Beyond The Weinberger Doctrine
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - History
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Beyond The Weinberger Doctrine
Author: Major Scott T. Campbell, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: The Weinberger Doctrine provides a legitimate
framework concerning the use of military force where our
national interests are considered vital to our national
security; in this post Cold War era--less than vital
national interests requires us to go beyond the Weinberger
Doctrine.
Background: The current state of world affairs and the use
of military means to pursue our national interests are
becoming more and more complicated. The Weinberger Doctrine
provided a legitimate framework for the commitment of
military forces during the later stages of the Cold War.
Additionally, it still provides a legitimate framework for
those situations where our national interests are considered
vital to our national security.
Our current national security strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement identifies several national interests that are
categorized as being less than vital to our national
security. We need to use a different set of criteria when
determining whether to use military force in these
situations.
Recommendation: When our national interests are considered
less than vital to our national security, we need to get
away from the use of a checklist and start to analyze each
situation in which we are contemplating the use of military
force. We need to ask ourselves: (1) Does the benefit of
using military force override the costs we are willing to
pay? (2) What is the desired end--state? (3) Are the
forces deployed commensurate with their mission? (4) Is the
military the most effective element of our national power?
and (5) Is the use of force overwhelming and decisive?
BEYOND THE WEINBERGER DOCTRINE
Major Scott T. Campbell
The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and the emergence of the United States as the world's
only remaining superpower is a fundamental fact. The result
however; is a very complex and different world.
The Soviet Union, which dominated almost every aspect
of America's security strategy is gone. In its place
new countries have been born all across Eurasia. All
of them are struggling--struggling to become
democracies, struggling to develop market economies and
struggling to develop multiethnic societies.1
In this post Cold War era, the use of military means to
pursue our national interests are becoming more and more
complicated. We continue to ask ourselves the same
fundamental question presented by former Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger: "under what circumstances, and by
what means, does a great democracy such as ours reach the
painful decision that the use of military force is necessary
to protect our interests or to carry out our national
policy?"2
On 28 November 1984, while addressing the Washington Press
Club, then--Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger proposed
the following six major tests to be applied when we are
weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad:
(1) The United States should not commit forces to
combat overseas unless the particular engagement or
occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or
that of our allies....
(2) If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops
into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly
and with the clear intention of winning....
(3) If we do decide to commit forces to combat
overseas, we should have clearly defined political and
military objectives....
(4) The relationship between our objectives and the
forces we have committed--their size, composition, and
disposition--must be continually reassessed and
adjusted if necessary....
(5) Before the United States commits combat forces
abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will
have the support of the American people and their
elected representatives in Congress....
(6) The commitment of US forces to combat should be a
last resort.3
These six points now comprise the tenets of what has
become known as the Weinberger Doctrine. The doctrine
provided a legitimate framework for the commitment of
military forces during the latter stages of the Cold War.
Additionally, it still provides a legitimate framework for
those situations where our national interests are considered
vital to our national security.4
In this post Cold War era, our current national security
strategy of Engagement and Enlargement identifies several
national interests that are categorized as being less than
vital to our national security. It is precisely for this
reason that I propose we need to go beyond the Weinberger
Doctrine. We need to utilize a different set of criteria
when determining whether to use military force in these
situations!
The current state of world affairs and the use of military
force also requires us to address the War Powers Resolution.
Several arguments exist concerning the impracticality of the
resolution and that it is even unconstitutional. In this
post Cold War era, the resolution will continue to be
tested.
Our national security strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement recognizes that "our nation can only address
this era's dangers and opportunities if we remain actively
engaged in global affairs."5 The global interdependence
created during the Cold War, has critically linked our
national security to events and access overseas. We learned
after World War I that the United States can not afford to
abandon its allies and resort to isolationism. As stated by
Mr. Weinberger, "Stark isolationism quickly would lead to a
far more dangerous situation for the United States: We would
be without allies and faced by many hostile or indifferent
nations."6 Our national security strategy states, "We can
and must make the difference through our engagement; but our
involvement must be carefully tailored to serve our
interests and priorities."7
Our involvement or the means to accomplish our policies
may consist of a single element or any combination of the
four elements of national power: political, economic,
military and social. Our national security strategy of
Engagement and Enlargement takes all of these into account.
The three primary objectives that President Clinton has
stressed are:
Enhancing Our Security. Taking account of the
realities of the post--Cold War era and the new
threats, a military capability appropriately sized and
postured to meet the diverse needs of our strategy,
including the ability, in concert with regional allies,
to win two nearly simultaneous major regional
conflicts. We will continue to pursue arms control
agreements to reduce the danger of nuclear conflict and
promote stability.
Promoting Prosperity at Home. A vigorous and
integrated economic policy designed to stimulate global
environmentally sound economic growth and free trade
and to press for open and equal U.S. access to foreign
markets.
Promoting Democracy. A framework of democratic
enlargement that increases our security by protecting,
consolidating and enlarging the community of free
market democracies. Our efforts focus on preserving
democratic processes in key emerging democratic states
including Russia, Ukraine and other new states of the
former Soviet Union.8
As stated by Richard N. Haass, the loss of "national
cohesion has created a period of history that can be
characterized as one of 'international deregulation.' There
are new players, new capabilities, and new alignments, but
as of yet, no new rules."9 The current world situation
requires us to look beyond the Weinberger Doctrine.
The circumstances in which military means may now be
utilized are numerous. Our primary focus is no longer just
simply warfighting. As described by Mr. Haas, we are now
faced with the fact that, "Military interventions can be
classified according to the following purposes: deterrence,
prevention, compellence, punishment, peacekeeping,
peace--making, nation--building, interdiction, humanitarian
assistance, and rescue."10 These additional
responsibilities also include several gray areas. I concur
with Mr. Weinberger in his statement that, "The most likely
challenge to the peace--the gray area conflicts--are
precisely the most difficult challenges to which a democracy
must respond."11 As these gray areas, situations in which
our national interests are considered less than vital,
continue to increase; it is my opinion that the Weinberger
Doctrine is no longer such an enduring guide.
While I do not believe that we can create a checklist that
pertains to every potential conflict; I do believe that we
must now ask ourselves certain fundamental questions and
apply certain principles concerning the use of our military
forces. The following criteria must be addressed as we
continue the debate concerning the commitment of our
military forces.
(1) First, Once our political interests and objectives are
clearly identified, we need to ensure that the benefit of
using military force overrides the costs we are willing to
pay. If we determine that the costs are too great, then we
should use some other element of national power.
The first point emphasizes our interests. As stated by
Mr. Nuechterlein, there are four basic interests that could
apply to any state: "defense of the homeland, economic
well--being, favorable world order, and promotion of
values."12 He also divided these down into four levels of
intensity:
Survival Issues: The very existence of the
nation--state is in jeopardy, either as a result of
overt military attack on its own territory or from
the imminent threat of attack should an enemy's
demands be rejected....
Vital Issues: Serious harm will likely result to the
state unless strong measures, including the use of
conventional military force, are employed to counter an
adverse action by another state or to deter it from
undertaking a serious provocation...
Major Issues: The political, economic, and ideological
well--being of the state may be adversely affected by
events and trends in the international environment
which thus require corrective action in order to
prevent them from becoming serious threats....
Peripheral Issues: The well--being of the state is not
adversely affected by events or trends abroad, but the
interests of private citizens and companies operating
in foreign countries are endangered.13
As a result of the end of the Cold War, Edwin J. Arnold,
Jr. identifies that, "For the first time in this century,
none of the most powerful states of the world seems to
harbor aggressive intent."14 The threat of involvement over
issues concerning survival or vital issues has been greatly
reduced. What we are now experiencing is a number of
regional conflicts throughout the world. These conflicts
can be categorized as either major or peripheral issues.
Somalia is one example.
Our interests in Somalia were in line with our national
security strategy of promoting democracy and enhancing our
security. We identified our interests in Somalia, but did
we evaluate the costs we were willing to accept? That the
humanitarian operation in Somalia quickly came to an end on
"October 3 when 18 U.S. soldiers were killed and 75 wounded
while raiding the stronghold of Mohammad Farah Aideed"15
would seem to indicate that we did not.
In Bosnia, it is evident that the political leadership did
evaluate the benefit to cost ratio. Secretary of Defense
William Perry stated, "It would take hundreds of thousands
of troops and probably significant casualties to impose the
outcome we want--world peace."16 In this case, the cost of
using military force to achieve our political objective
outweighs the benefit; however, this is not to say that we
do not have political interests in Bosnia. Our interests
are humanitarian interests to limit the spread of violence
and suffering while the world works for a peaceful solution.
As the world's remaining military super power, we need to
use our military power judiciously. Regardless of what
level or intensity of political interest, we need to
continue to apply the cost to benefit analysis before we
utilize our military forces. We need to ensure that the
level of our military involvement is in line with our
political objectives.
(2) Second, Not only do we need to continue to clearly
identify our political and military objectives, but we need
to identify the desired end--state or the conditions that
will signal the end to our use of military force.
As Clausewitz has stated, "No one starts a war--or rather,
no one in his senses ought to do so--without first being
clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war,
and how he intends to conduct it."17 One point I want to
clarify is that the identification of end--state conditions
should not be confused with end--dates. We need to identify
end--state conditions that will signal the end of military
force application and when we can withdraw our forces. In
Beirut, the United States as part of the first Multinational
Force (MNF) was responsible for the evacuation of Yasir
Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
trapped in West Beirut. Mr. Weinberger stated that after
accomplishing the objective, it "was agreed with our
associates that after ten quiet days following the departure
of the PLO forces, it was time to leave, and we left."18
Clearly defined objectives enable us to define end--state.
When our end--state can not be achieved, we either need to
redefine the mission or withdraw our forces.
The second MNF was assigned the mission--to "establish a
presence. Later the mission was defined to be the
interposition of the MNF between the withdrawing armies of
Israel and Syria, until the Lebanese armed forces were
sufficiently trained and equipped to take over that role."19
The problem was that neither Syria nor Israel was
withdrawing. Hindsight tells us that with no mission, the
MNF should have been pulled out. General Colin Powell, the
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated,
"Military force should be used only when we can measure that
the military objective has been achieved."20
When defining end--states, we need to be aware that
Clausewitz also stated, "The original political objectives
can greatly alter during the course of the war and may
finally change entirely since they are influenced by events
and their probable consequences."21 When political
objectives change, we need to be aware that the end--state,
mission and the forces deployed may also have to be adjusted
accordingly.
As stated in our national security strategy, we need to be
aware of our exit strategy. "Do we have timelines and
milestones that will reveal the extent of success or
failure."22 The identification of end--state conditions
will prevent mission creep.
(3) Third, We need to continually evaluate the mission and
the environment. Forces need to be deployed commensurate
with their mission and objectives.
In today's environment, the need to continually evaluate
each mission is even greater. The issue we are faced with
is; do we task organize with a preponderance of combat
forces or combat service support forces?
The original mission of the United Nations Operations in
Somalia (UNISOM I) under a U.S. led Unified Task Force
(UNITAF) was to create a secure environment for famine
relief. In this situation, there was a lesser need for
combat service support forces and a greater need for combat
forces. Although the preponderance of UNITAF forces
consisted of combat troops, it also consisted of specialized
units such as medical units, civil affairs, psychological
operations units, special operations forces and others. The
success of UNITAF can be attributed to the appropriately
balanced force structure matched to accomplish the mission.
On 4 May 1993, the official turnover between UNITAF forces
and the U.N. led forces signaled the start of UNISOM II. As
the mission continued, UNISOM II transitioned to a
nation--building operation. UNISOM II forces were not
appropriately structured nor equipped to accomplish the
mission. The specialized forces present for UNITAF were not
found among their forces. These forces should have been
provided to support the new mission or the mission should
have been terminated or scaled back. We need to continually
reassess the mission, and the forces we have committed to
ensure that the committed forces are commensurate with their
objectives. Former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Colin Powell stated, we need to be aware of "How might he
situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by
force, develop further and what might be the
consequences?"23
(4) Fourth, Military power should be employed in
conjunction with the other elements of national power; not
necessarily as a last resort.
The world situation in which the Weinberger Doctrine was
developed has completely changed. The end of the Cold War
has all but eliminated the threat of superpower
confrontations over survival issues. Our national interests
now include major and peripheral issues. As mentioned
earlier, the interventions that the military may now be
involved in are numerous.
My argument is that the use of military force strictly as
a last resort; no longer applies. Instead the political
leadership of our country is challenged by a dynamic world
situation. We must now weigh each element of national power
against the other to determine which is the most effective
concerning our particular national interests. In my
opinion, Weinberger's sixth test restricts our ability to
effectively utilize all our elements of national power.
President Bush believed that "force can be a useful
backdrop to diplomacy, a complement to it, or, if need be, a
temporary alternative."24 "Bush clearly believed that the
use of military force is one of the means available at any
time to achieve national interests, not only as a last
resort."25 I look at each element of national power as a
tool that can used to accomplish our national objectives.
If military power is the most effective tool to accomplish
our objective; we have analyzed the benefit to cost ratio;
our objectives are clearly identified and achievable; then
we should use it.
Some examples of the use of force other than as a last
resort includes the Clinton Administration attack against
Iraq in 1993. Information obtained was persuasive enough to
indicate that Iraq did in fact plan an assassination attempt
against President Bush.26 Additionally, "The Reagan
Administration bombed Libya when it determined that Libya
was responsible for a terrorist attack in Berlin."27
Many people subscribe to the "just war" theory in which
the use of military force should not be taken until all
other options have failed. True isolationists use the
Weinberger Doctrine as an argument for not getting involved.
As a democratic society, most people would assume this is
the most reasonable approach; however, it has the potential
to work against us.
The Gulf War is a good example. If we waited for
diplomacy and economic sanctions to work, the coalition had
a greater chance of breaking apart. The passage of time
also would have allowed Iraq more time to prepare their WMD
capabilities and possibly inflict a greater number of
casualties.28
In Grenada, if we waited, we were looking at a possible
hostage situation or the possibility of the government
aligning with Cuba or the Soviet Union.29
Another argument is the importance of acting early to
prevent a crisis from developing into an even larger crisis.
For example, most of us would agree that when our national
interests are involved, we would much rather intervene early
and prevent a regional crisis from turning into an
international crisis.
If we look at the situation of the Philippines in December
of 1989, the United States responded to a request from
Corazon Aquino, "Where some military leaders were attempting
a coup d'etat."30 The United States responded by over
flying the facilities captured by the insurgents to
intimidate them. As the situation unfolded, "The coup
collapsed the following day."31 This may be an over
simplification of the benefits of an early intervention, but
the point is made. Early intervention prevented this event
from escalating into a major contingency.
Technological developments such as precision guided
munitions have also put a spin on this argument. It is now
possible "for the United States to use compellent force,
that is, to strike targets in one place (i.e., the capital
city of an adversary) to influence behavior elsewhere."32
The use of precision guided munitions provides minimal risks
to U.S. forces and greatly reduces the risk of collateral
damage.
My fourth argument demonstrates that we should not limit
the use of our military force to strictly being utilized as
a last resort. There are benefits to early intervention and
situations where the use of military force may be the most
appropriate means to accomplish our political objectives.
(5) Fifth, Overwhelming and decisive use of force when
military intervention is required.
The use of overwhelming force will ensure "quick,
decisive, and low casualty results that have come to
characterize US military operations."33 This point is in
line with my first argument. Once our political interests
and objectives have been identified and we have determined
that the benefit of using military force overrides the costs
we are willing to pay; we need to commit our troops in a
manner that will guarantee a high probability of victory at
the lowest possible cost. Through overwhelming force, we
also advance the possibility of deterring a conflict by
demonstrating to our potential adversaries our willingness
to use maximum force. The strategy of overwhelming force
emphasizes the use of decisive force to rapidly overwhelm an
adversary. During the Gulf War, our deployment of a large
military force not only resulted in an overwhelming victory,
but it also gave added incentive to diplomatic attempts to
end the war peacefully. The results obviously demonstrate
that we learned what Secretary Weinberger had hoped we had
learned from Vietnam. "If a war is not serious enough for
us to have to win it, it is not serious enough to enter
it."34
The use of overwhelming force also brings up a discussion
concerning the War Powers Resolution. The point brought out
by Edwin J. Arnold is that overwhelming force "alters the
nature and duration of guaranteed public and congressional
support for committing U.S. forces. Under such conditions,
operations involving overwhelming and rapid application of
military force would theoretically be completed before
support could erode."35
I propose that we continue to strive for these results and
that overwhelming force should be applied whenever we are
considering the use of military force.
I do want to discuss one point concerning our emphasis on
minimizing casualties. We need to remember the lessons from
our past. As stated by Grant T. Hammond, "If war lasts long
enough (like Korea and Vietnam) the adversary does not have
to win militarily. Rather, he has only to not lose."36 Too
much emphasis on low casualty rates can quickly become a
weakness.
In this post Cold War era, the "remarkable trinity" of the
people, the government, and the military as described in
Carl von Clausewitz's, On War is more applicable today than
ever before. Modern technology that provides almost
instantaneous press and media coverage can easily influence
the will of the American people. As we learned in Vietnam,
"Military actions not fully supported by the American people
cannot succeed."37
The impact that the press and the media now have to
influence the will of the American people is another reason
that we need to apply the principle of overwhelming force.
The final issue pertaining to the use of military force is
the argument concerning the War Powers Resolution. The War
Powers Resolution "Public Law 93--148 was passed by the 93rd
Congress on November 7, 1973."38 This law is commonly
referred to as the War Powers Act. It states that the
President, as the Commander in Chief, can introduce United
States Armed Forces into hostilities or potential hostile
situations outside the territory of the United States for an
initial period of sixty days. The sixty days can be
extended for thirty days if approved by Congress. At the
end of this ninety day period, if directed by Congress, the
President has to remove the forces involved. As stated by
Mr. Haass, "The centrality of the decision--making authority
in the executive branch has been compromised by the
legislative branch to an extent that actively interferes
with that process."39
One of the problems with the War Powers Act is that it
interferes with the President's ability to conduct his
foreign policy. In line with our national security
strategy, the National Command Authorities may determine
that it is in our interests to get involved in a peace
keeping or nation building mission. The problem is:
it places the burden of action on those who want to
continue the policy (that is a particular intervention)
rather than those who want to change it. At the same
time, there has not been a corresponding acceptance or
responsibility by Congress for the outcome of decisions
concerning the employment of military forces.40
It is to the point where the legislative branch uses this
authority strictly for partisan gains. A great debate
concerning the argument surrounding the War Powers
Resolution argument was stated in an article written by
former commandant of the Marine Corps P. X. Kelly. In it he
stated:
The foreign policy of the United States continues to be
compromised--sometimes dangerously--by the political
posturing of Congress and the 1973 War Powers
Resolution. The lesson was driven home during
Operation Desert Shield four years ago, last year in
Somalia and earlier this month as many members of both
houses of Congress sought to distance themselves from
the political accountability in the event harm comes to
any U.S. forces in Haiti prior to next months
congressional elections.
In fact, for more than two decades, Congress has used
the War Powers Resolution as an insurance policy.
Whenever the president sends troops into harms way,
legislators demand that he 'obey the law' by getting
their approval. They then demand as a condition of
support a public withdrawal date and other assurances
that make a successful operation virtually
impossible--knowing that a wise president will be
forced to go forward alone.
This way, if the mission fails or there are significant
U.S. casualties, members of Congress can avoid
political accountability to the voters--after all, the
president 'broke the law.' On the other hand, if the
president succeeds, despite being weakened by
congressional opposition, members of Congress explain
that they were behind the president on the merits from
the beginning (surely they can't be criticized for
demanding compliance with the 'law') and they march
proudly in victory parades. It's a brilliant
tactic--if you don't care about the lives of our
troops.41
It has been argued that the War Powers Resolution is even
unconstitutional. Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell
stated that:
the Resolution expanded Congress' authority 'beyond the
power to declare war to the power to limit troop
deployment in situations short of war,' and concluded:
'Into the very situation that requires national
steadiness and resolve, the War Powers Resolution
introduces doubt and uncertainty. This does not serve
our Nation. The War Powers Resolution therefore
threatens not only the delicate balance of power
established by the constitution. It potentially
undermines America's ability to effectively defend our
national security.'42
It is precisely for these reasons that I recommend that
the War Powers Resolution needs to taken to the U.S. Supreme
Court and decided on; once and for all. The current state
of the world affairs will continue to put the resolution to
test.
Conclusion
The world has changed dramatically since Secretary
Weinberger first published his six tests concerning the use
of military force. With the end of the Cold War, our
enemies are no longer clearly identified. Our national
security strategy is no longer based on deterrence and
preventing the spread of communism.
While still concerned with political interests that are
considered vital, many of our interests currently fall into
the categories described by Mr. Nuechterlein as either
"major" or "peripheral." Today, the difficult decisions
surrounding the commitment of our military forces in these
situations remains even more difficult.
Since the Weinberger Doctrine, several of our prominent
political and military leaders have attempted to either add
or delete to the doctrine. What I propose is that we get
away from the use of a checklist and start to analyze each
situation in which we are contemplating the use of force.
We need to ask ourselves: does the benefit of using military
force override the costs we are willing to pay, what is the
desired end--state, are the forces deployed commensurate
with their mission, is military power the most effective
element of national power and is the use of force
overwhelming and decisive?
I have also discussed that we need to do away with the War
Powers Resolution. This will provide the President with the
greatest amount of flexibility in carrying out his foreign
policy and provide the opportunity to effectively utilize
the points that I have discussed.
Utilizing our national security strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement, I have demonstrated that we must go beyond the
Weinberger Doctrine when we are weighing the use of our
military forces abroad. If we apply the criteria I have
discussed, then we as a nation, can achieve what Secretary
of Defense Weinberger originally intended; "national unity
of purpose."44
1 William J. Perry, speech in Philadelphia, Nov. 3, 1994 as quoted in Defense Issues,
"The Rules of Engagement," Vol.9 No. 84,
2 Caspar W. Weinherger Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon,
New York: Warner Books, 1990, p.446
3 Ibid,p.453--454
4 Secretary Weinherger's tests are used by Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. (Ret.) to
analyze national security decisions made during the Persian Gulfwar in On Strategy II: A
Critical Analysis of the Gulf War. Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 1992pp. 11--13, 17,
31--32, 117, 171 and Thomas R. Dubois, "The Weinberger Doctrine and The Liberation
of Kuwait," Parameters Vol. XXI, No. 4 (Winter 1991--1992), pp. 24-38.
5 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1994). p. ii
6 Caspar W. Weinberger The Uses of Military Power Defense, January 1985, p. 5
7 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, p. i
8 Ibid., p.5
9 Richard N. Haass Intervention: The use of American Military Force in the
Post-Cold War World, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1994,p.5
10 Haas, Intervention, p. 50
11 Weinberger, Fighting, p. 447
12 Donald E. Nuechterlein "The Concept of 'National Interest': A Time for New
Approaches," Orbis, 23(Spring 1979), p.76
13 Ibid., pp. 79--80
14 Edwin J. Arnold, Jr. "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Interests,"
Parameters Spring 1994, p. 10
15 Fred Barnes "Peacekeeping disenchantment," Asia--Pacific Defense Reporter,,
February--March 1994, p. 35
16 Perry, Defense Issues p. 3
17 As quoted in Weinberger, Fighting p. 453
18 Ibid., p. 150
19 Ibid.,p. 1
20 Les Aspin "With the Soviets and Cold War Gone, What is the Future for US
Forces?", ROA National Security Report, November 1992, p. 23
21 Carl von Clasewitz On War ed. and trans., Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1976, p. 92
22 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement p. 10
23 Colin L. Powell "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Winter
1992/93, Vol.71, No. 5, p. 38
24 George Bush "The Use of Military Force: The President's Difficult Choice,"
Defense Issues,8(No. 1, 1993),p.2
25 Arnold, Parameters p. 12
26 Haass, Intervention, 55--56
27 Ibid., p.56
28 Ibid., p.88-89
29 Ibid., p.89
30 Ibid., p.29
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p.16
33 Arnold, Parameters, p.12
34 Weinberger, Fighting. p. 181
35 Arnold, Parameters p. 7
36 Grant T. Hammond "Paradoxes of War," Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1994, p.13
37 Ibid., p.361
38 Haass, Intervention p.167
39 Ibid., p. 175
40 Ibid.,p.79
41 P.X. Kelley and Robert F. Turner "Out of Harms Way: From Beirut to Haiti,
Congress Protects Itself Instead of Our Troops," The Washington Post, 23 October 1994,
Sec. C, p.2, cols. 1--2.
42 Ibid.,col.5
43 Bard E. O'neill discusses that a government's response should be based after an in
depth analysis of the environment, popular support, organization, unity, and external
support. For more information see Bard E. O'neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside
Modern Revolutionary Warfare, Brassey's (US), Macmillian Publishing Company, New
York, 1990
44 Weinberger,Fighting, p.456
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Vol. 9 No.84
Weinberger, Caspar W. Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical
Years in the Pentagon, New York: Warner Books, 1990
Summers, Harry G.,Jr. Colonel (Ret.) On Strategy II: A
Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, Dell Publishing
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