Reserve Support Of Operations Other Than War
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Manpower
CONTENTS
Executive Summary i
Introduction 1
Bottom Up Review 2
Peacetime Operational Missions 5
Peace Operations 8
Composition of Marine Corps Reserve 9
Access 13
Personnel Tempo 19
Annual Training Period 21
Finite Resource 25
Involuntary Mobilization 29
Mobilization Legislation 31
Marine Corps Input 32
Limitations 36
Funding 38
Conclusion 41
Endnotes 45
Bibliography 51
FIGURES
Figure 1. Components of the Marine Corps Reserve 10
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Reserve support for Operations Other Than War
Author: Major Tom Duhs, United States Marine Corps Reserve
Research Question:
Within the framework of todays Defense budget, there is a
disparity between continuing security requirements and available
resources. The United States Defense Department continues to
maintain a strategy of forward deployed naval forces. This
strategy impacts the peacetime personnel tempo, which has been
increased due to the downsizing of the Marine Corps force
structure. In order for the Marine Corps to maximize the use of
all of its resources, the Marine Corps Reserve can be employed to
a greater extent, which includes missions not traditionally
assigned to Reservists. The Marine Corps Reserve, included as
part of the Total Force in Operations Other Than War, can
decrease personnel tempo pressure on the Active Component. The
Marine Corps Reserve as part of the Total Force can make
significant contributions to any Marine Air Ground Task force to
which they may be assigned.
Discussion:
One of the objectives of the Bottom Up Review was for the
services to examine ways in which the Reserve forces could
contribute to Operations Other Than War and thus reduce personnel
tempo (perstempo). For its part, the Marine Corps Reserve offers
three ways in which it supports the Active Component and meets
these requirements. The first way is to use individual
volunteers for various operations, exercises or special projects
and pay them with special funds. The second way, is for the
Reserve to augment the Active Component with specialized units
trained to accomplish specific tasks and missions over their two
week annual training period or weekend drill periods. Finally,
Reservists could be "mobilized" or "activated" by the President
and Congress for a specific amount of time for a specific task
which could include Operations Other Than War or other situations
where Reserves could be employed.
In each of the ways, there are limitations, risks, and costs
involved. For example, Reserve volunteers are limited by law to
the amount of time in which they can serve on active duty.
Additionally, the amount of funding dollars available is "finite"
and that limits the number of individuals the Corps is able to
pay to serve as volunteers. One solution is to use Reservists
for operational commitments, rather than allowing them time to
conduct their annual training periods.
For a Reservist, time is a crucial factor when considering
which option to choose. Specific units trained for specific
tasks are usually available for only the two week period. This
limit makes it an option of limited utility. Real world crises
or operations generally require more than a two week commitment.
Another option which maximizes the time available to use the
Reserves, is the "mobilization" or "activation" option. The
mobilization option carries the political cost which must be
shouldered by the president and Congress. Legislation currently
exists that allows for adequate time to make the transition from
"part-time" to "full-time" status.
The Commanding General of the Marine Forces Reserve has
offered several suggestions, using both options, regarding
possible missions that the Reserve may be able to take over or at
least contribute to. In either case consideration of increasing
the use of Reservists requires additional funding.
Conclusion:
The Marine Corps Reserve is capable and should conduct
Operations Other Than War as part of larger Marine Air Ground
Task Forces. Operations Other Than War are appropriate missions
for the Reserve and as part of the Total Force their contribution
is essential. Various references agree that the Reserve should
be included in Operations Other Than War.
Funding considerations will be a side issue when deciding
future use of the Reserve for Operations Other Than War. If the
decision is made to task the Reserve with Operations Other Than
War, funding must be provided.
Missions currently executed by the Active Component, such as
Great Lakes and UNITAS cruises are examples of assignments which
could be transferred completely to the Reserve. However, if the
Reserve is assigned additional missions which were previously
executed by the Active Component, funding must be commensurate
with those new taskings. Nevertheless, the Reserve Component is
the key part of the Total Force, especially in Operations Other
Than War, to bridge the gap between continuing security
requirements and limited resources. By using the Reserves, the
Marine Corps can decrease the perstempo of the Active Force.
Introduction.
Conflicts around the globe continue to involve the
Marine Corps in Operations Other Than War. A busy 1994 was
an indication of what may be expected in the future. We can
surmise that participation in Operations Other Than War will
continue as a major source of activity for the Naval forces.
The personnel tempo (perstempo) of the Active Component has
remained constant and shows no indication of decreasing
commitments. The Marine Corps Reserve, included as part of
the Total Force in Operations Other Than War, can decrease
personnel tempo pressure on the Active Component. Greater
reliance upon the Reserve continues to be more prevalent
since the Active Component end strength was reduced.
Operations Other Than War are viable missions for the Marine
Corps Reserve and as such they will be employed as part of a
larger Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The current
proposal toward increasing the use of the Reserve Component
poses both interesting opportunities and serious concerns
for the Marine Corps.
The Bottom-up Review, and subsequent policy guidance
from the Secretary of Defense, recommended Active duty
forces transfer completely some missions to the Reserve
Components.1 This thesis will examine a few of the current
issues that must be considered prior to committing the
Marine Corps Reserve to Operations Other Than War, or use as
a means of reducing the perstempo of the Active Component.
Views from the current and former Office of Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD RA), Ms.
Debbie Lee and Mr. Stephen M. Duncan respectively, will be
presented to discuss compensating leverage, peacetime
operational missions, domestic social problems, limitations
and expectations.
The Marine Corps position, and various options for
increasing the use of the Reserve in order to reduce
perstempo will be presented. Finally, existing legislation
governing the call-up of Reservists and the composition of
the Reserve manpower pool available to carry out additional
missions will be discussed. The concluding remarks will
show that the Marine Corps Reserve should be included as
part of Total Force Operations Other Than War thus
decreasing perstempo.
BOTTOM-UP REVIEW.
Now that the Cold War is over and the threat of global
war more remote, the Department of Defense (DoD) through the
Bottom-Up Review attempted to determine the following: How
do we structure the armed forces of the United States for
the future; and, how much defense is enough in the post-Cold
War era?2 The review assessed what each of the services
brought to the table in terms of capabilities. The forces
were then sized based on their capabilities.
The size of the active force has been reduced in the
"drawdown". Never-the-less, in order to maintain a robust
military capability, a new operational concept must be
developed. During a time of rancorous debate regarding
roles and missions, as well as tighter defense dollars, the
Marine Corps must find ways to continue to serve the nation
efficiently using all of its available resources. According
to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs,
Deborah R. Lee, the concept of "compensating leverage"
should signal a greater relative importance for the Reserve
Components compared to the past:
The Bottom-Up Review was a watershed document for the
Reserves that determined that we could and should --
rely more on the Reserves in the future. As a member
of the Bottom-Up Review team, I advocate a new strategy
for the new era -- a strategy I call "compensating
leverage". Compensating leverage means that, instead
of reducing the Reserve Components in the same direct
proportion as the Active Components, we should look for
smart, mission effective ways to use the Reserves to
control our peacetime costs and to minimize the risks
associated with the active draw down. It also means
assigning to the Reserves missions that properly employ
their strengths and providing them with sufficient
resources so that they can be ready when they are
needed.
The compensating leverage strategy was accepted
under the Bottom-Up Review. The result: we will look
even more to the Reserves in the future to help us
produce the win/win strategy we envision in the case of
two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies.3
In the political environment existing today, budgets
are austere, the structure of all services has been reduced,
programs are being cut, and further changes for the military
are in progress. The shrinking defense budget has been a
powerful catalyst for Congress and the military to take a
close look at the possible savings that may be achieved
through increased use of the Reserve Component. The
possibility of increased reliance on the Reserve may be
unpopular with some in the Active duty military.4 However,
there is no disagreement with this concept within the Marine
Corps. Increasing the use of the Reserve for operations is
completely consistent with Marine Corps philosophy.
The Clinton Administration supports a policy of
increasing the use of Reservists for peacetime operations.
These operations do not demand mobilization for war or
national emergency; however, use of the Reserves may be
required for unforeseen contingencies. Because of the
reductions in the size of the force, the Reserves may be
called upon to perform a number of tasks which have
previously not been considered within their purview. The
Bottom Up Review required the services to examine ways in
which Reserves may contribute to Operations Other Than War
and to reducing perstempo.5
Congress directed the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to
increase the opportunities for Reservists to serve on Active
duty in positions traditionally filled by Active Component
personnel. The SECDEF was required to: Review the
opportunities for Reservists to serve during peacetime in
positions traditionally filled by Active duty personnel and
to remove any impediments to this happening. SECDEF was
also required to report to the Congressional Armed Services
Committees on his plan to increase the use of Reservists in
peacetime and on any legislation necessary to increase such
opportunities.6
PEACETIME OPERATIONAL MISSIONS.
Peacetime operational missions fall under the umbrella
of Operations Other Than War, in that they require time,
resources, and possibly Reserve personnel to execute. The
Department of Defense has been looking for ways to assign
reservists to a wide range of "peacetime operational
missions and domestic social problems"7. Ms. Deborah R.
Lee, commented on her vision of Civil/Military Cooperation
for the Reserves.
In response to section 1081 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY-93, pilot programs have been
established at sites around the country. We are
initially concentrating on three focus areas for
potential Civil-Military pilot projects: (1)
Education/Job training, (2) Health and Medical Services,
(3) Engineering/ Infrastructure,-- programs drawing on
the extensive peacetime resources of Reserve members for
educational programs for at-risk youth and medical
programs for individuals in medically under served
areas, as well as providing stewardship for the national
infrastructure assets. The idea here has been to
leverage our defense resources-- facilities, equipment
and personnel-- to address critical needs here at home.
And to do so in ways that are fully compatible with
wartime readiness. Limited Office of the Secretary of
Defense-Reserve Affairs (OSD-RA) funding support is
designed to cover incremental costs involved in the
planning, coordination and initiation of the pilot
projects.
The results of these pilot programs are beginning
to show and it is indeed gratifying to see how Defense
resources can effectively be leveraged to address
critical needs here at home. We anticipate that in
addition to the existing pilot projects we will have new
pilots in fiscal year 1995. At the end of the fiscal
year 1994 pilot cycle, we will complete a comprehensive
report suggesting how the department should proceed with
civil/military cooperation programs for the future.8
Reserves have been called on to be actively involved in
efforts to stop "low literacy levels, high unemployment
rates, the high numbers of high school dropouts,
unavailability of health care, rising crime and drug
abuse".9
Although it is unclear as to how the Reserve Component
will "stop" these negative tendencies within our society,
those deficiencies have been identified as a priority for
action under the terms of the Bottom Up Review.
Fortunately, the Army and Air National Guard forces will
continue as the first line of defense for domestic
emergencies.10 As the Marine Corps Reserve gets marginally
involved with these problems, training time, which would
otherwise be spent on preparation for the conventional
warfighting mission, is lost.
Efforts, to include Reservists for activities not
involving important national security interests, deviate
from an important premise upon which the "Total Force"
concept was originally based. Former Army Chief of Staff,
Creighton Abrams intentionally integrated Reservist into the
modern Army's force structure for one reason: To make it
very difficult, politically, for a President to use
significant military force without calling up the
Reserves.11 The question of why we use the military at all
in a particular situation should dominate any consideration
of the use of Reservists. If the American people have not
been persuaded to pay for an active force structure large
enough to carry out the number of Operations Other Than War
desired by the administration, the solution should not be
automatic and frequent activations of Reservists.
Activation, movement, billeting and processing of the
Reserves costs as much as using the Active forces, whatever
the requirement.
Rather, what is offered as a peacetime strategy for
Reserve employment should be revisited. More courageous and
effective political advocacy should be undertaken to
persuade the nation at large, including Reservists, their
employers and families, that military operations are worth
the price paid for them.12 Army and Air National Guard
forces are positioned more favorably than others to take
advantage of the Civil/Military projects. In order to be
competitive for Federal dollars, Reserve Components from all
services are attempting to participate in Civil/Military
projects.
In order for the Marine Corps Reserve to participate in
Operations Other Than War or any type of Civil/Military
exercise or operation, it must choose between three options
or methods. The first is to use individual volunteers from
the Reserve. The second is to use Inactive Duty for
Training (drill time) or the two week annual training period
and third, and least probable, is to mobilize Reservists in
order to carry out a specific peacetime task or mission.13
Each choice comes with a price, either fiscal, in readiness,
or political.
PEACE OPERATIONS.
Some examples of how the Guard and Reserve have
supported Active forces in executing a broad range of peace
operations include the following: While on active duty for
training, Reserve units have supplemented Active forces
assigned to the Unified Combatant Commands; e.g. medical and
engineering assistance in USSOUTHCOM, and USEUCOM's
operations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Reservists made critical
contributions in post-hostility operations in Panama and
Kuwait, disaster relief in Bangladesh, assisting displaced
Haitians, in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and in humanitarian relief
efforts in the Cameroon epidemic.14 Units and individual
members of the Guard and Reserve have also supported DoD's
Military-to-Military Contact programs by providing members
to Liaison Teams stationed in Eastern Europe and with
contact teams to meet requests of foreign nations.15
Other Guard and Reserve Components have performed
contributory support operations joining with the Active
Component under the umbrella of the Total Force Policy. The
objective of the Total Force Policy is to integrate the
capabilities and strengths of Active and Reserve forces in
the most cost effective manner possible, and to maintain as
small an Active peacetime force as national security policy,
military strategy and overseas commitments permit. Required
military forces are maintained in that component of the
Total Force--Active or Reserve-- in which-they can most
effectively and most economically accomplish required
objectives at an acceptable level of risk.16
Contributory support may be provided as an enhancement
of Reserve Component training, (weekend or annual) or as
additional voluntary support by Reservist's while on Active
Duty for Special Work (ADSW). Reserves are paid only by
Reserve dollars unless there is a Presidential call-up.
Current examples of Reserve volunteers serving on ADSW
include; Marine Reserves serving on a humanitarian mission
to Cuba,17 Guardsmen supplementing USAREUR's maintenance
force, augmenting Air Mobility Command flight and mainten-
ance crews, and providing CONUS air movements for the Navy.
Linguistic specialist are frequently used by the Active
forces and paid with ADSW funds. Excellent language skills
and intelligence resources are part of the valuable
expertise residing in the Reserve Component. Individual
Reservists routinely contribute to Operations Other Than War
as part of Total Force on a daily basis.18 Contributions,
such as those mentioned above, show that Reserve
participation in Peace Operations are reducing perstempo for
the Active Force.
COMPOSITION OF MARINE CORPS RESERVE.
In order to provide legitimacy to the Total Force
premiss, a basic understanding of what and who makes up the
Marine Corps Reserve is in order.19 The Ready Reserve is
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the major source of manpower augmentation for the Active
force. The Ready Reserve is the manpower pool which will
relieve perstempo and join Active units for Operations Other
Than War. It includes Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR)
units, Individual Ready Reserve and Mobilization Training
Units. SMCR units are organized, equipped and trained to
perform a wartime mission. Members of these units train
throughout the year and participate annually in active duty
training. Pre-trained individual Reservists include
Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA's) and members of
the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR generally
consists of Marines who have served recently in the Active
Component or SMCR and have some period of obligated service
remaining on their contract. The majority of the members in
the IRR do not participate in Reserve training. The Standby
Reserve generally consists of members who have completed
their statutory eight-year military obligation and have
chosen to remain in the Standby Reserve. Members of the
Standby Reserve do not generally participate in reserve
training or readiness programs. They may be mobilized by
authority of Congress.21
Although the majority of the volunteers who augment the
Active Component come from the SMCR, many also come from the
IRR. SMCR personnel fill a Table of Organization (T.O.)
billet within the Marine Reserve Component. These Marines
conduct monthly drills and participate in a two week annual
training duty once per calendar year.
The Individual Mobilization Augmentee is a category
within the SMCR program that is currently in place and can
serve to fulfill some of the goals of expanding the use of
the Marine Corps Reserve, especially war-time expansion. An
IMA is an officer or staff non-commissioned officer that, as
a Reservist, trains with an Active Component staff during
peacetime and fills those same "Battle Staff" functions
during war.
This program is worthwhile because IMA's are required
upon mobilization to augment or backfill when a member of
the Active duty staff leaves. These Marines serve on an
existing staff, for example; the Marine Forces Pacific
(MARFORPAC) staff. When a contingency arises the workload
increases, consequently, the existing staff incurs
additional requirements. The IMA program provides a
competent and trained individual which is functional when
the need arises, and more importantly, requires no further
training. The IMA fills a legitimate role, they train to be
functional upon mobilization. The Active Component staff
has confidence in the individual because of the long time
association that has been built during the Reservists
service on the staff. Sometimes the Reservist may be
drilling with the staff for two or three years. The
continuity that the IMA's bring to the staff is valuable
because the Active Component personnel seldom remain in the
same position for long, uninterrupted periods of time.22
Although the IMA is not required for the day to day
work of the Active staff, he is a trained individual that
can be used during crisis times as needed.23 Throughout the
Reserve establishment there are many individual Marine
Reservists who are counted upon to serve when the Active
Component needs additional assistance. These personnel
contribute to relieving some of the stress of perstempo.
Within the SMCR, there are many outstanding Marines who are
called to serve on Active duty, as individuals, when crisis
situations require additional manpower. Because individual
Reservists are recognized as a valuable resource, they are
often asked to serve on Active duty for more than just their
required drill and annual training periods. In many
instances, Reservists are asked to "volunteer" to work on
Active duty and help Active Component staffs when additional
manpower is required. DoD policy authorizes the use of IMA
volunteers to support contingency operations; however, DoD
does not provide additional funding; Individual Reserve
volunteers are, and will continue to be heavily relied upon
to meet specific requirements. In any case, the method of
obtaining the services of Reservist's for missions and tasks
such as; Operations Other Than War involve the question of
"access".
ACCESS.
In order to have Reservists participate in Operations
Other Than War and decrease perstempo, the question of "How
do you get them?" must be addressed. The Marine Corps uses
three methods in which it is able access the Reserve; annual
training, volunteers, or mobilization. In September 1993,
the Department of Defense (DoD) established the "Senior
Level Working Group on Accessibility" to identify major
issues in accessing Reserve Components.24 Of particular
interest are the provisions of law governing access to the
Reserve Component. Accessibility is an important variable
in planning the Total Force. Access, as it pertains to the
length of time Reservists will be available to the Active
Component, is important to both the President and to the
Active Component Commanders. The President must be
concerned about the political ramifications involved in
calling up the Reserves while Active Component Commanders
are concerned about how soon can they acquire the Reserves
and how long can they use them.
As DoD prepares to shift peacetime missions of
Operations Other Than War to the Reserve, certainty of
access must be assured. Access also effects the Active
Component as they plan to use Reserve personnel and units
for contingencies and other requirements. The assurance of
Reserve participation is a major planning factor which will
reduce perstempo for the Active Component.
Current force structure requires some form of
premobilization recall to Active duty of specific units
which are critical to deploying the forces. Early access to
Reserve "enabling" forces has been raised as a significant
issue in every major war game during the last several years.
In some cases, it has been "the overarching issue".25
Enabling forces are considered those forces which are
resident in the Reserve that the Active Component must have
in order to meet its wartime requirements. For example, all
of the Civil Affairs Groups and much of the sustainment
capability of the combat service support units are resident
in the Marine Corps Reserve. Depending on the scenario, a
Reserve Component member or unit must be accessible for call
to Active duty, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to meet
operational requirements.
Forward deployed Task Forces, such as a Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU), are not conducive to the
employment of voluntary Reservists. Current regulations
allow a Reservist to serve on a volunteer basis for 179
days. At the 180 day mark those volunteers count against
the total end strength of the Marine Corps. So, peacetime
Reserve capabilities can be accessed by either the first or
second method.26
(1) The first method is through training periods
(drills and annual training). A drill is any continuous
four hour period, of which the SMCR/IMA Reservist gets 48
per year. A reservist may accumulate not more than sixty
drill periods per year. CMC approval is required for
waivers which allow an individual to accumulate over sixty
drills in a anniversary year.27
The annual training (AT) duration for SMCR units in
MARFORRES is a minimum of 14 days, excluding travel. The
Maximum number of days is 19 (excluding travel). Any
requests to exceed this limitation must be forwarded via the
chain of command to the CMC (RA). In no case will the AT
period exceed 30 days.28 Members of the SMCR are required
to serve at least one AT each year. Although, the goal of
the AT period is to enhance the Reservist's mobilization
potential vice serving an Active Component requirement, any
employment is permitted as long as it does not exceed the 19
day limit.29
(2) The second method is voluntary, through periods of
Active duty other than for training. This voluntary program
is commonly known as, [Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) in
support of the Active Component (Category IV Program) or CAT
IV]. By DoD policy, ADSW tours are normally limited to an
aggregate of 139 days or less in any one fiscal year.30 The
major issue of concern regarding this option is the
inadequacy of funding.
Selected Reserve units cannot be counted upon as a
source of volunteers. Volunteers can be collected from the
Reserve Component and formed into units on an ad hoc basis
but, a hodgepodge collection of individual volunteers is not
an efficient or logical method of doing business.31
Bringing a Reservist to serve with the Active Component
can be done with base support units or combat service
support units over a weekend drill period or even a two week
annual training duty period. A Marine Corps Reserve
infantry unit can make little or no contribution to the
Active Component over a weekend. Reserve volunteers could
make a contribution but the problem would be to get a
Reserve unit to volunteer to serve with the Active duty unit
for any period, short of mobilization, longer than the
required 15 days for annual training duty. Ad hoc
volunteers could be obtained to serve up to the 179 day mark
but for missions that require a team approach, a disparate
group of volunteers is not the answer. For the Marine
Corps, there is a reluctance to depend on a voluntary
system, preferring instead the certainty afforded by an
involuntary recall of numerous critical Reserve units.32
(3) The third method of accessing the Reserve is by
use of mobilization. This method is not for peacetime
access. Early in 1994 the DoD proposed a plan to Congress
which would expand Reserve Component access in major
conflicts and peace operations. Specifically, the DoD
sought to provide the Secretary of Defense with, call-up
authority which would provide early access to 25,000
Selected Reservists. This plan would have provided access
to some Selected Reserve capability early in a crisis.33
However, the recommendation failed to gain Congressional
approval. Congress has improved the involuntary call up
authority, however, by increasing the time of the call up to
270 days. Increasing the time available for call up will
provide sufficient time for Reservists to gear up, train,
and participate in a crisis. By increasing the call up time
limit, DoD is hopeful the recent change will provide greater
Presidential "access" to the Reserves. The conferees,
noting the length of time required to train and certify some
types of Reserve Component units after mobilization,
increased the call-up period and effectively removed one
objection to the use of the Reserve in a national
emergency.34 This recent legislation passed at the end of
the term of the 103rd Congress. Never-the-less, the OASD RA
believes Reservists can be used on a voluntary basis to
relieve some of the pressure of operational commitments and
reduce high personnel tempo within the Active Component. If
the services do not come up with plausible methods to
increase the use of Reservists, there is always the
possibility Congress will make this directive.35
Because of the brisk pace of operational commitments,
the Active Component must obtain augmentation from the
Reserve Component. Augmentation is defined as "trained and
equipped Reserve units, detachments of those units, and/or
qualified individual Reservists assigned to Active force
commands to bring those commands to the manning required
within existing force structure for an operational mission,
national emergency, or in time of war".36 The shrinking end
strength of the Active Component places the Reserves in the
position of being required to take on existing and future
commitments.
A great deal of attention has focused on the widening
gap between the requirements of the Active Component and the
resources available to meet ongoing commitments. Stephen M.
Duncan, former OASD RA (1987-1993), was critical of several
recent proposals by the Clinton Administration. One of the
points Mr. Duncan raises is that while the drawdown has
significantly reduced manpower, the operational commitments
have continued at the same pace as before the Cold War
ended. Excessive perstempo, if continued un-abated, could
have an adverse effect on the morale of the active forces.
As the Reserve contributes to the Total Force and
undertakes Operations Other Than War issues such as;
funding, methods of access, availability of units, and
volunteers must be addressed. Mobilization promises to be
the surest method of obtaining Reserve participation for
Operations Other Than War. All three methods used to access
the Reserves provide the means by which perstempo will be
reduced.
PERSONNEL TEMPO.
Recently, Marines have experienced first hand how
stressful the perstempo can be. The amount of deployed time
for Marines is at a high level. Record amounts of time away
from the family causes morale problems and could eventually
drive people out of the service.
An example of the rigorous schedule performed by
Marines is provided by the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit
(MEU). The 24th MEU conducted a Mediterranean deployment,
or had been at sea in a support role, in Somalia and in
Bosnia. They recently came home after six months at sea.
The typical procedure would have been for the unit to
receive a ten-day stand down period. In essence, they would
be given a break, time to spend with their families. After
a ten day stand down, the unit would spend time at their
home base working and training and going through the post
deployment activities which accompany any six month
deployment. Halfway through the first ten days home, the
units were re-assigned to ships and sent to Haiti because
there was an insufficient number of Marines to cover
contingencies abroad.37
The example of 24th MEU is becoming more common for
Fleet Marines. For first term Active Component Marines,
there isn't much time spent at home. The stress of
perstempo is real. During the first four years of obligated
service, the average Marine will be deployed 45% of the time
during the first year. He will be deployed 27% of the time
the second year, 20% during the third year and during the
fourth year he will be deployed 22% of the time. In
September 1994, the Marine Corps had 25% of the operating
forces deployed worldwide. For example; 28,928 Marines, 10
of 24 Infantry Battalions, 10 of 30 Helo Squadrons, 6 of 23
Fixed Wing Squadrons were deployed.38
With deployments at such a high rate, the Marine Corps
Reserve must contribute in a manner which will decrease the
perstempo of the Active forces. Use of individual
volunteers is one option. Another option is to use
Reservists during their two week annual training period for
operational missions. The two week annual training periods
are planned in advance and require no additional outlay of
funds. This option is cost effective and if planned with
sufficient lead time could produce excellent results.
Although this option is not illegal, it is not what the
training period was designed to accomplish. When this
option has been used it was criticized. The former
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Mr.
Duncan, was critical of using the two week annual training
time for anything other than Reserve training.
ANNUAL TRAINING PERIOD.
Mr. Duncan raises a counter argument to using, method
one, the Reserves annual training periods. He makes the
point in his opposition to Pentagon plans which use limited
Reserve training funds and training time for "contributory"
peacetime operational missions. He was opposed to using the
Reservist's two week annual training period to conduct
peacetime operations.39
The reason for Mr. Duncan's criticism, had to do with
how the Reserves received funding for Peacetime operations.
Peacetime operations conducted by Active forces, are funded
from Active Component funds. Peacetime operations conducted
by Reservist's, even though they are receiving training,
should be funded from the Reserve Component. Active
Component funds can cover operations and maintenance type
expenditures; however, pay and allowances still must come
from Reserve Component funds. Reserve funding for pay and
allowances is not available for additional operations
outside of scheduled training periods.
Reserve annual training can support Operations Other
than War when the mission assigned to the Reserve unit is
consistent with its warfighting mission. In order to
integrate with the Active forces quickly and effectively,
the Reserve unit's training must be as realistic as
possible. Training must support unit mission requirements.
Appropriate use of Reservist's training period, as a
peacetime operational mission, might be the assignment of
military police units to provide external security such as
for Cuban and Haitian migrant camps at Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base. Conducting military occupational skill (MOS) specific
kinds of missions, for a special type unit, would serve the
dual purpose of training the Reservists and at the same time
provide some relief to Active Component perstempo.
The use of organizations entirely unsuited for a
particular assignment, yet filling in during their annual
training period, may raise some opposition. Members of
units performing assignments inconsistent with their
warfighting mission would be most opposed to using the two
week annual training duty period for Operations Other Than
War assignments. In the view of some, this practice could
degrade readiness.
Some might argue, using the Reservists annual training
time for the performance of peacetime operations contradicts
the purpose of conducting annual training. Annual training
is a time for the unit to practice for the wartime mission
as a "team". Additionally, the annual training period can
be used to obtain Military Occupational Skill (MOS) training
and qualification. The annual training period is the unit's
most important evolution of the year. Annual training is
the culmination and focus of the previous twelve months of
drill periods. The monthly drill periods are used for
planning, practice, coordination, and training which reaches
the decisive point during the two week annual training
period. If, for example, an infantry unit substitutes
something else for combat training, essential combat
training will be postponed for a full year during which
readiness will decline without an opportunity to recover.
The notion that training for important combat missions
can be universally accomplished merely by performing other
operational activities is overly optimistic. Sending
Reservists to Haiti to "enhance democracy" or for "nation-
building" is fine for members of Civil Affairs Groups, or
Civil Engineers or similar units. But, nation-building is
not the same as training for a Desert Storm type of "come-
as-you-are" major regional conflict. Specific units are
staffed, equipped and manned for a given function and
mission. If an opportunity to participate in an Operation
Other Than War presented itself and the training, person-
nel, and capability of a Reserve unit fit the requirement,
then including the Reserves should be considered. Expanding
the use of Reserves is the requirement and desired goal.
Normally, the two week training period should be used
preparing for the missions the unit was designed to perform.
However, all Reserve units must be readily adaptable to new
roles and missions which they may be assigned in todays new
Total Force environment. With adequate lead time, planning,
and scheduling Reservists could be assigned with Active
Component units to Operations Other Than War. Reservists
could be part of a Marine Air Ground Task Force during their
two week annual training period. If this kind of scheduling
were to take place the Active Component would obtain relief
from perstempo and the Reserve could be committed to
Operations Other Than War. Units with missions similar to
the task assigned would be able to provide the most
qualified personnel. Under the Total Force concept, the
Reserve should participate alongside the Active Forces and
this arrangement would benefit both Components.
FINITE RESOURCE.
Under the Total Force Concept, equal partnership
includes investing the time and commitment to the Marine
Corps as the Reserve participates in Operations Other Than
War. As planners consider expanding the use of the Reserve,
consideration must be given to consequences that may come
about because of increased taskings.
Reservists are citizen soldiers, that is they are
primarily citizens. They have career, education, and family
demands as well as military demands. Marine Corps
Reservists serve with pride and their record during Desert
Shield/Storm was a huge success. However, that was a
national emergency where the Reserve served in the specific
capacity for which they were trained. Operations Other Than
War represent something short of mobilization for a major
conflict. Participating in Operations Other Than War, where
practicing and preparing for the warfighting mission is not
accomplished, causes some Reservists to think twice before
leaving their homes and businesses. When dubious military
commitments intrude into the private lives of Reservists,
the outgrowth can be increased friction in families and
resentment among civilian employers. The Chief of the Air
Force Reserve has speculated that the problem is driving
their people to the "breaking point".40
The consequence of increasingly frequent intrusions
into the lives of the Reservist must be considered. The
Reserve is a "finite" resource that cannot be abused without
some expectation of adverse effect. The policies suggested
by DoD as a means of increasing the use of Reserves to
reduce perstempo and conducting Operations Other Than War
must be weighed and carefully planned out.
The consequence of using method number three, the
mobilization option, may be that some Reservists just call
it quits and retire, drop out of the IRR, or not re-enlist.
If the individual perceives that his or her service is not
valued or is misused, chances are they will leave the
Reserve. In today's environment of the Total Force, the
Reserves may now be used in roles and missions that were
never before contemplated.
The most recent example of new roles and missions for
the Reserves, involves their use in Haiti. In September
1994, President Clinton signed an Executive Order
authorizing the "involuntary" activation of as many as 1,600
Reservists for nation building efforts in Haiti. "Civilian
officials deny that the military is being turned into a
social-welfare agency, but they have also proudly announced
plans to have Reservists repair housing, restore the
environment, build a pier for fishing vessels in an
economically depressed fishing community, dig wells, and
survey the safety of dams and airport runways".41
Conducting Operations Other Than War is a shift away from
the traditional way in which the military has been employed
during the past fifty years.
Shifting emphasis from preparing for warfighting to
peacekeeping operations requires a change in priorities. In
Mr. Duncan's opinion, the proper use of the Reserves
includes the following three examples:42
a. Serious crisis. Mobilization when serious
crisis threaten the nations security. Under the Total Force
concept, the Reserve Component provides a framework in which
each Reserve unit maintains its capability to make that
short-notice transition to mobilization status, to deploy,
and to meet operational challenges across the potential
spectrum of conflict.
b. Volunteers with special skills. Increased
reliance even in peacetime on "selected Reservists" who have
special skills and volunteer for additional assignments.
All services are attempting to develop some shift of
responsibility from Active to Reserve individual volunteers.
In situations where Reserve volunteers could fulfill known
requirements, there still exists detrimental built-in
delays. For example, time delays include; the mandatory
advertising process for volunteers, (This process requires
message traffic from higher headquarters, which notifies
commands of the opportunities for Reserve volunteers to
participate in operations and exercises.) Reservist's
responses to the solicitations, command selection of best
qualified applicants, administrative issuance and
transmittal of orders and delays in reporting. If these
encumbrances are not considered serious and the gaining
command is willing to wait the three to twelve days for the
volunteer, the use of volunteers has merit. However, there
are few critical requirements that allow for time delays.
Basic to any use of Reserve capability is the ability
to compensate Reservists who perform Active duty beyond
normal drill and annual training. In as much as a Reservist
performing Active duty cannot generate civilian income,
volunteers are available only to the extent that funding is
available to provide an off-set (if often at a reduced rate)
income.43
c. Collateral Missions. Where Reservists can be
effectively trained for their combat missions by activities
that have collateral benefits. For example; an infantry
unit fighting forest fires can be used as a time to build
teamwork, cohesion, and esprit. Although conducting these
types of operations may be useful for some types of units,
it might be a stretch to consider it beneficial for all.
Although the Reserve is a finite resource they are part
of the Total Force. Mr. Duncan's counter argument limits
the circumstances by which Reservists may be used. Since
Operations Other Than War are legitimate missions the
Reserve should participate. The following are examples of
where Reserve participation helped to relieve perstempo;
Artillery units have been used recently to guard
refugees in Cuba. Military Police units assigned in Haiti
is another good example where Reservists have contributed
directly to the mission and derived maximum training
benefits at the same time.
INVOLUNTARY MOBILIZATION.
The last and least probable means of obtaining
Reservists to serve in Operations Other Than War is by the
use of involuntary mobilization, method number three. Since
its inception, the Marine Corps Reserve has been mobilized
four times for the major conflicts of this century. They
include:44
(1) World War II, 68 percent of the Marine Corps' total
strength was Reserve. Almost all of the 10,000 Marine
Aviators who served were Reservists.
(2) Korea, Over 85,000 Reservists were called to
Active duty.
(3) Vietnam, Although no national mobilization took
place, several USMCR elements were involuntarily mobilized
to Southeast Asia and served with distinction.
(4) Persian Gulf War, 31,172 Reservists were
mobilized.
The future range of situations in which the Reserve
Components may be required include:
Wars and contingency operations.45 In the case of
unambiguous threat to vital U.S. interests, there is little
question that Reserve units and individuals would be ordered
to active duty without their consent. The only problem in
accessing Reserve Components in these situations would be
early in a crisis, when the full nature of the threat could
be ambiguous yet some Reserve augmentation would still be
needed.
Domestic emergencies. The Army and Air National Guard
in each state can be ordered into service for state missions
by the Governor. The issue of employing Federal resources
in a domestic emergency, and access to Reserve Components
other than the Guard for these missions, is relevant only if
the available Guard capabilities are overwhelmed and Federal
assistance is requested.
Peace operations. The situation in which Reservists
are activated for peace operations will depend on a variety
of considerations such as; the nature of the operations,
Reserve capabilities required, or other military operations
underway. The major issue for consideration will be, "is it
politically advisable to order Reservists to Active duty
without their consent in order to carry out a peace
operation?"
The Marine Corps Reserve exists to augment,
reinforce,and reconstitute the Active Component. It is
unlikely that Marine Reserves will be used separately from
the Active duty Marine Corps. Therefore, it is unlikely
that the Marine Corps Reserve will be used for domestic
emergencies, or peace operations unless they are part of a
larger, Marine Air Ground Task Force.
MOBILIZATION LEGISLATION.
Serious discussion of using the Reserve for Operations
Other Than War must include the legal authority which would
require their services if activated. Previously, the
Reserve role was to mobilize both support and combat forces,
and to deploy them quickly. As a result, Congress expanded
the authority given to the President to order Reserve units
to active duty without their consent by the passage of Title
10 USC 673b in 1976, and amendments in 1980 and 1986.
During this period, the major role of the Reserve Component
in lesser contingencies was in airlift, refueling, and air
defense. There was little doubt about access to the Reserve
Component following enactment of Section 673b. In the event
that the armed forces would require access to the Reserve
Component, provisions of Title 10 of the U.S. Code provide
the legislative authority.46
The call-up authority accomplishes two things. It
provides required forces and signals our intent and national
will. Under Base Force end-strengths, the deployment of
significant portions of the Active Component will create a
requirement for individual fillers that exist due to the
fact that the deployment took place. Specific units
required by the Active Force will be called up early in a
mobilization. Other Reservists are required early in the
mobilization process to set up receiving stations. The
scope of this will vary with the individual services and how
much dependence they have placed on the supporting
establishment and the individual Reservists to meet the
wartime requirements of the operating forces. The forces
(i.e. the "mix" of units and individuals) needed are
determined by the events taking place. Deploying
contingency forces creates a need for units (CSS units
needed for sustainability) and individuals (the supporting
establishment having been depleted of individuals to make up
operating force manning shortfalls).47
Some of the Reserve Components mobilize their forces by
echelon. The Marine Corps policy differs, in that all
Reserve units are ready to mobilize immediately, whereas
other Reserve Components are given a period of time to
prepare for mobilization.
MARINE CORPS INPUT.
In order to provide input to the SECDEF and to comply
with the spirit and intent of the DoD guidance, the Marine
Corps has an obligation to provide innovative solutions for
the requirements described in the Bottom Up Review. With
the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) shrinking from 123,000 during
the Persian Gulf War to 107,000 in FY 1995, the Marine Corps
is searching for ways to use the Reserves more than had
previously been required. The "need" is probably more than
can be realistically met by the Reserve. The net loss of
16,000 Marines represents a loss that cannot be made up in
total by Reserves. The manpower loss is the equivalent to
5,840,000 mandays of Reserve service per year. However,
Marine Forces Reserve can make a significant contribution.
They are able to augment and reinforce the Active Component
across the spectrum, from Operations Other Than War to major
conflict.
The Marine Reserve will be part of a Marine Air Ground
Task Force participating in joint operations. When a
requirement arises for the nation to call on the Marine
Corps all contact between the Reserve Component and
warfighting Commander-in-Chief (CINC) is through the Service
Component Commander. In other words, if a CINC required a
force of Marines, he would receive a MAGTF, most likely a
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) which will be part of a
larger joint and/or combined force. Our current strategy
and warfighting doctrine prefers that all future U.S.
military operations will be joint efforts. The Marine Force
provided will be integrated with Active and Reserve
Component forces, not separate Reserve Component forces.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps will provide a total
force to meet the CINC requirement through the Service
Component Commander.48 This concept is absolutely
consistent with the mission of the Marine Corps Reserve.
"The Mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to
provide trained and qualified units and individuals to
be available for active duty in time of war, national
emergency and at such other time as the national
security may require."49
The Commanding General of the Marine Forces Reserve
(MARFORRES) Major General James E. Livingston offered
several solutions which focus on relieving some of the
stress of high perstempo. Major General Livingston's
suggestions offer solutions as to how the SMCR may be
involved with Operations Other Than War by augmenting Active
Marine Forces. Any augmentation of the Active Force will
help to reduce perstempo.
In order to participate there will be major challenges
for the Marine Corps Reserve of the future. The first
challenge will be to weave SMCR units more seamlessly into
the fabric of the Total Force. In order for the Active
Component to have confidence in the Reserve force, they must
cross-train together as much as possible. Working together,
in order to "seamlessly integrate" an effective team, is
relevant and appropriate use of the Marine Corps Reserve
Component.50
The second challenge, for the Marine Corps Reserve,
will be to concentrate on augmentation and reinforcement of
active MEF's for the future. This goal can be accomplished
through coordination and planning. One way Reserves have
moved toward increased integration is by progressively
expanding the scope of participation in MAGTF exercises. In
order for the Marine Corps to implement this policy, the
Commanding General, MARFORRES Major General Livingston
suggests the Reserve can relieve Active Component exercise
perstempo with longer range planning (12-18 month lead) and
provision of JCS overseas travel funds. He believes the
Reserve is a willing player if the exercise training is
meaningful and maintains combat readiness. Major General
Livingston further suggests, as an example, that the Reserve
Force Service Support Group (FSSG) can augment, reinforce or
take the lead in some operations such as; Maritime Pre-
positioned Force (MPF) offload operations. Reserve aviation
squadrons could serve 30 day tours relieving the Aviano
(Bosnian deployment), and our ground, and Combat Service
Support (CSS) could perform a significant portion of our
yearly requirement for the Great Lakes and UNITAS cruises.
Individual Reserve personnel could fill Joint, MARFOR, and
MAGTF staff assignments. In the supporting establishment,
the Reserves could provide structure and manning for
classroom instructors, flight instructors, maintenance
personnel and Base/Station staff. Reserve aviators could be
assigned to Active squadrons as the Navy and Air Force have.
Reserve aviators could substantially man our overall Marine
Corps support aircraft requirement (C-9's, C-12's, C-20's,
etc.).51 Because all of these operations have attendant
costs, a decision would have to be made as to where the
additional Reserve funding would come from.
The effect of Major General Livingston's suggestion was
that the Active Marine Forces would explore possible areas
where Reserve force units could be properly integrated. The
ultimate goal of the "Total Force" concept included the
"seamless integration" of the Reserve Component with the
Active Component.
In order to accomplish Major General Livingston's goals
and carry out additional assignments, the Reserve Component
is finding the most appropriate opportunities in which the
spirit and intent of the new guidance may be accomplished.
Certainly, the drawdown of the Active Component has had a
significant influence on the expanded use of the Reserves.
In addition to using the SMCR units as proposed by Major
General Livingston, implementation of the new policy
guidance may be accomplished by the expanded use of some
other Marine Corps programs as well. The structure of the
Marine Corps Reserve, represents the "Reserve of the Force-
in-Readiness", an entity which serves to reinforce, augment
or reconstitute the "Force-in-Readiness". Under the
umbrella of the "Total Force" the role of the Marine Corps
Reserve will continue to serve a reinforcement,
augmentation, reconstitution role 52
LIMITATIONS.
Policy makers who put forward suggestions which call
for Reserve volunteers to take on expanded roles and
missions must consider other key factors such as; funding
limitations and regulatory restraints. The Marine Force
Reserve welcomes and supports additional funding and
increased use of the Reserve Component. Additional funding
authorized by Congress for Reserve Component ADSW would
increase access to the Reserve by the Active Component.
Additional funding should come under the condition that
these monies are additive to Marine Corps Total Obligational
Authority (TOA).53
It may be questionable as to whether or not Reserves
cost less money than the Active Component. When funds are
taken away from the Active Component and given to the
Reserve Component in order to reduce perstempo, there is
little savings.54 At the beginning of the drawdown, policy
makers believed that by cutting Active forces, monetary
savings could be obtained by placing a greater reliance on
the Reserves. However, more reliance on the Reserves has
come with additional costs. In addition to the normal pay
and allowances, additive monetary costs include; travel
costs, training, medical costs, as well as dependent care.
When the costs are tallied up the amount of savings accrued
by enlisting the services of the Reserves is
insignificant.55
An additional impediment to expanded use of Reserves
has been the regulatory restraints imposed by various
policies, orders and instructions. These often place limits
such as; 139 day limit at which time a Reservist rates
Permanent Change of Station (PCS) and 179 day limit at which
time a Reservist counts against Active Component end
strength.56 In order to stay within the law, which requires
remaining under the authorized end strength of the Marine
Corps, Reservist may not serve more than 179 days on active
duty in a given year.
The question for Marine Corps planners is, how to most
efficiently use the funding allotted? The choices are;
Active Component Forces with a higher perstempo, or using
Reserves on a continual basis to fill in on exercises and
Operations Other Than War. DoD guidance seems to indicate
that the Reserves will be used to a greater extent than ever
before.
The Marine Forces Reserve does not support unnecessary
involuntary activation of the Reserve Component in
peacetime, except for National or Civil emergency. The
potential hardship to Reservists and the resulting negative
impact could cause the loss of valuable manpower necessary
for the primary wartime mission. The exceptions should be
only if that capability exists exclusively within the
Reserve, and at the onset the Reserve member fully
understands the possibility of mobilization and extended
periods of service on Active duty. (i.e. CAGs)57 Regardless
of cost efficiency, decisions have been made that force the
services to place more commitments with the Reserve
Components.
FUNDING.
If Congress determines more use of the Reserve is
required, funding will be provided. However, at this time,
DoD initiatives to increase employment of Reserves for
peacetime requirements are inadequately funded. The Marine
Corps cannot afford to internally increase ADSW funding at
the expense of other appropriations; Therefore, in order to
support new requirements, the Marine Corps requires funding
beyond the Marine Corps Total Obligation Authority. From FY
1992 through FY 1994, the Marine Corps has consistently
overexecuted its ADSW program. Most recently, FY 1994 was
budgeted at $0.8M, and executed at $1.8M. The aggressive
execution of this program has been consistently constrained
by prevailing fiscal realities.58
One example of how the ADSW program is aggressively
executed is through the use of IMA's for contingencies.
Current Marine Corps policy provides that IMAs may be used
to support contingency operations. This policy allows for
funds to return IMAs to voluntary Active duty in connection
with their IMA billet responsibilities.59 When
circumstances are such that require the services of
individual volunteers, Force commanders have a ready pool to
call on. Force commanders manage their own separate,
discretionary ADSW accounts and have additional funds
available from Headquarters Marine Corps, Reserve Affairs.
The Reserves can contribute to Active Component perstempo
reduction; however, even with unlimited funding the Reserves
are no panacea to high levels of Active Component perstempo
resulting from cuts in Active Forces with no corresponding
decrease in operational and training commitments.60 Prior
to receipt of Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC)
or Partial Mobilization authority, Reserve volunteers on
Active Duty Special Work orders are the only alternative to
meet augmentation requirements. DoD policy authorizes the
use of IMA volunteers to support contingency operations,
however, funding is not provided.
There is no money to pay for Reserve volunteers before
PSRC is authorized. Therefore, all pay and allowances will
be borne by existing Reserve Military Personnel Marine Corps
(RMPMC) and Reserve Operations and Maintenance Marine Corps
(RO&MMC) funds. Absorbing costs associated with Reserve
volunteers may require fiscal programming at the expense of
existing validated programs. While the notion of expanding
the use of the Reserves has great merit, costs associated
with doing so are presently prohibitive. The Marine Corps
cannot support any position that advocates funding such an
endeavor through offsets to existing manpower programs.61
The Marine Corps has little fiscal flexibility. Sixty-
Nine per cent of the TOA pays for manpower entitlement.
Therefore, the Total Force Marine Corps cannot afford to
internally increase ADSW funding at the expense of other
appropriations. Additive funding would further enhance ADSW
support, but in this era of dramatically reduced fiscal
options and tough resource decisions we must live with
less.62
CONCLUSION.
The Marine Corps Reserve is capable and should conduct
Operations Other Than War as part of larger Marine Air
Ground Task Forces. Operations Other Than War are
appropriate missions because the Marine Corps Reserve is
part of the Total Force and their contribution is essential.
Prudence would dictate that training for Operations Other
Than War makes sense from a practical point of view because
the likelihood for future employment in this arena is high.
Certainly, there are many skills that are
interchangeable between traditional warfighting and
executing Operations Other Than War. Units such as; CAG's,
Engineer's, CSS and Air units can make a contribution and
are available for service with the Active Component. These
types of units, with special qualifications, can easily
assimilate with Active Component forces for Operations Other
Than War.
Regardless of whether the missions or skills are
interchangeable or not, the Reserves must expand into new
roles. The Reserve is able and willing to augment,
reinforce, and contribute as an equal partner of the Total
Force.
In order to be an equal partner Reserves must practice
and train so that they can effectively meet the requirements
of all assigned missions across the spectrum of conflict.
The purpose of the practice and training is to accomplish
the "seamless integration" with the Total Force and to build
a capable, competent, and credible Reserve. Seamless
integration means the transition of an individual Reservist
or unit (of whatever size) into the Active Component, with
no discernable difference in capability or performance
between the individual or unit and regular counterparts. If
a national emergency is such that Reserve augmentation is
required, then the SMCR individuals and units must be able
to execute missions regardless of type.
Relieving the stress of high perstempo for the Active
forces is another assignment that the reserves must embrace,
as a new role. The Active and Reserve Component should be
integrated for the major exercises around the globe. Long
lead times and meaningful realistic assignments for the
Reserves would help accomplish the "seamless integration"
concept that is desired today. A close working relationship
between the Active and Reserve Components can only build
trust and confidence between the two forces. Additionally,
Headquarters Marine Corps should assign specific exercises
to the Reserve Component.
When decisions are made that transfer completely some
missions to the Reserve Component, funding must be provided
over and above the Marine Corps TOA. The decision to use
Reservists for Active Component missions will have to be
paid for somehow. That funding should not come out of
Active Component allocation but rather should be budgeted
for during the POM and apportioned to the Reserve. Funding
considerations will be a side issue for any decision
regarding future use of the Reserve. The bottom line is: If
Congress decides more use of the Reserve is required,
funding must be provided.
Future planners considering the use of the Reserve
should conduct a follow-up investigation that allows for
adequate funding and increased use of the Reserve Component.
Undoubtedly, the Marine Corps of the future will place
heavier reliance on the Reserve. Reduced force structure
will require increased use of the Reserve for contingencies,
especially Operations Other Than War, even though those
contingencies are perceived to be less than a national
emergency.
Follow-up research might center around frequent
activations or mobilizations. What would be the impact on
the Reserve Component if the President activated units such
as, a battalion or squadron for one year at a time? Because
the force has been downsized and commitments remain
constant, the President may have no choice but to mobilize
units for extended periods.
If funding limitations continue into the next century,
the Reserve Components will have to be used with greater
frequency and differently than they are now. It might be
interesting to forecast public reaction to frequent Reserve
call-ups. How would mainstream America react to frequent
intrusions into the lives of Reservists? How would the
Reserve Component react? Perhaps, if the Reservist's were
to be on Active duty for one year at a time, the entire
ethos of the Reserve Component might change.
Research into such a topic might indicate what changes
may come about in the future. Regardless of what the
forecast for the future may be, there will be interesting
opportunities and innovative solutions advocated by both the
Active and Reserve Components of the U. S. Marine Corps.
ENDNOTES
1. Deborah R. Lee, Accessibility of Reserve Component
Forces in the Post-Cold War World, DRAFT, Department of
Defense, 19 October 1993.
2. Ibid.
3. Colonel Eric L. Chase and Lt. Col. Douglas Stone, The
Next Generation: Marine Corps Reserve Vision 2000., "Reserve
Concepts and Issues." 21.
4. Terrance O'Connell, "Looking for more Action,"
Navy Times, 19 Dec. 1994. Focus on the Reserve;
5. CMC WASHINGTON DC//PP-O// TO ALMAR 161/94. (UNCLAS)
subject: "Readiness Terminology" 271100Z May 94.
Ms. Lee, Congressman Talent, and others have used the
terms "Operational Tempo and Personnel Tempo"
interchangeably in their writings. I have used the
definitions provided in ALMAR 161/94 as the standard
throughout the thesis. The following definitions provided
in the ALMAR are germane.
A. OPTEMPO: Level of Operations and Training over
time. Common measurements include Flight hours, Track
hours, Ship steaming days, Rounds of ammunition etc.
B. DEPTEMPO: Percentage of time in a given annual
period that a unit, or element of a unit, supports
operations or training away from its home base, or station
for a period greater than (10) consecutive days.
C. PERSTEMPO: Percentage of time in a given annual
period, that an individual supports operations and training
away from his barracks, home base or station for a period of
time greater than twenty-four (24) hours; To include
unaccompanied FMF duty assignments and TAD.
6. Lt. Col. Stephen P. Anderson, AUS (Ret.), The Officer,
Legislative Update, September 1994.
7. Deborah R. Lee, Accessibility of Reserve Component
Forces, Department of Defense, 18 April 1994, 5.
8. Deborah R. Lee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs, statement before the Senate Committee on
Armed Services Force Requirements and Personnel Subcommittee
in connection with National Guard and Reserve Programs.
"oral version", 23 March 1994. 7.
9. Ibid.
10. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs, The Reserve Components of the United States
Armed Forces, June 1994. 2.
11. Stephen M. Duncan, "A Reservists training isn't for
social welfare," Navy Times, 26 Dec. 1994. Focus on the
Reserve. 20.
12. Ibid.
13. RAP-24 Headquarters Marine Corps, Information Paper,
941026, "Employing Reserves for Peacetime Active Component
Requirements".
14. MSgt. L.P. Cabal, "Understanding the Cubans",
Continental Marine, Jan-Feb 1995/Vol. 18,No.7; 12-13.
15. RAC-7 Headquarters Marine Corps, Trip Report, 940919,
"Joint Contact Team, Transition Coordination Conference",
Stuttgart, Germany, 14-15 Sept. 94.
16. The Reserve Components of The United States Armed
Forces, 9.
17. MSgt. Cabal, 12-13.
18. Deborah R. Lee, Accessibility, 7-9.
19. See, Figure 1. for a wire diagram of the Ready Reserve.
20. Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual
(MCRAMM), MCO P1001R.1G. Department of the Navy,
Headquarters Marine Corps. 1 May 92.
21.Marines, Almanac 95, January 1995, Special Edition. 21.
22. Maj. C.W. Murphy, Reserve Affairs Policy Branch,
interview by author 9 Dec 1994.
23. Author unknown, "Positive Deployment 95" Position
Paper, undated.
Potential supporting establishment augmentation
requirements are identified in the 130 "Wartime Tables of
Organizations" ("W" T/O's). These T/O's currently authorize
2784 IMA's 6711 pre-assigned IRR's and 2026 pre-assigned
retirees to enhance the supporting establishment's ability
to support the warfighting needs of deploying Marine
Expeditionary Forces.
24. Lee, "Accessibility", i.
25. Capt. John M Kirby USN "Reserve Accessibility" working
notes to the Reserve Affairs Policy Section at Headquarters
Marine Corps. 1.
26. RAP-24, "Employing Reserves for Peacetime Active
Component Requirements", Information Paper, 26 Oct 1994.
27. MCO P1001R.1G. (MCRAMM), 4-17.
28. Ibid.
29. OSDA/RA Meeting on 20 May 94. RAP OIC, Lt. Col.
Heidenthal attended and provided this note to BGeneral
Berkheiser and Col Sexton.
"Section 672b; DoD's General counsel has interpreted 672b
as providing authority for use of the Reserve Component on
operational missions as well as for Active Duty for
training. However the 15 day limit clearly still applies."
30. MPP-63 Headquarters Marine Corps, Point Paper. 940803
"Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) in support of the Active
Component" (Category IV Program.) p.1-2.
The ADSW (CAT IV) Program is funded through the
Military Personnel Marine Corps (MPMC) appropriation for pay
and allowances, and the Operations and Maintenance Marine
Corps (O&MMC) short tour appropriation for travel and per
diem.
The Policy during Peacetime is as follows;
(1) Reserve personnel must provide a unique talent or
expertise that is not readily available in the inventory of
active duty Marines, by Government Service employees, or
when civilian contractor service is considered to be cost
prohibitive, not cost effective, and/or untimely.
(2) The ADSW (CAT IV) Program may not be used to.
alleviate manpower shortfalls, augment active duty staffs,
create a position which duties are those required to enable
or enhance day-to day operations, or to improve manning of
a table of organization (T/O) by filling a vacant billet
(e.g., billets left vacant due to a permanent change of
station, temporary active duty, or a result of military or
civilian judiciary actions.
(3) By DoD policy, ADSW tours are normally limited
to an aggregate of 139 days or less in any one fiscal year
(because of the PCS vice TAD rule). Exceptions may be
granted by CMC. Short breaks in tours (30 days or less) to
circumvent this requirement are not authorized.
Although there are four additional paragraphs to the
Peacetime policy regulations these three are the most
important for this narrative.
The Policy for Operations Short of Mobilization or PSRC
are as follows;
(1) New DoD policy provides for the use of Individual
Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) to support contingency
operations. ADSW may be used to return IMAs to voluntary
active duty in connection with their IMA billet
responsibilities.
(2) CMC (MP) may, upon receipt of PSRC or partial
mobilization authority, modify ADSW orders to reflect
involuntary recall.
The CAT IV program allows the Marine Corps to tap into
a pool of individuals who have special skills or experience
and who are available to meet short-fuzed requirements. In
addition, it is the only means available to the CMC to bring
Reservists on active duty to meet operational requirements
short of mobilization or PSRC.
31. Lt. Col. Heidenthal, D.P., Reserve Affairs- Policy
(RAP) "Increased use of the Reserve Components in total
force missions." Talking points. 29 Sept 1994.
32. Kirby, "Reserve Accessibility".
33. Lt. Col. Stephen P. Anderson, AUS (RET). 7.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Roles of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve.,
Mobilization Summary, Volume II (MPLAN). Paragraph 1401.A.
37. Congressman James M. Talent (R-MO.) "Hollowing Out
American Armed Forces", The Officer, Sept. 1994, 31-32.
38. General C.E. Mundy, "Marine Corps Presentation on Roles
and Missions of the Armed Forces", Briefing to Marine Corps
University Students, Quantico, VA. 26 Oct 1994.
39. Stephen M. Duncan, 20.
40. James M. Talent, 31-32.
41. Stephen M. Duncan, 20.
42. Ibid.
43. Lt. Col. S.F. Tremel, "Talking Points", 4 Aug 1994.
44. The Reserve Components of The United States Armed
Forces, 33.
45. Title 10 USC 101 (a) (13) defines a contingency
operation as "a military operation that (A) is designated by
the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of
the armed forces are or may become involved in military
actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the
United States or against an opposing military force; or (B)
results in the call or order to, or retention on Active duty
of members of the uniformed services under section 672(a),
673, 673(b), 673(c), 688, 3500, or 8500 of title 10 USC, or
any other provision of law or during a national emergency
declared by the President or Congress."
46. Naval Reserve Project, Naval War College, The
Presidential Reserve Call-up: A Treatise for Military
Commanders, Naval Reserve Paper No.2 Advanced Concepts
Department, 1990. 1-20.
47. RAC-7, Headquarters Marine Corps, "The Call-Up
Authorities and the Base Force" Point Paper, Undated.
48. Col. N.E. Williams, Marine Corps Service Planner,
Memorandum for the Director, J-3 The Joint Staff
"Assignment of Reserve Component (RC) Forces (J-3A 00175-
94), 7 Feb. 1994.
This position is reinforced by the Assistant Secretary
of Defense's (RA) opinion that all Navy and Marine Reserves
should remain under peacetime control of the Secretary of
the Navy, who will continue to provide units to the CINCs as
required. The Current DoD Directive 5100.1 enumerates all
functions of the Department of Defense and its major
components. It certifies, that the function of the Military
Department is to "... maintain in readiness mobile reserve
forces, properly organized, trained, and equipped for
employment in emergency."
The Services remain in the best position to train and
administer their Reserve Components. All Marine Corps units
are trained against common standards to ensure their
readiness is maintained across the spectrum of assigned
missions.
49. FMFM 1-2 "The Role of the Marine Corps in the National
Defense" (Washington, DC: United states Marine Corps. 1991),
3-7.
50. MGen. James E. Livingston and Col. Eric Chase, "Marine
Reserve Force: Critical Back-Up Muscle for America's Post-
Cold War Force-In-Readiness", Marine Corps Gazette, March
1994, 14-17.
51. Ibid.
52. Chase and Stone, 5.
53. Col. J.M. Maloney, "Peacetime Access to Reserve
Component Capability" memorandum for CG MARRESFOR, 22 Jul.
1994.
54. Maj. C.W. Murphy, interview of 9 Dec 1994.
55. Ibid.
56. Tremel, Talking Points.
57. Col. J.M. Maloney, CG MARRESFOR Comments on ltr 1001,
RAC-01 dtd 21 Jul 94 "Peacetime Access to Reserve Component
Capability" 22 July 1994.
58. Department of the Navy Program Budget Decision, (PBD)
"Reserve Initiatives", Reclama, PBD No: 718, undated.
59. Maj. C.W. Murphy, "Use of IMA's for contingency
operations." Memorandum, 3 Aug 1994.
60. Unknown Author, "Peacetime Access to Reserve Component
Capability", Point Paper, 26 Jul 1994.
61. Unknown Author, "Positive Deployment 95", Position
Paper undated.
62. BGen. R.G. Richard, "Memorandum For the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Reserve Affairs" 12 Oct
1994.
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