JFACC:
A Reattack: The Joint Force Air Component Commander And Joint
Air
Operations
CSC
1995
SUBJECT
AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Title:
JFACC: A Reattack, The Joint Force Air Component Commander and Joint Air
Operations
Author:
Major James J. Drew, USAF
Thesis:
Centralized control of joint air by a single air commander, the JFACC, is
essential
to ensure unity of the joint air effort and realize the full impact of theater
air
power.
Background:
The idea of a single air commander is not new but dates back to World
War
II. The recent idea of a joint force air component commander (JFACC) in charge
of
joint air operations got its first real test in Operation Desert Storm-and it
worked.
The
centralized control of joint air under a single air boss using a coordinated
air
tasking
order (ATO) was a major factor behind the dramatic success of the air
campaign.
Although there is a general consensus on the need for a JFACC, service
views,
reinforced by dissimilar service doctrine, differ considerably on how
centralized
control
of joint air is best achieved. Specifically, there is still considerable debate
over
a
number of issues which include: the JFACC as a commander and the apportionment
of
joint air assets, the JFACC's role in the targeting process, his relationship
with the
Joint
Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB), JFACC control of deep attack assets, and
composition
of the JFACC's staff. This paper examines each of these areas in light of
our
recent experience in Desert Storm and proposes solutions to some past problems
which
can alleviate similar difficulties in the future. It also examines the distinct
perspectives
of the soldier and the airman, as well as different (and sometimes
conflicting)
service doctrinal views, which contribute to the lingering controversies over
the
concept of a JFACC.
Recommendation:
Joint doctrine on the role and authority of the JFACC must be more
explicit.
Service doctrines need to evolve to fully integrate the new paradigm of the
JFACC
who can best employ joint air power to achieve unity of effort and maximum
effect.
The air targeting and ATO processes must be streamlined to improve their
effectiveness,
and the JTCB must assume a more conspicuous role in integrating the
targeting
recommendations of ground commanders with those of the JFACC. The
JFACC's
staff should be composed of a more equitable representation of each service
component
Finally, the control of deep attack assets must be reexamined with the
JFACC's
need to synchronize the theater deep attack effort in mind.
CONTENTS
Page
Executive
Summary ii
Contents
iii
List
of Figures iv
Introduction
1
Historical
Perspective 2
The
JFACC Role: Command, Control, or Coordinate? 3
The
JFACC and Apportionment 5
The
JFACC and Targeting 7
The
JFACC and the ATO 16
The
JFACC and the JTCB 20
The
JFACC and His Staff 24
The
JFACC and Doctrinal Difficulties 26
The
JFACC and Deep Attack 32
Conclusion
34
End
Notes 38
Bibliography
44
LIST OF
FIGURES
Page
Figure
1: Strategic Attack and Battlefield
Preparation Sorties 12
Figure
2: The ATO Cycle 17
Figure
3: JTCB Under DJFC 23
Figure
4: JTCB Under JFACC 23
JFACC: A REATTACK
The Joint Force Air Component Commander
and Joint Air Operations
Joint force operations are here to stay,
and in most multi-service operations,
there
will probably be a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) to ensure
unity
of effort among service aviation components. Yet the centralized command and
control
of joint air operations under a JFACC still remains a controversial issue among
services.
Different views abound on the JFACC's role as a commander or coordinator
that
are reinforced by dissimilar service doctrines and distinct warfighting
philosophies.
In
particular, the JFACC's role in the targeting process and establishing target
priorities
continued
to be an area of ongoing debate. Service doctrines clash on how centralized
control
of theater air assets is best accomplished. This paper's central theme is that
centralized
control of joint air by a single air commander, the JFACC, is essential to
ensure
the unity of the joint air effort and realize the full impact of air power. To
that
end,
lingering controversies over the JFACC as a commander, apportionment of air,
the
JFACC's
role in the targeting process and with the Joint Targeting Coordination Board
(JTCB),
control of deep attack assets, the JFACC's staff, and conflicting service
doctrines
must be settled. The JFACC experience in Operation Desert Storm provides
a
rich basis for examining each of these issues as they emerged then and as they
stand
now. These remaining issues that continue to hinder unity of the air effort
under
a
JFACC in joint operations need to be resolved. In short, it is time to put the
joint" into
JFACC.
Historical Perspective
The idea of a single air commander goes
way back to World War II. Since then,
the
U.S. military has experienced a history of fragmented air operations. The
Solomons
Campaign was the first true joint air operation in U.S. history with a single
airman
commanding all the land-based aircraft of Marines, Army Air Force, and Navy
components.
During the course of the campaign, officers from the Marine Corps, Navy,
and
Army Air Force each served as the air commander. Perhaps it was limited air
assets
and a situation in which the certainty of winning was actually in question, but
not
until
the Gulf War has the same degree of unity of effort in the planning and
execution
of
joint air operations again been displayed. In Korea, coordination control was
the
byword
where service air components operated practically autonomously. The Navy
adamantly
insisted on independent operations based on geographic deconfliction while
the
Air Force attempted to gain operational control over naval air. In Vietnam, the
laissez-faire
control of air power continued with essentially five separate air wars taking
place
along with the division of airspace over North Vietnam between the Air Force
and
Navy
into a "route package' system which proved very inadequate.1 The Commander
in
Chief of Pacific Command ran the air war over North Vietnam while the
Commander,
U.S.
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV) controlled the air war in
the
South and Cambodia. A bitter feud between the Air Force and the Marines erupted
over
control of Marine air. Targeting was micro-managed by Washington, and even the
Air
Force would not place its Strategic Air Command B-52 bombers under the control
of
its
own 7th Air Force commander. All of this led to an unsuccessful attempt by
COMUSMACV
to tighten control in 1968 under a single air manager for Vietnam.
In contrast with the fragmented approach
to the air war in Vietnam, the
Commander
in Chief, Central Command (ClNCCENTCOM), General H. Norman
Schwarzkopf,
established centralized control of theater fixed-wing air operations under
a
JFACC, Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, from the very beginning.
Schwarzkopf
was a firm believer in the JFACC concept and strongly supported the
notion
that the JFACC was solely responsible for planning the air campaign. In
prosecuting
the air campaign, Schwarzkopf gave Homer his full support saying,
"There's
only going to be one guy in charge of the air: Horner... If you want to fight
your
interservice battles, do it after the war."2 Operation Desert Storm was the first
practical
test of the JFACC idea in a major military conflict. General Horner's challenge
involved
orchestrating the air power capabilities of 14 separate national or service
component
with those of 10 coalition forces.3 Although not without some growing
pains,
the dramatic results of the air campaign demonstrated that the JFACC concept
works.
Centralized control of air power contributed to the dramatic success of the 43
day
air campaign. Operating under a single air boss and a single, coordinated air
tasking
order (ATO) resulted in the efficient, coherent application of air power and
significantly
lessened the possibility of fratricide among coalition aircraft.4
The JFACC Role: Command, Control, or
Coordinate?
Despite disagreement over some specific
issues, there is a general consensus
on
the need for a JFACC in large joint air operations. Unity of effort, achieved
through
centralized
control of joint air assets through a JFACC, is the most decisive way to
employ
theater air power. Centralized control allows the joint force commander (JFC)
to
focus his air power on enemy targets that best support his theater strategy and
use
air
power's inherent flexibility and speed to effectively respond to changes in the
combat
situation.5 It allows the JFC to employ
air power at the time and place in which
it
will have the greatest impact. How best to achieve this unity of effort and
what
constitutes
centralized control are key issues in the JFACC debate.
Does the JFACC command, control, or
coordinate? The simple answer is yes.
According
to Joint Pub 3-0, the JFACC derives his authority from the JFC who
establishes
the JFACC's specific responsibilities and command authority. The JFACC's
four
chief responsibilities are to plan, coordinate, allocate, and task in executing
the air
portion
of the JFC's campaign strategy. Typically, the JFACC exercises operational
control
(OPCON) over assigned and attached forces as a functional component
commander
and tactical control (TACON) over forces made available by other
components
for tasking.6 Ultimately, the JFC
defines the JFACC's command authority.
To
effectively orchestrate the joint air operation, the JFACC must command his
assigned
forces, control or task other air assets via TACON, and coordinate between
service
components in setting targeting priorities and allocating actual sorties.
Coordinating authority defines a
consultative relationship between commanders.
It
usually applies more to planning activities and does not involve authority to
task. A
coordinator
can only ask. The JFACC does more. Since the JFACC is normally
designated
a supported commander for the JFC's air effort, he exercises tactical control
which
is the authority to "direct and control designated forces," in other
words, to task.7
The
single ATO is the JFACC's key instrument for exercising centralized control of
the
joint
air effort. The point is that operational control of all joint air assets is
not
necessarily
essential for the JFACC to run the air war. The desired unity of effort can
be
achieved through tactical control.8 Coordination alone falls short. In Desert
Storm,
the
JFACC did not actually command (exercise OPCON of) Navy or Marine air units.
These
units reported to their respective service component commanders. However,
General
Horner exercised tactical control through the ATO by tasking these forces to
fly
missions
based on the CINC's apportionment guidance.9
The JFACC and Apportionment
The JFC is ultimately responsible for
running the air war and apportions joint air
assets
by percentage or weight of effort based on his priorities.10 The JFACC makes
recommendations
on apportionment, usually based on the anticipated sortie rates of air
resources
available in-theater, for the JFC's apportionment decision. Based on the
JFC's
apportionment guidance, the JFACC then allocates sorties through the ATO.
The
focus should really be on weight of effort in expressing JFC apportionment
guidance.
Apportionment simply by percentages is undesirable because it limits the
JFACC's
flexibility to best allocate sorties and may not result in optimum use of the
air
assets
involved. Here is why: The actual numbers, types, and unique capabilities of
the
aircraft available in-theater can affect the percentage figures since some
aircraft
only
perform certain roles (or they perform certain roles only so well).11 For
example, if
there
are 30 F-15Cs out of a total of 100 aircraft, this 30 percent of theater air
will be
allocated
to the air superiority (anti-air warfare) mission because that is what F-15Cs
do--and
all they do. Another equally unsatisfactory approach is to divide air assets in
shares
to support each ground commander; in other words, the JFACC gives each
corps
commander a certain number of daily sorties. However, concentration of air
power
is a central principle of air warfare.12 Concentration allows the theater
commander
to focus aerial firepower on the most important targets at the most
important
time. Merely dividing air assets among ground commanders dilutes the
effectiveness
of air power. This lesson was aptly demonstrated in the early fighting in
the
North African campaign of World War II when aircraft were parceled out to Army
corps.
As a result, there was no unity of effort for Allied air, no concerted effort
to
achieve
air superiority, and air losses were prohibitively high as German air
devastated
small
formations of Allied aircraft trying to support their ground units.13
In addition, the number of sorties flown
is not what really matters. What counts
is
the type of aircraft and ordnance mix applied against each particular target
Different
types
of targets require different aircraft and weapon combinations in varying
numbers
to
achieve an optimum probability of kill. The JFC should ideally provide his
guidance
on
relative air priorities through weights of effort and leave the actual
determination of
how
many aircraft are required to fulfill these priorities to his JFACC planning
experts.
Weight
of effort is best expressed in terms of emphasis within the mission categories
of
strategic
attack, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), offensive counter air
(OCA),
defensive counter air (DCA), close air support (CAS), and air interdiction
(INT).
Weight
of effort will usually vary with the particular phase of the JFC's theater
campaign.
Early in a campaign, gaining air superiority through OCA and SEAD, along
with
attacking key strategic targets such as command and control facilities, are
usually
top
priorities. Once control of the air is assured, other missions can be flown
unhampered
by any significant enemy counterair threat. As a campaign progresses
further,
certain aircraft such as F-16s may shift from SEAD to CAS or INT. With major
ground
operations underway, priorities naturally shift to direct support of engaged
ground
forces along with interdiction of rear echelon enemy forces. Certainly the
requirement
for CAS is directly related to the progress of the ground operation.
However,
some level of strategic attack may still be necessary to prevent the enemy
from
reconstituting previously destroyed warmaking capabilities.
The JFACC and Targeting:
The targeting process-the
identification, selection, and prioritization of enemy
targets
for attack-is a significant area of friction between components and centers on
how
target priorities are determined. The JFACC must carry out the JFC's
apportionment
guidance by matching available air assets against the target list The
issue
here is the relative priority of the targets nominated by ground commanders
within
their
respective areas of operation (AO) vis-a-vis strategic or theater targets
identified
by
the JFC and how the JFACC allocates air assets to each.
The disagreement on target priorities
stems in part from different basic
perspectives
of the airman and the soldier. The JFACC has a theater-wide view of the
battlefield-and
seeks to employ air power in line with the JFC's priorities for maximum
overall
effect. As an airman, this theater-wide view comes naturally because of the
range,
speed, and expanse of his medium. The ground commander is concerned
about
his AO-and rightly so. As a soldier, he naturally focuses on the immediate and
near-term
battle within his geographic area, and he sees the enemy forces immediately
opposite
him as the most important targets to win his battle. Surface forces typically
depend
on geographic division of the theater for effective control, and the ground
commander's
primary concern is to destroy the enemy within his battlespace with as
much
firepower as he can obtain. The airman, unconstrained by geography in his
medium,
favors direct attacks on enemy strategic targets as an expedient means to win
the
war.
These two very different perspectives
often clash, and Desert Storm was
no
exception. Both the Army's VII Corps and the Marines' I MEF commanders
became
concerned about emphasis on the strategic air campaign at the
expense
of battlefield preparation.14 Prior to Desert Storm, joint targeting
procedures
for component commanders and the JFACC were not clearly
established.
General Schwarzkopf never established a CINC-level joint
targeting
coordination board (JTCB). Technically, a JTCB did exist, but its
importance
or authority in the overall targeting process is questionable since it
was
not comprised of any flag officers or even full colonels.15 The absence of a
true
high-level JTCB meant that the Army corps and division commanders did
not
have a forum to express their concerns and views about targeting to the
CINC
and the JFACC. A targeting process emerged that was sponsored by the
JFACC
who hosted a daily joint targeting meeting. However, the JFACC's
Guidance-Apportionment-Targeting
(GAT) cell, also known as the "Black Hole",
assumed
many functions normally performed by a JTCB. It exercised the
greatest
influence on the targeting process since it controlled the Master Target
List
and MAP. Although it had some planners from other services who could
provide
some oversight of the process, the vast majority were Air Force officers.
This
led to allegations that the JFACC-led targeting process lacked the
necessary
balance between the Air Force's strategic view and Army and Marine
Corps
concerns of shaping the immediate battlefield. Ground commanders felt
that
the air effort was weighted too heavily on strategic targets instead of such
targets
as artillery on the front lines in Kuwait.16 The CENTCOM J-3 never
became
involved to level the playing field, and there was no effective joint
campaign
oversight by the CENTCOM staff who primarily ran CENTCOM's
operations
center.
A major area of debate was (and still
is) over who should integrate the
target
lists of various components, the JFACC staff or a theoretically more
objective
JFC-level JTCB. On 31 January with the ground offensive
approaching,
Schwarzkopf told Horner:
Target development and nomination during
the early phases of the
campaign were clearly led by the...
[JFACC]. As we move into
battlefield preparation, maneuver
commander input into the target
selection process becomes even more
important. Therefore, the
opportunity for corps and other
subordinate commanders to plan for and
receive air sorties to fly against
targets of their choosing must increase.17
Because
of ground commander concerns that battlefield preparation was not receiving
enough
emphasis, General Schwarzkopf charged the Deputy ClNC (DCINC),
Lieutenant
General Calvin Waller, with the responsibility for reviewing targets
nominated
by ground commanders and arbitrating disputes over the corresponding
apportionment
of air.18 General Waller, along with General Horner, developed initial
sortie
allocation recommendations 72 hours prior to ATO execution, reviewed these
with
ground commanders, and made a final proposal to Schwarzkopf 48 hours prior to
ATO
execution.
A master target list, initially
developed before the war by the Air Staff's
Checkmate
division and the Navy's Strike Projection Evaluation and Antiair Research
(SPEAR)
team, eventually grew from 300 to over 700 targets and was a comprehensive
description
of strategic targets in Iraq.19 Targets submitted by ground commanders for
battlefield
preparation in Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) were integrated into a
separate
DCINC target list. The reason for two distinct target lists may be that the
master
target
list was developed during the early stages of Desert Shield by Checkmate as
part
of
its air-only option named Instant Thunder. The list was further refined by the
Black
Hole
planning cell as the air campaign plan developed into its four stage form. The
KTO
planning
cell was separate from the Black Hole team during this process. The two
planning
cells were finally merged to form the Guidance-Apportionment-Targeting cell
just
before Desert Storm. The DCINC consolidated and prioritized corps commander
targets
into a single KTO target list which went to the JFACC who then allocated
sorties
against
it.
JFACC planners envisioned the air
campaign as a phased application of air
power.
The first phase would destroy Iraqi's air defense system, gain air superiority,
attack
strategic Iraqi targets such as its command and control network, and strike key
warfighting
industries and infrastructure such as Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical
production
facilities. Next, the campaign featured a short second phase to destroy air
defenses
in the KTO followed by a third phase which focused on preparing the
battlefield
for the coalition ground campaign in Kuwait. The last phase would provide
air
support for the ground offensive. In reality, the strategic attack,
interdiction, and
battlefield
preparation phases all merged into a single, enormous air campaign which
soon
brought different service views on the best ways to allocate air power to the
forefront.
The Air Force generally emphasized attacking strategic Iraqi targets, the
Army
and Marines stressed targeting front-line Iraqi forces in Kuwait, and the Navy
emphasized
fleet defense targets. Although part of the disagreement had to do with
different
views on what wins wars, certainly some of it also had to do with the timetable
of
the individual phases. The Air Force was reluctant to shift from strategic
attack to
battlefield
preparation so early in the air campaign.20
The best way to allocate air power is
the JFC's way. During Desert Storm,
General
Schwarzkopf, was given a nightly briefing on the next day's ATO that included
strategic
targets to be hit and number of sorties by type of aircraft allocated to
battlefield
preparation
in Kuwait. He took an active role in determining the air targeting decisions in
the
KTO and often made adjustments that he deemed appropriate.21 Even though the
DCINC's
JTCB did not review target nominations generated by the GAT, General
Schwarzkopf
and General Horner knew of, and agreed with, the target selections.
Target
priorities were discussed at the CINC's daily 1900 target selection briefing,
and
Army
and Marine representatives were present at these briefings. During one
briefing,
ground
commanders complained about not enough attacks on front-line Iraqi forces in
the
KTO. Horner replied that they misunderstood the best way to use air power.
Schwarzkopf
ended it by saying, "Guys, it's all mine, and I will put it where it needs
to be
put."22
At the 1900 meetings, General Horner and Brigadier General Buster Glosson
would
brief General Schwarzkopf on the ATO for two days in the future. Horner
recounts:
"[Schwarzkopf] would say, 'No, no, no, here is what I want done... Put 200
sorties
on this one [Iraqi division], and 30 sorties on that one' and stuff like that.
So that
is
what we did. Now that frustrated the Army greatly because they felt nobody was
listening
to them. Well, the trouble was they weren't in charge. They wanted to be in
charge,
and they weren't in charge. Schwarzkopf was in charge."23
Click
here to view image
Figure
1: Strategic Attack and Battlefield Preparation Sorties (Source: A League of
Airmen)
Despite dissent to the contrary, the
battlefield was well-prepared for the ground
offensive
by G-day. After just seven days into the air campaign, the majority of sorties
were
allocated to battlefield preparation, and from day thirteen through the
coalition
ground
offensive, over 80 percent of ATO sorties were for battlefield preparation (see
Figure
1).24 Battlefield preparation sorties flown in Kuwait exceeded 35,000 including
5,600
against the Republican Guard.25
Repeated
air attacks reduced the military effectiveness of Iraqi front-line units along
the
Kuwait-Saudi
border to less than 50 percent, less than 70 percent for second echelon
units,
and less than 80 percent for (primarily) Republican Guard forces along the
Iraq-
Kuwait
border near Basrah. A sign in a JFACC planning cell read: "We are not
'preparing
the battlefield,' we are destroying it"26
Apparently unknown to corps commanders,
the CINC had directed the JFACC,
General
Horner, not to bomb Iraqi units that were below 50 percent strength.27 General
Schwarzkopf's
focus of effort was to reduce Republican Guard strength which he saw
as
the Iraqi center of gravity.28 Since the Guard units were deployed in reserve
behind
front-line
regular Iraqi divisions facing coalition ground forces, this decision probably
reinforced
ground commanders' concerns that they were not being allocated enough air
against
the front-line forces facing them. Schwarzkopf had also directed the JFACC
staff
not to attack front-line artillery until just before G-day to prevent it from
being
replaced.
In addition, the CINC limited attacks on Iraqi forces in the west so as not to
tip
off the Iraqis to the coalition's "left hooks attack plan.29 This CINC
guidance largely
determined
the way the JFACC allocated sorties against corps commander targets.
The
JFC has the lead role in theater-level targeting, but this role is not well
defined in
current
joint doctrine. This may be at the root of the confusion in Desert Storm.
Ground
commanders were dissatisfied with the JFACC targeting process for not being
responsive
to their target nominations, but at the same time, the JFACC's targeting
conformed
to the CINC's priorities and supported his deception plan. Ground
commanders
nominated targets of immediate tactical importance to them while the
JFACC
and CINCCENT took a theater-wide approach. Tension resulted because the
ground
commanders did not understand that the ClNC's preference for striking the
Republican
Guards sometimes outweighed their own preferences for striking front-line
targets.30
After Desert Storm, the Army's VII Corps
complained that the JFACC actually
allocated
sorties against only 15 percent of some 2,000 nominated targets.31 Of the
3,067
total targets nominated by the Army for air attack during the course of the
war, a
little
over one-third were actually hit.32
However, there were problems with many of
targets
the Army submitted. Some nominated targets were outdated with validations
over
a month old. Others could either not be confirmed or had repositioned, had
already
been hit and were awaiting battle damage assessment (BDA) results, or simply
were
not suitable as an air target. Suitable targets that could be revalidated were
normally
targeted although some were not necessarily the Army's higher priority
targets.33
A major shortcoming in the process was a lack of feedback to the ground
commanders
on the status of various targets, not unresponsiveness to ground
commander
targeting requests. The JFACC staff provided no explanation when
unsuitable
targets were dropped from the target list. Some targets within kill boxes
were
attacked, but in those cases, the Army generally had no way of knowing what was
actually
destroyed. In addition, problems with outdated intelligence and limited air
targeting
expertise hampered corps ability to provide suitable air targets. Doctrinally,
for
a JFACC to commit sorties against outdated, mobile, unconfirmed, or otherwise
unsuitable
targets might waste valuable sorties that could strike other validated targets
elsewhere
in-theater. Furthermore, it may result in risking aircrews and aircraft
unnecessarily.
Along with the misunderstanding between
the JFACC and ground commanders,
problems
with timely and accurate BDA greatly complicated the air targeting process in
Desert
Storm. The CINC gave both the Army Component, Central Command (ARCENT)
and
the Marine Corps Component, Central Command (MARCENT) responsibility for
assessing
battle damage within their respective AOs. This decision seems to make
sense;
however, ARCENT and MARCENT each used different criteria to determine BDA.
Initially,
ARCENT used only A-10 mission reports (MISREPs) or confirmation by imagery
intelligence
to determine a tank kill. Other coalition aircraft mission reports were not
counted
until later confirmed by overhead sensors. MARCENT counted MISREPs from
A-10s
and AV-8s.34 At first, MISREPs from F-15Es, F-111Fs, and A-6s were not credited
as
kills despite cockpit video showing targets blowing up. Later, ARCENT changed
its kill
criteria
and credited one-third of A-10 and one-half of F-111F, F-15E, or A-6 claimed
kills
in
their official counts The JFACC staff initially assumed that pilot MISREPs
would be a
primary
means of BDA. Since no common method of determining BDA was agreed upon
by
the JFACC, ARCENT, and MARCENT, all parties had trouble agreeing on when a 50
percent
attrition level was achieved. Without this common reference, ground
commanders
also lacked a reliable basis for assessing JFACC support in their AOs. As
mentioned
earlier, attrition levels determined the focus of the JFACC's targeting efforts
in
the
KTO, and these results remained subject to dispute depending on the criteria
used.
Lack of real-time BDA had a significant
impact on the air targeting process.
The
absence of BDA on targets just hit-or being hit-to a certain extent determined
which
targets in the JFACC's Master Attack Plan (MAP) were scheduled to be attacked-
-and
which were not.36 The BDA process simply could not keep pace with the
enormous
scope and rapid tempo of the air campaign.37 The attrition level confusion
was
compounded by independent (and more conservative) Defense Intelligence
Agency
(DIA) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessments which were
significantly
lower than CENTCOM's own estimates. DIA did not have access to aircraft
imagery
and relied on national-level overhead reconnaissance assets which, designed
primarily
to monitor relatively static strategic areas of interest, could only detect
catastrophic
damage.38 Due to delays in assessing data from overhead sensors,
attrition
figures fluctuated from one day to the next and complicated the JFACC staff's
attempts
to effectively allocate sorties against targets. In addition, the lagging BDA
cycle
affected the ATO development cycle. Target selection and ATO development
were
often complete before BDA results of previous sorties became available.39 The
JFACC's
attack planners were often forced to make their own damage assessments
using
cockpit videotape recordings.
The JFACC and the ATO
The air tasking order is the JFACC's key
tool for ensuring unity of effort in the
air
war, and its development is directly affected by the targeting process. The ATO
is a
two
part document consisting of a main section with mission and target information
and
a
special instructions (SPINS) section containing necessary information on topics
such
as
aircraft deconfliction, radio frequencies, aircraft routing and airspace
control
measures,
search and rescue, and air refueling procedures. The ATO is an Air Force
mechanism
for directing a large-scale air campaign. It allows a JFACC to concentrate
air
strikes involving large numbers of aircraft from different units and different
bases
across
multiple targets in a short period of time. The ATO also enables the JFACC to
selectively
employ platforms best suited to attack particular targets with the most
effective
munitions. Its significance was summarized by General Horner, "Without the
ATO,
you don't have the JFACC. With the ATO, you don't have anything but a
JFACC."40
The ATO concept is in keeping with the Air Force's philosophy of centralized
control
and decentralized execution, but this differs from the Navy and Marine
philosophy
of centralized command and decentralized control using mission-type
orders.
The Navy had never favored an ATO system because of the less predictable
nature
of war at sea or along a coast. The Navy also had reservations about
involvement
in a centrally directed air campaign by a JFACC, but had no alternative to
the
ATO system. It had no similar system for command and control of an air campaign
of
such scope or duration. Both the Navy and the Marines were willing to sacrifice
efficiency
in air operations for a less rigid approach.41 In Desert Storm, the ATO often
exceeded
700 pages and this size, along with some communications interoperability
problems,
caused dissemination delays. As a tasking mechanisms the ATO process
was
frequently criticized as inflexible and too slow to quickly respond as the
fast-
moving
air campaign progressed.42
Click
here to view image
Figure 2: The ATO Cycle (Source: Gulf
War Air Power Survey, Vol. I)
The lengthy 48 hour ATO development
cycle (depicted in Figure 2) was another
factor
in the overall air targeting process. The ClNC's targeting and apportionment
guidance
was passed at the daily 0700 JFACC staff meeting. The MAP for the day two
days
in advance was then created by the GAT cell of the JFACC's staff. Once
approved
by the Director of Campaign Planning at 2000, the GAT targeting cell officers
would
perform weaponeering-determine the specific type and quantity of weapons
required
to achieve the desired damage level given target vulnerability, weapons
effects
and reliability. The MAP information went to the ATO Division in the form of
target
planning worksheets. The ATO division developed a flyable ATO which was
finally
disseminated to units around 1800 the next day for execution beginning at 0500
the
following morning. Coalition land-based forces including the Marines received
the
ATO
by computer via the Computer-Aided Force Management System (CAFMS) to
land-based
units which proved to be cumbersome and time-consuming. The Navy had
no
capability to receive the ATO electronically. Navy communications equipment was
not
compatible with CAFMS so the ATO was flown out to sea from Riyadh by S-3
courier
daily.43 As a result of these difficulties, changes were rarely made to Navy
missions
once the ATO went out.
Numerous changes to the ATO during
Desert Storm, sometimes because of late
BDA,
hindered its timely dissemination. Changes issued to the ATO comprised a
significant
percentage of the total sorties flown. ATO sortie changes, primarily changes
in
timing or target changes, averaged over 500 per day out of around 2,550 average
total
sorties flown each day. In all, approximately 23,000 ATO changes were made
during
the course of the air campaign.44 The JFACC should minimize changes to the
ATO
once it is published since effects tend to ripple throughout the product
affecting
not
only the planners attempting to put the ATO together but also on the fliers who
need
adequate time to effectively plan their individual missions. Many fliers noted
that
the
ATO changes made daily in the ATO became almost overwhelming.45 Unless they
is
not absolutely critical, changes should be incorporated into the next day's
ATO. The
CAFMS
software was designed to handle a maximum of 2,400 planned sorties per day.
The
ultimate result was that the ATO was disseminated several hours late for the
first
three
weeks of the war. Clearly, the ATO development and dissemination process
needs
to be streamlined and shortened to increase the flexibility in execution and
responsiveness
of joint air operations. An more aggressive enemy could take
advantage
of inherent time lags and inflexibility. The best way to shorten the ATO
cycle
is to reduce the CAFMS processing which took over 13 hours during Desert
Storm.
In addition to a shorter ATO development
cycle, the targeting cycle of
nominating,
validating, and revalidating air targets must be cut down from
approximately
48 hours to 36 hours. For the ground commander, one issue is
responsiveness.
He must be able to nominate a target within his AO (but unable to
strike
with organic assets) and have it taken out quickly if it affects his close
battle.
Also,
to effectively prosecute the deep battle, the ground commander must be involved
in
the target selection process. For example, targets that might normally be
selected
for
air attack by the JFACC staff because of their importance to the enemy may, in
fact,
be
of even more importance intact to the ground commander's future plans.
Therefore,
the
ground commander may want to restrict certain targets within his AO from air
attack.
Finally, since the BDA cycle provides a
key input for the daily targeting process,
real-time,
accurate BDA is essential for JFACC planners to concentrate successive
attacks--or
reattacks-on the most important remaining targets. The damage
assessment
function itself should be centralized. A single agent such as a joint
intelligence
center (JIC) should be ultimately responsible for collating BDA inputs from
various
sources into a single overall picture.
Furthermore, BDA should be principally
determined
by the JFC's staff in the theater of operations, not Washington, The JFC in
the
combat theater is in the best position to make the ultimate assessment. In addition,
greater
emphasis must be given to cockpit videotape imagery as a reliable, real-time
validation
of MISREPs in determining BDA.46 MISREPs validated by cockpit video
should
be given full credit for targeting purposes.
Also, unmanned aerospace vehicle
(UAV)
imagery, the Navy's Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS), and the
new
Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance Pod System (ATARS), must be exploited
as
primary sources of real-time BDA imagery to shorten the joint targeting cycle.
Satellite
imagery is a valuable source of BDA, but it cannot be relied on as the primary
source. Analysis of these products is an inherently
time consuming process, and the
systems
limited total capacity cannot meet the demands of large, high tempo
operations.
The JFACC and the JTCB
To prelude similar difficulties
between the JFACC and ground commanders
over
targeting in the future, a joint form to give ground commanders a greater voice
in
the
target selection process is needed. A
joint targeting coordination board (JTCB)
chaired
by the deputy JFC (DJFC) and made up of senior component representatives
of
the JFACC, land component commander (which could include representatives of
Army
and Marine corps-level elements), naval component commander, J-2
(intelligence),
and J-3 (operations) should be established to evaluate, consolidate, and
prioritize
targets. For multinational operations,
membership could even include certain
coalition
force representatives. While membership
may vary somewhat, the object is to
have
senior (O-6 to O-7) decision-makers from every component present to ensure
target
priorities within each AO are addressed along with theater-level targets. The
DJFC
should chair the JTCB since he has the authority to task the three functional
component
commanders.
The JTCB receives validated targets
nominated by all major elements. Army
corps
targets may be submitted through the battlefield coordination elements (BCE)
located
within the JAOC. The JTCB reviews the
nominated targets daily and develops
an
integrated list that establishes relative theater targeting priorities which,
in turn, will
drive
attack sequencing and allocation of air assets. Other major functions of the JTCB
include
balancing conflicting component target priorities, coordinating the type of
deep
attack
asset to be used against theater interdiction targets, and ensuring target
priorities
are both consistent with the JFC's campaign strategy. A final function is the
coordinated
joint targeting effort with all players understanding the intent and focus of
the
game plan. An additional feature is
that the JTCB will provide and avenue for
necessary
feedback and dialogue between the JFACC and ground commanders on the
status
of their previously nominated targets.
As a JFC review mechanism, the JTCB must
take a macro view of the entire
theater.
It must focus primarily on target categories and not involve itself in the
details
of
attacking individual targets. This should be left to the JFACC staff to work
out.
Moreover,
the primary focus of the JTCB should be on future operations in the 72 hour
time-frame.
However, some targets are time-critical, since not striking them first might
result
in an unacceptable threat to friendly forces, they may be of a fleeting nature
because
they are temporarily vulnerable, or important operational benefits may be
gained
by destroying them as soon as possible. In such cases, the JTCB process must
be
flexible enough to also address such targets of opportunity.
Current joint doctrine on the JTCB and
its relationship with the JFACC is
extremely
vague; more specific guidance on JTCB role in joint targeting is required. A
future
Joint Pub 3-56.1, "Command and Control of Joint Air Operations,"
currently in
draft
form, provides little useful guidance on the JTCB or authority of the JFACC.
While
it affirms the JFACC's authority to task and direct missions in the ATO to meet
the
JFC's theater objectives and ensure unity of effort, it fails to address the
JTCB or
the
JFACC's role in the joint targeting process other than to acknowledge that it
is the
JFC's
decision on whether or not to establish a JTCB. Meanwhile, in the absence of
more
concrete guidance, the U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Pacific Command have
both
developed JFACC concepts of operation which outline specific JFACC functions
and
responsibilities as well as a JTCB structure. U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and
U.S.
Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) place the JTCB, chaired by the DJFC, under the
JFC
(depicted in Figure 3).
Click
here to view image
The
JFACC's and His Staff
Another controversial JFACC issue during
Desert Storm was the composition of
the
JFACC's staff. The JFACC staff was not joint. Although it had representatives
(liaison
officers) from the other services and the British Royal Air Force, its
membership
was
predominantly Air Force. Both the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Major
General
John A. Corder, and the Director of Air Campaign Planning, Brigadier General
Buster
Glosson, were U.S. Air Force generals.47 This naturally tended to reinforce
perceptions
of parochialism. A truly joint staff in the Air Operations Center (AOC),
composed
of representatives from each service, would go a long way towards
alleviating
such concerns. A joint JFACC staff involves more than a handful of liaison
officers
from other services performing in an advisory role. Instead, the JFACC's staff
should
be composed of a mixture of talented officers drawn from each service in
proportion
to the approximate number and type of air assets each contributes to form a
Joint
AOC (JAOC).48 This more balanced staff would also provide the JFACC and JFC
with
a solid range of expertise across all service aviation specialties. The real
role of
these
JFACC staff officers is to combine their individual service expertise in
planning
effective
joint air operations, not to ensure that their service views prevail.49
The JFACC himself is normally the
component commander with both the
preponderance
of air assets in-theater and the best capability to direct and control air
operations.50
For most large operations, this usually (although not always) means that an
U.S.
Air Force officer will assume the JFACC role since the Air Force will probably
provide
both the preponderance of aircraft and the AOC infrastructure. A deputy JFACC
or
director of operations from a service other than the JFACC's should be
appointed. In
Desert
Storm, a U.S. Navy officer in such a position would have provided better
service
component
representation and also helped allay suspicions of service bias. Furthermore,
the
Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) and Airspace Control Authority (ACA) duties
are
normally performed by the same individual because joint air defense efforts and
airspace
control measures are closely interrelated. Although the duties of the AADC and
ACA
can be performed by the JFACC himself, as was the case in Desert Storm, the
scope
of responsibilities is large enough that these are better delegated to another
flag
officer.
To minimize the possibility of fratricide, both joint air defense operations
and
airspace
control procedures must be integrated together in the ATO and airspace control
order
(ACO). Since, the JFACC is in the best overall position to synchronize the
entire
counterair
effort of both aircraft and ground defense systems, it follows that the AADC
and
ACA should report to the JFACC as an element of his staff.
"Dual-hatting" of the JFACC,
who is probably also a service component
commander,
is another area of debate. Lt. Gen. Horner was both the commander of
the
Air Force Component, Central Command (CENTAF) and Commander, Ninth Air
Force
in addition to being the JFACC. Although serving in these two different and
potentially
conflicting roles, General Horner did much to accommodate the interests
and
concerns of the other services.51 The willingness to deal is a characteristic
of an
effective
JFACC. As JFACC, Horner was willing to make tradeoffs with other
component
commanders and enjoyed good working relationships with each. This
avoided
open conflict over the JFACC's status and authority. Also, daily dialogue of
the
JFACC with other senior leaders is vital in ironing out difficulties that
arise. Still,
with
dual-hatting, concerns over conflict of interest, such as assigning key
missions or
targets
to one's own service to steal the limelight, are bound to arise. When dual-
hatting
is unavoidable, the perception of conflict of interest can be minimized by a
balanced
JFACC staff consisting of officers from each services and aviation specialty.
The
JFACC's task, whatever his service, is to make the most effective use of all
the air
assets
available, regardless of their service source. As one JFACC planner in Desert
Storm
aptly summarized, "It's a war; we're not trying to make budget decisions,
we're
trying
to defeat someone."52
The JFACC and Doctrinal Difficulties
Different service perspectives and
doctrine on the control and employment of air
power
fuel arguments over the JFACC's role in joint air operations. The phrase
"shaping
the battlefields may mean two very different things to an aviator and an
infantryman.
Furthermore, the airman and soldier may differ in defining the enemy's
center
of gravity. The airman may view the command and control network or other
strategic
targets as an enemy center of gravity while the soldier tends to see the enemy
force
itself as the center of gravity. Each service has a distinct view of joint
warfighting
which
is shaped by their respective service doctrine. Admittedly, each point of view
has
sound
rationale supporting it. But while doctrine serves a useful purpose in that it
defines
the service's mission and identity, it can sometimes serve as a barrier to true
jointness.
For the Air Force, the principal
doctrinal precept is the primacy of the strategic
air
war. The Air Force's doctrine is that centralized control (if not command) of
all
service
component air assets, under a single air commander, allows air power to be
focused
where it will do the most good in achieving theater objectives and promotes
both
unity and economy of effort. The JFACC, in the Air Force view, is in the best
position
to determine priorities among various theater air assets in keeping with the
JFC's
guidance. He fights the entire depth, width, and height of the battlespace. The
Air
Force's greatest fear is the misuse of air by failing to achieve air
superiority at the
outset
or diluting air power, a concern not altogether unfounded in U.S. military
history.
General
Momyer, former commander of Seventh Air Force in Vietnam, wrote:
Throughout the three wars, World War II,
Korea, and Vietnam, the
command and control of airpower has been
a major issue. Airpower has
great flexibility to perform many tasks
in war, and its ability to respond
with varying levels of firepower to a
variety of targets has led Army and
Navy commanders to seek control of
airpower as part of their forces.
But to give in to these understandable
wishes of surface commanders is
to destroy the very thing that gives
airpower its strength-the ability to
focus quickly upon whatever situation
has the most potential for victory
or for defeat Airmen know that
centralized control of airpower in a
theater of war can best serve armies and
navies; to fragment airpower is
to court defeat In North Africa, Europe,
Korea, and Vietnam this
principle has been proven time and
again. As Air Marshal Tedder writes,
'Air warfare cannot be separated into
little packets; it knows no
boundaries on land or sea other than
those imposed by the radius of
action of the aircraft; it is a unity
and demands unity of command.'53
The
danger lies in suboptimizing the battlefield which can result in the diffusion
of air
power
at the expense of the theater objectives. Air Force officers argue that the
soldier
does not understand the synergy of focused and direct attacks on strategic
targets
of the enemy.54 The Air Force position is that early destruction of the enemy's
leadership,
command and control capability, lines of communication, industrial
infrastructure,
and other warfighting capabilities through strategic attack can help
ensure
a decisive victory.55 Attacks against command and control centers and airfields
play
a major role in the air superiority battle. The Air Force believes that air
superiority
is
a fundamental priority and a precondition for the effective conduct of joint
ground or
air
operations.
While the Air Force acknowledges its
support responsibilities to ground forces, it
does
take a decidedly strategic focus with air superiority, deep attack, and
interdiction
as
elements of a larger air war executed independently of the ground battle.
Indeed,
Air
Force doctrine states that air power employed primarily in a close air support
role
(as
opposed to interdiction and strategic attack) is not likely to achieve
campaign-level
effects.56
This statement seems to ignore the point that air power may provide crucial
support
which ultimately helps the Army win a major land battle. That victory, in turn,
can
have a profound effect on an entire campaign, and air power has therefore
contributed
to that effect. Despite the claims of those who advocate the classic
strategic
bombing campaign, history has shown that a strategic air campaign can have
a
devastating impact on the enemy, but it will not win a war by itself.57 In
General
Horner's
words, "See, the trouble with our air power people is that sometimes they
get
too
carried away with what air power is all about.. They wanted the Iraqi army to
surrender
without the ground battle taking place so that it would vindicate them as
airmen...
The reason you would want that to happen is so that no U.S. soldiers were
killed
on the battlefield."58
The Navy's focus is on the primacy of
the war at sea that involves sea control,
forward
presence, and power projection in the littoral or near-land environment. In
this
context,
the Navy views its carrier air as an extension of the fleet and is reluctant to
surrender
control to a land-based commander. The Navy sees its air performing a
combination
of fleet defense and strike operations along the littorals. Naval air is an
essential
part of overall fleet operations, and the traditional view holds that since
carrier
air
supports naval operations, it should therefore fall under the command of the
naval
commander
afloat. However, while maritime missions have priority, sorties in excess of
maritime
air requirements are made available for JFACC tasking. The Navy's strictly
maritime
missions were not normally included in the ATO. The JFACC does not need
to
control these sorties, only those which are integrated with the joint air
effort inland.
The Navy has recently come a long way in
its shift from war in the open ocean
towards
becoming part of the joint sea-air-land team. Going into Desert Storm, the
Navy's
focus was on maritime battle against the former Soviet navy and independent
contingency
operations. It was not well prepared to integrate with land-based air forces
in
an extended air campaign. The Navy lacked a developed system for planning and
directing
an air campaign comparable to the Air Force's AOC or for developing an ATO
to
integrate employment of aircraft from multiple bases. This capability to
control an air
war
is an essential prerequisite for a future Navy JFACC. Also, the Navy's limited
number
of precision munitions and lack of onboard target identification systems for
beyond-visual-range
(BVR) missile employment tended to limit its participation in
certain
aspects of the air campaign which called for those capabilities.59
The Marine Corps' fundamental precept is
the primacy of the Marine Air Ground
Task
Force (MAGTF). In spite of the 1986 Omnibus Agreement, the Marines and the
Air
Force views still diverge on control of the organic air component of its
MAGTF.60
Marines
view their air assets as an integral part of their air-ground combat team and
are
very
uncomfortable with the idea of a theater air commander who is able to shift
Marine
air
assets away from the direct support of their ground forces. The Marine reliance
on
its
air component stems from the Corps's unique role in amphibious operations and
the
need
for immediate firepower during the critical landing phase before other
supporting
arms
are ashore to provide such fire support. Marine air compensates for the MAGTF's
limited
artillery and armor, and it exists to support the MAGTF's ground component. It
is
also the MAGTF commander's primary means of fighting the deep battle. The
association
of Marine air with the ground component it serves is so close that
questioning
the need for separate Marine air is equivalent to questioning the need for a
Marine
Corps.61
The Marines do believe in centralized
control of air-but by the MAGTF
commander.
This is so that when the MAGTF needs air, it can get it immediately
instead
of finding that the air it relied on was diverted elsewhere in theater. The Air
Force
is adamant about the centralized control of all theater air assets under a
single
air
boss for reasons already explained. So who is right? Both services have valid
points.
The Joint Chiefs simultaneous endorsement of both the JFACC concept and
the
Omnibus Agreement continues to create a context for disagreement between the
Marines
and the Air Force. During Desert Storm, the Air Force did, in fact, adhere to
the
Omnibus Agreement which reaffirms the integrity of the MAGTF combined-arms
team
and recognizes that Marine air is required for MAGTF effectiveness as a
fighting
force.
Since the Omnibus agreement states that OPCON of Marine air is retained by
the
MAGTF commander, Marines prefer to think of the JFACC title as a designation
and
the JFACC himself as strictly a coordinator.62 In Desert Storm, Marine
commanders
and the JFACC staff disagreed over the degree to which the ATO
covered
Marine sorties in excess of the number specifically committed to it. Some
Marine
officers, including Lt. Gen. Royal N. Moore, Jr., Third Marine Aircraft Wing
Commander,
viewed the ATO as merely a coordination mechanism.63 This assertion
ignores
the fact that the air tasking order was, as the name implies, the instrument
used
by
the JFACC, as the supported commander for the ClNC's air effort, to task various
missions.
All fixed-wing Marine air was in the ATO. Sorties provided to the JFACC
included
all A-6 and EA-6B and half of the F/A-18 sorties with MARCENT retaining
tasking
authority over all AV-8B and the remaining F/A-18 sorties for use in zones near
their
ground forces.64 Interestingly, in mid-February 1991, MARCENT withheld all
fixed-
wing
assets for CAS use because the JFACC's allocated sorties did not meet
MARCENT's
ground support requirements. Despite
these philosophical differences,
General
Horner and General Moore made the whole process work through a series of
mutual
tradeoffs and compromises.66 General Horner commented, "You do common
sense
things. And you don't worry about doctrine."67
For the Army, the principal precept is
the primacy of the land battle. In the
AirLand
Battle, which is now evolving into something called Army Operations, a basic
notion
is that war is ultimately decided by the soldier on the ground. Like the
Marines,
the
Army complains that the Air Force's desire for centralized control leads to too
much
emphasis
on strategic operations at the expense of direct support for front-line ground
troops
that it wants-and often needs.68 Unlike the Marines, the Army lacks an organic
fixed
wing air component, and because of a limited number of ATACMS, it still depends
largely
on air power to fight the deep battle.69 The Army tends to view air power as a
supporting
force for its ground scheme of maneuver and would like to allocate a fixed
number
of sorties dedicated for the exclusive use of each corps, in essence, to
provide
an
"air umbrella." However, in the Air Force's view, such an approach
fragments air
power
and wastes the synergy associated with centralized control of air power.
Centralized
control allows the JFACC to focus air assets where they are most needed
by
the joint force as a whole. It provides flexibility to shift roles or redirect
aircraft to
other
targets on the battlefield as a result of weather obscuring a primary target or
significant
changes in one area of the battlefield. Also, as previously noted, the
number
of sorties flown is not as important as the types of aircraft and weapons that
fly
those
sorties. Centralized control allows a JFACC to allocate the best combination of
aircraft
and weapon and concentrate this firepower for the desired effect against each
target.
Of course, the ground commander is in the best position to identify and
prioritize
targets in his AO which are a factor to his forces. When it comes to direct
support,
the crux of the matter is responsiveness. Army commander's want dedicated
CAS
because when they need it, they need it right away. On a dynamic battlefield,
30
minutes
is a long time to wait. Battles have been won and lost in less time. The
concept
of "push CAS" developed by General Horner to provide readily
available
aircraft
for direct support is a great idea, but it only works when an abundance of air
assets
are available (as was the case in Desert Storm).70
Army helicopters are yet another issue.
Should they come under the JFACC's
purview?
The Army sees its helicopters as part of a combined-arms team along with
armor,
infantry, and artillery, all supporting its scheme of fire and maneuver. Attack
helicopters
are used as a maneuver element in support of ground operations and are
not
truly theater assets by virtue of their limited speed and range. When used in a
combined-arms
or CAS role, they are best left under the direct control of the ground
commander.
However, Army helicopters used in an interdiction role or beyond the fire
support
coordination line (FSCL) should come under the JFACC's purview in the ATO.
The JFACC and Deep Attack
Another area of debate concerns JFACC
control of deep attack assets other
than
aircraft. B-52-launched Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) come under the
JFACC's
control through the ATO, but should Navy TLAMs and Army ATACMS also be
included
in the JFACC's sphere of control? Generally, yes. TLAMs are a highly useful
weapon
permitting strikes in either bad weather or against heavily defended targets in
the
daytime without risking aircraft. It is essential that TLAMs be closely
integrated with
air
strikes to achieve unity of effort in the timing and targeting of deep strike
operations.
TLAMs
not employed in support of strictly maritime targets should fall under the
JFACC's
control in executing the JTCB's joint target list.
With a range of over 120 km, ATACMS is
the Army's principal means of
prosecuting
deep operations.71 The ATACMS can also be a superb SEAD weapon in a
high
threat environment too lethal for aircraft to attack enemy defenses without
incurring
excessive risk.72 ATACMS is designed to
be a highly responsive deep strike
system,
while the Army's shorter range Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) is
considered
an artillery system. Since these are fundamentally employed as organic
corps
support weapons, it is not desirable for a JFACC to exercise control over them
when
used against targets within the corps' AO. However, when employed in deep
operations
against targets outside the ground commander's AO, JFACC control is
again
essential to allow the JFACC to deconflict targets between aircraft and other
attack
assets when developing the MAP and to synchronize the theater deep attack
effort.
To facilitate the integration of deep
attack assets, a deep attack coordination
line
(DACL) should be established by the JFC, beyond which Navy TLAMs and Army
ATACMS
employment must be coordinated with the JFACC's air interdiction efforts.
This
concept differs from the fire support coordination line (FSCL), inside which
pilots,
operating
within the ground commander's main battle area, must coordinate their air
attacks
with the ground commander. The DACL will normally be located beyond the
FSCL.
The ground commander may freely employ his organic deep attack assets
inside
the DACL. Past the DACL, he must coordinate with the JFACC who integrates
all
deep attack assets to synchronize the theater deep battle. Merely extending the
FSCL
way out to permit unrestricted use of ATACMS unnecessarily hampers the
JFACC's
air interdiction effort. Pilots operating inside the FSCL cannot expend
ordnance
unless under the control of a forward air controller (FAC), and the number of
aircraft
that FACs can work at any given time is very limited. An example of this
occurred
in the latter stages of Desert Storm when the XVIII Airborne Corps advanced
the
FSCL well north of the Euphrates River. It was so far ahead of coalition ground
forces
that it created what amounted to a sanctuary for Iraqi forces from air attack
that
allowed
them to escape north out of Kuwait.73 Just as it is crucial for the ground
commander
to synchronize all attack assets inside the FSCL, it is equally essential for
the
JFACC to integrate all deep attack assets in prosecuting the theater-wide deep
battle.
Conclusion
As Desert Storm dramatically
demonstrated, air power has come of age.
Stealth
technology, lethal precision-guided weapons, long range air-and sea-launched
cruise
missiles, and airborne battlefield management and surveillance systems
combine
to make air power one of the most dominant and versatile aspects of modern
warfare.
As President George Bush observed, "Gulf lesson one is the value of air
power."74
Other than the U.S., no nation has a comparable ability to use concentrated
air
power with modern precision munitions against its adversaries. With the diverse
aerospace
capabilities of the four services, air power will remain a dominant aspect of
U.S.
military might and a unique advantage the U.S. can exploit in future conflicts.
The
decisiveness
of air power so clearly demonstrated in Desert Storm comes from its
inherent
offensive capability." Only air power has the capability to strike the
enemy
anywhere,
anytime, and hit multiple targets simultaneously. The lethality of modern air
power,
coupled with its freedom of maneuver, range, and precision, has revolutionized
modern
warfare." Although air power alone may not win a war, without air power, a
war
will not be won. Air power creates the essential conditions for success on the
ground
and at sea.
The effectiveness of joint air
operations is best achieved through the centralized
control
of a JFACC who ensures unity of effort and coherent employment of air power
to
best achieve decisive theater-wide results. The key elements of the successful
Desert
Storm air campaign were centralized control of the joint air assets under a
JFACC
and a single ATO. The JFACC achieved true unity of effort in the air war, and
this
allowed the CINC to focus air power against the most critical targets at the
right
time
to support his concept of operations. Centralized control will continue to be
important
in future conflicts with fewer U.S. air power assets available due to current
force
reductions. In Desert Storm, the JFACC had an abundance of fighter assets to
employ
which kept inter-service conflicts, for the most part, on the back burner. The
coalition
forces fielded 2,430 fixed-wing aircraft and flew an average of over 2,500
combat
and support sorties per day.77 There was enough air for each service to
employ
its air assets the way it doctrinally preferred to fight" with the recent
downsizing
of U.S. forces, the real test for the JFACC will come in the future when
limited
air resources force hard choices between competing priorities on the
battlefield.
Can the clash of different service
doctrines over control of joint air operations be
reconciled?
Yes, but first, old mindsets must change. The new paradigm for joint air
operations
is that unity of effort is effectively achieved through a single air boss
exercising
tactical control over all service component air assets. The Air Force must
recognize
that air power alone will not necessarily win a war through a strategic
bombing
campaign designed to drive the enemy into submission. It must also
recognize
that supporting engaged ground forces is just as important to the theater
campaign
as the strategic air battle is. It must give greater emphasis to CAS in
doctrine
and training. The Navy must prepare now to assume the role of JFACC in the
future,
especially in the littoral warfare environment. The Navy must integrate its
carrier
air
with other joint air assets beyond the fleet defense role in a larger theater
air
campaign.
The Marines need to recognize that under certain circumstances such as
sustained
operations ashore, Marine air does not always need to be strictly tied to its
MAGTF
combined-arms role. They must acknowledge that a JFACC's authority from
the
JFC to exercise tactical control involves more than mere coordination. The Army
must
recognize that air power does not only exist to support the ground forces'
scheme
of
maneuver. The use of ground forces to facilitate an air-dominant operation,
such as
fixing
enemy ground forces in place to increase their vulnerability to attack by air
power,
is
as valid a tactic as the use of air to support a ground scheme of maneuver.
Also, as
a
deep weapon, the Army's ATACMS needs to be integrated with the JFACC's air
targeting
plan to ensure unity of effort.
Service doctrine should provide a
constructive basis for examining new
warfighting
ideas, not serve as a dogma that obstructs effective joint operations
because
it fails to acknowledge exceptions to its major doctrinal precepts. Nor should
service
doctrine usurp either joint doctrine or the JFC's concept of operations. To
fight
joint,
mutual understanding and appreciation of the other services' warfighting doctrines
is
essential to understand warfare in not only one's own medium but in the other
mediums
as well. There is no room for any dysfunctional interservice squabbling when
the
shooting starts.
Service components should be allowed to
fight the way they are organized and
trained.
At the same time, services must tailor their organization and training to the
way
they
will fight in the future--and that way is joint. Joint exercises must involve a
JFACC,
JTCB,
JAOC, and different service component air assets with limited total air
resources
to
force the tough calls. Joint targeting, BDA, and ATO planning and dissemination
processes,
along with equipment interoperability, must be tested in dynamic exercise
environments.
Exercises must be designed to focus on true joint integration of air
assets,
not service-sponsored exercises in which other services play mere token or
supporting
roles.
"Jointness" should not be
confused with "fair-sharing," that is, the assignment of
missions
or targets for parochial reasons at the expense of overall campaign
effectiveness.
It is not the Air Force, Army, Marines, and Navy fighting separate air,
land,
and sea campaigns. These service forces are each part of air, land, and sea
components
fighting the JFC's campaign. They all work for the JFC and a common
goal:
to win-and win decisively. True jointness requires a JFACC to make the most
effective
use of all air assets available, regardless of their parent service. It is not
necessary
to be "purple." Each service component brings its own unique air
power
capabilities
(and limitations) to the fight. The diverse capabilities of each service air
component
are complementary and can be best employed by the JFACC who
synchronizes
joint air actions for maximum overall effect and unity of effort.
NOTES
1 The route package concept, which was
developed in Korea and flourished in
Vietnam,
divided airspace over North Vietnam into seven parcels or "route
packages."
The
Air Force or the Navy was assigned responsibility for targets and operations
within
its
respective packages. It was nothing more than an arrangement to get around
unresolved
doctrinal issues and offered simplicity at the expense of effective
employment
of all air assets available. See General William W. Momyer, Air Power in
Three
Wars (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1987), pp. 95-96; JFACC Primer, 2nd ed.
(Washington
DC: Department of the Air Force, February 1994), p. 5; James A.
Winnefeld
and Dana J. Johnson, Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity of Command
and
Control, 1942-1991 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993), pp. 156-160. In
some
circumstances, such as single strikes or smaller scale operations, geographic
separation
may be useful in preventing mutual interference and simplifying planning.
At
that time, lack of sophisticated communications and computer systems prohibited
the
kind of close coordination that is possible today.
2 Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS),
Vol. I, Part II, Command and Control
(Washington,
DC: GPO, 1993), pp. 58, 62, 217.
3 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Title
V Final Report to Congress, April 1992,
p.
101.
4 Les Aspin and William Dickinson,
Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the
Persian
Gulf War (Washington, DC: Brassey's (US), Inc., 1992), p. 1, 8, 10; Conduct
of
the Persian Gulf War, pp. 101, 103,179; James P. Coyne, Airpower in the Gulf
(Arlington,
VA: Air Force Association, 1992), p. 155; Charles A. Horner, General.,
USAF
(ret), "The Air Campaign," Military Review, September 1991, p. 26;
Thomas A.
Keaney
and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report
(Washington,
DC: GPO, 1993), pp. 161, 240.
5 AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of
the United States Air Force, Vol. I.,
March
1992, pp. 3, 7, 17-18.
6 According to Joint Pub 0-2, Unified
Action Armed Forces (UNMF), 11 August
1994,
operational control (OPCON) is "authority to perform those functions of
command
over
subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces,
assigning
tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to
accomplish
the mission." It provides "full authority to organize commands and
forces
and
to employ those forces as the commander...considers necessary." Tactical
control
(TACON)
is "command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or
military
capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to detailed
and,
usually,
local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to
accomplish
missions or tasks assigned."
7
Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), pp. 111-112.
8 The Air Force position is that
tactical control is the appropriate level of JFACC
authority
to conduct joint air operations. See JFACC Primer, p. 10.
9 Keaney and. Cohen, p. 146; Winnefeld
and Johnson, Joint Air Operations, pp.
125-126;
James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson, "Unity of Control: Joint Air
Operations
in the Gulf," Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1993, p. 98.
10 According to Joint Pub 1-02, DoD
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
apportionment
is the JFC's "determination and assignment of the total expected effort
by
percentage and/or priority that should be devoted to various air operations
and/or
geographic
areas for a given period of time." This differs from allocation which
involves
assigning
actual sorties by mission and type aircraft based on the JFC's apportionment
guidance.
11 Numerous examples exist. The F-15C
currently performs only an air-to-air
role
and the A-10 is strictly a ground attack aircraft to name just two. Many
aircraft are
best
utilized in only certain roles. For example, the F-117 is best suited for
strategic
attack
and the AV-8B for a direct support role.
12 AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of
the United States Air Force, Vol. II, pp.
119-120;
John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington
DC:
National Defense University Press, 1988), p. 161; Jerome V. Martin, Victory
From
Above:
Air Power Theory and the Conduct of Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.: Air University Press, 1994), p.8.
13 Momyer, pp. 39-41. The Air Force has
never forgotten this hard lesson.
14 Aspin, pp. 9-10; Rick Atkison,
Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War
(Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1993), p. 222; Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Irac:
AirPower in
the
Gulf War (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), pp. 2O6-209;
Richard B.
Lewis,
"JFACC: Problems Associated With Battlefield Preparation in Desert Storm,"
Airpower
Journal,
Spring 1994, pp. 16, 19; Dwight R. Motz, "JFACC: The Joint Air Control
'Cold War'
Continues,"
Marine Corps Gazette, January 1993, p. 70; Winnefeld and Johnson, Joint Air
Operations,
pp. 192, 194.
15 GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and
Control, pp. 63, 171.
16 Stephen W. Dade, "Adventures in
Targeting," Marine Corps Gazette, June
1992,
pp.
34-35; John W. Schmidt and Clinton L. Williams, "Disjointed or Joint
Targeting?,"
Marine
Corps Gazette, September 1992, p. 67-8; Triumph without Victory: The
Unreported
History of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Times Books, 1992), pp. 267-
268.
17 GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and
Control, pp. 57-58.
18 GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and
Control, p. 58; Triumph without
Victory,
p.268; Winnefeld and Johnson, pp. 125,
136, 192, 194.
19 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p.
94.
20 Rick Atkison, Crusade: The Untold
Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston:
Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1993), p. 221; Lewis, pp. 8, 20; Triumph without Victory, pp.
265-267.
Schwarzkopf directed Horner to begin the Phase III well inside of two weeks
into
the air campaign.
21 Atkison, pp. 105-106; GWAPS, Vol. 1,
Part II, Command and Control, p. 60;
Lewis,
p. 7.
22 GWAPS, Vol. 1, Part II, Command and
Control, pp. 59-60.
23 General Charles A. Horner interview,
27 Dec 1993.
24 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p.
101; Lewis, p. 8.
25 Reaching Globally, Reaching
Powerfully: The United States Air Force in the
Gulf
War (Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, September 1991), p. 41.
26 Ibid., pp. 40, 42.
27 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp.
90-91, 94, 140; GWAPS, Vol. I, Part I,
Planning,
p. 170; Hallion, p. 209; Lewis, pp. 12,19; Reaching Globally, p 40.
Historical
evidence shows that units are rendered combat ineffective after suffering
attrition
levels of 20 to 50 percent. Schwarzkopf's combat analysis team concluded
that
50% attrition was necessary as a precondition for a coalition ground offensive
to
succeed.
According to Lewis, corps commanders were unaware of Schwarzkopf's
guidance
until after the war, apparently due to some sort of communications disconnect
between
ARCENT and the commanders.
28 According to Carl von Clausewitz, a
center of gravity is "...the hub of all power
and
movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our
energies
should be directed." Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael
Howard
and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 595-
96;
GWAPS, Vol. I, Part I, Planning, p 172; Keaney and Cohen, pp. 152-153.
29 Lewis, pp. 13,19.
30 Keaney and Cohen, pp. 152-153, 155;
Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, p. 110.
31 Atkison, p. 219; Lewis, p. 17. Nominated
targets were to be plotted to within
100
meters on the map and then validated just hours before an air strike. Of an
average
110 targets nominated daily, only a few dozen actually were designated for
attack
in the ATO.
32 Atkison, p. 222.
33 Atkison, p. 219; Michael Leurs,
"Joint Doctrine: New Pubs, Old
Controversies,"
Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1994, p. 112; Lewis, pp. 18, 21. To
be
a suitable target for air, among other things, it must be readily identifiable
from
altitude
and vulnerable to aircraft-delivered munitions. An example of an unsuitable
target
would be infantry dispersed and dug in over a large area.
34 Hallion, p. 208; Lewis, pp. 10-13.
Kills on tanks, APCs, and artillery pieces
were
counted in determining attrition levels. Col. Lewis, a member of the JFACC's
staff,
gives an excellent account of specific details surrounding the BDA confusion
during
Desert Storm.
35 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p.
113; Keaney and Cohen, p. 142; Lewis,
p.
10-13; Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, p. 149-150. ARCENT never revised its
initial
figures based on its revised "discounted" criteria however.
36 The MAP contained TOT, mission
number, the basic encyclopedia number
(BEN)-a
reference to the DIA's automated installation file identifier, target category
code,
target description, and number and type aircraft tasked to conduct the attack.
Some
delays led to unnecessary restrikes. See GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and
Control
p. 299.
37 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp.
175-176, 343; Norman Friedman,
Desert
Victory: The War for Kuwait (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p.
186;
Larry Grundhauser, et al., "The Future of BDA," Concepts in Airpower
for the
Campaign
Planner (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1993), pp. 89-91;
GWAPS,
Vol. I, Part II, Command and Control, p. 304; Keaney and Cohen, p. 142.
Under
ideal circumstances, overhead imagery of a single target took 18 hours to be
processed
and disseminated by DIA in Washington to Riyadh for assessment. When
multiplied
by approximately 2,000 sorties each day, the system was overwhelmed.
38 Atkison, p. 236; Conduct of the
Persian Gulf War, pp. 138, 175-176, 343-344;
Coyne,
p. 159; Keaney and Cohen, p. 140-142; Lewis, p. 13; Grundhauser, et al., p.
99.
Triumph without Victory, p. 276. The Iraqis resorted to burying their tanks and
artillery
pieces in sand, sandbagging turrets, and wrapping gun barrels with rags which
made
it both harder for aircraft to achieve kills and to assess damage. Analysts had
a
hard
time assessing target destruction unless it was very apparent such as a tank
turret
blown
off. BDA was also hampered by poor weather which often obscured some
targets
and prevented reconnaissance imagery. Satellites could only cover around 20
percent
of the targets hit.
39 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp.
103,176.
40 GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and
Control, p. 52.
41 Friedman, p. 174.
42 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp.
103-105, 552, 574; Friedman, pp. 174-
175;
GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and Control, pp. 51, 55; Royal N. Moore, Lt
Gen.,
USMC, "Marine Air: There When Needed," Proceedings, November 1991, p.
63;
Motz,
pp. 70-71; Winnefeld and Johnson, Joint Air Operations, p. 110; Winnefeld,
Niblack,
and Johnson, p. 111. Gen. Moore referred to gaming the ATO process by
scheduling
additional sorties which he canceled if not needed because he felt that the
ATO
process did not respond well "to a quick-action battlefield." The
NAVCENT staff
created
a "Fleet Defense" sortie category to give them the flexibility to
strike targets
important
to the Navy but not serviced by the normal targeting process.
43 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p.
104-105; Keaney and Cohen, p. 151;
Hallion,
p. 256. The Contingency Tactical Air Control Automated Planning System
(CTAPS)
is an ongoing joint program to address problems associated with
disseminating
a joint ATO. The Navy is installing CAFMS on its carriers in the
meantime.
44 GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and Control,
pp. 220-227, 231-235. A
number
of these ATO changes were due to bad weather (around 100 on several days).
Weather
was so bad that four out of every ten sorties through late January were
canceled.
45 GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and
Control, p. 231; Keaney and Cohen,
p.
151.
46 Aircraft video tape recordings (AVTR)
is not a panacea. It does not
necessarily
permit reliable BDA either because some products, such as A-10 and F-16
video,
show the target at weapons release but not up to impact like F-15E or F-117
products
do. The use of cockpit video imagery for higher headquarters BDA review in
currently
a USAF Air Combat Command special interest item.
47 Horner placed certain Air Force
officers that he personally knew in those key
positions
where he felt, as JFACC, he needed individuals in whom he could place
special
trust. The Air Force was comfortable with the Air Force-dominated staff
supplemented
by liaison officers from the other services, and the other services did not
initially
seem eager to provide manning. See GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and
Control,
p. 67; Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, p. 106-107.
48 Authors Winnefeld and Johnson
recommend a standing JFACC cadre staff of
joint
membership/composition that can be rapidly expanded for large-scale, continuous
combat
operations. See Joint Air Operations, p. 135 and "Unity of Control: Joint
Air
Operations
in the Gulf," Joint Forces Quarterly, p. 99.
49 Winnefeld and Johnson, Joint Air
Operations, p. 137.
50 Joint Pubs 3-0, 3-01.2, and 3-04 set
forth criteria for JFACC selection.
51 According to Lt Gen. Walter E.
Boomer, I MEF Commander, General Horner
adhered
to the Omnibus Agreement and made no attempt to assume operational
control
of Marine air. In return, the Marine Corps provided sorties for JFACC tasking
as
promised.
See "Special Trust and Confidence Among the Trail-Breakers,"
Proceedings,
November 1991, p. 50; GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and Control,
pp.
57, 73; Martin, p. 38; Moore, p. 64; Winnefeld and Johnson, Joint Air
Operations,
p.
147; Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, p. 110.
52 Hallion, p. 254.
53 Momyer, p. 107-108.
54 Triumph without Victory, p. 267.
55 Christopher Bowie, et al., The New
Calculus: Analyzing Airpower's Changing
Role
in Joint Theater Campaigns (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), p. 44; Winnefeld,
Niblack
and Johnson, p. 60.
56 AFM 1-1, Vol. II, p. 166.
57 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp.
xxi; Friedman p. 267. Air power was
(and
is) a necessary ingredient for victory, just not the only ingredient. Air power
contributed
in an extraordinary way to the coalition victory in Desert Storm, but maritime
and
ground operations also played essential roles as well.
58 Horner interview, 27 Dec 1993. Some
Air Force planners, especially in
Checkmate,
believed that air power could single-handedly win the war through an
intense
strategic bombing campaign. The initial plan named "Instant Thunder"
focused
heavily
on strategic targets almost to the exclusion of Iraqi forces in Kuwait. See
Friedman,
p. 160,171; Triumph Without Victory, p. 269-274.
59 James Blackwell, Michael J. Mazarr,
and Don M. Snider, The Gulf War:
Military
Lessons Learned (Washington DC: The Center for Strategic Studies, 1991),
pp.
20-21.
60 The 1986 Omnibus Agreement specifies
that the MAGTF commander will
retain
operational control over his organic air assets but will make sorties available
to
the
JFACC for air defense, long-range interdiction, and reconnaissance. These are
not
considered
"excess" sorties. In addition, he will make available those sorties
in excess
of
MAGTF direct support requirements. The JFC still retains the prerogative to
reapportion
any MAGTF air assets he deems necessary to accomplish the overall
mission.
61 Winnefeld and Johnson, Joint Air
Operations, p. 10.
62 The 16 December 1990 CINCCENT
Operations Order for Operation Desert
Storm
contained a statement that the MAGTF commander will retain OPCON of his
organic
air assets as the Omnibus Agreement requires. The order gave Horner the
authority
to require air units to consult in planning and execution of interdiction
operations,
but it did not give him the authority to compel agreement if they differed.
Such
differences were to be referred to USCINCCENT. Ambiguity of the operations
order
did little to reconcile the different views of the Air Force and the Marines
over the
JFACC's
authority. See GWAPS, Vol. I, Part II, Command and Control, pp. 42, 50-51;
Winnefeld,
Niblack, and Johnson, Joint Air Operations, p. 94.
63 GWAPS, VoI. I, Part II, Command and
Control, p. 42; Moore, p. 64;
Winnefeld
and Johnson, Joint Air Operations, p. 109.
64 Winnefeld and Johnson, Joint Air
Operations, pp. 119-120; JFACC Primer, p. 7.
65 Fedorchak, Scott A., "Close Air
Support: Repeating the Past Again?,"
Airpower
Journal, Spring 1994, p. 30.
66 Coyne, , p. 155; Moore. p. 64;
Winnefeld and Johnson, Joint Air Operations,
p.
119. An example of a tradeoff was USAF A-10s for CAS in exchange for Marine
F/A-18s
for deep strike missions that the A-10 is unsuited for.
67 Horner interview, 27 Dec 1993.
68 James Blackwell, Thunder in the
Desert: The Strategy and Tactics of the
Persian
Gulf War (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), pp. 114-119, 129-131.
69 The total programmed buy of ATACMS is
around 2000. Army attack
helicopters
can provide CAS in some circumstances.
70 In anticipation of the ground
commanders' requirements for CAS, Horner
developed
the "Push CAS" concept because he did not want aircraft sitting on
the
ground
waiting for a call from attacking Army units. CAS aircraft would fly to a stack
or
holding
point at regular intervals (as frequently as 7 minutes) to await tasking. If no
CAS
was needed at the moment, they were sent deeper in the KTO to kill boxes.
71 Deep operations are those directed
against enemy targets beyond the close
battle
area. Interdiction is an important facet of deep operations designed to
destroy,
delay,
or disrupt enemy forces or sustainment before it can be employed against
friendly
forces. Improvements to the ATACMS will extend range out to around 400 km.
72 Ten ATACMS were fired against targets
in Kuwait during the first night of the
war
as part of the joint defense suppression effort. A total of 33 ATACMS were
fired in
Desert
Storm with great effectiveness.
73 JFACC Primer, p. 34; Keaney and
Cohen, p. 157.
74 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p.
89, George Bush, 29 May 1991. The
impact
of air power can be overstated. Desert Storm was an ideal environment for the
asymmetric
application of air power against Iraqi ground forces despite the worst
weather
in 40 years. The open desert and set-piece nature made the Iraqi forces
extremely
vulnerable to air attack, and the aircraft themselves possessed the
technology
to conduct precision strikes. Iraq's inability or unwillingness to aggressively
act
further compounded their predicament. Still, air power did ground Iraq's air
force
(the
sixth largest in the world), destroy over 400 aircraft, overwhelm Iraq's air
defense
system,
and shatter Iraqi ground forces' confidence. See "Air Force Performance in
Desert
Storm," White Paper, April 1991, p. 2.
75 Martin, p. 95.
76 Hallion, pp. 253-4.
77 Martin, p. 63.
78 Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, p.
265.
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Atkison,
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Trail-
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