Military

Joint Fires And Fire Support: Do We Have The Vision?

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues

 

 

                              EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

                             

Title:   Joint Fires and Fire Support:  Do we have the

Vision?

 

Author:  Major Michael J. Dean, United States Marine Corps.

 

Thesis:  The Marine Corps must change the way it views fire

support in order to fully apply the concepts and meet the

goals outlined in "Forward From the Sea."

 

Background:  Marines take pride in the combat power we are

able to generate through the synchronization of supporting

arms inherent in Naval Expeditionary Forces.  However, this

view is an inward focus that does not display the vision

necessary for us to win on future battlefields or survive as

a Corps.  We are entering into an entirely new era of

warfare.  Future military success will depend on our ability

to fight with a joint perspective.  We can not let

parochialism stand in our way.

 

Recommendations:

     A number of recommendations are made throughout this

paper.  These include such concepts as standardizing joint

fire support language; developing an awareness of joint

problems; understanding Marine Corps doctrine and using

common sense.  Specific recommendations include enhancing

the Marine Corps liaison capabilities, improving our

Professional Military Education and changing the way our

Corps views joint duty.

     However, the most critical recommendation is to make

changes to the way we think in order to respond to this

challenge.  We must develop an awareness and understanding

of our sister services' systems and procedures in order to

remain a viable force and effectively use all assets that

are available in the joint environment.

 

    JOINT FIRES AND FIRE SUPPORT:  DO WE HAVE THE VISION?

 

 

     Marines take pride in the combat power we are able to

 

generate through the synchronization and integration of

 

supporting arms inherent in Naval Expeditionary Forces.

 

However, we must become capable of drawing upon all the

 

unique assets and strengths that each service brings to a

 

conflict.

 

     The Navy's strategic concept "Forward From the Sea"

 

emphasizes this fact.  The Marine Corps, as part of the

 

Naval service must "...operate jointly to ensure that we can

 

operate successfully in all warfare areas..."1  The

 

coordination of those assets that contribute to operational

 

fires and tactical fire support is one part of this

 

requirement.

 

     The purpose of this paper is to analyze the way the

 

Marine Corps views fire support to determine if we have the

 

vision to fully apply the concepts and meet the goals

 

outlined in "Forward From the Sea."  In organization, this

 

paper will follow the basic structure of our fire support

 

system.  This system consists of three key elements:

 

Command, Control and Communication (C3), Weapons and

 

Ammunition and Target Acquisition.2

 

COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION

 

     The requirements for joint warfare clearly indicate

 

that each service must be both interoperable and

 

complementary.  To achieve this goal, it is imperative that

 

the services be flexible, versatile and have a common

 

understanding of doctrinal matters.  In the area of fire

 

support, this includes knowledge of C3 systems and

 

procedures.  Language is one element of these systems.

 

     Unfortunately, language can become the barrier that we

 

must penetrate in order to be successful.  While it can be a

 

facilitator, it can also become a stumbling block.  As an

 

example, each service has an organization and/or an

 

individual who plans for the use of air power, controls the

 

function of air defense, coordinates air-to-ground support

 

operations, and coordinates ground fires.

 

     Each performs similar, if not identical, functions.

 

However, depending on the branch of the service, each

 

organization or individual has a different title as

 

illustrated in the following table:

 

Table 1.

 

FUNCTION                Marines      Army/Air Force      Navy

Air Planning            TACC              AOC         TACC

Air Defense             TAOC              CRC         AAWC

Air to Ground            DASC              ASOC        ASCS

Fire Support            FSCC              FSE         SACC

 

 

 

     The problem is obvious, and it appears that education

 

could be a solution.  However, communication between

 

services is even more critical.  It is easy to envision a

 

breakdown simply because an individual or organization is

 

not aware of the other services' language.  A better

 

solution lies in the establishment of and adherence to joint

 

doctrine, forcing the services to rid themselves of

 

parochial languages.

 

     As Joint Pub 1-01.1 illustrates, the Department of

 

Defense has begun this process.3  However, we are not moving

 

fast enough.  Recent events illustrate this point.  In 1991

 

the United States (U.S.) military began to reduce its

 

footprint in Europe from approximately 336,000 to 100,000

 

active duty soldiers.4

 

     However, as a result of international factors, the U.S.

 

military in Europe is now performing more missions, which

 

are more varied in nature.  To achieve success, the services

 

must now rely upon each other for critical support.

 

Unfortunately, they are accomplishing all this well before

 

the "joint doctrine" is complete and the mechanisms are in

 

place to facilitate the actions.

 

     Simple solutions are the best.  In this respect, the

 

establishment of a common "joint language," or at least the

 

elimination of some parochial hold-outs, would make sense

 

and facilitate the synchronization of separate service

 

assets.  In the area of fire support the standardization of

 

doctrinal language across all services would be a small

 

step.  See the example below.  These terms could describe

 

the same functions listed in Table 1.

 

 

Table 2.

 

FUNCTION          STANDARD TERMS/LANGUAGE

 

Air Planning      Air Coordination Center (ACC)

Air Defense       Air Defense Center (ADC)

Air to Ground      Air-Ground Coordination Center (AGCC)

Fire Support      Fire Support Center (FSC)

 

 

     Standardization and interoperability are the keys.

 

From Marine Corps perspective, we should take the lead and

 

immediately make the necessary changes to our doctrine and

 

training syllabi to cement joint language into our culture.

 

We do not need to hold on to the past terminology simply

 

because it is Marine.  Only in those uniquely Marine areas

 

do we need our own language.

 

     Another example of doctrinal problems is the discussion

 

over fire support coordination measures.  The one item that

 

seems to cause the greatest concern is the definition and

 

placement of the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL).

 

Concerning this, common sense needs to be a common virtue.

 

     In regards to the FSCL, Joint Publication 1-02 and

 

current Marine Corps publications amazingly provide the same

 

definition "...the FSCL is established by the appropriate

 

ground commander to ensure coordination of fire not under

 

his control, but which may affect current tactical

 

operations."5  The key is that this is the guidance provided

 

by both Marine Corps and joint doctrine.

 

     A number of issues have risen about the use of the

 

FSCL.  The most controversial being, how can we attack

 

targets beyond the FSCL without prior coordination?

 

However, by definition, "...this fire support coordination

 

measure permits the attack of targets forward of the FSCL

 

without prior coordination with the ground force

 

commander."6

 

      For the Marines operating in a Marine Air Ground Task

 

Force (MAGTF), the commander of the Ground Combat Element

 

(GCE) would designate and coordinate the location of this

 

fire support coordination measure to support his plans.  Any

 

strikes beyond the FSCL are the responsibility of the higher

 

headquarters.

 

      When focusing on the MAGTF and the limited range of GCE

 

assets, parochialism permits us to believe that no real

 

coordination is necessary.  However, in this case the

 

Command Element of the MAGTF would plan and control strikes

 

beyond the FSCL to influence the deep battle.

 

      When Marines enter into the joint arena, they may no

 

longer be the only ground or air force.  Depending on who

 

owns the airspace, as well as what boundaries are given to

 

the Marines, for the MAGTF to employ fire support assets

 

beyond the FSCL, the commander may have to coordinate with a

 

higher or other affected headquarters.

 

      Not only does this reflect a common sense approach to

 

problems, but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

 

clarified the issue in a memorandum.

 

      ...a fire support coordination line (FSCL) will be

      designated by the land or amphibious force commander

and coordinated with the JFACC and other supporting

      elements.  It is a permissive fire support coordination

      measure used to expedite fires.7

 

     Therefore, control of all fires short of the FSCL,

 

including air interdiction, is the responsibility of the

 

appropriate ground force commander.  Fires beyond the FSCL

 

are not subject to his approval or review.  However, common

 

sense dictates that forces planning to attack targets or

 

operate beyond the FSCL must inform affected commanders.

 

This allows sufficient time to avoid friendly casualties as

 

well as providing for more efficient use of assets.

 

     According to Marine Corps and joint doctrine, control

 

and coordination of all fires is a requirement.  In any

 

situation involving deep fires beyond FSCL, if the Joint

 

Force Commander (JFC) designates a Joint Force Air Component

 

Commander (JFACC), it is the ground forces' responsibility

 

to inform that organization of these strikes.  Concerning

 

the Marine Corps, if it assigns a MAGTF to a Joint Task

 

Force (JTF), the MAGTF commander would have this

 

responsibility.

 

     In its most simplistic form, an awareness of this

 

"jointness issue" and some basic common sense is what we

 

need.  Our Corps should not view this as a limit on Marine

 

Corps' flexibility.  We must view it as efficient usage of

 

assets and flexibility for the entire JTF.

 

     Concerning this and the previous C3 issues, the bottom

 

line is for Marines to understand their own doctrine and use

 

common sense.  We cannot afford to remain a prisoner of our

 

own culture.  Otherwise, our parochialism may no longer be

 

only a critical vulnerability; it may become a center of

 

gravity.

 

     Another key to any successful joint operation is

 

effective liaison at all levels between elements of the

 

various forces.  This facilitates unity of purpose, intent

 

and standard procedures.  As a testimony to this issues'

 

impact, some units that routinely operate in the joint

 

environment devote an entire staff section to this

 

requirement.

 

     Concerning fire support, the best method is to

 

establish and train liaison teams that have their own

 

organic communications and a sufficient number of personnel

 

to operate continuously.8  The Marine Corps' air and naval

 

gunfire liaison companies (ANGLICO) are perfect for this

 

mission.  Units such as these can turn this potential

 

critical vulnerability into a combat multiplier.

 

     According to our doctrine, ANGLICO units provide

 

expertise in naval air and naval surface fire support to the

 

joint and combined arena.9  In this role, they also have

 

utility far beyond this task.  The use of this resource as a

 

communication and connectivity link between forces is a

 

clear example.

 

     However, besides training to accomplish these missions,

 

there is another significant hurdle to overcome: manpower.

 

There are never enough personnel or assets to accomplish

 

this liaison task.  There are only four ANGLICO companies in

 

the Marine Corps; of these, only two are active.  In

 

addition, as with most Marine Corps organizations, personnel

 

shortages are a matter of routine.  In this case, the

 

shortage is critical.

 

     Ideally, ANGLICO provides liaison teams for a U.S. or

 

Allied division and three of its brigades.  Each brigade

 

team provides support for two battalions and two companies

 

within each battalion.  However, due to a number of factors

 

ranging from operational tempo to unit strength, very few

 

teams are available to support missions other than those

 

which occur on a regular basis.

 

     The primary reasons for this shortage is a decision

 

made by the Marine Corps in 1986 to provide a task organized

 

control and liaison team from ANGLICO to each Marine

 

Expeditionary Unit (MEU).  As a result, three teams

 

simultaneously support three MEUs on each coast.  Therefore,

 

approximately 1/3 of ANGLICO's combat strength is

 

unavailable to fulfill the unit's primary mission.

 

     Additionally, real world contingencies in locations

 

such as Haiti and Bosnia also put a strain this unit.

 

Without augmentation from the Marine Corps Reserve, some

 

innovative staffing or "global sourcing" (which can

 

breakdown the cohesive fabric of any combat unit), this unit

 

is not be capable of meeting its primary task.10

 

     With the increasing importance and evolving nature of

 

joint operations, these liaison functions are becoming more

 

critical and essential to success.  As the Marine Corps

 

continues to "right size," it should give consideration to

 

enhancing this organization.  It would be worthwhile to

 

increase this unit's Table of Organization by at least the

 

same number of personnel supporting the MEUs.

 

     Another recommendation would be to increase the size of

 

this organization from two active duty companies to four or

 

at least double the number of operators assigned to 1st and

 

2nd ANGLICO.  In terms of manpower, this equates to 18

 

Officers and 108 enlisted Marines for each company.  Lending

 

greater flexibility to any MAGTF or JTF, the benefit to both

 

the Marine Corps and the nation would far outweigh this

 

relatively small manpower cost.

 

     As discussed earlier, clear doctrine, communication

 

systems and the liaison functions are keys to success in

 

this environment.  However, just admitting that there may be

 

a problem is the first step the Marine Corps needs to take

 

to improve in the joint fire support arena.  The area of

 

weapons and ammunition will follow.

 

 

WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION

 

     By virtue of the Marine Corps force structure and

 

heritage, fighting as a combined arms team is "...second

 

nature to Marine Corps units."11  While we profess great

 

capability in the employment of Marine systems, as a direct

 

result of our organization's culture, we give little

 

consideration to the integration of other component assets.

 

     For example, how many Marine Fire Support Coordinators

 

(FSC) understand the capabilities and limitations of

 

conventional Air Force aircraft, Army attack helicopters,

 

A-TACMS or the Navy's Tomahawk missiles.  Concerning the

 

nonlethal area, what about the capabilities and limitations

 

of assets from those services that support the pillars of

 

Command and Control Warfare (C2W) such as electronic

 

warfare, deception and PSYOPS?12

 

     Not only are we, as an organization, deficient in the

 

understanding of these resources, but we are grossly unaware

 

of the new systems and capabilities that are under

 

development.  Marines must be aware that each service has

 

programs that imagine "...a world of enhanced battlefield

 

intelligence, enlarged communications networks, space-based

 

weaponry and sensor to shooter technologies."13

 

     Any Marine with interests in fire support should remain

 

cognizant of these issues.  As a member of the naval

 

service, we should also have an awareness of such items as

 

the Navy's research and development efforts into a self

 

escorting, stealth type aircraft.  In addition, we should

 

acknowledge their emphasis on using technology to enhance

 

surface fire capability.  For example, by placing an MLRS

 

type missile aboard ship, as well as using liquid or

 

electrothermal propellants, we may once again have a

 

credible naval surface fire support platform.14

 

     To be true experts in this arena, Marines must think

 

beyond service boundaries.  This requires a complete

 

knowledge of the current and future capabilities that each

 

service can bring to the battlefield.  However, this is not

 

merely a question of awareness of the weapon systems, but we

 

must expand this knowledge to include our sister services'

 

culture, tactics, doctrine, command, control, communication

 

and intelligence systems.

 

     We can achieve success in this area and cover our

 

cultural and doctrinal flanks through education.  However,

 

the process must begin early in a Marine's career.  As an

 

example, it is amazing that a group of our brightest company

 

grade officers attending the Amphibious Warfare School were

 

unaware that the Air Force conducts Close Air Support (CAS)

 

missions.15

 

     As professionals and as an institution, we must take a

 

wider view of this process to become truly joint.  The most

 

likely locations to begin to infuse this information would

 

be in our career-level schools and non-resident courses.

 

However, our Professional Military Education (PME) system

 

currently does not provide an adequate understanding of our

 

sister services' systems or approach to warfare.  We need an

 

aggressive program to make us aware of these resources.

 

This is a critical failure of our academic institutions: the

 

Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps Institute.

 

      Taking a more pragmatic approach, in addition to

 

education, joint training can also be the "...steel that

 

welds."16 our services together.  In this respect, joint

 

duty assignments for officers, external assignments for

 

enlisted Marines and joint training exercises can provide

 

invaluable experiences.  The Marine Corps is slowly moving

 

in that direction.  However, we also need a shock to this

 

system.

 

     Concerning joint duty, in an era of increasing

 

"jointness" it seems that the options are too far and too

 

few between.  Because of manpower constraints, these

 

assignments are only available to a few officers.  In fact,

 

as a result of "right sizing," there is a conscious effort

 

to reduce this total even further.  In regards to enlisted

 

Marines and what the Marine Corps calls an external

 

assignment, the same applies.

 

     Additionally, within our Corps and our culture, we view

 

this duty as marking time, "skate duty" or a necessary evil.

 

In the officer's case, we often refer to this as the "Texaco

 

Syndrome."  The duty that he or she needs to "stay in the

 

game" and remain promotable.17

 

     As a Corps, we need to alter the way we think.  We can

 

not wait for another promotion list to be in question for us

 

to accept the value of this duty.  One way to demonstrate

 

the importance of this duty would be to increase not

 

decrease the number of joint billets available to Marines.

 

In support of this we could establish joint billets at each

 

Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).

 

     The Navy is already present in our expeditionary forces

 

and will probably increase its presence in the near

 

future.18  Concerning fires and fire support, we could

 

easily incorporate other services by designating billets in

 

our Force Fires Center as joint.  Our deploying units would

 

benefit from our sister service expertise and this would

 

also support the MEF's efforts to be true purple

 

organization.

 

     Of course, we would pay a price.  The current manpower

 

system would require us to offer up Marine Corps personnel

 

to perform similar functions in Army and Air Force

 

organizations.   However, this is not a direct cost to our

 

manpower system.  It is simply a one for one replacement.

 

     While there are other hidden costs, designation of

 

joint billets at the MEF Force Fires Center would obviously

 

provide more options for joint duty.  To this end, it would

 

improve our Corps' ability to function in that arena,

 

benefiting both the Marine Corps and the nation.  Hence, the

 

price would be worth the investment.

 

     Approaching this issue from another aspect, while joint

 

training exercises are becoming more frequent, often these

 

do not contribute to the enhancement of knowledge at the

 

small unit level.  To emphasize this point, sample a few

 

infantry Marines and ask how many have seen an Air Force F-

 

16 or Army Apache perform a CAS mission.

 

     One could argue that it is not necessary for the Marine

 

Second Lieutenant or Sergeant to understand or be

 

comfortable with fire support in the joint environment.

 

However, they will eventually be the senior officers and

 

staff noncommissioned officers of our Corps.  To be truly

 

joint, we must make each joint experience fruitful and

 

meaningful.  This is a challenge that falls on the local

 

commander.  A discussion of the third fire support element,

 

target acquisition, will follow.

 

 

 

TARGET ACQUISITION

 

     According to current Marine Corps and joint doctrine,

 

"...targeting is the process of selecting targets and

 

matching the appropriate response to them, taking into

 

account operational requirements and capabilities."19

 

However, this is another area where the Marine Corps'

 

knowledge and equipment fall short.

 

     We are making strides in this area.  These primarily

 

come in the form of education and assimilation of the ideas,

 

organizations and roles involved in the joint targeting

 

process.  The fact that we now have a MEF level targeting

 

board to nominate targets to the JFC attests to our

 

development in this area.

 

     However, for the Marine entering into the joint fire or

 

fire support arena, the role of the Joint Targeting

 

Coordination Board (JTCB) and its relationship with the JFC

 

and component commanders provides the key to understanding

 

this process.  This is particularly true regarding the

 

conduct of deep operations.

 

     As a Corps we need to be aware that the joint targeting

 

process is not an Air Force or Army target selection

 

process.  It is a "purple" process, and we build it around

 

the JTCB.  The JCTB is "...a joint activity comprised of

 

representatives from the JFC staff, all components, and if

 

required, their subordinate units.  The JTCB reviews target

 

information, develops target guidance and priorities and may

 

prepare and refine joint target lists."20  In any case, this

 

broad target planning is a joint process reflecting JFC's

 

guidance and objectives.

 

     The JCTB provides for the prioritization, employment,

 

synchronization and deconfliction of joint fires.  Depending

 

upon how much authority it has, it may play the central role

 

in the synchronization of the deep operations for the JTF.

 

From a Marine or MAGTF perspective, rather than viewing it

 

as an impediment to our operations, we should view the JCTB

 

as an organization that provides for our participation in

 

the targeting process in support of the JFC's end state.

 

     Additionally, the JCTB also supports the MEF Commander

 

in his single battle by shaping the deep area.  Therefore,

 

taking a macro perspective, it is an organization that is

 

"... ideally suited to bring all players of the joint force

 

together as a team."21  It is a true combat multiplier.

 

Marines must understand that this concept is critical

 

to "jointness."  While the MEF Commander does have his

 

single battle, all organizations within the joint force must

 

focus to synchronize and support the JFC's single battle.

 

We can no longer focus only on our Amphibious Objective Area

 

(AOA).

 

     An understanding of this targeting process is vital.

 

However, awareness and the ability to access information

 

from target acquisition platforms are also essential on the

 

joint battlefield.  Platforms such as the Navy's E2C

 

Hawkeye, Joint Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar and

 

Surveillance System (JSTARS), the USAF RC 135, and the Navy,

 

Marine and Army Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) can provide

 

a Marine commander with real-time, over-the-horizon target

 

locations.

 

     However, connectivity and communication are also

 

important.  As a Corps, not only must we know how to use

 

these assets, but we must have the communication links

 

necessary to make the system work.  "Sensor to Shooter"

 

applications have become the buzz word in the fire support

 

arena.  JSTARS provides a good example.   This is an Air

 

Force platform that provides a real time display of enemy

 

movements.  Our problem is that the Marine Corps lacks the

 

hardware to access this information.  Currently this

 

equipment is only available through the Army.22

 

      The modern battlefield, whether it be in the low, mid

 

or high intensity arena, is a complex place.  An

 

understanding of the joint targeting process, as well as the

 

assets available, provides the Corps with additional tools

 

to conduct the battle.  We cannot always count on

 

overwhelming combat power or unlimited time as a key to our

 

success.  From this macro perspective, no one service can do

 

it alone.  As Marines we must strive to use the assets of

 

all components to shape the battlefield.

 

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

     Without knowing it, Marines by their very nature are

 

purple.  We have always had to rely upon assistance from

 

organizations and agencies outside our service to survive

 

and accomplish our missions in both peace and war.  In fact,

 

because of its flexibility and versatility, the MAGTF, the

 

hallmark of our Corps, has become a model for the

 

development of future joint air-ground task forces.23

 

     However, as a Corps we tend to focus inward.  This type

 

of attitude does not display the vision necessary for our

 

Corps to survive.  This paper has made a few recommendations

 

that could impact on our employment of fires and fire

 

support in the joint environment.  However, the most

 

critical change must be in the way we think.

 

     A revolution is occurring in the military.  This will

 

change how we operate in war and operations other-than-war

 

as well as the future organization and structure of the

 

armed forces.  We must make certain changes to the way we

 

think in order to respond to this challenge.  The JTF will

 

forever "...blur present-day distinctions among the Army,

 

Navy, Air Force and Marines..."24

 

     In the development of our fire support doctrine and

 

training we must emphasize this fact.  We must focus beyond

 

the AOA to fully apply the concepts and meet the goals

 

outlined in "Forward from the Sea."  We need to wake up to

 

this fact and be willing to expend the resources in order to

 

accomplish this task.

 

     These few recommendations only scratch the surface of

 

the fire support arena.  However, this is only one part of

 

the larger question.  The simple fact is that we are

 

entering into an entirely new era of warfare.  We must

 

change and adapt to remain a viable force.  We cannot let

 

parochialism stand in our way.

 

                              End Notes

 

 

1.   John H.  Dalton,  Forward From the Sea,  (Washington D.C.:

Department of the Navy, 1994): p. 7.

 

2.  Ground Combat Operations, OH 6-1, (Quantico, Virginia: Marine

Corps Combat Development Command, Jan. 1988): p. 4-18.

 

3.  Compendium of Joint Doctrine Publications, Joint Pub 1-01.1,

(Washington D.C.: Office of the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, 14 Jul. 1993): p A-1 through A-13.

 

4.  Rick Atkinson,  "One Fighting Machine, Extremely Lean," The

Washington Post, (19 Feb. 1995): p. A1.

 

5.  Fire Support in Marine Air-Ground Task Force Operations, FMFM 2-

7, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 26

Sept. 1991): p. A-4.

 

6.  Ibid, p.A-4.

 

7.  Major Rolf W. Sandbakken, USMC, "Responsive Air Support-Another

View," The Air Land Sea Bulletin, no 93-2, (June 1993): p. 11.

 

8.  OH-6-1, p. 15-2.

 

9.  Naval Gunfire Support, FMFM-7,  (Washington D.C.: Headquarters

United States Marine Corps, 3 Aug. 1978): p. 20.

 

10. Telephone interview with Major Don Putnam, Executive Officer,

2nd ANGLICO Company on February 24, 1995.

 

11. LTC Art Briethaupt, USA, Lt Col Dave Lockett, USAF, LCDR James

Bradford, USN, Major Mac Coleman, USAF, "Close Air Support: Who

Should Do It?" The Air Land Sea Bulletin, no 93-3, (Sept. 1993):

p.9.

 

12. LTC William G. Welch, USA, "Joint Targeting Concept," Air Land

Bulletin, no 92-2, (30 June 1992): p. 7.

 

13.  Bradley Graham,  "Battle  Plans  for  a New Century,"  The

Washington Post, (21 Feb. 1995): p. A-4.

 

14.  John Gordan,  "Naval Fire Support and the Force Projection

Army," Field Artillery, (Oct. 1993): p. 25.

 

15.  Taken from a discussion with Major Bob Wagner, USAF following

a brief he gave to Amphibious Warfare Class 94/95.

 

16.  John  Dubia,  "On  the  Move,  Preparing  for  the  Purple

Battlefield," Field Artillery, (Oct. 1993): p. 1.

 

17.  Telephonic interview with Mr George Harris, Joint Officer

Assignments, MMOA-3, Headquarters Marine Corps on 24 February,

1995.

 

18.  Taken from discussions with Major Rick Raftery, USMC on the

proposal to place United States Navy Intelligence Officers in MEF

organizations to compensate for the shortfall in Marine Corps

intelligence officers.

 

19.  FMFM 2-7,  p. 3-2.

 

20.  Sandbakken, p. 11.

 

21.  Jerry A. Roberts, "Ocean Venture 93 and the Joint Targeting

Coordination Board," Field Artillery, (Oct. 1993): p. 21.

 

22.  Taken from discussions with Major Rick Raftery, USMC on the

status of the JSTARS program and potential Marine Corps access to

it.

 

23.  Dalton, p. 7.

 

24.  Graham, p. A-1.

 

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