The
Effects Of Restrictive Rules Of
Engagement On The Rolling Thunder
Air
Campaign
CSC
1995
SUBJECT
AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Title: The Effects of Restrictive ROEs on the
Rolling Thunder Air Campaign
Author: Major Matthew J. Dorschel, United
States Air Force
Thesis: The ROEs that were in place for the
Rolling Thunder air campaign were
overly
restrictive and made the conduct of the air campaign inefficient and hampered
its
effectiveness.
Background: The air war over North Vietnam has been at
the center of many heated
debates
on the proper application of air power and how it should be used and
controlled.
Rolling
Thunder provides an excellent example of how difficult the task of planning and
executing
a successful air campaign is. Restrictive rules of engagement were put in place
for
Rolling Thunder chiefly due to the fear of escalation and direct involvement of
the
Soviet
Union or China in the war. The goals of the air campaign were limited and
President
Johnson hoped to achieve results through tightly controlled, applied pressure
on
the
N. Vietnamese government. The controls however, violated accepted air doctrine
and
tied
the hands of the military commanders that were tasked to meet the arduous
objectives
of
the campaign. Rolling Thunder barely achieved any of the desired results --
restrictive
rules
of engagement undoubtedly played a major part in the failure of U.S air power
in this
singular
black mark on the record of American military aviation.
Recommendation: US leaders must evaluate national
objectives in future wars and decide
if
they can be met with military means. Then, rules of engagement must allow those
tasked
to
accomplish the mission, to do so in a way consistent with proven doctrine and
strategy.
As
Desert Storm illustrated, airpower can achieve decisive results without
restrictive rules
of
engagement.
INTRODUCTION
United States air commanders possessed
superior numbers of aircraft and a more
capable
air force than did North Vietnamese commanders during the air war in Southeast
Asia.
Then why did they experience such poor results? Specifically, why was the
famous
Rolling
Thunder air campaign unable to achieve decisive results that might have positively
influenced
the outcome of the war in Vietnam? The overly restrictive rules of engagement
(ROE),
which put limits on where aircraft could fly, which targets they could attack,
and
how
they may attack those targets, were a significant reason that American air
commanders
were unable to execute a successful campaign in Southeast Asia.
The restrictive ROEs in Vietnam were put in
place by President Johnson to ensure the
war
did not escalate (Johnson feared Chinese and Soviet intervention). The President
hoped
to achieve results by using an "air pressure campaign" to coerce the
North
Vietnamese
to discontinue supporting the Vietcong (VC). These restrictions violated Air
Force
doctrine and tied the hands of air commanders that were tasked with the execution
of
the air war in Southeast Asia.
Many airmen who flew during the Vietnam War
believe that victory would have been
possible
for the United States had there been less restrictive ROEs. That assertion may
no
be
entirely true; certainly there are multiple causes for the failures of U.S. air
power in the
Vietnam
conflict; however, it is apparent that overly restrictive ROEs will have a
dramatic
negative
affect on the outcome of any air campaign.
In all likelihood, America's involvement in
future conflicts will be "limited" and
political
concerns will be similar to those that were important during the Vietnam War.
As
military
leaders we must do what we can to ensure that ROEs will enable us to accomplish
favorable
results, not keep us from achieving our objectives. The lessons from Vietnam
and
specifically from the Rolling Thunder campaign have shaped Air Force doctrine
and
continue
to influence the way airmen plan and execute an air campaign.
U.S. involvement in Vietnam began as far
back as 1954, but the "official" position until
late
1963 was that no combat missions were to be conducted. It was not until the
Gulf of
Tonkin
incident in August of 1964 that U.S. air strikes became more aggressive:
"On 4
August,
North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked two U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of
Tonkin.
President Johnson ordered air attacks on the North Vietnamese boat bases and
their
supporting fuel storage facilities in reprisal."1 A substantial deployment
of U.S.
aircraft
began and further attacks on U.S. facilities led to stronger action than
retaliatory
air
strikes.
In the spring of 1965 the inability of the
South Vietnamese military to thwart the
Vietcong
and what appeared to be a collapse of their government led American leaders to
the
determination that a bombing campaign was needed. The campaign was to achieve
the
following
objectives: reduce the flow of men and material from North Vietnam to South
Vietnam,
send a clear message to the North Vietnamese leaders that continued action
would
exact a high price, and raise the morale of the South Vietnamese.2
From March of 1965 to November of 1968, a
limited air campaign aimed at these
objectives
was run -- it was called Rolling Thunder. This strategic air interdiction
campaign
was conducted with rules of engagement that covered all aspects of the
campaign,
from planning to execution. The ROEs were so restrictive that it was all but
impossible
to achieve the desired results; they forced commanders and planners to go
against
the central principles of Air Force bombing doctrine.
The ROEs in place for the air campaign over
North Vietnam included restrictions on
where
aircraft could fly, what conditions aircraft could attack enemy forces (when
they
were
considered hostile), and what degree of force could be used both in
self-defense and
attack.3
Another part of the ROEs restricted pilots from attacking certain types of
targets
that
were off limits; some of these were: enemy airfields, SAM sites, power plants,
naval
craft
in some areas, a 30 mile area around Hanoi, and a 10 mile area around
Haiphong.4
The
inability to attack certain targets made it difficult to stop the flow of men
and material
into
South Vietnam, and the requirements to spare North Vietnamese civilians limited
the
use
of certain types of munitions, such as B-52s and napalm. Until early 1967, in
many
instances
U.S. pilots were not allowed to engage enemy fighters unless they themselves
had
been attacked first.
According to the 1964 Air Force Manual I-I,
Aerospace Doctrine, United States Air
Force
Basic Doctrine, the goal of strategic interdiction was to reduce enemy
logistical
support
to levels below that necessary to sustain combat operations and to use the
principles
of surprise and mass to attack those targets vital to enemy war-fighting
capability.
By not following these proven principles of war, the air commanders were
unable
to wage an effective air campaign and Rolling Thunder lacked the impact that
was
necessary
for achieving the stated political and military objectives.
Rolling
Thunder ROE: -- Violation of Doctrine
Restrictive ROEs not only made it difficult
to damage the most important targets in
North
Vietnam, they had an equally negative affect on the commanders and aircrews that
were
tasked to plan and fight with the tight restrictions. Civilian leaders believed
that the
restrictions
were necessary to keep the war limited and achieve the objectives of reducing
the
supply flow and sending a clear message to North Vietnam leaders; they imposed
the
restrictions
hoping that the threat of future destruction would force North Vietnam to the
negotiation
table.5 This philosophy was not embraced by military planners and aircrews
who
felt it was in violation of their training and contrary to Air Force doctrine.
U.S. Military planners and airmen realized
that the limited style of warfare they were
fighting
was not producing the needed results. Air commanders proposed a set of tasks
that
was designed to achieve decisive results and reduce the war-making capability
of
North
Vietnam. They wanted to disrupt external assistance being provided to North
Vietnam
and impede the flow of supplies into the south, and directly attack the
resources,
facilities,
and operations in North Vietnam which were contributing the most to the
enemy's
war effort.6 However, civilian leaders were not convinced and the ROEs that
protected
these targets were kept while weak blows to the North Vietnamese periphery
continued.
The fear inside the beltway was that a more efficient air campaign would risk
unacceptable
civilian losses and collateral damage.
The disagreement between the military and
civilian leaders continued throughout the
Vietnam
War, partly due to a mistrust that civilian leaders had for military leaders.
The
president and his advisors often disregarded the advice of military experts,
believing
that:
"Generals know only two words: spend and bomb."7 The often referred
to Tuesday
lunches
at the White House (where President Johnson did much of the planning and
targeting
for the air campaign) did not even regularly include the chairman of the JCS
until
late
1967.8
Due to the lack of military expertise, the
targeting and planning effort was weak and
very
ineffective. There was never a lack of significant targets in North Vietnam,
but
aircrews
were forced to fly against seemingly insignificant targets and even re-attack
destroyed
targets, while SAM sites and MiG airfields were off limits until 1967.9 The JCS
target
list was virtually ignored and targets remained protected for almost all of the
Rolling
Thunder campaign. Two of the most significant target areas on the list were
Hanoi
and Haiphong; targets in these areas could only be attacked if approved by
LBJ's
Tuesday
lunch group. Often, these targets were approved for short periods or during
periods
of poor weather, which made it difficult (if not impossible) to achieve any
desired
effect.
Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara
testified before Congress in 1967, in response
to
the targeting questions and stated that the targets influencing operations in
South
Vietnam
were the roads and material moving over these roads. McNamara's testimony
was
an attempt to explain U.S. policy; he insisted that other North Vietnam targets
were
not
fundamental to the operations in South Vietnam.10 Many military commanders
disagreed
with this assessment to no avail, "the President and the Secretary of
Defense
continued
to make the final decisions on what targets were authorized, the size and
frequency
of sorties, and in many instances even the tactics used by the American
pilots."11
Another restriction that tied the hands of
American military commanders was the ROE
that
restricted the use of the B-52 in North Vietnam. This weapon had great range,
armament
capacity, and it struck fear into the enemy like no other weapon; it was
extremely
effective in South Vietnam. The B-52 was prohibited from extensive use in
Rolling
Thunder because civilian authorities believed it would have signaled a higher
level
of
escalation, and that it might cause Chinese or Soviet intervention.12 This
prohibitive
measure
to maintain the limited objectives of the war denied air commander from using
the
principal
of mass, and forced them to fly multiple fighter sorties where one B-52 would
have
accomplished the job more effectively.
The crews that flew the aircraft found the
ROEs not only overly restrictive but
extremely
complicated, confusing, and difficult to learn and remember. The list of
restrictions
and limitations was so long and changed so often that they were difficult to
comprehend
on the ground, much less remember and keep straight while in a fast moving
combat
situation.13 Crews depended on daily study and on radar controllers to keep them
from
violations of the complex ROEs, and from flying where they might not be able to
defend
even when fired on.
Several incidents of ROE violations led to
court-martial charges; one that led to
charges
against the commander and the aircrew was the strafing of the Soviet ship
Turkestan
in 1967 near Haiphong.14 Fear of ROE violations and the consequences of
them
led to a dilemma; many aircrews felt as if they could not accomplish their
mission
without
either getting killed by the enemy or brought up on court-martial charges by
their
own
governrnent.15
American air losses over North Vietnam rose
continuously with over 500 aircraft lost
during
1966 and 1967. Crews began to see that it was highly unlikely they would
survive
a
100-mission tour in Southeast Asia.16 Many of these losses resulted from
restrictions
against
attacking SAM sites or other significant targets in or around populated areas.
The
ROE
restrictions allowed the North Vietnamese to continuously build up their air
defense
systems
in the most critical areas of the region (with Hanoi being the most
significant).
The
combination of restrictive ROEs and the heavy enemy air defenses made the job
of air
commanders
and each aircrew member more difficult than it should have been.
North
Vietnam Exploits U.S. ROE:
The restrictive ROEs in North Vietnam aided
the enemy by providing sanctuaries and
restricted
areas where they had the space and time to build up their air defenses to
engage
U.S.
aircraft. The piecemeal approach to attacks in North Vietnam did not allow
concentrated
bombing and actually strengthened the will of the North Vietnamese as
opposed
to weakening it. American leaders made it clear in public statements that we
had
no
intention of destroying the government of North Vietnam; the leaders in North
Vietnam
saw this as an opportunity to exploit an American weakness.17
The most significant restricted areas that
provided sanctuary were the 30 mile area
around
Hanoi, the 10 mile area around Haiphong, and a 25 to 30 mile "buffer
zone" along
the
Chinese border. These sanctuaries prevented attacks against key targets in the
north
without
prior approval from Washington. The North Vietnamese took advantage of this
by
offsetting the damage done by our aircraft in non-protected areas. Because
Haiphong
Harbor
was a safe port, they were able to ship up to 85% of their war goods by sea and
download
them with impunity 24 hours a day at that location.18 These safe havens
allowed
the enemy to stockpile war materials until they could be moved to the south.
The
"buffer
zone" along the Chinese border was thousands of square miles where the
North
Vietnamese
could store and transport materials with no fear of U.S. attack. This made
any
attempts at reducing the ability of the enemy to sustain their combat
operations almost
futile.
The enemy also took advantage of the
restrictions in areas where attacks might result
in
civilian casualties. North Vietnamese put air defense systems and war materials
in or
near
populated areas to protect them. Because of improvements in air defense
systems,
the
enemy was able to effectively identify/target U.S. aircraft from these
sanctuaries. Even
when
U.S. intelligence showed these areas to be crowded with supplies (and a
legitimate
target
according to the laws of war), ROEs prevented our aircraft from hitting them.19
When restrictions were lifted in some areas
(1967) any collateral damage was used by
the
enemy as a propaganda tool to charge the U.S. with indiscriminate bombing of
innocent
people. Exaggerated reports of collateral damage were effective in destroying
the
already decaying support for U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
Because U.S. airmen were required to
positively identify targets, they were normally
restricted
to fly during the day and in periods of good weather. When the enemy realized
this
they took advantage by concentrating forces and materials in protected areas
during
the
day, and moving at night or during periods of poor weather. They were able to
do this
in
part because of the relatively short distances between prohibited areas; large
quantities
of
rolling stock could be moved the short distances at night or in periods of
lousy weather.
Possibly the greatest advantage that
restrictive ROEs gave the enemy was time. The
ability
of the enemy to build up their air defenses was due in large part to the
freedom of
movement
they enjoyed in the havens protected by ROEs. The air defense system in
North
Vietnam was almost non-existent in 1965, but by the end of 1967 it became one
of
the
most complete and sophisticated systems in the world. SAM sites increased from
15
in
1965 to 270 by 1968; missiles fired from these sites increase from 200 in 1965
to almost
3,500
in 1967. The number of AAA guns grew from 700 in 1965 to over 7,400 in spring
of
1968.20
The predictable nature of the American
offensive also gave a distinct advantage to the
enemy
in Southeast Asia; because of restrictions on where aircraft could fly -- the
North
Vietnamese
knew our likely routes and concentrated their defenses is these areas. The
redundancy
of the attacks allowed the enemy to predict with measured success what the
most
likely targets were and when they would be hit.
The
Bottom Line: Military Objectives
The initial objectives of Rolling Thunder
were to stop the flow of men and material
into
South Vietnam, send a clear signal to the North Vietnamese leaders that
continued
support
of the Vietcong would exact a high price, and build up the morale of the South
Vietnamese.
Although Rolling Thunder was effective in raising the morale of the South
Vietnamese,
it only slowed the flow of men and materials into South Vietnam, and the
campaign
had no noticeable effect on the support for the Vietcong from Hanoi.21
The objective of stopping the flow of men
and material into the south would have been
problematic
regardless of restrictive ROEs. The enemy by nature could operate on very
limited
supplies and was able to move these supplies in small amounts over difficult
terrain.
The only way to completely halt the flow would have been total destruction of
the
enemy
regime or occupation of its territory. Restrictive ROEs did limit the amount of
bombing
in North Vietnam, however, this alone was not enough to keep Rolling Thunder
from
achieving the goal of interdicting their supply lines. The flow of men and
supplies
continued
to increase throughout the campaign: "In 1965 approximately 12,000 North
Vietnamese
soldiers had infiltrated South Vietnam, but by 1968 over 300,000 North
Vietnamese
troops had entered South Vietnam."22
Even with these problems Rolling Thunder
was able to destroy a fair amount of the
North
Vietnamese infrastructure; according to reports the bombing destroyed 77
percent
of
all ammo depots, 65 percent of fuel storage facilities, 59 percent of all power
plants, 55
percent
of major bridges, and 39 percent of railroad yards.23 However, this success was
not
enough to keep North Vietnam from being able to withstand a long war against
the
United
States (both economically and politically).24
A continuous flow of materials and a large,
unoccupied labor force allowed the North
Vietnamese
to withstand much of the destruction. Russia and China were able to supply
the
enemy along routes that were protected by ROEs and to store and disperse the
supplies
from ROE protected sanctuaries. Food and POL imports from outside sources
kept
the North Vietnamese well supplied, and they were able to continue the
guerrilla style
fight
that was so effective.25 The large North Vietnamese labor force also did much
to
offset
the destruction that Rolling Thunder accomplished. This force (over 300,000) of
laborers
was able to quickly repair the damage to major targets and almost nullify
bombing
efforts.
An example of the effectiveness of this labor force and their determination was
revealed
in a 1965 Peking radio broadcast that reported how after U.S. aircraft hit a
certain
bridge, that night more than 3,000 people with lamps and tools repaired it and
it
was
back in service immediately.26
If bombing restrictions had been lifted, it
may have been easier for air commanders and
crews
to accomplish their mission, but the guerrilla warfare style of fighting and
the
agrarian
nature of the enemy society would have made it difficult to accomplish more
with
a
synergistic air campaign. American air power was geared towards fighting an
industrialized
country that relied on that industry day-to-day, but the North Vietnamese
had
almost no industry and the transportation system was limited. Repair of damaged
LOCs,
use of secondary roads and trails, use of ox and horse carts, and when
necessary
even
use of bicycles are all evidence of the extreme measures that the enemy was
willing
to
take to ensure supplies continued to move south.27
Some would also argue that due to the
nature of guerrilla warfare, a more efficient
interdiction
campaign would have done no more than require the North to take longer in
achieving
their objectives. Determination, patience, and a will to continue are hallmarks
of
the
guerrilla warfighter, and those were characteristics that the American war
machine
could
not attack. The determination of the North Vietnamese was evident throughout
Rolling
Thunder, willingly accepting great losses of trucks, rail cars and logistical
watercraft
to mention a few. The enemy also continued to buildup his air defense systems
to
offset the bombing campaign. When U.S. bombing increased the North Vietnamese
countermeasures
increased; the enemy met each challenge and responded by showing
their
resolve.
By the end of 1967, Rolling Thunder had
failed to achieve two out of three of the
stated
goals of the campaign; it hadn't broken the will of the North Vietnamese
government
or stopped the flow of material to the south. A 1967 Senate Armed Services
report
on the bombing campaign reached the following conclusions:
...the achievement of campaign
objectives, to a greater extent, can
not be attributed to inability or
impotence of air power. It attests, rather,
to the fragmentation of US air might by
overly restrictive controls,
limitations, and doctrine of gradualism
placed on US aviation forces which
prevented them from waging the air
campaign in the manner and according
to the time table which was best calculated to achieve maximum
results.28
This committee (along with the military
commanders) recommended fewer controls
and
continued bombing in North Vietnam to achieve better results. In retrospect it
seems
that
fewer ROEs were a big part of the problem; the strong will of the North
Vietnamese
people
along with the guerrilla nature of the war were also factors in the equation
that led
to
the lack of impact that Rolling Thunder had in Vietnam.
Conclusion
The restrictive ROEs in North Vietnam kept
the United States from going beyond the
limited
goals that our civilian leaders decided were necessary. This made the job of
air
commanders
and crews that flew in North Vietnam difficult at best. Even the limited goals
that
were stated for the Rolling Thunder air campaign from 1965 to 1968 were
virtually
impossible
to achieve. The ROEs were in violation of accepted and published U.S. Air
Force
doctrine and long standing principles of war. Because of limitations, U.S.
airpower
was
applied in a piecemeal fashion and never had the effect that air commanders
believed
was
possible.
The ROEs were an effective way for
President Johnson and his secretary of defense to
control
the level of violence, and prevent Chinese or Soviet intervention. In Vietnam
restrictions
made it difficult to match military strategy with published doctrine; this
factor
alone
may not be responsible for the lack of impact that the bombing campaign in
North
Vietnam
had, but it was a significant factor. Civilian control of the military is
extremely
important,
our elected officials have to answer to the American people; but the expertise
of
military advisors should be considered when trying to achieve military goals.
The effect that ROEs had on commanders and
aircrews was profound. Commanders
were
tasked with stopping the flow of supplies into the south, but safe zones
provided
sanctuary
for the enemy, and many vital targets were within these protected areas. Crews
were
forced to fly in predictable ways, fly the same routes over and over, and
operate in
ways
that went against their training and experience. The continuous changes to the
rules
and
the complexity of them made learning and remembering them a difficult task and
the
predictable
nature of the campaign and the protected areas in North Vietnam caused heavy
American
losses. It was all but impossible to inflict the kind of damage necessary to
achieve
the stated goals of the offensive.
The success that Rolling Thunder did
achieve was offset by the advantage that the
enemy
had due to the limitations imposed by Washington on the air campaign. War
supplies
continued to move into North and South Vietnam through protected areas, and
ROEs
allowed them to stockpile and disperse them without harassment from American
aircraft.
The restrictions also gave the enemy time to develop an effective air defense
system
which knocked out a large number of American aircraft.
The lessons of Vietnam need to be
remembered and applied to future conflicts that the
United
States may be involved in. Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union a
"new
world
order" and a cloudy world political picture make it more likely that we
must be
prepared
for low intensity conflicts with limited aims. Air Force doctrine has not
changed
that
much since the 1960s; we still advocate intensive bombing to take out key
centers of
gravity
and destruction of the enemy capability to make war (while limiting collateral
damage).
War as a political objective is no more than measured violence; uncertainty
about
the correct amount of violence and how to control it will be key features of
future
wars.
During Desert Storm, General Homer (the
joint forces air component commander)
insisted
on centralized control and decentralized execution for the air campaign. The
air
operations
in the Gulf were a good example of air commanders being able to match
published
doctrine with the military strategy. ROEs were appropriate during the war in
the
Gulf and allowed us to achieve our objectives while minimizing civilian
casualties and
securing
domestic and international support.
Our success in Desert Storm illustrates
that we can plan and execute an effective air
campaign
without ROEs that violate doctrine or accepted principles of war. Both military
and
civilian leaders need to evaluate national objectives in future wars and decide
if they
can
be met with military means. The limits that may be placed on the military could
prohibit
success within those restrictions. Once this evaluation is accomplished and we
match
doctrine and strategy, airpower will accomplish what it sets out to.
END NOTES
1 Tifford, Earl H., SETUP: What the Air Force
did in Vietnam and Why (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air
University Press, June, 1991), p 81.
2 Winston, Donald D., Bomb Restriction
Criticism Has Little Effect on Supplemental, Aviation Week &
Space Technology, 20 February 1967, p 18.
3 Drake, Ricky J., The Rules of Defeat: The
Impact of Aerial Rules of Engagement on USAF
Operations in North Vietnam. 1965-1968.
Air University Press, 1993, p 4.
4 Ibid. p4.
5
Department of Defense Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed. (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1971-1972).
p388.
6 Drake, Ricky J., The Rules of Defeat: The
Impact of Aerial Rules of Engagement on USAF
Operations in North Vietnam, 1965-1968.
Air University Press, 1993. p 20.
7 Gelb Leslie H., & Richard K. Betts., The
Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. (Washington D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1979) p 137.
8 Broughton, Jacksel M., Going Downtown: The
War against Hanoi and Washington. (New York:
Pocket Books. 1990). p 90.
9 Broughton, Jacksel M., Thud Ridge. (New
York: Bantam Books, 1985), p 6.
10 McNamara, Robert S., Text of Hearings before
Armed Services Committee on Air War Against N.
Vietnam, Part 4. (90th congress, 1st
session, 25 August 1967), p 278.
11 Momyer, William W., Airpower in Three Wars.
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force.
1978). p 19.
12 Schlight John., The War in South Vietnam:
The Years of the Offensive, 1965 - 1968. (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988).
p 49.
13 Broughton, Jacksel M., Going Downtown: The
War against Hanoi and Washington. (New York:
Pocket Books, 1990), p 202.
14 Broughton. Jacksel M., Thud Ridge. (New
York: Bantam Books, 1985), p 261.
15 Basil, G.I., Pak Six: (Associated Creative
Writers, 1982). p 93-94.
16 Broughton, Jacksel M., Going Downtown: The
War against Hanoi and Washington. (New York:
Pocket Books, 1990),p 179.
17 Parks, W. Hays, Rolling Thunder and the Law
of War. (Air University Review, Jan-Feb, 1982), p 3.
18 Sharp, Ulysses S. Grant., Report on the War
in Vietnam. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1968),p3.
19 Sharp, Ulysses S. Grant., Strategy for
Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect. (San Rafael, CA: Presidio
Press, 1968), p 118-119.
20 Lewy, Gunter., America in Vietnam. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1978) p 405.
21 Broughton, Jacksel M., Thud Ridge. (New
York: Bantam Books. 1985), p xii.
22 Sharp, Ulysses S. Grant, Strategy for Defeat
Vietnam in Retrospect. (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press,
1968),p3.
23 Lewy, Gunter, America in Vietnam. (New York:
Oxford University Press. 1978). p 389-390.
24 Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Project
Checo Report: Rolling Thunder, July 1965 - December
1966 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1967), p 133.
23 Clodfelter, Mark., The Limits of Airpower:
The American Bombing of North Vietnam. (New York:
Free Press, 1989) p 135.
26 Ibid., p 202.
27 Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Project
Checo Report: Rolling Thunder, July 1965 - December
1966 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1967). p 127.
28 Broughton, Jacksel M., Going Downtown: The
War against Hanoi and Washington. (New York:
Pocket Books, 1990), p 188.
29 Paret Peter., Innovation and Reform in
Warfare. The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military
History. 1957-1987. (Washington D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1988) p 407.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Air
Force Manual (AFM) 1-1. Aerospace Doctrine, United States Air Force Basic
Doctrine,
August 1964.
Basil,
G.I., Pak Six. La Mesa, Calif.: Associated Creative Writers, 1982.
Broughton,
Jacksel M., Thud Ridge. New York: Bantam Books, 1985.
Broughton,
Jacksel M., Going Downtown: The War against Hanoi and Washington. New York:
Pocket Books, 1990.
Clodfelter,
Mark. The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. New
York: Free Press, 1989.
Department
of Defense. Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed. Boston: Beacon Press,
1971-1972.
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