Perception Or Reality: Is The V-22 Ready For Production?
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Perception Or Reality: Is The V-22 Ready For
Production?
Author: Major John Kevin Dodge, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: The V-22 is well qualified for Low Rate Initial
Production (LRIP). During its first Operational Assessment
(OT-IIA), the Osprey adequately displayed the potential
effectiveness and suitability needed to meet the established
operational requirements.
Background: During the Bush administration, Secretary of
Defense Cheney made a strong push to cancel the V-22 program
despite its documented capabilities. Support in Congress
was to strong to allow the program to be killed, but due to
the extremely long delays encountered during the stalemate,
a huge amount of misinformation about the Osprey's
characteristics was distributed. Some of the misinformation
was intentional, some was unintentional. These
misperceptions have caused numerous problems in solidifying
support for a very capable platform. Supporting information
will be provided by an extensive amount of operational
documentation and knowledge gained by the author while
serving as the Marine V-22 Operational Test Director from
1990 to 1992, and the V-22 Multiservice Operational Test
Director from 1992 through the Osprey's first Operational
Assessment in 1994. Test Reports and Requirements Documents
pertaining to the first Operational Test period will be
utilized to provide background information and support the
contention that the V-22 is ready for limited production.
This analysis will provide an extensive program background
to demonstrate the capabilities of the current aircraft, the
associated costs, requirements, doctrine and tactics
development and an overview of the first Operational
Assessment (OT-IIA) of the Osprey. Supporting narratives
will also demonstrate the capability of the V-22 to meet
current Forward...From The Sea doctrine.
Recommendation: The potential operational effectiveness and
suitability demonstrated by the V-22 during OT-IIA qualified
it for a limited production decision. During the course of
the assessment, tactics development was initiated and
supporting information supplied to the Pentagon. The
author contends that the V-22 is well qualified for Low
Rate Initial Production.
PERCEPTION OR REALITY: IS THE V-22 READY FOR PRODUCTION?
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement: The V-22 is well qualified for Low Rate
Initial Production (LRIP). During its first Operational
Assessment (OT-IIA), the Osprey adequately displayed the
potential effectiveness and suitability needed to meet the
established operational requirements.
I. PERCEPTION AND REALITY
A. PERCEPTION
B. REALITY
II. V-22 PROGRAM BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY
B. PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
C. ACQUISITION STATUS AND COST
III. JOINT SERVICE REQUIREMENTS
IV. DOCTRINE AND TACTICS DEVELOPMENT
A. DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT
B. TACTICS DEVELOPMENT
V. V-22 OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT (OT-IIA)
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
PERCEPTION OR REALITY: IS THE V-22 READY FOR PRODUCTION?
I. PERCEPTION AND REALITY
A. PERCEPTION
At the dawn of the 20th century and the birth of
aviation Henry Ford said, "The airplane won't amount to a
damn until it can go straight up and down, and hover."
While thousands of slightly biased helicopter pilots may
readily agree with Mr. Ford's observation, history has
provided yet another look at a false perception.
B. REALITY
American fixed-wing aircraft have ruled the skies for
generations and helicopters have provided the flexibility of
vertical flight for almost half as long. Together these two
forms of aviation have made countless contributions to the
defense and prosperity of our Country.
Just as the airplane and the helicopter made their
contributions to the development of aviation and modern
warfare, a new capability has survived drastic attempts to
kill it. Tilt-rotor technology has taken the form of the
V-22 "Osprey" and by filling the gap between the airplane
and the helicopter will revolutionize how we fly and how we
fight.
Since being canceled by former Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) Cheney in late 1988, the V-22 program has contended
with a huge amount of misinformation regarding cost,
capability, effectiveness and suitability. The result has
often led to false perceptions about the Osprey by the very
people expected to employ it.
In spite of these false perceptions and with the cards
often stacked against it, the V-22 program continued to
slowly move ahead. On 9 December 1994, SECDEF Perry
announced a Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) decision in
favor of the V-22.1
This article contends that the V-22 is well qualified
for LRIP. The Osprey adequately displays the potential
effectiveness and suitability needed to meet its operational
requirements, and has successfully passed the Critical
Design Review (CDR) and Milestone II Plus criteria needed to
proceed into limited production.2
Supporting information will be provided by an overview
of: the V-22's program background and status, joint service
requirements, doctrine and tactics development, the V-22's
first Operational Test (OT-IIA) period.
Issues and questions to be addressed include: Does the
V-22 program currently possess the funding and test assets
needed to preclude a risk to its scheduled goals? Does the
system demonstrate the potential to verify and validate the
system effectiveness and suitability parameters? Is the
current approach to operational testing, and tactics
development in line with the Forward.. From the Sea maneuver
warfare doctrine? What considerations must be employed to
maximize the V-22's capabilities and tactics development
prior to Fleet introduction in 2001?
II. V-22 PROGRAM BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY
The V-22 Osprey, formally the Joint Multi-Mission
Vertical Lift Aircraft (JMVX), is an outgrowth of work
initiated in 1969 under the Department of the Navy's
Vertical Assault Medium Transport (VMAT) requirement.3 In
late 1981, the services agreed to the joint development of
an advanced vertical lift aircraft to meet the current joint
requirement, as well as other multi-mission applications.
In April 1983, the government awarded a preliminary
design contract to the Bell/Boeing team. In May 1986, the
Department of Defense authorized the V-22 program to enter
into Full Scale Development (FSD). Citing priorities, the
Army dropped out of the program in 1990 in order to pursue
Light Attack (LHX) helicopter technology. The first flight
of the Osprey occurred on 14 March 1989. In April 1989,
SecDef Cheney recommended against going forward with FSD of
the V-22. Congress however, continued to support the
tiltrotor. Throughout this period of contention, the
majority of misinformation regarding V-22 characteristics
surfaced.
Often deemed "official" but in reality inaccurate,
service planners would sometimes utilize this misleading
information unknowingly. False perceptions by service
members not directly associated with the program began to
divide grass roots support into those who wanted
tiltrotor technology and those who wanted something "now."
The National elections in 1992 ended the stalemate when
a change in the SecDef position removed the main obstacle of
the 0sprey, Mr. Cheney. Late in 1992, the Secretary of the
Navy (SecNav) directed Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD) of the V-22. The EMD version was designed
to meet the then current requirement, Medium Lift
Replacement Operational Requirements Document (MLR-ORD), but
the anticipated support from the new administration failed
to appear. Delays in key decision requirements and budget
downsizing continued. These delays, in combination with
direction from Ms. Nora Slatkin (Under-Secretary of the Navy
for Acquisition), provided the needed "window of
opportunity" to conduct the first Operational Assessment
(OT-IIA) of the V-22. This assessment was conducted from
May to July 1994 by the V-22 Multiservice Operational Test
Team (MOTT). It provided an assessment of the Critical
Operational Issues (COIs) related to potential operational
effectiveness and suitability of the Osprey.4 This
assessment is required by the Defense Acquisition Board
(DAB) to make a LRIP decision.5
B. PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
Pursuing the Osprey as the aircraft to fulfill the
multiservice specific requirements, the V-22 program
management and its associates have overcome a series of
significant challenges: incorporated advanced technology
with an innovative manufacturing process; employed a new
acquisition process aimed at maximizing affordability and
aircraft effectiveness; trimmed weight and cost to meet
service and congressional requirements; implemented a
single-site Integrated Test Team (ITT) concept at Patuxent
River, MD which consolidated Developmental Testing (DT) and
removed redundancy in government and contractor test
requirements; incorporated Integrated Product Teams (IPTs)
to enhance aircraft design, shorten lines of communication,
reduce cost and manufacturing time; and endured a demanding
and completely objective operational assessment.
Most important of all, the program incorporated design
and maintenance changes in current and EMD Osprey's from
lessons learned following the loss of FSD ship O5 and the
tragic loss of FSD ship O4 at Quantico, VA. These changes
include: the addition of drains in the nacelle cowling;
increased engine inlet strength to withstand engine surges;
increased integrity of the firewall between the engine
compartment and upper nacelle area; addition of a
temperature sensing device in the upper nacelle area;
improved fire protection of the interconnect drive system;
redesign of the Warning, Caution, Advisory (WCA) system. 6
A major Cockpit Management System (CMS) redesign for
the EMD aircraft was initiated following the loss of ship
04. Significant changes in the design philosophy, display
technology and layout, software design and information
management have greatly enhanced the aircraft's overall
potential.7
Each EMD aircraft will be production representative,
be built utilizing production tooling and incorporate the
majority of changes determined to be necessary in the flight
test program. These EMD aircraft (ship numbers 7-10) will
then be extensively flight tested in operational
environments. Particular attention will be focused on areas
determined to require additional testing in previous
operations.
One potential "speedbump" to the V-22 program's current
schedule is not necessarily a failure to meet the stated
requirements, but the limited number of FSD airframes
available for the required testing and training. With
Research and Development (R&D) funding low and scheduled
requirements high, any reduction in test articles has the
potential to affect the projected Initial Operating
Capability (IOC) of fiscal year (FY) 2001. Government
flight testing utilizing ship O2 was suspended in November,
1994. Ship O3 is the only platform currently available to
meet all government and contractor flight test and training
requirements.
This limited availability of flight test assets will
affect the capability of the current schedule to cope with
unforseen situations. Availability of test and training
assets will continue to be a limiting feature of program
flexibility until completion and availability of EMD
aircraft 7-10 in FY-97.
C. ACQUISITION STATUS AND COST
The Marine Corps is now scheduled to procure 425 MV-
22's, the Navy 48 HV-22's and the Air Force 55 CV-22's. The
Corps number is down from the originally desired 552. The
change was attributed to a decrease in attrition rate
estimates due to projected reliability, maintainability and
survivability enhancements over helicopter rates. The
Department of the Navy has currently imposed a $1 billion
annual ceiling for procurement of the V-22, which means it
will take 25 years to get the desired numbers, close to the
estimated 30 year life-cycle of the aircraft.8 This $1
billion annual ceiling will restrict the production rate of
MV-22's to an average of 200 aircraft per year vice the
originally desired 36.9
Over the past few years, varied and often inaccurate V-
22 cost per copy estimates have been widely published. The
1994 Preliminary Design Review (PDR) established official
cost estimates based on a 523 (total for all services)
aircraft buy at a rate of 2 aircraft per month. In FY-94
dollars the current estimate per copy in flyaway cost is
$36.4 million. The Bell/Boeing Design to Cost (DTC)
objective is $29.4 million.10
While a stiff price tag, the real qualifier in the
acquisition process is never cost alone. Weapon systems are
purchased based on cost and operational effectiveness. The
V-22 was subjected to 19 separate studies and 5 Cost and
Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA). In each and
every one the Osprey came out on top.
The bottom line on cost will always be directly
proportional to the size of the production run. Should the
benefits of tiltrotor technology enhance the Corps
expeditionary capability to the degree suggested by past
studies and testing, the "strain" of being left at the
starting gate awaiting strategic lift might prove too much
for the Army to bear.
III. JOINT SERVICE REQUIREMENTS
Having a complete understanding of the service specific
requirement is essential to conducting valid operational
testing. Without an in-depth and independent evaluation,
the service sponsor will have no guarantee the requirement
has been met. Since the first JVX Joint Services
Operational Requirement (JSOR) dated 14 December 1982 was
promulgated, there have been 4 additional (and often
conflicting) requirements documents generated which have
related to the V-22.
An updated version of the original JSOR was signed into
effect on 13 February 1985 and remained as the only valid
requirements document of record until the Operational
Requirements Document (ORD) for the JMVX was formally
presented in December 1994. The Jmvx ORD combines the
United States Marine Corps (USMC) requirement for a Medium
Lift Replacement (MLR) aircraft and the United States
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) requirement for a
Multi-Mission Advanced Vertical Lift aircraft.
The JMVX will be required to provide its service
sponsors with a multi-engine, dual-piloted, self-deployable,
medium lift Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL) aircraft to
conduct combat assault/assault support, Combat Search and
Rescue (CSAR), Special Warfare (SpecWar). Naval logistics
support and Special Operations (SpecOps) missions
worldwide.11
The development goals of the JMVX include: logistic
commonality; user friendly technologies; increased multi-
mission effectiveness; improved aircraft reliability and
maintainability; optimized shipboard compatibility, enhanced
survivability and reduced vulnerability; and allow for
future system growth.12 All services require a night and
all-weather capability, the capability to operate in
contaminated environments, reduced operations and support
costs and a fully integrated self-defense avionics suite.
Design allowances for the integration of service
specific mission and configuration requirements will be
required. The MV-22 will require a capability to transport
24 combat-loaded Marines and a crew of 3 for a 200 nautical
mile radius of action. The CV-22 requirement is 18 troops
and a crew of 4 for a 500 nautical mile radius of action.
To date, the Navy (HV-22) requirement for CSAR requires a
480 nautical mile radius of action.13 These different
radius of action requirements will necessitate the
installation of wing tanks in the HV-22 and CV-22.
Commensurate with an established requirement (and available
funding), these tanks may be incorporated in the MV-22 at a
future date.
Airspeed requirements for the MV-22 call for a 240 KTAS
cruise and a 270 KTAS dash capability. The CV-22
requirement is 230 KTAS cruise and 250 KTAS dash.14
The aircraft must carry up to 12 litters or up to a
10,000 pound internal load and a 10,000 pound external load
(MV-22 only, dual or single point).15
The aircraft must be capable of Air Combat Maneuvers
(ACM), possess a ballistic tolerance up to 14.5 MM in select
areas and have a service ceiling of 25,000 feet MSL.16
The JMVX must have a mission configurable, selectable
rate of fire (air-to-ground and air-to-air) weapons system
compatible with night vision devices.17 An integration of
weapons system information on a helmet mounted sighting
system in addition to a capability to mount a crew-served
weapon in the aft cabin area (ramp) is desired. Without
additional funding it will remain an option for future
growth. While hard points are not in the current design of
the airframe, the requirement also lists a "desire" for an
air to air missile capability on the MV-22.
The JMVX requirement is straight forward about the need
for a self-defense capability. Space, weight and center of
gravity (CG) provisions have been incorporated into the EMD
design for a turreted nose gun, but the aircraft will
probably enter service without a defensive weapon system.
Current plans call for the weapon to be a three barrelled
50 caliber system to be incorporated as a kit, during or
after production.18
The need to ensure this critical weapon system is
installed during LRIP and prior to the full scale
operational evaluation (OPEVAL) is significant. With the
increased threat and tempo of operations worldwide, the need
for ensuring the system meets the requirement for
effectiveness and suitability (especially if installed as a
kit) prior to tactical fielding is critical.
Door guns are not a feasible option on the V-22 due to
the diminished and variable fields of fire caused by the
nacelles and their potential for rapid rates of movement.
In addition, the design of the windows and emergency hatches
incorporates an explosive charge for release vice a
mechanical linkage. The crew upper and lower hatch doors
are not designed to open during forward flight, and
incorporate a weight on wheels (WOW) switch for safety.
IV. DOCTRINE AND TACTICS DEVELOPMENT
A. DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT
Doctrine is the general guidance that establishes a
particular way of thinking about how a military organization
will fight a war or employ a concept. Doctrine is
authoritative but not prescriptive. Its purpose is to
provide a basis for mutual understanding among the members
of the organization and serve as a foundation for harmonious
action during war.
Like pulling a trigger, doctrine requires judgement in
application. Equally as important, doctrine development
requires a fundamental understanding of the technology it is
sometimes based upon. From the earliest times, innovation
in technology has influenced the face of war in one way or
another. Marines have often found themselves at the
forefront of innovation. The helicopter, AV-8 and now V-22
provide the example. Within the framework of established
and developing doctrine, technology and tactics must
complement each other.
Based on the changing strategic face of a multipolar
world, the Navy and Marine Corps enacted a fundamental shift
in America's operational focus and warfighting priorities.
Defined by the September 1992 publication of ... From The
Sea, and expanded two years later in Forward...From The Sea,
the shift signaled a change in focus and priorities. The
Naval Service has refocused from dealing with a global
maritime power on the high seas to projecting strength and
influence along the littorals.19 The necessity for our
forces to rapidly project decisive military power cannot be
over emphasized.
FMFM-1 states, "we should strike our enemy where and
when we can hurt him most." The strategic shift in focus
adds definition to our developing doctrinal concept of
Operational Maneuver From the Sea, and fits hand-in-glove
within the Corps' framework of maneuver warfare. Stressing
tactical maneuverability within the battlespace, and
reinforcing the need to project combat power over a greater
distance in less time than currently possible, the V-22 will
enhance the commanders warfighting capability and provide
flexibility not currently available.
Envisioned to serve with the currently fielded Air
Cushioned Landing Craft (LCAC) and the Advanced Amphibious
Assault Vehicle (AAAV), the V-22 has provided the catalyst
of technology that will help fill the current gap in
developing doctrine. "Equipment should be designed so that
its usage is consistent with established doctrine and
tactics."20 This statement from FMFM-1 does not intend to
preclude the use of technological advancements which will
enhance our overall capability to accomplish the mission.
Designed with the capability to project forces deep inland
from Over The Horizon (0TH), allowing surface ships to
remain outside the ever increasing (and available) range of
anti-ship missiles, the V-22 has through the application of
technology reinforced a change in doctrine. This shift will
require additional changes in the doctrinal and tactical
employment of our current assets in support of this new
direction, and will require service planners to fully
comprehend the employment characteristics of the V-22.
Having a complete understanding of service specific
doctrine is as essential to realistic operational testing as
a complete understanding of the requirement, the aircraft's
characteristics and the threat. When taking a totally
objective view of Forward...From The Sea, planners should
ask themselves this simple question, can a helicopter meet
the requirements of this doctrine?
B. TACTICS DEVELOPMENT
Understanding new doctrine, studying the effects
of new technology, and developing new tactics in line with
tiltrotor capabilities is just the first phase of the
education process.
The student will observe that changes in tactics
have not only taken place after changes in weapons
which reasonably is the case, but that the interval
between such changes has been unduly long.
A.T. Mahan
Tiltrotor tactics development presents a unique
challenge and requires those involved to keep an open mind.
As one of the primary responsibilities of the V-22
Operational Test Directors, development of the
OPTEVFOR/Operational Tactics Guide (OTG) will provide the
tactics for the initial operational employment of the V-22.
Done in coordination with other tactical development
commands (Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One)
to ensure both rotary and fixed-wing perspectives are
utilized, the framework for tactics development is
coordinated through the V-22 Tactics Manual Working Group.
Utilizing modeling and simulation to augment operational
testing in the aircraft, all available assets are employed
to maximize results, gain an insight into employment methods
and define maneuver techniques.
OT-IIA provided the first opportunity to conduct
tactical flight scenarios in the V-22 utilizing employment
techniques developed to date. Current assault support
tactics developed for helicopters were found to be
compatible when the V-22 was in the helicopter and
conversion mode at lower airspeeds (0 to 120 kts). Tactical
employment considerations during hover operations will
require additional assessment due to proprotor downwash.
During maneuvering flight utilizing nacelle authority
to provide vectored thrust, V-22 design and performance
characteristics provide significant benefits over
conventional helicopters. The tremendous acceleration and
deceleration available through nacelle authority provides
enhanced maneuver capabilities and serves well as the
defining characteristic of tiltrotor tactical performance.
When operating in the conversion mode at higher
airspeeds (120-160 kts) the currently established assault
support tactics for helicopters are minimized and will
completely diminish as the V-22 enters fixed-wing flight.
New tactics for V-22 employment in the high speed
conversion and fixed-wing configuration are required.
Higher speed, range, payload, and altitude considerations in
combination with developing employment doctrine will also
require a change in the approach to assault support escort
tactics.
With formal V-22 tactics development initiated, the
importance of utilizing actual V-22 tactics and performance
considerations in modeling, simulations and wargames is
reinforced. Inputs made based on past perceptions and dated
considerations may invalidate results. The most important
consideration concerning the V-22 is the fact that it is not
a helicopter or a fixed-wing. Forcing it into a category
other than tiltrotor will ultimately reduce its unique
capabilities.
V. V-22 OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT (OT-IIA)
47 years after another tremendous innovation in
technology (the helicopter) entered its first phase of
operational testing, the V-22 entered into its first formal
operational phase of testing. Going "in test" on 15 May
1994, this first test period lasted 54 days, assessed
hundreds of operational issues, generated 14.8 flight hours
and 59 hours of V-22 simulator time and concluded on 7 July,
1994. The test phase was conducted to support a program
decision point, and the Critical Design Review. The overall
purpose was to assess the V-22's potential operational
effectiveness and suitability.
Marine Helicopter Squadron One (HMX-1) is the Marine
Corps Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) Squadron for
assault support helicopters and related equipment. OT&E is
used to determine if the test article will perform in its
intended environment. In the absence of actual combat, only
realistic operational testing can be used to test an
aircraft against its stated requirement.
HMX-1 is the lead agency for the V-22 Multiservice
Operational Test Team (MOTT) consisting of Marine, Navy and
Air Force test directors, analysts, maintainers and support
personnel.
The operational assessment was conducted in three
phases. Phase I consisted of ground assessments and
selected maintenance actions. Operations took place at Bell
Textron in Arlington, TX and utilized aircraft 01 and 06.
These assessments included removal and replacement actions.
cargo handling system assessments, emergency egress and
ingress operations, and embarkation and debarkation of
combat loaded troops and injured personnel. Deficiencies
noted in the cargo handling system warranted early release
of the OT-IIA preliminary findings. The V-22 program
management initiated immediate redesign procedures and the
changes will be incorporated in all future V-22 aircraft.
Phase II involved flight training for the author and
the Air Force Test Director, LtCol Joe Bonin. The training
assessments were conducted at Patuxent River. Six training
flights were completed. During this phase, assessments were
conducted involving training, mission planning, cockpit
management, digital flight controls, navigation systems,
normal VFR operations, basic instrument and simulated
instrument flight characteristics, simulated emergencies,
air-crew coordination and safety.
Phase III Involved five tactical scenario flights and
was conducted at Patuxent River, MD and Marine Corps Base
Quantico, VA. Operational areas assessed included: low-
level (300 AGL) navigation at airspeeds up to 245 kts.,
confined area landings, simulated Special Operations Forces
(SOF) inserts and extracts, troop assault and medevac
operations, Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) operations,
simulated aerial refueling utilizing the KC-130, external
load and downwash assessment utilizing Helicopter Support
Team (HST) personnel, formation flights with KC-130, CH-53D,
AH-1 and T-2 aircraft, self-deployment assessment at 13,500
MSL, Search and Rescue and scramble launch, and finished
with a night flight and cockpit lighting assessment.
While limited in scope, the overall result of the
assessment concluded that, "within the constraints imposed
by the test limitations, the V-22 is potentially
operationally effective and potentially operationally
suitable."21
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The OT-IIA Report recommended that the EMD program
proceed. In addition, 34 separate recommendations were made
detailing issues identified during the conduct of the
assessment. These issues will require further action or
continued assessment prior to OPEVAL.
The V-22 is well qualified for limited production.
Once fielded, the V-22 will add a tremendous capability to
American Forces in the 21st century.
ENDNOTES
1Bell-Boeing Team. "Osprey Fax," Vol 5, Issue no. 12.
Philadelphia: (Bell-Boeing Team, December 14, 1994), 1.
2COMOPTEVFOR/AFOTEC, "Operational Assessment Report of
the V-22 Osprey, OT-IIA. (Project M960-OT-IIA), August
1994, 2.
3Department of the Navy, "Operational Requirements
Document for Multi-mission Vertical Lift Aircraft," Study,
384-88-94, November 1994, 1.
4COMOPTEVFOR/AFOTEC, "Operational Assessment Report of
the V-22 Osprey, OT-IIA." (Project M960-OT-IIA), August
1994, 2.
5Department of Defense, "Defense Acquisition Management
Policies and Procedures." Instruction, 5000.2, February
1993, 3-19.
6Maj J. K. Dodge, USMC, "V-22 Status Report"
Nighthawk News, January 1994, 8.
7LtCol G. Hammes, USMC, "V-22 Multiservice Operational
Test Director, interview by author, 5 March 1995.
8Bell-Boeing Team, "V-22 Osprey Tiltrotor Aircraft."
Design to Cost Estimate, 5199-32b&w, January 1995, 32.
9United States Marine Corps, Code APP-23, "Don V-22
Procurement Profile." Point Paper, May 1993, 2.
10Bell-Boeing Team, "V-22 Osprey Tiltrotor Aircraft."
Design to Cost Estimate, 54199-32b&w, January 1995, 32.
11Department of the Navy, "Operational Requirements
Document For Joint Multi-mission Vertical Lift Aircraft,"
Study, 384-88-94, November 1994, 2.
12Ibid, 4.
13Ibid.
14Ibid.
15Ibid, 6.
16Ibid, 9.
17Ibid, 10.
18LtCol Boyer, USMC, V-22 Program Code PMA-275M,
interview by author, 19 February 1993.
19Department of the Navy, "Forward...From The Sea,"
(Washington, DC: 1994), 2.
20Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States
Marine Corps, "Warfighting," FMFM-1, November, 1989.
21COMOPTEVFOR/AFOTEC, "Operational Assessment Report of
the V-22 Osprey. OT-IIA." (Project M960-OT-IIA), August
1994, 2.
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15. United States Marine Corps, Code APP-23. "Department of
the Navy V-22 Procurement Profile." Point Paper,
May 1993.
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