Fratricide: Avoiding The Silver Bullet
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues
Fratricide: Avoiding the Silver Bullet
There is little that compares to the stress, confusion,
and emotion of combat. Servicemen make decisions that are
irreversible and other people may die as a result. The death
of a friendly soldier is always tragic, but never more so than
when he/she is inadvertently killed by his own comrades.
Despite efforts to prevent fratricide, it has been and will
continue to be one of the inevitable costs of war. One of the
most unfortunate memories of the Gulf War was that "35 of the
148 U.S. combat deaths were due to friendly fire."1 Most
Americans do not realize that the quick and decisive victory
against Iraq likely saved thousands of lives. But to others,
this question remains: Is death by friendly fire necessary?
The purpose of this paper is to explore the devastating
effects of fratricide from a unit's perspective. It will also
highlight the Marine Corps need to concentrate on solutions to
minimize this tragic side affect of war through positive
leadership and the application of modern technology.
Furthermore, the Corps needs to purchase the inexpensive, on-
the-shelf technology that is available now in order to begin
fratricide reduction within itself and Service wide.
The material studied pointed clearly to two factors which
were the primary cause of most fratricide incidents: (1)
direct human error and (2) the misuse of technology. In
researching this paper, I compared five wars to determine the
primary causes of fratricide. The table below illustrates my
findings:
Click here to view image
As shown, rarely were incidents of fratricide due to
mechanical failure of a weapon system, but more likely it was
a direct result of some measurable human failure. The
nervousness of inexperienced troops, a lack of control or fire
discipline, or the disorientation, confusion, and carelessness
of pilots were the principal causes of most incidents.
Another primary contributing factor is today's improved
technology. Modern technology enables large, complex, and
fast moving formations to fight in rain, darkness, and low
visibility, which further complicates the battlefield and
greatly increases the likelihood of fratricide. Additionally,
technology has greatly increased the lethality and engagement
ranges of our current weapon platforms. This advancement in
technology has pushed us beyond the traditional form of
conventional warfare into extremely high speed engagements on
the move, making it more difficult to distinguish friendly
units from enemy units. The combination of the above factors
(speed/mobility) coupled with today's weapons, is increasing
the likelihood that all direct engagements will be
fatal.
As highlighted above, a more rapid paced, less structured
battlefield, with a mix of increasingly lethal weaponry, is
now the norm for the US military. Thus, the risks of
casualties resulting from fratricide have increased
dramatically. Indicative of this is the experience of front
line units in the Gulf War. No unit experienced the affects
of fratricide more than the light armored vehicle (LAV) units.
"On 29 January 1991, an A-10 aircraft fired a maverick missile
which malfunctioned in flight and struck a light armored
vehicle killing seven (7) and seriously wounding two (2)."2
This incident had devastating affects not only on family
members but also on the units morale. Fratricide is a
perplexing problem - one that needs to be addressed and
studied so potential solutions will be available prior to
future conflicts. One must understand that each fratricide
incident contains a unique set of circumstances which are
difficult to model or simulate.
Background:
The realities of modern warfare demand a solution to the
dilemma of fratricide. As directed by the Department of
Defense (DOD), the search for technological and material
solutions must be a joint effort. The Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) issued guidance on 26 March 1992
outlining a visionary overall Combat Identification goal,
consisting of the following component objectives:
"to be able to rapidly identify enemy,
friend, and neutral;
to manage and control the battle area;
to optimally employ weapons and forces;
and, as a consequence of the above,
to minimize fratricide."
From this vision the DoD Joint Management plan for Combat
Identification was developed to provide Joint Service
coordination and oversight of Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine combat identification requirements, policies,
procedures, development, procurement programs, and related
technology efforts.
The critical system characteristics that were agreed upon
by all four services include:
1) "Providing positive ID regardless of target
aspect and/or sensor maneuvers.
2) Operating within host platform power/space
budgets.
3) Operating in same environment as host
platforms/systems.
4) Correlating ID data with on board weapon
sensor data.
5) Providing adequate electronic protection in
order to prevent exploitation/jamming.
6) Avoiding degradation of existing avionics
performance.
7) Maintaining existing systems when
practicable.
8) Developing architecture which allows
operations across the entire spectrum. (peace
to war)
9) Utilizing common data standards and common
data interfaces."4
Click here to view image
In order to help define the complexity of Combat
Identification, the Joint Combat ID Working Group,
comprised of membership from all the services and
supporting cast of
laboratories and research centers, developed a picture of four
mission areas. These mission areas are: air to air; surface
to air; air to surface; and surface to surface. For focal
efforts, the Navy has the lead for air to air and surface to
air, while the Army has the lead for surface to surface and
air to surface. These mission areas, combined with the
threefold aspect of hostile, enemy and neutral identification
requirement, comprise the pyramid picture above.
These mission areas were a tremendous help in
crystallizing the appropriate perspective in the development
of the Joint Combat ID Mission Need Statement. In analyzing
the four mission areas, two critical aspects were considered:
Situational Awareness (SA) and Positive Target Identification
(TI).
The capability of situational awareness is to know the
location of the individual host system and to maximize the use
of information gathered by friendly sensors to track and
identify friendly forces. The positive target identification
aspects are being increased through development of systems to
provide levels of identification for friend/neutral, foe,
type/class, and nationality. Friendly identification is a
fairly mature system (IFF/identify friend or foe) in air to
air missions whereas tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)
are consistent throughout the other mission areas. The two
predominant problem areas that exist are hostile and neutral
identification. These two, coupled with friendly
identification, provide a complete picture of situational
awareness. During Desert Storm, the recognition of this
problem caused many artificial restrictions to be placed on
both air and ground operating forces in an effort to control
errors. The final solution will ensure interoperability
across all mission areas.
With the proliferation of common equipment across the
globe, the lack of commonality in tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP) in coalition forces, compounded by the
complexities of modern warfare, the combat identification
problem can be greatly reduced through the application of
modern technology and strong positive leadership. The Gulf
War has validated the fact fratricide will not be accepted and
that proper procedures/technology must be identified and in
place to eliminate this terrible side affect of war. In order
to facilitate the modern warfighter from artificial
restrictions and to reduce fratricide, the Combat
Identification Program has been addressing a multitude of
capabilities that incorporate strong leadership and modern
technological advances.
Capabilities Required to Reduce Fratricide
Battlefield Combat Identification must provide integrated
situational awareness for mid/far-term systems. In the near
term, information from adjunct systems such as a small
lightweight GPS receiver/precision lightweight GPS receiver
(SLGR/PLGR) will be used. Battlefield Combat Identification
(BCI) must also provide target identification (TI) of friendly
ground and airborne platforms, to include dismounted soldiers,
in ground-to-ground, air-to-ground, ground-to-air, and air-to-
air missions. BCIS needs to automatically integrate and
correlate friend and enemy position locations (situational
awareness) as reported through command and control systems
(C2) with through-sight or target acquisition capabilities.
Since maximum effective range would include the target
acquisition process, the battlefield combat identification
(BCI) must provide identification under all situations which
could permit the BCI host to engage a target. BCI cannot
degrade the host system performance nor unit combat
effectiveness. If a transponder is used, the response should
be encoded to include the identification of the interrogation
signal it is responding to.
Current Marine Corps efforts to improve Combat ID include
Satellite-based Global Positioning Systems (GPS), new
generation Night Vision Goggles (NVG's), Digitization of the
Battlefield, and an increase in the use of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV'S). These systems represent a considerable
effort to provide situational awareness and target
identification to all levels of the MAGTF. Some additional
enhancements of situational awareness have resulted from the
introduction of the SINCGARS radio which reduces the enemy's
ability to interfere with communications, allowing friendly
units to remain in contact.
During the recent OSD-level program reviews for POM95,
modernization of armored vehicles, to include a shared
situational awareness capability, was addressed for Army and
Marine Corps armored vehicles. This capability would be
provided through an applique Inter-Vehicular Information
System (IVIS). A proposal was developed to fund this
capability for all Marine Corps and Army armored vehicles.
Although the efforts described above significantly
improve on Combat ID, each effort has been developed
independently, without consideration of the Combat ID mission
need statement or Marine Corps goals for Combat ID. The Corps
is currently working to develop an integrated plan to
determine our requirements and set forth policy, guidance, and
direction for Combat ID.
Because it is the one Service involved in all four
mission areas, USMC efforts to direct and focus current and
future acquisitions are crucial to ensure that affordable and
interoperable systems are fielded. Without the Corps
involvement and interaction, systems could be purchased which
might be cost prohibitive and lack the necessary
interoperability for joint operations. The Marine Corps is
actively involved in Combat ID, but to date, our role has been
limited to that of monitoring the other Services' initiatives.
In the future, the Marine Corps will need the appropriate
funding in order to take the lead in developing its own unique
systems capable of eliminating friendly fire casualties.
Until the time comes when there is adequate funding allocated
for research and development, fratricide will continue to
plaque the Corps.
Roadmap Focus
Initial efforts are being addressed as follows:
1) The near-term (fielded in less than 3 years) Battlefield
Combat Identification (BCI) can be an applique (non-
permanent, easily attached and removed), partially
integrated system which provides positive target
identification (TI) of friendly forces. Existing and
programmed systems such as fire control, communications,
sensors, position navigation, and heading reference will
be maximized for situational awareness. As the near-term
solution to combat identification the Corps is presently
evaluating the DRAPA light system, which is a transponder
"that receives the interrogation signal from the attack
platform and transmits a friendly reply to the sender."5
The system was recently tested in exercises in both Yuma,
Arizona, and the Republic of Korea, and received
enthusiastic praise for its effectiveness to locate
friendly units. The Darpa light system, though
impressive, only covers two of the four mission areas:
air to ground and ground to ground. This may seem
unacceptable, but one must remember this simply covers
the near-term phase. The positive aspect of this system
is that no aircraft modifications are required other than
the pilots being required to wear night vision goggles
(NVG). With a price tag of $300 per copy, combined with
its proven capabilities, I believe the Corps made the
right decision in purchasing this capability.
2) The mid-term (fielded in 3 to 7 years) Battlefield Combat
Identification System (BCI) will increase integration of
SA and positive TI to distinguish between friend,
hostile, and neutral/noncombatants. The mid-term system,
which covers the entire area of operations, will include
capabilities for ground-to-air, and air-to-air
engagements. Mid-term BCI will also include the
dismounted soldier and associated weaponry, and
accommodate application to fixed wing air platforms. To
meet the mid-term requirement the Corps is researching
technology that deals with radar signal modulation. This
system would cover all four (4) mission areas "with an
accuracy of properly identifying friendly forces more
than 92% of the time."6 The system operates by
installing a radar-responder on a piece of ground
equipment that emits a pulse via an aircraft fire control
radar. The aircraft fire control radar then relays the
pulse back to another ground station identifying the
object in question as friend, foe or neutral.
3) The far-term (fielded in beyond 7 years) BCI will consist
of a joint, fully-integrated positive friend, hostile,
and neutral/noncombatant identification, communication,
position, and navigation system that will provide on-
platform correlation of TI and SA. Far-term BCI will
operate in all previously named engagement and platform
sets. The system the Corps is presently evaluating is
called the Battlefield Cellular Phone w/GPS. This
innovative technology consists of phone numbers linked to
grid squares. A cellular phone queries cellular nets for
situational awareness and proper location of friendly
forces. Individuals and small units will carry beepers
in order to receive proper friendly locations. The
shooter dials a grid square of the intended target, while
the beepers within that grid square respond with global
positioning system (GPS). An attractive feature of this
system is that the cellular station can be in a airborne
platform or stationary on the ground. Although this
concept needs more development, it is one that is both
affordable and adaptable and could greatly enhance combat
identification.
Shortcomings of Existing Systems.
Currently, a limited number of various POS/NAV devices
are being used to increase situational awareness. For
example, the issue of the global positioning system (GPS) will
augment map and compass land navigation techniques. Generally
however, units rely on terrain association with tactical maps
and voice position reporting. Positions are first overlaid on
situational maps to provide positional awareness at higher
headquarters. Operation and frag orders are then transmitted
by voice or in writing, providing the remaining elements of
METT-T to complete situational awareness. One of the
shortcomings of GPS is its lack of self-encryption. This
opens it up to the possible interception by those enemies with
the sophistication to do so.
Other than the use of visual and aided visual methods,
current models of battlefield target identification (TI) focus
on the ground-to-air situation. A target identification (TI)
system with a ground-to-ground and air-to-ground capability
does not exist. In addition, the extended ranges of modern
weapon systems make it virtually impossible for the operator,
even under ideal conditions, to visually identify to the
maximum effective range of the weapon, which contributes to
the problem of fratricide.
Working Group Efforts
Presently, the USMC Combat ID Working Group is developing
a Marine Corps Combat ID Plan, maintaining a coordinated
effort in Combat ID, and integrating developed Combat ID goals
into the Marine Corps Master Plan. This plan will include
identifying all current Marine Corps initiatives which assist
in meeting the Combat ID requirements. Developing a Marine
Corps roadmap which includes a more detailed plan for
implementing actions will illustrate the route the Corps
intends to take in fulfilling the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC) validated Mission Need Statement (MNS).
Additionally, the Marine Corps is actively pursuing
structure and funding for participation in the All Service
Combat ID Evaluation Team and their efforts. This program
will operate much like the OSD directed Advance Concept
Technology Demonstration (ACTD). Participation will bring
together new technology and operators into a structured and
metered arena simulating combat, to test and improve not only
the technology, but the immediate improvements that can be
made to tactics, techniques, and procedures. This type of
operation will allow for development of a tested,
interoperable, integrated solution to combat identification
both today and for the future. One must remember that in
today's climate of force reduction and competing interests the
upper echelons of leadership in the Marine Corps will have to
heighten the priority and focus more attention on the
complexity of developing a integrated solution to combat.
The military, working closely with our civilian partners,
will continue to tackle this enormous challenge through the
application of science, technology, training, and positive
leadership. While advanced technological devices may
certainly be of significant value in reducing the complexity
of combat identification through situational awareness (SA)
and positive target identification (TI), they cannot provide
a comprehensive solution to what is a problem of human
imperfection that results in fratricide.
Combat is defined as, "active fighting between enemy
forces."7 That each side will suffer casualties in the
process is taken for granted; they are the inevitable, if
regrettable, consequence of such a deadly proposition.
However, it is not generally taken for granted that each side
is almost certain to suffer casualties inflicted by its own
forces.
Yet, in each conflict which America has participated,
especially those of the twentieth century, a significant
number of Marines have been killed or wounded as the result of
friendly fire. That the percentage of casualties resulting
from friendly fire from World War I through the Gulf War has
been extremely low does not make the accidental killing or
wounding of one's own troops any less tragic or disastrous.
Nor does it offer much consolation to the commander
responsible for the lives of his troops or to the Marine who
runs the risk of falling victim to the fire of his own forces.
It may well be that in the "fog of war"8 friendly fire
casualties are inevitable, but this solemn observation does
not absolve the armed forces from doing everything in their
power to eliminate the problem.
As a future commander, the safety and well-being of the
troops is priority number one; therefore, the disastrous
effects of fratricide must not be overlooked. The area to be
hit hardest from an incident of fratricide would be morale -
one of the most vital components of a successful unit. No
service member is excluded from the feelings of guilt and
shame, which ultimately has an adverse effect on performance.
Not only does it effect the morale of the unit, but also
of the country. For every service member who loses his life
during wartime, there is a family who must deal with their
loss. To learn that their loved one was killed by friendly
fire makes that loss even harder. As a result, the armed
forces may lose the confidence and support of the American
people, a crucial element of any successful campaign.
With these thoughts in mind, the Corps is committed to
finding the appropriate solution: one that is affordable,
interoperable, and yet retains the edge technology has given
us in combat. But most importantly, the Corp is dedicated to
a solution that removes fratricide from our military
terminology.
ENDNOTES
1. Joint Requirements Oversight Brief, June 1992.
2. Stephanie Kang, Army Times, copyright 1994, Army Times
Publishing Company.
3. Mr. Kirk Nicholas, Integration and Assessment Branch Brief,
MCCDC 1993, p 3.
4. Joint Requirements Oversight Council Brief, June 1992.
5. Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS) (draft).
Program Executive Office Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
Office of the Project Manager Combat Identification, Fort
Monmouth, NJ. p I-8.
6. Mr. Kirk Nicholas, Integration and Assessment Branch Brief,
MCCDC 1993.
7. The Random House College Dictionary, (revised edition),
copyright 1982, p 267.
8. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War Edited and Translated by Michael
Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
New Jersey. 1976
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Beebe, Gilbert Wheeler, and DeBakey, Michael E. Battle
Casualties: Incidence. Mortality, and Logistic
Considerations. Springfield, Il: Charles C Thomas, 1952.
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Bantam Books, 1977.
Childers, C.D., conducted by HQMC, MCRDAC/AWT. Blue-on-Blue
Incidents. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS
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(IFF) Operability. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System
(MCLLS #03072-59524), February 15, 1988.
Interview with Mr. Kirk Nicholas, Assistant Director
Accessment Branch, NCCDC on 17, 26 and 27 January 1995 at
Marine Corps Combat and Development Command, Quantico,
Virginia.
Joint Requirements overnight Council Brief, June 1992.
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December 4, 1992.
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Executive Summary
This report examines the tragic loss of life from
incidents of fratricide and the implications it has on
morale. In addition, the report evaluates the Corps need to
focus more attention on effective joint training, positive
leadership, and incorporating the technology that is
available today in order to eradicate this gruesome side
effect of war. Finally, I will discuss the efforts
the Corps is undertaking in regards to the near-term (less
than 3 years), mid-term (3 to 7 years), and far-term (beyond
7 years) to abolish fratricide from our terminology.
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