Military

Forward...From The Sea; Can We?

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting

 

 

 

                EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

 

Title: Forward... From The Sea; Can We?

 

Author: Major M.G. Dunnagan, United States Marine Corps

 

Thesis: Although the Navy and Marine Corps espouse the forward from the sea concept,

deficiencies in mine countermeasure capabilities may hinder our ability to do so.

 

Background: The United States Navy and Marine Corps recently published a joint

strategic concept which will guide them into the next century. "Forward... From The

Sea" stresses the need for a forward deployed naval presence which can react swiftly to a

crisis which effects our national security. In order to do this, the naval force must have

the capability to rapidly introduce combat power ashore. A deficiency in Shallow Water

Mine Countermeasures (SWMCM) was higlighted during Desert Storm, which may

preclude the projection of power ashore in future scenarios. The Navy and Marine Corps

have formed a joint SWMCM program monitored by a Three-Star Steering Group and a

SWMCM Commitee. A number of programs are being studied and developed to give the

Navy/Marine Corps team a viable SWMCM capability. Some of these improved

capabilities are already fielded while others will not be fielded for 10 to 15 years.

Continued command interest as well as continued budgeting will be required to ensure

naval forces have the capability to project power ashore in support of national interests.

 

Recommendation: Operational Maneuver From The Sea and Over The Horizon are

outstanding concepts, but without a viable SWMCM capability, these concepts may not

be possible in future scenarios. The Navy and Marine Corps must continue to develop a

SWMCM capability as well as incorporate joint breaching operations into amphibious

training exercises.

 

             FORWARD...FROM THE SEA; CAN WE?

 

 

 

     The United States Navy and Marine Corps recently

 

published a joint strategic concept which will guide them

 

into the next century.  "Forward... From The Sea" stresses

 

the need for a forward deployed Naval presence to react

 

swiftly to any crisis which may effect our national

 

interests or national security.  Focusing on the littoral

 

area, Navy and Marine Corps forces can seize and defend

 

advanced bases--ports and airfields--to enable the flow of

 

lands-based air and ground forces....1  This represents a

 

major shift in focus for the Navy, from deep water

 

operations to littoral operations.

 

     In this paper I will look at one aspect of amphibious

 

warfare that has often been overlooked but which is of

 

extreme importance.  Shallow Water Mine Countermeasures

 

(SWMCM) represent a major deficiency in our amphibious

 

capabilities.  Although this deficiency was recognized by

 

the Navy it was really brought to the forefront by the Gulf

 

War.  The Iraqis heavily mined the coastline of Kuwait and

 

had we decided to conduct an amphibious assault it would

 

have been extremely costly in both equipment and lives due

 

to a SWMCM deficiency.  The Navy and Marine Corps are

 

currently involved in developing capabilities and procedures

 

to enable naval forces to assault through mined littoral

 

areas.

 

     There are two reasons why this deficiency was allowed

 

to exist.  One reason was the Navy's former focus on deep

 

water operations.  Until recently, the amphibious side of

 

the Navy was viewed by many as a necessary evil and was

 

treated with great disdain.  All counter mine warfare was in

 

the deep water Navy, which was not collocated with nor had

 

any dialogue with the amphib Navy.  This represents a

 

problem as these two communities, now heavily involved in

 

SWMCM efforts, are still not overly conversant in each

 

other's capabilities and techniques.  The good news is that

 

they are working to overcome this deficiency.

 

     SWMCM deficiencies also resulted from the previous

 

focus on Europe and NATO during the Cold War.  One aspect of

 

the NATO alliance was the reliance of member countries on

 

each other for various capabilities.  Since many of our NATO

 

allies have a SWMCM capability it was felt that it would be

 

too costly for the United States to develop a capability

 

which was considered a duplication.  For these reasons,

 

there is a very large hole in our ability to conduct

 

amphibious operations, against a determined enemy with a

 

mine capability, in a littoral area.

 

     In response to this identified shortcoming, the Navy

 

and the Marine Corps have formed a joint SWMCM program

 

monitored by a Three--Star Steering Group and a SWMCM

 

Committee.  A number of programs are being studied and

 

developed to give the Navy/ Marine Corps team a viable SWMCM

 

capability.  These programs are divided into near term (5

 

years) and far term (10 years).  The priority for the Marine

 

Corps is to develop detection and reconnaissance assets to

 

enable avoidance as well as exploitation of gaps and to aid

 

in mine warfare planning.  Amphibious warfare doctrine

 

recommends avoiding mined areas through maneuver

 

capabilities or taking overt actions to prevent the hostile

 

mining of coastal and open water areas.2

 

     The areas in the littorals that must be breached are

 

broken down into five distinct areas.  Traditionally, the

 

Navy has the responsibility of clearing mines/obstacles up

 

to the high tide mark, the Marine Corps has the

 

responsibility of clearing from the high tide mark inland.

 

More precisely:

     Mines must be detected, prepared for neutralization

     and neutralized in the deep water (over 200'),

     shallow water (200'--40') and very shallow water

     (40'--10') approaches to the beach without alerting the

     defender or in--stride with the assault. After the

     approaches are clear, the surf zone (10'--0'),

     beach and craft landing zone mine/obstacle

     barriers must be breached in--stride.3  In order to do

 

this, multi--faceted detection, breaching and lane marking

 

capabilities must be developed, tested and trained with.

 

 

 

                        THE THREAT

 

 

     The end of the Cold War has ushered in an era of world

 

instability and uncertainty.  The Navy/Marine Corps team can

 

no longer focus on only a few areas as "The Threat."  Naval

 

Expeditionary Forces may be called upon to conduct

 

amphibious operations in any number of the world's

 

littorals.  The fall of the Soviet Union has served to

 

exacerbate this problem with the widespread proliferation of

 

weapons of all kinds, to include traditional and

 

non-traditional types of mines.  Any threat country that

 

possesses a coastal navy could easily develop a credible and

 

sophisticated mine warfare capability.  As mine

 

proliferation in the past has not been given the same

 

scrutiny as armored vehicles or aircraft, and mine sales are

 

difficult to track and inventories are difficult to

 

determine, such a capability could present a tactical

 

surprise.4  Obviously, a tactical surprise to an amphibious

 

unit in the assault could result in mission failure.  The

 

high level of mine proliferation world--wide is one reason

 

why the Marine Corps' priority is to develop detection and

 

reconnaissance capabilities.

 

     Marine Corps doctrine and amphibious operations are

 

critically dependent upon mobility and maneuver.  A threat

 

country with a naval mining capability can seriously impede

 

maneuver and conceivably slow down or completely stop

 

mobility.  Given the fact that 90% of the United States

 

strategic lift is done by sealift, the magnitude of the

 

threat grows exponentially.  A viable SWMCM capability is

 

necessary to ensure success for any naval force projection.

 

     The proliferation of mines poses a serious problem to

 

United States naval forces in the near term.  Today 49

 

countries possess a [water] mining capability, of which 29

 

have some demonstrated mine production capacity and 20 are

 

attempting to export mines.5  Mining is probably the

 

simplest and the least expensive means of denying a littoral

 

area to a naval force.  The lack of a SWMCM capability in

 

our naval forces became public knowledge following Desert

 

Storm.  Our SWMCM capability is the Achilles heel of our

 

naval force projection concept espoused in "FORWARD... FROM

 

THE SEA."

 

     Many types of mines are now available for naval use on

 

the world market, ranging from the more traditional "dumb"

 

mines to a wide variety of technologically advanced mines.

 

The variety and availability of these mines make

 

countermeasures extremely difficult.  The following is a

 

brief survey of some of the new technology available today

 

or in the near future.

 

       "Stealth" Mines. With the improvement in detection

       means, means for avoiding detection are also

       improving. These are primarily for bottom mines,

       and include nonmetallic casings, non--traditional

       shapes, casings made of materials that can avoid

       sonar detection and casings that enable the mine

       to bury itself in the bottom. These methods for

       avoiding detection will be on the market within

       10 years.

       Mobile Mines. These mines are launched from a

       platform such as a small craft or a submarine and

       travel under their own power to a designated point.

       This gives the using country plausible deniability.

       Mines of this type are produced and offered for sale

       by Russia.

       Anti-invasion Mines. These mines are specifically

       designed to target landing craft and vehicles in or

       near the surf zone. Although not sophisticated, the

       dynamics of the surf zone make them difficult to

       detect and neutralize.

       "Active" Mines. This type of mine is a munitions

       launching platform in itself. The Russian MSHM mine

       is able to shoot a torpedo at its selected target.

       Further technological developments will likely enable

       the targeting of LCACs and helicopters involved in

       sweep operations. Active mines give a minefield its

       own self-protection capability.6

 

     In addition to these types of mines, technology has

 

made a new generation of fuses, combination sensors, and

 

detonators.  Using the right fuse gives the mine target

 

discrimination and counter--countermeasure capabilities.

 

The seemingly endless combinations available will continue

 

to create problems for mine countermeasure efforts.  Many of

 

these new generation fuses are available off the shelf,

 

adding one to a traditional "dumb" mine gives the threat

 

country a sophisticated weapon.

 

     The easy availability of many of these mines and fuses

 

makes the chances of encountering them in a future conflict

 

very likely.  This paper will now turn to the initiatives

 

that are being studied or developed to enable the Naval

 

Expeditionary Force to project power ashore.

 

 

               INITIATIVES/ CAPABILITIES

 

 

     The preferred method for dealing with any mined area is

 

avoidance.  If there are other beaches in the area which

 

will accommodate an amphibious landing and the concept of

 

operations, the landing force should avoid mined areas

 

through operational maneuver from the sea.  The problem with

 

this is the lack of reconnaissance and intelligence assets

 

available to the CATF and CLF to give them this type of

 

information.  Another option is to generate rules of

 

engagement, early in the crisis, which allow pre--emptive

 

strikes prior to commencement of the operation.  These

 

strikes would be conducted against the enemy's mine

 

manufacturing or storage facilities, mine laying platforms

 

and units which lay the mines.  Unfortunately, pre--emptive

 

strikes are not always a viable option.  Therefore, the

 

landing force must have the ability to conduct countermine

 

operations from shallow water inland to craft landing

 

zones(CLZ).  This paper will take a look at some

 

capabilities that are on hand now and others that will

 

become available in the near term and far term.

 

     Presently, the principle forces available to the Navy

 

for MCM operations are ships and helicopters.  The

 

Avenger(MCM--1) is the larger ship, capable of 13.5 knots.

 

A total of 14 of these are becoming available now.  The

 

Osprey(MHC--51) will be delivered over the next 3 years and

 

will eventually total 12.  Additionally a MCM command and

 

control support ship will become available with the

 

conversion of the USS INCHON.  This ship will enhance C4I

 

for the MCM forces.  The Osprey is capable of conducting

 

mine sweep and neutralization operations in water as shallow

 

as 30 feet but prefers to operate in a minimum depth of 40

 

feet to reduce the ship's vulnerability to mines.

 

     The MH--53E Sea Dragon offers a rapid response MCM

 

capability as it can be strategically air lifted to the

 

crisis area.  The Sea Dragon can conduct sweep operations

 

faster than the Osprey but cannot identify mines, requiring

 

time consuming post--flight analysis.  This helicopter can

 

conduct sweep operations in water as shallow as 20 feet, but

 

cannot sweep at night or during periods of reduced

 

visibility.

 

     Modifications to the LCAC have created the

 

Multi--purpose Craft Air Cushion(MCAC), two of which have

 

MCM applications.  In one configuration, the MCAC conducts

 

sweep operations towing the same array used by the Sea

 

Dragon.  In another configuration the MCAC conducts

 

breaching operations firing the M58 line charges.  These

 

modifications, when they become available to the fleet, will

 

offer a platform that is capable of conducting MCM

 

operations in shallow water, very shallow water and through

 

the surf zone.  The MCAC with line charges will have the

 

capability of conducting breaching operation past the high

 

tide mark to the CLZ.  A modification to the line charge

 

will have two rockets propel a surf zone array vice a single

 

line of explosive charge.  The surf zone array will breach

 

lanes in the water with a much higher degree of probability.

 

Experiments are also being conducted on an inexpensive

 

method to stabilize the rockets and to produce a straighter,

 

truer flight.  Unlike the Sea Dragon, the MCAC will have the

 

capability of operating 24 hours a day.

 

     In addition to the already mentioned assets which are

 

already available or under development, there are numerous

 

other capabilities being considered.  The EOD MCM Detachment

 

is specifically trained and equipped to support ship and

 

helo MCM operations by diving against influence fired

 

underwater ordnance.  The basic EOD Detachment cannot dive

 

against influence fired ordnance, but can be used to augment

 

operations in the surf zone and ashore.  The Marine Mammal

 

System is used with the EOD MCM Detachment and can detect,

 

mark and neutralize both moored and bottom mines.  The

 

Marine Mammal System is the only operational system with a

 

capability to detect buried mines.  These mammals have been

 

trained to place and activate explosives on or near the

 

mine, without injury to themselves.  There are numerous

 

other systems in the fleet or which will be available in the

 

immediate future which will enable MCM forces to hunt,

 

identify, sweep and neutralize mines.

 

     The near--term concept for conducting SWMCM operations

 

is somewhat bleak.  These types of operations can only be

 

conducted deliberately, in a benign environment.  The

 

concept is threat dependent from both a helicopter

 

perspective (exposure to enemy fire/asset limitations) as

 

well as to the degree of complexity/density of the

 

mine/obstacle barriers.7

 

     The far--term concept, when realized, will give the

 

naval Expeditionary Force the capability it needs to project

 

power ashore in a hostile environment.  This concept calls

 

for significant improvements in reconnaissance and detection

 

through evolving technologies.  It calls for clandestine

 

detection and neutralization operations to assist the NEF in

 

achieving tactical surprise.  Technologies promise to

 

provide an in--stride deliberate breaching capability for

 

amphibious assaults, thereby allowing the advantage of

 

operational maneuver from the sea to be fully realized even

 

in a mine/obstacle threat environment.8

 

 

                    COMMAND AND CONTROL

 

 

     The above initiatives will fail unless doctrine is

 

developed which covers the command and control aspect of MCM

 

operations during amphibious operations.  Currently there is

 

no doctrine which covers the command and control aspect of

 

MCM operations during amphibious operations.  A

 

COMSURFWARDEVGRU TACMEMO, titled "Amphibious Operations in a

 

Mine Environment," is out in the fleet and the MEFs right

 

now for concurrence and/or recommendations.  It proposes a

 

command and control concept for amphibious MCM operations,

 

which I will outline and then analyze.

 

     The CATF is responsible for command and control during

 

an amphibious operation.  The Central Control Officer(CCO)

 

and the Tactical Air Officer (TAO) belong to the CATF.  They

 

are responsible for directing and adjusting the timing of

 

arrival of craft and helicopters in CLZs and LZs,

 

respectively.  The TACMEMO establishes a MCM Commander who

 

is responsible for directing all MCM operations from the

 

seaward side of the mined area to the high water mark/ CLZ.

 

Obviously, close and continuous coordination is required

 

between the MCM Commander and the CCO and the TAO.

 

     In addition to the MCM Commander, two other commanders

 

have responsibilities for initial mine breaching and

 

clearance in the landing area.  The CLF is responsible for

 

providing task organized forces to conduct breaches through

 

the beach zones and CLZs as well as egress routes inland

 

from the CLZs for the assault forces.  The Landing Force

 

Support Party(LFSP) Commander is responsible for conducting

 

rapid follow--on clearance to widen already cleared lanes.

 

The LFSP Commander will continue these operations in order

 

to increase throughput of personnel, equipment and supplies

 

across the beach.  Additionally, he will continue clearing

 

the beach to establish a beach support area from which to

 

support the MAGTF.  It should be noted that the LFSP

 

Commander works for the CLF.

 

     The MCM Commander has three mine warfare elements.

 

These are the Air MCM units, the Surface MCM units and the

 

Underwater MCM units.  The MCM Commander controls and

 

technically directs these assets using a Mine Clearance

 

Coordination Net.  Tactical control of all helicopters is

 

exercised by the Tactical Air Control Center through its

 

Helicopter Coordination Section and Primary Helicopter

 

Direction Center(HDC).  Extremely close coordination is

 

necessary between the MCM Commander's control agency and the

 

Primary HDC to ensure proper routing of AMCM assets as well

 

as their protection from hostile air.

 

     The key to successful command and control of MCM

 

operations in an amphibious environment will be detailed

 

planning as well as close and continuous coordination.  A

 

problem will be the determination of when and where the

 

"handoff" occurs between the MCM commander and the CLF. The

 

transition must occur in the initial phases of assault

 

forces landing so they become the focus of effort and get

 

priorities of fires and air support.  At some point in the

 

operation the MCM Commander, the CLF and the LFSP Commander

 

will be conducting MCM operations simultaneously.  Again the

 

time and space dimension of the handoff becomes critical as

 

all are competing for scarce assets.

 

     Another significant problem will be ensuring that

 

seaward and landward ingress and egress routes are aligned

 

and marked.  Aligning and marking these routes is a

 

responsibility of the MCM Commander, and will be extremely

 

difficult at best.  The dynamics of the shallow water area

 

and particularly the surf zone to include strong currents,

 

wave action, surge and tides will multiply the difficulty of

 

aligning and marking cleared routes.  The natural forces at

 

work in this area almost rule out any type of marking other

 

than the use of GPS.  The use of GPS to transit cleared

 

lanes is probably the only marking system that can over come

 

the problems created by a constantly changing surf zone.

 

     The problems identified above are just a few of the

 

major problems I see with the proposed command and control

 

concept.  These problems can be overcome with detailed

 

planning and close, continuous coordination.  The Navy and

 

Marine Corps must start practicing MCM operations in joint

 

amphibious exercises.  Effective command and control can

 

make the difference between success and failure, so every

 

effort must be made to exercise and refine this command and

 

control concept.

 

                       CONCLUSION           

 

 

     The SWMCM program started at almost ground zero

 

following the Gulf War.  A serious shortcoming in this

 

capability surely bad a significant impact on the CINC's

 

decision not to conduct an amphibious assault against the

 

Iraqis in Kuwait.  Fortunately, the amphibious forces

 

positioned off the Kuwaiti coast played a significant role

 

without having to actually conduct an assault.  The problem

 

was identified and elevated to the highest level without the

 

loss of life and equipment that would have taken place had

 

an amphibious assault been conducted.

 

     Since 70% of the world population lives within 200

 

miles of the ocean, and 80% of the world's capitals lie

 

within 300 miles of a coastline, most of America's global

 

interests are well within reach of the sea9.  In light of

 

this, the Naval Expeditionary Force will continue to be the

 

force of choice for protecting and defending our national

 

interests in future conflicts or crises. To do this, we must

 

be able to rapidly project power ashore in any environment,

 

including mine-infested coastlines.  The Navy and Marine

 

Corps are working diligently in the areas of research and

 

development, available off the shelf assets and new

 

concepts/doctrine to overcome our MCM deficiencies.  This

 

effort will require robust and continued funding to be

 

successful.  During this time of continuing cuts and reduced

 

budgets for the military, this program must remain a

 

priority.  Fortunately, the MCM's budget is only "a drop in

 

the bucket" compared to the Navy's overall budget, as it is

 

primarily involved in making improvements to existing

 

capabilities.10

 

     The thesis question in this paper is, "Can we go

 

Forward...From The Sea?"  At present, there are numerous

 

scenarios in which the Naval Expeditionary Force simply does

 

not have the capability to get through a heavily mined

 

littoral which is being defended by a determined enemy.

 

Depending on the situation the NEF may be able to avoid the

 

mined area and still accomplish its mission.  For the near--

 

term the NEF is only capable of conducting SWMCM operations

 

in a benign environment, or by avoiding the mined area

 

through Operational Maneuver From The Sea.

 

     The good news is that, in the far--term, efforts in

 

research, development, and budgeting will continue to

 

command interest at the highest level.  As I stated earlier,

 

the Navy and Marine Corps must take every opportunity to

 

practice these new concepts and capabilities in training

 

exercises.  Utilizing these new concepts and capabilities in

 

amphibious training exercises, will allow the opportunity to

 

test, change and refine doctrine, tactics and techniques in

 

an environment where the cost is low risk.