC, are by definition CAS.

 

Click here to view image

 

 

How Deep Is Deep?

 

 

 

       Since both Joint Pub 1-02 and FMFM 5-42 agree that air action "at such distances

 

from friendly forces that detailed integration with the fire and movement of friendly forces

 

is not required," then air support outside this FSCL is beyond the control of the GCE

 

Commander. By this definition, such air support is DAS (Air Interdiction or Armed

 

Reconnaissance, in USMC terminology). Because of the extended ranges of Army

 

weapons (120-150 km) that could be in support of Marine elements (such as security and

 

reconnaissance forces), coordination (not detailed integration) between MEF, ACE and

 

GCE commanders is still necessary out to what the author has termed the Joint Fires

 

Coordination Line (JFCL). A similar line is termed Deep Battle Synchronization Line

 

(DBSL), created by Combined Forces Korea (CFK), and in use by I MEF and various

 

Army components (U.S. Army III Corps). The British Army (of the Rhine) uses yet

 

another -- the Reconnaissance and Interdiction Planning Line (RIPL).102 Figure 2 is a

 

graphic depiction of the British model. In their scenario, the attack helicopter is the

 

primary CAS platform, with fixed-wing attack aircraft providing Battlefield Air

 

Interdiction (BAI) -- the elimination of threats prior to their reaching the FSCL.103 Such a

 

system is more akin to U.S. Army CAS planning than USMC, in that it relies on large

 

numbers of attack helicopters and long-range artillery to support the close battle. Perhaps

 

the Marine Corps could adopt a similar system by using attack jets to perform the

 

long-range artillery (as it does now), and complementing their attacks with an increased

 

number of attack helicopters.

 

Click here to view image

 

       Whether JFCL, DBSL or RIPL, the purpose is fundamentally the same. Beyond

 

this line there is little chance that the effects of weapons of either combat element

 

commander can effect the other. At issue here is the MEF Commander's ability to shape

 

"his" battlefield. Unquestionably the JFC's Battle takes precedence, but surely there

 

is an achievable balance. In Figure 1 (see page 55), the author has determined the outer

 

edge of the MEF Commander's Tactical Area Of Responsibility (TAOR) by dividing the

 

Deep Battlespace forward of the FSCL into JFC Deep and MEF Deep. This is an attempt

 

to visualize the MEF Commander's need to shape his battlefield and influence events 72

 

hrs and out, in accordance with the JFC's total battle. The key is to coordinate both,

 

without adversely impacting the overall effort. In any case, no amount of lines on a map

 

can replace the coordination that must be undertaken within the future battlespace at all

 

levels of command. The Marine Corps already has one aircraft eminently capable of

 

prosecuting that battle anywhere within the AOR -- the F/A-18. To do that it must

 

continue to be flexible in its ordnance loads. Until the new joint munitions arrive, this

 

means carrying a similar multi-mission mix to that carried in DESERT STORM. It also

 

validates the requirement to have sufficient attack helicopters available to complement that

 

ordnance choice with the PGMs AH-1Ws routinely carry.

 

 

 

Non-Linear Battlespace

 

 

 

       Regardless of where the close battle takes place, whether inside or beyond the

 

FSCL, one thing is clear. Unless the Corps embarks on a massive procurement of medium

 

and heavy artillery, to include MLRS, it will continue to need large numbers of attack

 

aircraft to supply the fires required to be victorious. The future continues to offer new

 

and more intricate variations on the battlespace, some more recognizable than others.

 

Marines will be measured not only on the relatively clean and predictable lines of a

 

"conventional battlefield," but in places where the lines are as blurred as the allegiances of

 

the belligerents. Indeed, we face our greatest challenges in the Bosnias and Somalias of

 

this and perhaps the next century. Without a monolithic Soviet Threat to be the focus of

 

our training, we are forced to prepare for a myriad of lesser (though every bit as deadly)

 

threats. The "Littoral Focus" is the current thrust, and is the obvious choice for a

 

seaborne Marine Corps constantly on the lookout for a raison d'etre, a reason to exist.

 

       The bulk of those areas place our battlefields in a different type of environment

 

than many of the past. Overpopulated, malnourished and poor third-world areas tend to

 

dominate the region. How does a commander draw FSCLs and try to call in fixed wing

 

CAS to negotiate Restricted Fire Areas (RFAs) in a "city" -- even a decaying carcass of

 

one such as Mogadishu? It is a challenge for the best of tacticians. A FAC is limited in

 

the ways he can describe which window of a building he is taking fire from to a fast

 

moving jet's pilot. Laser pointers/designators help to a degree, but the "geometry"

 

involved in setting up a safe laser PGM shot is difficult enough in an open battlefield,

 

much less a built-up area. Presently he can't just walk up to the jet pilot and point out

 

what he wants him to do, though perhaps in the future (10-20 yrs) he may have a digital

 

audio-video link to allow just that. If the AH-1W and F/A-18 had a munition more

 

suitable for urban operations, it might very well be the weapon of choice. Unfortunately

 

the only real anti-building weapons the SuperCobra carries are the TOW and HELLFIRE

 

missiles -- both with shaped-charge warheads, which are sufficient for some hard targets,

 

not so for others. Perhaps a more appropriate weapon would be a "blast-fragmentation"

 

warhead on the HELLFIRE, similar to the Swedish RBS-70 anti-ship HELLFIRE, now

 

being evaluated by the U.S. Navy for the new anti-ship upgrade on the SH-60B Seahawk.

 

On the fixed-wing side, a bomb in the neighborhood of 250 lbs, with an similar warhead

 

would be more appropriate.

 

       In any case, the clean, geometric battlefield painted in Figure 1 could easily be

 

usurped by the uncomfortable, ill-defined one of Figure 3, representing just such an urban

 

miasma. (Red cross-hatched rectangles represent built-up areas). In effect, the battlefield

 

"geometry," (i.e., urban or open) helps define both aircraft and mission requirements. It

 

would be logical to assume longer time on station requirements, increased PGM loads and

 

the types of munitions proposed above.

 

Click here to view image

 

 

The Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS)

 

 

 

       "CAS requires an integrated, flexible and responsive command and control

       structure to process CAS requirements, and a dependable, interoperable and

       secure communications architecture to exercise control.105

 

       As is the case with the air control systems of the other Services, MACCS is

 

responsible for the integration and coordination of all facets of Marine Air within the

 

MAGTF. As such, it should play a significant role in determining how to coordinate a

 

new framework for CAS along more complementary, and less competitive lines. Within

 

MACCS, the agencies most involved with the control of close air support are the Tactical

 

Air Command Center (TACC), Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC) and the Direct Air

 

Support Center (DASC). Airborne coordination of CAS assets is performed by the

 

Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne), or TAC(A). Terminal control of aircraft is

 

performed either by a FAC on the ground or in the air (FAC[A]). As efficient as this

 

operation is in getting aircraft to the target area in a timely manner, the procedure is

 

nowhere near as streamlined as it could be.

 

       Figure 4 is a stylized representation of the current Marine CAS request system. As

 

depicted, unless there are airborne CAS aircraft from a push CAS scenario, the FAC's call

 

will go to the DASC, get processed and retransmitted via another net to the fixed and

 

rotary wing Frag Officers on duty. There the request is matched to a mission off the ATO

 

for fixed-wing. Rotary-wing CAS is not listed on the ATO at the present time (nor was it

 

in DESERT STORM), and is scheduled through the DASC and the squadron flight

 

schedules.

 

Click here to view image

 

       Of the two classes of CAS, pre-planned and immediate, the former is the most

 

efficient. Pre-planned is broken down into pre-planned scheduled and pre-planned

 

on-call. Scheduled aircraft check in with the DASC and TAC(A)JFAC(A) per the time

 

listed on the ATO, and may or may not have to wait to perform their attack. On-call

 

aircraft are available for work if needed by the GCE. Immediate CAS is just as the name

 

connotes; when the GCE needs CAS, it needs it right now. Aircraft, both fixed and

 

rotary-wing, will stand strip alert, adhering typically to 5, 15 and 30 minute readiness

 

postures. The aircraft must be in a state of preparation to be airborne within the stated

 

timeframe. It is the most inefficient means of "fragging" aircraft support, but it serves the

 

ground commander well.

 

       The apparent key to simplifying the system would be to remove some of the middle

 

"filtering" levels in the C2 system, yet this is not an easy task. With any significant distance

 

or geographical barriers between the DASC and the ground FAC, the two are generally

 

incommunicado in a direct sense. The FAC depends on the TAC(A), FAC(A) or, if

 

available, the DASC(A) to keep his line of communication back to the DASC open. The

 

CAS jet requires clearance from the FAC before he can drop his ordnance, yet often

 

cannot talk to him without a third party (typically the TAC(A)) repeating both ends of the

 

conversation. (The ability of the F/A-18D to accomplish both TAC(A) and FAC(A)

 

duties on a limited basis will help somewhat.) Attack helicopters are nominally in the

 

same boat as the ground FAC, due to their low, terrain-hugging flight profile. While many

 

AH-1W pilots are FAC(A) qualified, the communications shortfalls of the aircraft can limit

 

this role. It is not uncommon for them to be unable to talk to anyone after TAC(A)

 

hand-off and prior to being in range of the ground FAC. Currently attack helicopters have

 

neither the High Frequency nor satellite radios required to communicate from their tactical

 

environment. Locating the Harriers and SuperCobras as close to the Forward Line of

 

Troops (FLOT) as tactically sound is one way to cut down on both transit and response

 

time.

 

      Satellite-based communication, given sufficient channels, could prove to be part of

 

the solution in the future. Ideally, the same "silence is consent" scenario employed by the

 

Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) on calls for artillery and mortar fire could help

 

streamline the CAS process as well. The critical missions would be the immediate CAS

 

requests, of course. This would require an automatic retransmission of CAS requests,

 

perhaps through a dedicated Tactical Air Request (TAR) net "manager" resident on an

 

orbiting FASTFAC, TAC(A), ABCCC, or more preferably, via a satellite bounce directly

 

to the DASC. Any controller or coordinator who could fill the request prior to action

 

being required back at the DASC could enter the net and take the mission, with the DASC

 

always in a position to non-concur.

 

      This would benefit the ground FAC and the attack helicopter the most, as they are

 

more tied to the inconsistencies of low altitude radio communications than fixed-wing

 

platforms. The attack helicopter could respond to missions within its capability, then

 

serve as a designation platform or FAC(A) for aircraft with more firepower for missions

 

beyond its capability. The reduction in radio coordination alone that such a satellite-based

 

"net manager" system would bring would be worth the price of the extra space vehicles

 

and SATCOM radios it would require to implement.

 

      Such a satellite feed to the proposed Force Fires Coordination Center (FFCC) in

 

the MEF rear could operate the deep battle in a similar fashion, presumably. A perfect

 

example would be a pilot on a deep interdiction mission spotting a high value target that

 

may have been previously unaccounted for. A call directly to the FFCC via the same type

 

of net monitoring described in the CAS scenario would clearly go a long way toward

 

facilitating the timely flow of intelligence and scrambling of attack assets that would be

 

mandatory to successfully react to the call. The time lapse involved in processing such

 

information through the normal intelligence channels frequently removes the MEF

 

commander from being in a position to act on such critical news.

 

       The FAC(A) is an indispensable part of this equation. While both the F/A-18 and

 

the AH-1W are capable to varying degrees (the F/A-18 by model -- the "D" is the

 

two-seat FAC(A)-capable variant; and the AH-1W by its flight regime and radio shortfall),

 

any serious changes to MACCS will require procurement initiatives to boost that

 

capability. Either aircraft must be capable of controlling the other when the FAC cannot,

 

or the mission dictates.

 

 

 

The Threat (1995-2005)

 

 

 

       The Marine Corps Mid-Range Threat Estimate (1995-2005) makes three

 

judgments about the world in the next ten years. First, chaos will be the norm. Ethnic,

 

religious and military conflict, both intra and inter-state will predominate the world's "hot

 

spots." The great majority of these hot spots lie in the littoral regions of the world.

 

Second, while most of these will be low-intensity conflicts, the spectrum of technology

 

many of these developing countries will be able to wield runs the gamut of low to highly

 

lethal in capability. "Nontraditional" arms producers such as South Africa will add to the

 

readily available glut of sophisticated weapons, to include nuclear, biological and chemical

 

(NBC). Third, the vast majority of the world where such chaos and technology will reign

 

is within the Marine Corps' expeditionary environment. What is worse, the shortfall in

 

readily available information about the states in the world's littorals brings heightened

 

danger to each and every MAGTF deployment into these new areas of concern.107 The

 

Threat Estimate goes on to say:

 

              "Successful application of tehnological developments will enhance the

       success of units and the lethality of conflict over the next ten years. The influence

       of technology can be immediate and profound: its successful employment permits

       any actor to exponentially accelerate the development of military capabilities....This

       could grant the adversary a tremendous gain in the capability to find out the

       weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the US force, while giving him the command,

       control and combat capabilities required to take advantage of his knowledge."108

 

       While on the surface this sounds like the rationale for increasing the technological

 

capabilities of our own equipment, it must be recognized than in doing so we run the risk

 

of both pricing ourselves out of the reduced-budget, new equipment market and

 

developing weapons systems so complex and expensive that we may hesitate to risk them

 

on certain missions. A CAS mission against just such a threat level, albeit in what may be

 

an overall low-intensity environment, may fit such a scenario. For example, consider a

 

joint scenario where a MEF ground element in the defense is engaged with an enemy

 

equipped with only an average armor and artillery capability, where the U.S. force has air

 

superiority, but the presence of a credible low altitude air defense supplanted with

 

numerous stolen Stinger surface-to-air missiles is suspected. The MEF commander must

 

choose between honoring that threat and sending his CAS aircraft to high altitude, or keep

 

them low, counting on his own SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) procedures

 

to minimize the danger. The higher he sends his fixed-wing the greater the difficulty in

 

IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) for his pilots. Yet if his troops need the CAS at a

 

critical juncture, perhaps to help stave off a mechanized assault under conditions of

 

darkness, he is likely to send the aircraft, regardless of the danger. His decision should not

 

end at this point, however.

 

       The question is whether to risk a $34 million machine in that environment when a

 

$10 million one might will suffice. In this scenario an attack helicopter, flying in a

 

nap-of-the-earth profile that uses the ground itself as protection, would be much less

 

vulnerable and every bit as lethal as a jet bombing from ten thousand feet. More to the

 

point, the commander shouldn't have to think about such a decision. There should be

 

sufficient air assets of both fixed and rotary-wing that the choice (which would be made by

 

the local commander or FAC, instead of higher) would not be a difficult one.

 

       Such a "sufficiency" is not apparent in today's Marine Corps. A look at the

 

numbers of aircraft from which a CAS inventory could be pulled is listed below:

 

USMC Fixed-Wing

FY-94 Unit Flyaway Cost/Aircraft

Aircraft Total #             (ancillary support not included)            Total Flyaway Investment

F/A-18A&C      179                                          $34.0M                                 $6.09B

F/A-18D              72                                            $34.0M                                 $2.45B

AV-8B               151                                          $29.5M                                 $4.45B

 

Total                  402                                          ------                                             $13.00B

 

USMC Rotary-Wing

FY-94 Unit Flyaway Cost/Aircraft

Aircraft Total #             (ancillary support not included)            Total Flyaway Investment

AH-1W             144                                          $9.9M                                      $1.43B

 

                        Table 5. USMC CAS Aircraft Inventory (current 22 March 1997)109

 

 

            The most interesting numbers in the table belong to the Harrier and Cobra. The

 

difference in capability between the two aircraft may not warrant a pricetag differing by a

 

factor of more than three. When one considers that the AV-8B Remanufacture program

 

presently being funded will cost approximately $140 million for just the first four aircraft,

                             

the numbers stand out even more.110   The money being appropriated for projects such as

 

AV-8B Remanufacture must provide the requisite return on investment for the ground

 

Marine. The night attack FLIR and engine upgrades can probably be justified to a ground

 

commander, resulting in the ability to loiter longer, carry greater payloads and fight at

 

night. Yet the Corps plans to add further enhancements to what is billed as its premier

 

CAS platform. By adding a radar and increasing its air-to-air capabilities, the Corps may

 

be unintentionally fueling the arguments of foes such as the Air Force, who say that the

 

Harrier could fill the void left by the Hornet's proposed transfer. The cost to add the

 

APG-65 radar to the AV-8B is considerable, to say the least. However, it should give the

 

Corps' primary CAS aircraft the ability to perform day/night radar bombing with accuracy

 

similar to the Hornet. It is also interesting that in the DoD "Conduct of the Persian Gulf

 

War" Final Report to Congress, nearly every aircraft that served in the conflict has both

 

its accomplishments and shortcomings (or issues) listed. The one notable USMC

 

exception was the AV-8B Harrier.111 The politics of this oversight/ommission should not

 

escape the reader.

 

       Funding aside, if it is simply a matter of working harder in the tactical arena to

 

"fine tune" the coordination requirements of CAS missions involving C2, Suppression of

 

Enemy Air Defense (SEAD), deconfliction and other related issues, then there is

 

insufficient attention and effort being generated within the Corps to resolve the issue.

 

SEAD has long been a thorn in the side of Fire Support Coordinators (FSCs) and tactical

 

planners. Since it played only a minor role in DESERT STORM, that interest appears to

 

be waning. The fact that there is a (Proposed) Joint Pub 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques

 

and Procedures For Close Air Support in work is a positive sign that, in the Joint

 

community at least, steps are being taken to safeguard friendly air and ground forces and

 

provide coherent, coordinated procedures for future CAS. The Marine Corps,

 

interestingly enough, is the lead Service in the development of this manual.

 

       The author contends that the capabilities of the F/A-18 and AH-1W, operating in

 

an integrated, complementary role, combined with the costs depicted in Table 3, are the

 

ideal aircraft to provide the "return on investment" previously stated. Furthermore, the

 

same reasons would seem to exclude the need for the AV-8B in the CAS role.

 

 

                                   CHAPTER 7

 

 

                            COMPLEMENT, NOT COMPETE

 

 

Complementary CAS

 

 

 

       While the Air Force feels that Army attack helicopters are sufficient enough to

 

warrant the retirement of both of the Air Force's primary CAS aircraft, the A-10 and

 

OA-10, the same is not true of the Marine Corps.112 Based on DESERT STORM lessons

 

learned, neither fixed nor rotary-wing aircraft perform CAS sufficiently to warrant

 

reductions (or even elimination) of the other community. More logically, there is a place

 

for each in a complementary role in the CAS battle now. Marine Air is not suffering from

 

mission/capability redundancy, but rather an underachieving force structure/architecture

 

that could be manipulated to complement strengths and negate vulnerabilities.

 

       Just as no Service should expect to fight a battle (or a war) on its own, neither

 

should the Marine Corps try to fight this one segment of it using just one platform. No

 

single weapons system is so "stand-alone" that it would not benefit from cooperative

 

employment with a complementary system. In this case, it is finding the proper mix of

 

systems that provide such a synergistic approach to battle. The fact is that the Corps has

 

historically treated the fixed and rotary-wing complementary issue as a fixed vs rotary

 

issue -- often not so surreptititiously.

 

       As previously stated, attack helicopters could not be equal partners in the CAS

 

mission due to limitations in capability. Why has it taken so long for attack helicopters to

 

make the technological advances necessary to maximize their potential and become such

 

partners? In the author's opinion, it is partly due to the opposition of the fixed-wing

 

hierarchy in USMC Aviation, which saw the attack helicopter as competition for

 

fixed-wing attack, rather than as cooperative partners or complimentary attack forces on

 

an attack team. Primarily, however, it is due to the attack helicopter community's inability

 

to reach a consensus on requirements and articulate them to HQMC. It can no longer

 

afford to do so. While the pursuit of shares of a limited defense budget have forced the

 

competition for some time, this organizational conflict at the expense of doctrinal

 

cooperation is not healthy for either the Marine Corps or our defense systems management

 

effort. The days of elevating one system/aircraft above others that can do the same

 

mission are over. Just as "jointness" is the way the United States must organize, plan and

 

fight its future wars, so is complementary battlefield aviation integration the way the

 

Corps must prosecute its CAS. A lesson can be learned from the Army and Air Force

 

battles in the seventies over which program would support the Army better -- the Army's

 

AH-56 Cheyenne or the Air Force's A-X (eventually the A-10). The results of their

 

infighting demonstrates what can happen if this complementary view is for show only:

 

       "For public consumption, Air Force and Army officials say the A-X and Cheyenne

       are complementary, not competitive, systems. But a history of the development of

       the two programs clearly indicates that a contest has been underway for several

       years.

 

       The AH-56 Cheyenne was subsequently canceled for technical problems, while its

 

competitor, though also experiencing problems, was scaled down into what is now the

 

A-10. Ironically, the Air Force would now like to delete the A-10 from its active

 

inventory as well.

 

 

 

Marine Hunter-Killer Teams (MarHuk)

 

 

 

       The "attack team" mentioned earlier is the most logical way to employ both fixed

 

and rotary-wing assets in the close air support scenario. During the latter stages of the

 

Vietnam War the Marine Corps used a concept called Marine Hunter-Killer, or MarHuk,

 

to attack and defeat North Vietnamese anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and gun positions

 

along the coast. Brand new AH-1J SeaCobras, joining the war in late 1968, based on

 

LPD shipping would form attack teams of two to four aircraft. Two would fly "high,"

 

usually above 1500 feet, in an attempt to attract radar attention and draw AAA fire from

 

enemy coastal and riverine batteries. The high aircraft were the "hunters," while the

 

second section of aircraft, the "killers," would fly in at NOE altitudes to fire 5" Zuni

 

rockets at the targets. Though highly effective, the concept became obsolete overnight

 

with the introduction of the shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile shortly thereafter.114

 

       Perhaps a revival of this concept, with TacAir replacing the SeaCobras in the

 

"killer" role, would offer a reasonable way to achieve complementary success. The

 

AH-1W would work in pre-briefed missions with the Hornet or Harrier, "hunting" for

 

targets in the close battle. Whether discovering them on their own or in cooperation with

 

a ground FAC, the SuperCobras could make the determination on preferred tactics to

 

engage and destroy the target based on the pilot's experience as both a FAC(A) and attack

 

operator. Fratricide could be minimized by allowing the AH-1W to use its on-board Night

 

Targeting System (NTS) to detect, recognize and finally, provide positive verification of

 

the target's identity. The ability of the helicopter to maneuver closer to the target, and at

 

slower speeds than the "fast-mover" will facilitate a higher recognition rate in a reduced

 

time period. The NTS's laser designator/rangefinder can be operated with each of the

 

system's organic FLIR, television and direct view telescopic optics. Should the FAC or

 

the AH-1W pilot determine that a complementary engagement would offer the greatest

 

chance of success, the helicopter can lase the target for accurate range and grid coordinate

 

data, then provide both that data and a stable laser "spot" as the mark for the "killer"

 

aircraft to employ. Ideally, the attack jet would lock onto the spot and drop PGMs onto

 

the hapless enemy target. Should environmental conditions or lack of PGM inventory

 

preclude it, the grid coordinates would be entered into the jet's fire control computer for

 

an accurate "dumb" bomb drop.

 

       The F/A-18 can now carry an updated version of their older Laser Designator

 

Targeting (LDT) pod, called the "CPO" pod.115 This provides him with both a targeting

 

FLIR and Laser capability in the same pod, thus freeing up a wing station for ordnance,

 

fuel or a navigation FLIR pod. The AH-1W's laser spot will be graphically depicted on

 

the Hornet's Multi-Function Display (MFD), and the F/A-18 pilot's Head's Up Display

 

(HUD) steering cursors will allow him to make precision attacks almost routinely. In the

 

instance where the situation might be reversed, when perhaps localized environmental

 

conditions (smoke, etc.,) might interfere with the Cobra's "hunter" duties, it would be

 

possible for the Hornet to do the designating for the AH-1W's HELLFIRE missile system,

 

thus reversing the roles. Such a scenario would be ideal when the Hornet has no PGMs of

 

its own to attack precision targets with. The possibilities are enormous, but only if the

 

two communities recognize them, train to take advantage of them, and have sufficient

 

assets (both in aircraft and CPO pods) to make complementary CAS the desirable option.

 

The AV-8B Harrier's night attack capabilities and planned upgrades would allow it to

 

participate more fully in such a cooperative CAS arrangement as well. Only its short

 

"legs" and reduced payload keep it from being a more viable member of such a MarHuk

 

concept at the present time.

 

       The Army and the Air Force have used a similar version of this concept, called

 

Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) with their A-10s and Cobras, the latter being succeeded by

 

Apaches, but the training is sporadic and not as adequately integrated as is necessary to

 

truly refine the concept. The A-10 is also configured as a day, clear weather attack

 

aircraft. It would require major budgetary and programmatic initiatives to be upgraded to

 

the all-weather, night attack category, an option the Air Force is currently unwilling to

 

pursue.116 With the Marine version of a revised MarHuk only the most severe weather

 

will completely prohibit any type of CAS; with the night and "less-than-ideal" weather

 

capabilities of the F/A-18D and AH-1W, plus the programmed improvements to the

 

AV-8B, this is unlikely to occur often. There will be times when the threat or terrain

 

precludes the SuperCobra from executing its "hunter" duties, or when weather will not

 

allow the use of PGMs or visual target detection by the "killer" attack jet, but rarely will it

 

be so prohibitive that neither can function.

 

       Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) has made a

 

strong attempt to integrate the fires of the fixed and rotary-wing CAS assets during the

 

exercises in its bi-annual Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) Courses since late 1993.

 

In its Instructor Outline for "OAS Fixed Wing/Rotary Wing Integration," (CWTI 00160),

 

MAWTS-1 teaches that the Corps has historically done a good job at integrating either

 

fixed or rotary-wing assets with artillery, but not with each other.117 The outline stresses

 

that knowledge of Marine Air capabilities as well as friendly and enemy situations are

 

critical. More importantly, a simplified system of integrating attack helicopters with

 

fixed-wing CAS aircraft must be devised and practiced. The outline advocates the

 

development of "simplistic target area templates" that will help FACs and FAC(A)s plan

 

and implement integration options based on recognizable battlefield scenarios.118 A good

 

example follows:

 

       "Sending fixed wing attack aircraft to "iron bomb" tank formations may not make

       sense if we have HELLFIRE equipped AH-1Ws available. Conversely, utilizing

       attack helicopters to strip infantry from the same armored column when artillery or

       cluster munition armed fixed wing attackers are available is equally wasteful.

       Threat permitting, the solution lies in a plan that utilizes the AH-1Ws to engage

       the tanks, while the AV-8s and F/A-18s simultaneously engage the supporting

       infantry. Again, the goal is to optimize the capabilities of our OAS assets and

       integrate them into the fire support plan in complementary ways."119

 

For the type of integration detailed in this outline to be successful, old doctrinal mind-sets

 

must be overcome. We must think in terms of cooperative, rather than sequential CAS

 

engagements as the norm. Instead of the fire support plan listing timelines for air support

 

where fixed and rotary are segregated events, the effort must be made to ensure they are

 

planned and practiced as integrated occurrences.

 

       One key variable that must not be overlooked is non-lethal fires. The EA-6B

 

Prowlers of the Marine VMAQ squadrons are extraordinarily well-equipped to provide the

 

SAM protection frequently required for the shooter aircraft. Whether the protection is in

 

the form of jamming or firing lethal High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM) at

 

enemy radar emitters, the EA-6B would be an indispensable partner in the MarHuk

 

scenario. With the Prowler jamming, either hunter or killer could find itself performing

 

the SEAD mission for the other. The AH-1W's employment of the SIDEARM

 

anti-radiation missile would be an effective complement to the fast-movers' HARM. This

 

would be a change in training for the AH-1Ws at the least, for few past helicopter

 

missions require or warrant Prowler protection. The key is to assemble a team that offers

 

the highest chance of succeeding in providing superior close air support to the ground

 

Marines.

 

       Implementation of the MarHuk concept for a MEF-sized force would require a

 

significant increase in the HQMC programmed requirement of 233 attack helicopters

 

(primary authorization + pipeline + attrition aircraft), probably in the form of three

 

additional HMLA squadrons of 18 AH-1Ws each.120 At present each Amphibious Ready

 

Group (ARG)/MEU(SOC) deploys with only four AH-1Ws, while those ARGs that

 

deploy with LHA or LHD class ships carry six AV-8Bs in addition to the AH-1Ws.

 

Attack helicopters, like their fixed-wing counterparts, are employed in combinations of

 

two aircraft, called "sections." The MEU ACE must maintain 100% mission capability to

 

operate two sections, yet those same two are tasked with escorting the 18-24 transport

 

helicopters aboard, as well as providing CAS to the embarked GCE. The issue of

 

increasing the numbers of AH-1Ws aboard MEU(SOC) shipping to at least six is currently

 

under study at HQMC.121

 

       The Center for Naval Analysis recently completed a report entitled "Bombs on

 

Target" (CRM 94-144) that researched the feasibility of future technology to give the

 

FAC ultimate responsibility for both target designation and the authorization to deliver

 

weapons --- whether or not the FAC can see the aircraft or the pilot can see the target.122

 

The study was commissioned by the Commanding General of MCAGCC, at MCB

 

Twentynine Palms in an effort to reduce the "wasting" of fixed-wing CAS sorties during

 

Marine Combined Arms Exercises (CAXs). Such wasting occurs on a fairly regular basis,

 

primarily because the FACs are "geographically" challenged in the mountainous desert

 

environment of Twentynine Palms. The situation isn't restricted to mountainous terrain,

 

obviously. During Operation DESERT STORM, there were numerous instances where

 

ground FACs knew there were enemy vehicles just over their limited visual horizon, yet

 

they could not be spotted from the FAC's earthbound position. One such occurrence is a

 

first-hand account by Marine Lieutenant Colonel Barry Ford:

 

              "As the Marines were coming from the west onto the East-West road into

       Kuwait City, we were screening the flanks of the Marine company. Visibility was

       less than 200 meters, and we had to fly under the telephone lines because of the

       extremely low ceiling. We received frantic calls from the company we were

       supporting and then their FAC to "take out an enemy vehicle coming down the

       road." I saw the vehicle at 300 meters, but couldn't confirm it was enemy. At that

       time the FAC cleared us hot on the vehicle, and I said "confirm no friendlies on

       that side of the road," and he said "Confirmed. All Marines on this side of the

       road. Cleared hot! Cleared hot!" We still had to approach to within 75 meters to

       get a good ID on it (we had no Night Targeting Systems yet), and just as we were

       about to open fire my wingman yelled "Abort, abort, abort! There's Marines

       crawling all over that vehicle!" Sure enough, we could now see the Marines had

       already captured the vehicle and were pulling Iraqi's out of it. That wasn't the only

       time I was cleared hot when I knew the FAC couldn't see the target. We all grew

       accustomed to asking FACs to confirm numerous times before we shot -- a bad

       habit in combat, but the only way we had to limit the fratricide."123

 

       Incidentally, when asked about the use of AH-1Ws in a MarHuk-style

 

arrangement, the study's principle researcher said the use of attack helicopters in any

 

fashion for CAS was, unfortunately, never addressed nor considered by either those who

 

commissioned the study or performed it.124

 

       One shortcoming the above quote clearly highlights is the predicament of today's

 

ground FAC. Ultimately responsible for not only getting CAS assets for his commander,

 

he is the individual who "owns" the bombs once he clears the CAS pilot "hot" to deliver

 

them. Yet he is outfitted with underpowered, outdated communications equipment and is

 

transported (if he's lucky) in a HMMWV driven by his lone ad hoc Tactical Air Control

 

Party member. His sole target acquisition asset is his pair of binoculars, yet he is charged

 

with locating targets and processing them for destruction by air in day, night and adverse

 

weather conditions. This is unacceptable by any accounting.

 

       First, the Marine Corps must seriously consider equipping the FAC with

 

high-powered, long-range, frequency-agile communications equipment that will give him

 

the chance to get the job done. Clearly the importance of CAS in the MAGTF warrants

 

this. Second, he must have night capable electro-optical/FLIRsystems of sufficient

 

magification to at least detect and recognize targets out to the range of infantry organic

 

weapons. Identification can be accomplished by the AH-1W in the "hunter" role, if

 

necessary. A suitable system would be to mount either the SuperCobra's Night Targeting

 

System (NTS) or the OH-58D's Mast Mounted Sight (MMS) on top of a telescoping pole

 

to give the FAC some ability to extend his visual horizon and magnify a target. With

 

either of the above systems he could get accurate laser rangefinding and even

 

self-designate the target for the CAS killers. This would be ideal for both the

 

LASER-capable F/A-18 and AH-1W. Finally, he needs the speed, protection, agility and

 

mobility of the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) as his dedicated FAC vehicle. These three

 

improvements would go a long way towards improving the capability and performance of

 

the finest FACs in the world -- U.S. Marine aviators. As Captain Harry Ward, DESERT

 

STORM Marine FAC puts it:

 

       "...it is more likely that the movement of the infantry would be slower and,

       therefore, the coordination of fixed-wing aircraft would be easier. The bottom line

       is that the future of close air support in the Marine Corps is fixed-wing attack jets

       and attack helicopters controlled by tactically proficient FACs."125

 

       Investigations into the future of CAS are represented by their inclusion in the

 

ongoing White Commission on Roles and Missions and the House Armed Service

 

Committee hearings. Unfortunately at the time of printing of this writing, the commission

 

had not released any interim or final reports on the subject. The significance of the

 

inclusion of CAS in the proceedings underscores the importance that is still placed on this

 

vital warfighting capability.

 

       It is incumbent upon Marine planners in the acquisition community to procure the

 

best aircraft and weapons systems to perform this missions. Additionally, it is the

 

responsibility of tacticians in both the ground and aviation communities to ensure these

 

systems are utilized in a manner that best meets the MAGTF commander's requirements,

 

whether fighting solo or as part of a joint or combined force.

 

 

                                   CHAPTER 8

 

                                  CONCLUSION

 

 

       The battlespace of the future is liable to increase in complexity, lethality and pace,

 

regardless of its associated "intensity level." It is likely to be held in a locale where the

 

violence is as intense as the hatred that fuels it. Regardless of the speed at which it

 

advances, Marine infantry will continue to need close air support to augment its killing

 

potential. Without an ambitious, possibly doctrinally unsound and prohibitively expensive

 

program to modernize the Corps' close and long range organic fires, it is likely to remain

 

so. The Marine Corps simply does not need to take on the trappings of a second land

 

army if the aviation community can adequately fill the bill.

 

       The historical evolution of CAS, its current direction and the latest initiatives of

 

our "Sister Services" unmistakably point to a Marine Corps future (1995-2005) served by

 

both fixed and rotary-wing aircraft operating in an integrated, "complementary" system.

 

Marine Hunter-Killer (MarHuk) teams of F/A-18s and AH-1Ws in sufficient numbers

 

should perform integrated, complementary CAS for Marines over the next decade. The

 

use of the MarHuk concept will provide the answer to the three elusive variables in CAS:

 

accuracy, fratricide and timely response. The key to success is to train both FACs and

 

aircrews to an acceptable MarHuk standard that is flexible enough to deal with

 

contingencies in these CAS "variables." The fall-back position will be for the ground unit

 

to make use of whatever CAS platform is able to reach the battle. There simply must be

 

sufficient assets of both fixed and rotary-wing CAS aircraft available and capable of doing

 

the job. The goal in MarHuk is smart, complementary CAS, not short-sighted

 

competition.

 

                                     NOTES

 

 

1     JCS Pub 1 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 June 1987), 70.

 

2     (Proposed) Joint Pub 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures For Close

Air Support, (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff; 15 November 1994), I-2, and FMFM

5-41, Close Air Support and Close-in Fire Support, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters

United States Marine Corps. 28 October 1992), 1-1.

 

3      (Proposed) Joint Pub 3-09.3, I-5.

 

4      (Proposed) Joint Pub 3-09.3, I-4, and (Draft) ATP-27 (C) Offensive Air Support

Operations, (United States Navy, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Military Agency for

Standardization: May 1994), 3-3.

 

5      Field Manual (PM) 100-5 Operations, (Headquarters, Department of the Army,

Washington,D.C.: 14 June 1993), 2-19.

 

6      Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1 Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air

Force, (Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.: March 1992),

161-165.

 

7     (Proposed) Joint Pub 3-09.3, I-4.

 

8     Brooke Nihart, "How the Marines Do It," Armed Forces Journal, Volume 107 (25

April 1970): 24.

 

9      Brooke Nihart, "McNamara Backs Army on Big Gun Ship Order," Journal of

Armed Forces, Volume 105 (13 January 1968):  1.

 

10     General Merrill A. McPeak, Chief of Staff; USAF. Presentation to the

Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, (U.S. Government Printing

Office, Washington, D.C.: 1994), 113.

 

11     Nihart, "How the Marines Do It," 24.

 

12     Department of the Army, "Force XXI," Army Focus 1994, (HQDA, Washington,

D.C.: September 1994), 29, and Department of the Army, "Aviation Warfighting

Treatise," (Headquarters, United States Army Aviation Center and Fort Rucker, Fort

Rucker, AL.: 27 September 1993), 23.

 

13     U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Close

Air Support, House Report 1965, 89th Congress, 2nd Session 1965. (Washington, D.C.:

US Government Printing Office, 1966) (U261 U5A6 1965a), 4872.

 

14     Congress, 4859.

 

15     Congress, 4861-4862.

 

16     Congress, 4862-4864.

 

17     Congress, 4864.

 

18     Congress, 4876.

 

19     John Everett-Heath, Helicopters in Combat: The First Fifty Years (London, Arms

and Armour Press, 1993), 37, 96.

 

20     "General Keith B. McCutcheon Papers," Box 2, Personal Papers Collection,

Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard.

 

21     Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC (Ret.), The Marine Officer's Guide (Naval

Institute Press: Annapolis, MD, 1977), 139.

 

22     Senator John Glenn and C.J. Heatley III, Forged in Steel: U.S. Marine Corps

Aviation (Howell Press, 1987), 17.

 

23     Joseph Volz, "Fairchild-Hiller, Northrop to Build AX Prototypes," Armed Forces

Journal, Volume 108 (4 Jan 1971): 17.

 

24     John J. Sbrega, "Southeast Asia," in Case Studies in the Development of Close Air

Support, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History,

United States Air Force, 1990), 441.

 

25     Sbrega, "Southeast Asia," 461-462.

 

26     Heinl, Jr., The Marine Officer's Guide, 140-141.

 

27     Allan R. Millett, "Korea, 1950-1953," in Case Studies in the Development of

Close Air Support, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air

Force History, United States Air Force, 1990), 381.

 

28     Millett, "Korea, 1950-1953," 381.

 

29     Millett, "Korea, 1950-1953," 383.

 

30     USAF Historical Research Center, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Korean Evaluation Project, "Commanders' quotes: CAS,"

File K110.8-33. (Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL 1953), 33.

 

31     Lecture presented at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College by a USMC

general officer entitled "Roles and Missions and the Marine Corps," MCB Quantico, VA,

12 December 1994.

 

32     Department of Defense Directive 5160.22, Change 1, Clarification of Roles and

Missions of the Departments of the Army and Air Force Regarding Use of Aircraft,

(Washington DC: Department of Defense, 26 April 1960). 232.

 

33     Heinl, Jr. The Marine Officer's Guide, 72.

 

34     USMC Command and Staff College lecture handout "JFACC," LtCol Joseph

Jones, USMC, MCB Quantico, VA, January 1995.

 

35     Lecture presented at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College by a

former USAF general officer JFACC, entitled "Component Command," MCB Quantico,

VA, 7 Dec 1994.

 

36     John Boatman and Barbara Starr, "The Battle For Superiority in US Roles and

Missions," Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 October 1994, 27.

 

37     "General Carl A. Spaatz Personal Papers," February 5, 1943, Box 10, Library of

Congress.

 

38     Major General J.M. Myatt, USMC. Letter to Commission on Roles and Missions

of the Armed Forces, subject: "Close Air Support and Fire Support in DESERT SHIELD

and DESERT STORM," 8 December 1994, 3.

 

39     John Boatman and Barbara Starr, "US Forces Joust Over Roles and Missions,"

Jane's Defence Weekly, 21 January 1995, 10.

 

40     Lecture presented at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College by a USMC

general officer entitled "Roles and Missions and the Marine Corps," MCB Quantico, VA,

12 December 1994, in which the general discussed the pending LOA with the Army over

MLRS support for the Marine Corps.

 

41     FMFM 5-42, from USMC Command and Staff College lecture handout

"Operational Level Offensive Air Support," LtCol D.A Driscoll, USMC, MCB Quantico,

VA, January 1995.

 

42     Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Pub. 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military

and Associated Terms., 70.

 

43     Congress, 4878.

 

44     Thomas PL Keaney, "Surveying Gulf War Airpower," Joint Forces Quarterly,

(Washington, D.C.: Autumn 1993, Number 2), 32.

 

45     Lieutenant Colonel D.A. Driscoll, Jr., USMC, Air Power in the Gulf War: JFACC

Targeting, Marine Corps War College Research Paper. (Quantico, VA.: 20 May 1994),

26.

 

46     (Proposed) Joint Pub 3-09.3, 1-3, 1-5.

 

47     Boatman and Starr, "Roles and Missions,"  29.

 

48     Boatman and Starr, "Roles and Missions,"  29.

 

49     Boatman and Starr, "Roles and Missions,"  27.

 

50     Boatman and Starr, "Forces Joust," 10.

 

51     Boatman and Starr, "Forces Joust," 10.

 

52     Lieutenant Colonel William G. Welch, USA. "Is Fixed-Wing CAS Worth It?"

Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1994, 53. LTC Welch was a 20 year Army

artillery veteran who developed his ideas on close air support while serving as the senior

operations and plans officer for the 1st Battlefield Coordination Element prior to, during

and after the Gulf War. He also served as a member of the special planning staff in "The

Black Hole," that planned air operations against Iraq.

 

53     Lieutenant Colonel Barry M. Ford, USMC. "The Future is Attack Helicopters,"

Proceedings, September 1994, 55.

 

54     Boatman and Starr, "Forces Joust," 10.

 

55     Former USAF JFACC, 7 December 1994.

 

56     Myatt, "Close Air Support and Fire Support in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT

STORM," 5.

 

57     Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen. Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary

Report, (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.: 1993), 48-51.

 

58     Boatman and Starr, "Forces Joust," 10.

 

59     Lieutenant Colonel Frederick R. Strain, USAF. "The New Joint Warfare," Joint

Force Quarterly, September 1993, 17.

 

60     Center for Naval Analyses, "Navy/Marine Corps TACAIR Integration," Marine

Corps Projects at CNA, (Alexandria, VA: September 1994), 15.

 

61     CNA, "Navy/Marine Corps TACAIR Integration," 15.

 

62     CNA, "Navy/Marine Corps TACAIR Integration," 16.

 

63     Department of Defense, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," Final Report to

Congress, Appendix T, (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.: April

1992), 665.

 

64     Norman G. Ewers, "A Conversation with LtGen Royal N. Moore, Jr.," Marine

Corps Gazette. Quantico, VA., October 1991, 44-49, and an interview between LtCol

Mark Gibson and Major Charlie Mitchell, USMC, on 21 March 1995. Major Mitchell

served as the Operations Officer for VMFA-333, MAG-11 during Operations DESERT

SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

 

65     Department of Defense, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," 673.

 

66     (Proposed) Joint Pub 3-09.3, V-18 to V-19, and FMFM 5-41, 45.

 

67     (Proposed) Joint Pub 3-09.3, V-18 to V-19, and FMFM 5-41, 45.

 

68     Brooke Nihart (and staff), "Sixty Years of Unresolved Problems," Armed Forces

Journal, Vol 107 (25 April 1970): 23.

 

69     Sbrega, "Southeast Asia," 453.

 

70     Driscoll, Airpower in the Gulf War: JFACC Targeting, 25.

 

71     Lieutenant General Royal N. Moore, USMC, "Marine Air: There When Needed,"

Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1991, 63-70.

 

72     Myatt, "Close Air Support and Fire Support in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT

STORM," 5.

 

73     McPeak, Presentation to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed

Forces, 92.

 

74     McPeak, Presentation to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed

Forces, 93.

 

75     McPeak, Presentation to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed

Forces, 115.

 

76     David A. Fulghum, "Pentagon Criticizes Air Strike On Iraq," Aviation Week and

Space Technology, January 25, 1993, 47.

 

77     Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol II.

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 352-353.

 

78     Earl W. Rubright, "Balance-Blast-Budget," Unpublished research paper for HQ

USCENTCOM/CCPB MacDill AFB, FL, March 4, 1993, 1.

 

79     Mitchell interview, 21 March 1995.

 

80     Keaney, "Surveying Gulf War Airpower," 33.

 

81     Rubright, "Balance-Blast-Budget," 1.

 

82     Rubright, "Balance-Blast-Budget," 2.

 

83     William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and

Congress, (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.: February 1995), 204.

 

84     Welch, "Is Fixed-Wing CAS Worth It?" 53.

 

85     Stephanie Kang. "Other Incidents of Friendly Fire." The Navy Times, April 1994,

9.

 

86     FMFM 5-40 Marine Aviation, from USMC Command and Staff College lecture

handout "Marine Aviation," LtCol D.A. Driscoll, USMC, MCB Quantico, VA., January

1995.

 

87     Command and Staff College lecture handout "Marine Aviation: Anti-Air Warfare

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS," LtCol D.A. Driscoll, USMC, MCB Quantico, VA.,

January 1995.

 

88     Major Mark J. Gibson, USMC, "The AH-1W SuperCobra: Semper Volens,

Semper Potens," Marine Corps Gazette, December 1992, 71.

 

89     DoD, Final Report to Congress, Appendix T, 667-668, and HQMC (Code APW)

Memorandum stating AH-1W recorded statistics from Gulf War, 2 March 1995.

Comparing statistics from the various Services and aircraft involved in CAS is difficult.

Even within USMC aircraft, some reported Mission Capable rates, other Fully Mission

Capable and still others "availability" rates. The difficulty in determining whether a

mission launched as CAS actually completed the mission as CAS, AI or armed

reconnaissance remains not fully resolved.

 

90     "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," 667, and APW Memorandum.

 

91     Matthew Allen, Military Helicopter Doctrines of the Major Powers, 1945-1992:

Making Decisions About Air-Land Warfare (Westport, 1993), 226.

 

92     USMC Command and Staff College Faculty lecture, "Defensive Operations --

Aviation." MCB Quantico, VA, 1995.

 

93     Strain, "The New Joint Warfare," 22.

 

94     Professor I.B. Holley, Jr., in Case Studies in the Development of Close Air

Support, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History,

United States Air Force, 1990), 535.

 

95     Lieutenant Commander Matthew J. Faletti, USN, "Close Air Support Must Be

Joint," Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1994, 57.

 

96     Faletti, "Close Air Support Must Be Joint," 57.

 

97     General Colin L. Powell, USA (Ret.), Roles, Missions and Functions of the

Armed Forces of the United States, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1993),

iii-17.

 

98     Perry, Annual Report to the President and Congress, 197.

 

99     Strain, "The New Joint Warfare," 17.

 

100    Keaney, "Surveying Gulf War Airpower," 34.

 

101    McPeak, Presentation to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed

Forces, 35.

 

102    Everett-Heath, Helicopters in Combat: The First Fifty Years, 150.

 

103    Everett-Heath, Helicopters in Combat: The First Fifty Years, 150.

 

104    Everett-Heath, Helicopters in Combat: The First Fifty Years, 151.

 

105    (Proposed) Joint Pub 3-09.3, II-1.

 

106    (Proposed) Joint Pub 3-09.3, II-16.

 

107    MCIA-1570-001-95, "Threats in Transition" Marine Corps Mid-Range Threat

Estimate -- 1995-2005, (Quantico, VA., Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, July 1994),

viii-ix.

 

108    MCIA-1570-001-95, 12.

 

109    Major Mark Bamberger, USMC, Aviation Plans and Weapons Requirements

Officer, APW-53, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, interview by author, 21

March 1995. Major Bamberger is responsible for AH-1 and UH-1 requirements at

HQMC.

 

110    Bamberger interview, 21 March 1995.

 

111    Department of Defense, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," 673.

 

112    McPeak, Presentation to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed

Forces, 521.

 

113    Joseph Volz, "AX vs AH-56: Competitive or Complementary." Armed Forces

Journal, Vol 107. 25 April 1970, 25.

 

114    Brigadier General Coleman D. Kuhn, USMC, (Ret.). Former Commanding

General of 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade, interview by the author in the spring of

1993.

 

115    Mitchell interview, 21 March 1995.

 

116    McPeak, Presentation to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed

Forces, 108.

 

117    Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, "OAS Fixed Wing/Rotary

Wing Integration; Instructor Outline," CWTI 00160, (MAWTS-1, Yuma, AZ.: 13

September 1993), 2.

 

118    Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, 6.

 

119    Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, 5.

 

120    Captain Steven L. Fahrenkrog, USN, Marine Attack Helicopter Program Manager,

PMA-276, interview with the author on 23 March 1995.

 

121    Bamberger interview, 21 March 1995.

 

122    Dr. Dennis A. Gallus, Center for Naval Analysis, interviewed by the author on 1

March 1995, concerning issues raised by his study "Bombs on Target" (CRM 94-144),

CNA.

 

123    Lieutenant Colonel Barry M. Ford, USMC, interview with the author concerning

FAC and fratricide issues during Operation DESERT STORM, on 26 March 1995.

 

124    Gallus interview, 1 March 1995.

 

125    Captain Harry Ward, USMC, "Comment and Discussion on LtCol B.M. Ford's

article "The Future is Attack Helicopters," Naval institute Proceedings, October 1994,

12.

 

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