Military















JFACC: A Reattack: The Joint Force Air Component Commander And Joint







JFACC:
A Reattack: The Joint Force Air Component Commander And Joint


Air
Operations


 


CSC
1995


 


SUBJECT
AREA - Aviation


 


 


                                                            EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY


 


 


Title:
JFACC: A Reattack, The Joint Force Air Component Commander and Joint Air


Operations


 


Author:
Major James J. Drew, USAF


 


Thesis:
Centralized control of joint air by a single air commander, the JFACC, is


essential
to ensure unity of the joint air effort and realize the full impact of theater
air


power.


 


Background:
The idea of a single air commander is not new but dates back to World


War
II. The recent idea of a joint force air component commander (JFACC) in charge


of
joint air operations got its first real test in Operation Desert Storm-and it
worked.


The
centralized control of joint air under a single air boss using a coordinated
air


tasking
order (ATO) was a major factor behind the dramatic success of the air


campaign.
Although there is a general consensus on the need for a JFACC, service


views,
reinforced by dissimilar service doctrine, differ considerably on how
centralized


control
of joint air is best achieved. Specifically, there is still considerable debate
over


a
number of issues which include: the JFACC as a commander and the apportionment


of
joint air assets, the JFACC's role in the targeting process, his relationship
with the


Joint
Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB), JFACC control of deep attack assets, and


composition
of the JFACC's staff. This paper examines each of these areas in light of


our
recent experience in Desert Storm and proposes solutions to some past problems


which
can alleviate similar difficulties in the future. It also examines the distinct


perspectives
of the soldier and the airman, as well as different (and sometimes


conflicting)
service doctrinal views, which contribute to the lingering controversies over


the
concept of a JFACC.


 


Recommendation:
Joint doctrine on the role and authority of the JFACC must be more


explicit.
Service doctrines need to evolve to fully integrate the new paradigm of the


JFACC
who can best employ joint air power to achieve unity of effort and maximum


effect.
The air targeting and ATO processes must be streamlined to improve their


effectiveness,
and the JTCB must assume a more conspicuous role in integrating the


targeting
recommendations of ground commanders with those of the JFACC. The


JFACC's
staff should be composed of a more equitable representation of each service


component
Finally, the control of deep attack assets must be reexamined with the


JFACC's
need to synchronize the theater deep attack effort in mind.


 


                                   CONTENTS


 


 


                                                           Page


 


Executive
Summary                                            ii


 


Contents                                                   
iii


 


List
of Figures                                              iv


 


Introduction                                                 
1


 


Historical
Perspective                                        2


 


The
JFACC Role: Command, Control, or Coordinate?              3


 


The
JFACC and Apportionment                                   5


 


The
JFACC and Targeting                                       7


 


The
JFACC and the ATO                                        16


 


The
JFACC and the JTCB                                       20


 


The
JFACC and His Staff                                      24


 


The
JFACC and Doctrinal Difficulties                         26


 


The
JFACC and Deep Attack                                    32


 


Conclusion                                                  
34


 


End
Notes                                                    38


 


Bibliography                                                
44


 


                                LIST OF
FIGURES


 


 


                                                               Page


 


Figure
1:  Strategic Attack and Battlefield
Preparation Sorties  12


 


Figure
2:  The ATO Cycle                                         17


 


Figure
3:  JTCB Under DJFC                                       23


 


Figure
4:  JTCB Under JFACC                                      23


 


                           JFACC: A REATTACK


 


      The Joint Force Air Component Commander
and Joint Air Operations


 


 


 


      Joint force operations are here to stay,
and in most multi-service operations,


 


there
will probably be a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) to ensure


 


unity
of effort among service aviation components. Yet the centralized command and


 


control
of joint air operations under a JFACC still remains a controversial issue among


 


services.
Different views abound on the JFACC's role as a commander or coordinator


 


that
are reinforced by dissimilar service doctrines and distinct warfighting
philosophies.


 


In
particular, the JFACC's role in the targeting process and establishing target
priorities


 


continued
to be an area of ongoing debate. Service doctrines clash on how centralized


 


control
of theater air assets is best accomplished. This paper's central theme is that


 


centralized
control of joint air by a single air commander, the JFACC, is essential to


 


ensure
the unity of the joint air effort and realize the full impact of air power. To
that


 


end,
lingering controversies over the JFACC as a commander, apportionment of air,
the


 


JFACC's
role in the targeting process and with the Joint Targeting Coordination Board


 


(JTCB),
control of deep attack assets, the JFACC's staff, and conflicting service


 


doctrines
must be settled. The JFACC experience in Operation Desert Storm provides


 


a
rich basis for examining each of these issues as they emerged then and as they


 


stand
now. These remaining issues that continue to hinder unity of the air effort
under


 


a
JFACC in joint operations need to be resolved. In short, it is time to put the
joint" into


 


JFACC.


 


      Historical Perspective


 


      The idea of a single air commander goes
way back to World War II. Since then,


 


the
U.S. military has experienced a history of fragmented air operations. The


 


Solomons
Campaign was the first true joint air operation in U.S. history with a single


 


airman
commanding all the land-based aircraft of Marines, Army Air Force, and Navy


 


components.
During the course of the campaign, officers from the Marine Corps, Navy,


 


and
Army Air Force each served as the air commander. Perhaps it was limited air


 


assets
and a situation in which the certainty of winning was actually in question, but
not


 


until
the Gulf War has the same degree of unity of effort in the planning and
execution


 


of
joint air operations again been displayed. In Korea, coordination control was
the


 


byword
where service air components operated practically autonomously. The Navy


 


adamantly
insisted on independent operations based on geographic deconfliction while


 


the
Air Force attempted to gain operational control over naval air. In Vietnam, the


 


laissez-faire
control of air power continued with essentially five separate air wars taking


 


place
along with the division of airspace over North Vietnam between the Air Force
and


 


Navy
into a "route package' system which proved very inadequate.1 The Commander


 


in
Chief of Pacific Command ran the air war over North Vietnam while the
Commander,


 


U.S.
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV) controlled the air war in


 


the
South and Cambodia. A bitter feud between the Air Force and the Marines erupted


 


over
control of Marine air. Targeting was micro-managed by Washington, and even the


 


Air
Force would not place its Strategic Air Command B-52 bombers under the control
of


 


its
own 7th Air Force commander. All of this led to an unsuccessful attempt by


 


COMUSMACV
to tighten control in 1968 under a single air manager for Vietnam.


 


      In contrast with the fragmented approach
to the air war in Vietnam, the


 


Commander
in Chief, Central Command (ClNCCENTCOM), General H. Norman


 


Schwarzkopf,
established centralized control of theater fixed-wing air operations under


 


a
JFACC, Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, from the very beginning.


 


Schwarzkopf
was a firm believer in the JFACC concept and strongly supported the


 


notion
that the JFACC was solely responsible for planning the air campaign. In


 


prosecuting
the air campaign, Schwarzkopf gave Homer his full support saying,


 


"There's
only going to be one guy in charge of the air: Horner... If you want to fight


 


your
interservice battles, do it after the war."2  Operation Desert Storm was the first


 


practical
test of the JFACC idea in a major military conflict. General Horner's challenge


 


involved
orchestrating the air power capabilities of 14 separate national or service


 


component
with those of 10 coalition forces.3 Although not without some growing


 


pains,
the dramatic results of the air campaign demonstrated that the JFACC concept


 


works.
Centralized control of air power contributed to the dramatic success of the 43


 


day
air campaign. Operating under a single air boss and a single, coordinated air


 


tasking
order (ATO) resulted in the efficient, coherent application of air power and


 


significantly
lessened the possibility of fratricide among coalition aircraft.4


 


 


 


      The JFACC Role: Command, Control, or
Coordinate?


 


      Despite disagreement over some specific
issues, there is a general consensus


 


on
the need for a JFACC in large joint air operations. Unity of effort, achieved
through


 


centralized
control of joint air assets through a JFACC, is the most decisive way to


 


employ
theater air power. Centralized control allows the joint force commander (JFC)


 


to
focus his air power on enemy targets that best support his theater strategy and
use


 


air
power's inherent flexibility and speed to effectively respond to changes in the


 


combat
situation.5  It allows the JFC to employ
air power at the time and place in which


 


it
will have the greatest impact. How best to achieve this unity of effort and
what


 


constitutes
centralized control are key issues in the JFACC debate.


 


      Does the JFACC command, control, or
coordinate? The simple answer is yes.


 


According
to Joint Pub 3-0, the JFACC derives his authority from the JFC who


 


establishes
the JFACC's specific responsibilities and command authority. The JFACC's


 


four
chief responsibilities are to plan, coordinate, allocate, and task in executing
the air


 


portion
of the JFC's campaign strategy. Typically, the JFACC exercises operational


 


control
(OPCON) over assigned and attached forces as a functional component


 


commander
and tactical control (TACON) over forces made available by other


 


components
for tasking.6  Ultimately, the JFC
defines the JFACC's command authority.


 


To
effectively orchestrate the joint air operation, the JFACC must command his


 


assigned
forces, control or task other air assets via TACON, and coordinate between


 


service
components in setting targeting priorities and allocating actual sorties.


 


      Coordinating authority defines a
consultative relationship between commanders.


 


It
usually applies more to planning activities and does not involve authority to
task. A


 


coordinator
can only ask. The JFACC does more. Since the JFACC is normally


 


designated
a supported commander for the JFC's air effort, he exercises tactical control


 


which
is the authority to "direct and control designated forces," in other
words, to task.7


 


The
single ATO is the JFACC's key instrument for exercising centralized control of
the


 


joint
air effort. The point is that operational control of all joint air assets is
not


 


necessarily
essential for the JFACC to run the air war. The desired unity of effort can


 


be
achieved through tactical control.8 Coordination alone falls short. In Desert
Storm,


 


the
JFACC did not actually command (exercise OPCON of) Navy or Marine air units.


 


These
units reported to their respective service component commanders. However,


 


General
Horner exercised tactical control through the ATO by tasking these forces to
fly


 


missions
based on the CINC's apportionment guidance.9


 


 


 


      The JFACC and Apportionment


 


      The JFC is ultimately responsible for
running the air war and apportions joint air


 


assets
by percentage or weight of effort based on his priorities.10 The JFACC makes


 


recommendations
on apportionment, usually based on the anticipated sortie rates of air


 


resources
available in-theater, for the JFC's apportionment decision. Based on the


 


JFC's
apportionment guidance, the JFACC then allocates sorties through the ATO.


 


The
focus should really be on weight of effort in expressing JFC apportionment


 


guidance.
Apportionment simply by percentages is undesirable because it limits the


 


JFACC's
flexibility to best allocate sorties and may not result in optimum use of the
air


 


assets
involved. Here is why: The actual numbers, types, and unique capabilities of


 


the
aircraft available in-theater can affect the percentage figures since some
aircraft


 


only
perform certain roles (or they perform certain roles only so well).11 For
example, if


 


there
are 30 F-15Cs out of a total of 100 aircraft, this 30 percent of theater air
will be


 


allocated
to the air superiority (anti-air warfare) mission because that is what F-15Cs


 


do--and
all they do. Another equally unsatisfactory approach is to divide air assets in


 


shares
to support each ground commander; in other words, the JFACC gives each


 


corps
commander a certain number of daily sorties. However, concentration of air


 


power
is a central principle of air warfare.12 Concentration allows the theater


 


commander
to focus aerial firepower on the most important targets at the most


 


important
time. Merely dividing air assets among ground commanders dilutes the


 


effectiveness
of air power. This lesson was aptly demonstrated in the early fighting in


 


the
North African campaign of World War II when aircraft were parceled out to Army


 


corps.
As a result, there was no unity of effort for Allied air, no concerted effort
to


 


achieve
air superiority, and air losses were prohibitively high as German air
devastated


 


small
formations of Allied aircraft trying to support their ground units.13


 


      In addition, the number of sorties flown
is not what really matters. What counts


 


is
the type of aircraft and ordnance mix applied against each particular target
Different


 


types
of targets require different aircraft and weapon combinations in varying
numbers


 


to
achieve an optimum probability of kill. The JFC should ideally provide his
guidance


 


on
relative air priorities through weights of effort and leave the actual
determination of


 


how
many aircraft are required to fulfill these priorities to his JFACC planning
experts.


 


Weight
of effort is best expressed in terms of emphasis within the mission categories
of


 


strategic
attack, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), offensive counter air


 


(OCA),
defensive counter air (DCA), close air support (CAS), and air interdiction
(INT).


 


Weight
of effort will usually vary with the particular phase of the JFC's theater


 


campaign.
Early in a campaign, gaining air superiority through OCA and SEAD, along


 


with
attacking key strategic targets such as command and control facilities, are
usually


 


top
priorities. Once control of the air is assured, other missions can be flown


 


unhampered
by any significant enemy counterair threat. As a campaign progresses


 


further,
certain aircraft such as F-16s may shift from SEAD to CAS or INT. With major


 


ground
operations underway, priorities naturally shift to direct support of engaged


 


ground
forces along with interdiction of rear echelon enemy forces. Certainly the


 


requirement
for CAS is directly related to the progress of the ground operation.


 


However,
some level of strategic attack may still be necessary to prevent the enemy


 


from
reconstituting previously destroyed warmaking capabilities.


 


 


 


 


      The JFACC and Targeting:


 


      The targeting process-the
identification, selection, and prioritization of enemy


 


targets
for attack-is a significant area of friction between components and centers on


 


how
target priorities are determined. The JFACC must carry out the JFC's


 


apportionment
guidance by matching available air assets against the target list The


 


issue
here is the relative priority of the targets nominated by ground commanders
within


 


their
respective areas of operation (AO) vis-a-vis strategic or theater targets
identified


 


by
the JFC and how the JFACC allocates air assets to each.


 


      The disagreement on target priorities
stems in part from different basic


 


perspectives
of the airman and the soldier. The JFACC has a theater-wide view of the


 


battlefield-and
seeks to employ air power in line with the JFC's priorities for maximum


 


overall
effect. As an airman, this theater-wide view comes naturally because of the


 


range,
speed, and expanse of his medium. The ground commander is concerned


 


about
his AO-and rightly so. As a soldier, he naturally focuses on the immediate and


 


near-term
battle within his geographic area, and he sees the enemy forces immediately


 


opposite
him as the most important targets to win his battle. Surface forces typically


 


depend
on geographic division of the theater for effective control, and the ground


 


commander's
primary concern is to destroy the enemy within his battlespace with as


 


much
firepower as he can obtain. The airman, unconstrained by geography in his


 


medium,
favors direct attacks on enemy strategic targets as an expedient means to win


 


the
war.


 


      These two very different perspectives
often clash, and Desert Storm was


 


no
exception. Both the Army's VII Corps and the Marines' I MEF commanders


 


became
concerned about emphasis on the strategic air campaign at the


 


expense
of battlefield preparation.14 Prior to Desert Storm, joint targeting


 


procedures
for component commanders and the JFACC were not clearly


 


established.
General Schwarzkopf never established a CINC-level joint


 


targeting
coordination board (JTCB). Technically, a JTCB did exist, but its


 


importance
or authority in the overall targeting process is questionable since it


 


was
not comprised of any flag officers or even full colonels.15 The absence of a


 


true
high-level JTCB meant that the Army corps and division commanders did


 


not
have a forum to express their concerns and views about targeting to the


 


CINC
and the JFACC. A targeting process emerged that was sponsored by the


 


JFACC
who hosted a daily joint targeting meeting. However, the JFACC's


 


Guidance-Apportionment-Targeting
(GAT) cell, also known as the "Black Hole",


 


assumed
many functions normally performed by a JTCB. It exercised the


 


greatest
influence on the targeting process since it controlled the Master Target


 


List
and MAP. Although it had some planners from other services who could


 


provide
some oversight of the process, the vast majority were Air Force officers.


 


This
led to allegations that the JFACC-led targeting process lacked the


 


necessary
balance between the Air Force's strategic view and Army and Marine


 


Corps
concerns of shaping the immediate battlefield. Ground commanders felt


 


that
the air effort was weighted too heavily on strategic targets instead of such


 


targets
as artillery on the front lines in Kuwait.16 The CENTCOM J-3 never


 


became
involved to level the playing field, and there was no effective joint


 


campaign
oversight by the CENTCOM staff who primarily ran CENTCOM's


 


operations
center.


 


      A major area of debate was (and still
is) over who should integrate the


 


target
lists of various components, the JFACC staff or a theoretically more


 


objective
JFC-level JTCB. On 31 January with the ground offensive


 


approaching,
Schwarzkopf told Horner:


 


      Target development and nomination during
the early phases of the


      campaign were clearly led by the...
[JFACC]. As we move into


      battlefield preparation, maneuver
commander input into the target


      selection process becomes even more
important. Therefore, the


      opportunity for corps and other
subordinate commanders to plan for and


      receive air sorties to fly against
targets of their choosing must increase.17


 


Because
of ground commander concerns that battlefield preparation was not receiving


 


enough
emphasis, General Schwarzkopf charged the Deputy ClNC (DCINC),


 


Lieutenant
General Calvin Waller, with the responsibility for reviewing targets


 


nominated
by ground commanders and arbitrating disputes over the corresponding


 


apportionment
of air.18 General Waller, along with General Horner, developed initial


 


sortie
allocation recommendations 72 hours prior to ATO execution, reviewed these


 


with
ground commanders, and made a final proposal to Schwarzkopf 48 hours prior to


 


ATO
execution.


 


      A master target list, initially
developed before the war by the Air Staff's


 


Checkmate
division and the Navy's Strike Projection Evaluation and Antiair Research


 


(SPEAR)
team, eventually grew from 300 to over 700 targets and was a comprehensive


 


description
of strategic targets in Iraq.19 Targets submitted by ground commanders for


 


battlefield
preparation in Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) were integrated into a


 


separate
DCINC target list. The reason for two distinct target lists may be that the
master


 


target
list was developed during the early stages of Desert Shield by Checkmate as
part


 


of
its air-only option named Instant Thunder. The list was further refined by the
Black


 


Hole
planning cell as the air campaign plan developed into its four stage form. The
KTO


 


planning
cell was separate from the Black Hole team during this process. The two


 


planning
cells were finally merged to form the Guidance-Apportionment-Targeting cell


 


just
before Desert Storm. The DCINC consolidated and prioritized corps commander


 


targets
into a single KTO target list which went to the JFACC who then allocated
sorties


 


against
it.


 


      JFACC planners envisioned the air
campaign as a phased application of air


 


power.
The first phase would destroy Iraqi's air defense system, gain air superiority,


 


attack
strategic Iraqi targets such as its command and control network, and strike key


 


warfighting
industries and infrastructure such as Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical


 


production
facilities. Next, the campaign featured a short second phase to destroy air


 


defenses
in the KTO followed by a third phase which focused on preparing the


 


battlefield
for the coalition ground campaign in Kuwait. The last phase would provide


 


air
support for the ground offensive. In reality, the strategic attack,
interdiction, and


 


battlefield
preparation phases all merged into a single, enormous air campaign which


 


soon
brought different service views on the best ways to allocate air power to the


 


forefront.
The Air Force generally emphasized attacking strategic Iraqi targets, the


 


Army
and Marines stressed targeting front-line Iraqi forces in Kuwait, and the Navy


 


emphasized
fleet defense targets. Although part of the disagreement had to do with


 


different
views on what wins wars, certainly some of it also had to do with the timetable


 


of
the individual phases. The Air Force was reluctant to shift from strategic
attack to


 


battlefield
preparation so early in the air campaign.20


 


      The best way to allocate air power is
the JFC's way. During Desert Storm,


 


General
Schwarzkopf, was given a nightly briefing on the next day's ATO that included


 


strategic
targets to be hit and number of sorties by type of aircraft allocated to
battlefield


 


preparation
in Kuwait. He took an active role in determining the air targeting decisions in


 


the
KTO and often made adjustments that he deemed appropriate.21 Even though the


 


DCINC's
JTCB did not review target nominations generated by the GAT, General


 


Schwarzkopf
and General Horner knew of, and agreed with, the target selections.


 


Target
priorities were discussed at the CINC's daily 1900 target selection briefing,
and


 


Army
and Marine representatives were present at these briefings. During one
briefing,


 


ground
commanders complained about not enough attacks on front-line Iraqi forces in


 


the
KTO. Horner replied that they misunderstood the best way to use air power.


 


Schwarzkopf
ended it by saying, "Guys, it's all mine, and I will put it where it needs
to be


 


put."22
At the 1900 meetings, General Horner and Brigadier General Buster Glosson


 


would
brief General Schwarzkopf on the ATO for two days in the future. Horner


 


recounts:
"[Schwarzkopf] would say, 'No, no, no, here is what I want done... Put 200


 


sorties
on this one [Iraqi division], and 30 sorties on that one' and stuff like that.
So that


 


is
what we did. Now that frustrated the Army greatly because they felt nobody was


 


listening
to them. Well, the trouble was they weren't in charge. They wanted to be in


 


charge,
and they weren't in charge. Schwarzkopf was in charge."23


 


Click
here to view image


 


Figure
1: Strategic Attack and Battlefield Preparation Sorties (Source: A League of
Airmen)


 


 


      Despite dissent to the contrary, the
battlefield was well-prepared for the ground


 


offensive
by G-day. After just seven days into the air campaign, the majority of sorties


 


were
allocated to battlefield preparation, and from day thirteen through the
coalition


 


ground
offensive, over 80 percent of ATO sorties were for battlefield preparation (see


 


Figure
1).24 Battlefield preparation sorties flown in Kuwait exceeded 35,000 including


 


5,600
against the Republican Guard.25


 


Repeated
air attacks reduced the military effectiveness of Iraqi front-line units along
the


 


Kuwait-Saudi
border to less than 50 percent, less than 70 percent for second echelon


 


units,
and less than 80 percent for (primarily) Republican Guard forces along the
Iraq-


 


Kuwait
border near Basrah. A sign in a JFACC planning cell read: "We are not


 


'preparing
the battlefield,' we are destroying it"26


 


      Apparently unknown to corps commanders,
the CINC had directed the JFACC,


 


General
Horner, not to bomb Iraqi units that were below 50 percent strength.27 General


 


Schwarzkopf's
focus of effort was to reduce Republican Guard strength which he saw


 


as
the Iraqi center of gravity.28 Since the Guard units were deployed in reserve
behind


 


front-line
regular Iraqi divisions facing coalition ground forces, this decision probably


 


reinforced
ground commanders' concerns that they were not being allocated enough air


 


against
the front-line forces facing them. Schwarzkopf had also directed the JFACC


 


staff
not to attack front-line artillery until just before G-day to prevent it from
being


 


replaced.
In addition, the CINC limited attacks on Iraqi forces in the west so as not to


 


tip
off the Iraqis to the coalition's "left hooks attack plan.29 This CINC
guidance largely


 


determined
the way the JFACC allocated sorties against corps commander targets.


 


The
JFC has the lead role in theater-level targeting, but this role is not well
defined in


 


current
joint doctrine. This may be at the root of the confusion in Desert Storm.


 


Ground
commanders were dissatisfied with the JFACC targeting process for not being


 


responsive
to their target nominations, but at the same time, the JFACC's targeting


 


conformed
to the CINC's priorities and supported his deception plan. Ground


 


commanders
nominated targets of immediate tactical importance to them while the


 


JFACC
and CINCCENT took a theater-wide approach. Tension resulted because the


 


ground
commanders did not understand that the ClNC's preference for striking the


 


Republican
Guards sometimes outweighed their own preferences for striking front-line


 


targets.30


 


      After Desert Storm, the Army's VII Corps
complained that the JFACC actually


 


allocated
sorties against only 15 percent of some 2,000 nominated targets.31 Of the


 


3,067
total targets nominated by the Army for air attack during the course of the
war, a


 


little
over one-third were actually hit.32 
However, there were problems with many of


 


targets
the Army submitted. Some nominated targets were outdated with validations


 


over
a month old. Others could either not be confirmed or had repositioned, had


 


already
been hit and were awaiting battle damage assessment (BDA) results, or simply


 


were
not suitable as an air target. Suitable targets that could be revalidated were


 


normally
targeted although some were not necessarily the Army's higher priority


 


targets.33
A major shortcoming in the process was a lack of feedback to the ground


 


commanders
on the status of various targets, not unresponsiveness to ground


 


commander
targeting requests. The JFACC staff provided no explanation when


 


unsuitable
targets were dropped from the target list. Some targets within kill boxes


 


were
attacked, but in those cases, the Army generally had no way of knowing what was


 


actually
destroyed. In addition, problems with outdated intelligence and limited air


 


targeting
expertise hampered corps ability to provide suitable air targets. Doctrinally,


 


for
a JFACC to commit sorties against outdated, mobile, unconfirmed, or otherwise


 


unsuitable
targets might waste valuable sorties that could strike other validated targets


 


elsewhere
in-theater. Furthermore, it may result in risking aircrews and aircraft


 


unnecessarily.


 


      Along with the misunderstanding between
the JFACC and ground commanders,


 


problems
with timely and accurate BDA greatly complicated the air targeting process in


 


Desert
Storm. The CINC gave both the Army Component, Central Command (ARCENT)


 


and
the Marine Corps Component, Central Command (MARCENT) responsibility for


 


assessing
battle damage within their respective AOs. This decision seems to make


 


sense;
however, ARCENT and MARCENT each used different criteria to determine BDA.


 


Initially,
ARCENT used only A-10 mission reports (MISREPs) or confirmation by imagery


 


intelligence
to determine a tank kill. Other coalition aircraft mission reports were not


 


counted
until later confirmed by overhead sensors. MARCENT counted MISREPs from


 


A-10s
and AV-8s.34 At first, MISREPs from F-15Es, F-111Fs, and A-6s were not credited


 


as
kills despite cockpit video showing targets blowing up. Later, ARCENT changed
its kill


 


criteria
and credited one-third of A-10 and one-half of F-111F, F-15E, or A-6 claimed
kills


 


in
their official counts The JFACC staff initially assumed that pilot MISREPs
would be a


 


primary
means of BDA. Since no common method of determining BDA was agreed upon


 


by
the JFACC, ARCENT, and MARCENT, all parties had trouble agreeing on when a 50


 


percent
attrition level was achieved. Without this common reference, ground


 


commanders
also lacked a reliable basis for assessing JFACC support in their AOs. As


 


mentioned
earlier, attrition levels determined the focus of the JFACC's targeting efforts
in


 


the
KTO, and these results remained subject to dispute depending on the criteria
used.


 


      Lack of real-time BDA had a significant
impact on the air targeting process.


 


The
absence of BDA on targets just hit-or being hit-to a certain extent determined


 


which
targets in the JFACC's Master Attack Plan (MAP) were scheduled to be attacked-


 


-and
which were not.36 The BDA process simply could not keep pace with the


 


enormous
scope and rapid tempo of the air campaign.37 The attrition level confusion


 


was
compounded by independent (and more conservative) Defense Intelligence


 


Agency
(DIA) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessments which were


 


significantly
lower than CENTCOM's own estimates. DIA did not have access to aircraft


 


imagery
and relied on national-level overhead reconnaissance assets which, designed


 


primarily
to monitor relatively static strategic areas of interest, could only detect


 


catastrophic
damage.38 Due to delays in assessing data from overhead sensors,


 


attrition
figures fluctuated from one day to the next and complicated the JFACC staff's


 


attempts
to effectively allocate sorties against targets. In addition, the lagging BDA


 


cycle
affected the ATO development cycle. Target selection and ATO development


 


were
often complete before BDA results of previous sorties became available.39 The


 


JFACC's
attack planners were often forced to make their own damage assessments


 


using
cockpit videotape recordings.


 


 


 


      The JFACC and the ATO


 


      The air tasking order is the JFACC's key
tool for ensuring unity of effort in the


 


air
war, and its development is directly affected by the targeting process. The ATO
is a


 


two
part document consisting of a main section with mission and target information
and


 


a
special instructions (SPINS) section containing necessary information on topics
such


 


as
aircraft deconfliction, radio frequencies, aircraft routing and airspace
control


 


measures,
search and rescue, and air refueling procedures. The ATO is an Air Force


 


mechanism
for directing a large-scale air campaign. It allows a JFACC to concentrate


 


air
strikes involving large numbers of aircraft from different units and different
bases


 


across
multiple targets in a short period of time. The ATO also enables the JFACC to


 


selectively
employ platforms best suited to attack particular targets with the most


 


effective
munitions. Its significance was summarized by General Horner, "Without the


 


ATO,
you don't have the JFACC. With the ATO, you don't have anything but a


 


JFACC."40
The ATO concept is in keeping with the Air Force's philosophy of centralized


 


control
and decentralized execution, but this differs from the Navy and Marine


 


philosophy
of centralized command and decentralized control using mission-type


 


orders.
The Navy had never favored an ATO system because of the less predictable


 


nature
of war at sea or along a coast. The Navy also had reservations about


 


involvement
in a centrally directed air campaign by a JFACC, but had no alternative to


 


the
ATO system. It had no similar system for command and control of an air campaign


 


of
such scope or duration. Both the Navy and the Marines were willing to sacrifice


 


efficiency
in air operations for a less rigid approach.41 In Desert Storm, the ATO often


 


exceeded
700 pages and this size, along with some communications interoperability


 


problems,
caused dissemination delays. As a tasking mechanisms the ATO process


 


was
frequently criticized as inflexible and too slow to quickly respond as the
fast-


 


moving
air campaign progressed.42


 


Click
here to view image


 


        Figure 2: The ATO Cycle (Source: Gulf
War Air Power Survey, Vol. I)


 


 


      The lengthy 48 hour ATO development
cycle (depicted in Figure 2) was another


 


factor
in the overall air targeting process. The ClNC's targeting and apportionment


 


guidance
was passed at the daily 0700 JFACC staff meeting. The MAP for the day two


 


days
in advance was then created by the GAT cell of the JFACC's staff. Once


 


approved
by the Director of Campaign Planning at 2000, the GAT targeting cell officers


 


would
perform weaponeering-determine the specific type and quantity of weapons


 


required
to achieve the desired damage level given target vulnerability, weapons


 


effects
and reliability. The MAP information went to the ATO Division in the form of


 


target
planning worksheets. The ATO division developed a flyable ATO which was


 


finally
disseminated to units around 1800 the next day for execution beginning at 0500


 


the
following morning. Coalition land-based forces including the Marines received
the


 


ATO
by computer via the Computer-Aided Force Management System (CAFMS) to


 


land-based
units which proved to be cumbersome and time-consuming. The Navy had


 


no
capability to receive the ATO electronically. Navy communications equipment was


 


not
compatible with CAFMS so the ATO was flown out to sea from Riyadh by S-3


 


courier
daily.43 As a result of these difficulties, changes were rarely made to Navy


 


missions
once the ATO went out.


 


      Numerous changes to the ATO during
Desert Storm, sometimes because of late


 


BDA,
hindered its timely dissemination. Changes issued to the ATO comprised a


 


significant
percentage of the total sorties flown. ATO sortie changes, primarily changes


 


in
timing or target changes, averaged over 500 per day out of around 2,550 average


 


total
sorties flown each day. In all, approximately 23,000 ATO changes were made


 


during
the course of the air campaign.44 The JFACC should minimize changes to the


 


ATO
once it is published since effects tend to ripple throughout the product
affecting


 


not
only the planners attempting to put the ATO together but also on the fliers who


 


need
adequate time to effectively plan their individual missions. Many fliers noted
that


 


the
ATO changes made daily in the ATO became almost overwhelming.45 Unless they


 


is
not absolutely critical, changes should be incorporated into the next day's
ATO. The


 


CAFMS
software was designed to handle a maximum of 2,400 planned sorties per day.


 


The
ultimate result was that the ATO was disseminated several hours late for the
first


 


three
weeks of the war. Clearly, the ATO development and dissemination process


 


needs
to be streamlined and shortened to increase the flexibility in execution and


 


responsiveness
of joint air operations. An more aggressive enemy could take


 


advantage
of inherent time lags and inflexibility. The best way to shorten the ATO


 


cycle
is to reduce the CAFMS processing which took over 13 hours during Desert


 


Storm.


 


      In addition to a shorter ATO development
cycle, the targeting cycle of


 


nominating,
validating, and revalidating air targets must be cut down from


 


approximately
48 hours to 36 hours. For the ground commander, one issue is


 


responsiveness.
He must be able to nominate a target within his AO (but unable to


 


strike
with organic assets) and have it taken out quickly if it affects his close
battle.


 


Also,
to effectively prosecute the deep battle, the ground commander must be involved


 


in
the target selection process. For example, targets that might normally be
selected


 


for
air attack by the JFACC staff because of their importance to the enemy may, in
fact,


 


be
of even more importance intact to the ground commander's future plans.
Therefore,


 


the
ground commander may want to restrict certain targets within his AO from air


 


attack.


 


      Finally, since the BDA cycle provides a
key input for the daily targeting process,


 


real-time,
accurate BDA is essential for JFACC planners to concentrate successive


 


attacks--or
reattacks-on the most important remaining targets. The damage


 


assessment
function itself should be centralized. A single agent such as a joint


 


intelligence
center (JIC) should be ultimately responsible for collating BDA inputs from


 


various
sources into a single overall picture. 
Furthermore, BDA should be principally


 


determined
by the JFC's staff in the theater of operations, not Washington,  The JFC in


 


the
combat theater is in the best position to make the ultimate assessment.  In addition,


 


greater
emphasis must be given to cockpit videotape imagery as a reliable, real-time


 


validation
of MISREPs in determining BDA.46 MISREPs validated by cockpit video


 


should
be given full credit for targeting purposes. 
Also, unmanned aerospace vehicle


 


(UAV)
imagery, the Navy's Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS), and the


 


new
Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance Pod System (ATARS), must be exploited


 


as
primary sources of real-time BDA imagery to shorten the joint targeting cycle.


 


Satellite
imagery is a valuable source of BDA, but it cannot be relied on as the primary


 


source.  Analysis of these products is an inherently
time consuming process, and the


 


systems
limited total capacity cannot meet the demands of large, high tempo


 


operations.



 


 


 


            The JFACC and the JTCB


 


            To prelude similar difficulties
between the JFACC and ground commanders


 


over
targeting in the future, a joint form to give ground commanders a greater voice
in


 


the
target selection process is needed.  A
joint targeting coordination board (JTCB)


 


chaired
by the deputy JFC (DJFC) and made up of senior component representatives 


 


of
the JFACC, land component commander (which could include representatives of


 


Army
and Marine corps-level elements), naval component commander, J-2


 


(intelligence),
and J-3 (operations) should be established to evaluate, consolidate, and


 


prioritize
targets.  For multinational operations,
membership could even include certain


 


coalition
force representatives.  While membership
may vary somewhat, the object is to


 


have
senior (O-6 to O-7) decision-makers from every component present to ensure 


 


target
priorities within each AO are addressed along with theater-level targets.  The


 


DJFC
should chair the JTCB since he has the authority to task the three functional


 


component
commanders.


 


            The JTCB receives validated targets
nominated by all major elements.  Army


 


corps
targets may be submitted through the battlefield coordination elements (BCE)


 


located
within the JAOC.  The JTCB reviews the
nominated targets daily and develops


 


an
integrated list that establishes relative theater targeting priorities which,
in turn, will


 


drive
attack sequencing and allocation of air assets.  Other major functions of the JTCB


 


include
balancing conflicting component target priorities, coordinating the type of
deep


 


attack
asset to be used against theater interdiction targets, and ensuring target


 


priorities
are both consistent with the JFC's campaign strategy.  A final function is the


 


coordinated
joint targeting effort with all players understanding the intent and focus of


 


the
game plan.  An additional feature is
that the JTCB will provide and avenue for


 


necessary
feedback and dialogue between the JFACC and ground commanders on the


 


status
of their previously nominated targets.


 


      As a JFC review mechanism, the JTCB must
take a macro view of the entire


 


theater.
It must focus primarily on target categories and not involve itself in the
details


 


of
attacking individual targets. This should be left to the JFACC staff to work
out.


 


Moreover,
the primary focus of the JTCB should be on future operations in the 72 hour


 


time-frame.
However, some targets are time-critical, since not striking them first might


 


result
in an unacceptable threat to friendly forces, they may be of a fleeting nature


 


because
they are temporarily vulnerable, or important operational benefits may be


 


gained
by destroying them as soon as possible. In such cases, the JTCB process must


 


be
flexible enough to also address such targets of opportunity.


 


      Current joint doctrine on the JTCB and
its relationship with the JFACC is


 


extremely
vague; more specific guidance on JTCB role in joint targeting is required. A


 


future
Joint Pub 3-56.1, "Command and Control of Joint Air Operations,"
currently in


 


draft
form, provides little useful guidance on the JTCB or authority of the JFACC.


 


While
it affirms the JFACC's authority to task and direct missions in the ATO to meet


 


the
JFC's theater objectives and ensure unity of effort, it fails to address the
JTCB or


 


the
JFACC's role in the joint targeting process other than to acknowledge that it
is the


 


JFC's
decision on whether or not to establish a JTCB. Meanwhile, in the absence of


 


more
concrete guidance, the U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Pacific Command have


 


both
developed JFACC concepts of operation which outline specific JFACC functions


 


and
responsibilities as well as a JTCB structure. U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and


 


U.S.
Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) place the JTCB, chaired by the DJFC, under the


 


JFC
(depicted in Figure 3).


 


Click
here to view image


 


The
JFACC's and His Staff


 


      Another controversial JFACC issue during
Desert Storm was the composition of


 


the
JFACC's staff. The JFACC staff was not joint. Although it had representatives


 


(liaison
officers) from the other services and the British Royal Air Force, its
membership


 


was
predominantly Air Force. Both the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Major


 


General
John A. Corder, and the Director of Air Campaign Planning, Brigadier General


 


Buster
Glosson, were U.S. Air Force generals.47 This naturally tended to reinforce


 


perceptions
of parochialism. A truly joint staff in the Air Operations Center (AOC),


 


composed
of representatives from each service, would go a long way towards


 


alleviating
such concerns. A joint JFACC staff involves more than a handful of liaison


 


officers
from other services performing in an advisory role. Instead, the JFACC's staff


 


should
be composed of a mixture of talented officers drawn from each service in


 


proportion
to the approximate number and type of air assets each contributes to form a


 


Joint
AOC (JAOC).48 This more balanced staff would also provide the JFACC and JFC


 


with
a solid range of expertise across all service aviation specialties. The real
role of


 


these
JFACC staff officers is to combine their individual service expertise in
planning


 


effective
joint air operations, not to ensure that their service views prevail.49


 


      The JFACC himself is normally the
component commander with both the


 


preponderance
of air assets in-theater and the best capability to direct and control air


 


operations.50
For most large operations, this usually (although not always) means that an


 


U.S.
Air Force officer will assume the JFACC role since the Air Force will probably


 


provide
both the preponderance of aircraft and the AOC infrastructure. A deputy JFACC


 


or
director of operations from a service other than the JFACC's should be
appointed. In


 


Desert
Storm, a U.S. Navy officer in such a position would have provided better
service


 


component
representation and also helped allay suspicions of service bias. Furthermore,


 


the
Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) and Airspace Control Authority (ACA) duties


 


are
normally performed by the same individual because joint air defense efforts and


 


airspace
control measures are closely interrelated. Although the duties of the AADC and


 


ACA
can be performed by the JFACC himself, as was the case in Desert Storm, the


 


scope
of responsibilities is large enough that these are better delegated to another
flag


 


officer.
To minimize the possibility of fratricide, both joint air defense operations
and


 


airspace
control procedures must be integrated together in the ATO and airspace control


 


order
(ACO). Since, the JFACC is in the best overall position to synchronize the
entire


 


counterair
effort of both aircraft and ground defense systems, it follows that the AADC


 


and
ACA should report to the JFACC as an element of his staff.


 


      "Dual-hatting" of the JFACC,
who is probably also a service component


 


commander,
is another area of debate. Lt. Gen. Horner was both the commander of


 


the
Air Force Component, Central Command (CENTAF) and Commander, Ninth Air


 


Force
in addition to being the JFACC. Although serving in these two different and


 


potentially
conflicting roles, General Horner did much to accommodate the interests


 


and
concerns of the other services.51 The willingness to deal is a characteristic
of an


 


effective
JFACC. As JFACC, Horner was willing to make tradeoffs with other


 


component
commanders and enjoyed good working relationships with each. This


 


avoided
open conflict over the JFACC's status and authority. Also, daily dialogue of


 


the
JFACC with other senior leaders is vital in ironing out difficulties that
arise. Still,


 


with
dual-hatting, concerns over conflict of interest, such as assigning key
missions or


 


targets
to one's own service to steal the limelight, are bound to arise. When dual-


 


hatting
is unavoidable, the perception of conflict of interest can be minimized by a


 


balanced
JFACC staff consisting of officers from each services and aviation specialty.


 


The
JFACC's task, whatever his service, is to make the most effective use of all
the air


 


assets
available, regardless of their service source. As one JFACC planner in Desert


 


Storm
aptly summarized, "It's a war; we're not trying to make budget decisions,
we're


 


trying
to defeat someone."52


 


 


 


 


      The JFACC and Doctrinal Difficulties


 


      Different service perspectives and
doctrine on the control and employment of air


 


power
fuel arguments over the JFACC's role in joint air operations. The phrase


 


"shaping
the battlefields may mean two very different things to an aviator and an


 


infantryman.
Furthermore, the airman and soldier may differ in defining the enemy's


 


center
of gravity. The airman may view the command and control network or other


 


strategic
targets as an enemy center of gravity while the soldier tends to see the enemy


 


force
itself as the center of gravity. Each service has a distinct view of joint
warfighting


 


which
is shaped by their respective service doctrine. Admittedly, each point of view
has


 


sound
rationale supporting it. But while doctrine serves a useful purpose in that it


 


defines
the service's mission and identity, it can sometimes serve as a barrier to true


 


jointness.


 


      For the Air Force, the principal
doctrinal precept is the primacy of the strategic


 


air
war. The Air Force's doctrine is that centralized control (if not command) of
all


 


service
component air assets, under a single air commander, allows air power to be


 


focused
where it will do the most good in achieving theater objectives and promotes


 


both
unity and economy of effort. The JFACC, in the Air Force view, is in the best


 


position
to determine priorities among various theater air assets in keeping with the


 


JFC's
guidance. He fights the entire depth, width, and height of the battlespace. The


 


Air
Force's greatest fear is the misuse of air by failing to achieve air
superiority at the


 


outset
or diluting air power, a concern not altogether unfounded in U.S. military
history.


 


General
Momyer, former commander of Seventh Air Force in Vietnam, wrote:


 


      Throughout the three wars, World War II,
Korea, and Vietnam, the


      command and control of airpower has been
a major issue. Airpower has


      great flexibility to perform many tasks
in war, and its ability to respond


      with varying levels of firepower to a
variety of targets has led Army and


      Navy commanders to seek control of
airpower as part of their forces.


      But to give in to these understandable
wishes of surface commanders is


      to destroy the very thing that gives
airpower its strength-the ability to


      focus quickly upon whatever situation
has the most potential for victory


      or for defeat Airmen know that
centralized control of airpower in a


      theater of war can best serve armies and
navies; to fragment airpower is


      to court defeat In North Africa, Europe,
Korea, and Vietnam this


      principle has been proven time and
again. As Air Marshal Tedder writes,


      'Air warfare cannot be separated into
little packets; it knows no


      boundaries on land or sea other than
those imposed by the radius of


      action of the aircraft; it is a unity
and demands unity of command.'53


 


 


The
danger lies in suboptimizing the battlefield which can result in the diffusion
of air


 


power
at the expense of the theater objectives. Air Force officers argue that the


 


soldier
does not understand the synergy of focused and direct attacks on strategic


 


targets
of the enemy.54 The Air Force position is that early destruction of the enemy's


 


leadership,
command and control capability, lines of communication, industrial


 


infrastructure,
and other warfighting capabilities through strategic attack can help


 


ensure
a decisive victory.55 Attacks against command and control centers and airfields


 


play
a major role in the air superiority battle. The Air Force believes that air
superiority


 


is
a fundamental priority and a precondition for the effective conduct of joint
ground or


 


air
operations.


 


            While the Air Force acknowledges its
support responsibilities to ground forces, it


 


does
take a decidedly strategic focus with air superiority, deep attack, and
interdiction


 


as
elements of a larger air war executed independently of the ground battle.
Indeed,


 


Air
Force doctrine states that air power employed primarily in a close air support
role


 


(as
opposed to interdiction and strategic attack) is not likely to achieve
campaign-level


 


effects.56
This statement seems to ignore the point that air power may provide crucial


 


support
which ultimately helps the Army win a major land battle. That victory, in turn,


 


can
have a profound effect on an entire campaign, and air power has therefore


 


contributed
to that effect. Despite the claims of those who advocate the classic


 


strategic
bombing campaign, history has shown that a strategic air campaign can have


 


a
devastating impact on the enemy, but it will not win a war by itself.57 In
General


 


Horner's
words, "See, the trouble with our air power people is that sometimes they
get


 


too
carried away with what air power is all about.. They wanted the Iraqi army to


 


surrender
without the ground battle taking place so that it would vindicate them as


 


airmen...
The reason you would want that to happen is so that no U.S. soldiers were


 


killed
on the battlefield."58


 


      The Navy's focus is on the primacy of
the war at sea that involves sea control,


 


forward
presence, and power projection in the littoral or near-land environment. In
this


 


context,
the Navy views its carrier air as an extension of the fleet and is reluctant to


 


surrender
control to a land-based commander. The Navy sees its air performing a


 


combination
of fleet defense and strike operations along the littorals. Naval air is an


 


essential
part of overall fleet operations, and the traditional view holds that since
carrier


 


air
supports naval operations, it should therefore fall under the command of the
naval


 


commander
afloat. However, while maritime missions have priority, sorties in excess of


 


maritime
air requirements are made available for JFACC tasking. The Navy's strictly


 


maritime
missions were not normally included in the ATO. The JFACC does not need


 


to
control these sorties, only those which are integrated with the joint air
effort inland.


 


      The Navy has recently come a long way in
its shift from war in the open ocean


 


towards
becoming part of the joint sea-air-land team. Going into Desert Storm, the


 


Navy's
focus was on maritime battle against the former Soviet navy and independent


 


contingency
operations. It was not well prepared to integrate with land-based air forces


 


in
an extended air campaign. The Navy lacked a developed system for planning and


 


directing
an air campaign comparable to the Air Force's AOC or for developing an ATO


 


to
integrate employment of aircraft from multiple bases. This capability to
control an air


 


war
is an essential prerequisite for a future Navy JFACC. Also, the Navy's limited


 


number
of precision munitions and lack of onboard target identification systems for


 


beyond-visual-range
(BVR) missile employment tended to limit its participation in


 


certain
aspects of the air campaign which called for those capabilities.59


 


      The Marine Corps' fundamental precept is
the primacy of the Marine Air Ground


 


Task
Force (MAGTF). In spite of the 1986 Omnibus Agreement, the Marines and the


 


Air
Force views still diverge on control of the organic air component of its
MAGTF.60


 


Marines
view their air assets as an integral part of their air-ground combat team and
are


 


very
uncomfortable with the idea of a theater air commander who is able to shift
Marine


 


air
assets away from the direct support of their ground forces. The Marine reliance
on


 


its
air component stems from the Corps's unique role in amphibious operations and
the


 


need
for immediate firepower during the critical landing phase before other
supporting


 


arms
are ashore to provide such fire support. Marine air compensates for the MAGTF's


 


limited
artillery and armor, and it exists to support the MAGTF's ground component. It


 


is
also the MAGTF commander's primary means of fighting the deep battle. The


 


association
of Marine air with the ground component it serves is so close that


 


questioning
the need for separate Marine air is equivalent to questioning the need for a


 


Marine
Corps.61


 


      The Marines do believe in centralized
control of air-but by the MAGTF


 


commander.
This is so that when the MAGTF needs air, it can get it immediately


 


instead
of finding that the air it relied on was diverted elsewhere in theater. The Air


 


Force
is adamant about the centralized control of all theater air assets under a
single


 


air
boss for reasons already explained. So who is right? Both services have valid


 


points.
The Joint Chiefs simultaneous endorsement of both the JFACC concept and


 


the
Omnibus Agreement continues to create a context for disagreement between the


 


Marines
and the Air Force. During Desert Storm, the Air Force did, in fact, adhere to


 


the
Omnibus Agreement which reaffirms the integrity of the MAGTF combined-arms


 


team
and recognizes that Marine air is required for MAGTF effectiveness as a
fighting


 


force.
Since the Omnibus agreement states that OPCON of Marine air is retained by


 


the
MAGTF commander, Marines prefer to think of the JFACC title as a designation


 


and
the JFACC himself as strictly a coordinator.62 In Desert Storm, Marine


 


commanders
and the JFACC staff disagreed over the degree to which the ATO


 


covered
Marine sorties in excess of the number specifically committed to it. Some


 


Marine
officers, including Lt. Gen. Royal N. Moore, Jr., Third Marine Aircraft Wing


 


Commander,
viewed the ATO as merely a coordination mechanism.63 This assertion


 


ignores
the fact that the air tasking order was, as the name implies, the instrument
used


 


by
the JFACC, as the supported commander for the ClNC's air effort, to task various


 


missions.
All fixed-wing Marine air was in the ATO. Sorties provided to the JFACC


 


included
all A-6 and EA-6B and half of the F/A-18 sorties with MARCENT retaining


 


tasking
authority over all AV-8B and the remaining F/A-18 sorties for use in zones near


 


their
ground forces.64 Interestingly, in mid-February 1991, MARCENT withheld all
fixed-


 


wing
assets for CAS use because the JFACC's allocated sorties did not meet


 


MARCENT's
ground support requirements.  Despite
these philosophical differences,


 


General
Horner and General Moore made the whole process work through a series of


 


mutual
tradeoffs and compromises.66 General Horner commented, "You do common


 


sense
things. And you don't worry about doctrine."67


 


      For the Army, the principal precept is
the primacy of the land battle. In the


 


AirLand
Battle, which is now evolving into something called Army Operations, a basic


 


notion
is that war is ultimately decided by the soldier on the ground. Like the
Marines,


 


the
Army complains that the Air Force's desire for centralized control leads to too
much


 


emphasis
on strategic operations at the expense of direct support for front-line ground


 


troops
that it wants-and often needs.68 Unlike the Marines, the Army lacks an organic


 


fixed
wing air component, and because of a limited number of ATACMS, it still depends


 


largely
on air power to fight the deep battle.69 The Army tends to view air power as a


 


supporting
force for its ground scheme of maneuver and would like to allocate a fixed


 


number
of sorties dedicated for the exclusive use of each corps, in essence, to
provide


 


an
"air umbrella." However, in the Air Force's view, such an approach
fragments air


 


power
and wastes the synergy associated with centralized control of air power.


 


Centralized
control allows the JFACC to focus air assets where they are most needed


 


by
the joint force as a whole. It provides flexibility to shift roles or redirect
aircraft to


 


other
targets on the battlefield as a result of weather obscuring a primary target or


 


significant
changes in one area of the battlefield. Also, as previously noted, the


 


number
of sorties flown is not as important as the types of aircraft and weapons that
fly


 


those
sorties. Centralized control allows a JFACC to allocate the best combination of


 


aircraft
and weapon and concentrate this firepower for the desired effect against each


 


target.
Of course, the ground commander is in the best position to identify and


 


prioritize
targets in his AO which are a factor to his forces. When it comes to direct


 


support,
the crux of the matter is responsiveness. Army commander's want dedicated


 


CAS
because when they need it, they need it right away. On a dynamic battlefield,
30


 


minutes
is a long time to wait. Battles have been won and lost in less time. The


 


concept
of "push CAS" developed by General Horner to provide readily
available


 


aircraft
for direct support is a great idea, but it only works when an abundance of air


 


assets
are available (as was the case in Desert Storm).70


 


      Army helicopters are yet another issue.
Should they come under the JFACC's


 


purview?
The Army sees its helicopters as part of a combined-arms team along with


 


armor,
infantry, and artillery, all supporting its scheme of fire and maneuver. Attack


 


helicopters
are used as a maneuver element in support of ground operations and are


 


not
truly theater assets by virtue of their limited speed and range. When used in a


 


combined-arms
or CAS role, they are best left under the direct control of the ground


 


commander.
However, Army helicopters used in an interdiction role or beyond the fire


 


support
coordination line (FSCL) should come under the JFACC's purview in the ATO.


 


 


 


      The JFACC and Deep Attack


 


      Another area of debate concerns JFACC
control of deep attack assets other


 


than
aircraft. B-52-launched Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) come under the


 


JFACC's
control through the ATO, but should Navy TLAMs and Army ATACMS also be


 


included
in the JFACC's sphere of control? Generally, yes. TLAMs are a highly useful


 


weapon
permitting strikes in either bad weather or against heavily defended targets in


 


the
daytime without risking aircraft. It is essential that TLAMs be closely
integrated with


 


air
strikes to achieve unity of effort in the timing and targeting of deep strike
operations.


 


TLAMs
not employed in support of strictly maritime targets should fall under the


 


JFACC's
control in executing the JTCB's joint target list.


 


      With a range of over 120 km, ATACMS is
the Army's principal means of


 


prosecuting
deep operations.71 The ATACMS can also be a superb SEAD weapon in a


 


high
threat environment too lethal for aircraft to attack enemy defenses without


 


incurring
excessive risk.72  ATACMS is designed to
be a highly responsive deep strike


 


system,
while the Army's shorter range Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) is


 


considered
an artillery system. Since these are fundamentally employed as organic


 


corps
support weapons, it is not desirable for a JFACC to exercise control over them


 


when
used against targets within the corps' AO. However, when employed in deep


 


operations
against targets outside the ground commander's AO, JFACC control is


 


again
essential to allow the JFACC to deconflict targets between aircraft and other


 


attack
assets when developing the MAP and to synchronize the theater deep attack


 


effort.


 


      To facilitate the integration of deep
attack assets, a deep attack coordination


 


line
(DACL) should be established by the JFC, beyond which Navy TLAMs and Army


 


ATACMS
employment must be coordinated with the JFACC's air interdiction efforts.


 


This
concept differs from the fire support coordination line (FSCL), inside which
pilots,


 


operating
within the ground commander's main battle area, must coordinate their air


 


attacks
with the ground commander. The DACL will normally be located beyond the


 


FSCL.
The ground commander may freely employ his organic deep attack assets


 


inside
the DACL. Past the DACL, he must coordinate with the JFACC who integrates


 


all
deep attack assets to synchronize the theater deep battle. Merely extending the


 


FSCL
way out to permit unrestricted use of ATACMS unnecessarily hampers the


 


JFACC's
air interdiction effort. Pilots operating inside the FSCL cannot expend


 


ordnance
unless under the control of a forward air controller (FAC), and the number of


 


aircraft
that FACs can work at any given time is very limited. An example of this


 


occurred
in the latter stages of Desert Storm when the XVIII Airborne Corps advanced


 


the
FSCL well north of the Euphrates River. It was so far ahead of coalition ground


 


forces
that it created what amounted to a sanctuary for Iraqi forces from air attack
that


 


allowed
them to escape north out of Kuwait.73 Just as it is crucial for the ground


 


commander
to synchronize all attack assets inside the FSCL, it is equally essential for


 


the
JFACC to integrate all deep attack assets in prosecuting the theater-wide deep


 


battle.


 


 


 


      Conclusion


 


      As Desert Storm dramatically
demonstrated, air power has come of age.


 


Stealth
technology, lethal precision-guided weapons, long range air-and sea-launched


 


cruise
missiles, and airborne battlefield management and surveillance systems


 


combine
to make air power one of the most dominant and versatile aspects of modern


 


warfare.
As President George Bush observed, "Gulf lesson one is the value of air


 


power."74
Other than the U.S., no nation has a comparable ability to use concentrated


 


air
power with modern precision munitions against its adversaries. With the diverse


 


aerospace
capabilities of the four services, air power will remain a dominant aspect of


 


U.S.
military might and a unique advantage the U.S. can exploit in future conflicts.
The


 


decisiveness
of air power so clearly demonstrated in Desert Storm comes from its


 


inherent
offensive capability." Only air power has the capability to strike the
enemy


 


anywhere,
anytime, and hit multiple targets simultaneously. The lethality of modern air


 


power,
coupled with its freedom of maneuver, range, and precision, has revolutionized


 


modern
warfare." Although air power alone may not win a war, without air power, a


 


war
will not be won. Air power creates the essential conditions for success on the


 


ground
and at sea.


 


      The effectiveness of joint air
operations is best achieved through the centralized


 


control
of a JFACC who ensures unity of effort and coherent employment of air power


 


to
best achieve decisive theater-wide results. The key elements of the successful


 


Desert
Storm air campaign were centralized control of the joint air assets under a


 


JFACC
and a single ATO. The JFACC achieved true unity of effort in the air war, and


 


this
allowed the CINC to focus air power against the most critical targets at the
right


 


time
to support his concept of operations. Centralized control will continue to be


 


important
in future conflicts with fewer U.S. air power assets available due to current


 


force
reductions. In Desert Storm, the JFACC had an abundance of fighter assets to


 


employ
which kept inter-service conflicts, for the most part, on the back burner. The


 


coalition
forces fielded 2,430 fixed-wing aircraft and flew an average of over 2,500


 


combat
and support sorties per day.77 There was enough air for each service to


 


employ
its air assets the way it doctrinally preferred to fight" with the recent


 


downsizing
of U.S. forces, the real test for the JFACC will come in the future when


 


limited
air resources force hard choices between competing priorities on the
battlefield.


 


            Can the clash of different service
doctrines over control of joint air operations be


 


reconciled?
Yes, but first, old mindsets must change. The new paradigm for joint air


 


operations
is that unity of effort is effectively achieved through a single air boss


 


exercising
tactical control over all service component air assets. The Air Force must


 


recognize
that air power alone will not necessarily win a war through a strategic


 


bombing
campaign designed to drive the enemy into submission. It must also


 


recognize
that supporting engaged ground forces is just as important to the theater


 


campaign
as the strategic air battle is. It must give greater emphasis to CAS in


 


doctrine
and training. The Navy must prepare now to assume the role of JFACC in the


 


future,
especially in the littoral warfare environment. The Navy must integrate its
carrier


 


air
with other joint air assets beyond the fleet defense role in a larger theater
air


 


campaign.
The Marines need to recognize that under certain circumstances such as


 


sustained
operations ashore, Marine air does not always need to be strictly tied to its


 


MAGTF
combined-arms role. They must acknowledge that a JFACC's authority from


 


the
JFC to exercise tactical control involves more than mere coordination. The Army


 


must
recognize that air power does not only exist to support the ground forces'
scheme


 


of
maneuver. The use of ground forces to facilitate an air-dominant operation,
such as


 


fixing
enemy ground forces in place to increase their vulnerability to attack by air
power,


 


is
as valid a tactic as the use of air to support a ground scheme of maneuver.
Also, as


 


a
deep weapon, the Army's ATACMS needs to be integrated with the JFACC's air


 


targeting
plan to ensure unity of effort.


 


      Service doctrine should provide a
constructive basis for examining new


 


warfighting
ideas, not serve as a dogma that obstructs effective joint operations


 


because
it fails to acknowledge exceptions to its major doctrinal precepts. Nor should


 


service
doctrine usurp either joint doctrine or the JFC's concept of operations. To
fight


 


joint,
mutual understanding and appreciation of the other services' warfighting doctrines


 


is
essential to understand warfare in not only one's own medium but in the other


 


mediums
as well. There is no room for any dysfunctional interservice squabbling when


 


the
shooting starts.


 


      Service components should be allowed to
fight the way they are organized and


 


trained.
At the same time, services must tailor their organization and training to the
way


 


they
will fight in the future--and that way is joint. Joint exercises must involve a
JFACC,


 


JTCB,
JAOC, and different service component air assets with limited total air
resources


 


to
force the tough calls. Joint targeting, BDA, and ATO planning and dissemination


 


processes,
along with equipment interoperability, must be tested in dynamic exercise


 


environments.
Exercises must be designed to focus on true joint integration of air


 


assets,
not service-sponsored exercises in which other services play mere token or


 


supporting
roles.


 


      "Jointness" should not be
confused with "fair-sharing," that is, the assignment of


 


missions
or targets for parochial reasons at the expense of overall campaign


 


effectiveness.
It is not the Air Force, Army, Marines, and Navy fighting separate air,


 


land,
and sea campaigns. These service forces are each part of air, land, and sea


 


components
fighting the JFC's campaign. They all work for the JFC and a common


 


goal:
to win-and win decisively. True jointness requires a JFACC to make the most


 


effective
use of all air assets available, regardless of their parent service. It is not


 


necessary
to be "purple." Each service component brings its own unique air
power


 


capabilities
(and limitations) to the fight. The diverse capabilities of each service air


 


component
are complementary and can be best employed by the JFACC who


 


synchronizes
joint air actions for maximum overall effect and unity of effort.


 


 


 


NOTES


 


      1 The route package concept, which was
developed in Korea and flourished in


Vietnam,
divided airspace over North Vietnam into seven parcels or "route
packages."


The
Air Force or the Navy was assigned responsibility for targets and operations
within


its
respective packages. It was nothing more than an arrangement to get around


unresolved
doctrinal issues and offered simplicity at the expense of effective


employment
of all air assets available. See General William W. Momyer, Air Power in


Three
Wars (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1987), pp. 95-96; JFACC Primer, 2nd ed.


(Washington
DC: Department of the Air Force, February 1994), p. 5; James A.


Winnefeld
and Dana J. Johnson, Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity of Command


and
Control, 1942-1991 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993), pp. 156-160. In


some
circumstances, such as single strikes or smaller scale operations, geographic


separation
may be useful in preventing mutual interference and simplifying planning.


At
that time, lack of sophisticated communications and computer systems prohibited


the
kind of close coordination that is possible today.


      2 Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS),
Vol. I, Part II, Command and Control


(Washington,
DC: GPO, 1993), pp. 58, 62, 217.


      3 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Title
V Final Report to Congress, April 1992,


p.
101.


      4 Les Aspin and William Dickinson,
Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the


Persian
Gulf War (Washington, DC: Brassey's (US), Inc., 1992), p. 1, 8, 10; Conduct


of
the Persian Gulf War, pp. 101, 103,179; James P. Coyne, Airpower in the Gulf


(Arlington,
VA: Air Force Association, 1992), p. 155; Charles A. Horner, General.,


USAF
(ret), "The Air Campaign," Military Review, September 1991, p. 26;
Thomas A.


Keaney
and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report


(Washington,
DC: GPO, 1993), pp. 161, 240.


      5 AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of
the United States Air Force, Vol. I.,


March
1992, pp. 3, 7, 17-18.


      6 According to Joint Pub 0-2, Unified
Action Armed Forces (UNMF), 11 August


1994,
operational control (OPCON) is "authority to perform those functions of
command


over
subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces,


assigning
tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to


accomplish
the mission." It provides "full authority to organize commands and
forces


and
to employ those forces as the commander...considers necessary." Tactical
control


(TACON)
is "command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or


military
capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to detailed
and,


usually,
local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to


accomplish
missions or tasks assigned."


      7
Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), pp. 111-112.


      8 The Air Force position is that
tactical control is the appropriate level of JFACC


authority
to conduct joint air operations. See JFACC Primer, p. 10.


       9 Keaney and. Cohen, p. 146; Winnefeld
and Johnson, Joint Air Operations, pp.


125-126;
James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson, "Unity of Control: Joint Air


Operations
in the Gulf," Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1993, p. 98.


      10 According to Joint Pub 1-02, DoD
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,


apportionment
is the JFC's "determination and assignment of the total expected effort


by
percentage and/or priority that should be devoted to various air operations
and/or


geographic
areas for a given period of time." This differs from allocation which
involves


assigning
actual sorties by mission and type aircraft based on the JFC's apportionment


guidance.


      11 Numerous examples exist. The F-15C
currently performs only an air-to-air


role
and the A-10 is strictly a ground attack aircraft to name just two. Many
aircraft are


best
utilized in only certain roles. For example, the F-117 is best suited for
strategic


attack
and the AV-8B for a direct support role.


      12 AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of
the United States Air Force, Vol. II, pp.


119-120;
John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington


DC:
National Defense University Press, 1988), p. 161; Jerome V. Martin, Victory
From


Above:
Air Power Theory and the Conduct of Operations Desert Shield and Desert


Storm
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.: Air University Press, 1994), p.8.


      13 Momyer, pp. 39-41. The Air Force has
never forgotten this hard lesson.


      14 Aspin, pp. 9-10; Rick Atkison,
Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War


(Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1993), p. 222; Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Irac:
AirPower in


the
Gulf War (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), pp. 2O6-209;
Richard B.


Lewis,
"JFACC: Problems Associated With Battlefield Preparation in Desert Storm,"
Airpower


Journal,
Spring 1994, pp. 16, 19; Dwight R. Motz, "JFACC: The Joint Air Control
'Cold War'


Continues,"
Marine Corps Gazette, January 1993, p. 70; Winnefeld and Johnson, Joint Air


Operations,
pp. 192, 194.


      15 GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and
Control, pp. 63, 171.


      16 Stephen W. Dade, "Adventures in
Targeting," Marine Corps Gazette, June


1992,


pp.
34-35; John W. Schmidt and Clinton L. Williams, "Disjointed or Joint
Targeting?,"


Marine
Corps Gazette, September 1992, p. 67-8; Triumph without Victory: The


Unreported
History of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Times Books, 1992), pp. 267-


268.


      17 GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and
Control, pp. 57-58.


      18 GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and
Control, p. 58; Triumph without


Victory,
p.268;   Winnefeld and Johnson, pp. 125,
136, 192, 194.


      19 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p.
94.


      20 Rick Atkison, Crusade: The Untold
Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston:


Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1993), p. 221; Lewis, pp. 8, 20; Triumph without Victory, pp.


265-267.
Schwarzkopf directed Horner to begin the Phase III well inside of two weeks


into
the air campaign.


      21 Atkison, pp. 105-106; GWAPS, Vol. 1,
Part II, Command and Control, p. 60;


Lewis,
p. 7.


      22 GWAPS, Vol. 1, Part II, Command and
Control, pp. 59-60.


      23 General Charles A. Horner interview,
27 Dec 1993.


      24 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p.
101; Lewis, p. 8.


      25 Reaching Globally, Reaching
Powerfully: The United States Air Force in the


Gulf
War (Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, September 1991), p. 41.


      26 Ibid., pp. 40, 42.


      27 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp.
90-91, 94, 140; GWAPS, Vol. I, Part I,


Planning,
p. 170; Hallion, p. 209; Lewis, pp. 12,19; Reaching Globally, p 40.


Historical
evidence shows that units are rendered combat ineffective after suffering


attrition
levels of 20 to 50 percent. Schwarzkopf's combat analysis team concluded


that
50% attrition was necessary as a precondition for a coalition ground offensive
to


succeed.
According to Lewis, corps commanders were unaware of Schwarzkopf's


guidance
until after the war, apparently due to some sort of communications disconnect


between
ARCENT and the commanders.


      28 According to Carl von Clausewitz, a
center of gravity is "...the hub of all power


and
movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our


energies
should be directed." Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael


Howard
and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 595-


96;
GWAPS, Vol. I, Part I, Planning, p 172; Keaney and Cohen, pp. 152-153.


      29 Lewis, pp. 13,19.


      30 Keaney and Cohen, pp. 152-153, 155;
Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, p. 110.


      31 Atkison, p. 219; Lewis, p. 17. Nominated
targets were to be plotted to within


100
meters on the map and then validated just hours before an air strike. Of an


average
110 targets nominated daily, only a few dozen actually were designated for


attack
in the ATO.


      32 Atkison, p. 222.


      33 Atkison, p. 219; Michael Leurs,
"Joint Doctrine: New Pubs, Old


Controversies,"
Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1994, p. 112; Lewis, pp. 18, 21. To


be
a suitable target for air, among other things, it must be readily identifiable
from


altitude
and vulnerable to aircraft-delivered munitions. An example of an unsuitable


target
would be infantry dispersed and dug in over a large area.


      34 Hallion, p. 208; Lewis, pp. 10-13.
Kills on tanks, APCs, and artillery pieces


were
counted in determining attrition levels. Col. Lewis, a member of the JFACC's


staff,
gives an excellent account of specific details surrounding the BDA confusion


during
Desert Storm.


      35 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p.
113; Keaney and Cohen, p. 142; Lewis,


p.
10-13; Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, p. 149-150. ARCENT never revised its


initial
figures based on its revised "discounted" criteria however.


       36 The MAP contained TOT, mission
number, the basic encyclopedia number


(BEN)-a
reference to the DIA's automated installation file identifier, target category


code,
target description, and number and type aircraft tasked to conduct the attack.


Some
delays led to unnecessary restrikes. See GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and


Control
p. 299.


       37 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp.
175-176, 343; Norman Friedman,


Desert
Victory: The War for Kuwait (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p.


186;
Larry Grundhauser, et al., "The Future of BDA," Concepts in Airpower
for the


Campaign
Planner (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1993), pp. 89-91;


GWAPS,
Vol. I, Part II, Command and Control, p. 304; Keaney and Cohen, p. 142.


Under
ideal circumstances, overhead imagery of a single target took 18 hours to be


processed
and disseminated by DIA in Washington to Riyadh for assessment. When


multiplied
by approximately 2,000 sorties each day, the system was overwhelmed.


      38 Atkison, p. 236; Conduct of the
Persian Gulf War, pp. 138, 175-176, 343-344;


Coyne,
p. 159; Keaney and Cohen, p. 140-142; Lewis, p. 13; Grundhauser, et al., p.


99.
Triumph without Victory, p. 276. The Iraqis resorted to burying their tanks and


artillery
pieces in sand, sandbagging turrets, and wrapping gun barrels with rags which


made
it both harder for aircraft to achieve kills and to assess damage. Analysts had
a


hard
time assessing target destruction unless it was very apparent such as a tank
turret


blown
off. BDA was also hampered by poor weather which often obscured some


targets
and prevented reconnaissance imagery. Satellites could only cover around 20


percent
of the targets hit.


      39 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp.
103,176.


      40 GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and
Control, p. 52.


      41 Friedman, p. 174.


      42 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp.
103-105, 552, 574; Friedman, pp. 174-


175;
GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and Control, pp. 51, 55; Royal N. Moore, Lt


Gen.,
USMC, "Marine Air: There When Needed," Proceedings, November 1991, p.
63;


Motz,
pp. 70-71; Winnefeld and Johnson, Joint Air Operations, p. 110; Winnefeld,


Niblack,
and Johnson, p. 111. Gen. Moore referred to gaming the ATO process by


scheduling
additional sorties which he canceled if not needed because he felt that the


ATO
process did not respond well "to a quick-action battlefield." The
NAVCENT staff


created
a "Fleet Defense" sortie category to give them the flexibility to
strike targets


important
to the Navy but not serviced by the normal targeting process.


      43 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p.
104-105; Keaney and Cohen, p. 151;


Hallion,
p. 256. The Contingency Tactical Air Control Automated Planning System


(CTAPS)
is an ongoing joint program to address problems associated with


disseminating
a joint ATO. The Navy is installing CAFMS on its carriers in the


meantime.


      44 GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and Control,
pp. 220-227, 231-235. A


number
of these ATO changes were due to bad weather (around 100 on several days).


Weather
was so bad that four out of every ten sorties through late January were


canceled.


      45 GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and
Control, p. 231; Keaney and Cohen,


p.
151.


      46 Aircraft video tape recordings (AVTR)
is not a panacea. It does not


necessarily
permit reliable BDA either because some products, such as A-10 and F-16


video,
show the target at weapons release but not up to impact like F-15E or F-117


products
do. The use of cockpit video imagery for higher headquarters BDA review in


currently
a USAF Air Combat Command special interest item.


      47 Horner placed certain Air Force
officers that he personally knew in those key


positions
where he felt, as JFACC, he needed individuals in whom he could place


special
trust. The Air Force was comfortable with the Air Force-dominated staff


supplemented
by liaison officers from the other services, and the other services did not


initially
seem eager to provide manning. See GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and


Control,
p. 67; Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, p. 106-107.


      48 Authors Winnefeld and Johnson
recommend a standing JFACC cadre staff of


joint
membership/composition that can be rapidly expanded for large-scale, continuous


combat
operations. See Joint Air Operations, p. 135 and "Unity of Control: Joint
Air


Operations
in the Gulf," Joint Forces Quarterly, p. 99.


      49 Winnefeld and Johnson, Joint Air
Operations, p. 137.


      50 Joint Pubs 3-0, 3-01.2, and 3-04 set
forth criteria for JFACC selection.


      51 According to Lt Gen. Walter E.
Boomer, I MEF Commander, General Horner


adhered
to the Omnibus Agreement and made no attempt to assume operational


control
of Marine air. In return, the Marine Corps provided sorties for JFACC tasking
as


promised.
See "Special Trust and Confidence Among the Trail-Breakers,"


Proceedings,
November 1991, p. 50; GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and Control,


pp.
57, 73; Martin, p. 38; Moore, p. 64; Winnefeld and Johnson, Joint Air
Operations,


p.
147; Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, p. 110.


      52 Hallion, p. 254.


      53 Momyer, p. 107-108.


      54 Triumph without Victory, p. 267.


      55 Christopher Bowie, et al., The New
Calculus: Analyzing Airpower's Changing


Role
in Joint Theater Campaigns (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), p. 44; Winnefeld,


Niblack
and Johnson, p. 60.


      56 AFM 1-1, Vol. II, p. 166.


      57 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp.
xxi; Friedman p. 267. Air power was


(and
is) a necessary ingredient for victory, just not the only ingredient. Air power


contributed
in an extraordinary way to the coalition victory in Desert Storm, but maritime


and
ground operations also played essential roles as well.


      58 Horner interview, 27 Dec 1993. Some
Air Force planners, especially in


Checkmate,
believed that air power could single-handedly win the war through an


intense
strategic bombing campaign. The initial plan named "Instant Thunder"
focused


heavily
on strategic targets almost to the exclusion of Iraqi forces in Kuwait. See


Friedman,
p. 160,171; Triumph Without Victory, p. 269-274.


      59 James Blackwell, Michael J. Mazarr,
and Don M. Snider, The Gulf War:


Military
Lessons Learned (Washington DC: The Center for Strategic Studies, 1991),


pp.
20-21.


      60 The 1986 Omnibus Agreement specifies
that the MAGTF commander will


retain
operational control over his organic air assets but will make sorties available
to


the
JFACC for air defense, long-range interdiction, and reconnaissance. These are
not


considered
"excess" sorties. In addition, he will make available those sorties
in excess


of
MAGTF direct support requirements. The JFC still retains the prerogative to


reapportion
any MAGTF air assets he deems necessary to accomplish the overall


mission.


      61 Winnefeld and Johnson, Joint Air
Operations, p. 10.


      62 The 16 December 1990 CINCCENT
Operations Order for Operation Desert


Storm
contained a statement that the MAGTF commander will retain OPCON of his


organic
air assets as the Omnibus Agreement requires. The order gave Horner the


authority
to require air units to consult in planning and execution of interdiction


operations,
but it did not give him the authority to compel agreement if they differed.


Such
differences were to be referred to USCINCCENT. Ambiguity of the operations


order
did little to reconcile the different views of the Air Force and the Marines
over the


JFACC's
authority. See GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and Control, pp. 42, 50-51;


Winnefeld,
Niblack, and Johnson, Joint Air Operations, p. 94.


      63 GWAPS, VoI. I, Part II, Command and
Control, p. 42; Moore, p. 64;


Winnefeld
and Johnson, Joint Air Operations, p. 109.


      64 Winnefeld and Johnson, Joint Air
Operations, pp. 119-120; JFACC Primer, p. 7.


      65 Fedorchak, Scott A., "Close Air
Support: Repeating the Past Again?,"


Airpower
Journal, Spring 1994, p. 30.


      66 Coyne, , p. 155; Moore. p. 64;
Winnefeld and Johnson, Joint Air Operations,


p.
119. An example of a tradeoff was USAF A-10s for CAS in exchange for Marine


F/A-18s
for deep strike missions that the A-10 is unsuited for.


      67 Horner interview, 27 Dec 1993.


      68 James Blackwell, Thunder in the
Desert: The Strategy and Tactics of the


Persian
Gulf War (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), pp. 114-119, 129-131.


      69 The total programmed buy of ATACMS is
around 2000. Army attack


helicopters
can provide CAS in some circumstances.


      70 In anticipation of the ground
commanders' requirements for CAS, Horner


developed
the "Push CAS" concept because he did not want aircraft sitting on
the


ground
waiting for a call from attacking Army units. CAS aircraft would fly to a stack
or


holding
point at regular intervals (as frequently as 7 minutes) to await tasking. If no


CAS
was needed at the moment, they were sent deeper in the KTO to kill boxes.


      71 Deep operations are those directed
against enemy targets beyond the close


battle
area. Interdiction is an important facet of deep operations designed to
destroy,


delay,
or disrupt enemy forces or sustainment before it can be employed against


friendly
forces. Improvements to the ATACMS will extend range out to around 400 km.


      72 Ten ATACMS were fired against targets
in Kuwait during the first night of the


war
as part of the joint defense suppression effort. A total of 33 ATACMS were
fired in


Desert
Storm with great effectiveness.


      73 JFACC Primer, p. 34; Keaney and
Cohen, p. 157.


      74 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p.
89, George Bush, 29 May 1991. The


impact
of air power can be overstated. Desert Storm was an ideal environment for the


asymmetric
application of air power against Iraqi ground forces despite the worst


weather
in 40 years. The open desert and set-piece nature made the Iraqi forces


extremely
vulnerable to air attack, and the aircraft themselves possessed the


technology
to conduct precision strikes. Iraq's inability or unwillingness to aggressively


act
further compounded their predicament. Still, air power did ground Iraq's air
force


(the
sixth largest in the world), destroy over 400 aircraft, overwhelm Iraq's air
defense


system,
and shatter Iraqi ground forces' confidence. See "Air Force Performance in


Desert
Storm," White Paper, April 1991, p. 2.


      75 Martin, p. 95.


      76 Hallion, pp. 253-4.


      77 Martin, p. 63.


      78 Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, p.
265.


 


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