A Comparative Analysis Of The Challenge Faced In Peacekeeping
Operations By British General Thomas Gage In America And
Colonel Timothy Gerahty In Beirut
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues
MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY
COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
QUANTICO, VA
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CHALLENGE FACED IN
PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS BY BRITISH GENERAL THOMAS GAGE IN AMERICA AND
COLONEL
TIMOTHY GERAHTY IN BEIRUT.
BY
MAJOR THOMAS M. CORBETT
DR. J.B. MATHEWS (1ST MENTOR)
KERRY STRONG (2ND MENTOR)
LTCOL(COL SELECT) CALVERT USAF (3RD MENTOR)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: A Comparative Analysis of the Challenges Faced in
Peacekeeping Operations by British General Thomas Gage in
America and U.S. Marine Colonel Timothy Gerahty in Beirut.
AUTHOR: Major Thomas M. Corbett
PROBLEM OR RESEARCH QUESTION: To analyze the similarities
and discuss differences involved in peacekeeping operations
in Colonial America as faced by British General Thomas Gage
and in Beirut, Lebanon as faced by U.S. Marine Colonel
Timothy Gerahty in Beirut. Further, to conclude with
plausible lessons learned by future peacekeepers so that
potential mistakes will not be repeated.
DISCUSSION: Although these two peacekeeping operations
occurred nearly 200 years apart, there are many
similarities. Both missions would fail miserably and
ultimately end in disaster with great loss of life. In
addition, both General Gage and Colonel Gerahty would
witness "presence" degenerate into undeclared war.
This thesis both examines, as well as analyzes the
similarities and differences of the two operations in the
following areas; Flawed Policy and Strategy; Escalation;
Windows of Opportunity; Mission Creep and Creditable Force;
Disaster; Command and Control; Intelligence; Training and
Rules of Engagement.
CONCLUSION: The value of this thesis is derived from the
analysis of the similarities of the peacekeeping operations
under study and the development of lessons learned. Clear,
concise mission statements, creditable force, and unified
political and military strategy are necessary for success in
future peacekeeping operations. Finally, when peacekeeping
deteriorates into peace enforcement or even undeclared war,
governments must either pull the force out or prepare to
engage in full combat operations.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.............................................1
CHAPTER ONE: FLAWED POLICY AND STATEGY.................6
CHAPTER TWO: ESCALATION AND MISSION CREEP.............23
CHAPTER THREE: WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY..................58
CHAPTER FOUR: COMMAND AND CONTROL.....................61
CHAPTER FIVE: MISSION CREEP AND CREDITABLE FORCE......65
CHAPTER SIX: DISASTER.................................68
CHAPTER SEVEN: INTELLIGENCE............................76
CHAPTER EIGHT: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.....................80
CONCLUSIONS.............................................87
INTRODUCTION
There seems to have developed a somewhat
superstitious belief in the mere "UN Presence".
Soldiers and their political masters seldom see
eye to eye on the aims and tasks, and definitely
not on the means and methods in the field, where
soldiering and politics meet on more or less
ill-defined and impossible missions. The
political decisions easily became tantamount to
self deception and the soldiers are left in the
lurch even before financing the operation becomes
the nightmare of the organization.1
It is my intent to present a comparative analysis of
peacekeeping operations involving British General Thomas
Gage and Colonel Tim Gerahty in Lebanon. I will provide
pertinent historical background and in depth analysis of the
following areas: Flawed Policy and Strategy; Escalation;
Windows of Opportunity; Creditable Force; Command and
Control; Intelligence; Disaster; and Rules of Engagement.
will discuss differences and compare the many similarities
that both these commanders faced during these ill-fated
peacekeeping missions. As each chapter unfolds, the reader
may want to compare the events and analysis with recent
peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Haiti. I will
conclude with plausible lessons learned by future
peacekeepers so that potential mistakes will not be
repeated.
In North Carolina, near the entrance to Camp Johnson, a
subsidiary base of the overall Camp LeJeune complex, a
Memorial Wall was erected that bears the names of all
Americans who died in Lebanon. The inscription on the wall
reads "They Came in Peace". Along Lejeune Boulevard, on
Highway #24, from the monument to the main gate, there are
272 Bradford pear trees planted for those Marines that died
in Lebanon(241) and Grenada (31).2 Only by understanding the
complexities involved in Peacekeeping Operations, can we
prevent tragic endings.
Before reading this study, one must have a thorough
understanding of several basic fundamentals related to
Peacekeeping Operations. These fundamentals apply to both
cases this study analyses.
First, it is utopianism to think that a military force,
by itself, can create or restore peace. This is especially
true if that force belongs to a civilized Western nation
that must abide by its constitution and keep respect for
democracy. Due to the nature of civilized societies and
their respect for human life, it becomes extremely difficult
to enforce peace with weapons. The second fundamental to
understand is that a military force can only contribute to
setting up a process of peace, when, and only if, the
majority of the civilian population wants peace and supports
that military force and its country.3
Further, it is necessary to have a rudimentary
understanding of Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter. Chapter VI is titled: The Pacific
Settlement of Disputes and involves a solution to
international peace by negotiation, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of the
parties own choice. The majority of scholars and the
military hierarchy refer to this chapter as "Peacekeeping".
Chapter VII is titled: Action with Respect to Threats to
the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.
This chapter states that all members of the United Nations
undertake to make available to the Security Council, armed
forces, assistance, and facilities for the purpose of
maintaining international peace and security. This chapter
is referred to as "Peace Enforcement".4
If circled rings are placed around Peacekeeping(Chapter
VI) and Peacemaking (ChapterVII) and then intersect the two
circles, the problems that arise during
actual operations will arise at this
epicenter of the intersection. It is
here, where the two circled rings
intersect that both British General
Gage and U.S. Marines Colonel Gerahty
would be located. It is also in this intersection that
tragedy would occur for these two commanders and the
peacekeeping missions would fail miserably. Therefore, the
importance of these lessons and the value of this study
cannot be understated.
Before beginning this study and analysis, a synopsis of
each Commander's background should be valuable to the
reader. The following information presented is provided to
the reader solely for insight.
Thomas Gage was born in 1719 in England, the second
born son of a noble family. His father, Viscount Gage,
pursued an erratic career in British politics. Great wealth
entered this noble family when Thomas' brother, who was the
eldest, married a Jewish heiress. The usual paths opened to
younger sons of nobility in 18th Century England were the
church, the law, and the army. He spent eight years at
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Westminster School and was commissioned sometime between
1736 and 1740. In 1741 he purchased a commission as a
lieutenant in a regiment. Gage saw service in Flanders
against the French. As a Lieutenant Colonel, Gage served
under Major General Edward Braddock in the French and Indian
wars in America. He married Margaret Kemble, daughter of a
wealthy New Jersey family.
Colonel Gerahty was born in St. Louis Missouri in 1938.
He attended college at The Jesuit Christian College at St.
Louis Missouri. His military career includes two combat
tours in Vietnam with the 1st Marine Division Staff and 1st
Reconnaissance Battalion. Due to a previous tour in the
Middle East, he was selected to command the 24th MAU in
Beirut. Colonel Gerahty graduated from the Marine Corps
Command and Staff College in 1973.
CHAPTER ONE
FLAWED POLICY AND STRATEGY
An incident occurred toward the close of 1763 which
resulted from the great Indian uprising. This involved the
infamous massacre of harmless Christianized Indians of
Conestoga in Pennsylvania by overzealous citizens. They
went so far as to break into the Lancaster jail to kill
twenty of these inoffensive people. Further, they advanced
on Philadelphia to attack some 140 Christianized Morovian
Indians who had taken refuge there. At the request of
Governor John Penn, General Gage, Commander-in-Chief of the
colonies, sent regular British soldiers from New York with
orders to defend the Indians. Early in 1764 when the
frontiersmen finally appeared on the outskirts of the city
of Philadelphia, they were confronted not only by regular
British soldiers, but also bands of armed citizens,
including Quakers, raised by Benjamin Franklin. They
decided that there would be less pleasure in fighting the
outraged Quakers and the troops than in slaughtering
helpless Indians and they retreated to their homes.
Benjamin Franklin praised the Army for its assistance in
maintaining public order. Two years later, Franklin and the
majority of Americans would not rejoice at the prospect of
public tranquillity maintained by the presence of the
redcoats.5
In 1763 the Treaty of Paris ended the Seven Years War
between France and England. As a result, Canada was ceded
to England. It can hardly be argued that by conceding
ownership of Canada and Eastern Louisiana to England made
the independence of the British Americans inevitable.
However, it is clear that the destruction of French military
power on the North American continent contributed to the
colonists' perception to think that they no longer needed
the strong protecting arm of the Mother Country and
encouraged them to believe that they owed little to the
government in London. An American habit of thinking of
rights within the empire rather than duties toward the
empire was enormously strengthened from the vacuum created
when the French left North America.6
The English hierarchy believed that Pontiac's uprising
was caused in part by encroachment of colonists upon Indian
lands and that the rights of the red men should be
protected, temporarily by imperial decree. Consequently,
there was little objection in England to the famous
Proclamation of October 1763 which forbade the occupation of
lands claimed by the Indians and particularly their lands
that lay west of the Allegheny Mountains. Nor was there any
question to the need of maintaining a standing army of
British regulars in America to garrison the new possessions
of the empire and to ward off French, Spanish, and Indian
aggressions. It was decided to detail approximately seven
thousand regular soldiers for this service. More
importantly, there was little doubt in the minds of English
leaders that the colonies should contribute to the cost of
maintaining this force. In order to defray the cost of
garrisoning soldiers in North America, the English needed
more revenue from taxes.7
A brief synopsis of the taxes are as follows:
- 1764 Sugar Act - Set higher duties on imported sugar
and cut the duties on molasses in half, to lesson the
likelihood of smuggling. Enlarged the power of the vice
admiralty courts.
- 1764 Currency Act - Prohibited issuance of paper
money by the colonies.
- 1765 Stamp Act - Required printed documents to affix
revenue-raising stamps purchased from British-appointed
stamp distributors.
- 1765 Quartering Act - Required colonies to furnish
British troops with housing and certain provisions.
- 1766 Declaratory Act - Asserted Parliament's
sovereignty over the colonies after repealing the Stamp Act.
- 1767 Townshend Revenue Act - Imposed duties on tea,
glass, paper, paints, and other items.
- 1773 Tea Act - Reduced duty on tea, but gave the East
India Company the right to sell directly to Americans.
- 1774 Coercive Acts Closed the port of Boston,
restricted provincial and town governments in Massachusetts,
and sent additional troops to Boston.
The fiercest and most vocal opposition to Britain's
revenue laws occurred in Boston, Massachusetts. A militant
group of agitators led by an ex tax collector, Samuel Adams,
and a local merchant, John Hancock, conducted a campaign
that skillfully combined violence with sophisticated legal
and political strategy. Radicals of this rebellious
"faction" sat not only in the elected Massachusetts
Assembly, but on the executive council which governed the
colony. To strike at the mother country and Parliament,
where it was most vulnerable, embargoes were imposed on all
British goods carrying import duties. The Sons of Liberty.
which had formed in New York over the opposition of the
Stamp Tax had now grown in numbers, tarred and feathered
anyone who did not observe the ban.8
Gage was determined that this must be settled
by the home government and wrote "Quash this spurt
at a blow, without too much regard to the
expence[sic] and it will prove olconomy in the
end... If the principles of moderation and
forbearance are again adopted, or that these
transactions shall find favor and protection with
any popular leaders amongst you there will be an
end to these provinces as British colonies."9
Gage wanted a display of military power to keep the
movement from growing out of control. Governor Bernard of
Massachusetts asked for two regiments. One to be placed in
the town and one to be placed in a barracks located on
Castle Island. With news of regular soldiers arriving at
Boston, Sons of Liberty members preached open rebellion.
The Fourteenth and Twenty-ninth regiments, along with a ship
of the line, were sent from Halifax under the command of
Colonel Dalrymple to support and protect the civil
magistrates and officers. When the Fourteenth and
Twenty-ninth Regiments reached Boston they were put in the
wharf warehouses. The British government, learning of the
trouble in America, sent two regiments from England, the
Sixty-fourth and the Sixty-fifth in 1769. British troops
remained in Boston for seventeen months before intentionally
firing a shot - a shot that came on March 5, 1770.10
The term "presence" is important when analyzing the
policy and overall strategy of both Great Britain in 1763
and the United States in 1983 (discussed later in this
chapter). In the rivalry between the nations of France and
England, the colonies were fundamentally important. The
importance of the colonies when correlated to this rivalry
helped to formulate government policy that was accepted as
truth. First of all, colonial interests and advantages were
subordinate to the mother country. Each country had a right
to restrict the trade of its colony and its subjects. As a
rule, surplus commodities of a colony were sent to the
mother country. Finally, trade and the resources of a
colony were kept out of the hands of a competing rival
colony.11 Englishmen believed that the subordination of the
colonies' interests and dependence on the mother country was
the true design and intention for the colonies. Only in
this way could the welfare of the mother country be
preserved in the matter of governmental control, trade, and
revenue.12
Following the French and Indian Wars, Great Britain
needed to bolster its revenue she lost in support of the
conflict. In addition to this problem, was the cost of
garrisoning British soldiers in the Colonies. The American
colonial military policy that later developed was a direct
result of the traditional British fear of a peacetime army;
the demand for economy due to fiscal retrenchment; apathy on
the part of most politicians concerning colonial problems;
and the fear of a costly Indian war on the frontier.
However, Parliament moved for an act to station a force in
America and determined that the colonies must bear at least
the greater share of supporting the army through taxation.
The earliest explicit objection to a large peacetime
garrison in America can be found in the papers of Benjamin
Franklin, the writings of James Otis, and the records of the
Massachusetts Assembly. Otis discussed the army in the
pamphlet. THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND
PROVEN where he states: "... The danger of a standing army
in remote provinces is much greater to the metropolis than
at home".13
The British colonial policy of taxation in order to
support the standing army was flawed. The colonies did not
want the "presence" of British soldiers. The "presence" of
British soldiers in Boston only exacerbated the underlying
fundamental problem of the situation. Due to this flawed
policy, and other associated factors, which will be
discussed in later chapters, Americans eventually came to
view the redcoats as the enemy.
The policy and strategy of the United States would also
lead to the Marines being received as the enemy in Beirut.
The first time Marines entered Beirut was in 1958. Lebanon
had been threatened by a civil war between Christian
Maronites and Muslims. Lebanese President Camille Chamoun
requested American and British assistance. United States
President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the deployment of
troops to Lebanon. At the time of the request, there were
three Marine Battalion Landing Teams(BLT's) in the
Mediterranean. Brigadier General Sidney S. Wades 2nd
Provisional force, formed from troops of the 2d Marine
Division for an exercise with British Royal Marines and the
Italian navy in Sardinia. General Wade would eventually
take control of all the units which would land in Lebanon.
The three BLT's were BLT 1/8 commanded by LTCOL John
Brickly, BLT 2/2 commanded by LTCOL Hodd, and BLT 3/6
commanded by LTCOL Jenkins. BLT 2/2 landed and immediately
set up a defensive perimeter at the airport and later moved
into the city and took control of the dock area, in addition
to posting guards around the American Embassy. BLT 1/8
landed four miles north of Beirut. Concurrently, elements
of 2/8 and the US Army 24th Airborne Brigade who were flown
in from Germany commanded by Major General Paul D. Adams who
eventually became Commander-in-Chief of the American land
forces. The aforementioned units composed all American
troops in Lebanon. The Marines stayed from July to
October.14 A few shots had been fired but there were no
casualties in this peacekeeping operation. In 1958
President Eisenhower believed that the U.S. security
interests included avoiding Soviet encroachment into the
Middle East out of concern for the control they might
ultimately gain over the oil reserve in the region. "Our
interests were clear, out determination and capabilities
obvious, and our political backing solid.15
The Marines entered Lebanon again in 1982 destined to
play a larger role than they had ever anticipated. The
Israeli invasion operation code named Peace for Galilee
would precipitate American intervention. Gabriel's book
OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE: THE ISRAELI-PLO WAR IN LEBANON
provides a detailed account of this operation. The invasion
culminated with the seize of Beirut and the entrapment of
the Palestine Liberation Army(PLO) in and around the city.
In the immediate aftermath of the invasion there was
apparently some sentiment in the U.S. administration of
expanding UNIFIL's (United Nation Interim Force in Lebanon)
and mandate to give it a role in Beirut that ended when
Israel made clear its unwillingness to cooperate with U.N.
troops. In early July, 1982, U.S. envoy Phillip Habib was
in Lebanon. The Lebanese had requested that the United
States station some of its troops temporarily there. Such
an agreement might convince Israel to pull its troops back a
short distance and allow the Palestinian forces to evacuate
safely. On 7 July, it was reported that President Reagan
five days earlier had secretly agreed in principle to send
800-1000 U.S. Marines to join a similar French contingent in
a temporary "evacuating and peacekeeping" force subject to
receipt of a formal request by the government of Lebanon.
The siege of Beirut continued on into August with
bombardment of the city by Israeli tanks, artillery, and
gunboats. Reagan telephoned Begin to express his outrage.16
There were many political ramifications. Skepticism
was expressed in both the Pentagon and Congress about the
role of U.S. forces. The Soviet Union reiterated its
objection to the introduction of U.S. troops in Lebanon.
Arab league countries put forth proposals for the evacuation
of PLO fighters and Syria maneuvered to retain a significant
role in Lebanon while rearming after being bludgeoned by the
Israelis during the invasion.17
On 18 August, final agreement on the terms of the
evacuation and schedule was reached. The Lebanese
government formally requested France, Italy, and the United
States to contribute troops to a multinational force (MNF).
The stated mandate:
... provide assistance to the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) as they carry out their
responsibilities, namely, to facilitate the
withdrawal from Lebanon of Palestinian leaders and
combatants in a manner which will (1) assure the
safety of such deporting personnel; (2) assure the
safety of the person in the area; and (3) further
the restoration of the sovereignty and authority
of Lebanon over the Beirut area.18
The MNF agreement specifically directed that the
command authority would be exercised by each contingent
through existing military channels; however, a liaison and
coordination committee would facilitate communication among
the contingents and the Lebanese Armed forces (LAF).
Further, the MNF would not engage in combat and the duration
of operations was to be no more than 30 days. The French
contingent arrived on 21 August, 1982 with 350 troops. The
U.S. troops consisting of 850 Marines from the 32nd MAU
arrived on 25 August, 1982, and the remaining 510 French and
575 Italian forces arrived on the 26th of August, 1982.19
The Marines from the MAU went ashore with unloaded
individual and crew served weapons. A deliberate decision
was made to demonstrate that the Americans were on a
peace-keeping mission. Moreover, they had to show that they
trusted the Lebanese Armed Forces to maintain security20
European Command (Eucom) peacetime rules of engagement
dictated that the Marines were to carry unloaded weapons,
although it does not take long to insert a magazine into a
weapon and chamber a round. The Marines would take up their
positions within the port area of Beirut.
The highlight of the evacuation was the departure of
PLO leader Yassar Arafat on the 30th of August. The
evacuation of the PLO continued quietly and efficiently with
Marines maintaining port security for the operation. By 3
September, Colonel Mead, the MAU Commander noted a
significant change in atmosphere. In Beirut the lights were
on again at night because of restoration to the city's power
plant. There was increased traffic in the streets, shops
were reopening and the Lebanese were seen repairing damaged
buildings in addition to cleaning up the rubble.21 Over
16,000 Palestinian forces were evacuated and departed for
various Arab countries. The majority of the PLO departed
for Syria. The MNF began its departure on 10 September with
the U.S. Marines. The evacuation was complete on 13
September 1982.22
One day after the evacuation, a bomb exploded at the
headquarters of the Lebanese Christian Phalangist party,
killing Bashir Gemayel, Lebanese President-elect. In the
following days, a brutal massacre of several hundred
Lebanese and Palestinian civilians to include women,
children, and the elderly occurred at the refugee camps of
Sabra and Shatila. Reportedly, it was executed by Christian
Falangist forces.23
President Reagan agreed that getting the PLO out of
Lebanon to curtail their terrorism into Israel was clearly
in our national interests and had sent the Marines for that
purpose. Phillip Habib; however, had guaranteed Yasser
Arafat that the Marines would stay there to protect the PLO
fighters' families. President Reagan, more from a sense of
guilt than as a matter of clear U.S. security interests,
ordered that the Marines return.24
The Multinational Forces would enter Beirut again in
September 1982. The total force was nearly 3,500 troops and
would eventually grow to 5,400 by the summer of 1983. The
Marines came ashore with 1200 troops on 29 September. It is
interesting to note that the new Lebanese President Amin
Gemayel argued throughout for large numbers, even as high as
30,000.25
The two French battalions were deployed in and near the
port of Beirut; two Italian Battalions in the southwest
sector of the city; the U.S. Marine Amphibious Unit(MAU) at
the international airport, and later, the British company
east of the airport.26 The mandate of the new MNF was:
... provide multinational presence requested
by the Lebanese government. More specifically, it
was to provide an interposition force which would
establish "an environment which will permit the
Lebanese armed forces to carry out their
responsibilities; assist the efforts of the
Lebanese government to assure the safety of
persons in the area and bring an end to violence
and facilitate the restoration of Lebanese
government sovereignty and authority in the Beirut
area."27
The Rules of Engagement restricted the armed forces to
self-defense. The 32nd MAU was told if its assigned area
was infiltrated, intruders were to be warned. Only if
Marines and any accompanying Lebanese armed forces were
fired upon could the Marines return fire to ensure their
safety and that of the Lebanese. Finally, the Sixth Fleet
commander was to be prepared to extract forces from Beirut
if it became necessary. Reagan stated that "... our
agreement with the government of Lebanon expressly rules out
any combat responsibilities for the U.S. forces."28 The
State Department informally targeted the withdrawal of the
Marines for no later than the end of December, 1982.
Ambassador Phillip Habib attempted to negotiate a plan
agreeable to the governments of Lebanon, Israel, France, and
Italy. From this plan evolved the 32nd MAU's mission, which
was to "provide ... a presence in Beirut that would in turn
help establish the stability necessary for the Lebanese
government to regain control of their capital."29 This
mission required the 32nd MAU to occupy positions in the
vicinity of Beirut International Airport and to establish
and maintain close continuous liaison with the French,
Italian, and Lebanese forces.30
Beirut II, the second deployment was dubbed, would be
considerably unlike Beirut I. Located positions at the
airport, the Marines would be in the midst of an area
densely populated by Shiite Muslims.
The term "presence" had an even more notorious
connotation with respect to Lebanon. The actual mission
statement was in: general to "provide the multinational
presence requested by the Lebanese government to establish
the stability necessary for the Lebanese government to
regain control of their capital".31 As was mentioned
earlier, the Marines were ordered into and the MNF
reentered Beirut out of guilt more than in U.S. national
interests. The term "presence" was interpreted differently
by each succeeding MAU Commander in Beirut.32 To Colonel
Tim Gerahty it meant:
"... The mission of the MAU in Lebanon here
is a diplomatic mission, a mission of presence,
and implies a showing of the flag, so to speak.
That has been carried out here for over 1 year in
the form of American flag on our bunkers, being
displayed on all our uniforms...our patrolling
that has been quite extensive for the last
year."33
The mission directive was never clearly defined.
Maintaining a non-combat presence presumed a permissive
environment. For that reason, a highly restrictive set of
rules of engagement, as well as force structure, was
designed to maintain a balance between political and
military considerations with a premium on visibility to the
public.34 The presence was to be passive. The operational
directive called for the troops to patrol but not police.35
The other part of the mission which led to a flawed policy
was to create an environment which would allow the LAF to
carry out their responsibilities. This would eventually
lead to training the LAF. The notion of "presence" proved
manageable in the early months of Beirut II, but it became
less so when the MNF was perceived by the Moslem populace as
operating in support of the Lebanese armed forces as they
came into military confrontations with the opposing
militias.36
CHAPTER TWO
ESCALATION AND MISSION CREEP
Both General Gage and Colonel Gerahty witnessed
increasing escalation in dissident attitudes, physical
threats, violence, and killing. Furthermore, both witnessed
their missions "creep" into undeclared war.
In the American colonies, the British troops were
initially deployed along the frontier, essentially the
Appalachian Mountains and Florida, to "protect" the Indians
from encroachment and unfair practices of the colonists.
This situation changed however, upon the initiation of
taxation. The colonies, especially Massachusetts, became
increasingly vocal over the issue of taxation. The colonies
exerted enough pressure on each and every act to cause
parliament to withdraw the various tax legislation. British
troops were moved in ever increasing numbers to Boston and
other coastal towns and cities to restore order.
Quarreling between the soldiers and citizens in Boston
was unavoidable. The British troops were frequently
denounced by colonial organizations, newspapers, and private
individuals in Boston and the Massachusetts Colony.
Soldiers were often arrested for breaches of the peace and
constantly abused with the most bitter and profane epithets.
Furthermore, townspeople did all they could to persuade
soldiers to desert. However, soldiers did not always
conduct themselves with propriety either. Nevertheless, the
British Commanding Officer, Colonel Dalrymple, under strict
orders from Gage, tried to preserve street discipline and
prevent disorder.37
Some British Officers believed that the
"faction" deliberately encouraged attacks upon the
troops in the hope that an incident would occur
which would render the troops odious in the eyes
of mankind and which might have to widen the gulf
between Britain and America."38
It was a cruel situation for the British. The soldiers
were under constant abuse from the populace. Officers found
it exceedingly difficult to keep their own men in order. It
was a frustrating situation because they were not allowed to
employ military force except under instruction from civil
officials. Governor Thomas Hutchinson, Bernard's successor,
dared not employ them to prevent mob action.39 Gage
continued to believe that he had no right to interfere in
civil matters and would not officially persuade civil
authorities to request the military action.40
Incidents in Boston continued to increase with
accidental discharges by soldiers and the routine tar and
feathering of customs' informers. The British commander of
the two regiments in Boston, Dalrymple, predicted a
formidable attack on the main guard by a mob. He reported
to the Boston executive council that citizens still waylaid
and attacked soldiers in the streets and that he was given
orders not to retaliate even though incidents were
escalating. The Boston councilors declared that the only
way to prevent clashes was to remove the soldiers to Castle
Island. At the time, Castle Island barracks needed repairs
and could only garrison one regiment.41
The Boston Massacre(Illustration 1) resulted when a
small mob attacked a British sentry in front of the custom
house. The sentry called for help. Captain Robert Preston,
officer of the Main Guard, at first did nothing because he
could not use force without legal authorization anymore than
the sentry could. after a second call for help, he
immediately sent a sergeant and seven men from the main
guard. The mob attacked the soldiers with clubs and the
soldiers fired their muskets(probably without orders)
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fearing for their own safety. The soldiers reloaded and
prepared to fire againbut were restrained by their
commander. The mob made no attempt to retaliate.
Lieutenant Colonel Carr, Commander of the Fourteenth
Regiment, appeared on the scene and organized units of his
regiment for an armed struggle. The Twenty-ninth Regiment,
though confined to Barracks, was placed under arms.
Selectmen and Justices of the Peace informed Colonel
Dalrymple that they would be unable to hold popular rage in
check unless the soldiers were removed from the town.
Governor Hutchinson's council advised compliance (even
though Dalrymple was outraged) and the Twenty-ninth and
Fourteenth were moved to Castle Island. After the
Fourteenth and Twenty-ninth Regiments were transferred to
Castle Island, the clamor against the soldiers in Boston
died down. Gage planned to move the Twenty-ninth due to
insufficient garrison room and two regiments on Castle
Island would not help improve the situation in
Massachusetts. In the summer of 1772, the Fourteenth
Regiment was relieved by the Sixty-fourth Regiment under
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Leslie, who served as
Commanding Officer at Castle Island until Gage himself
returned to Boston as governor of Massachusetts late in the
spring of 1774.42
Propaganda by the radicals in Boston could have a
debilitating effect on the destinies of Preston and the
soldiers during the aftermath of the Boston Massacre. The
real danger lay in the possibility that a verdict of not
guilty or a verdict of guilty coupled with reprieves or
pardons would cause Boston radicals to take justice into
their hands. Preston was acquitted thanks to John Adams and
his other effective lawyers. The jury decided that four of
the six soldiers fired in self-defense. The other two were
found guilty of manslaughter and were lightly punished.
Gage's own verdict on the cases of Preston and his men
offered to Hutchinson was
... had you or I been in the situation these
men were in, I do believe that we should have
fired in defense of our own lives. It should be
added that the responsibility for sending the
troops to Boston lay with the ministry, but that
the decision for keeping them in the town in the
summer of 1769 came from Bernard and of course
Hutchinson who insisted that the soldiers be kept
in Boston.43
Faced with pressure by the "liberty" mobs, Britain
reacted with astonishing tolerance. By the fall of 1773
nearly all the taxes had been dropped. Tea was the only
product still carrying an import duty, and this was a
minimal threepence on the pound. Still the Sons of Liberty
blocked its sale by their embargo.44 The Townshend Acts,
except for the tax on tea had been rescinded on March 5,
1770 the very day of the Boston Massacre. Some believe Gage
felt that the British government had made the same blunder
twice in repealing the Stamp Act and in repealing the major
portion of the Townshend Acts. In private letters to
Barrington (who twice served as the Secretary of War) he
vehemently denounced his superiors in London because they
continued to assert the vast powers of Parliament in high
words while taking no effective steps to support those
powers.45
To overcome the embargo created by the Americans the
British government planned to slash the price of tea by
changing the law. Parliament granted authority for the East
India Company(EIC) to ignore the imperial trading rules and
to bypass London wholesalers. Stripped of the middle
profit, British tea, now sold direct by the EIC, would be
far cheaper in America than the smuggled products from the
other sources. News of this skillful move to the market by
the British government on the only product still carrying
British duty was greeted with outrage by radial groups in
America. Throughout the coastal towns, the Sons of Liberty
swore they would stop the landing of EIC tea. In New York
the EIC agents were threatened and forced to say: "unless
the act imposing a duty upon tea imported into the colonies
is repealed. there is not the least prospect of it being sold
in the province."46
The British news report of the riot of "Mohawk Indians"
was no great shock, but the destruction of tea which was the
property of a major British corporation, operating under
royal charter was an act that went for beyond acceptable
limits. In London, it was viewed as the ultimate insult to
the British government.47
On Jan 27, 1774 when the official report by Governor
Hutchinson reached London the implications apparent were
more alarming than the destruction of the tea. To the
ministers in London, the letter sounded very inadequate for
the governor of a colony with troops at his command.
Hutchinson reported that he could not organize the 26 man
council that governed Massachusetts. Lieutenant Colonel
Alexander Leslie, commanding a regiment on Castle Island
complained angrily that the council had forbidden him to
march troops on the town. "Leniency won't do now with the
people here".48
It was becoming extremely clear to the British
government that there had to be a limit to tolerance with
the Colonies. The raid on the tea ships had provided proof
that Britains past colonial policy of appearement had been a
complete failure. The British responded by ordering the
blockade of the Boston port. Lord North said in Commons:
"Four or five frigates will do the business without any
military force".49 This would deeply hurt the Bostonians
who earned their living from the port. As soon as the tea
had been paid for the embargo would be lifted. It would
serve as a searing example to the other colonies to curb
their militants. Gage told the King "Whilst we are lambs,
they'll be lions".50 Gage thought that what was needed now
was resolute action. Two other acts, (altogether called the
Coercive acts) were passed to bring Massachusetts under
direct British control. The executive government and the
courts were to come under the unfiltered direction of the
King and his governor. Gage would replace Hutchinson as
governor and he was ordered to arrest and try the tea party
ringleaders. More regiments of troops, destined for
take possession of two cannon that had just arrived and
returned these munitions to Boston. There had been no
resistance and no shots had been fired. However, that same
night, signal bonfires were burning on the hilltops around
Boston. The troops expeditions had been wildly exaggerated
into something more serious: Boston had been bombarded by
the warships in the harbor! Based on this false information
3000 men collected on Cambridge common and an additional
10,000 were reported to be on their way from the back
country of Massachusetts. Crude plans were developing to
advance on Boston "like locusts and rid the town of ever
soldier".55 Selectmen calmed the crowd and hurried to
Cambridge to quell the false information. But the men who
had massed at Cambridge were only part of a total call to
arms that was enveloping all of New England. The news of
the Boston bombardment was still being rushed south,
uncorrected. "The disease; Gage was soon to write
Dartmouth, was believed to have been confined to
Boston...but there is no knowing where to apply the
remedy"56
The last remnants of Gage's civil administration were
fast disappearing, if not already gone. His problems now
primarily military were how best to use his 3000 soldiers.
He decided on retrenchment into the city. By concentrating
his forces, he stood a good chance of defending Boston until
the King resolved to put a "very respectable force" in the
field.57 The government and commissioners moved back into
Boston proper. General Gage prepared for war in the town of
Boston. Guards were placed on all ammunition dumps and
guns (formerly of the Boston Militia). Cannon were placed on
the narrow neck that joined Boston to the mainland. Two 24
pounders and eight 9 pounders were set up in a battery
formation at this site. Military patrols toured the streets
and soldiers began to erect fortifications. Naval warships
were hauled in close to town where they could quickly be
swung around to bring their guns to bear on the city. The
governor, General Gage, dispatched a message to New York to
have all regiments sent to Boston.58
Intelligence reports stated that in Connecticut some
100,000 men were reportedly to be marching on Boston. An
advance party for a 500 man American Cavalry Regiment
confirmed that there was no bombardment. Gradually the news
spread throughout Connecticut that they had been alerted by
a false alarm and they returned home. However, it had been
Massachusetts, boarded transports in British ports. Unlike
the soldiers at Hutchinson's disposal at Castle Island,
these men would be in Boston proper itself and not kept
discreetly out of sight. They would represent a constant
reminder to the Boston citizens of the port that the king
and Parliament meant business.51
The Committees of Correspondence which had formed among
the colonies in America were promoting a campaign to combat
the new British policy by 1774.
A communication system of link express riders
were well established and hardened into a
practical working structure. The tactics that had
been successful in the past should be employed
once more, though this time on a much wider scale:
a combined ban by all the colonies of all trade
with Britain.52
On June 14, 1774 the first troop convoys from Britain
sailed into the harbor. The British troops pitched their
tents in lines on the Boston Common. Other troop transports
were also headed for Boston. British soldiers were
converging on Boston from New York, from Canada, and
Britain. Gage and his commanders sincerely believed that
most of the people of Massachusetts were loyal to the King
but frightened of the radical element in Boston. Therefore,
complaints were received with courtesy, and soldiers were
punished when they seemed at fault. Despite these placatory
efforts, the tension in Boston rose. Gage still had only
about 3000 troops in the port. This seemed relatively few
to handle any large scale troubles. Arresting the
ringleaders seemed undesirable and Gage apparently tried to
bribe Samuel Adams but the response was "the governor should
cease insulting the feelings of an exasperated people".53
Massachusetts was in a state of anarchy. There was no
effective Council and few courts as the radial faction mobs
moved into courtrooms and threatened both judges and
sheriffs. The situation again escalated when on August 26,
1774, the Committees of Correspondence of four Colonies
resolved that a Provincial Congress should take over the
government of the colony because Parliament's laws were
unconstitutional.54
The confrontation came faster than Gage had
anticipated. Intelligence agents reported to Gage that
black powder stored in Charlestown, and owned by the people
of Massachusetts, was being distributed through the country.
On 1 September, 1774, Gage had British soldiers execute a
quiet and efficient operation to confiscate the powder and
a dress rehearsal for undeclared war. Conflict had been
avoided, but nothing in New England would be the same again.
Men had mobilized in the thousands against the British. The
militant patriot movement had progressed beyond votes and
impassioned speeches. It had created an army for a
revolution. Now resistance to the British became even more
aggressive. Every time the British soldiers marched away
from Boston, express messengers on round the clock
intelligence duty rode with the news into the country.
Gage urged Lord Barrington, Secretary of War, to press
the government to repeal the new acts - not because this
would remove the cause of the revolt but because it would
provide time to raise the big army he was convinced was
necessary.59
Adams and other Boston radicals kept public emotions
aroused when articles were published in the press. But by
now they became concerned with more spectacular matters such
as reorganizing the militia and setting up magazines to
supply it. One quarter of the force, the Minutemen were to
be ready to mobilize within hours to the call to arms. This
was definitely the most organized challenge that Gage had
yet encountered and he was impotent to meet this escalation.
Gage marched troops across the neck and into the
country day after day because he wanted the presence of
British soldiers to be a normal sight in the villages. But
every time the troops moved out of Boston, they were
shadowed constantly. News of other trouble came in. The
governor of New Hampshire reported that following the
arrival of a messenger named Paul Revere from Boston, 400
men had assaulted Castle William and Mary, the royal
fortress at Portsmouth. These rebels had seized all the
ammunition, cannon. and small arms. At the same time in
Boston, Admiral Grover reported to London, that the Sons of
Liberty were making open plans to assault Castle William as
soon as the water froze between the island and the mainland.
Moreover, they would take it by sheer numbers. Gage sent a
dispatch to London. If the King wanted to stop this armed
revolt, then he (General Gage) needed an army of 20,000
men!60
Other variables arose such as the one in France that
affected this situation. America was the territory of
conflict between the English and French. This could be
tempting to a France humiliated in the French and Indian
Wars ten years before. Lord Dartmouth wrote Gage
"Everything depends on what ministers the young King (Louis
VII) will choose to put his confidence in".61 Another
factor emerged that closely linked France. This was the
Quebec Act which restructured the government of Canada,
altered its borders and gave formal recognition to the Roman
Catholic Church in Canada. Horace Walpole writes "that the
court was preparing a Catholic Army to keep the colonies in
as great subjection as they had been when Canada was in the
hands of the French".62 This act added to an already
festering stream of grievances by the colonies. All
governors of all the colonies had warned the British
government of universal support to Boston and Massachusetts
and violent opposition to Parliament's measures. Three
ships of the line and 600 Marines were dispatched so Gage
would have a fighting force that, in addition to his ships,
amounted to nearly 4000 men. To further heighten the crisis
King George IV issued a battle cry:
... the line of battle seems chalked
out...The New England governments are in a state
of rebellion, blows must decide whether they are
to be subject to this country or independent.63
When Gage's letter reached London, government hard
liners dominated the cabinet meetings. Dartmouth wrote to
Gage ordering him that now force was to be repelled by
force. The long term plan was to give Gage a strength of
10,000 men - exactly half of what he had asked for, but more
than double what he already had - and was ordered:
... to take a more active and determined part"
than the defensive policy he had operated under so
far and "the first essential step" was to arrest
and imprison the principal actors...in the
Provincial Congress [Adams and Hancock}.64
The King planned to support Gage by sending to Boston
three Generals. William Howe, who had led the assault up
the plains of Abraham when Wolfe stormed Quebec, "Gentlemen
Johnny" Buegoyne, a flashy but competent cavalry commander
and Sir Henry Clinton."65
We were promised, taunted Charles Fox
(speaking in the House of Commons) that on the
very appearance of troops all was to be
tranquility at Boston, yet so far from reducing
the spirit of that people, these troops were
reduced... reduced to the most shameful
situation...66
General Gage is fairly consistent in his assertions
that the policy of the British government should be one of
hardline resolve in order to effectively crush any
opposition to the mother country and Parliament's
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legislation. However, British appeasement actions to the
colonists' reactions is typical of a "soft policy." This is
clearly evidenced following the Boston Massacre by their
willingness to submit one of their officers, Captain
Preston, to be tried by the colonials. Yet, if he had
committed any offense at all, it was a military crime
subject to trial by military court. Furthermore, they
withdrew the troops to Castle Island in the harbor. Only
when the King and Parliament became so outraged by the
destruction of tea in 1774, did the government respond with
appropriate force; yet, the 10,000 troops sent were only
half the number requested by General Gage. The measures
taken by the British Government to support and enforce the
Coercive Acts with naval ships and troops came too late as
the colonists had organized an army for revolution. General
Gage was involved in an "undeclared war." The continual
escalation of events culminated in disaster for the British
on the road back from Lexington and Concord.
The events in Beirut are very similar to the ones that
occurred in America 200 years earlier. Lebanon is a bit
more complex; however, the escalation and final tragedy was
just as compelling as the events in the colonies in 1775.
The Marines would spend 18 months in Lebanon in which
the mission of "presence" was not changed. When 32nd MAU
began its presence mission, Colonel Mead conducted a map
reconnaissance at the positions he was to occupy at the
airport. He readily determined that he needed the high
ground approximately 5 kilometers east of the airport to
guarantee the MAU's safety ashore if the situation began to
deteriorate. However, Ambassador Draper and Israeli Defense
Minister Aerial Sharon had mutually agreed to permit the
Israeli forces to use the Old Sidon Road for resupplying
their troops in the Shouf Mountains. If the Marines took
the heights that Colonel Mead had wanted, it would have
created a politically unacceptable perception that the
United States was protecting Israeli supply routes. Thus,
the Americans would be looked upon as anti-Muslim and
certainly less than neutral with respect to the Israelis, an
image completely opposite from that which the Marines wanted
to portray. Therefore, the decision was to restrict the
Marines to a location in the vicinity of and to the west of
the unused railroad tracks at the southeastern portion of
the airport perimeter. The military importance of the high
ground to the east of the Old Sidon Road was reiterated to
Ambassador Habib. While Habib may have recognized the
validity of the Marines rationale to hold the high ground,
he refused to permit the MAU to occupy them.67
Evident to all parties concerned was the fact that the
overall effectiveness of the MNF in bolstering the Lebanese
Army would depend on a diplomatic effort to withdraw Israeli
and Syrian forces, and the establishment of a new political
consensus in the country. Negotiations for this withdrawal
started up in December but proceeded very slowly. At the
same time, the U.S. contingent embarked on a new function
which was to train and rebuild the Lebanese Army. Some
believe that the perception of neutrality by the MNF had
started to deteriorate.69
The situation in Beirut was in control through February
1983 when the Lebanese Army without incident took control of
East Beirut from the Lebanese Christian militia which had
ruled there since the 1975-1976 Civil War.
The Headquarters of the 32nd MAU and those MAU's that
succeeded it were located in a two story reinforced concrete
building which had formerly house the airports firefighting
school facilities. The BLT occupied a bombed out, fire
damaged, four story reinforced concrete building, southwest
of the MAU Headquarters. Marines manned sentry posts,
dug-in bunkers, and at check points dug in regular chest
high fighting holes which were also sand bagged and rigged
with overhead cover.70
In an exception to the relative calm, there were
several incidents from January to April involving U.S. and
IDF troops. One incident involved Captain Johnson a Company
Commander of LIMA Co. BLT 3-8, who forced three Israeli
tanks from entering the Marines/Lebanon checkpoint
position.71
At this time the U.S. was promising to do everything
necessary to guarantee Israel's security after its
withdrawal from Lebanon. On 16 March 1983 in the first such
incident, Italian and U.S. MNF units were attacked on patrol
and received non-fatal injuries. The sense of
accomplishment following the apparent successes of Beirut's
I and II were diminishing in the face of the increasing
terrorist threat.72
On 18 April a truck drove to the U.S. embassy and its
cargo of explosives detonated killing scores of Lebanese. A
total of 63 people were killed. The pro-Islamic Jihad
organization claimed responsibility.73
On 17 May, following direct efforts by Secretary of
State George Schultz, Lebanon and Israel concluded a
withdrawal which contained an assertion that the state of
war between them no longer exists and gave Israel certain
supervisory authority in security regions in Southern
Lebanon. Muslim elements in Lebanon reacted negatively to
this agreement and Syria flatly refused to pull its troops
out as the accord contemplated. Clashes along political and
religious lines broke out, including artillery shelling on
Lebanese Army positions.74
On 30 May, Marine Colonel Timothy J. Gerahty, the 24th
MAU commander, assumed responsibility as commander of the
U.S. contingent of a multi-national force in Beirut.
Lieutenant Colonel Gerlach commanded BLT 18. The BLT
commander, upon his arrival in Beirut immediately began to
improve his positions at the airport.
On 22 July the airport was attacked by guns and rocket
launchers fired by members of Walid Jumblatt's predominately
Druze Progressive Society. Nearly a dozen 122mm rockets and
102mm shells exploded inside the Marine perimeter.
Anti-American sentiment escalated at the end of the month
when a group of two or three Shia Muslim supporters of Amal
fired short bursts of automatic fire at Marines who were
jogging in the perimeter of the airport. As a result of
these attacks, the 24th MAU begin a series of lethal and
non-lethal responses.75
On 28 August, the MNF engaged in combat for the first
time when Marines and Lebanese soldiers were fired upon by
automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades. In
accordance with the rules of engagement, marines responded
with carefully orchestrated return fire. The next day's
fighting intensified around the airport and Druze mortar
fire continued to land on Marine lines. The BLTs 81mm
mortars fired six illumination rounds over one of the
suspect positions in an effort to suppress its fire.
Minutes later 82 mm mortar fire killed one Marine and
wounded four others. The U.S. Marines suffered the MNFs
first casualties of the war. All four MNF contingents were
under fire by this time and on 30 August four French
soldiers were killed. On 1 September President Reagan said
there would be no change in the force's role and no increase
in the size of the unit. However, on 1 September he ordered
a carrier and two thousand Marines to sit off shore.76
On 3 and 4 September, acting at the request of Lebanon
and the MNF countries, Israel withdrew its force from the
Beirut area to the Awali River. This move created a void
that the Lebanese Army was unprepared to fill, and the
result was fierce fighting along factional lines which
eventually became a battle for the city. The Muslim Druze
militia occupied all territory in the hills overlooking the
airport except the town of Souk-El-Garb which was later
taken by the Lebanese Army.
Shelling and sporadic fire continued on the MNF units,
moreover, the MNF were taking fatalities. Marines
positioned at the Southern end of the airport continued to
receive artillery rocket and small arms fire as the Lebanese
Army continued to use the area as a staging base for
operations in the Shouf Mountains. A heavy rocket attack
hit the Marines on 5 September killing two and wounding two
others. Marines responded by firing 155mm illumination
rounds. The LAF attack in the hills faltered with the
result ending with the Druze owning all high ground
overlooking Beirut and Marine positions at the airport. In
a show of force on 7 September, France and the United States
launched warplanes over the city of Beirut from offshore
ships. On 8 September, during the visit of General Gray (CG
2d MarDiv) and General Miller (CG FMFLANT), three rocket
rounds landed approximately two hundred meters from where
they were standing. A coordinated 155 howitzer volley and a
5 inch salvo from the USS Bowen responded marking the first
time a U.S. warship had fired on the mainland.77
On 12 September, the Reagan administration granted
broad authority to U.S. ground commanders in Lebanon to call
on naval gun fire and air strikes to defend themselves and
assist the Lebanese Army and other MNF units. This was
based on a determination by the U.S. National Command
Authorities that the successful defense of Souk-El-Garb by
the LAF was essential to the safety of the Marines.
As mentioned earlier, the Israeli pullback from central
Lebanon created a power vacuum that was filled by warring
Lebanese factions. Druze combatants, supported by the
Syrians, PLO, and Shiite militias fought against Lebanese
rightists. The Druze coalition began to prevail, giving
Special Envoy McFarlane ammunition to make a case for a
stronger U.S. Military role. McFarlane advocated a show of
force in order to coerce the Syrians to cooperate.
McFarlane found a persuasive reason to employ the Marines as
a result of a battle in the Shouf Mountains for the village
of Souk-El-Garb. According to Tom Friedman (New York Times
Bureau Chief in Lebanon), this involvement changed the local
perception of Americans deployed in Lebanon from neutral
peacekeepers to just another warring faction.78 Once the
Marines were perceived as part of the factional strife in
Lebanon, they too would become vulnerable to attack.
Soon after the fighting on September 19th 1983, the
Lebanese Commander-in-Chief, who belonged to the rightist
group, implied that he would like to see the U.S. Marines
directly involved in the fighting on the side of the
Lebanese Army. The reasoning was the fact that the Syrian's
were actively supporting the Druze. Despite prior
opportunities to do so, the U.S. generally had declined to
be drawn into the factional strife in Lebanon. This would
change, however, when McFarlane misused his authority as
special envoy and became the equivalent of an "artillery
spotter" for the Lebanese rightists. Syrian and Palestinian
backed Druze units had started an artillery and ground
assault on a Lebanese Army unit that controlled a ridge
overlooking Beirut. The Lebanese commander said that he was
under massive attack and requested U.S. help. According to
Friedman; McFarlane ordered the Marine Commander in Beirut
to have the Navy ships under his authority fire in support
of the Lebanese Army. To his credit, the American Marine
Commander in Beirut, strenuously but unsuccessfully opposed
McFarlane's order because it would make American troops
party to intra-Lebanese factional fighting; moreover, that
Lebanese Muslims would retaliate against American Marines
ashore. Overruling this advice, McFarlane had the guided
missile cruisers Virginia, John Rogers, Bowen, and the
destroyer Radford fire 360 five-inch shells at the Druze,
Syrian, and Palestinian forces. This gave rise to the
extensive and excessive use of American force. A Defense
Department official stated that this action had been
approved at the highest levels.79
Soon after this incident, the U.S. battleship New
Jersey arrived in Lebanese waters. Colonel Gerahty
recognized that providing U.S. naval gunfire support to the
LAF had changed his mission. The Marines would now be
considered legitimate targets by anti-government forces.80
For the next several days the Ambassadors residence and the
Minister of Defense came under heavy shelling. The U.S.
Warships Bowen and Virginia responded with 30 five inch
rounds.
A change began to appear in the MAU's official report;
"naval gunfire became the weapon of choice,
if it could engage the enemy firing units, as it
gave some separation from U.S. MNF and did not
require them to use organic howitzers firing HE
rounds in defense of the LAF or MOD (Ministry of
Defense)." This marked the first time the
anti-government elements were referred to as enemy
in any Marine report.81
On 23 September, fighting continued around the airport.
Simultaneously, both the French and Italian compounds were
taken under fire. The MAU fired 81mm HE rounds into
suspected AMAL positions and that evening 155mm howitzers
and NGF engaged artillery positions that were firing on the
airport. At this point, diplomats had managed to arrange a
cease-fire to take effect on 26 September. However, sniper
fire continued to harass MNF forces and sporadic fighting
continued to occur in the suburbs. In October, 1983, the
cease fire began to unravel as PLO members began to
infiltrate back into the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.
Snipers again began to fire on one of the Marine positions
located at the Lebanese University. On 8 October, heavy
fighting erupted between the Lebanese forces and the militia
at Burj Al Batajinah, Ash Shuwayfat, and Khaldah.
On 16 October, Company A, at the Lebanese University,
came under siege. They were fired on by RPGs heavy machine
guns and automatic weapons. The Marines responded by firing
Dragon anti-tank missiles and silenced one of the machine
guns. Fighting eventually tapered off by midnight.82
Beirut was quiet on the 21st and 22nd of October. On
23 October, the BLT headquarters building of the U.S.
Marines was destroyed by an extremely powerful explosion in
a suicide terrorist bomb attack. Casualties included 241
killed and more than 100 wounded. Almost simultaneously, a
similar attack occurred at the French MNF barracks killing
58. The Free Islamic Revolution Movement claimed
responsibility for both attacks.83
In the aftermath of these tragedies, the MNF tried to
show resolve in the face of a situation that was all but
hopeless. Both France and the United States continued air
attacks on anti-government installations and the New Jersey
brought its mammoth 16 inch guns into action on 14 December
firing on Syrian occupied positions after reconnaissance
planes had encountered gun fire. 22 MAU had replaced 24th
MAU in what is termed Beirut VI and would be the last U.S.
MNF which would stay in Beirut from 20 November 1983 to
February 26th 1984. This time the Marines would occupy
extensively dug-in sea-land containers until their pullout.
On 7 February the Shiite and Druze militias took control of
West Beirut from the Lebanese Army. The MNF troops would
pullout the end of March, 1984. President Reagan notified
Congress that he had
... decided that the U.S. would terminate its
participation in the MNF. The MNF was no longer a
necessary or appropriate means of achieving
American goals in Lebanon.
Clearly, from an analysis viewpoint, when the MNF
returned to Beirut following the Sabra and Shatila
massacres, the Muslim opposition thought that the MNF was
there to protect civilians. Later, these factions viewed
the MNF as the enemy. Perhaps these same factions also
viewed the ambitious program of training and rebuilding the
Lebanese Army as taking sides and not maintaining
neutrality. In the view of some, the perception of a
neutral MNF began to deteriorate. While the notion of
presence proved manageable in the early months, it became
less so when the MNF was perceived by the Moslem populace as
operating in support of the Lebanese armed forces and they
came into ever increasing military confrontation with the
opposition militias. The "window of opportunity" closed
(discussed in a later chapter) with the refusal of Israel to
withdraw its troops in October of 1982. Many saw the
destruction of the embassy on April 18, 1983, as retribution
for America's support for the Israeli invasion. Rightly or
wrongly, the U.S. was viewed as providing Israel assistance
in the form of weapons, money, and diplomatic cooperation.85
The agreement of 17 May 1983, was seen by many Lebanese as
ceding the south to Israeli control. This is when many
clashes occurred due to the outrage of Muslim Lebanese.
Marine and LAF units were consequently fired upon during
patrols. U.S. Naval gunfire support provided for the LAF in
the battle for Souk-EI-Garb is viewed as a "watershed" when
the MNF, especially the U.S., deserted a neutral stance.
More likely, the loss of neutrality occurred earlier and the
shelling only represented the escalation of combat.86
Colonel Gerahty, in command ashore at this time, and his
Marines responded vigorously with artillery and naval
gunfire as they were shelled. In my opinion, it is at this
point that the mission of peacekeeping became one of
"undeclared war." The opposition increased the ante when
the terrorist bombed the BLT Headquarters. Just like in the
American colonies, the MNF in Beirut became the "problem"
rather than the solution.
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CHAPTER THREE
WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY
The British government grew increasingly committed to
their quest of subjugating the colonies in order to enforce
the taxes levied by Parliament. As British soldiers
attempted to restore order by their "presence," they became
the fundamental obstacle to reconciliation and peace.
Similarly, when the U.S. government grew committed to
Gemayel and the Lebanese government, opposing factions
identified the U.S. Marines as enemy forces. Therefore, the
"presence" of the Marines became an obstacle to Lebanese
conciliation and peace.87 In both of these missions, the
opportunity for peace and reconciliation manifested itself.
But, these "windows of opportunity" remained open for only a
short period of time.
In my opinion, the independence of the American
colonies from Great Britain would have occurred at some
point in the future. Moreover, granting the American
colonies their independence would have been less costly for
the British government than financing the American War of
Revolution.
An opportunity did present itself for the British
government to acquire the necessary funds to finance a small
standing army on the frontier of the colonies. Benjamin
Franklin suggested that Parliament establish an American
currency and obtain a revenue from that currency. Another
suggestion by colonial agents called for voting the needed
money in the colonial assemblies. Instead, Prime Minister
Grenville was determined to impose the Sugar and Currency
Acts (discussed earlier). Historians have determined that a
considerable number of people in England thought the
measures unwise and dangerous.88 From this point on in
America, the situation continued to deteriorate and unrest
escalate.
Following the successful evacuation of the PLO from
Beirut, and subsequent redeployment of the MNF in the wake
of the Sabra and Shatila massacres, a "window of
opportunity" was indeed open for peace in Lebanon. The
three critical months of October, November, and December,
1982, determined the future of Lebanon. It was the failure
to begin reconciliation, and, more importantly, to bring
about the withdrawal of foreign forces (Israel and Syria)
from Lebanon. It was failure to withdraw Israeli and Syrian
forces, as well as any residual PLO elements, that lead to a
deteriorating environment marked by escalating anti-MNF
violence in 1983 and 1984.
CHAPTER FOUR
COMMAND AND CONTROL
An analysis of the Command and Control aspects of the
two operations under study is necessary in order to
ascertain the impact on the mission. Further, command and
control aspects need to be analyzed in order to determine if
they had any impact on the Commanders' decisions.
General Gage's chain of command was fairly
unconvoluted. He reported to the Secretary of War, Lord
Barrington, in England and ultimately King George III. The
problem with the command structure was not the successive
"filtration layers" as seen in Beirut but the time/distance
factor of communications. Any correspondence between the
Commander-in-Chief and government officials in London would
take at least a month to complete. This type of control is
certainly not conducive to the peacekeeping operations in
which General Gage was involved. The situation in Boston
could change rapidly between extreme violence or subdued
calm in this time frame. The British reaction to the
colonists action was slow or ended up with wrong policy
decisions due to these rapid changes. In my opinion, it is
certainly understandable that General Gage and the British
troops could be and were left in many frustrating situations
due to the vulnerability in the Command and Control
structure.
Colonel Gerahty was involved in a situation where the
command structure was seemingly a complex web of "confusion"
of successive filtration layers (see Chart 1). Colonel
Gerahty was the Commander of the U.S. Multinational Force in
Beirut as well as the MAU(Marine Amphibious Unit) Commander.
He reported to a multi-layered optional chain of command in
addition to an administrative chain of command at FMFLANT
(Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic). Furthermore, the State
Department Chain of Command had direct influence on
decisions he made. Dr. Mathews in his Doctoral Dissertation
likened the Command structure and operational aspects to a
"slinky". It could contract so that policy and decisions
came immediately from the top or contract so that policies,
decisions, or requests had to filter through successive
levels of authority. Even the Long Commission concluded
that the command structure created a problem for physical
security for the USMNF ashore.
Now, there is one other problem with such a long chain
of command, and it was noted by the Long Commission set up
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to investigate the destruction of the Marine Barracks. With
such a large number of people in the chain, everybody
assumes the other guy is going to take care of the problem,
whatever the problem is.89 Both commanders faced
frustrating Command and Control structures exacerbated by
deteriorating situations on the ground.
CHAPTER FIVE
MISSION CREEP AND CREDITABLE FORCE
When comparing and analyzing "mission creep" by General
Gage and Colonel Gerahty, "presence" becomes the key element
in both operations. For General Gage in America, the
"presence" of British soldiers to restore peace and the
protection of custom officials was the main reason troops
were dispatched to Boston. The flawed British colonial
policy, as discussed earlier, precipitated this expansion in
mission. Furthermore, many would argue that the term
"presence" has various meanings, one of which is visibility
of some kind. John F. Lolly, Council for the Congressional
Investigations' Subcommittee, in his questioning of Col.
Gerahty in the hearings before the committee on Armed
Services made a significant comment:
... that it is an inherent conflict for the
commander to be placed in the position where he
has to try and maintain visibility and try to
maintain security, and it is, in my view an
impossible situation.90
In Boston, the presence of troops only exacerbated the
tension with the colonists and, coupled with British policy,
only served to increase escalation. Attempts were made by
the colonists to force the British troops out of Boston.
This constant "mob pressure" resulted in the Boston Massacre
in 1770. As time passed and escalation increased, the
troops became viewed by the government as instruments of
punishment as evidenced by the Coercive Acts, and became
viewed by the colonists as the enemy. However, by this time
in 1775 Boston, the mission clearly "creeped" from
protection of the custom officials, to locating radical
"faction" members for trial, to enforcing Parliamentary
legislation, to undeclared warfare in a full scale
insurrection. Gage did not initially have a creditable
force in Boston. His only two regiments had a combined
strength of 954 troops. His forces were strengthened
following the Boston Tea Party to approximately 3000 in
order to bring Boston under British control. However, this
number of troops still seemed inadequate to handle the
"armed" population the size of Massachusetts.
Mission "creep evolved in Lebanon as the Muslim
populace perceived the MNF as operating with the Lebanese
armed forces to defeat the opposition. When the United
States utilized naval gunfire to support the LAF during the
battle of Souk-El-Garb, the concept or mission of presence
became obsolete.91 This can be related to creditable force
as well. The Marines were in a static defensive position at
the airport. "We had Marines flapping our arms saying we
are sitting ducks and I had no authority to move out of the
airport."92 Just like General Gage Colonel Gerahty found
himself in a situation of an "undeclared war". Rocket and
mortar attacks on the Marines would be dealt with by the
NGF, artillery and air strikes. Clearly, Gerahty's mission
evolved into full scale combat.
CHAPTER SIX
DISASTER
There would be tragic loss of life and ultimate
disaster for the forces under Gage and Gerahty. General
Gage had some experience with the tactics used by the
colonists against the British forces on their ill-fated
withdrawal from Concord to Boston. When General Gage was a
Lieutenant Colonel, he had charge of the advance force for
General Braddock that was ambushed during the French and
Indian Wars. However, the sheer magnitude of the colonial
forces slaughtering the British troops on their return from
Concord appalled even him.
Gage had received an intelligence report that if the
British army went out of Boston and into the country,
Minutemen would oppose them. The report stated that about
500 Minutemen and their whole magazine of powder, consisting
of 90 to 100 barrels was at Concord, 18 miles from Boston.
For psychological as well as practical reasons, this new
crisis demanded a military gesture. So a raid on Concord
was planned for the night of April 18, 1775. 700 troops
slipped quietly across the Boston common to the water and
ferried to a farm located on the other side. Troops were
issued thirty-six rounds of ammo per man. Colonel Smith,
commanded this outfit which was headed by six light infantry
companies under Major Pitcairn of the Royal Marines. Their
movement would take them toward Lexington and the next town
beyond which was Concord.
A group of British officers on a forward recce captured
Paul Revere on the road to Concord. Revere said "There'll
be five hundred Americans here in a short time" for I've
alarmed the country all the way up. Several more express
riders were stopped and all spoke confidently of 1000 men
massing on the village green in Lexington.93 An officer had
been sent to Colonel Smith, located with the grenadiers
farther back down the road, warning that impending
opposition was likely. Smith upon hearing the American
signaling guns sent an urgent message back to Boston
requesting reinforcements. Major Pitcairn reformed the
column in case of ambush and the British column moved into
Lexington where they could see ranks of men waiting on the
green for them. Pitcairn was on the scene close enough to
assess the situation, and decided upon a course of action.
He could hardly continue marching on to Concord leaving men
formed up for conflict in his rear at Lexington. He shouted
for the rebels to lay down their arms.
The first shot of the American Revolution was fired
(probably from the direction of Buckman Tavern by an
American from across the green). The British soldiers
reacted fiercely. For months they had to endure insults and
harassment from the provincials in Boston. Without order,
they raised their muskets and fired, then charged. Pitcairn
tried to stop them but none obeyed. The troops were
seemingly intent on slaughter. Colonel Smith arrived on the
scene and was horrified at the sight. He immediately had a
drummer sound orders. Only then did the angry troops obey
their officers and reform ranks. By then there was not an
American in sight except for eight dead men lying awkwardly
on the grass.94
The British soldiers continued then to march for
Concord, the elite corps of grenadiers following the light
infantry. The road was deserted. The British observed a
column of several hundred men moving toward them from
Concord. They stopped and then moved back into the town.
The sight of this column of Americans was enough to warn the
British that there was organized opposition in Concord just
as in Lexington only of a larger size. When the column
halted in Concord, Colonel Smith ordered contingents to hold
the bridges north and south to hold off any Americans who
might converge on Concord from the neighboring countryside.
A crisis occurred at the north bridge. Captain Parsons
had command of seven companies to hold the bridge and had
orders to conduct a raid on a farm owned by Militia Colonel
James Barrett. Ostensibly, this farm had harbored a large
arms dump. As soon as the British reached the bridge they
saw a militia of 400 men approaching. Parsons posted two
companies to his right to cover the road, left one at the
bridge and marched off to Barrett farm with the rest. At
the bridge Captain Laurie decided that despite his orders to
hold the bridge, his little force was too small to challenge
a large number of men. He formed his troops in ranks hoping
the Americans would halt. They did not, and firing erupted.
Two soldiers died. When Parsons returned he only saw the
two dead soldiers one of which had been scalped.95
At the time Lord Percy was marching with his Brigade
from Boston in response to Colonel Smith's request for
reinforcements. Colonel Smith gave the orders to start the
18 mile march home. Flankers were put out. On the
Lexington road the hill sloped down to a small bridge over a
stream. As the British column approached the stream, the
flankers moved back onto the highway in order to cross. The
Americans were waiting in ambush for them on the right of
the hill. Lieutenant Sutherland said "I dare say near a
thousand were approaching through the trees. Then a much
larger body drawn up to my left".96 The Americans fired and
slaughtered men in the forward companies. The troops fired
back only to find their targets had taken cover behind stone
walls and trees. The officers urged their men on. But the
incident at the bridge would not be an isolated one. All
along the road Americans were taking up covered positions.
Every clump of trees, or boulders, or houses, shots rang
out. This was infuriating to the British troops who thought
this was "dirty fighting". These were methods of men afraid
to stand and fight, who thought nothing of shooting a man in
the back! The flankers did their best, but the numbers of
Americans were in the thousands. As the soldiers reached
Lexington they were ragged and tired. They had no sleep the
night before and had marched 20 miles since the previous
morning. As the British troops continued to move down the
route, firing continued and more soldiers died. The British
troops were at the breaking point and did at one time panic
and began to run but the officers were able to gain order.
When they arrived at Lexington village, they could see three
ranks of British soldiers formed from Lord Percy's First
Brigade. Percy allowed half an hour recovery time and then
ordered the 1800 British soldiers to begin their march to
Boston. But as the column advanced a mile "they were fired
at by all quarters".97 The "Indian style" fighting
techniques appalled the British and as a result, angry
soldiers rushed house after house, killing everyone they
could find. The number of British killed and wounded grew,
and as they approached Cambridge the firing became more
intense.
The Americans who had been streaming into Cambridge all
day, were assembling ahead in greater numbers than the
British had yet encountered. Percy realized that he had to
choose the alternate route to Charlestown in order to get
back. By the time they approached the narrow neck that
connected the mainland to the Charlestown peninsula it was
dusk, and for the first time since they had left Lexington,
they were no longer under fire.98 Percy did not know what
to expect from the inhabitants of Charlestown, so he gave
the orders for the column to proceed onto Bunker Hill and
prepare to defend the high position. Gage sent additional
troops to assist in manning the defensive positions that
Percy's hard pressed force had set up on the northern slopes
of Bunker Hill facing the mainland. Slowly the British were
evacuated across the waters to Boston.99
It has been a disastrous day, 237 casualties, many
wounded, but as always many of them would soon die. It was
an appalling total, considering the quality of the soldiers
(i.e. the grenadiers) - many of them from the best fighting
units in the British Army - and the nature of the attackers:
farm men, largely ungeneraled and uncoordinated.100
Like General Gage, Colonel Gerahty had prior
experience with the tactics used by the warring opposition
in Lebanon. This was due to the car bombing of the U.S.
Embassy in Beirut. Gerahty stated: "...in the case of the
embassy I think they were talking about the bomb
around(2500) or (2800) pounds of explosive force."101
However, Gerahty's experience was not on the same scale when
related to the BLT Headquarters bombing.
"Massive, massive .... The blast focus - when you are
talking 12,000 and 15,000 lbs. of explosives...." "This is
the car bomb capital of the world, but we had not thought of
a truck bomb."102 Perhaps the retaliatory efforts during
peacekeeping/ peace-enforcing missions should be studied
closely, because the ultimate aim of the escalation is to
enduce the military occupiers to leave the country. Such
was the case in the colonies and in Beirut. Furthermore,
both efforts succeeded!
CHAPTER SEVEN
INTELLIGENCE
The intelligence aspect of these two peacekeeping
operations is significant from the standpoint of possibly
averting disaster and mission failure. In that context, a
determination can be made on whether the slaughter on the
road back from Concord and the BLT Headquarters building
bombing might have been avoided.
Clearly, records indicate that General Gage had a
considerable intelligence network. Furthermore, he had
lived in America for 12 years, served as a Lieutenant
Colonel under General Braddock in the French and Indian War,
and had married a woman born in the colonies. Of any man in
the official British hierarchy, he should have had a clear
understanding of the makeup, character, and intentions of
the colonists.
In early 1775, General Gage attempted to find out the
plan of action of the rebels as well as learn the nature of
the country around Boston. In this way, his troops could
operate at maximum efficiency. Troops and loyalists
reported to a Stephen Kimble whom Gage placed in charge of
his intelligence operations. Even more valuable to Gage was
a source of information with direct access to rebel
headquarters in Concord. Historians believe that this man
was Dr. Benjamin Church, a fiery orator and a trusted man in
the colonies. Apparently Gage had more than two spies at
Concord for records indicate he had a clear picture of rebel
equipment and stores located there.103
It is my opinion that General Gage did have an
extremely clear picture of rebel activities in and around
Boston and Concord. (But what is puzzling, is why he
ordered the guns and powder of Concord seized with a force
of only 700 troops is still in debate. This is a
significant point because in September 1774. after the
seizure of powder at Charlestowne, the rebels had set
bonfires on the hilltops around Boston signaling that the
British had bombarded: the city. As discussed earlier, the
aftermath saw the rebels massing by the thousands in
response. It had been a dress rehearsal. (The answer
probably can be arrived at by the fact that Gage had
approximately 3000 troops in Boston and thought the seizure
could be carried out swiftly and quite efficiently.) It
should be mentioned here that some historians believe Mrs.
Gage furnished information to the colonial leaders for the
raid on Concord. However, no conclusive evidence can be
found.104
In contrast to General Gage, who possessed an intimate
knowledge of the colonies, Colonel Gerahty was thrust into a
situation with limited knowledge of Lebanon and a scenario
with limited human intelligence in relation to the dissident
groups in the area.105 Even the Long Commission concluded
that Colonel Gerahty was not provided timely intelligence
tailored to his specific needs which would have enabled him
to defend against the threat that he faced. Furthermore,
that the failure of adequate intelligence and assets
severely limited his ability to perceive the threat.
However, could the American Embassy bombing in May have been
a "dress rehearsal" for the BLT Headquarters bombing? And
could it have alerted" the MNF forces to take appropriate
defensive steps? Colonel Gerahty provided insight:
I think I have counted over 100 car bomb
threats for instance...as a game for a threat, we
were talking about car bombs, or, in the case of
the Embassy, I think they were talking about the
bomb around 2500 or 2800 pounds of explosive
force. Security against bomb damage that could be
caused of the magnitude that hit the BLT building
on the 23rd of October is just of a magnitude as
to completely remove any security...on the basis
of the terrorist truck bomb, is that they could,
with the killing power they have with that kind of
explosive power, could park in the main airport
road without ever getting inside the compound and
blow my headquarters, my MSSG and half of us away
without ever getting inside the compound.106
The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Kelly,
stated that there was no shred of intelligence which would
have alerted a reasonable and prudent commander to the new
and unique security threat of kamikaze truck bombs.107
Perhaps Gerahty and all other MNF officials could not fathom
a threat of this magnitude as all evidence suggests.
CHAPTER EIGHT
TRAINING AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
General Gage initially commanded what can be termed a
"rough lot" of men in the colonies up until the time of the
Coercive Acts. Many of the soldiers were pressed into
service. Discipline was-harsh and rigidly enforced.
However, as events escalated in Boston, crack regiments were
shipped to The New World. Those included grenadiers and
Marines who were elite British soldiers especially trained
for the high spectrum of war.
When introduced in the army in 1677, the
function of the grenadiers had been to hurl hand
grenades among the enemy's ranks at close
quarters. The size and weight of these missiles
demanded that the throwers should be tall of
stature and muscular in build. By 1775, the
grenades had disappeared, but the grenadiers still
remained, representing in. height-and strength the
flower of each regiment.108
The American Marines who entered Lebanon were also
highly trained in the high spectrum of warfare. The
difference between the British soldiers of colonial times
and the 1980's American Marines is that the Marines were all
volunteers, professional, and possessed a high degree of
self-discipline. Colonel Gerahty provided insight on the
Marines he commanded:
Discipline has not been a problem, in fact,
on the contrary, the discipline and the morale of
the force since the time we first got together
last January till this afternoon testifying before
the Armed Services Investigation Committee in
Washington, D.C. is as high and as positive of any
unit I have been in and I have been 20-plus years
at this and I say that with all honesty.109
If both commanders were in charge of highly disciplined
and well trained troops, how could both missions end in
disaster? An examination of the rules of engagement may
provide a clue. Certainly the rules of engagement were not
the cause of disaster in either case. However, they may
have been a contributing factor.
During the occupation of Boston by British troops up
until Lexington and Concord, General Gage tried to preserve
strict discipline and order. As Commander-in-chief, Gage
was the authority for determining rules of engagement.
However, he refused to authorize use of military force
except under instruction from civil officials until he
became governor of Massachusetts in 1775, at the time of the
Coercive Acts. As for the civilian leadership: "Neither
Governor Bernard nor his successor, Governor Thomas
Hutchinson, who took office on July 31, 1769, nor any other
qualified officer dare to employ them to prevent mob
action."110
British troops in Boston were to be a stabilizing
presence for order. They could not initiate force by arms
and because of these constraints, the colonists perceived
their weaknesses which contributed to an ever increasing
escalation of violence leading to open rebellion. Even the
Journal of the Times in 1769 ran articles of attack on the
British in Boston and stated that their presence was
illegal.111
The situation that occurred in Lebanon is strikingly
similar. The Marines performed their mission under normal
peacetime rules of engagement. The force was not to engage
in combat and force was to be used only as required for
self-defense against a hostile threat, or act, or in defense
of Lebanese Army elements operating with the U.S. troops112
The opposition Moslem militiamen were aware of these
constraints and capitalized on the Marines perceived
weakness of not being able to initiate force thereby gaining
the initiative.113 As Hammel notes:
... once it was realized that the Marines
would not raise the ante, the United States ceased
to be a serious player in Lebanese internal
affairs and the objective became the
neutralization of the MAU and the manipulation of
the organs of American democracy.114
There were also additional rules of engagement in
Beirut. Following the bombing of the American Embassy, the
ROE was outlined on a "blue"card" for external posts. for
internal posts, the ROE was outlined on a "white card". The
difference is that for a "blue card" ROE, magazines are
loaded in the weapons and for the "white card" ROE,
margazines are kept in the pouches. Post 6 and 7 at the BLT
Headquarters were operating under the "white card" ROE and
magazines were kept in the pouches of Marine sentries at the
time of the bombing. It only took approximately six seconds
for the explosive-laden truck to be driven into the lobby of
the BLT Headquarters and then detonate reducing the building
to rubble in a matter of seconds (see Illustration 5 and 6).
The Long Commission concluded that the Marine mission
statement and the implementation of the "blue card" - "white
card" rules of engagement had contributed to a mindset which
detracted from the Marines readiness to respond to the
terrorist attack on the BLT Headquarters.115
Both General Gage and Colonel Gerahty operated in an
environment that changed into undeclared war. Their
operating rules of engagement failed to meet the
requirements necessary to authorize a commander to respond
with necessary force to meet a hostile threat.
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CONCLUSIONS
There are valuable lessons to be learned from the
comparative analysis of the challenges faced by General
Thomas Gage and Colonel Tim Gerahty. First, the issue of
creditable force and related rules of engagement.
Commanders must have a large enough force to accomplish the
mission and the rules of engagement must not be detrimental
in ensuring that the mission is carried out. If not, the
credibility of the force will be severely weakened.
Governmental policy must take into account the
geopolitical ramifications of the peacekeeping mission.
This will ensure that the force conducting the mission
remains or is perceived as remaining neutral. The British
soldiers in the colonies were viewed as the enemy because of
the colonials' perception that they were the enforcers of a
flawed British policy. Similarly, in Beirut, the Marines
were perceived as the enemy due to support of the LAF. By
governmental policy addressing the social forces at work,
conflicts will be avoided decreasing future escalation.
Therefore, a political mission such as peacekeeping should
have a coherent and unified political and military strategy.
Further, policymakers should attempt to act on "windows of
opportunity" to make the correct political policy decisions.
A flawed governmental policy is directly related to the
mission or in better terms, "mission creep." Peacekeeping
missions are executed initially to meet short term
objectives. However, as evidenced from this study, the
British stayed in Boston for years and the Americans in
Beirut 18 months. Their very presence coupled with flawed
political policies forced "mission creep" in order to
accomplish ever increasing political schemes. Neither the
British government nor the American government realized that
their commanders on the ground were attempting to fulfill a
passive neutral presence in an undeclared war zone.
If the situation deteriorates to the point of
undeclared war, it must be recognized that the force is the
target. Every attempt will be made to discredit the force
and rally public opinion to force them to disengage. All
concerned must understand that to leave the force in place
will only invite disaster as seen at Lexington, Concord, and
Beirut on a scale that can only be considered inconceivable
at the hands of a hostile citizenry. If the level of
violence has reached a state of undeclared war, the force
must be pulled out. In the case of General Gage and Colonel
Gerahty, the prudent decision would have been to put the
troops back on the ships, await the decision to either
reinforce to prepare for full combat operations ashore or
withdraw. However, neither commander had the authority to
withdraw to the ships.
Command structures must be responsive to instability in
the area and requests by the commander on the ground. For
both General Gage and Colonel Gerahty, the command structure
helped to facilitate confusion.
In this study, I have addressed the geo-political
framework setting the stage on which General Gage and
Colonel Gerahty would operate. Furthermore, I provided
analysis of the similarities of challenges that these
commanders faced. Finally, I offered several important
conclusions that can be gleaned for use by future operations
of this kind.
... presence became a show of force, and
the audience was not impressed; rather than
facilitating peace, it proved to be a catalyst for
the outbreak of war. Peacekeeping is a concept
still in its infancy. It can only work when it is
allowed to work. What makes that frightening is
what it suggests about peace itself; we only keep
it when we want it.116
1 Major General Carl Van Horn, SOLDIERING FOR PEACE (New
York:McKay Company Inc, 1967), vii.
2 Dr. J.B. Mathews. Doctoral Thesis LEARNING THE LESSONS
OF BEIRUT (DIC 1989), 213
3 Anthony McDermott and Kjell Skjelsback, THE
MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN BEIRUT 1982-1984 (Florida:
International University Press, 1991), 155. Herinafter cited
as McDermott.
4 United Nations Charter
5 Peckham, Howard H., THE COLONIAL WARS 1689-1762, (The
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 103.
6 Alden, John Richard, GENERAL GAGE IN AMERICA, A HISTORY
OF HIS ROLE IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (State University
Press, 1948), 105. Herinafter cited as Alden.
7 Alden, 106
8 Alden, 146
9 Alden, 160
10 Alden, 163
11 Andrews, Charles M., THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN
HISTORY IV; ENGLAND'S COMMERCIAL AND COLONIAL POLICY (Yale
University Press, 1965), 7
12 Andrews, 396. Herinafter cited as Andrews.
13 Shy, John, TOWARD LEXINGTON: THE ROLE OF THE BRITISH
ARMY IN THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Princeton
University Press, 1965), 14
14 Frank, Benis M., U.S. MARINES IN LEBANON 1982-1984
(Washington DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters,
U.S. Marine Corps, 1987), 6. Herinafter cited as Frank.
15 McFarlane, Robert C., LESSONS OF THE BEIRUT BOMBING, 2.
Herinafter cited as McFarlane.
16 McDermott, 9
17 McDermott, 9
18 McDermott, 9
19 McDermott, 11
20 Frank, 17
21 Frank, 19
22 McDermott 11
23 McFarlane, 3
24 McFarlane, 3
25 McDermott, 13.
26 McDermott, 13
27 McDermott, 13
28 McDermott, 13
29 McDermott, 13
30 McDermott, 13
31 Frank, 23
32 Frank, 23
33 98th Congress, 284
34 Frank, 23
35 McDermott, 44
36 McDermott, 45
37 Alden, 165
38 Alden, 167
39 Alden, 117
40 Alden, 122
41 Alden, 169
42 Alden, 179
43 Alden, 184
44 Pearson, Michael, THOSE DAMNED REBELS, THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION AS SEEN THROUGH BRITISH EYES (New York: G.P.
Putnams & Sons, 1972), 18. Herinafter cited as Pearson.
45 Alden, 180
46 Pearson, 16
47 Pearson, 20
48 Pearson, 31
49 Pearson, 31
50 Pearson, 31
51 Pearson, 36
52 Pearson, 41
53 Pearson, 41
54 Pearson, 43
55 Pearson, 43
56 Pearson, 43
57 Pearson, 43
58 Pearson, 45
59 Pearson, 46
60 Pearson, 49
61 Pearson, 49
62 Pearson, 52
63 Pearson, 55
64 Pearson, 55
65 Pearson, 55
66 Pearson, 56
67 Frank, 30
68 McDermott, 13.
69 McDermott, 14
70 Frank, 30
71 Frank, 45
72 Frank, 60
73 McDermott, 14.
74 McDermott, 14
75 Frank, 74
76 McDermott, 15
77 Frank, 86
78 Tanter, Raymond, WHO'S AT THE HELM? LESSONS OF LEBANON
(Westview Press, Inc, 1990), 224. Herinafter cited as
Tanter.
79 Tanter, 224
80 Frank, 89
81 Frank, 89
82 Frank, 90
83 McDermott, 16
84 McDermott, 20
85 McDermott, 21
86 McDermott, 20
87 McDermott, 18
88 Alden, 108
89 98th Congress, 268
90 98th Congress, 284
91 98th Congress, 258
92 Gerlach, LtCol, Brief to Peacekeeping Class, United
States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, March 1995.
93 Pearson, 68
94 Pearson, 74
95 Pearson, 75
96 Pearson, 79
97 Pearson, 80
98 Pearson, 81
99 Pearson, 83
100 Pearson, 84
101 Pearson, 89
102 98th Congress, 285
103 Alden, 63
104 Alden, 65
105 98th Congress, 265
106 98th Congress, 285
107 98th Congress, 285
108 Curtis, Edward E., THE BRITISH ARMY IN THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, (Yale University Press, 1926), 31.
109 98th Congress, 263
110 Alden, 167
111 Alden, 165
112 McDermott, 60
113 McDermott, 61
114 Hammel, Eric, THE ROOT. THE MARINES IN BEIRUT, AUGUST
1982 - FEBRUARY 1984, (Pacifica Press, 1993), 33.
115 Frank, 52
116 McDermott, 33
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