Aviation Manning: Why We're Stretched To The Limit
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Aviation Manning: Why We're Stretched To the Limit
Author: Major J. H. Daas, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: The frenetic pace of operational and personnel tempo in
light of recent endstrength reductions has caused a paucity in
aviation manning.
Background: The Marine Corps has undergone force reductions
while at the same time maintaining and even increasing
operational requirements. The number of Marines provided to
squadrons throughout the Marine Corps are significantly lower
than a few years ago. Operational units complain that readiness
and quality of life for their individual Marines are adversely
affected because of personnel shortages. There are many
contributing factors causing shortages that include recruiting,
training, force structure allocation, and Military Occupational
Skill assignment. As the Marine Corps down-sizes, and ultimately
right-sizes, there is a delicate balance between the finite
number of Marines and the operational and personnel tempo they
are expected to maintain.
Recommendation: The various agencies that impact occupational
skill determination need to establish closer relations.
Synchronization and oversight is required in this age of limited
resources, and most importantly, limited numbers of Marines.
Aviation Manning: Why We're Stretched To the Limit
The Marine Corp's manpower management process currently
allocates 111 Marines for an F/A-18 squadron, but the Navy
requirement for the same squadron integrated onto an
aircraft carrier stipulates 206. Where do the extra Marines
come from? A helicopter training (HMT) squadron requests a
staffing increase to 218, but the available personnel
inventory will only support 172. The authorized strength
for MOS 6333, EA-6 electrical systems technician, is 71.
There are only 45 in the entire Marine Corps. Who gets
shorted? Personnel tempo (perstempo) in VMAQ units exceeds
50%. Can we afford to let these Marines out of the
squadrons to pursue other career broadening tours?
These are only several of a myriad of issues facing
manpower managers (as well as squadron commanders) on a
daily basis. Prior to attending Command and Staff College,
I served a four-year stint in the Enlisted Assignment Branch
(Code MMEA) at Headquarters, Marine Corps. The tour
culminated as the head, Enlisted Distribution Section, which
is responsible for auditing enlisted staffing for the Marine
Corps among other things. A significant part of our time
was spent trying to determine where all the aviation Marines
were. After a year of wrestling with this dilemma, the
following conclusions were evident:
- There are not enough Marines to support current
operational tempo (optempo).
- The training pipeline is rife with inefficiency.
- In an effort to save squadrons during an era of
downsizing, manning controls are stretched to the breaking
point. This paper will address these issues and other
factors that contribute to the paucity of aviation skill-
related Marines when measured against operational
requirements. While it is true the Marine Corps has
traditionally done "more with less," reductions in personnel
manning of Marine aviation units create significant
challenges to maintaining operational readiness.
A simple solution to the aviation manning challenge
would be to produce more Marines with aviation skills,
reduce optempo, or a combination of both. This is easier
said than done. It's difficult to increase training
capacity in an era of downsizing and shrinking resources.
As to op tempo, most will agree that relief is nowhere in
sight. How are we managing in the face of personnel
shortages? Typically, Marines accomplish the mission
through diligence and extra effort. After traveling to
bases throughout the Marine Corps and hearing the pleas of
commanders, maintenance officers, and personnel chiefs, it
became obvious that Marine aviation manning is stretched to
the limit.
After examining the numbers and sorting through the
manpower management system, MMEA identified several
contributing factors and tried to provide answers to the
Fleet. They weren't the answers the FMF wanted to hear,
though. Work is ongoing to alleviate shortages, but
problems will continue for the foreseeable future. There
are no simple solutions and many moving parts to deal with.
The contributing factors run the gamut from recruiting to
retention. There is interconnectivity, yet no overlapping
responsibility. Very few people, if any, understand the
entire process.
Personnel shortages are not confined to aviation units.
Currently, the Marine Corps has 73 MOS's manned at less than
85% of requirement. Aviation personnel shortages are more
acutely affected, however, because of their mission to fly
and maintain aircraft. How did the Marine Corps get into
this predicament?
Structure Chances
After Desert Shield, confusion reigned as to force
makeup and endstrength. While awaiting results of the Force
Structure Planning Group, the size of the Marine Corps
fluctuated between 177K and 159K, and ultimately 174K were
authorized. The Marine Corps started reductions and went
too fast. Commanders started discharging Marines and non-
EAS attrition exceeded 30%. Force reductions are easier to
implement than force buildups. The confusion surrounding
endstrength fluctuations and force structure paralyzed the
manpower process. Deactivating aircraft types compounded
the problems. HQMC planners designed separation incentives
to entice Marines with outdated skills to leave the Marine
Corps. The program was a success, much to the chagrin of
personnel monitors and Fleet squadrons.
Planners were frustrated in their efforts to keep pace
with the changing picture. Out-year planning was an
educated guess at best. Was MCB Hawaii going to close?
What aviation assets would remain? When would the senior
leadership make a decision? Many decisions made during that
turbulent time were based on inaccurate data and it will
take years to recover.
Force structure planners faced the dilemma of reducing
organizational structure (i.e., cutting squadrons) and
maintaining current manning levels, or keeping units intact
while spreading manpower thinner. The overwhelming worry
was once structure was lost, it was lost forever. Through a
combination of re-allocation, creative accounting, and "buy
now-pay later" postulating, the Marine Corps avoided
significant reductions to its core units. Now, we are
suffering the consequences.
Table of Organization (T/O) is a wartime planning
figure that should be largely transparent to the FMF. The
figure they should concentrate on is the staffing goal (S/G)
which is derived from the Authorized Strength Report (ASR).
Authorized strength is what congress is paying for,
currently 174K. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation
(DC/S Aviation) receives a percentage of this authorized
strength to design manning for aviation related units. In
essence, DC/S Aviation controls their own destiny to a large
extent.
In April 1991, the ASR for the Second Marine Aircraft
Wing was 100% of T/O. In October 1994, the ASR was 88% of
T/O. That translates to a 12% reduction in authorized
manning. As a rule, ASR should at least be 90% of T/O. In
April 1991, the ASR for a VMFA squadron was 140; in December
1994 it was 111. Had the mission requirements changed? Can
a squadron accomplish the same degree of proficiency with 29
less Marines? Someone decided they could.
ASR is further decrimented by Marines that are
training, transients, patients, and prisoners (T2P2). A
T2P2 percentage is factored into the ASR, but is invariably
exceeded. Additionally, special assignments, other "B"
billets, and uncompensated staffing "overages" are other
drains on available manpower. Some MOS's are undermanned
for a variety of reasons. While our focus is usually on the
resultant shortages, in 1994, 42 aviation MOS's exceeded
105% of requirement. Two examples are 6013, KC-130
mechanic, currently 122%, and 6013, EA-6 mechanic, at 143%.
Naturally, there are not too many complaints concerning
excess Marines. These extras, however, come at the expense
of existing shortfalls.
When T2P2 is subtracted from ASR to give us current
available manning, the resulting figures are the staffing
goals for monitors to maintain. The problem is that
staffing goals are based on available population, not
mission requirements. If there are not enough Marines to
maintain a consistent staffing goal, the computer simply
reduces it to reflect reality.
The Enlisted Staffing Goal Model (ESGM) is a
computerized program that projects available population six
months in the future. ESGM then allocates the projected
available population throughout the Marine Corps based on
precedence levels categorized as excepted; 100% of grade/
MOS requirement (HMX-1), priority; 100- of aggregate numbers
- some substitution allowed for grade and MOS (they could
receive a sergeant to fill a staff sergeant billet), and
pro-share; which gets whoever is left. Aviation units are
nearly all priority commands. This does not allow much
flexibility to deal with changes in the inventory. The
model faces the dilemma of apportioning Marines equally
among units with the same level of priority. When
everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority.
Currently, the available personnel pool is generating
staffing goals that are inadequate to meet optempo/perstempo
requirements. MAG 13 did a study in 1993 and informed HQMC
they needed a minimum staffing goal of 82% of T/O to safely
conduct their mission requirements. Unfortunately, MMEA had
to go on record informing MAG 13 that HQMC couldn't
guarantee their minimum requirements.
To add better perspective, one can examine the staffing
procedure for infantry units to draw a corollary comparison.
In 1992, the Enlisted Assignment Branch initiated the TOUR
II staffing program. Briefly, TOUR II involves cyclical
staffing of deploying units based on their deployment date.
Marines report to a battalion 8-10 months before deployment
to train and facilitate cohesion. Marine Expeditionary
Units, Special Operations Capable (MEU SOC) are completely
built or "locked on" six months prior to deployment. Lock
on for Unit Deployment Program (UDP) units is three months.
At this point, priority shifts to the next unit in the
queue. The program has worked well. For one thing, there
is no shortage of infantry Marines. As added insurance,
MMEA artifially deflated the staffing goal to provide a
"fudge factor." In other words, battalions received fewer
Marines than the ESGM allocated. Priority goes to deploying
units at the expense of non-deploying units. Post
deployment, these battalions attrit significantly until
built for the next deployment. Do they go short? Yes, but
the difference is they are not flying airplanes.
In 1993, MMEA incorporated TOUR II for aviation and it
has been marginally successful. There is no slack in
aviation manning, so staffing goals weren't depressed
because they were already too low. The significant
difference from infantry TOUR II is that with aviation
units, there is no downside in the cycle where priority can
shift. Non-deploying units have the same manning
requirements as those getting ready to go. Shortages are
exacerbated by deployability status of individual Marines.
Frequently, squadrons have significant numbers of non-
deployable Marines for various reasons, and another
deployable Marine has to replace them. Typically, that
Marine just completed a previous deployment. The result is
a round robin effect where Marines make one deployment after
another. This dynamic is affecting retention, family
stability, and any number of other factors and functions
involving personal situations.
The shortages became so acute that MMEA was forced to
admit to the various MAGs that minimum sourcing requirements
could not be met. Official notification of planned
shortages (MMEA's inability to accomplish the mission) went
to Wing and Group with the understanding they would have to
fill shortages with internal assets or go short. Credit the
branch head with the moral courage to place himself on the
skyline and opening his actions to further scrutiny. This
obviously alienated HQMC from the FMF, but did provide an
accurate portrayal of the true magnitude of existing
shortages.
Due to the unique nature of aviation and the specialty.
skills required to task organize squadrons and detachments,
MMEA allows a large degree of autonomy by the individual
Groups. Granting of latitude has advantages and
disadvantages. On the plus side, detachments (dets), Marine
Aviation Logistic Squadron (MALS) augmentees, and short
skilled MOS's are managed at the user level, a form of
decentralized execution. Visibility at the HQMC level
suffers somewhat in this instance and the system requires a
great deal of communication and flexibility. Sometimes,
abuses are inevitable. Units are naturally going to protect
their own interests. Both Wing and Group are hesitant to
transfer Marines until a replacement is onboard, and
sometimes they simply fail to comply with directives.
One example of how decentralized execution causes
friction is the manning of detachments for Marine
Expeditionary Units. Individual Groups and squadrons are
responsible for deciding detachment makeup. The deploying
squadron receives staffing goal and the dets come from the
parent squadron. The problem is that higher headquarters
(MARFORLANT and MARFORPAC) were insisting on full complement
air crews. These "gold-plated" dets were requiring T/O
crews from a squadron manned according to staffing goal.
The validity of this requirement is not at issue; the simple
arithmetic shows that the squadron suffers the consequences.
Add to this the requirement to triple-site in certain
instances and there is a serious staffing dilemma facing
unit commanders. For example, some squadrons chop a det to
a MEU before deployment and another det to 31st Meu upon
arrival on Okinawa. The core squadron becomes a mere shell.
They routinely ask HQMC for assistance, but there are no
extras to give them.
Group commanders are forced to make difficult
decisions. The deploying units are obviously a priority.
One unit suffering the consequences is the training
squadrons, who are going short although many of their
instructor billets are excepted (highest priority). The
trainers are competing with the deployers. They have voiced
their concerns, among them the potential of not meeting
pilot training requirements.
One training squadron requested a staffing goal
increase to 218 because they felt this was the minimum
requirement to accomplish their mission. The T/O calls for
214, ASR is 193, and the ESGM tells us we can only afford to
give them 172. What is the answer? Unfortunately, the
answer is "no." The domino effect is that training
shortages eventually equate to further shortfalls in the
Fleet squadrons.
One of the most controversial structure adjustments was
the HQMC consolidation of airframe structure and hydraulic
MOS's. By combining MOS's and declaring it a dual skill
capability, the force structure planners were able to
further reduce manning requirements. These "savings" could
then shift elsewhere. Without arguing the relative merits
of this decision, it does provide a graphic illustration of
the interoperability and effects on various agencies. The
change was not time-phased, HQMC implemented it all at once
and the FMF howled. Their manning dropped across the board.
For instance, prior to consolidation, MOS 6142 and 6152
totaled 584 Marines. After consolidation into MOS 6152,
helicopter airframe mechanic, the number dropped to 322, a
45% reduction. HQMC overestimated unit ability to cross-
train at the squadron level and obtain the additional
expertise while operating at peak optempo. The training
establishment had to revamp curriculum and make other
adjustments that take time.
In the interim, squadrons wanted to maintain a relative
mix of skills that approximated the "status quo"
indefinitely. They resisted the change and asked MMEA to
help. Once the MOS's changed on the unit diary and updates
posted in the manpower management system (MMS), the monitors
lost visibility of previous specialties, but agreed to help
in the transition.
Carrier Manning
The agreement to deploy Marine squadrons with Navy
aircraft carriers may be a joint effort, and an assist to
the Navy, who is undergoing their own personnel problems,
but it is difficult to pull off. As previously stated, the
staffing goal for an F/A-18 squadron, less its MALS augment,
is 111. Navy requirements call for a total of 206 Marines.
This excess comes from internal assets. MAGs on both coasts
are forced into drastic adjustments because no outside help
is available. One can only imagine what this is doing to
the other squadrons.
To make matters worse, the Navy wants its fully
complemented squadron on board for workups nine months
before the scheduled deployment. MEUs aren't even built
until six months prior. To illustrate how difficult this
requirement is, deploying units are still fed Marines up to
a week before sail date. Operationally, the requirement is
legitimate, but nine months is an eternity in the manpower
arena. The extra time requirement disqualifies many Marines
as EAS non-deployable. This requirement is not going away
and miraculously the Marine Corps has pulled off several
iterations.
Training Pipeline
As part of the endeavor to figure out where all the
aviation Marines were, MMEA tried to determine if enough of
them were made in the first place. This entailed some
cross-boundary exploration that incited the sensitivities of
various entities, chief among them was the recruiting and
training commands. While "thinking out of the box" may be a
vogue concept, many Marines and institutions within the
headquarters are threatened by the possible consequences.
As MMEA stubbornly and deftly chipped away at the rice
bowls, the discovered deficiencies were glaring. The
accession, training, and skill attainment process is
cumbersome, complicated, and widely divergent. The process
isn't broke, but it needs fixing.
The most difficult obstacle to grasping this process is
the wide array of players and the bureaucracy involved.
Recruiting a young man or woman to fill a particular skill,
and then getting that Marine through an available training
pipeline in a timely fashion is a convoluted process. The
interconnectivity between various organizations and
individuals is like a maze. MMEA convened a meeting in the
Spring of 1994 to explore the issues, and approximately
sixty action officers showed up. It took thirty minutes to
figure out what everybody did. Unfortunately, some
attendees were merely spies to ensure their particular area
of interest wasn't highlighted. Some of the issues
discussed:
- The annual recruiting mission is based on contracts
that can be sold, and not necessarily on the needs of the
Marine Corps. Aviation contracts are popular, but not all
of them. The fall back plan was to make up the difference
in what recruiters could sell and what the Marine Corps
actually needed with open contracts.
- The sister services, who provide a significant number
of training school seats, require two years advance notice
to reserve slots. They obviously know the merits of long-
range planning. While the Marine Corps struggled with
endstrength and force makeup, they submitted at least two
years of "swag" requests. If a Marine receives an
overabundant skill, it equates to a four-year mistake. If
requisite numbers of various skills fall short, catching up
is very difficult.
Our sister services are also undergoing force
reductions and are limiting capacity in their schools. The
reductions in training available to the Marine Corps and
their ramifications were not identified in time. In cases
where school seat requirements fluctuated or lessened, the
Marine Corps was loathe to reduce annual requests
accordingly because of the fear of not being able to
recapture seats if the need arose. The Marine Corps
continued to purchase excessive seats as an insurance policy
and assigned overabundant MOS's at the expense of short
skills.
- The aviation training pipeline is largely at the
mercy of the Navy. Marines request seats from the Navy and
our gyrating requirements and constantly changing numbers
frayed our credibility. The "A" and "C" school interface
was disjointed. Marines attend basic MOS skill courses and
then transition to follow-on schools based on particular MOS
requirements. The Director of Training & Education's (T&E)
crusade to reduce time awaiting training permeated the
school houses. Students were vectored into the first
available training seat regardless of need assessments.
T&E adopted a computerized system for tracking student
flow that is conceptually sound, but practically, only
partially effective. The problem was with Millington
Tennessee, where most aviation initial training occurs,
because they only had one outdated computer terminal and
weren't wired into the system. They couldn't keep the
system updated and provide planners with essential data.
Training requirements and availability varies as the
following figures will attest. In 1992, only 3,786
candidates were sent for 3,899 "A" school seats. The Marine
Corps underexecuted, especially when attrition is factored
in. In typical fashion, planners tried to compensate the
next year; in 1993, 3,937 students were sent to fill 3,543
seats. The Marine Corps overexecuted and overshipped in the
hopes additional training opportunity would open. This
doesn't endear the Corps with the Navy and frankly, is a
waste of time and money. In 1994, realizing the shortages
endemic to the Fleet and bowing to pressure for a quick fix,
the Marine Corps obtained 4,145 seats in the hope a surge
would help alleviate shortages and make up for prior
transgressions. While on the surface this appears to be a
positive step, in actuality it resembles a form of deficit
spending. Four or six years from now, when most of these
Marines ends their active service, the Marine Corps will
have to surge again to replace them. It amounts to a
vicious cycle. On a positive note, many of these issues are
being studied and some improvement is forthcoming.
Another potential problem is the planned migration of
the aviation training establishment to Naval Air Station
Pensacola from Millington. Preliminary planning figures
reflect reduced training capacity and interruptions in the
pipeline which could undermine efforts to balance short
skills. This will undoubtedly affect skill attainment, and
it remains to be seen how effectively the Navy and Marine
Corps can execute.
Reserve Structure
Marine Reserve structure experienced much of the same
uncertainty felt in the active force. While active duty
staffing in support of 4th Marine Aircraft Wing is
relatively small, some of our best and most experienced
Marines support the Reserve effort. Political posturing and
hesitancy to carry out Base Realignment And Closure (BRAC)
decisions kept some bases and facilities open though the
structure had shifted or zeroed out. This dilemma shows the
challenges facing monitors. The Reserve establishment
requests a status quo in staffing because the actual
shutdown date for a particular Reserve center is negotiable
and they want to keep flying. The new Reserve center wants
its people ASAP and the Fleet is critically short in many of
these same skills. At one time, there were approximately
400 Marines maintained in unallocated billets at various
Reserve centers. This may seem an inconsequential number,
but their skills and expertise were desperately needed in
the FMF.
Conclusions
Assuming that Optempo/Perstempo will remain constant in
the near future, what can be done to facilitate manpower
staffing? From a HQMC perspective, first and foremost,
discipline must prevail within the manpower management
process. Granted, the post Desert Shield years were an
anomaly for planners, but now that endstrength appears
stable, the system can work like it is programmed to. The
process itself is a fairly efficient design, the problem in
my opinion, is we are all too ready to deviate or abandon
procedures at the first sign of trouble.
Decisiveness on the part of our senior leadership would
be a welcome addition and a big assist to action officers.
It's bewildering to confront the amount of time it takes to
get a decision at HQMC, which at times is hamstrung with
leadership by committee and consensus. Time is wasted on
contingency planning and lost because it is difficult to
recover from late decisions. On occasion, any benefits
derived from a decision are diluted because they are
overcome by events. Planning in a vacuum is an art form at
HQMC, but a necessary evil.
Another area for improvement is inter-agency
communication. There are many dedicated, well-meaning
people working projects that impact on others and they need
to be aware of the interconnectivity. As much as D/CS
Aviation is concerned about manpower management, they
rarely, if ever, came to MMEA for discussions. It was as if
they were two time zones away instead of two decks in the
same building. When MMEA made overtures to ascertain the
evolving situations, it was sometimes viewed as
interference. Too many people at HQMC view the world from a
limited perspective; what's best for my shop rather than
what is most beneficial for the Marine Corps. Many of them
need to get out and visit with the field. While MMEA was
certainly guilty of bureaucracy and makes its share of
mistakes, the sobering visits to commands helped gain their
perspective. It also helps to honestly and forthrightly
explain your viewpoint because it chips away at the cloak of
secrecy.
The accession and skill attainment process needs
further exploration. The problem again is no crossover
responsibility and the fixation with individual efforts.
The assignment flexibility introduced by grouping like
skills into recruiting packages is a positive initiative.
We have to get better at long-range planning. Computer
models are great, but human analysis remains a critical
factor we can't forget about.
The training pipeline must be level-loaded. Recruiting
is cyclical with the summer months more conducive to
enlisting high school graduates. This is a fact of life
that has to be reconciled with the training establishment,
who operates a year round schedule that is at odds with
realities of recruiting dynamics. Yearly fluctuations in
requirements must be dealt with incrementally. This year's
quick fix will only come back to haunt us again four years
later. Planners must address shortages over a three year
period of time with a gradual increase. With dwindling
resources and decreased training opportunities, quick fix,
reactionary approaches are hard to pull off anyway.
Priorities must be set, and aviation is obviously a critical
element, so MMEA weights MOS assignments accordingly. There
are many non-aviation MOS's that are critically short,
however, and the Corps has to maintain balance.
Transfer of aviation units complicated staffing. The
Hawaii indecision clobbered the manpower process for over a
year. Planning for PCS squadrons going to Okinawa,
consolidating training on one coast, and the NAS Miramar
evolution all had detrimental effects. MMEA was forced to
maintain overstaffs in the event the puzzle didn't unfold as
we were told it probably would. As these migrations occur,
systemic discipline can return.
Many aviation related MOS's are fenced from serving on
special assignments. Hopefully, this is a short-term
solution. These Marines deserve a chance to serve in "B"
billets and for every one of them not serving, another
Marine has to take his place; another vicious cycle emerges.
A few aviation MOS's returned early to the FMF from special
assignments to help alleviate shortages.
The Marine Corps stresses Total Quality and here is a
situation ideally suited to the fundamental approach of TQL.
A consolidation of divergent efforts can produce progress.
At a minimum, the various action officers need to meet
periodically to discuss evolutions and their cross-
pollination effects. Communication and dialogue are
critical. Recently, MMEA included representatives from DC/S
Aviation on road trips and an MMEA representative
accompanied the head of ASM on another trip. These are
positive developments and need to be reinforced.
Optempo remains fast and furious. Airframes are aging,
especially in the helicopter community. Shortages of
aviation skills are highlighted and the fire hose turned on.
No clear cut, readily identifiable solutions are evident.
Aviation units manage to accomplish the mission. The Marine
Corps asks, expects, and demands a lot from its Marines, and
will continue to do so. No aviation commanders have yet
stepped forward to say they can't accomplish the mission,
although several have threatened to do so. In a pinch, the
Marine Corps will rely on ingenuity and hard work to
persevere. This always works, but with some concerted
effort and imagination, the Marine Corps can work smarter in
addition to working harder.
Endnote
Note: All facts and figures derived from the Headquarters Master
File in the Manpower Management System, accessed in Kansas City.
Bibliography
1. Dean, Mike, Major, United States Marine Corps, former head of
Combat Arms Monitor Section, HQMC. Personal interview about
the TOUR II staffing program. February - March, 1994.
2. O'Connell, Terry, Captain, United States Marine Corps, Head
Recruit Distibution Section, HQMC. Personal interview about
MOS assignments. February - March, 1995.
3. Schultz, Dave, Captain, United States Marine Corps, Enlisted
Plans Section, HQMC. Personal interview about enlisted
manpower plans. February - March, 1995.
4. Wright, L.A., Manpower Analyst, HQMC. Personal interview
about enlisted staffing procedures. February - March, 1995.
5. Various Fleet personnel managers and unit commanders.
Meetings, presentations, and question and answer sessions
with operational units throughout the Marine Corps. 1994.
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