Military

A Contrast In Capabilities:  Amphibious Forces At Inchon

And SWA

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - History

 

 

                               TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

INTRODUCTION                                                   PAGE 1

 

CHAPTER I                                                      PAGE(S) 2- 9

 

             AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

             AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY (1930'S-WWII)

             AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY (DEMOBILIZATION)

             AMPHIBIOUS PLANING REQUIREMENTS

 

CHAPTER II                                                      PAGE(S) 11-25

 

             AMPHIBIOUS LEADERSHIP/MACARTHUR AT INCHON

 

CHAPTER III                                                     PAGE(S) 25-32

 

             SOUTHWEST ASIA

             SWA (DEPLOYMENT OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES)

             SWA (ARRIVAL OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES IN THE PERSIAN GULF)

             SWA (AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING)

 

CHAPTER IV                                                     PAGE(S) 35-53

 

             COMPOSITING

INITIATING DIRECTIVE/AOA

 

             AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS/OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

             COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

             COMPOSITE WARFARE

 

CONCLUSION                                                     PAGE(S) 53-54

 

INTRODUCTION

 

 

       I left the Persian Gulf in June of 1991 convinced that it was time to leave the

 

Marine Corps. The past nine months had been an odyssey of incredible frustration, anger

 

and disbelief Serving as the S-4 of an infantry battalion in the 5th Marine Expeditionary

 

Brigade had been a unique experience. I joined the Marine Corps because my uncle, a

 

Marine in World War II, participated in every major campaign from the Marshalls to

 

Okinawa. His stories of these amphibious landings made me want to be a Marine. Forty

 

five years later I served with amphibious forces in the Persian Gulf. Based on this

 

experience I feel the Marine Corps had totally lost its amphibious capability. This belief

 

was rooted in emotion, not academic, analytical assessment.

 

       As time passed I realized I needed to examine the conduct of amphibious

 

operations during the Southwest Asia (SWA) conflict in detail. At my level, planing

 

seemed disjointed, crisis oriented, and ineffective. Initially, I blamed individuals. Surely

 

the Marines of my uncle's era would have done a better job. My research of this topic has

 

proven that these perceptions were understandable, yet at the same time, inaccurate. The

 

causes of the amphibious planning problems in the Gulf were systemic. Specifically, the

 

naval component commander for Central Command lacked the expertise to conduct

 

operational level amphibious planning. As a result of this deficiency, other staffs in the

 

joint command took the initiative in scripting the role of amphibious forces in the overall

 

campaign plan. This led to diffuse planning and distorted command relationships.

 

       This paper will also discuss factors that degraded the amphibious planning effort

 

at all levels in Southwest Asia. This will be accomplished by comparing the staff action

 

process at Inchon against that conducted during SWA. The Navy-Marine team at Inchon

 

used their extensive tactical proficiency in amphibious warfare with the operational level

 

of war vision established by General MacArthur. This special relationship was not present

 

during Southwest Asia. Amphibious planners in the Persian Gulf lacked the experience

 

and training of their Korean War predecessors. This deficiency was compounded by the

 

fact that the naval component headquarters in SWA failed to provide adequate guidance

 

during the planning process. The combination of these factors degraded unity of effort

 

and confused command relationships. The efficiency, focus, and rapidity of planning

 

during Inchon were not replicated during SWA. This paper will analyze the factors that

 

led to this contrast of staff capabilities. This analysis will also include recommendations to

 

enhance the amphbibious planning effort in future conflicts.

 

 

 

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

 

 

       The purpose of the following section is to illustrate the complexity and intellectual

 

magnitude of amphibious warfare. During the Gulf War several senior officers said that

 

the amphibious landing was the "easy part" of our operation.1 The author has served as a

 

Team Embarkation Officer on every class of amphibious ship, as a Combat Cargo Officer

 

for an LPD, and as an Officer-in-Charge of the Tactical-Logistics Group (TACLOG) for

 

three major deployments. The entire process by which Marines land from naval vessels is

 

anything but "easy". Extensive coordination, detailed planning, and reactive on-the-spot

 

adjustments are required to off-load men and material in a manner that supports the

 

commanders landing plan and subsequent scheme of maneuver ashore. This process

 

requires synchronization of various ship-to-shore assets from multiple platforms. Moving

 

thousands of men, hundreds of pieces of rolling stock/end items and sustainment ashore is

 

a complex task. Those that say this process is the "easy part" have never executed such a

 

maneuver.

 

       The key to success in this type of operation is having people who understand both

 

the theory and mechanics of the amphibious art/science. These personnel can de-conflict

 

the myriad of problems that arise during amphibious planning and execution. More

 

importantly, senior officers that possess these skills can craft visionary plans that maximize

 

the operational benefits offered by amphibious maneuver.

 

       Planners can draw from over sixty years of amphibious precedent in their quest for

 

effective staff action. The lack of comprehensive amphibious planning at some commands

 

during Southwest Asia would indicate that the Navy-Marine team has developed

 

institutional amnesia on matters relating to this specialized type of warfare. This deficiency

 

can be rectified by re-learning the lessons of history.

 

 

 

AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY(1930'S - WWII)

 

 

 

       The methodology for the conduct of amphibious operations is based upon sixty

 

years of doctrinal development and historical application. The 1933-1945 period witnessed

 

the most dramatic growth and application of amphibious doctrine. The Commandant of

 

the Marine Corps suspended all formal instruction at the schools in Quantico in 1933 in

 

order to codify developing amphibious doctrine. The Tentative Manual for Landing

 

Operations of 1934 was the product of these efforts. This comprehensive publication

 

covered command relationships, ship-to-shore movement, naval gunfire, securing a

 

beachhead, and logistics.2

 

       These theories were first tested in peacetime exercises in the 1930's with mixed

 

results. The concept of landing from the sea was valid, yet amphibious techniques,

 

procedures, and equipment were still in the developmental stages. Work continued until

 

the outbreak of World War II, when theory was put to the ultimate test. Combat

 

procedures were written in blood as real world assaults quickly identified doctrinal

 

deficiencies. The extremely costly landing at "Bloody Tarawa" taught amphibious

 

planners valuable lessons on fire support, communications, and beach reconaissance/

 

hydrography. Even as these procedures were modified and improved it became apparent

 

that even under optimal conditions, amphibious assaults were costly endeavors. On Iwo

 

Jima the Marines suffered over 26,000 casualties; with 6,821 dead and 19,217 wounded.3

 

During the equally intense Okinawa campaign the Navy had 36 ships sunk and 368

 

damaged, with an astonishing 4,709 killed.4

 

       Amphibious warfare came of age during World War II. Planning procedures were

 

streamlined and made more effective as the war progressed After Midway and

 

Guadalcanal the Japanese were on the strategic defensive, thus allowing amphibious

 

planners to utilize a PERMA(Planning, Embarkation, Rehearsal, Movement, Assault)

 

planning cycle. Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur provided unity of command in

 

their respective theaters while their staffs focused the amphibious planning effort towards

 

designated objectives. This atmosphere facilitated effective amphibious planning.

 

       The Commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF) received an initiating

 

directive that tasked him to conduct an amphibious operation to seize an area while

 

providing him with the assets, command/control, and authority to perform his job. Assets

 

were often scarce and in direct competition between each theater, but normally were

 

sufficient to gain a relative combat power advantage over the Japanese. The Commander

 

of the Landing Force (CLF) designed his concept of operations ashore and built an

 

organization for shipping that supported his scheme of maneuver ashore. Once the plan

 

was developed, forces were embarked in such a manner to support the landing plan. This

 

load plan was tested during the rehearsal phase to ensure the ship-to-shore movement

 

placed forces ashore in the proper sequence, at the correct time, and under the protective

 

umbrella of supporting air/naval gunfire. This practice landing was followed by movement

 

to the objective area and the actual assault.

 

       PERMA was a logical, linear, and rational planning process. This does not mean

 

that PERMA was simple to achieve or lock-step in exertion. Concurrent detailed

 

planning at all levels was required to synchronize the efforts of all participants. The

 

planning/supervisory responsibilities of the blue and green staffs were enormous. The

 

establishment of the amphibious objective area, sea echelon areas, and control of the

 

ship-to-shore movement were labor intensive. Landing plans and the associated serial

 

assignment, landing craft, and landing sequence tables were generated without the benefit

 

of computers and Xerox copy machines. The delivery of accurate, timely, and effective

 

naval gunfire/air was essential for movement against island defenses. Synchronizing and

 

concentrating this combat power required detailed coordination and extensive

 

communication. The spirit of this process was best summed up by the legendary World

 

War II amphibian, Rear Admiral R.K. Turner. He stated, "....the assembly of a large

 

amphibious attack force brings together numerous units of different arms and services

 

which may have operated together, or have had limited contact with each other. Since a

 

very high degree of coordination is required for a successful assault, the activities of each

 

of these elements must be carefully dovetailed with those of numerous other previously

 

unrelated elements...detailed supervision is required, if a smooth working team is to be

 

provided, and this supervision is exercised by a relatively small number of experienced

 

personnel."5 The PERMA process was executed by cadres of amphibious experts who

 

built an ever increasing reservoir of expertise with each landing. As the war progressed

 

the landings became larger and more complex. During the Guadalcanal campaign the

 

amphibious task force had 51 ships, a figure that was dwarfed by the 495 present for Iwo

 

Jima.6

 

       The point of this historical overview is to show that amphibious warfare came of

 

age in World War II. The mechanics and techniques of amphibious assault were hard

 

earned. None of this was easy because the lessons learned were written in blood. On

 

Tarawa the defects of our amphibious techniques became readily apparent. The

 

ship-to-shore movement was nearly ruined by poor hydrography and coral reefs. Planned

 

naval gunfire support was inadequate for the task at hand and poorly timed to maneuver

 

ashore. These problems were identified and corrected to the largest extent possible.

 

            The subsequent campaign against the Marshalls incorporated these lessons with

 

superb results. Fires, maneuver, and protection were weaved into a synchronized battle

 

plan that yielded high operational gains at low tactical cost. This campaign, code named

 

FLINTLOCK, secured a two thousand mile archipelago containing several vital airfields

 

and fleet anchorages. Outer island strong points in the Marshalls were neutralized with

 

fires and bypassed, while amphibious forces seized the relatively weaker inner atolls.

 

       General MacArthur used similar operations in the Southwest Pacific to maneuver

 

around enemy strengths while simultaneously isolating Japanese forces. MacArthur's

 

amphibious commander, Rear Admiral Barbey, masterfully deployed forces against

 

Japanese gaps and critical vulnerabilities. The highly successful New Guinea/Solomons

 

campaign epitomized the proper use of superior maneuver and concentration of forces.

 

       Firepower, not maneuver, became the focal point of later battles in the Central

 

Pacific and Okinawa. The location, size, and strategic value of these objectives dictated

 

attrition warfare methods. Subsequently, the Navy and Marine Corps became very

 

proficient at executing amphibious assaults/forcible entry operations. The result of this

 

experience was the codification of battle-tested doctrine, techniques, and procedures.

 

Attrition warfare honed our technical amphibious assault skills, while other campaigns

 

highlighted the utility of amphibious maneuver. These two concepts are not mutually

 

exclusive. Successful application of operational maneuver from the sea requires an

 

in-depth appreciation of both concepts. One must thoroughly understand the basic tenets

 

of amphibious warfare, its capabilities and limitations, before it is applied at the

 

operational level of war. MacArthur and the planners of Inchon recognized and respected

 

this special relationship. This paper will contend that the naval component commander for

 

Central Command did not fully appreciate this concept in Southwest Asia..

 

       Amphibious doctrine was forged into operational/tactical reality in World War II.

 

This process emphasized the criticality of focused, detailed, and comprehensive planning.

 

Amphibious warfare was a multi-faceted instrument that had proven itself in a spectrum

 

ranging from high intensity assault to maneuver driven by economy of force. This legacy

 

served us well at Inchon, but not during SWA. Why? The answer to this question begins

 

with an analysis of the Inchon campaign.

 

 

 

AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY(DEMOBILIZATION)

 

 

 

       The success at Inchon would have been difficult to predict in the five years

 

preceding the Korean war. After World War II demobilization fever hit the country and

 

the Navy/Marine team suffered accordingly. Senior Army and Air Force officers were

 

sounding the death bell for Marines and amphibious warfare. The infamous Secretary of

 

Defense, Louis Johnson, stated in 1949, "....the Navy is on its way out...There's no reason

 

for having a Navy and Marine Corps. General Bradley tells me that amphibious

 

operations are a thing of the past. We'll never have any more amphibious operations. That

 

does away with the Marine Corps."7 True to his word, Mr. Johnson inflicted axe like

 

blows on the Department of the Navy. The amphibious fleet of World War II had been

 

able to lift eleven Marine Expeditionary Force equivalents on 610 vessels. That vast

 

armada had been cut to 91 ships by the spring of 1950. The 400,000 plus Marine Corps

 

that marched across the Pacific had been shrunk to 35,086 in 1948. The number of landing

 

craft that carried Marines to the beach was reduced by 510 that same year. 90% of the

 

nations amphibious capability had been cut by 1950, yet in that same year American forces

 

landed and delivered a crushing blow to the North Korean Army at Inchon.8

 

       How did this occur in view of the limited assets available? Part of this answer lies

 

in the amphibious expertise the leadership, staffs, and landing forces of Inchon carried

 

over from World War II. The other factors present at Inchon were unity of command,

 

focus of effort, and assignment of a main effort. These three principles guided Inchon

 

planners down a tumultuous, yet straightforward path. That experience contrasted with

 

that of the planners of Southwest Asia, who planned operations across a spectrum of

 

never-to-be realized possibilities. During Inchon this focused mind set was driven from

 

the top, specifically by General MacArthur. No such commander, or staff replicated this

 

role during SWA.

 

 

AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

 

 

       The requirement for unity of command, focus of effort, and assignment of a main

 

effort are often heard themes in today's discussions of maneuver warfare or Air-Land

 

Battle. Unity of command is one of the timeless principles of war. This concept vests

 

directive authority in one commander to ensure unity of effort is achieved. Unity of

 

command ensures that the combat capabilities/potential of multiple units are consolidated

 

into one synergistic effort. The commander and his staff must generate top-down

 

planning. Leaders must be able to articulate a vision of success and desired end state

 

through their intent. The commander's staff implements this vision by coordinating the

 

activities of the force toward this common goal. Asset allocation and priority of effort

 

emanate from one source. This is the genesis of unity of command.

 

       The next related element in the triumvirate of effective planning/warfighting is

 

focus of effort. FM 100-5 says focus (unity of effort) "is an effective system of command

 

which relies upon leadership to provide purpose, direction, and motivations; emphasizes

 

well-understood common doctrine, tactics, and techniques  and takes effective measures

 

to limit the effects of friction. Leaders set the example, communicate their intent clearly,

 

build teamwork...accept responsibility, delegate authority, anticipate developments, take

 

decisive actions, and accept risks."9 This paragraph illustrates those points that made

 

Inchon so successful. General MacArthur provided unity of command and focus of effort

 

from the top. These same principles were not evident at the requisite locations during

 

amphibious planning during SWA, specifically at Central Command's naval component

 

headquarters, NAVCENT.

 

       Our last principle, designation of main effort; is a logical extension of unity of

 

command and focus of effort. The commander assigns a main effort to accomplish the

 

most vital tasks during each phase of the battle. The actions of the main effort are

 

designed to create decisive results in accordance with the commanders intent. FM 100-5

 

states the main effort "is assigned to the element with the most important task to

 

accomplish within the commanders concept...this provides a focus of effort that each

 

subordinate commander uses to link his actions to the actions of those around him."10  The

 

main effort receives the priority of fires, combat support, and combat service support. The

 

activities of the entire organization are focused towards supporting this main effort. This

 

prioritization of effort facilitates decision making in issues concerning asset allocation

 

within the force.

 

       The linkage between unity of command, focus of effort, and assignment of main

 

effort streamlines planning and increases operational tempo. These three conditions foster

 

the synchronization of force capabilities into one cohesive operational plan. Harmony was

 

achieved between these three functions in the Southwest Pacific and the Marshalls in

 

World War II. General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz displayed a keen appreciation for

 

the power of top down planning by articulating an operational vision of success for their

 

respective operations. Each possessed a staff that had the experience and technical

 

expertise to turn the commander's operational blueprint into amphibious reality.

 

       The lack of command and staff cohesion in other World War II battles nearly led

 

to disaster. Admiral Fletcher at Guadalcanal and Admiral Halsey in the Philippines

 

exhibited behavior which indicated that unity of command had not been clearly defined

 

throughout the naval task force. The Inchon landing was conducted in the spirit of the

 

Marshalls and Southwest Pacific, while amphibious planning in the Persian Gulf reflected

 

some of the trends witnessed at Guadalcanal and the Philippines. The next section will

 

discuss the Inchon landing in order to illustrate General MacArthur's effective

 

orchestration of amphibious planning.

 

AMPHIBIOUS LEADERSHIP(MACARTHUR AT INCHON)

 

 

 

       General Douglas MacArthur was the architect of the Inchon landing. In 1950 this

 

distinguished soldier possessed a degree of respect and power that has not been matched

 

in this century. At the outbreak of the Korean War MacArthur was the senior man in the

 

United States Army. His accomplishments, capabilities, and legacy were without equal.

 

Today's joint combatant commanders possess exceptional power and authority but they

 

still answer to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These commanders also have

 

comparable time in service with their contemporaries. General MacArthur's position as the

 

Commander in Chief of Far East Forces (CincFE) was somewhat different. The author of

 

"Victory at High Tide" observed that MacArthur in 1950 "had been a regular officer 12

 

years before the incumbent Chief of Staff of the JCS...the Air chief of Staff had been a

 

West Point cadet when MacArthur was Superintendent... [he] was a strategist without

 

peer...a proven practitioner of war at all levels of command."11 As the five star

 

commander of all American military forces in the Far East he possessed the unquestionable

 

authority to impose unity of command in operations in Korea. His reputation,

 

background, and personality provided him extreme latitude in the conduct of the Korean

 

War. This power would eventually lead to his relief, yet it provided the focus of effort

 

required for the masterful stroke at Inchon.

 

       The North Korean invasion of South Korea in June, 1950 advanced quickly against

 

out gunned and out manned forces. The United States, under U.N. auspices, rushed to

 

stem the northern tide that was pressing against the ever shrinking Pusan perimeter.

 

General MacArthur correctly assessed that the North Korean's critical vulnerability was

 

their extended, landlocked logistical lines of communication. Seoul was a rail and road

 

hub that was vital to the maintenance of these re-supply routes. Additionally, Seoul served

 

as a strategic center of gravity. The political windfall generated by the recapture of the

 

South Korean capital would be most beneficial to the Allied cause. MacArthur realized

 

from early on that amphibious maneuver would be his force of choice to attack the North

 

Korean critical vulnerability. He articulated his intent on the 4th of July, a mere nine days

 

after the invasion. More importantly, MacArthur wanted the landing to be conducted on

 

the 22nd of July.12 Logistics constraints in the form of available shipping and forces,

 

coupled with stunning battlefield defeats, delayed the landing. Nonetheless, throughout

 

the arduous summer of touch and go battles in the besieged Pusan Perimeter, MacArthur

 

never lost sight of the Inchon landing. As a five star general with no equal he was well

 

equipped to provide the vision, guidance, and direction necessary to execute true

 

operational maneuver from the sea.13

 

       General MacArthur's bold concept was complemented by the presence of a solid

 

amphibious planning team. Experienced "amphibians" were at hand to conduct extensive

 

detailed planning in an exceptionally tight time-frame. The placement of these amphibious

 

experts in the Far East was not an accident, it was a direct result of MacArthur's

 

pre-conflict emphasis on this specialized style of warfare. In early 1950 MacArthur

 

requested and received amphibious training from the Amphibious Training Command,

 

Pacific Fleet. Mobile Training Team Able was sent to the Far East in early 1950. Its

 

mission was to train one regiment out of each of MacArthur's under-strength divisions in

 

amphibious warfare. An Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison (ANGLICO) instruction team was

 

attached to this training cell to enhance instruction in the planning and coordination of

 

fires.14 Both of these experienced cadres worked closely with RADM James H. Doyle's

 

Amphibious Group One. Doyle had extensive combat experience from World War II and

 

had worked as Admiral Kelly Turner's operations officer.

 

       Once the Korean War started these three units were thrust into the crisis action

 

planning being conducted by MacArthur's Joint Strategic Plans and Operations

 

Group(JSPOG). The JSPOG was tasked with turning the concept of an amphibious

 

envelopment into operational reality. Logistical constraints and real world setbacks

 

delayed the landing, but the JSPOG was in place and functioning. This experienced

 

group was able to calculate and define the real world requirements for MacArthur's

 

concept. This initial planning would lay the groundwork for the concurrent, detailed

 

coordination that would take place with another team of amphibious experts, the 1st

 

Marine Division staff in less than sixty days the JSPOG, ComPhibGru One, and 1st

 

Marine Division staffs would put together one of the most successful amphibious

 

operations in history. This accomplishment was all the more impressive in view of the fact

 

that MacArthur felt that Inchon was, in his words, "the most intricately complicated

 

amphibious operation I had ever attempted"15.

 

       Operational vision and amphibious expertise brought Inchon to fruition.

 

MacArthur provided the focus of effort, and in so doing, canalized the energies of the

 

subordinate staffs. MacArthur stood fast in his conviction that the landing had to occur at

 

Inchon, despite rational arguments to the contrary. The problems with Inchon ranged

 

from tidal variations to channel access. The tides ranged thirty two feet and only at short

 

intervals during the month could these huge shifts support naval shipping. The access to

 

Inchon was through the circuitous and constricted Flying Fish Channel, a navigation

 

dilemma that could be compounded by mine emplacement and shore battery fires. The

 

landing site lacked true beaches and instead offered mud flats and sea-walls that would

 

require scaling ladders. Worse yet the Marines would be landing in the middle of a built

 

up area in the heart of an industrial city. These factors led ComPhibGru One's gunnery

 

officer to comment, "We drew up a list of every natural and geographic handicap...and

 

Inchon had 'em all."16

 

       These handicaps did not sway MacArthur's faith in the Inchon plan, instead they

 

served to strengthen his resolve. The same factors that made the site an unlikely choice

 

would serve as operational strengths. The North Koreans would never expect a landing at

 

that location. Inchon's proximity to Seoul would facilitate the capture of this vital

 

political/logistical center of gravity. MacArthur realized that the operational benefits of

 

this landing outweighed the tactical risks. This calculation was based on in-depth

 

knowledge of the operational and tactical levels of amphibious warfare. MacArthur fully

 

understood the capabilities and limitations of his forces. His risk versus gain assessment

 

for Inchon was backed by a thorough understanding of the mechanics and nuances of

 

amphibious warfare. MacArthur's extensive amphibious experience from World War II

 

gave him the requisite technical knowledge to make this operational gamble.

 

       The man tasked with spearheading the landing, Rear Admiral Doyle, did not share

 

MacArthur's optimism for success. At a briefing held in Tokyo he told the commander of

 

Far East forces that the "best I can say is that Inchon is not impossible"17. This tepid

 

display of support was countered by a forty five minute dissertation by MacArthur on the

 

merits of his plan. His own words best summarize his intent, he stated, "The amphibious

 

landing is the most powerful tool we have. To employ it properly, we must strike hard

 

and deep...I realize that Inchon is a 5000 to 1 gamble, but I am used to taking such

 

odds...We shall land at Inchon and I shall crush them!"18 At that moment any lingering

 

doubt on the landing site was erased. Operational vision had been transmitted from the

 

top and it set the stage for effective planning.

 

       The strategic vision for Inchon was provided by MacArthur but it took the

 

Navy-Marine team to execute the plan. How the Marines got involved in the operation

 

reveals the power of MacArthur and the influence of then Commandant, General Clifton

 

B. Cates. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities General Cates stopped the Chief of

 

Naval Operations (CNO) while the latter was walking down a Pentagon hallway. The

 

Commandant proposed that a Regimental Combat Team (RCT) of Marines be sent to

 

Korea to aid MacArthur's besieged forces. The CNO cabled the commander of naval

 

forces in the Far East with guidance hinting that a request for Marines should be

 

forwarded to Washington. Several days later the JCS received a request for the RCT from

 

MacArthur. This back channel force allocation stands in stark contrast to today's time

 

phased force deployment system. Today's service chiefs do not have the power to force

 

feed units to combatant commanders. During SWA our senior leadership was unable to

 

place Marine units ahead of other services in the force flow. During the Korean conflict

 

our deployment system was less structured than it is today. This condition facilitated

 

MacArthur's subsequent request for the entire 1st Marine Division on 16 July of 195019.

 

        MacArthur, drawing from his experience in World War II, realized the Marines

 

would be the logical choice for spearheading his ambitious plan. By placing these forces

 

as the main effort he accomplished two vital tasks. First, focus of effort was enhanced by

 

designating a main effort for the landing. All activities of the joint task force were geared

 

towards getting the Marines ashore in the most expeditious manner possible. Second, the

 

mission and tasks of the main effort were well suited to their capabilities. The budget

 

stricken Marine Corps had to call upon Reserve support to execute its mission for Korea.

 

These men possessed an incredible reservoir of amphibious/combat experience. Of the

 

51,942 reserves called to active duty in the first 9 months of the war, roughly 99% of the

 

officers and 77.5 % of the enlisted were World War II veterans.20 More importantly, the

 

senior leadership and staff billets were held by men who understood amphibious warfare

 

These duty experts were well qualified to conduct the crisis action planning that was

 

required in the summer of 1950.

 

       The Marine team was complemented by an experienced naval/higher headquarters

 

counterparts. The 1st Marine Division staff synchronized their planning efforts with the

 

men of Amphibious Group One and the JSPOG. The logistics, time-space, and threat

 

problems associated with Inchon were very formidable. MacArthur's early designation of

 

Inchon as the landing site concentrated the planning effort. This top down support was

 

magnified by the naval chain of command. The CNO, Admiral Sherman, told the Far East

 

naval commander, Admiral Struble, "Rip, I'm going to back the Inchon operation

 

completely. I think it is sound. If it's approved it will be held very soon, and you will

 

recognize the importance of the Navy doing everything possible for its success".21 This

 

was a straightforward, unqualified display of support. The value of top this down backing

 

would become evident as Navy and Marine staffs successfully worked through a myriad of

 

real world planning challenges. Concurrent, parallel, and detailed planning flourished in an

 

environment in which the participants had extensive combat experience and doctrinal

 

proficiency. A 1st Marine Division after action report said that this was possible "only by

 

a virtual around the clock working day, concurrent planning by Attack Force and Landing

 

Force, willing teamwork by both, and especially the amphibious know how of key staff

 

members gained by long experience..." 22

 

       MacArthur's early selection and commitment to the Inchon landing maximized the

 

planning effort. His solicitation and subsequent use of the Navy-Marine team placed the

 

right force against the right task at the right time. MacArthur conceived a visionary

 

campaign plan which capable subordinates were able to turn into operational reality. This

 

relationship epitomizes proper command and staff planning. The Marine Corps FMFM on

 

command and control states that the commander must state a vision of success and he

 

must provide decisive information at the most critical junctions in the planning process.23

 

MacArthur accomplished these tasks at the outset of the Korean conflict, thereby

 

facilitating amphibious planning. MacArthur had clearly defined the parameters for

 

accomplishment of the amphibious "Basic Decisions". These actions spawned detailed

 

planning in all facets of the operation, a time consuming and laborious process. The

 

committment to the Inchon landing site eanabled planners to streamline their efforts in

 

accordance with an unwavering intent, concept of operations, and force list.

 

       A clear cut objective like Inchon was not designated for the amphibious forces in

 

Southwest Asia. Planners in the Gulf chased their tails in pursuit of ever-changing

 

objectives. The lack of higher headquarters "amphibious" focus at the CincCent and

 

NavCent level led to a perpetual "plan early to plan again" syndrome. This condition

 

made detailed planning difficult and it stymied efforts to achieve any amphibious focus of

 

effort. This lack of top down planning degraded the operational capability of Marine

 

forces afloat in SWA. Bottom up planning expended vast amounts of junior staff energies

 

and resources; while doing little to shape the actual employment of their forces. This also

 

forced lower level staff officers to plan at the tactical and operational level. The

 

Amphibious Group (PhibGroup) and Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) staffs spent

 

too much time force feeding higher headquarters with operational level plans. As a result,

 

detailed "execution level" planning suffered.24

 

       MacArthur's actions at Inchon ensured the operational capabilities of all

 

Navy-Marine forces were optimized. Maneuver warfare places a high priority on achieving

 

and maintaining operational tempo. This process gains momentum by combining the

 

synergistic effects of the operational functions. This terminology did not exist exactly in

 

this context in 1950, yet the concepts were applied at Inchon. The planners ensured that

 

a high priority was placed on the integration of fires, protection, maneuver, intelligence,

 

logistics, and command and control. The cumulative effect of these efforts placed the

 

Allied forces inside the North Korean Observation/Orientation//Decision/Action (OODA)

 

loop. This was accomplished because MacArthur had identified the enemy critical

 

vulnerability and targeted it for amphibious exploitation. His intent, operational concept

 

of operations, and resolve ensured all the staffs energies were focused on integrating the

 

operational functions against Inchon. The JSPOG established clear marching orders for

 

the landing. Friendly forces were tasked to seize the port of Inchon and the Kimpo airfield.

 

They were then directed to cross the Han river and liberate Seoul. The operational

 

functions were energized towards accomplishing these tasks. Intelligence efforts were

 

geared towards collecting as much data as possible on the objective area.

 

       The Inchon planners and commanders displayed boldness in their concept for

 

seizing the port city. Tactical maneuver into the heart of the port could not occur until the

 

enemy forces on Wolmi-Do island were neutralized or destroyed. This key piece of terrain

 

was a natural obstacle to landing forces because it sat abreast the main channel leading to

 

the primary landing sites in Inchon. The severe tidal ranges complicated any maneuver

 

against the island because landing forces would have to attack at daybreak, with no hope

 

of reinforcement until 1800 that evening. Worse yet, sufficient tides only ran on 15

 

September and then again in mid-October. The late afternoon tide also meant eight LST's

 

would be high and dry the entire evening after the landing. The decisions to take

 

Wolmi-Do in the morning and to leave the beached LST's that evening were significant.

 

Either force could have been a total combat loss under the wrong circumstances.

 

       The dangers of these decisions were offset by a comprehensive blend of

 

deception, fires, and protection. Prior to the landing, numerous air and naval gunfire

 

strikes were launched against potential landing sites on both coasts of the Korean

 

peninsula. Guerrilla forces struck North Korean lines of communication to disrupt

 

command and control and security in the rear areas. The Inchon landing was prefaced by

 

a high volume of point blank fires. During the "softening" up of Wolmi-Do island the

 

United States Navy fired 1000 rounds of five inch shell in less than one hour. Destroyers

 

closed to within 1300 yards to destroy North Korean gun emplacements. The

 

overwhelming magnitude of these preparation fires totally disrupted the meager enemy

 

defense. The fires from Navy ships sent "1,732 rounds at Wolmi-Do, only slightly less

 

than the number of five inch shells that hit Omaha Beach before.....Normandy...." 25

 

Naval air also strafed and bombed this target with tons of ordnance. These initial fires

 

were a warm up for the subsequent bombing of Inchon. Naval gunfire and air delivered

 

munitions pounded the city, sparking fires and substantial collateral damage. This

 

destruction was not an issue in 1950 Korea, but definitely surfaced as a problem in Kuwait

 

in 1991. General Schwartzkopf had received firm guidance from our nation's leadership

 

dictating that damage to the Kuwaiti infrastructure be minimized. These restrictions were

 

a major factor in the cancellation of the Ash Shuyaba landing. The CNN "real time"

 

feedback of combat operations will ensure that future planners evaluate the destructive

 

effect of their fires and evaluate their impact on the enemy, domestic public opinion, and

 

our political leadership.

 

       The command and control of fires for Inchon was exceptional because only Navy

 

or Marine airplanes dropped ordnance on designated targets. MacArthur did not let the

 

Air Force conduct operations in the Navy/Marine Amphibious Objective Area (AOA).

 

The air and sea space for Inchon belonged to MacArthur's Joint Task Force commander,

 

Vice Admiral Struble. During World War II Struble had served with MacArthur during

 

the landings at Leyte, consequently the General's comfort level with his on-scene

 

commander was high. Additionally, Struble had witnessed the difficulties of integrating

 

Air Force strategic bombing assets into tactical bombing missions during the Normandy

 

landing. Lastly, naval air support of Marine ground forces had proven its worth. The Air

 

Force was irritated at their exclusion from the AOA but they were powerless to overrule a

 

five star general. This event seems unbelievable in comparison to today's requirements

 

under the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC).

 

       The Air Force wasn't the only service slighted in the command and control arena.

 

The Marine Corps seemed to be the logical choice to source the headquarters for the

 

Corps level command at Inchon. The 1st Marine Division had been designated the main

 

effort because the first phase of the operation was amphibious. This arrangement seemed

 

to indicate that the Commanding General of Fleet Marine Forces Pacific should head the

 

Corps that would undertake the assault. The wire diagram in Appendix I provides an

 

excellent snapshot of command relationships in September, 1950. The 7th Fleet

 

commander, Vice Admiral Struble was the Joint Task Force commander. As such he had

 

control of all components of the naval task force. This armada of 230 ships carried a

 

Marine Division, an Army division, a Marine Wing, and all respective supporting agencies;

 

a grand total of 71,339 men.26

 

       MacArthur designated a provisional headquarters, X Corps, to conduct the land

 

portion of the operations once control was phased ashore. The CNO recommended to

 

MacArthur that CG of FMFPAC and his staff assume the role as X Corps headquarters.

 

MacArthur vetoed this idea because he felt Operation Chromite was "....a land operation,

 

once the landing was made...would require a headquarters for a lightning strike which

 

could be handled by personnel...who had commanded in Europe and Italy. The real

 

essence the Inchon landing was not merely to land and form a beachhead but to drive

 

across difficult terrain 18 miles and capture a large city..."27 MacArthur felt the Army was

 

better prepared than the Marine Corps to coordinate such a campaign.

 

       Service parochialism aside, MacArthur's actions reflect the ongoing debate of the

 

role of the Marine Corps in land campaigns. The Marines were the force of choice to

 

"kick in the door" at Inchon, but the Army was charged with conducting the land

 

campaign. Taking this thought process one step further it implies the Navy and Marine

 

Corps are joined at the hip in this enabling process. This logic goes against the grain of

 

"Forward...From the Sea" which implies that the Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF)

 

commander wages deep, close, and rear battle in the littorals of the world. MacArthur's

 

actions at Inchon stove-piped phases of the campaign and sent a clear message to the

 

Marine Corps; the prosecution of a land campaign is the Army's domain. The good news

 

in this arrangement was the Navy-Marine team had autonomy of action during the first

 

phases of Inchon. However, Inchon does not serve as a role model for either the MEF or

 

NEF as a warfighter.

 

       MacArthur designated his deputy, Major General Edward Mallory "Ned"

 

Almond, as the X Corps commander. During the embarkation to assault phase X Corps

 

was administratively loaded aboard ship. X Corps did not have command and control

 

capability at sea and it did not act as an operational headquarters until it was moved

 

ashore. The transition from Joint Task Force-7 (VADM Struble) to X Corps was not

 

seamless. CATF, Rear Admiral Doyle, passed control to X Corps ashore, not the 1st

 

Marine Division. This handover violated doctrine and in turn created command and

 

control problems. The preponderance of detailed planning had been conducted by the

 

Navy/Marine/JSPOG staffs. Therefore X Corps was not in tune with the logistical,

 

operational, and administrative arrangements for the force. Once X Corps was activated,

 

the friction caused by confusion over command relationships and priority of re-supply

 

reached crisis proportions. X Corps often bypassed the 1st Marine Division staff by

 

tasking regiments directly or by commandeering logistical assets. These problems have

 

been glossed over by the overwhelming success of the Inchon operation. Nonetheless,

 

these command relationships did not facilitate "seamless battle".

 

       Inchon does provide an outstanding example of the effectiveness of amphibious

 

warfare. The doctrine, expertise, and techniques mastered in World War II served us well

 

in the Korean conflict. These principles, when matched with a commander of MacArthur's

 

caliber, led to the most decisive amphibious operation of the century. Inchon was the last

 

"operational" level landing combat landing conducted in this century. Since then, our

 

amphibious skills have atrophied. During the Cold War the Navy neglected amphibious

 

warfare. The former Soviet threat facilitated the emphasis on a blue water strategy; one

 

which dealt with the employment of carrier battle groups, deep strike aviation, and

 

nuclear surface/sub-surface vessels. The "gator" Navy was not the place to be if one was

 

interested in career enhancement or promotion. Amphibious warfare languished in the

 

naval doldrums during this period. This institutional neglect would create problems during

 

the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91. Forty years of institutional neglect decimated the

 

Navy's once robust amphibious capability. The senior naval battle staffs in SWA were ill

 

equipped to face the myriad of "littoral" planning challenges that presented themselves in

 

the Persian Gulf. At Inchon our amphibious knowledge/experience was still viable, forged

 

from the fires of World War II. Unfortunately, those skills had migrated to a chosen few

 

by SWA.

 

 

 

SOUTHWEST ASIA

 

 

 

       Inchon was a smashing success that exemplified the power of amphibious

 

maneuver. The amphibious planning process for this operation serves as a model of

 

effectiveness. Based on this rich historical precedent it would seem the Marine Corps and

 

amphibious warfare were timeless assets. Unfortunately, developments in the Persian Gulf

 

tarnished the Navy-Marine amphibious image. Granted, the afloat Marines in SWA served

 

a vital function; their presence tied down thousands of Iraqi troops. Nevertheless, an

 

undercurrent of institutional malaise exists concerning the performance and role of these

 

forces. These feelings were reinforced by defense analyst Scott Turver in the naval

 

periodical Proceedings, he wrote, "In light of the fact that no amphibious forces ever did

 

assault Iraqi forces in the Northern Persian Gulf during 1991, the Marines face grave

 

political uncertainties"28. If this is true and our future is influentially dependent on

 

amphibious operations, or in today's lexicon, littoral warfare; are the Navy and Marine

 

Corps where they need to be as collective institutions? The SWA experience seems to

 

indicate that amphibious warfare is at risk. The Navy has endorsed littoral warfare in its

 

"Forward...From the Sea". This shift in operational focus had made headway since SWA,

 

but the road to a truly littoral Navy is going to be a long and difficult one. To this end the

 

lessons learned from SWA amphibious forces need to be surfaced, analyzed, and rectified.

 

What were the problems?

 

       The first problem in SWA was the lack of top down planning. The NAVCENT

 

and the 7th Fleet staff did not provide operational level vision, guidance, or direction in

 

amphibious matters. These organizations lacked depth and expertise in littoral warfare.

 

This condition was compounded by the fact that NAVCENT did not have any

 

"amphibious" or "gator" personnel on their staff. As a result these organizations focused

 

on events that fell within the purview of their comfort zone; namely "blue water"

 

operations. Carrier, strike warfare, and maritime interdiction operations were the focus

 

of planning effort. This diluted the bottom up planning that occurred at the PhibGroup

 

and MEB "lower levels". Additionally, a "business as usual" attitude permeated the naval

 

atmosphere in SWA. During amphibious rehearsals several ships were scheduled for

 

inport maintenance. These availability periods were not coordinated with Marine

 

operations and the resultant loss of lift degraded combat training. This lack of high level

 

Navy-Marine interaction was also highlighted by the removal of the amphibious helicopter

 

platform, USS TRIPOLI, for mine sweeping operations. The requirement for a mine

 

clearing capability had been identified up front by the PhibGroup/MEB staffs yet

 

NAVCENT delayed tasking until just before the commencement of ground operations.29

 

The removal of this integral helicopter ship severely degraded the flexibility and

 

effectiveness of the landing plan. These examples highlight the disconnect between

 

operational requirements and operational planning at NAVCENT.

 

       The first organization to impact amphibious planning in SWA was MARCENT.

 

The CINC's landlocked Marine component commander generated requirements for

 

NAVCENT's afloat Marines. MARCENT acted like the Commander of the Landing

 

Force (CLF) ashore and his requirements drove the planning train. As we shall see, two of

 

the three proposed landing sites in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) were

 

specifically chosen to facilitate the MARCENT scheme of maneuver. This planning

 

arrangement made NAVCENT's amphibious team a "defacto" subordinate of the CINC's

 

Marine component commander. Meanwhile, the PhibGroup and MEB staffs were

 

generating plans for various amphibious scenarios in order to energize higher level Navy

 

staffs. These amphibious "worker bees" did their best to educate NAVCENT on the

 

multitude of possible employment options for the Navy-Marine team afloat. These

 

activities placed a great strain on the PhibGroup and MEB staffs. The creation of viable

 

amphibious plans requires a great deal of detailed planning and coordination. The lack of

 

guidance from NAVCENT locked lower level planners in a treadmill of redundant and

 

diffuse planning. NAVCENT never took charge of amphibious operations in a

 

warfighting sense30. Instead, that staff danced to the requirements and proposals

 

submitted by adjacent and subordinate elements.

 

       The combined effect of these stillborn relationships led to a perpetual "plan early

 

to plan again" syndrome. Future naval component commanders of combatant commands

 

will have to streamline this process. The NAVCENT of the 21st century must be

 

prepared to act as a warfighter if the tenets of littoral warfare are to be achieved.

 

Warfighting relies heavily on prior planning and effective command relationships.

 

NAVCENT failed to nurture the development of either one of these activities for

 

amphibious forces in SWA.

 

 

SWA (DEPLOYMENT OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES)

 

 

       What challenges faced amphibious planners? NAVCENT's lack of top down

 

guidance has been discussed. The magnitude of this deficiency is best analyzed in the

 

context of actual events. After Iraqi forces thrust into Kuwait in August of 1990 the 4th

 

Marine Expeditionary Brigade (4th MEB) embarked aboard ship in less than eleven days.

 

The Brigade had been in the middle of a PERMA planning cycle for an amphibious

 

exercise slated for Norway. The staff and embarkation teams worked around the clock to

 

re-configure loads to support potential combat operations in the Gulf. This process

 

epitomized EMPRA(Embarkation, Movement, Planning, Rehearsal, Assault). Due to the

 

extremely short time-frame for load-out the ships were not combat loaded. Subsequent

 

rehearsals of the landing plan in the Persian Gulf revealed the requirement for a major

 

re-configuration of the embarkation plan.

 

       During the Korean conflict the planners for Inchon were able to adhere to a

 

PERMA cycle.31 MacArthur's early guidance gave the staffs adequate, though

 

compressed, time-lines for embarkation. Inchon shipping was loaded out over a thirty day

 

period and the assault echelon was, for the most part, combat loaded. In SWA the

 

re-configuration of shipping ate valuable planning and training time. If Saddam had

 

decided to push into Saudi Arabia in September the initial organization for shipping would

 

have reduced combat effectiveness. At this point in time NAVCENT should have stepped

 

up to the table and made amphibious reconfiguration and employment the operational

 

focus of effort. Instead, the PhibGroup/MEB staffs generated their own re-embarkation

 

plans based on their best guess of future operations.

 

       Future conflicts will in all likelihood follow the EMPRA cycle. Navy and Marine

 

component commanders have a vested interest in the development of standing

 

embarkation plans that have the flexibility to be implemented on a moments notice. This

 

planning is conceptually obvious, yet extremely difficult in execution. The MEB staffs

 

used to hold the reservoir of amphibious expertise in the Marine Corps. Manpower cuts

 

have eliminated the MEB's and forwarded their planning responsibilities to the Marine

 

Expeditionary Force (MEF) headquarters. The ability of the MEF to conduct this type of

 

planning will be tested in the future, yet their high operational tempo seems to indicate

 

that too few people are in place to perform this role. The Navy could facilitate this

 

process but they face the same "op-tempo" challenges as the Marines. Additionally, the

 

limited number of experienced amphibians in the Navy staff hierarchy hinders the pursuit

 

of a "littoral" focus.

 

       The frequency and complexity of World War II amphibious assaults created a core

 

of experienced amphibians that facilitated the planning for Inchon. The lack of operational

 

level combat landings during the period between Inchon and Southwest Asia led to an

 

atrophy of our "assault from the sea" skills. This deficiency was most noticeable at the

 

NAVCENT level.

 

 

SWA (ARRIVAL OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES IN THE PERSIAN GULF)

 

 

       ComPhibGru 2/ 4th MEB linked up with two other amphibious units once they

 

arrived in SWA. They were Regimental Landing Team-4 from Okinawa, embarked

 

aboard Amphibious Ready Group Bravo shipping, and the west coast 13th Marine

 

Expeditionary Unit( 13th MEU) which was located aboard the vessels of Commander,

 

Amphibious Squadron Five (PhibRon Five). Appendix 2 illustrates this command

 

structure.

 

       NAVCENT published a broad concept of operations that gave the three groups

 

autonomy.32 This approach foreshadowed a NAVCENT "MEU" mentality that failed to

 

optimize the collective capabilities of the aggregate amphibious task force. The initial

 

guidance read as follows: "The primary employment of these forces is an amphibious

 

assault force, prepared to conduct the full range of amphibious operations, independently

 

or in concert with other friendly forces. As a CincCent theater reserve, this force may also

 

be tasked to reinforce USMARCENT forces ashore via an administrative landing at Ad

 

Damman or Al Jubayl.. The ATF will be organized into three groups, capable of

 

consolidating in order to conduct a large scale operation...RLT-4 will reinforce I MEF

 

ashore."13  A mission analysis of this passage reveals the seeds of future problems.

 

NAVCENT's vision of success is too broad and does not provide focus of effort.

 

Conducting the full range of amphibious operations includes amphibious assault,

 

withdrawal, demonstration, or raid. Couple this with the twenty one missions of a Marine

 

Special Operations Capable MEU and the planner's plate becomes full. In execution, this

 

obtuse guidance generated significant planning duplicity of effort.

 

       NAVCENT's original mission statement reflects the defensive posture and

 

mind-set of Desert Shield. The reinforcing role of amphibious forces envisioned by

 

NAVCENT is understandable in context, yet "hindsight" aided analysis reveals a degree

 

of operational myopia. During the Korean conflict MacArthur quickly identified the

 

operational leverage that an amphibious envelopment would yield. During the initial phase

 

of the Gulf conflict amphibious forces were placed in a reinforcing, defensive posture.

 

NAVCENT identified landings at any one of three possible sites, all located in the extreme

 

southern Kuwait or northern Saudi Arabia.

 

       During Inchon planning, MacArthur resisted proposals to land the amphibious

 

force further south. He had identified the enemy's critical vulnerability and attacked it

 

deep and to the enemy's rear. The leverage of amphibious maneuver was maximized.

 

During SWA geographic and political restraints hindered operational maneuver from the

 

sea. Nonetheless, NAVCENT planners should have been identifying enemy critical

 

vulnerabilities that were susceptible to amphibious forces. This type of planning was

 

conducted at the Group/MEB level, not at NAVCENT. This lack of top down vision

 

degraded the utility of amphibious forces. A more expansive discussion of this problem

 

will be presented later in this paper.

 

SWA (AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING)

 

 

       The Navy-Marine team afloat tried to energize planning by sending higher

 

headquarters a descriptive list of ten employment options for amphibious forces. These

 

potential force concepts ranged from MEU level raids to a MEB level assault. Scattered

 

between these extremes were demonstrations, feints, and deception operations. The

 

versatility and breadth of potential operations was discussed in detail. These ten options

 

were published in order to educate NAVCENT and CINCENT on the utility of

 

amphibious power projection from the sea. These efforts were geared towards raising the

 

level of amphibious awareness in the theater. These events preceded a subsequent three

 

phase amphibious planning cycle that ran from October of 1990 to March of 1991.

 

       The first phase, 6 Oct-11 January, centered on a potential amphibious assault on

 

the former Kuwaiti naval base at Ras Al Qulayah. The second phase, II January-2

 

February, dealt with an assault on the port facility at Ash Shuyaba. The purpose of these

 

assaults was to seize a port/beach lodgment for the build up of logistics sustainment for

 

subsequent re-supply of advancing MARCENT forces.34 This mission was beyond the

 

organic logistical capability of the afloat forces. The afloat supply levels were meant to

 

support two brigade size forces, not a two division maneuver element. The amount of

 

ship- to-shore assets were insufficient to rapidly build a Force Combat Service Support

 

Area (FCSSA) for a two division element in 72 hours.35 This concept was predicated on

 

the belief that 72 hours was sufficient time to build combat power/sustainment ashore for

 

follow on support of MARCENT.

 

       The logistics rationale for the landing sites was flawed. Granted, the seizure of a

 

lodgment would have eventually facilitated the shore-to-shore transfer of supplies from

 

Saudi Arabia. That scenario demanded that the CINC allocate shipping and NAVFOR

 

eliminate the mine threat. The time/space dilemmas associated with this concept were

 

significant. The landward logistics agencies were, given the geographic/time-line

 

constraints, more qualified to execute this mission. By December of 1990 the

 

preponderance of sustainment had been established in supply bases in Saudi Arabia. As

 

ground operations commenced forward based logistics had been placed to support

 

maneuver ashore in the interior of Kuwait. These pre-conditions made the amphibious

 

landing unnecessary from a logistical standpoint.

 

       This concept also displayed a tactical, vice operational, mind-set. The landings in

 

either one of these scenarios served a logistical, not operational purpose. The assault did

 

not place leverage on the enemy because we were attacking into his strength. The assault

 

was simply to support the CINC's supporting attack.

 

       Group/MEB level planners attempted to develop plans that maximized the

 

potential of amphibious forces. Ideas in this vein ranged from an assault into the Al Faw

 

peninsula to a large scale raid on Falayka island. These operations were designed to divert

 

the enemy's operational focus from the south to his seaward exposed rear area. These

 

concepts eventually took hold and were seriously considered during phase three, which

 

ran from 2 February to 1 March. The planning that occurred in the initial two phases had

 

a direct impact on the force structure available for this last concept.

 

       During the first two phases the probability of an amphibious assault into Ras Al

 

Qualayah or Ash Shuyabah seemed very high. On 26 October, 1990, NAVCENT,

 

published a Letter of Instruction (LOI) for the assault into the former Kuwaiti naval

 

base.36 As discussed, the LOI called for an assault and subsequent link up with

 

MARCENT forces within 36-72 hours. The size of friendly forces as they related to the

 

enemy threat did not support the concept of operations time requirements. In view of that

 

an additional Regimental Landing Team (RLT) was requested to reinforce 4th MEB. On

 

1 December 1990 this requirement was filled when ComPhibGru Three and the 5th Marine

 

Expeditionary Brigade sailed from San Diego.

 

       The deployment of this force ended a three month period of ever changing

 

command relationships for Battalion Landing Team 3/1. Originally part of the 11th MEU,

 

3/1 had been slated to deploy in November to relieve the 13th MEU in the Persian Gulf.

 

President Bush's October 1990 shift to an offensive posture in SWA, with the end goal of

 

expelling Iraq from Kuwait, changed the mission. 13th MEU was redirected to the Gulf

 

while 3/1 was composited with the 5th MEB at Camp Pendleton. Two battalions of the

 

5th Marines and the BLT from Ist Marines would form the body of RLT-5.37  Therefore

 

the MEB possessed three ground maneuver elements; thus providing Marine forces afloat

 

the extra punch they required for the Ras Al Qualayah landing.

 

COMPOSITING

 

 

 

       The compositing process that created the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was a

 

difficult process that highlighted the difficulties of merging standing organizations.

 

Theoretically, compositing is a seamless process that melds two similiar, but different

 

organizations into a warfighting whole; however, in reality, it is anything but fluid. The

 

11th MEU was a tight, well led organization that had honed its skills during months of

 

intensive training. The ComPhibron (Phibron)-Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)

 

relationship was very productive. Compositing led to the absorption of these staffs into

 

their higher ComPhibGru/MEB counterparts. This meant the former MEU & Phibron

 

commander lost their commands and became principal staff officers for the composited

 

staff. These staffs contained many hard working individuals, but their aggregate level of

 

amphibious expertise was below that of the Phibron/MEU. This situation was

 

compounded by the introduction of the 5th Marines regimental headquarters which

 

became the ground command element for the 5th MEB. Senior officers holding key

 

billets in both the regiment and MEB did not understand amphibious operations. Several

 

0-5 and 0-6 officers said the ship-to-shore movement was the easy part of amphibious

 

assault and the planning focus should be on operations ashore.38 Amphibious operations

 

are three dimensional; sea, land, and air. Accordingly, how we load and deploy drives

 

how we employ; no amount of theoretical fairy dust can negate this reality.

 

       The key agencies responsible for conduct of the planned assault into Kuwait were

 

not on the same sheet of ship-to shore music. Key billet holders did not understand such

 

basic concepts as turn around times, deck cycling of aircraft, and cross-decking

 

requirements. The PhibGroup N-3 and MEB G-3 never hosted a conference which

 

covered the details of the landing. The PhibGroup Combat Cargo Officer (CCO) failed to

 

coordinate the intricacies of the landing plan with the various ship CCO's. These

 

problems were at the micro/mechanical level and in total did not constitute a show

 

stopper. What they did do was degrade combat effectiveness and create friction before

 

the first shots were fired in anger.

 

       The PhibGroup and MEB level staffs were qualified to develop operational level

 

plans for NAVCENT but they lacked the nuts and bolts tactical expertise to execute same.

 

The PhibGroup/MEB planners attempted to simultaneously conduct operational and

 

tactical level planning. The MEU, battalion, and Phibron were forced to fill in the

 

planning gaps left by their common superior. Time, always a precious commodity in war,

 

was spent operating at the next highest level of command and staff action.39

 

       Lastly, the Ras Al Qualayah landing would have made the afloat Marines an

 

extension of MARCENT. In retrospect, Lieutenant General Boomer was acting as

 

Commander Landing Force (CLF) ashore and his requirements drove NAVCENT's

 

actions. The presence of two RLT's in the Gulf greatly enhanced the combat potential of

 

the amphibious force. This added capability could have been capitalized by considering

 

operational level of war missions for the afloat MEB's. NAVCENT elected to remain

 

focused on the tactical level of war and in so doing, subordinated its amphibious forces to

 

the Marine component commander ashore. Today's Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF)

 

commander, should be able to operate at the operational level of war in the littoral realm;

 

a precedent not set in Southwest Asia.

 

 

INITIATING DIRECTIVE/AOA

 

 

       NAVCENT never published an initiating directive for the Ras Al Qualayah

 

landing. This comprehensive document should specify command relationships and assign

 

the boundaries for a specific amphibious objective area (AOA). The general and

 

non-directive nature of the NAVCENT LOI did not fulfill the requirements of an initiating

 

directives. This led to confusion, friction, and debate at numerous coordination meetings.

 

The NAVCENT and I MEF staffs were not physically co-located, thereby efforts to

 

de-conflict issues were hampered. The size of the AOA, priority of fires, logistics, and

 

link up procedures were discussed at length. Considerable staff energy at all levels of

 

command was expended in the pursuit of compromise. Traditionalists would argue that

 

these problems were self-inflicted wounds.

 

       NWP-22 type doctrine clearly outlines planning responsibilities and command

 

relationships. The initiating directive is an authoritative document that specifies the

 

boundaries and powers of all the participants. NAVCENT should have scripted an

 

initiating directive early on in the planning cycle. This document should have articulated a

 

logical approach to AOA designation, coordination of fires, and battle space control

 

measures. This would have sent a clear message to the CINC and MARCENT that

 

NAVCENT was in charge of amphibious planning. Additionally, it would have shown all

 

key planners in the joint command that the naval component commander fully appreciated

 

the mechanics and operational level issues associated with amphibious warfare. In reality,

 

NAVCENT reacted to the input of its subordinate (PhibGroup/MEB) and adjacent

 

headquarters (MARCENT). This passive leadership made resolution of complex issues

 

difficult. NAVCENT had to constantly turn to its geographically displaced amphibious

 

subordinates for "technical" input so that it could argue issues in a coherent manner.1

 

       Current joint doctrine states the initiating directive "positively defines the AOA in

 

terms of sea, land, and air space. The size must be sufficient to ensure accomplishment of

 

the ATF mission, as well as to provide sufficient area for the conduct of necessary air,

 

land, and sea operations."42 The latter part of this definition provides CATF and CLF

 

wide powers in the control of battle-space functions in the AOA. This authority would

 

have brought early resolution to some of the issues that flared between MARCENT and

 

NAVCENT.

 

       Historically, an initiating directive has provided clear cut guidance on the conduct

 

of an amphibious campaign. Futurists would argue that amphibious command

 

relationships and doctrine are outdated and require revision. This view was presented by a

 

guest lecturer at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College43. According to that

 

speaker an initiating directive and AOA are not required in today's battle space. It seems

 

that a balance can be achieved between the traditionalists and the futurists. In essence,

 

that is what eventually occurred in SWA.

 

       Vice Admiral LaPlante stated during a personal interview that the AOA that was

 

eventually developed for SWA was adequate to conduct those operations required to

 

project combat power ashore.44 The amphibious forces afloat were going to fall under the

 

protective "umbrella" of the naval air/strike forces in the Gulf. This activity was time line

 

and phase dependent. It seems unlikely that the amphibious forces could have controlled

 

all activities in the AOA, given the number and mix of fire delivering platforms in the

 

combined/joint task force. Vice Admiral Laplante felt his control of the AOA would be

 

passive rather than directive. Essentially, the delivery of fires and coordination of all

 

battle-space activities in the AOA would be coordinated prior to the assault. CATF would

 

monitor and acknowledge entry and activities within the AOA, yet he would not be the

 

principal execution agent for control. One reason for this is the staff and C2 facilities of

 

amphibious forces afloat were not manned/equipped for this task. This arrangement did

 

not cause CATF any discomfort, and in his words "worked well"45. The fact that the final

 

AOA was viable does not detract from the fact that the road to this battle-space

 

reconciliation was difficult. Future planners might be called upon to resolve these issues in

 

weeks, not months as evidenced in SWA.

 

       The delineation of the AOA or Joint Operations Area requires extensive

 

coordination and continuous communication. MacArthur gave his naval component

 

commander total autonomy in the designated AOA at Inchon. His exclusion of the air

 

force in any AOA activities revealed his desire to keep things simple in the management of

 

battle-space. By segregating areas by service component he avoided inter-service

 

miscommunication as witnessed in World War II (Normandy/SW Pacific). Today's threat

 

and emphasis on joint operations demands that the CINC or Joint Task Force commander

 

play a very active role in battle-space management. CINCENT developed such a plan, but

 

it relied on MARCENT and NAVCENT for guidance concerning amphibious

 

requirements. The fact that NAVCENT's plan was driven by MARCENT scheme of

 

maneuver led to an incestuous relationship. Friction occurred when NAVCENT was told

 

by its amphibious subordinates that MARCENT would have to yield some control of

 

battle space functions in order to support the Marines ashore. This problem was caused

 

by the fact that NAVCENT's amphibious requirements were inextricably linked to

 

MARCENT's tactical desires.

 

 

 

AMPHIBIOUS OPTIONS/OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

 

 

       NAVCENT should have operated at the operational level of war in matters

 

pertaining to amphibious operations. Relegating NAVCENT amphibious forces afloat to

 

the role of an extension of MARCENT was not in the spirit of littoral warfare. The

 

tactical nature of the amphibious mission was reinforced when the landing site was

 

changed from Ras Al Qualayah to Ash Shuyabah. Time/distance calculations on

 

MARCENT's projected advance in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) led to this

 

adjustment. Ash Shuyabah was farther north and possessed better port facilities for

 

throughput operations. Unfortunately, the defensive network at this objective was firmly

 

established and was located in a built up commercial/residential area. A petro-chemical

 

plant was viewed as a potential explosive disaster and high rise buildings offered the

 

defenders outstanding fields of fire. Two years after the war the author's landing support

 

company conducted an MPF off-load in the port of Ash Shuyabah. During this time the

 

Iraqi defenses were analyzed. Based on this hands on evaluation the author feels that it

 

would have taken overwhelming and sustained fires to eliminate the dug in threat. CATF

 

and CLF fully recognized this dilemma and demanded the full application of CINC fires in

 

support of the assault. Vice Admiral Arthur (NAVCENT) transmitted this requirement to

 

the CINC during a brief on the command ship, USS Blue Ridge, on 2 February, 1991.

 

General Schwartzkopf was told that "Every high rise between the beach and the four lane

 

highway to the west is going to have to come down, or the Marines making the landing

 

will be too exposed. I'll have to level the buildings with naval gunfire and air strikes"46.

 

This demand flew in the face of the political requirement to minimize collateral damage to

 

the Kuwaiti infrastructure. The thought of leveling large portions of Kuwaiti real estate

 

caused the CINC to ask Lieutenant General Boomer if he felt the amphibious assault was

 

absolutely necessary. The MARCENT commander said he did not need the assault as

 

long as afloat forces continued to tie down three Iraqi divisions.47

 

       During World War II overwhelming firepower had been the key to operational

 

success in the Central Pacific. Even during Inchon the Navy-Marine team was free to

 

apply massive fires into a built up area. In SWA the fires available to support a landing

 

were even more formidable than those at Inchon, but rules of engagement/fear of

 

collateral damage prevented their use. These restrictions will likely influence fires in

 

future conflicts.

 

       The frontal assault, firepower versus manpower meat-grinders of the Pacific

 

reflect the extreme end of the conflict spectrum. SWA foreshadows future littoral

 

warfare; conflicts in which firepower constraints and rules of engagement will limit

 

operations. Maneuver from the sea will have to become more than a concept, it will have

 

to become operational reality. After SWA, then Rear Admiral Laplante said that,

 

"...frontal assault, forcible entry amphibious warfare is a thing of the past. The Gulf war

 

proved the concept of maneuver warfare on the ground....and that will be the model of

 

the future. What we have been calling up to now over-the-horizon (OTH) assault in

 

amphibious operations is better termed the maritime component of a maneuver warfare

 

campaign."48

 

       Naval expeditionary force commanders will have to adopt maneuver warfare and

 

an operational level of war mind-set. The point to remember is that at some point in time,

 

given today's ship-to-shore assets, we will have to blow holes in the enemy's defense. Gaps

 

will have to be created to allow forces to maneuver and exploit critical vulnerabilities.

 

Clearing mines, conducting SEAD/air strikes, or firing ATACM's in support of OTH is a

 

form of forcible entry. Amphibious power projection entails the placement of combat

 

power against the enemy at some time and place. Forcible entry should not be thought of

 

as a thing of the past but rather an enabling tool for operational maneuver from the sea.

 

       Future naval expeditionary force commanders will need to develop an operational

 

level of war plan that incorporates maneuver and firepower. NAVCENT planners became

 

fixated on conducting a World War II style amphibious assault that yielded tactical, not

 

operational benefits. The operational level options centered at the Al Faw peninsula were

 

not embraced by NAVCENT until just before the ground war commenced. These plans

 

should have been briefed to General Schwartzkopf as an alternate to the Ash Shuyaba

 

landing. The geographic constraints of the Kuwait coastline limited creativity for force

 

employment, however, raids against Al Faw or Bubiyan could have been force multipliers

 

for the CINC. These operations could have complemented the Army's "left hook" and in

 

so doing, helped entrap the retreating Iraqi forces. NAVCENT did not take action on

 

these proposals until after the decision to cancel the main landings had occurred. A guest

 

lecturer at the Marine Command and Staff College once said that a wise operational

 

planner always gives his commander two ways to win49. These events show that

 

NAVCENT failed to incorporate this concept in their amphibious planning. In retrospect,

 

the threat and friendly force structure existed to conduct both deception and raid

 

operations.

 

       The deficiencies of the NAVCENT staff were partially caused by a lack of trained

 

personnel. The commander of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade called the Marine

 

planners on the NAVCENT staff "hard working, but marginal at best in amphibious

 

matters."30 The paucity of amphibious expertise at the NAVCENT level was recognized

 

by the senior Marine Corps leadership. As a result, Major General J.J. Sheehan was

 

dispatched with a small staff to "jump start" amphibious planning in December, 1990.51

 

 

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

 

 

       The arrival of Major General Sheehan signaled the first step by the Marine Corps

 

to elevate the Marine forces under NAVCENT to something more than a tactical

 

extension of MARCENT.  Subsequent planning by Major General Jenkins and Major

 

General Sheehan called for the formation of a "6th MEF" headquarters. The intent behind

 

this proposal was to establish a parallel headquarters, at the NAVCENT level, to operate

 

at the operational level of war. 6th MEF would develop operational amphibious plans in

 

conjunction with NAVCENT while the subordinate PHIBGRU'S/MEB's executed the

 

same. To date these staffs had conducted bottom up planning which drained available

 

resources and time. The idea behind 6th MEF was to relieve some of this burden. This

 

proposal was delayed at HQMC by then Lieutenant General Mundy, but the final draft

 

authorizing the move was on the CMC's desk when the ground war commenced.52 The

 

short duration of the war stopped this plan from being implemented, but the concept

 

behind it was valid. The PHIBGRU/MEB staffs spent countless hours conducting

 

planning at the tactical and operational level. The Marine component of NAVCENT, led

 

by Major General Jenkins, needed general officer/staff representations at NAVCENT

 

headquarters. This same body could have been used to articulate NAVCENT amphibious

 

employment options at the CINC level while simultaneously coordinating with

 

MARCENT. 6th MEF could have acted as a go between NAVCENT and MARCENT,

 

thus avoiding the de-facto subordination of afloat Marines to those ashore.

 

       The lessons of Inchon do not serve us well in this command relationship analysis.

 

MacArthur had the power and operational environment to compartmentalize activities.

 

The Navy-Marine team force kicked in the door with literal autonomy of action, while X

 

Corps prosecuted the land campaign. This transition was not seamless, and though

 

adequate for 1950, would fall short today. Today's joint structure must have command

 

relationships that maximize the capabilities of each component. Each service must

 

recognize, understand, and articulate their full range of capabilities. The

 

structure/composition/focus/expertise of NAVCENT did not support the planning and

 

execution of naval and amphibious warfare. "Forward...From the Sea" calls for the Naval

 

Expeditionary Force (NEF) commander to be a warfighter in the littorals. This obligation

 

demands that the resident staff structure be capable of integrating all the capabilities of

 

amphibious /blue water forces into the operational level of war. These efforts will provide

 

top down planning and provide focus of effort. The Marine Corps must provide the naval

 

component commander with the requisite commander/staff to assist in this process. The

 

Gulf planners recognized this requirement, but implemented corrective actions too late in

 

the planning cycle.

 

       The push for an operational level of war utilization of amphibious forces in the last

 

phase of planning during SWA focused on raids and deception operations. The 4th MEB

 

commander pushed for a large scale raid into the Al Faw peninsula or Falyakah island.

 

The proximity of the Al Faw landing site to Iran, coupled with the enemy threat,

 

eliminated this plan from serious consideration. The Falaykah island raid did receive tepid

 

approval and was well on the way to execution until mine strikes on the USS Tripoli and

 

USS Princeton led to its postponement. Meanwhile MARCENT identified a requirement

 

for a MEF reserve ashore. After considerable deliberations the 5th MEB was off-loaded

 

in the vicinity of Mishab, Saudi Arabia on the first day of the ground war to fulfill this

 

mission. COMPHIBGRU 2/4th MEB continued to conduct deception operations off the

 

coast to continue to fix Iraqi defenses. These activities all played an important role in the

 

Gulf campaign. The deception operations kept the enemy in place as

 

MARCENT/ARCENT forces struck deep into his positions in Kuwait and southern Iraq.

 

The lack of an amphibious assault leads us back to the central "what if' argument

 

of the Gulf war. If amphibious forces had landed, would they have succeeded. The lack

 

of operational vision, poor command relationships at the component level, and

 

requirement for massive fires have been discussed. The deficiencies or problems presented

 

by these factors would have degraded the execution of an actual assault. Other events at

 

the PHIBGRU/MEB level also degraded the amphibious effort.

 

       As discussed, the requirement for two RLT's for an amphibious assault into

 

Kuwait led to the deployment of COMPHIBGRU 3/5th MEB on 1 December, 1990. This

 

force arrived in theater on 11 January, 1991. The command relationships between this

 

west coast amphibious force and their east coast counterparts were complicated. Rear

 

Admiral Cleary of Group 3 was senior to Rear Admiral Laplante of Group 2. Major

 

General Jenkins was senior to the head of 5th MEB, Brigadier General Rowe. Taking

 

time on station factors into consideration NAVCENT directed that COMPHIBGRU

 

2/4TH MEB would serve as the senior headquarters. Each amphibious force would

 

serve independently but in the event of an actual full blown assault, would consolidate. In

 

this eventuality, COMPHIBGRU 3 would serve as transport group commander while 5th

 

MEB served as an alternate command post afloat. The wire diagram depicted in

 

Appendix 3 illustrates this relationship.

 

       During personal interviews with Vice Admiral Laplante and Major General Jenkins

 

both indicated that this arrangement was the best possible under the conditions present.

 

The multitude of possible missions, coupled with the pain of compositing led to these

 

observations by CATF and CLF. This arrangement was logical in view of the situation.

 

This does not mean this arrangement should serve as a model for future operations. The

 

SWA afloat command relationships were outlined in a 1992 Marine Corps Gazette article.

 

The author, Lieutenant Colonel Brown, stated that "Because of the wide variety of

 

contingency missions, a unique command structure was adopted. The MFA(Marine Force

 

Afloat) was associated, rather than unified. The 4th MEB, the 5th MEB, and the 13th

 

MEU(SOC) kept their battle staffs intact instead of compositing to form a

 

MEF(-)...Although it seemingly violated the military principle of unity of command, this

 

arrangement gave the landing forces maximum independence and flexibility."53 The

 

author of this article drew the wrong lessons from that command relationship.

 

Independence and flexibility was achieved, but at a cost. This arrangement seemed to be

 

an efficient structure for deployed forces, but it was not effective.

 

       The command structure did not maximize the utilization of limited assets. For

 

instance, during the planning for the ship-to-shore movement into Ash Shuyaba, a critical

 

shortage of heavy airlift was identified for BLT 3/1. The movement of artillery pieces,

 

communication/ logistics vehicles, and sustainment was directly tied to the use of 4th

 

MEB's heavy lift helicopters. Requesting this asset was a monumental task. Requests had

 

to go to through RLT-5, then to 5th MEB, onto 4th MEB, and then down to Marine Air

 

Group-40. Since the task force was a "loose confederation" and 4th MEB was senior,

 

3/1 came out on the short end of asset allocation. The command arrangement led to a

 

"we-them" syndrome which caused the hoarding of assets. As a result, combat power was

 

degraded.54

 

       The asset allocation dilemma was indicative of the coordination problems between

 

the two afloat forces. The various headquarters were maintained because senior leaders

 

did not want to repeat the agonizing compositing process that had occurred ashore in

 

MARCENT. This rationale was based on valid concerns, but it diluted unity of effort in

 

the long term. The flexibility gained by the loose confederation of the MEB's was offset

 

by a corresponding loss of total force combat power. Limited assets were not maximized

 

because they were under the control of separate commands. This problem could have

 

been rectified if the command relationships depicted in Appendix 4 were embraced. This

 

command structure would have elevated ComPhibGru 2/4th MEB to a NAVCENT

 

FWD/6th MEF status, thus filling the operational level of war planning void at the naval

 

component headquarters. ComPhibGru 3/5th MEB would have served as CATF/CLF for

 

a two RLT Ground Combat Element(GCE), consolidated Aviation Combat Element, and

 

composited Combat Service Support Element. This relationship would have provided the

 

unity of command and focus of effort required to maximize limited assets. Flexibility

 

would have been retained since units under 5th MEB could have been task organized to

 

conduct any of the missions previously outlined.

 

       The elimination of MEB staffs and shifting of their responsibilities to the MEF

 

leads one to believe that future amphibious operations will face the same command

 

relationship problems. The difficulties of integrating Phibron/MEU size forces into RLT

 

formations still remains. Based on a 2.5 MEB amphibious lift capability the command

 

relationships for a MEF(FWD) with a two RLT ground combat element will have to be

 

de-conflicted. The ComPhibGru associated with each MEF would serve as the higher

 

naval headquarters. The MEU/Phibron staffs should be ready to fleet up to perform

 

RLT/PhibGroup commander duties. Presently 1st Marines sources all west coast MEU's.

 

If 8th Marines went back to sourcing all east coast MEU's this arrangement could be put

 

into practice. During SWA the 1st Marines headquarters deployed with one organic

 

battalion. Two battalions were afloat with MEU's in the Gulf and one was locked into a

 

MEU work-up stateside. Based on this experience the 1st and 8th Marines could train

 

with reserve units to replicate the most likely real world utilization of these forces.

 

       Command relationships must be complemented by effective staff and command

 

action. Leaders facilitate this process by having a working knowledge of the capabilities

 

and limitations of their subordinate elements. Commanders must fight the urge to operate

 

in their "comfort zone". NAVCENT's post conflict report card in this endeavor is less than

 

outstanding. Three months into Desert Shield Vice Admiral Mauz turned over command

 

of NAVCENT to Vice Admiral Arthur. Post-war articles written by the latter flag

 

officer make one wonder if amphibious forces were ever present in the Persian Gulf

 

NAVCENT's focus was on aviation and strike warfare, not operational maneuver from

 

the sea. This attitude typifies the rift between the green and blue water Navy that has

 

existed since World War II. This intellectual chasm has grown over time because blue

 

water doctrine has evolved with the threat while amphibious doctrine has remained

 

virtually unchanged.

 

COMPOSITE WARFARE

 

 

 

       Composite warfare(CWC) was developed to thwart the threat posed by modern

 

aircraft and naval vessels. The underlying premise behind CWC is that the complexity and

 

threat level of the modern seas is so great, that decentralized/compartmentalized control of

 

warfare specific functions is required. The lethality of air/surface delivered missiles,

 

coupled with the sub-surface threat, made CWC an operational requirement for fleet

 

survival. CWC integrates the defensive capabilities of the fleet against air, surface, and

 

sub-surface threats. Warfare commanders are assigned for each functional(threat) area,

 

coordinating operations within their specialty throughout the task force afloat.

 

       The placement of CATF and CLF in this CWC structure has been debated at

 

length. One view, held by Third Fleet, designates CATF and CLF as co-equals with each

 

other and with their respective functional warfare commanders. This arrangement

 

subordinates CATF/CLF to the CWC. Historically, the officer filling this senior billet has

 

an aviation or surface warfare (non-amphibious) background. The Third Fleet concept

 

subordinates the agents for amphibious power projection to the traditional leaders of the

 

"blue water" Navy. History has shown that the amphibious and sea control elements for a

 

naval task force often possess different viewpoints on mission essential tasks. The actions

 

of Admirals Fletcher and Halsey at Guadalcanal and the Philippines illustrate this point.

 

Achieving a balance between fleet protection and supporting the amphibious operations

 

requires commanders versed in both disciplines. Placing CATF/CLF under the Third

 

Fleet CWC structure would be valid if CWC was an honest broker. This can only occur if

 

CWC sheds his blue water bias. Operational maneuver from the sea can only be achieved

 

in this scenario if the officer in tactical command understands and accepts the duties and

 

obligations he has to his subordinate amphibious commander. An enlightened commander

 

would be able to think at the operational level of war from a "blue water" and "littoral"

 

perspective. This mind-set would facilitate the creation of a naval campaign plan that

 

synchronized all warfare assets. This coordination of warfighting capabilities would be in

 

accordance with commander's intent and mission. The paucity of Navy flag level officers

 

who share this perspective makes the Third Fleet proposal difficult to accept. This concept

 

will not support operational maneuver from the sea until commanders develop an

 

appreciation for the utility of amphibious forces.

 

       The creation of an amphibious warfare commander (AWC), parallel to the CWC

 

structure, could provide an alternative to the Third Fleet proposal. The AWC or CWC

 

would be co-equal in this structure, both reporting to the Commander of the Joint Task

 

Force(CJTF). CWC would still control the strike/anti-air/anti-surface/anti-subsurface

 

threat while AWC coordinated/executed amphibious events. CATF and CLF would

 

reside under, yet apart from, the AWC. This arrangement would elevate CATF/CLF

 

above their functional warfare contemporaries and therefore level the command

 

relationship playing field. The AWC would be the officer-in-tactical control in his

 

designated area, thereby facilitating the coordination of support for CATF and CLF. The

 

diagram in Appendix 5 depicts this structure.

 

       The fusing of CWC, amphibious, and joint command relationships is very complex.

 

In practice this process is often personality driven and situation dependent. During a

 

personal interview conducted with Vice Admiral Laplante a third course of action in this

 

search for command relationship harmony was proposed. He said that CWC is outdated

 

and requires major revision. In his mind, future NEF commanders and staffs will have to

      

operate at the operational level of war. Towards this end the commander and staff

 

operating from one location, will have to craft, coordinate, and synchronize all functional

 

warfare functions. He felt that present day and future C3 assets will support this

 

concept.55 Unfortunately, this proposal is very personality/capabilities dependent. Flag

 

level officers of less varied background than Vice Admiral Laplante might falter in the

 

application of this theory. The other key element in this concept resides with the staff

 

The complexity and degree of moving parts in this type of NEF staff would put

 

Napoleon's corporal into a coma. A comprehensive staff training program would be

 

required to achieve operational effectiveness.

 

       "Forward....From the Sea" calls for the seamless transition of forces from afloat to

 

those ashore. This event will not occur until the current debate over CWC and command

 

relationships within amphibious forces is resolved. Our forces are best served by a

 

structure that emphasizes the co-equal partnership of the AWC and CWC. Rank parity

 

would be a prerequisite for success in this relationship; since historical precedent has

 

shown that more than one carrier battle group commander has tried to subsume his

 

amphibious brethren. These two vehicles for naval power projection would report to the

 

commander of the joint task force or combatant command. This arrangement places a

 

heavy burden on the CJTF or CINC, because each has to fully understand the capabilities

 

and limitations of its subordinate organizations. The goal of this co-equal status is to

 

provide amphibious forces operational parity in the CWC or blue water realm. Command

 

relationships drive the proper employment of operational functions. We will achieve true

 

operational maneuver from the sea if we empower amphibious forces with due

 

representation in the naval command and control structure.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

 

       What lessons should we draw from Southwest Asia? First, it is evident that our

 

hard earned experience gained from World War II and Korea has eroded due to

 

institutional neglect. This "sin of littoral omission" has been committed by the Marine

 

Corps as well as the Navy. With that in mind we need to modify the instruction given at

 

professional schools and by the Marine Air/Ground Staff Training Program (MSTP) team.

 

Current instruction focuses on staff planning conducted in the prosecution of a land

 

campaign in a joint environment. The Marine Corps needs to work through its

 

institutional deficiencies in amphibious warfare and compositing before it fights corps level

 

battles ashore.

 

        Continued emphasis on land campaigns will put us in direct competition with the

 

Army, a force which we have neither the resources nor manpower to challenge. The

 

Marine Corps should embrace its time tested role as an enabling force for follow on

 

forces. Towards that end we should establish joint education and doctrine centers that

 

truly develop littoral warfare concepts. Command relationships, staff functions, and staff

 

training need to be addressed. Making organizations plan and operate at the required

 

level of war, not in their comfort zone, should be our goal. Future deconfliction of battle

 

space in joint operations will not become easier over time; it will take trained staff

 

personnel and knowledgeable commanders to resolve this and other complex issues.

 

       The United States Navy will have to shed its "blue water" bias and embrace the

 

ideas set forth in "Forward....From the Sea". Executing littoral warfare will require staffs

 

that understand both amphibious and blue water operations. NAVCENT's performance in

 

the Persian Gulf seems to indicate that we are lacking the doctrinal, technical, and real

 

world expertise to accomplish this goal. The Navy will have to cultivate staff officers and

 

leaders who appreciate the complementary relationship between carrier, strike, and

 

amphibious warfare. Present assignment, promotion, and budget policies will have to be

 

modified to give the "gators" the personnel, leadership, and funds they require. Lastly,

 

naval professional education will have to reflect the change in emphasis to littoral

 

operations.

 

       Inchon exemplified the utility of amphibious warfare. The leadership and staff

 

proficiency exhibited during that operation was exemplary. The planning conducted by

 

staffs in Southwest Asia indicates our amphibious edge has dulled since 1950. The ability

 

to project combat power across the littorals hinges on our ability to refurbish and revise

 

these cherished skills.

 

1     The author served as the logistics officer (S-4) for Battalion Landing Team 3/1

from June 1988 to June 1991. As such he deployed six months to the Western Pacific with

the 13th MEU in 1989. He then deployed to Alaska for three months with 15th MEU in

1989. Prior to this tour the author served as a tank platoon commander with BLT 1/8 and

deployed to the Mediterranean in 1984-5 for seven months. He also served as a Combat

Cargo Officer for the USS Duluth and deployed six months to Westpac with BLT 1/9

embarked. During SWA the author was involved in numerous planning meetings and

conferences with the amphibious staffs afloat.

 

2      Amphibious Warfare School, "Operation Eagle Crescent", Volume I, August 1994,

p. 13-SO-10

 

3      Major Jon T. Hoffman, USMCR, "The Legacy and Lessons of Iwo Jima," Marine

Corps Gazette, February 1995, p. 75

 

4      Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-109-11, The Amphibians

Came to Conquer (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters United States Marine Corps,

September 1991), p. 1104

 

5      FMFRP 12-109-II, pp. 843-44

 

6      FMFRP 12-109-II,p. 1005

 

 

7      Colonel Robert D. Heinl, USMC (Ret.), Victory at High Tide, (Philadelphia and

New York: J.B. Lippincott company, 1968), p.7

 

8      Heinl,p.7

 

9      Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Washington D.C.: Department of the

Army, 1986), p.23.

 

10     FM 100-5,p.24

 

11     Heinl,p.11

 

12     Heinl,p.14

 

13     Heinl,p.17

 

14     Lynn Montross and Captain Nicolas A. Canzona, USMC, Inchon-Seoul Operation:

U.S. Marine Operations in Korea (Washington, D.C. : Historical Branch, HQMC, 1955),

p.66

 

15     General Douglas MacArthrur, Reminiscences, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book

Company, 1964), 352

 

16    Heinl, p.24

 

17    Heinl, p.40

 

18    Heinl, p.42

 

19    Montross and Canzona, p. 56

 

20    Heinl, p.39

 

21    Montross and Canzona, p.56

 

22    Heinl, p.41

 

23     Fleet Marine Force Manul (FMFM) 3, Command and Control (Washington, D.C.:

Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1993), p.7

 

24     These comments are based on the authors participation in the planning process for

amphibious forces in Southwest Asia. Based on his experiences the planning was driven

from the bottom. During planning conferences the Phibron and MEU staffs executed the

detailed planning for the PhibGroup and MEB. These latter staffs tried to energize

planning amongst their common superiors. These events were witnessed by the author at

numerous meetings, conferences, and sandtable exercises.

 

25     Heinl, p.86

 

26     Heinl, p.52

 

27     Heinl, p.54

 

28     Scott Turver, "Tomorrow's Fleet," Proceedings, July 1992, p.62

 

29     The author first heard about the requirement for a mine sweeping platform in

October 1990 at ComphibGru 3/5th MEB meeting. No one at that meeting ever

envisioned that the already scare shipping assets of the amphibious force would be used

for that mission

 

30     VADM J.B. Laplante, interview by author, 21 February, 1995. The Admiral made

it clear during the interview that he drove the planning for amphibious forces. He also

indicated that NAVCENT focused on carrier and strike operations.

 

31     PERMA was conducted for Inchon with the exception of the rehearsal.

 

32     4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) After Action Report, 1991, 59.

 

33     4th MEB After Action Report, p.61

 

34     4th MEB After Action Report, p.75

 

35     72 hours was insufficient time to seize a lodgement and bring sustainment ashore

for a two RLT / two Marine division size force. The author bases this on the amount of

ship to shore assets and afloat supplies for both MEB's.

 

36     4th MEB After Action Report, p. 81

 

 

37     Personal knowledge of the author who served with BLT 3/1.

 

38     During a sandtable exercise in Oman the author challenged the Regimental CO and

S-3 on the ship-to-shore problems. A heated discusion ensued and the author was ordered

to drop the subject. The administrative off-load of 5th MEB into norther Saudi Arabia on

G-Day was marred by numerous ship-to-shore "mix-up's". It is the opinion of this author

that an actual oppossed landing would have been costly due to the disjointed,

non-seamless flow of combat power ashore.

 

39     These comments are based the author's six months of experience with each of the

commands listed.

 

40     4th MEB After Action Report, p.85

 

41     The author bases this analysis on message traffic he observed while embarked and

on comments provided by VADM Laplante during a personal interview. The overall

impression gained by this observer is that VADM Laplante performed the majority of

operational level thinking for NAVCENT.

 

42     Joint Pub 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (Washington, D.C.:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-7), p.II-8

 

43     The identity of this speaker must be withheld at this time due to the Marine Corps

Command and Staff College non-attribution policy.

 

44     VADM J.B. Laplante, USN, former commander of ComPhibGru Two, interview

by author, 21 February, 1995.

 

45     VADM Laplante, interview by author, 21 February, 1995.

 

46     Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston and

New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), 239.

 

47    Atkinson, p.240.

 

48    LtCol R.J. Brown, USMCR, "Marine Forces Afloat in Southwest Asia,

1990-1991", Marine Corps Gazette, November, 1992, p. 65

 

49    The identity of this speaker must be withheld at this time in accordance with the

Marine Corps Command and Staff College non-attribution policy.

 

50    MGEN H. Jenkins USMC (Ret.), CG 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, interview

by author, 15 January, 1995.

 

51    4thMEB, p.112

 

52    MGEN Jenkins, interview by author, 15 January, 1995.

 

53    Brown, p.62

 

54    Based on personal experience of the author.

 

55    VADM Laplante, interview by author, 21 February, 1995.

 

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      Arthur, Stanley R., "Desert Storm at Sea." Proceedings, December 1991. 82-87

 

      Atkinson, Rick., Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War, Boston and New

York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993.

 

      Bingham, Price T. "Air Power in Desert Storm and the Need for Doctrinal Change." Air

Power Journal. Winter 1991. 34-35

 

      Batcheller, Gordon D. "If Not Tarawa, What?" Marine Corps Gazette. November, 1992.

24-31.

 

      Brown, R.J. "Marine Forces Afloat in Southwest Asia" Marine Corps Gazette. November

1992. 60-66.

 

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1986.

 

      Fleet Marine Field Manual (FMFM) I. WARFIGHTING. Washington, D.C.

Headquarters United States Marine Corps. 1989.

 

      Fleet Marine Field Manual (FMFM) 1-1. CAMPAIGNING. Washington D.C.

Headquarters United States Marine Corps. 1990.

 

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Headquarters United States Marine Corps. 1993.

 

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CAME TO CONQUER. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.

September 1991.

 

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INSIDE STORY OF THE CONFLICT IN THE PERSIAN GULF. Boston New York, Toronto,

and London: Little, Brown and Company, 1995.

 

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Lippincott Company. 1968.

 

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1995. 71-75.

 

      Jenkins, H.W. Former Commanding General, Fourth Marine Expeditionary Brigade,

interview conducted by author, 15 January 95.

 

      Joint Pub 3-02, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, Washington,

D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff {J-7}. 8 October 1992.

 

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August 1992. 36-38.

 

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author, 21 February 1995

 

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