Military

United States Marine Corps Close Air Support, Revisited

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Aviation

 

 

 

 

 

                              EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

Author: Major Mark R. Cyr, United States Marine Corps

 

Thesis: Close Air Support (CAS) procedures and doctrine require modernization to

maximize available air power in the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Currently,

MAGTF combined arms operations in the close battle harness only a fraction of available air

power, which is oftentimes dissipated by inefficient doctrine and poor command, control, and

communication (C3) execution.

 

Background:  Marine air power is crucial to the success of the MAGTF mission. The present

CAS system is operating under self imposed doctrinal and training constraints that limit combat

capabilities in the close battle. To maximize available air power in the fluid environment of today's

battlefield, the United States Marine Corps must modernize CAS procedures and doctrine.

Proposed changes include the following:

 

     Define close and deep battle target areas to remove current restrictions on CAS

     engagements in relation to the Ground Combat Element (GCE) zone of action.

     Determine extended air asset control boundaries by technical ability rather than by

     established Fire Support Coordination Lines (FSCL).

     Ensure continuity in personnel manning of key air support billets through the maintenance of

     military occupational skill (MOS) technical and tactical proficiency.

     Emphasize the interdependence and the totality of the CAS system by enhancing training

     and education of the consumers of the process.

 

Recommendations:  This paper recommends three major changes to improve MAGTF combined

arms operations as they relate to air power. First, redefine close air support procedures and

doctrine to include targets beyond the FSCL. Second, promote use of organic and airborne

assets that provide C3 of target engagements in the expanded battlespace. Third, increase training,

education, and proficiency of CAS system personnel by:

 

     Establish a permanent MOS for the forward air controller (FAC).

     Lengthen tour lengths of all aviation assignments to the ground combat element (GCE).

     Enhance division and regimental air officers (AO) formal training in existing air control

     capabilities and procedures.

     Establish continuity in the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) air direction section by

     manning the positions with enlisted controllers.

 

   Specifics regarding these recommendations are the subject of this effort. Implementing these

recommendations will significantly improve the war fighting ability of the MAGTF on the modern

battlefield.

 

   This paper explores opportunities for increasing the combat efficiency of USMC

 

airpower by redefining immediate offensive air support employment, and reassesses the

 

role and application of Close Air Support in a maneuver warfare setting. Furthermore, this

 

paper will explore the principles of the CAS process, identity its weaknesses, and propose

 

changes to rectify the problem areas.

 

   The USMC's ability to integrate and control combat power of differing origins is the crux of

 

the MAGTF's effectiveness as a warfighter. The MAGTF's uniqueness is exemplified by its ability

 

to harness all of its combined arms combat power, with the requisite organic command, control,

 

and communications (C3) systems. Before proposing changes to the process, it is essential to first

 

discuss the present status and doctrine of Marine CAS as it relates to execution of the process.

 

The following proposal offers a framework as a basis for command and control of CAS execution

 

in the USMC today.

 

 

 

CAS: A MARINE STRENGTH

 

   From World War II, to the Persian Gulf, CAS has played a vital role in the success of Marine

 

operations. Close Air Support is air action against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly

 

forces requiring detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those

 

forces.1 Air assets provide the preponderance of combat power available to the MAGTF

 

commander, and are the predominant source of influence in the close battle.

 

   Close air operations are normally employed to allow for maximum application of firepower,

 

while simultaneously ensuring the safety of friendly personnel in the area. The Marine Corps

 

prides itself as a pioneer, practitioner, and proponent of CAS as a cornerstone of Marine

 

combined arms philosophy. The success of the air/ground team in the close battle relies heavily on

 

the exploitation of the enemy in the third dimension. The factors and strengths characterizing the

 

capabilities of Marine CAS are as follows:

 

   1) The habitual relationships between air and ground components foster strength in the

 

Marine combined arms team. Common language and core training facilitate team cohesiveness

 

and combat effectiveness.

 

   2) CAS has been, and is routinely practiced and employed in all environments and situations.

 

Standing procedures, innovative techniques, and expertise are attributes of past Marine CAS

 

successes. In Korea, for example, "Marine flyers were specialists in close support. It was their

 

mission, they were trained for it, and their equipment was optimized for the role."2 Today there is

 

still no substitute for a dedicated training effort necessary for effective CAS execution.

 

   3) Marines possess their own C3 system designed to support both requester and provider of

 

CAS. The primary CAS agency, the Direct Air Support Center (DASC), is collocated with the

 

senior Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC), for all training, exercises and operations.3

 

Collocation facilitates coordination by bringing air and ground representation together.

 

   4) USMC command emphasis on CAS execution facilitates the MAGTF subordinate chains of

 

command by responding to any application shortfall. When air support produces less than

 

expected results (qualitative or quantitative), the MAGTF commander's authority to direct

 

remedial action is inherent. MAGTF hierarchy of command also ensures priortization of resources

 

to the main effort. This also allows the commander the ability to influence close operations

 

through targeting, allocation of assets, and taskings.4 Command emphasis on CAS produces a

 

more timely response to problem areas, and a sharper focus of effort.

 

   5) Finally, Marines involved in the application of CAS, including individual pilots, controllers,

 

and requesting units, all possess a vested interest in the successful outcome of a sortie. The

 

individual Marine on the ground epitomizes this vested interest.

 

   The combination of all of these factors equates to a combined arms organization which value is

 

greater than the sum of its parts.

 

 

 

STATUS OF MARINE CAS

 

   Marine CAS, although historically very successful, has room for improvement. The major

 

weakness of Marine CAS is not in its ability to place ordnance on target. Rather, the weakness

 

lies in its inability to consistently pair limited assets with dynamic needs. The primary cause of

 

untimely and unresponsive sorties is lack of coordination. Many factors contribute to poor CAS

 

performance. The primary areas of concern are: air request/asset integration,  timing,

 

communications, training, outdated procedures and lack of confidence in the system. The

 

following discussions will attempt to impart the underpinnings of each area of concern.

 

 

 

REQUEST INTEGRATION, TIMING AND AVAILABILITY

 

   Timely response to immediate and on-call requests is one of the most difficult aspects of

 

CAS. Competing needs for limited air assets exacerbate the problem of providing sufficient

 

CAS coverage of the MAGTF area of operations. Routinely, the frequency of requests for

 

immediate air outstrip the supply of assets. This mismatch between supply and demand results in

 

unanswered CAS requests. Most CAS training scenarios are typically driven by sortie availability,

 

vice the requesters need. The high level of integration required in combining available sorties with

 

outstanding requests compounds the problem. Dedicated airborne CAS sorties occasionally fail to

 

blend with the requirement, in terms of remaining time on station (TOS) necessary to execute the

 

mission, inappropriate ordnance, or target location. Sortie availability, vice the request typically

 

drive most CAS training scenarios. There is a "quick fix" for this problem, but the solution has

 

drawbacks.

 

   Scheduling immediate sorties in the Air Tasking Order (ATO) with hard take off times

 

provides some relief. However, this practice counters the Marine credo "train as we fight".

 

Exercising available air support should not take precedence over the interactions of elements in a

 

dynamic environment. By scheduling immediate CAS sorties with fixed launch times, operator

 

training is maximized at the expense of exercising the system in a realistic and spontaneous

 

scenario. The result is that the requisite integration skills between participants in the CAS process

 

rarely mature.

 

   Timing is another crucial element for overall integration and CAS mission success. The speed

 

in which the immediate request is filled usually determines the outcome of the CAS mission.

 

Fleeting target opportunity and a small window of aircraft availability dictate that the process is

 

time sensitive and requires rapid decision-making. Typical Marine CAS aircraft average 15 to 30

 

minutes TOS. Aircraft type, ordnance carried, and base of origin are some of the factors effecting

 

TOS. Launching aircraft for a specific request rarely satisfies the initial call for support, and is

 

usually responsive only if the sortie originates from forward operating bases.

 

   with the exception of actual combat, there are very few exercise opportunities that can

 

simulate the sustained sortie rate and dynamics necessary to maximize system responsiveness. The

 

Weapons Tactics Instruction course comes close to producing those levels of air operations, but

 

they are of short duration, have minimal ground play, and are scripted.

 

LACK OF CONFIDENCE

 

   Confidence in the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) is effecting the

 

outcome of the CAS process in a negative way. Part of the problem is that the MACCS displays

 

symptoms of being cumbersome and lethargic. The system is inclusive, from the air traffic

 

controller in the tower, to the forward air controller with the lead battalion. From beginning to

 

end, there are a variety of agencies able to influence the outcome of the CAS sortie.5 Specifically,

 

there are four agencies having the greatest influence on CAS execution and outcome. They are

 

the regimental and division Air Officers (AOs), the Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs), the

 

Forward Air Controller and Tactical Air Coordinator Airborne (FACA/TACA), and the Direct

 

Air Support Center (DASC). When their efforts are conducted in harmony, the probabilities of

 

successful CAS are very good. On the other hand, discord causes inefficiency and fosters mistrust

 

in system dependability.

 

   Both air and ground CAS consumers frequently criticize C3. Many of their complaints are

 

based on a weak foundation of air control knowledge. Less than expected CAS performances

 

reinforces ill-conceived perceptions of the system. The nature of CAS employment includes a

 

degree of inefficiency not recognized by many CAS proponents and critics. A comparable

 

illustration is a firetruck responding to a call. The possible outcomes are: I) the truck never gets

 

to the fire because it is diverted, lost, or runs out of gas, 2) the truck arrives too late to save the

 

structure, or 3) the truck is unable to successfully fight the blaze (i.e., hoses are to short,

 

insufficient water pressure, etc.). Ultimately, the house damage or destruction is beyond the

 

control of the fire company or the homeowner. The lesson is, given the nature and dynamics of

 

combat scenarios, that CAS efforts sometime fail to produce desired results. Requesting units

 

must understand that some calls for air support may not be filled due to a variety of legitimate

 

reasons. Failure to recognize the realities of CAS execution help generate negative opinions which

 

perpetuate marginal confidence in the system. The key to formulating solutions is identifying the

 

difference between inefficiency and legitimate reasons for CAS failures.

 

 

 

COMMUNICATIONS

 

   Effective communication in the CAS process is another area of concern. Ground to ground

 

and ground to air communications are reliable only when exercised on a regular and continual

 

basis. Communication is the conduit for CAS processing and is mandatory between the DASC,

 

aircraft, teal controllers, and the AOs.

 

   The FAC's performance is crucial to the successful outcome of the entire CAS process. He

 

must be located in suitable geographic position that ensures effective communications for terminal

 

control. On many occasions, there have been aircraft overhead with no communication with the

 

unit that requested the support. Deficient training is the culprit, and wasted sorties are the results.

 

   Training does not emphasize the when, where, what, and how to communicate necessary

 

requirements for immediate CAS. If the AOs and TACPs fail to coordinate their efforts with the

 

DASC through effective communications, breakdowns will occur when the aircraft are on station.

 

CAS control personnel are expected to be communicators, as well as operators. Many immediate

 

air requests go unanswered because of operator error and poor understanding of techniques and

 

procedures required for effective communications. Successful CAS requires that effective

 

communication be redundant, dependable, secure, and ongoing.

 

 

 

TARGETING FIRE SUPPORT, AND OUTDATED PROCEDURES

 

   Air assets attack a large percentage of targets not in contact with ground forces.

 

Identification, prioritization, acquisition, and engagement are the elements necessary to destroy or

 

neutralize specific targets from the air. In order to accomplish these, the DASC's priority should

 

encompass real time linking of target identification information with specific sorties. In surge

 

operations with many targets identified, the DASC's role defaults to a target clearing house

 

(deciding which targets to be engaged). This function coincides simultaneously with its mission to

 

provide air resource allocation and airspace deconfliction (between a/c, and between a/c and

 

ground units). Target assessment, prioritization, and asset assignment are executed without delay,

 

using the available target intelligence. "The Commander's intent is the basis for making fire

 

support decisions during the battle, to determine when and how fires will be delivered, and to

 

determine requirements."6 Engagements will be according to the commander's guidance, and

 

coordinated with other fire support assets through the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC).

 

   New technology targeting sources are presently not incorporated in the MACCS standing

 

operating procedures. Pairing near and real time systems with the DASC would greatly increase

 

enemy engagements without increasing asset requirements. RPVs and Joint Surveillance

 

Targeting Attack Radar System (JSTARS) working with the DASC in the Kuwaiti Theater of

 

Operation (KTO) is an example. This arrangement, combined with abundant air sorties, proved to

 

be key in destroying many targets that would have gone uncontested.

 

   Integrating immediate CAS assets with other fire support means has been marginal at the

 

higher level fire support coordination centers (FSCC). Doctrinal integration of air assets into the

 

fire support scenario requires the fire support coordinator (FSC) to monitor the tactical air

 

request nets. This is done so that the air situation can be "coordinated" and prioritized by the

 

GCE. Using "silence is consent" as the criteria for air request approval is not effective nor used.

 

Historically, receipt of a request by the DASC implies approval. In thirteen years of air support

 

experience, this author cannot recall an occasion when the FSCC canceled or re-prioritized a

 

request with this method. All real fire support coordination takes place at the company level. The

 

forward observer (FO) and Forward air controller (FAC), prior to transmitting the request, decide

 

the appropriate means for engagement. If the request cannot be filled within 15 minutes, the

 

DASC will revalidate the request with the unit and attempt to source from other assets.

 

    Finally, the blurred distinction between the close and deep battle causes many lost target

 

opportunities. This, combined with a fluid battlespace and rapid maneuver, questions the validity

 

of current doctrinal air control procedures and fire control measures. Outdated procedures

 

produce ineffective results by not capitalizing on the increasing ability to engage targets in the

 

MAGTF area of operations. In an expanded battlespace, the present ability of the MAGTF to

 

identify and engage real time targets is deficient. This complicates the CAS process and requires

 

additional flexibility in solving inefficiencies.7

 

    These symptoms present opportunities to improve the CAS process in MAGTF air utilization.

 

Consumers' lack of C3 awareness, combined with poor coordination, marginal communications

 

and training, and outdated procedures, all add up to a less than effective CAS system. If

 

unanswered, the situation will contribute to forming rifts in the air/ground team, and will be a

 

continual problem for the MAGTF.

 

 

 

THE IDEAL SCENARIO

 

   Ideally, as the DASC receives requests from real-time target identifiers, they are prioritized

 

and filled with available assets that are: 1) inbound to the control area, 2) airborne at the CAS

 

holding point, 3) diverted from another lower priority mission, or 4) launched from forward

 

operating bases/airfields in the rear. The pilots are briefed the following: updated friendly and

 

threat situation, friendly artillery status, routing, target, and final controller, and working

 

frequencies. Once communication is established with the terminal controller (if required), the pilot

 

verifies the CAS brief and is given instructions prior to running the initial attack heading to the

 

target. The FAC or FACA marks the target with artillery, mortars, or rockets to provide the pilot

 

visual acquisition prior to ordnance release. If precision munitions are used, appropriate

 

designation of the target is executed. Re-attacks are directed if required and feasible. Bomb

 

damage assessments (BDA) are collected upon returning to base, and forwarded from all

 

participants in the mission (TACP, pilot, FACA). The intent is to put bombs on prioritized targets

 

within fifteen minutes of the initial target identification or request by maximizing the efficiency of

 

the sorties available. If more sorties are needed, the DASC will continue to push them to the

 

target area.

 

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION LINE/MEASURES

 

   The primary coordinating measure for CAS is the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL). It

 

is established by the appropriate ground commander to ensure coordination of fire not under his

 

direct control, but which may effect current tactical operations.8 The effect a target has on

 

current tactical operations is a key factor to the applicability of immediate air support in the

 

MAGTF. Tactical targets located in a position to effect current operations infers that they could

 

engage the GCE in the near future. Doctrinally, the FSCL divides the close battle from the deep.

 

It is supposed to maximize employment of weapons where they are most efficient.9 The DASC's

 

responsibility to control and direct air operations coincides with the definition of CAS, which

 

normally is employed in close proximity to friendly forces. Reasons to establish an FSCL are

 

two-fold; 1) to allow the maximum unbridled freedom of the MAGTF fires (permissive), and 2) to

 

ensure the safety of friendly forces (restrictive).

 

   The degree of restrictive coordination between agency and aircraft diminishes as distance from

 

the close battle area to the target increases. For targets in close proximity of friendlies, maximum

 

coordination and control of aircraft is required. For preplanned deep targets, 50 miles from the

 

friendlies, very little is necessary. The amount of time consumed coordinating is proportionate to

 

the degree of control required. Efficient coordination produces efficient immediate air support.

 

The entire MACCS, including the pilot, is involved in this effort. There is an extended chain of

 

events that occurs prior to dropping ordnance which has a significant impact on the outcome.

 

   The area between close and deep, beyond the FSCL, contains targets that can effect the

 

current battle. For this discussion, these targets will be identified as near deep targets. The

 

engagement of near deep targets can be facilitated by CAS assets and controlling agencies. Near

 

deep targets located beyond the FSCL should be classified in the close battle area because they

 

can effect current operations. They also possess the engagement characteristic of immediacy

 

present in all CAS targeting. The ability to target and control resources in a near/real time basis

 

should be the determinant for deciding whether a target is in the close battle area. The F/A-18D in

 

the FACA role, RPVs working directly with the DASC, and the employment of the airborne

 

DASC are the principle means for establishing and maintaining air control for the extended close

 

battle area. Sorties operating beyond the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) working

 

interdiction and armed reconnaissance are additional capabilities that if orchestrated, can effect the

 

close area near deep targets.

 

   Doctrinal procedures and control measures fail to address this situation. Near deep targets that

 

are of high priority require coordination and allocation of assets to ensure timely engagement.

 

The doctrinal control sphere of the DASC should be expanded to include the additional airspace

 

under the control of airborne agencies, target identifiers, and strike aircraft. This is one area of

 

inefficiency that is created by the definition of the FSCL, and by the doctrinal procedures imposed

 

upon the air control agencies.10

 

 

 

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION ZONE

 

   The limiting factors created by the FSCL can be overcome by the creation of a Fire Support

 

Coordination Zone (FSCZ). The FSCZ would extend beyond the FSCL as far as the DASC and

 

its subordinate airborne control agencies can identify and engage real time targets. Presently,

 

these agencies include: the airborne DASC, TACA, FACA, and the RPV. Increasing the span of

 

control of air assets enhances opportunities for engaging priority targets. Battlespace advantage

 

and synergy are realized by increasing mutually supporting capabilities, and technological

 

advances for target identification and engagement. Employing F/A-18D as FACAs in the FSCZ

 

under the control of the DASC, while linking with the RPV exemplifies this situation. Aircraft

 

utilization and probability of kill will greatly increase over present levels. Engaging targets that

 

influence current ground operations will be accomplished more efficiently with the addition of the

 

near deep battlespace concept into the close battle. Real time flexibility in the CAS system is

 

attainable by incorporating target identifiers for the near deep battle into the DASC, and

 

exercising decentralized control of air assets. Location of the target in relation to the FSCL will

 

no longer be the determinant for sortie assignment and target engagement. Basis for prioritization

 

will consider the ability of the agencies to control and engage assets on the target, the MEF

 

commander's target guidance, and the threat the target poses to current operations. CAS, in

 

support of ground units, will normally take priority over CAS in the FSCZ. Enemy long range

 

artillery and rockets is an example when it might not.

 

   Increasing the efficient air asset management and target engagements results in a heightened

 

battlespace awareness. By maintaining extended procedural control of sorties, and incorporating

 

real time target identifiers, engagements in the FSCZ meet the immediate CAS criteria

 

emphasizing reactive targeting

 

 

 

FLEXIBLE TASKING

 

   The development of a flexible ATO is another key factor contributing to responsive airpower

 

in a dynamic target scenario. Proactive schedules that anticipate real-time engagements, reinforce

 

the ability to attack close and near deep targets in a fluid environment. A majority of the air to

 

ground sorties should be scheduled with dual missions of CAS, and a Deep Air Support (DAS)

 

preplanned target. Once a mission checks in with the DASC, it will be assigned: 1) immediate

 

CAS target, 2) immediate near deep target in the FSCZ, or 3) directed to attack his preplanned

 

DAS target. Pre-determined transition times indicate that a sortie has just enough time remaining

 

airborne to prosecute his briefed preplanned target. If the sortie is not used when that specific

 

time is reached, its mission will change from a CAS/FSCZ air alert posture, to the preplanned

 

DAS mission it was assigned. This system maximizes utilization of assets while at the same time

 

places an increased priority on immediate target engagements that focus on the enemy.

 

 

 

TRAINING AND STRUCTURE

 

   Each CAS controlling agency has a uniquely critical link in the C3 chain. They must be

 

exercised in unison, on a regular basis so that agency/individual proficiency can be reached.

 

Realizing and maintaining MOS competency at each level of control is critical for efficient

 

execution. The required expertise level of readiness can only be achieved through a constant

 

program of garrison/exercise training between the agencies. It is too late to begin "learning the

 

job" when the request are received and the aircraft are on station.11

 

   Requisite proficiency training is achieved through experience gained only through time and

 

effort. The experience base broadens with each and every evolution so that painful lessons will

 

not be relearned. If one link in the chain is broken, all the efforts of every agency fail.

 

Competency through effective training in the crucial nodes of the system is required to maximize

 

the resources for immediate air support.

 

DASC TRAINING AND MANNING

 

   The present system provides the DASC and air support elements with 7208/7202/7242 Air

 

Support Control personnel, with the sole mission of facilitating offensive air support for the

 

MAGTF. Levels of experience for career SNCOs and officers average 15 years in deploying units.

 

The most crucial billets are its directors. The Senior Air Director is usually experienced and well

 

qualified. The weakness in DASC proficiency is in the tactical fixed wing and helicopter direction

 

section. Due to the unit's structure and manning, the positions are normally filled with junior

 

officers directly out of school. Typically, most directors participate in 10-15 different level

 

exercises in the first two years. Depending on the tempo of air play in these exercises, they

 

approach their required level of expertise at the end of this period. With the first tour complete,

 

approximately one third rise to the Senior Air Director position, one third remain as directors, and

 

one third leave the service. Subsequently, at any given time, 66% of the directors are manned by

 

marginally qualified personnel. Constant turnover and poor continuity are the result of a manning

 

policy that ultimately contributes to poor CAS processing.

 

   Introducing staff non-commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers as directors is a

 

way to provide a sustained experience base in those crucial positions. Precedence for this practice

 

is present in the Marine Air Control Squadrons (MACS). Enlisted weapons and tower controllers

 

are very effective and competent. A percentage of the director positions would continue to be

 

filled with lieutenants, providing a pool of candidates for the SAD position.

 

AO/FAC TRAINING AND MANNING

 

   AOs and TACPs positions are filled with pilots with the 75XX MOS. Their assignment to the

 

GCE is normally for a one year period. This philosophy of using aviators as FACs is done to bring

 

the wing and the ground closer together. In reality, it has done the opposite. The basis for the

 

argument lies in the pilot's ability to provide responsive results via the CAS process. One year

 

assignments are not enough time to achieve expertise as a FAC or AO. It is unfair and unrealistic

 

to expect a ground FAC's proficiency rating to be at the combat qualified level given the

 

frequency and type of operations encountered in a 12 month tour. There is more to being a FAC

 

than controlling sorties on target. The many procedures, techniques and equipment that must be

 

mastered, both doctrinal and mission peculiar, require a broader base of experience, proficiency,

 

and time on the job.

 

   On the other hand, Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) controllers routinely

 

prove themselves over and over again. Tour assignments are longer and allow for a more

 

consistent training process, the results of which are routinely observed in the DASC. Many

 

ANGLICO terminal controllers who are non-aviators have demonstrated repeatedly that wearing

 

wings is not a prerequisite for making an excellent FAC. ANGLICO's ability to coordinate and

 

integrate within the entire MACCS, request preplanned and immediate air, control aircraft

 

effectively with tactical communications, and maintain those communications with all parties

 

concerned is justification for a designated TACP MOS and extended tours for FACs.12 Opening

 

the FAC mission to other military occupational skills and extending the tour length, would

 

alleviate many of the FAC/AO training shortfalls.

 

 

 

SUMMARY

 

   Marine close air support can provide an overwhelming ability to influence the close and near

 

deep battle if dynamically employed. The full potential of Marine CAS is attainable if changes are

 

made in executing the many supporting activities leading up to the final phase of putting ordnance

 

on target. Immediate CAS in the close and near deep battlespace produce a great percentage of

 

the MAGTF's firepower, and can have a decisive effect on the enemy. Preparation for

 

employment of the CAS process, like any combat skill, is key for successful results.

 

   Effective timing, communications, integration, training, and targeting are prerequisites for

 

successful sustained CAS execution. The critical nature of efficient CAS is immediacy,

 

characterized by rapid decision making, fleeting targets, and limited windows of asset availability.

 

Combined with the challenges of effective communications, and a compressed battlespace, the

 

probability of successful prosecution are reduced with the present system. Although CAS was

 

very effective in southwest Asia, it required a six month work-up and the introduction of some

 

innovative procedures and techniques. Next time, the situation will be different. Preparing for the

 

challenge requires flexible planning, focused training, an expanded look at the battlespace, and an

 

increased awareness of the intricacies of the CAS process.  Effective CAS is critical to the

 

MEF's overall warfighting capability, and will be a hallmark for combined arms operations in

 

future conflicts.

 

1     Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1

December 1989, 70.

2     Cooling, Franklin Benjamin, "Case Studies in the Developmentof Close Air Support,"

(United States Air Force. Office of Air Force History, 1990), 542.

3     Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-4A, Close Air Support and Close-In Fire Support

(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, June 1988), 2-3.

4     Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 2-7-1, Fire Support Coordination by the MAGTF

Command Element (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, July 1992), 1-2.

5     Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-60, Control of Aircraft and Missiles, (Washington,

DC: Department of the Navy, June 1993), 6-1 through6-9.

6     Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 2-7, Fire Support in Marine Air-Ground Task Force

Operations (Washington DC: Department of the Naby, September 1991, 4-1.

7     John Boatman, "USA Redefines CAS Doctrine for a New Era of Warfare" Jane's Defence

Weekly, 12 DEC 1992.

8     Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 6-18, Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support

Coordination (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, March 1992, H-1.

9     Ibid. H-2.

10    Anthony Valentino, F/A-18pilot, interviewed by author, 3 March 1995.

11    MASS-2, MACCS/CAS Study Group, Report Number One, Jan 1990, page 5.

12    Ibid.page6.

 

                                 BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

1. Boatman, John, "USA Redefines CAS Doctrine For a New Era of Warfare," Jane's Defense

Weekly, 12 Dec, 1992.

 

2. Cohen Elliot and Keaney Thomas, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report. U.S.

Government Printing Office, Washington D. C.,1993.

 

3. Cooling, Franklin Benjamin, Case Studies in the development of Close Air Support. United

States Air Force, Office of Air Force History, 1990.

 

4. Fawcett, John M. Jr., Major USAF, "Which Way to the FEBA?" Air Power Journal, Fall 1992.

 

5. Jones, Brian W., LtCol USAF, "Close Air Support, A Doctrinal Disconnect, "Airpower

Journal, Winter 1992.

 

6. Marine Air Support Squadron-2, Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS)/ Close

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7. United States Marine Corps, FMFM 2-7-1, Fire Support Coordination by the MAGTF

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8. United States Marine Corps, FMFM 2-7, Fire Support in Marine Air-Ground Task Force

Operations, 26 September 1991.

 

9. United States Marine Corps, FMFM 6-18, Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support

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10. United States Marine Corps, FMFM 5-60, Control of Aircraft and Missiles, 22 June 1993.

 

11. United States Marine Corps, FMFM 5-4, Offensive Air Support, 13 September 1979.

 

12. United States Marine Corps, FMFM 5-42, Deep Air Support, 4 March 1993.

 

13. United States Marine Corps, FMFM 5-4A, Close Air Support and Close-In Fire Support, 10

June 1988.

 

14. Valentino, Anthony, LtCol USMC, Interviewed by author, 3 March 1995.