Military

Back To The Future: A Study Of Command And Control Procedures

For The Naval Expeditionary Task Force In Support Of Littoral

Maneuver Warfare

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - C4

 

 

 

 

 

                              Abstract of

Back to the Future: A Study of the Command and Control Procedures for the Naval

Expeditionary Task Force in Support of Littoral Maneuver Warfare.

 

      With the publication of the Navy's "Forward...From the Sea" and Naval Doctrinal

 

Publication I "Naval Warfare" there has been an increase on naval operations in the

 

littoral areas of the world. Additionally these operations will place an increase emphases

 

on the use of maneuver warfare encompassing the concepts of operational maneuver from

 

the sea. This shift in operations will require the development of both a force structure and

 

command and control organization for the exploitation of the benefits of maneuver

 

warfare while maintaining the ability to successfully conduct amphibious warfare. To

 

successfully develop both structures the Naval services must turn to historical examples of

 

amphibious operations within the littorals as well as lessons from current fleet operations.

 

A jointly oriented Naval Expeditionary Task Force combining the benefits of both the

 

Amphibious Ready Group and Carrier Battle group will meet the force requirements of

 

Operational Maneuver from the Sea. However, the command and control organization

 

must combine the concepts of joint warfare with the force structure currently presented

 

amphibious doctrine to ensure success. By establishing a command and control structure

 

that will allow the naval commander to conduct operational maneuver from the sea in the

 

deep, near and rear areas the Naval services will become the true enabling force for all

 

joint operations. Only in accomplishing this paradigm shift will the Naval services meet

 

the requirements placed upon them in future conflicts.

 

                          TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

CHAPTER                                                                PAGE

 

    I     INTRODUCTION                                                   1

 

    II    MANEUVER WARFARE                                               4

 

    III   NAVAL DOCTRINE                                                12

                 Amphibious Warfare Doctrine                            13

                 CWC Doctrine                                           18

                 Integration of Amphibious Warfare and the CWC Concept  20

 

    IV    NAVAL EXERCISE AND HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES                    24

                Historical                                              24

                    The Falkland Island Campaign                        25

                    Operation Urgent Fury                               33

                    Operation Chromite                                  36

                Fleetex                                                 39

 

    V     RECOMMENDATIONS                                               44

                Why Maneuver Warfare                                    45

                What is NETF and How Should it be Constructed           47

                Command and Control structure for the NETF              54

 

    VI   CONCLUSION                                                     61

 

    ANNEX A Amphibious Groups                                           63

 

    ANNEX B Acronyms                                                    65

 

    NOTES                                                               68

 

    BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                        72

 

                               BACK TO THE FUTURE:

          A STUDY OF THE COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES FOR THE NAVAL

           EXPEDITIONARY TASK FORCE IN SUPPORT OF LITTORAL MANEUVER

                                    WARFARE

 

                                  CHAPTER ONE

 

                                  INTRODUCTION

 

      -"A military, naval, Littoral War, when wisely prepared and discreetly conducted is

a terrible sort of war. Happy for the people who are Sovereigns enough of the sea to put

it into Execution! For it comes like thunder and lighting to some unprepared Part of the

World." - Thomas More Molyneux1

 

      With the demise of the Soviet Union and the increase in world regional tensions

 

the Department of the Navy has had to refocus and reorient the missions of its maritime

 

services. The senior leadership within the Navy and Marine Corps have come to the

 

realization that the threat we are most likely to encounter is a third world threat in the

 

littorals of the world. It is in the littorals of the world that the National Command

 

Authority (NCA) can use naval forces to carry out national policy by influencing events

 

ashore from our mobile sea bases operating in international waters.2 These forces would

 

be facing foes that are technologically inferior, but may be numerically superior.

 

Additionally, our forces face the possibility of heavy casualties and loss of life predicated

 

by the possession of high tech weapons bought on the open market by politically unstable

 

parties. With the ever changing requirements of the world we must witness a fundamental

 

shift in force composition, tactics and training within our naval forces to meet the

 

challenges of the future. The publication of Naval Doctrinal Publication 1 in 1994 and

 

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 in 1989, as well as the recent release of the Department of

 

the Navy's White Paper, "Forward .... From the Sea" in 1995, has recognized that the

 

maritime forces must shift from open ocean confrontation to joint military operations in

 

the littorals3.

 

      At the very heart of this move to support littoral warfare is the adoption of the

 

Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF) concept by the Navy and the implementation of

 

maneuver warfare by the Marine Corps. The key to success in any future third world

 

conflict will be the ability to mold these two concepts together to develop a single concept

 

of Operational Maneuver from the Sea.4 In order to successfully conduct maneuver

 

warfare any military organization must have an operationally sound command and control

 

doctrine. The Composite Warfare Doctrine (CWC), due to its limitations both in

 

execution and principle, can not meet the needs of the NETF to conduct maneuver

 

warfare. The Navy must develop a warfare concept that will be compatible with the

 

philosophy of maneuver warfare and the primacy of the Naval Expeditionary Task Force

 

commander. Furthermore, the Navy must be able to easily apply this concept in the joint

 

arena.

 

      In order to develop a command and control model that will function both as an

 

amphibious and naval force control mechanism and meet the functional requirements of

 

maneuver warfare, a basic framework must be first be established. To establish a

 

framework this paper will initially look at maneuver warfare. This examination will

 

include a detailed breakdown of maneuver warfare, a study of it in practice during the

 

German blitzkrieg, and some application to amphibious warfare. Next, an analysis will be

 

conducted of amphibious doctrine to include both the CWC and amphibious warfare

 

concepts and how the Navy has tried to integrate the two. A detailed look will then be

 

taken at how the Navy is currently approaching these problems along with proposed force

 

structures to meet possible future conflicts. Through an historical look at amphibious

 

warfare these models will be applied to three past conflicts that can be used as examples in

 

studying future potential littoral conflicts: the conflicts which will be addressed are

 

Grenada, the Falkland Islands, and Inchon. Additionally, there will be an historical look at

 

Second and Third Fleet exercises in 1993 and 1994 where the oval forces made an

 

attempt to support maneuver warfare by integrating these two concepts. Finally, from

 

lessons generated by these examples there will be a discussion of why we need maneuver

 

warfare; how we should approach force structure to support maneuver warfare; and in

 

what manner should command and control be established to support operational maneuver

 

from the sea.

 

      As a solution, this paper will propose that we take the concept of Amphibious

 

Warfare, as stated in Joint Publication 3.02, and make minor modifications in order to

 

achieve the command and control requirements to successfully fight a maneuver warfare

 

battle in the littoral environment. This paper will attempt to take a new look at an old

 

problem and apply both lessons learned in blood with those learned in exercises, and to

 

create a feasible and acceptable command structure which will allow us to operate in a

 

manner to optimize our potential to win future conflicts.

 

                                  CHAPTER TWO

 

                               MANEUVER WARFARE

 

-"Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness; travel by

unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions"-Sun Tzu5

 

                                                                          T

 

he concept of modern maneuver warfare is a "...warfighting philosophy that seeks to

 

shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions

 

which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope."6

 

Retired Air Force Colonel John Boyd put in writing the modern concept of maneuver

 

warfare when developing the theories of his OODA loop decision model.7 Colonel Boyd

 

discovered that pilots while involved in air-to-air combat would go through a decision

 

process of four distinct steps. These steps were observation, orientation, decision, and

 

action (OODA). He postulated that since every combat situation requires the

 

commander/pilot to conduct this process the pilot achieves victory only by completing the

 

OODA cycle at a faster tempo than his opponent. In completing his OODA loop at a

 

faster tempo, the commander would be able to get inside his opponents loop. This would

 

force him to react to vague events, generating confusion surrounding his environment,

 

resulting in a loss of cohesive control. Even though this would not likely physically

 

destroy the enemy, he would be incapable of continuing effective resistance.8

 

      Colonel Boyd, as well as many of the other maneuver warfare proponents,

 

conducted a search through history to find relationships in battle to apply the OODA loop

 

concept to land armies. They determined that throughout history there were several

 

examples of commanders who successfully translated the OODA loop decision cycle to

 

ground warfare. Colonel Boyd and other military analyst determined that maneuver

 

warfare required three basic elements to ensure a faster tempo decision process. The

 

decision process of maneuver warfare requires three basic tools: the focus of main effort,

 

the exploitation of surfaces and gaps, and the idea of using mission type orders.9

 

Through the use of these tools in developing a framework for operation the commanders

 

were able to ensure victory by reducing the time needed to make and act upon a decision.

 

This ultimately resulted in their opponents facing rapidly changing and seemingly

 

confusing, multiple threats.

 

      The focus of main effort, referred to by the Germans as Schwerpunkt, provides

 

direction for a military operation. It pulls together the efforts of all subordinate elements

 

of an attack and guides them to the completion of a common goal.10 It provides the

 

course of actions that a military operation must take. This in itself is a simplification of the

 

meaning of Schwerpunkt. Schwerpukkt is the focus upon an adversaries' weakness,

 

whether physical, morale, or organizational. This focus is not simply where the

 

commander centers the main attack (though it often is the main attack); it is the center of

 

an adversaries' cohesion and order, this very center of gravity that allows him to function

 

as a single, cohesive unit. It is not purely a physical focus but a conceptual one.11 A

 

commander must ensure that he is assessing the combat situation and continually

 

reevaluating his focus of effort throughout a battle. This ensures that his aim continues to

 

be the destruction of the adversaries' cohesion and ability to resist.12

 

      Weaknesses within an adversaries' unit and lines are only exploitable if discovered.

 

Therefore, the commander must employ the second tool of maneuver warfare -- the

 

concept of surfaces and gaps. Typically, a surface is an area of the adversaries' strong

 

established defense with a gap being a hole within that defense.13 A commander will use a

 

reconnaissance unit to determine where the gap is within the defensive line. Additionally,

 

a commander can use his intelligence organization to determine where gaps exist within

 

the enemies' defenses. Once a commander's reconnaissance units have determined the

 

location and existence of a gap, he will push a portion of his reserve force forward to

 

exploit the gap within his adversaries' lines. A commander bases the axis of advance for

 

military force upon the gaps that exist within an adversaries' line of defenses. All units

 

operating forward must be conducting reconnaissance to determine the change in enemy

 

positions and the existence of new gaps within his lines.14  As reconnaissance units

 

determine the existence of more and more gaps, a multiple axis front will result, causing

 

additional confusion within the adversaries' command organization. This will cause a loss

 

of cohesion within the adversaries' army. Liddel Hart referred to this as his "expanding

 

torrent theory."15 The key to the success of this type of tactic is a comprehensive forward

 

reconnaissance. This is why maneuver warfare experts refer to maneuver warfare as

 

intelligence or reconnaissance pull tactics.16

 

      The key to success of the first two concepts of maneuver warfare is the use of

 

mission type orders. Without the commander clearly establishing his vision of the mission

 

and his intent in the conflict, the decentralized control required for maneuver warfare can

 

not be established. This is basically a contract between superior and subordinate to

 

identify the mission goals, and what the commander wants to happen in a broad setting to

 

accomplish these goals.17 Different from the orders that many military commanders

 

typically give which delineate the smallest detail of an operation, mission orders allow

 

widely separated unit commanders, when faced with difficulty, to use a high level of

 

initiative and flexibility to carry out a commanders wishes.18 A subordinate does not wait

 

for permission to act; he takes action and back briefs his superior after completion of the

 

mission.

 

      There are two elements (sometimes referred to as contracts) to mission type

 

orders. One element is the commanders' intent. This is a long-term vision of how he

 

wants to attack the enemy and the final result he wishes to achieve. The short term and

 

small slice of the intent is the order relating to a specific point within the accomplishment

 

of a wider vision or mission.19 The key to success is ensuring a particular subordinate

 

understands the commanders' intent two levels up, and those two levels below understand

 

the order. Mission type orders can be thought of in very simple terms as centralized

 

planning and decentralized execution.

 

      There are Four elements of structure that must exist within an organization to

 

ensure the success of the three key elements of maneuver warfare: 1) a combined arms

 

organization; 2) a strong reserve force; 3) a decentralized command and control system;

 

and 4) a forward push logistics system.20 Without these elements of organization, a

 

commander will be unable to apply the concepts of maneuver warfare to any battle field.

 

      Combined arms organization should not be confused with the concept of

 

supporting arms. Supporting arms establish the ability of a commander to destroy targets

 

that may stand in his way for the advancement of his forces. Combined arms, on the other

 

hand, use a combination of different types of fire. Actions taken by an adversary to avoid

 

the effects of one type of weapon will quickly expose him to a second type of fire.21 This

 

will result in confusion and a loss of cohesion within the enemies' forces and result in the

 

creation of exploitable gaps within his defenses.

 

      A strong reserve force allows the commander to exploit gaps he discovers within

 

the enemies' defenses. By having a strong reserve the commander is able to expand his

 

area of attack and exploits all gaps found by his reconnaissance. If a commander cannot

 

exploit the gaps that he discovers he will lose the initiative within the conflict.

 

Additionally, a strong reserve will give the commander the ability to counter any attack his

 

opponent may throw against his forces, thus parrying a thrust into his initiative by his

     

enemy.22

 

      As stated earlier, a system of centralized planning and decentralized control must

 

be maintained. The armed service must establish a military organization framework based

 

on the concept of monitoring and leadership. This requires each level within the

 

organization to take responsibility for their actions while using a high level of initiative and

 

taking calculated risks on the battlefield. It requires the senior commanders to monitor

 

through observation and listening and not micromanage their subordinates. Because

 

maneuver warfare relies on the ability of commanders to make risk management decisions

 

it requires the leaders to lead from the front.23 Additionally, it requires a level of trust

 

between subordinates and superiors resulting from a shared way of thinking and

 

leadership. A commander must trust his subordinates to execute his mission and intent as

 

he envisions it for "Maneuver warfare tactics are trust." 24

 

      Finally, the organization must establish forward logistics to allow operational

 

support to be immediately available to the commander. The commander must have

 

available to him all logistics support required to exploit the rapid advance of his troops.

 

Without the ability to provide this support, a commander will lose the initiative created by

 

the rapid movement of his force. The key in avoiding this is to anticipate the logistical

 

needs of the commander and provide the support immediately required. These forward

 

push logistics will allow the commander to continue fighting unburdened by the

 

requirements to wait for the resupply of his forces.25

 

      Once the commander understands both the tools for the conduct of maneuver and

 

has in place the organizational structure required, he must apply them through the concept

 

of operational art. We can define operational art as the "art of using tactics to strike at the

 

enemies' strategic center of gravity."26 It is, in essence, the ability of applying battlefield

 

tactics to achieve strategic and political goals.27 It is a thought process that allows the

 

commander to concentrate on those tactical aspects that he requires to meet his objectives

 

mission completion. It is his ability to look beyond the fog of war and determine at a

 

higher level the "big picture" actions that he must take to meet the strategic objectives.

 

On the battlefield it does the commander little good to make a tactical decision or engage

 

the enemy if he is not exploiting a weakness of the enemy at an operational level.

 

      A careful study of history indicates that one of the best examples of this concept is

 

the German Blitzrieg Tactics. The Germans who developed these tactics are the only

 

military that successfully ingrained into their military's operation the concept of maneuver

 

warfare. Blitzkrieg stressed mobility and speed over the use of fire power. However,

 

concentrated fire power was armed at decisive points within the battlefield. It used

 

concentrated air power to prepare the way for the advancing forces through attacking the

 

command and control centers and choke points within the enemies' rear. The German

 

high command stressed infiltration tactics using armor and mobile infantry to infiltrate

 

deep into the enemies rear to disrupt enemy lines of communication.28 The Germans

 

executed this infiltration through the vertical movement of troops along a horizontally

 

organized front allowing troops to occupy "nodal points" and overrun their enemies

 

command centers. The Germans accomplished this type of operation by warfare aimed at

 

the operational defeat of the enemy. Units would avoid engaging the enemy strengths and

 

would capitalize on their weaknesses. The High Command encouraged commanders to

 

take initiative in executing their attack, with each being encouraged to take opportunistic

 

advantage of tempo, position, and enemy weakness in the battlefield. Guided by mission

 

type orders, those commanders who took calculated risks were rewarded with promotions

 

while those requiring direction from positions of command were eliminated. Centralized

 

planning and decentralized execution, along with an inbred understanding of the

 

operational level of war, were keys to their success.29

 

      Amphibious warfare, as currently executed, does not meet the tenets of maneuver

 

warfare. Current operations in the fleet are missing several key elements of both the tools

 

and the structure of maneuver warfare. Currently, amphibious warfare uses the concept of

 

centralized planning and decentralized control. Today's' commanders typically execute

 

these operations under the tight restrictions normally associated in land warfare with

 

micro-management.30 Due to this type of control the amphibious force is unable to take

 

advantage of any gaps in the enemies' lines that may occur during the time of battle.31

 

Additionally, the concept of pull reconnaissance is used strictly in the planning of the

 

operations and not in the execution of the landings. As currently operating, the

 

amphibious task force is not equipped to use a combined arms approach to warfare.

 

Currently, aircraft embarked aboard amphibious ships are better suited for the conduct of

 

close air support which, by definition, is a key element of supporting arms operations

 

rather than combined arms operations.32 As well, ATFs are not currently making

 

deployments with NGFS ships assigned in support.33 Finally, in order to support

 

amphibious operations the amphibious task force must be able to move the battle inland,

 

extending the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).34 The Navy has recognized its

 

shortfalls in establishing forces in support of maneuver from the sea and has established

 

the Naval Expeditionary Task Force to accomplish this mission in the littorals. The

 

remainder of this paper is directed towards establishing guidelines for developing a naval

 

force based upon current doctrine and lessons learned in both historical and current

 

operations.

 

                                 CHAPTER THREE

 

 

                                NAVAL DOCTRINE

 

 

      -"Doctrine is the starting point from which we develop solutions and options to

address the specific Warfighting demands and challenges we face in conducting operations

other than war" --Naval Doctrinal Publication 135

 

 

      Naval doctrine is an ever evolving process. It establishes how maritime forces

 

conduct their mission to meet the national objectives established by the National

 

Command Authority. Until the release of the Navy white paper,"... From the Sea," the

 

Navy's impetus was on fighting an open ocean, blue water war. As stated in the

 

introduction of this paper, with the publication of "...From the Sea," and the follow-on

 

publication of NDP-1 Naval Warfare, the emphasis of our fighting forces shifted to littoral

 

warfare. However, there still exists two doctrines within the naval structure that dictate

 

how we conduct operations in fighting an armed adversary. Those are the Joint

 

Amphibious Doctrine specified in Joint Publication 3.02 and Composite Warfare

 

Commander doctrine Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 10-1 REV(A). Before

 

determining how to support maneuver warfare, there must be a basic understanding of

 

these two doctrines. The attempt to mesh and deconflict these two doctrines through the

 

Seventh Fleet TACMEMO and Third Fleet TACMEMO must be studied.

 

      NDP-1 states that in order to conduct littoral warfare commanders must be

 

provided with a broad range of assets and only through these assets will the Navy be able

 

to conduct maneuver warfare.36 To fully utilize these assets, the established doctrine for

 

the execution of naval operations must be understood. This chapter will first present

 

amphibious doctrine and then CWC doctrine, to build a basis upon which to work within

 

the organization to support maneuver warfare within the littorals.

 

 

AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE

 

      Amphibious doctrine has been a long evolutionary process established through

 

periods of conflict and with the blood of both sailors and marines.37 The Joint Chiefs

 

adopted Naval Warfare Publication NWP-22 in principle in 1986 as Joint Publication 3.02.

 

The Department of the Navy updated 3.02 in October of 1992. It established the basis for

 

all amphibious operations both in force structure and command and control. It establishes

 

the command and control procedures for not only amphibious assaults but amphibious

 

raids, demonstrations, and withdrawals.38 The three underlying principles of amphibious

 

warfare doctrine, as established in JCS Publication 3.02 are: 1) Unity of command is

 

critical to the successful execution of any amphibious operation; 2) The complexity of

 

amphibious warfare and vulnerability of forces requires a unity of effort; 3) The ability to

 

conduct amphibious operations stems from mobility and fiexibility.39 Amphibious warfare

 

doctrine established the concepts of exploiting the weaknesses of the enemy using time

 

and location to its advantage to meet operational goals of the theater commander.40

 

      There are four basic components intrinsic to amphibious doctrine:

 

    1. The relationship of Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) to all other naval

 

      commanders in theater.

 

    2. How forces are controlled once the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) is

 

      established.

 

    3. The relationship between CATF and Commander Landing Force (CLF).

 

    4. The establishment of warfare conditions existing within the AOA to ensure a

 

      successful operation.

 

Once amphibious doctrine is understood through these relationships this framework can be

 

used to conduct any amphibious operation.

 

      Joint Publication 3.02 established a clear relationship, for all aspects of the

 

amphibious operation, between CATF and all other Naval components of the amphibious

 

task force. It clearly states that even though CATF may be subordinate to the oval

 

component commander in a joint operation, CATF still maintains the operational and

 

tactical control of all forces assigned to his task force.41 This includes the control of all

 

forces during the conduct of amphibious operations, including deception operations, non-

 

combatant evacuation operations, and all other types of non-conventional amphibious

 

operations.42 When required, CATF can establish a subordinate task organization

 

composed of a landing force and naval force units to conduct additional missions assigned

 

by either a CINC or Joint Force Commander (JFC). CATF must direct an organization

 

that will meet the requirements established for the embarkation of forces, protection and

 

movement of forces to the AOA and once established protection of all forces within the

 

AOA. If CATF does not have the forces required to conduct the operation or protect his

 

assigned forces, he requests additional forces from the JFC.43

 

      CATF can establish an organization to support his assigned missions based upon

 

the 15 group organization established by Joint Publication 3.02 for the conduct of

 

amphibious operations (These Groups are defined in Annex A.). The key groups include

 

the Transportation Group, the Carrier Battle Group, the Control Group, and the Screening

 

Group. The definitions for this discussion are the following:

 

 

             Transportation Group: Normally MSC shipping for large exercises.

             However, it is the shipping provided for the transportation and landing of

             the landing force within the AOA. Landing craft for movement of forces

             ashore are organic to this group.

 

             Control Group: Personnel, ships, and craft designated to conduct and

             control the ship-to-shore movement of troops.

 

             Carrier Battle Group: The Carrier Battle Group assigned to provide air,

             surface, and subsurface protection and strike warfare in support of the

             Amphibious Task Force.

 

             Screening Group: This group provides protection for the ATF enroute to

             and in the AOA. This includes AAW, ASUW, ASW protection for the

             force under the CWC Concept.44

 

 

If the size of the landing dictates, CATF may divide these groups into an Attack Group

 

and a Landing Group with the attack group providing initial assault forces and supporting

 

units. The Landing Group provides the forces to conduct the landing in support of the

 

mission.45 CATF will exercise operational control of all forces and groups assigned to the

 

amphibious task force as delineated by JFC and, at a minimum, the Transportation Group

 

and Tactical Air Group.

 

      The operation of forces within the AOA is even more tightly controlled by CATF

 

as delineated by Joint Publication 3.02. Once CJTF establishes the AOA, CATF receives

 

and maintains tactical control of all forces within the AOA whether or not these units

 

belong to the amphibious task force. Within the AOA, CATF selects and allocates the

 

ships and aircraft that provide fire support, ship to shore movement, advance force

 

operations, and anti-air warfare.46 CATF has all command and control authority over any

 

operations supporting the landing. These relationships allow CATF to establish a unity of

 

command and a focus of effort while de-conflicting both the missions and the forces

 

assigned within the AOA. These operations may include reconnaissance prior to the

 

landing, mine sweeping, deception operations, and preparation of the battlefield.47 This

 

relationship includes CATF's control of the forces of the landing force and the senior to

 

subordinate relationship between CATF and CLF.

 

      A special doctrinal relationship exists between CATF and CLF throughout the

 

amphibious operation with the relationship changing as the situation presented to the force

 

changes. Throughout the planning of an amphibious operation CATF and CLF are co-

 

equal and enjoy a peer relationship. If planning occurs in a different phase of the

 

operation this relationship does not change. This allows the CLF, whether it is an Army

 

or Marine officer, to determine the employment of his forces in the accomplishment of the

 

mission.48 During the embarkation, CLF will be responsible for the planning and conduct

 

of the embarkation of troops.49 Once the landing force completes embarkation through

 

the movement, rehearsal and the assault phases, CATF has responsibility for the operation.

 

Once CLF feels that he has established a supportable and secure position ashore, CATF

 

transfers control of the operation ashore to CLF.

 

      In order to successfully carry out any amphibious operation there must be some

 

basic warfare requirements met by CATF to ensure the success of the operation. All

 

forces will conduct operations through the five phases of operation; planning,

 

embarkation, movement, rehearsal, and assault. Planning is continuous and may occur at

 

any phase of the operation.50 The ATF must establish and maintain naval (surface and

 

subsurface) and air superiority within the AOA, however, an amphibious landing does not

 

require the superiority of landing forces.51  CATF's successful control and employment

 

of air assets will determine the success of the operation. CATF is ultimately responsible

 

for the centralized planning, coordination, and deconfliction of assets within the AOA.52

 

In addition, CATF must use supporting arms, not only to prepare the landing sight for

 

movement ashore, but to fix enemy positions to allow freedom of movement of forces.53

 

Throughout the planning phase both CATF and CLF must ensure the execution of an

 

aggressive and in-depth reconnaissance plan to ensure the location of enemy forces. CATF

 

and CLF use this information to assure the selection of an appropriate landing sight.54 An

 

amphibious operation can perpetuate the ability for success by assuring all of these tenants

 

are meet.

 

      With this detailed study of amphibious doctrine we now have the framework for

 

current doctrine in dealing with amphibious operations. However, in order to understand

 

how a commander uses forces to defend the battle group we must also understand the

 

command and control procedures used against surface, subsurface and air threats. The

 

way to understand the naval tactics and procedures in this area of combat is to conduct an

 

analysis of the Composite Warfare Commanders Doctrine (CWC).

 

CWC DOCTRINE

 

 

 

      The Composite Warfare Commander concept has evolved over the last twenty

 

years as a control method for carrier battle group operations against a possible Soviet

 

attack.55 It is overall defensive in nature but includes the offensive capability of strike

 

warfare. The CWC concept establishes the conduct of sea control that will be in a manner

 

best suited for the tactical situation.56 The control organization will range from tight

 

control in a limited engagement environment to decentralized control where defense is

 

paramount and the possibilities exist for multiple engagements. CWC coordinates all

 

control through the use of warfare commanders and warfare coordinators. When

 

delegated the authority, the warfare commanders have the ability to carry out tactical

 

control of assets and engage possible threats while carrying out the mission of the battle

 

group. Coordinators work directly through either one of the warfare commanders or the

 

Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) to carry out their portion of the mission.57 A key

 

element to the success of this doctrine, much as it is with maneuver warfare, is to have

 

commanders and coordinators who have earned the commander's confidence. These

 

commanders can carry out missions without interference or direction, per the mission

 

statement and set combat engagement rules established by the OTC and the CWC.58

 

      Typically, the commander of the CWC concept is the Officer in Tactical Command

 

(OTC) of the battle group and, as such, has the ultimate responsibility for completion of

 

the mission of the battle group. The OTC can never delegate his responsibility for the

 

conduct of offensive operations such as amphibious warfare. It allows him to delegate,

 

under the concept of "command by negation", tactical command to his warfare

 

commanders (Anti-Air Warfare, Anti-Surface Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Space

 

and Electronic Warfare, and Strike Warfare) the use of weapons to conduct tactical sea

 

control. The OTC, however, maintains at all times the authority and responsibility to

 

conduct his power projection mission. Under the concept of command by negation, the

 

OTC will allow full use of weapons and assets unless he specifically directs his

 

commanders otherwise.59 The OTC will allocate assets to his commanders based upon

 

the expected threat that he may face. The OTC is ultimately responsible for de-conflicting

 

disagreements between commanders and ensuring that the highest state of readiness is

 

maintained within the battle group.60 The underlying principle behind the concept is to

 

allow the commander the ability to conduct both offensive and defensive operations

 

against all sea and land based threats.61

 

      The Fleet commanders recognized as early as 1982, that fleet operations tended

 

towards single carrier operations where the CWC system was used to maximize the battle

 

groups defenses. This resulted in difficulties with operations and exercises when

 

amphibious forces and carrier battle groups integrated or operated together.62 To

 

integrate the two doctrines together, Second, Third, and Seventh fleet commanders issued

 

TACMEMOs to begin the resolution of the problem. An integration system proposed by

 

these TACMEMOs has been specified in Joint Publication 3.02 and NWP 10-1 REV (A).

 

However, to fully understand how this integration is taking place a return to the revision

 

of the Seventh Fleet and Third Fleet TACMEMOs issued during the same time frame as

 

the Navy white paper"... From the Sea" will be helpful. By studying both the Third

 

Fleet and Seventh Fleet TACMEMOs an understanding will be gained of how the Navy is

 

trying to integrate the two doctrines.

 

 

INTEGRATION OF AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE AND THE CWC CONCEPT

 

 

      Fleet exercises, involving amphibious operations, continue to embrace a structure

 

utilizing force-wide decision making and asset employment to counter multiple threats that

 

the amphibious force faces once the force enters the AOA. In response to this problem,

 

Third Fleet adapted the three situational relationships for multiple battle group operations

 

to address CVBG and ATF inter-operability.63 These situation relationships are situations

 

A,B,C:

 

 

             Situation A: The support force is to join and integrate with the ATF. The

      senior officer present (which could be CATF) becomes the OTC-CWC of the

      combined force unless otherwise directed by higher authority. All forces are

      integrated under a single OTC-CWC and set of warfare commanders.64

 

 

             Situation B: The support force does not join but provides direct support

      as designated by higher authority. The senior OTC of the separate forces has

      Tactical Control (TACON) and coordinates the tactical operations of all assigned

      forces. The junior commander is designated a support CWC and is delegated

      specific responsibilities and TACON of specific forces.65

 

             Situation C: Each force has its own OTC-CWC and warfare

      commanders. Individual battle group integrity is maintained. The OTC-CWCs

      operate in associated or mutual support to achieve the same broad mission

      objectives, but each has discretion as to how best support the other. The

      individual OTC-CWCs may or may not report to an on-scene common superior.66

 

      In applying situation A to task force operations the task force commander would

 

integrate the ATF and CVBG in to a single organization that creates a single larger battle

 

group. The officer designated as the OTC is the senior officer of the two battle groups.

 

The senior officer embarked aboard amphibious shipping is designated as CATF. He will

 

be subordinate to the OTC and the OTC will coordinate all operations not relating to

 

amphibious warfare. CATF is responsible to the OTC for the embarkation of and support

 

of the ATF's landing forces. Additionally, CATF controls Naval Gunfire Fire Support

 

(NGFS), Close Air Support (CAS), and Assault Support for the amphibious assault. The

 

AAWC, working with the Tactical Air Control Center, will control and coordinate battle

 

group air space.67 CLF retains his relationship with CATF except that he will be

 

subordinate to COMMARFOR if embarked on naval shipping.

 

      During situation B there exists two separate task organizations and CWC's. There

 

will be a separate organization between the CVBG and the ATF. However the CVBG

 

will provide direct support to the ATF as delineated by higher authority. The Senior

 

commander between the two will assume tactical control of all assets and coordinates the

 

operations of all units involved. Once the initiating directive establishes the AOA

 

supporting units will not enter the AOA unless providing direct support to the ATF.

 

ASUWC will coordinate the use of units for NGFS and the TACC will control air assets

 

within the AOA.68 CATF or CLF must request CAS from the CVBG 12-18 hours prior to

 

its requirement to their mission requirement.69 This results in a smaller degree of

 

difficulty to implement than situation A due to only minor disruptions in connectivity and

 

maintenance of unity of command in each Battle Group.70

 

      In implementing situation C each force maintains its own OTC-CWC and warfare

 

commanders along with battle group integrity. The two battle groups operate in mutual

 

support to accomplish the mission objectives. The CVBG will provide air cover and ship

 

defense support to the ATF as assets are available. The OTC determines the amount and

 

type of support provided by the CVBG. This is the optimum relationship for multiple

 

mission tasked forces.71

 

      As discussed earlier, this is an attempt to integrate amphibious warfare with the

 

CWC concept; however, through careful examination of all three situations we can find

 

violations of amphibious warfare doctrine. In an attempt to assure that the Navy maintains

 

the principles of the CWC concept the Navy has sacrificed some intrinsic concepts of

 

amphibious warfare. This is a case of tactics driving the war-fighting capabilities rather

 

than relying on doctrine as guidance for naval operations.

 

      In situation A, there exists a unity of command. However, the senior navy

 

commander does not assume the role of CATF. As will be demonstrated in Chapter Four

 

this creates problems in the assignment and division of forces for the completion of the

 

mission. In situation B CATF is the senior commander in the AOA. However, a unity of

 

force control does not exist. This creates a situation that divides the forces between their

 

requirements under the CWC and the requirements to support the ATF. This same

 

problem exists under situation C. However, the lack of dedicated assets in support of

 

CATF compounds the problem even further.  CATF will only have forces to meet his

 

mission if the CVBG releases and assigns assets in support. Additionally, due to the

 

relationships established for command and control, the amphibious task force is prevented

 

from applying the tenets of maneuver warfare within the framework established in Chapter

 

Two.

 

      In Chapter Four these situations will be examined in greater detail applying the

 

lessons learned through Second and Third Fleet exercises conducted during 1993 and

 

1994. Additionally, three historical examples will be examined, in order, to learn the

 

lessons concerning amphibious warfare. The information gained from these examples the

 

will be used to analysis the recommendations of the Naval Doctrine Command. A

 

recommendation will be developed as how to not only structure the force, but how to

 

establish a command and control procedure to support maneuver warfare.

 

                                 CHAPTER FOUR

 

                  NAVAL EXERCISE AND HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES

 

      -Everything works until something happens72 -- Admiral Picotte, Commander

                                              Amphibious Group Two

 

      For military professionals to understand what shapes the execution of warfare they

 

must look no further than history. In historical examples we find the evolution of tactics

 

and doctrine. Such is the case with amphibious warfare with the increasing threat coming

 

from the developing and under developed world." In these regions of the world

 

population centers have moved to the regions of the littorals, resulting in the majority of

 

the world threat moving with them. National leaders can best deal with these threats

 

through the employment of small combined naval task forces.74 The question centers on

 

how the Navy should employ and structure these task forces. Excellent insights come

 

from analysis of historical analyses of battles such as the Falklands, Grenada, and Inchon.

 

In addition, an examination of current integrated operations of Second and Third Fleets

 

also are useful. In this chapter, a detailed discussion of all of these operations will provide

 

the basis for suggesting a structure for operations in the littorals.

 

 

HISTORICAL

 

      In the previous discussion the development of amphibious operations within the

 

framework of current tactics and doctrine for the employment of integrated forces has

 

been discussed. An additional examination of three historical examples will continue to

 

develop an understanding of the successful integration of the CVBG and ATF in

 

relationship to the successful completion of any amphibious operation. All three case

 

studies were carefully chosen because they relate in some fashion to the possible scenarios

 

for armed conflict that naval forces may face over the next twenty years. All three

 

operations involved integrated operations in the littorals with each resulting in victory.

 

However, the forces achieved victory differently in each case. The analysis of the success

 

of the commander will look beyond the fact that the commander achieved success; it will

 

be a look at how the forces achieved this success and the lessons that can be gained from

 

each example. The three historical examples to be examined in the study of modern

 

amphibious warfare are: The British Falkland Island Campaign; Operation Urgent Fury,

 

the battle for Grenada; and Operation Chromite, the Inchon Landing. In the first two

 

cases there was a superior force engaged in battle with a third world nation. The Inchon

 

landing provides an example of the fully integrated Amphibious Task Force and Carrier

 

Battle Group. This analysis will establish what the best relationship and integration

 

structure is for the CVBG and amphibious forces.

 

 

The Falkland Island Campaign

 

 

      With the ever growing possibility that a developing nation may challenge the

 

United States on a regional level, military leaders must conduct a careful examination of

 

past conflicts involving this type of scenario. In the Falkland Island Campaign we find not

 

only a conflict involving one of the major military powers of the world; we can find a

 

good example of how this world power used amphibious operations to combat this type

 

of conflict. A carefully examination of the Falkland Island finds problems relating to the

 

support of the amphibious operation and the command organization of both the naval and

 

land forces. Additionally, technological and equipment short falls resulted in major

 

operational failures which endangered the successful completion of the campaign. Before

 

studying this campaign in any detail we must first realize that many decisions the naval

 

commander made were based on the realization that the aircraft carriers were his center of

 

gravity. Those in charge realized from the very beginning that the British people could not

 

and would not stand for significant loss of life and national prestige associated with the

 

loss of an aircraft carrier.

 

      From the very beginning of the conflict the British realized that regaining control

 

of the Falklands would require the use of amphibious forces. In the initial planning

 

process, the high command felt that the initial carrier battle groups would be able to win

 

both the air and sea battle prior to the arrival of the amphibious forces. This would leave

 

the force to conduct a minimally opposed landing and quickly dispatch the Argentines

 

from the Island.75 Once the British accomplished 30 percent destruction of the Argentine

 

air capability the British felt that the amphibious operation would not only be highly

 

successful but unopposed.76 There were three major problems with this concept of

 

operations.

 

      The first problem faced by the British was coordinated air defense. Even though

 

doctrine required the integration of carrier air into the battleforce, the timing of the arrival

 

of the carriers did not allow their initial integration into the battlegroup. The British

 

wanted to respond quickly with as large a force as possible. Neither the assigned carriers

 

nor the amphibious shipping was ready to join the battleforce when it deployed. The

 

initial units deployed with the carriers joining the battle group just prior to the initial

 

engagements. Due to their late arrival, the battle group as a whole did not practice, nor

 

was it ready for, coordinated air defense between all units.77 This lack of training would

 

prove to be a fatal mistake on more than one occasion throughout the war.

 

      The second difficulty that the British faced was determining the location of enemy

 

air force in relation to the ships at sea. Air support for the Argentine forces stationed on

 

the Falkland Islands operated from the southern airfields of Argentina. Much of the AOA

 

was within the range of Argentine land-based air. This resulted in the British having to

 

rely on air to air combat in order to defeat incoming enemy aircraft.78 Initial Harrier

 

tactics employed by the British for air to air engagement were inferior due to a lack of

 

comparable speed. However, the British pilots quickly overcame this problem by using

 

the Harriers' mobility to their advantage in engaging targets.79 Additionally, Argentine

 

aircraft attack profile allowed the planes to approach the battle group and safely escape

 

undetected and unengaged. The tactic the Argentine planes employed was to drop under

 

the ship's radar signature at fifty miles and proceed into a launch range. The Argentinean

 

aircraft would launch the sea skimming Exocet missile at range of 20 to 30 miles from the

 

battle group. Once the missile was launched the Argentine aircraft was able to escape

 

under the British radar detection signature.  The lack of airborne early warning (AEW)

 

greatly compounded this problem and was the largest problem facing the British.80

 

      The lack of AEW created a situation where the detection of many of the raids

 

occurred by ship board radar far from the battle group. As the aircraft approached their

 

launch point using the tactics previously described, the British ships lost their radar

 

contact on the enemy aircraft. This initial detection only gave a general warning that a

 

strike was going to occur and seldom gave any warning as to the direction of the attack.

 

Many engagements were initially detected by pilots' visually spotting the inbound

 

aircraft.81 This created a situation in which the British were constantly fighting the air war

 

from a disadvantage. This disadvantage increased later in the war when the commanders

 

moved the carriers further from the AOA to ensure their protection from air attacks. This

 

increased distance resulted in shorter times on station for British Harrier CAP aircraft. If

 

the British had been able to establish an air early warning net during the early phases of the

 

war, many of the losses of shipping would have been avoided. Additionally, the British

 

naval commanders would have been able to provide air cover to amphibious forces and

 

ground forces ashore.

 

      All of these problems created a situation that the British had not envisioned:

 

making an opposed landing against an enemy still possessing a capable air force. The

 

British task force was not, nor was its staff organization, established in a manner to

 

perpetuate the steps required to plan an amphibious exercise.82 Much of Brigadier

 

General Thompson's force did not arrive into the theater of operation until late on the

 

19th of May, four days after the loss of the H.M.S. Sheffield.83 Due to this fact, much of

 

the planning for the operation did not include Admiral Woodward, the Theater and Carrier

 

Battle Group Commander. The initial plan was to use South Georgia Island as a rehearsal

 

for the final assault on the Falklands. However, Admiral Woodward considered this plan

 

detrimental to the completion of the mission. He therefore redirected the emphasis

 

towards making a landing in West Falklands at the earliest conceivable time. Admiral

 

Woodward forced the issue of West Falkland to avoid a landing at Port Stanley, thereby

 

removing the carriers from the equation. There existed no perceived threat in the vicinity

 

of the Port San Carlos that would require extensive air cover. In forcing the landing

 

commander to change his plan of action he created a division between the Carrier Battle

 

Group command element and the Landing Force command element.84 At no time during

 

the planning process had Admiral Woodward made his intentions or the political situation

 

clear to the amphibious battle group. This ultimately resulted in a lack of unity of

 

command and focus of effort in completing the operation.

 

      Even though the British used some of the tenets of maneuver waive in

 

accomplishing their mission, their lack of focus of effort resulted in a heavy loss of men

 

and material. Ultimately, this could have resulted in the British loss of the war. Within

 

two hours of the initial assault on San Carlos, the Argentineans attacked the escort ships.

 

These ships, without proper air cover, proved to be helpless in defense. Whether by

 

accident or plan, the Argeninians targeted the escort ships rather than either the

 

transports or the men ashore, allowing the landing to continue. The commanders required

 

the Harriers to provide air cover in this area with only the ability to remain on station for

 

periods of twenty minutes. The location of the aircraft carriers well away from the Islands

 

resulted in little air cover being provided for the landing. This lack of air cover resulted in

 

the sinking of one escort frigate and the serious damaging of a second.85 Throughout the

 

attack, the ships' commanding officers urged Admiral Woodward to bring the carriers

 

closer to land to perpetuate the quick turn around of the Harriers in support of the

 

landing. He felt that the safety of the carriers was his first priority.86

 

      During the landing at Fitzroy, the British experienced the disastrous results that

 

they had avoided throughout the campaign, when an Argentinean air raid reached the

 

amphibious transports. The loss of an escort Frigate and the LCU Foxtrot 4 at Fitzroy

 

was due to the lack of early airborne warning, coupled with minimal escort shipping, the

 

unavailability of CAP, and the additional failure to set up and have the Rapier Surface Anti

 

Missile unit operational. This single attack resulted in fifty-seven wounded and fifty

 

killed.87 Additional information leads to the conclusion that there existed a lack of

 

coordination between the command elements of the units conducting the landing and the

 

naval units at sea. During several instances on the 8th of June, CAP was requested to

 

provide cover to the forces; however, the battle group provided none. The general lack of

 

communications between forces resulted in the British high command having no

 

information as to the status of the landing or even the location of troops.88 This loss of

 

life was small in comparison to the larger victory. However, this number could have easily

 

been ten times larger if earlier in the war the Argentines had targeted the amphibious

 

transports rather than British escort ships.

 

      Several lessons from the experiences of the British in the Falklands are apparent.

 

The operation proved to the world that amphibious warfare still had a place in promoting

 

and maintaining of national policy. However, the British achieved victory through sheer

 

luck and the fact that Argentina had limited access to additional Exocet missiles once the

 

war had begun. Many of the lessons to be learned relate to the employment of naval

 

aviation. The importance of airborne early warning (AEW) was proven time and time

 

again. If the British had been able to establish an early warning net they may have avoided

 

many of the losses they sustained. Additionally, the establishment of an AEW net would

 

have greatly increased the ability of the carriers to provide support to the operations by

 

decreasing the threat to the carriers. We can also take from this campaign the application

 

of the concept, "we fight as we train," is especially true when dealing with air integration

 

into the battle force. The British could have avoided the loss of H.M.S. Sheffield early in

 

the war if the battlegroup had integrated and trained with the carriers upon their arrival in

 

theater.

 

      The final aviation lesson that the United States Navy can learn from this operation

 

was the ability to use Harriers in the role of interceptor. The lack of pilot training and the

 

design of the Harrier as primarily a defensive weapon resulted in the British finding it

 

difficult to use the aircraft in the role of interceptor in the early stages of the conflict. As

 

the pilots' experience level grew in handling the aircraft in combat conditions, so did their

 

ability to use the Harriers in the role of interceptor. We can take this one step further in

 

that, Harriers carried on today's United States amphibious ships, unlike the units carried

 

aboard British ships, are not Sea Harriers and therefore their design does not include air-

 

to-air radar. Without the radar designed for air intercept the aircraft embarked on

 

amphibious ships are almost useless for defense against air strikes directed against

 

shipping. The lack of dedicated carrier AEW assets further compounds this problem in

 

today's amphibious fleet.

 

      The United States Naval services can gain additional lessons in dealing with

 

command and control for amphibious landings from the Falklands. Once the commander

 

has made the decision to conduct the amphibious operation, the landing must become the

 

focus of effort of all forces involved. In not creating this atmosphere, the British

 

endangered lives and equipment of their force. In fostering an attitude of an "ill-

 

concealed conviction of once the landing force was put ashore the chief problems of the

 

campaign would be over" the British placed the entire operation in peril.89 A commander

 

can only avoid an amphibious disaster through dedicated and continual air and naval

 

support within the theater of operation. Only through the fortunes of war were the British

 

able to receive only the minimal casualties that they incurred at Fitzroy. Additionally,

 

only a weak Argentine ground force and the lack of the concentration of air allowed for

 

minimal grounds casualties. To conduct a successful maneuver operation a commander

 

must establish a focus of effort. In an amphibious campaign that focus must be at one of

 

the points of attack within AOA and typically be where the amphibious landing is taking

 

place. Only through the use of the three keys will maneuver warfare be successful.

 

      Another lesson to be learned is the application of the concept that CATF and CLF

 

must maintain co-equal planning of the operation. When the commander of the naval

 

forces makes a decision that affects the performance of the ground element, all

 

commanders involved must discuss and come to a resolution on the decision. The landing

 

force commander questioned the very proficiency and training of his landing force due to

 

the lack of a rehearsal. It is true that the location selected for the landing was probably a

 

better site than originally considered by the command element of the landing force.

 

However, if the force commander does not have confidence in his forces the resulting

 

campaign could be ultimately a failure before it even begins. We can learn many lessons

 

by studying the Falklands Island campaign. The key is our application of these lessons.

 

 

Operation Urgent Fury

 

 

      Operation Urgent fury was the first live combat operation in which naval forces

 

attempted to mesh amphibious doctrine with the CWC concept. The command

 

organization generated a convoluted command and control system with each naval

 

organization present generating and maintaining a separate but co-equal CWC

 

organization.90 Throughout its execution the operation violated amphibious doctrine.

 

Amphibious forces conducted operations within the theater of operation without the

 

establishment of either an AOA or a CATF for the operation. Additionally, the CJTF

 

designated two separate ground commanders. Each ground commander received orders

 

to conduct ground operations at different ends of the island. The final result was the

 

Marine ground commander ultimately supporting the operations of the 18th Airborne

 

Corps commander with neither being established as either the CLF or a ground component

 

commander.91 Overall, there was a lack of unity of effort and cohesiveness that resulted in

 

a complex battlespace management problem.

 

      The dual command structure existing within both the naval forces and land forces

 

created a competitive and almost destructive relationship between commanders. This

 

structure forced each commander to compete for assets to accomplish his assigned

 

mission. Ultimately, this led to a lack of either the ability or feeling of responsibility to

 

pass information relative to enemy troop strength or position between commanders.92

 

This inability to communicate resulted in at least two incidents where troops engaged by

 

hostile fires had fires either unavailable to support the mission or had inappropriate fires

 

used to engage the enemy.93

 

      Additional difficulty occurred because the Joint Force Commander, Admiral

 

Metcalf, and his staff did not have a basic understanding of the amphibious operation.

 

From the very beginning of the operation Admiral Metcalf refused to assign NGFS ships in

 

support of the operation or the landing forces involved. Conversely, he preferred to

 

maintain control of fires from his unit. This resulted in the landing force and army

 

commanders relying on units under the operational control of the CVBG, stationed over

 

60 miles away from the operational area, to conduct desired fire support for the land

 

operations. Ultimately, the land force commanders had little if no tactical control over

 

how and when fires were used to support their operations.94

 

      This lack of understanding of amphibious warfare by Admiral Metcalf additionally

 

resulted in the division and distribution of amphibious forces throughout the island without

 

the knowledge or consent of the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) commander. Amphibious

 

shipping and Marine units received the task of conducting simultaneous landings at the

 

opposite points of the island.  This splitting of units caused the Amphibious Assault

 

Vehicle's (AAV) to conduct an amphibious landing without the support of their artillery,

 

tanks, or TOW weapons. The larger danger was the lack of direction each company

 

received prior to their landing. It was nine hours from the landing until the command

 

element was able to locate each force and present a concise order of battle to their

 

commanders. Only through the ineptness of the enemy and sheer luck did the landing

 

force avoid major casualties.95 By not establishing CATF or the AOA, Admiral Metcalf

 

created a system where no single commander had the responsibility or authority to control

 

and conduct NGFS, airspace management, ground force operations or CAS.96

 

      The Navy can gain some valuable lessons from the study of this operation. The

 

complexity of command relationships not only resulted in difficulty in the completion of

 

the mission; it endangered equipment and personnel. If there had been a larger, more

 

organized force, with more lethal combat power, casualties might have been high.

 

Amphibious doctrine has established procedures for the conduct of close air support and

 

naval gunfire support to assure the complete support of the landing force commander

 

whoever and wherever he is. In this manner we must ensure that we follow doctrine to

 

perpetuate the maximum destruction of the enemy. The establishment of clear and concise

 

control of amphibious forces, CATF and CLF, will assure that each element within the

 

chain of command understands the mission. Additionally, the establishment of the CATF

 

and CLF relationship assures success of the mission by instituting a clear focus of effort.

 

The implementation of this relationship fosters a true supporting and supported

 

commander relationship.

 

Operation Chromite

 

 

      The Inchon landing is the final amphibious operation that will be examined to

 

ensure the full spectrum analysis of low and medium intensity amphibious operations.

 

This campaign demonstrates many of the key elements of both modern maneuver warfare

 

and current amphibious doctrine. In the execution of the Inchon landing General

 

MacArthur created a combined arms team that had a singular goal and operated with

 

unity of command. General MacArthur established a clear chain of command from himself

 

through Admiral Joy, the fleet commander, to the task force commander, Admiral Struble

 

(Figure 4-1).97

 

Click here to view image

 

Additionally, with Admiral Struble assigned as CATF and General Smith assigned as the

 

Landing Force Commander, Admiral Struble established a clear CATF/CLF relationship

 

with the ground forces. Once General Smith felt comfortable with the situation ashore, he

 

would shift control to the Army command under General Almond. Additionally,

 

throughout the assault the carriers and escort shipping were subordinate to Admiral

 

Struble. Under this relationship they provided continues support to the attack group that

 

was under the command of Admiral Doyle.98 General MacArthur, as well, established all

 

Air Force assets under the control and supervision of Admiral Struble. This allowed the

 

Air Force to create a successful feint that indicated a landing at Kusan well away from the

 

initial landing at Inchon. This organization was the precursor to the concept of the joint

 

task force commander used today.99

 

      This operation also established the battlefield success that a commander enjoys

 

when he fully integrates carrier air and escort shipping to support an amphibious

 

operation. Admiral Struble used carrier air to accomplish preparation of the battlefield

 

through aerial reconnaissance and planned deep area destruction from the time the

 

movement phase commenced until the commencement of the landing. Additionally, the

 

allied forces used carrier air to slow the mining of Inchon harbor to perpetuate the

 

movement of troops ashore. The carrier support continued throughout the operation with

 

an advance force of Task Force 77 which was used to establish and isolate the AOA prior

 

to the arrival of the amphibious shipping. Additionally, this task force provided CAS and

 

CAP throughout all phases of the landing. The integration of forces was not limited to

 

the use of carrier air but included extensive use of NGFS to conduct close preparation of

 

the landing zone and fire support throughout the landing.100  A prime example was the

 

task force commanders specific assignment of the destroyer USS Mansfield to provide

 

NGFS throughout the transfer of troops to Wolmi-Do island and eventual transfer of

 

troops to Inchon. The ship maintained constant communication and support throughout

                                                                 

all phases of the landing ensuring that it never left a battalion without support.101

 

      These relationships established not only the focus of effort as the amphibious

 

landing, but the very planning of the operation as a demonstration of commanders intent.

 

General MacArthur's involvement and planning of the plan from the beginning

 

demonstrated the true concept of commanders' intent and mission orders. General

 

MacArthur was the only one who truly believed that the landing would be successful.

 

This operation was General MacArthur's vision alone of how the battle was going to

 

evolve and how the fight was to be carried to the enemy. It was he alone who accepted

 

the risk.102 This is one of the major concepts that a commander must use in order to

 

support maneuver warfare; a willingness to take calculated risks and achieve victory.

 

      Operation Chromate proves what a commander can accomplish if he applies the

 

maneuver warfare concept in conjunction with the framework provided by amphibious

 

doctrine of JCS Publication 3.02. In this operation a stunning and complete success was

 

achieved with minimal losses. The lessons we can take from Inchon are many: the

 

success of integration of carrier air, the success of maneuver warfare and, finally, the

 

success achieved in using proven doctrine as a guide for amphibious operations. This

 

operation proves that success lies in a clear unity of command and focus of effort. We can

 

use these lessons along with the lessons demonstrated throughout the previous example,

 

to develop a framework and command structure for conducting amphibious operations in

 

today's fast moving environment.

 

 

FLEETEX

 

 

      The lessons gained from the historical examples are that with unity of command

 

and the integration of amphibious forces with the carrier battle group there will be an

 

increase in the likelihood of a successful amphibious operation. As discussed in chapter

 

three, the three Fleet Commanders have attempted to return to integrated amphibious and

 

carrier battle group tactics for execution of amphibious operations in the littorals. In

 

accomplishing this integration they have attempted not only to conduct amphibious

 

operations but maintain the highly successful CWC system for battle group tactics. The

 

Fleet Commanders accomplished this integration through the execution of the tactics

 

proposed within the Third Fleet TACMEMO discussed in chapter three.

 

      During a two year period of 1993 to 1994, the Navy saw the execution of five

 

exercises in which both Second and Third Fleet practiced the concepts proposed and

 

established by the Third Fleet TACMEMO. At various times the forces attempted all

 

three situations with their execution studied and observed. Second Fleet Fleetex's tended

 

to use situation A during the transit phase and situation B once the amphibious force

 

entered the AOA.

 

      Second Fleet Exercise 1-93 saw the amphibious task force and the CVBG

 

operating with the forces being task-organized. The JTFC assigned tasks based upon his

 

analysis of the mission and the assessment of the groups' capabilities. The problem that

 

occurred was a lack of unity of command due to co-existing organizations and a lack of a

 

single commander controlling the naval forces (Figure 4-2)103. This problem was

 

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exacerbated once the CJTF established the AOA with difficulty occurring in the

 

coordination of asset movement across the AOA boundary.104 Second Fleet attempted to

 

correct this problem by integrating the task force under a single commander. The

 

organization of forces established the commander of the CVBG as the task force

 

commander. This created a confusion in command in that the CVBG was both an element

 

commander and the task force commander. The commanders of the Marine Expeditionary

 

Unit (MEU) and Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) felt that if appropriation of forces

 

favored the CVBG they would have no higher commander in which to appeal the

 

discussion. Additionally; the CVBG commander had difficulty in discriminating between

 

his role as the CVBG and Task Force Commander.105 This problem perpetuated itself

 

through exercises 3-93, 1-94 and 2-94. During Second Fleet exercises 1994, Second Fleet

 

established itself as the CJTF with the CVBG maintaining the billet of Naval Component

 

Commander (NCC) (Figure 4-3)106. In maintaining this relationship, the CVBG, as

 

component commander, established Carriers mission as the focus of effort resulting in the

 

amphibious forces being left without proper support.

 

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      Third Fleet, during it's combined exercises of 1-94, used situation C throughout

 

the exercise, resulting in a lack of unity of command and no inter-support between the

 

battle groups.107 To correct this problem during exercise 2-94, Third Fleet established,

 

under the CJTF, a Naval Component Commander. Third Fleet established the CVBG as

 

the component commander (Figure 4-4)108 and placed the force in situation A for the

 

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entire exercise. The PHIBRON, while being designated as CATF served more as a

 

transport and movement group commander while the CVBG maintained defensive control

 

of the AOA. During the transit phase the CVBG incorporated the PHIBRON into the

 

CWC organization where it served as the amphibious warfare commander. The difficulty

 

arose with the relationship of CLF. Even though CLF maintained a co-equal status with

 

CATF throughout the planning phase, his position in planning and execution of the

 

exercise was ambiguous.109 The ultimate result of the relationship was the lack of

 

centralized planning required under amphibious doctrine. Additionally, when CATF

 

served as a warfare commander prior to the establishment of the AOA he had to compete

 

for assets to complete the missions assigned. Examples were the GOPLAT and NEO

 

operations conducted during the operation.110

 

      We can derive specific lessons from these exercises. In order to assure that all

 

assets are available for the conduct of amphibious operations, a command relationship

 

must exist where the CATF maintains unity of command and establishes the focus of

 

effort. Additionally, there has to be a naval component command element established

 

above the CVBG to maintain the battle group at the same component level with the ATF.

 

This will maintain the relationship for not only execution but planning as well. Finally, the

 

CATF and CLF relationship requires that CATF he fully responsible for all aspects of the

 

amphibious operation and not be simply a figurehead to meet doctrinal requirements.

 

      We can use the lessons learned from not only the historical examples discussed

 

above, but from the execution of current fleet tactics to develop a framework for

 

supporting maneuver warfare in the littorals. Chapter Five will present a force structure

 

based on these lessons to support operations that naval units are likely to face in littorals

 

of the world. Additionally, this chapter will forward a workable command and control

 

structure for the integration of the CVBG and ARG battle groups to support maneuver

 

and amphibious warfare in the joint operating arena.

 

                                 CHAPTER FIVE

 

                                RECOMMENDATIONS

 

 

 

-"I'm suggesting that over-sea deployed naval forces should normally operate as if they

could directly affect events throughout a region, not in terms of days or weeks, but in

terms of minutes and hours."111 - Admiral Owens Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs

 

      With the ever increasing possibility of aggressive action between neighbors and the

 

potential for clan warfare, it becomes more probable that United States forces will become

 

involved in low-intensity and mid-intensity conflicts. Additionally, there is a high

 

probability that these actions will require either joint or combined operations. It is also

 

likely that not only will the National Command Authority (NCA) monitor these conflicts

 

but organizations such as CNN and the New York Times will closely follow the actions

 

taken by our units involved in these conflicts.112 In this type of environment the likelihood

 

of casualties, both in material and personnel, becomes an increasing concern. With the

 

increasing employment of weapons such as land/sea based cruise missile and diesel

 

submarines, it becomes even more important for our forces to conduct operations in a

 

manner that minimizes casualties. In order to minimize casualties, Naval forces must

 

develop an ambush mentality where we surprise and devastate the enemy before he

 

reacts.113 Maneuver Warfare presents Naval forces with the capability of achieving these

 

goals. However, there exists a concern that the Navy must not only restructure its force in

 

order to conduct maneuver warfare but that the Naval Service must change established

 

doctrine to achieve the benefits of this type of warfare. The Naval Service must not find

 

itself treating doctrine as dogma. The Navy does not have to completely rewrite doctrine

 

to accomplish the restructuring of our forces that the framework of maneuver warfare

 

requires. We must simply change the way it uses doctrine.114   The goal of this chapter is

 

to propose a framework for both force structure and command and control to accomplish

 

these goals. The discussion however, must first address in more detail why we need to

 

adopt maneuver warfare to ensure successful littoral warfare.

 

 

Why Maneuver Warfare

 

 

      Record arms sales to even the smallest third world nations have resulted in an ever

 

growing conflict in the third world. The Marines of the amphibious force are likely to be

 

outnumbered whenever facing the possibility of conflict.115 In this type of atmosphere the

 

United States can no longer fight a conflict with attrition type warfare. Attrition warfare

 

requires the commander to accept a larger number of casualties and he must be willing to

 

inflict the same type of casualties on his enemy. Warfare of this type is no longer

 

acceptable to either the amphibious forces that are employed or to the American people.

 

Maneuver warfare on the other hand, relies on the concepts of avoiding casualties and

 

attacking the weaknesses of the enemy to achieve maximum results. By relying on

 

maneuver warfare we will reduce the number of casualties while maximizing gain.116

 

Additionally, under the political constraints placed upon our military in today's world, a

 

force that is capable of a swift armed incursion with minimal casualties offers great

 

political and military value in promoting national policy. With the advent of the LCAC

 

and the coming on line of the MV-22 the United States has an amphibious force that can

 

take maneuver warfare to a new level. Amphibious forces can conduct landings at

 

multiple entry points along a large coast line. Suddenly a distance of over 400 miles of

 

coast line is open to assault with the possibility of multiple entry points. It allows today's

 

amphibious forces the speed and surprise to exploit our enemy's weaknesses.117

 

      Today's soldiers and sailors are not only facing the possibility of a larger force

 

equally as well armed as they are, they are probably facing one that is able to fight in all

 

four dimensions of conflict to include undersea, air, sea, and electronic warfare. The two

 

most significant threats are the land or sea based sea skimming missile and the use of

 

diesel submarines. The only way to combat such a threat is to operate at the operational

 

level of war.118 By conducting warfare at this level commanders will be able to shape the

 

battlefield and conduct an offensive campaign while creating a strong defensive position.

 

Maneuver warfare is the operational art that Naval forces can tailor to perform on the

 

operational level. Maneuver warfare is the one true type of warfare that refuses to pursue

 

a battle but strikes at the very center of gravity of the enemy. In using this operational art

 

Naval forces can create an environment where the commander sees the whole battlefield

 

and is able to concentrate his forces on the focus of effort with clear concise decision

 

making. Only through the employment of this type of warfare will the Navy continue to

 

maintain a viable force in today's four dimension battlefield.119

 

      Maneuver warfare is a "philosophy for generating the greatest decisive effect

 

against the enemy at the least possible cost to ourselves -a philosophy of fighting

 

smart."129  With maneuver warfare Naval forces will be able to take a force smaller than

 

its opposition and create a decisive blow to their military.  Naval forces will be the true

 

enabling force and have the ability to dominate the littorals. The Soviets postulated that a

 

force can gain surprise from the sea only through the "swift and concealed maneuver of

 

ones own force to attain favorable positions."121 This concept is the basis for maneuver

 

warfare.

 

      Once the Navy has accepted the tenets of maneuver warfare it must have a force

 

able to provide the necessary operational fires and maneuver element required to conduct

 

this type of warfare. The proposed structure is one of a Naval Expeditionary Task Force

 

(NETF). However, the Navy has yet to define the construction of this force. In the next

 

section of this chapter a way to construct this force will be proposed with a careful study

 

of how this construction allows us to conduct maneuver warfare in today's world

 

environment.

 

 

What is the NETF and how should it be constructed?

 

 

 

      With the release of NDP 1, the move to define exactly the Navy's concept for

 

fighting in the littorals has officially begun. The proposal of a Naval Expeditionary Force

 

(NEF)was a concept to integrate all aspects of maritime power. The choice of calling the

 

new force "expeditionary" was symbolic in nature. The expeditionary name signaled the

 

configuration of the force to project power ashore rather than being designed to oppose

 

large fleets in the open ocean: This change was a move away from the Mahanian style

 

warfare of two large navies giving battle on the high seas. This doctrinal change was a

 

move towards an emphasis on Navy-Marine Corps integration, committing forces in

 

support of national policy.122 Additionally, there is a realization that naval forces will not

 

be able to support or conduct maneuver warfare as envisioned earlier without the full

 

integration of navy and marine forces. The combination of the amphibious task force with

 

the carrier battle group gives an ability to fully exploit all aspects of maneuver warfare. It

 

will allow us to capitalize on speed and surprise creating a situation in which our adversary

 

cannot contend with the difficulties we present them. At the very heart of the shift to

 

maneuver warfare in the littorals is the complete integration of the carrier battle group and

 

amphibious ready group to form the Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF).123

 

      NDP 1, in fact, states that the Naval Expeditionary Forces are tasked organized,

 

forward deployed units that the Navy establishes to conduct a broad range of missions.124

 

The organization will rely on the assets provided by the carrier battle group for the

 

prosecution of the subsurface, surface and air threat. The expeditionary force will fully

 

integrate all assets to support the force ashore. This includes the shaping of the

 

battlespace in the deep and rear areas, as well as provide fires to support the movement of

 

troops that are ashore. The Marine side of the team will be the enabling force ashore to

 

conduct amphibious operations such as NEO's, GOPLATS, and in extremis hostage

 

rescue. Additionally, the Marines will act as the enabling force for further operations

 

ashore.125

 

      The Naval Expeditionary Task Force has its structure based around two assets, the

 

Amphibious Ready Group(ARG) and Carrier Air Wing/Carrier Battle Group. The

 

Amphibious Ready Group gives the Navy, that enabling force. The Carrier Air

 

Wing(Carrier Battle Group allows the navy to shape the battlespace and provide both rear

 

and forward area security for all forces. Additionally, in today's environment the majority

 

of threats presented to the CINC's, as well as the naval force, will require the use of

 

armed force. The combination of the Amphibious Ready Group and Carrier Air

 

Wing/Carrier Battle Group into the Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF) will provide

 

each CINC a formidable force to deal with these threats. The NCA can use NETF as the

 

tip of the spear to carry out national policy.

 

      The amphibious component of the NETF must include a large deck amphibious

 

ship such as an LHD or LHA to give the command and control capability to conduct a

 

large amphibious exercise. These ships provide the deck space and transport capability to

 

bring large numbers of MV-22's, transport helicopters and support helicopters. Ingrained

 

into this organization is the capability to provide strike warfare and some air support

 

through AV-8B Harriers. Additionally, it provides the lift capability to support a full

 

amphibious operation ashore as well as providing a sea borne lift capability. In addition to

 

the large deck amphibious ship the force should include 1-2 LSD 41/LSD36/LSD 49 for a

 

large LCAC and AAV lift capability within the theater of operation. Finally, the force

 

needs to include a LPD to provide both a secondary command and control ship as well as

 

a secondary helicopter support ship. This will allow the flexibility to conduct split battle

 

group operations, if required, with each group having some form of amphibious control

 

ship contained in their group.126

 

      With the carrier air wing there is the ability to shape the battlefield in both deep

 

and rear areas. The wing provides the ability to conduct fire support on demand within

 

the theater. The integration of a Marine Air Wing greatly increases this capability by

 

including the expertise provided by the marines in providing CAS and ground support

 

operations.127  Additionally, the carrier air wing, with the integration of the SH-60, S-3

 

and EA-6B, can combat the threat in all four dimensions of the battlefield. With the

 

integration of the airborne early warning asset of the E-2C the Navy can avoid many of the

 

mistakes made by the British during the Falklands war. From that conflict we learned the

 

importance of having CAP in providing a screen for not only the battle group but to the

 

land forces ashore. However, CAP is ineffective without the detection and control

 

provided by an AEW assets such as the E-2C. The major threat lacing the naval force

 

operating in the littorals is land launched cruise missiles. The carrier air wing gives the

 

commander the ability to combat this problem earlier through air interdiction.

 

      Complimentary to these assets are the battle group support/escort ships that

 

provide support to the carrier. With the decommissioning of both escort and amphibious

 

shipping it becomes increasingly important to ensure that Navy provides the proper

 

mixture of assets to support the mission that may be presented to the force when in

 

theater. As a minimum, the makeup of the force should include six escort ships and two

 

escort submarines. Included in this force should be three Aegis class ships. The mixture

 

does not matter whether they are of the Ticonderoga or Arleigh Burke class. These ships

 

can provide a multitude of assets and resources to include air control, air intercept, battle

 

space protection, and, finally, with the embarked Tomahawk, deep battlespace

 

preparation. In providing three such ships to the force we can again give the commander

 

the flexibility to conduct split force operations. Additionally, the Aegis platform provides

 

the optimal platform to conduct advance force operations, GOPLAT, and in some

 

instances in extremis hostage rescue. With its flight deck, anti-air missiles, and power

 

projection capability, the Aegis is the one asset that the commander can use in multiple

 

roles for multiple missions.128  Included in this mix of ships are two Spurance destroyers.

 

These ships provide a deep water ASW capability and the capability to prepare the deep

 

battle space with embarked Tomahawk missiles. They provide, as well, the additional

 

intelligence collection capability and ability to tap into many of the national surveillance

 

assets. Their organic electronic gathering capabilities are unparalleled within the battle

 

group making them a valuable asset to any force commander. The only unit that matches

 

the embarked helo capability provided by the Spruance is the FFG-7 Class.

 

      The organization should include one FFG-7 to support amphibious operations.

 

With the increasing shallow water submarine threat, the FFG-7 becomes a valuable asset

 

to the commander. The battle group commander can exploit the FFG-7's ability to

 

conduct shallow water ASW with its embarked helos and ship board sonar, (shipboard

 

sonar was specifically designed for shallow water operations). The FFG-7 can also

 

provide air cover, through the use of Standard missiles, for amphibious operations close to

 

shore. In assigning the FFG-7 in direct support of littoral amphibious shipping it will

 

greatly enhance the defense capabilities of this shipping. Due to its limited capability to

 

conduct other missions in support of littoral warfare, however, its involvement in the

 

NETF will decrease.

 

      The proliferation of the diesel submarine threat presents a large threat to the

 

NETF. Currently there are 41 nations of the world with diesel submarine accounting for a

 

total capability of over 400 operational diesel submarines. Of these countries 19 exist

 

within the third world.129 The best defense against this type of threat is the use of assets

 

within the submarine's environment. The only way the NETF commander can successfully

 

combat this threat is through the integration of submarine assets into the task force. Since

 

there exists the possibility of split force operations, it becomes vital that the commander

 

has access to enough submarine assets as are required to protect the force. Again, the

 

problem occurs in deploying the assets to meet the threat. In order to give the commander

 

the flexibility to do the type of operations he may face, while not over tasking the force,

 

the NETF should employ two submarines. Additionally, this gives the commander assets

 

to conduct special operations. Covert insertion in support of battle force operations

 

would be provided and conducted by assets organic to the force.

 

      The notional force composition for this type of battle force includes the following:

 

                   Notional Naval Expeditionary Task Force

 

1 CV/N (1 Carrier Wing)

1 Large-deck Amphibious Ship (LHA/LHD)

1-2 LSD 36/41/49

1 LPD

3 Aegis CG-47/DDG-51

2 DD-963 with embarked helos

1 FFG-7 with embarked helos

                         2 SSN's

Logistics Support (AOR/AOE)

 

A NETF of this configuration provides the CINC with power projection, battle space

 

dominance and command, control, surveillance, and sustainment assets. This force

 

configuration will give the force the most flexibility in supporting maneuver warfare. A

 

force of this shape will also give the commander the capability to split the forces to

 

support a CINC's multiple force requirements or the NCA's multiple theater operations.

 

      To operate in the joint environment in the littoral, naval assets must become fully

 

integrated. This integration will enable the CINC's to have not only the ground force to

 

act as the enabling force for the Army, but would permit shaping the battlespace in all four

 

dimensions of the battle. The only way the Navy can support these requirements is

 

through the combination and employment of multiple naval assets as a single force.130

 

Additionally, in the "come as you are" conflicts of today's world, a naval force will only

 

be able to fight in the configuration in which it trains and deploys. The force must be

                                                         

ready to apply its full combat power in support of the theater mission.131

 

      Once this force structure is in place, the key to success is the development of an

 

aggressive command and control system. This structure must allow us the ability to fight

 

a multiple threat scenario while employing the advantages of maneuver warfare. Each

 

NETF must be able to provide the C4I capabilities and organization to support maneuver

 

warfare in the joint and combined environment in the littorals.

 

      Several organizations within the Navy have forwarded proposals as to the

 

structure of this organization. However, by studying the results of the Grenada operation

 

and the exercises conducted in 1993 and 1994 raises doubt as to the ability to integrate a

 

staff organization that can successful carry out these operations. The Navy must take a

 

different type of look at command and control than what is currently being studied at

 

Naval Doctrine Command. Instead of adapting the amphibious doctrine to the CWC

 

system, the Navy must develop command and control within current amphibious doctrine

 

applying some of the tenets of CWC.132 The final section of this chapter proposes a

 

structure for command and control that achieves this type of organization.

 

Command and Control structure for the NETF

 

 

 

      The key to successful support of maneuver warfare is developing a command and

 

control organization that embodies the tenants of maneuver warfare. There must be in

 

place an organization that relies upon centralized planning and decentralized execution.

 

Maneuver warfare requires the integration of all arms to allow for the creation and the

 

exploitation of surfaces and gaps in the enemy's defenses.

 

      Naval Doctrine Command has forwarded a proposal that incorporates amphibious

 

doctrine into the CWC concept, establishing an Amphibious Warfare Commander (AWC)

 

that assumes the role of CATF.133 This concept may seem attractive at first. Upon close

 

examination there are some basic problems that exist with this type of organization. The

 

first and probably most basic problem is that by its very nature the CWC concept is

 

defensive in nature. The concept still requires the OTC to be tactically in charge of

 

power projection operations such as amphibious warfare.134 Maneuver warfare, by its

 

very nature, is an offensive type of warfare that relies on the exploitation of enemy

 

weaknesses. Additionally, the CWC violates the concept of mission type orders in that it

 

requires each commander to report to a centralized warfare commander to carry out his

 

assigned duties. Maneuver warfare relies on tactical thinking by unit commanders. The

 

CWC concept replaces this thinking with reactionary tactics that are lock step in nature

 

with only the OTC being the "big picture" commander.135 A final problem with this

 

concept is that it does not create a focus of effort, one of the very keys to amphibious and

 

maneuver warfare. The lesson that we can gain from the previous historical studies is that

 

if CATF serves in a subordinate role in the command organization, he will not be able to

 

establish the focus of effort for the operation. An organization such as this will result in

 

commanders competing for assets with no one commander receiving the full emphasis of

 

the task force. This was a problem that arose in Desert Storm with the execution of strike

 

warfare. There was constant competition between the CWC and JFACC for the Aegis

 

Cruisers in using them as a strike asset.136 If CATF and the amphibious operation is

 

delegated a subordinate role where it is competing for assets, this same set of

 

circumstances will occur.

 

      Traditional amphibious warfare doctrine, on the other hand, accepts many of the

 

tenets of maneuver warfare. It establishes a focus of main effort with a clear

 

commander's intent. Amphibious warfare is offensive in nature and can use the tenets of

 

maneuver warfare by using multiple entry points to confuse the enemy as to the actual

 

focus of the attack.137 This is proven through the lessons of Operation Chromite, the last

 

traditional amphibious assault. We must carry through the concept of establishing CATF

 

as the senior naval officer, to allow a single commander to develop both the focus of effort

 

and the commander's intent. However, we must make small changes in doctrine to

 

perpetuate the use of all assets available to the commander in today's high tech world of

 

joint warfare. We can still use the concept of both CATF and CLF to define both the

 

commanders of the Naval Expeditionary Task Force and the Landing Force. Their

 

relationship would be much as it is designed under current amphibious doctrine with minor

 

modifications being made by the Joint Force Commander (JFC) in the initiating directive.

 

The organization to support the mission assigned by CATF would have a Power

 

Projection force and the Battlespace Development force. The focus of effort will

 

determine the supported and supporting unit commander relationship.

 

      The Power Projection force will determine the group of ships assigned to conduct

 

and support the series of amphibious operations involving the landing force. The

 

Movement Commander and the Landing Force Commander will be under the power

 

projection force. This group will come under the command of the PHIBRON

 

Commander and typically include all of the amphibious ships assigned to the NETF.

 

Additionally, the force will have any ships required to complete the mission as assigned by

 

CATF. It is the Power Projection Commander's responsibility to conduct the amphibious

 

operations as delineated in commander's intent. It will be the Power Projection

 

Commander's responsibility to fully support the Battlespace Commander if CATF

 

designates him as the focus of effort. If CATF determines that the landing is the focus of

 

effort, it is the Power Projection Commander's responsibility to plan and direct his

 

subordinates to carry out the landing through mission type orders and commander's intent.

 

He must assure that he fulfills the goals of the mission established by CATF. If the focus

 

of effort shifts once the landing force is ashore, his subordinates have the responsibility of

 

shifting from the Movement Commanders focus to supporting the Landing Force

 

Commanders Focus. The Movement Commander will be the commander designated to

 

conduct and control the landing of forces ashore.

 

      The Landing Force Commander will be the Marine designated by CLF to

 

command the forces from the point of entry ashore until CLF takes command. Once the

 

landing force can fully exploit a gap and establish a clear focus of effort ashore, CLF will

 

take command of the forces. Once CLF establishes the force ashore either he or some

 

other commander designated by Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF) will become the

 

Ground Component Commander. It will be the responsibility of the commander of this

 

Power Projection group to keep CATF informed of developments ashore. However, he is

 

not to rely on CATF for the decisions as how to conduct and support the landings but rely

 

on the guidance given in the commander's intent.

 

      The Battlespace Commander has the responsibility for developing both the deep

 

and close battle. Once CLF has shifted control ashore the Battlespace Commander will

 

provide rear area security. Naval forces do not experience the concept of rear battle due

 

to the nature of the environment in which they are operating. The Navy has forces

 

projected in all directions away from the center of the force with a defensive posture being

 

required in the close battle area. The Battlespace Commander will have all forces under

 

his control that he requires in order to develop the battlespace in preparation for the use of

 

the Power Projection force. Under his control he will have a Deep Battle Commander and

 

a Close Battle Commander. Assets that the Battlespace Commander would use for the

 

preparation of the deep battle, such as Tomahawk missile ships, F/A-18, and EA-6B,

 

would be under control of the Deep Battle Commander. The Close Battle Commander

 

would be responsible for the preparations of the close battle and the defense of the force.

 

As such, he would have assets required for the defense of the force and the preparation of

 

the close battlefield. Assets that would fall under his control are the surface-to-air and

 

surface-to-surface missile ships as well as the ASW assets. Assets that both commanders

 

require would be deconflicted through assignment by the battlespace commander.

 

      Under this structure, the designation of Battlespace Commander belongs to the

 

Carrier Air Group Commander (CAG). Since under current operating procedures, CAG

 

has only a minimal manned staffs his staff would require augmentation to increase it in size

 

equivelent to a DESRON staff. The DESRON staff receives the designation of Close

 

Battle Commander. This allows the Close Battle Commander staff to establish an

 

organization, with his assigned asset, for the defense of the NETF similar to that which

 

currently exists under the CWC concept. The Deep Battle Commander will either be one

 

of the Aegis commanders or the commanding officers of one of the ships with tomahawks

 

embarked. The deconfliction in assigned assets again will be determined by establishing a

 

focus of effort within the Battlespace group and assigning appropriate assets to support

 

the mission. Typically, if a threat does not exist to the NETF then the deep battle will be

 

the focus of effort within this group. However, CATF must always consider the

 

protection of the force determining focus of effort.

 

      The role of CATF and Commander of the NETF will fall to the group commander

 

whether it is a PHIBGRU, a CARGRU, a CRUDESGRU, or a designated Naval

 

commander. CATF's responsibility is to assign forces and delineate the commander's

 

intent required to complete the mission specified by the JFC. CATF's staff will have a

 

representative of each of the subordinate commanders. This representation will include a

 

member from the Power Projection Force and Battlespace Force. Additionally, the

 

Landing Force Commander should have augmentation and representation to facilitate the

 

planning phase relationship under CLF. Figure 5-1 shows a line diagram of the specified

 

organizational relationships. The key to the success of this organization is a commander

 

that can successfully employ maneuver warfare by visualizing the entire campaign. The

 

commander's ability to direct the combined operations to complete the mission at an

                                           

operational level will determine his level of success.138

 

Click here to view image

 

      This proposed organization will provide the structure and the command and

 

control required to successfully conduct all aspects of maneuver warfare. As specified, we

 

do not have to completely rewrite doctrine to achieve the new structure required for our

 

forces. We must, however, perpetuate this change by changing the way we think of the

 

organizational structure and execution of tactics. We cannot accomplish maneuver

 

warfare tactics and concepts without the complete integration of the Navy and Marine

 

Corps. Only through the establishment of an organization that will allow the seamless

 

transfer of control and support will amphibious warfare be successful in the littorals.139

 

                                  CHAPTER SIX

 

 

                                  CONCLUSION

 

 

 

-"In many ways, the Surface Navy has abdicated amphibious tactical thinking to the

marines. That's terrible. We haven't kept up our professionalism and we really haven't

influenced the amphibious tactics from the ship to shore the way we should have."140

Admiral MetCalf

 

 

      As Admiral Metcalf has stated above, it is time for the Navy to take the lead in

 

developing amphibious warfare tactics. The adoption of the Naval Expeditionary Task

 

Force is the first move in this direction. Nevertheless, we cannot allow the Navy to lag

 

behind in the development of maneuver warfare tactics. Maneuver is the way that Naval

 

forces are going to perform operations in the future. Therefore the Navy must adapt its'

 

command and control organization as well as force structure to accommodate this change.

 

The developed integrated command structure will allow the carrier battle groups and

 

amphibious task groups to respond quickly in a crisis situation. This manner of operation

 

must not only be how we operate in a crisis situation, it must be how we operate on a day

 

to day basis. Only with the integration of these concepts into our tactics and doctrine will

 

we have the successful cornerstones of an amphibious operation.

 

      The Navy can only achieve this paradigm shift by changing not only how it

 

conducts operations but the manner in which it trains its' people. Every commander must

 

have an appreciation of the abilities and concepts of maneuver warfare as well as

 

amphibious operations. The Navy must conduct Amphibious warfare training as well as

 

teach the concepts of maneuver warfare from the entry level through the command

 

level.141 Additionally, the Naval service must ingrain the concept that warfare in the

 

littoral is the principle manner in which Naval forces are going to fight future wars. This,

 

in its very concept, reverses the Navy-Marine Corps role by making the Marines the

 

spearhead of our operations. The Navy must maintain CATF as the principle commander

 

of the battlegroup. In order to conduct offensive maneuver warfare we require a unity of

 

effort, a keen sense of interoperability, centralized planning and decentralized execution.

 

Only in establishing common doctrine will we be able to succeed in this environment.142

 

      The Navy must establish a clear direction in which to conduct amphibious

 

operations and in doing such promote maneuver warfare in the littorals. Current doctrine

 

in the amphibious world requires only minor modifications in order to achieve the desired

 

results. The changes that have been proposed within this paper will allow us to meet the

 

challenges of future operations in the littorals while maintaining the tenants of both

 

maneuver warfare and successful amphibious operations. These changes will ensure a

 

seamless flow of forces from the littorals to supporting operations ashore, while

 

maintaining continuous command and control. It will allow for the successful integration

 

of the Naval Expeditionary Task Force into the joint environment while meeting the ever

 

growing threat with the shrinking force composition of our naval forces. The key is, that

 

in order to meet the requirements of our future, the Navy must look to the lessons of the

 

past and gain from the experiences carved in blood. The Navy must turn back to see the

 

future.

 

                                   ANNEX A:

 

Transportation Group: Normally MSC shipping for large exercises. However, it is the

shipping provided for the transportation and landing of the landing force within the AOA.

Landing craft for movement of forces ashore are organic to this group.

 

Control Group: Personnel, ships, and craft designated to conduct and control the ship-to-

shore movement of troops.

 

Tactical Air Control Group: A shipborne organization established to operate the

Tactical Air Direction Center and a Tactical Air Direction Center for control of air

operations within the AOA

 

Surface Fire Support Group: Surface combatants assigned to the ATF to provide

surface fire support of the assault landings and landing force operations ashore.

 

Tactical Air Group: Tactical air units assigned to the ATF that are land based within, or

sufficiently close to, the AOA to provide tactical air support to the ATF

 

Carrier Battle Group: The Carrier Battle Group assigned to provide air, surface, and

subsurface protection and strike warfare in support of the Amphibious Task Force.

 

Screening Group: This group provides protection for the ATF enroute to and in the

AOA. This includes AAW, ASUW, ASW protection for the force under the CWC

Concept.

 

Mine Warfare Group: Mine warfare capable units assigned to the ATF that Conduct

offensive and/or defensive naval mine operations.

 

Reconnaissance and Special Warfare Group: Includes ships, embarked reconnaissance

troops, and sea-air-land teams that conduct reconnaissance, hydrographic surveys,

demolition of natural and manmade obstacles, and other special operations missions as

assigned.

 

Tactical Deception Group: A task organization established within the ATF to conduct

tactical deception operations against the enemy.

 

Inshore Undersea Warfare Group: One or more mobile inshore undersea warfare units

that provide surface and subsurface surveillance of enemy targets in seaward approach to

the landing area.

 

Maritime Patrol Air Group: Maritime patrol air units that conduct ASW and surface-

subsurface search and classification while the ATF is enroute to and within the AOA.

 

Air Transport Group: Transport aircraft units that provide air transport for Landing

Force elements and provide logistics support.

 

Naval Beach Group: A task organization that may consist of traffic control,

communications, beach and surf salvage, causeway and fuel elements of the beach party,

assault craft and elements of the Navy Cargo Handling and Port Group.

 

Electronic Warfare Group: A task organization within the ATF established to conduct

electronic warfare operations.

 

*  This area is directly quoted from Joint Publication 3-02 pages II-11 through II-12143

 

ANNEX B

 

Acronyms:

 

AAV:                                       Amphibious Assault Vehicle

AAW:                                      Anti-Air Warfare

AEW:                                      Air Electronic Warfare

AOA:                                      Amphibious Objective Area

ARG                                       Amphibious Ready Group

ASUW:                                   Anti-Surface Warfare

ASW:                                      Anti-Submarine Warfare

ATF:                                       Amphibious Task Force

AV-8:                                      V/STOL Aircraft

BLT:                                       Battalion Landing Team

C4I:                                         Command, Control, Communication, Coordination, Intelligence

CAG:                                      Carrier Air Group

CAP:                                       Combat Air Patrol

CARGRU:                              Carrier Group

CAS:                                       Close Air Support

CATF:                         Commander Amphibious Task Force

CG:                                         Guided Missile Cruiser

CINC:                                     Commander in Charge

CJTF:                                     Commander Joint Task Force

CLF:                                       Commander Landing Force

COMMMARFOR:               Commander Marine Forces

CRUDESGRU:                    Cruiser/Destroyer Group

CV/N:                                     Nuclear Carrier

CVBG:                                    Carrier Battle Group

CWC:                                      Composite Warfare Commander

DD:                                         Destroyer

DDG:                                      Guided Missile Destroyer

DESRON:                              Destroyer Squadron

E-2C:                                      AEW Aircraft

EA-6B:                                    Electronic Counter Measures/AEW Aircraft

FFG:                                       Guided Missile Frigate

GOPLAT:                               Gulf Oil Platform Takedown

JCS:                                        Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFC:                                        Joint Force Commander

LCAC:                                    Landing Craft Air Cushion

LCU:                                       Landing Craft Utility

LHA:                                       Amphibious Assault Ship, General Purpose

LHD:                                      Amphibious Assault Ship, General Purpose

LPD:                                       Landing Ship Personnel Dock

LSD:                                       Landing Ship Dock

MEU:                                      Marine Expeditionary Unit

MV-22:                                   Marine Vertical Assault Aircraft

NCA:                                      National Command Authority

NCC:                                      Naval Component Commander

NEF:                                       Naval Expeditionary Force

NEO:                                      Non Combatant Evacuation

NETF:                         Naval Expeditionary Task Force

NGFS:                                    Naval Gunfire Support

NWP:                                      Naval Warfare Publication

OTC:                                       Officer in Tactical Command

PHIBGRU:                             Amphibious Group

PHIBRON:                            Amphibious Squadron

S-3:                                         All Purpose Aircraft

SH-60:                                    Lamps III Helo

SSN:                                       Nuclear Submarine

TACON:                                 Tactical Control

 

 

NOTES

Chapter I

1Col Robert D. Heinl, Victory at High Tide: Inchon-Seoul Campaign, (Nautical & Aviation Publishing

Company of America, 1979) p. xiv

2U.S. Department of the Navy, Forward..From The Sea, (Washington D.C. Department of the Navy)p.3

3Admiral William A. Owens, The High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World, Unpublished

book scheduled for publishing by Naval Institute in April p.120

4CDR Terry C. Pierce, USN, Operational Maneuver From the Sea... Making it Work,Marine Corps

Gazette, October 1993, p.61

 

Chapter II

5Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Trans. Samual B. Griffith, (Oxford: Oxford Press, 1963), p.85

6Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM1), Warfighting (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy,

1989), p.59

7William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), p.4

8 Capt Richard S. Moore, USMC, Blitzkrieg From the Sea: Maneuver Warfare and the Amphibious

Operations, thesis (Newport, RI: Naval War College, may 1983), p.4

This single document and the follow-on article published in the Naval War College Review maybe the

most concise review of maneuver warfare that is currently available.

9William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), p.13

This is the definitive source of the complete and in-depth analysis of maneuver warfare and is the basis for

Terry Pierce operational maneuver from the sea.

10ibid p. 17

11ibid p. 18

12Moore p. 5

13Lind,Maneuver Warfare HandBook p.18

14ibid p.18

15Captain B. H. Liddel Hart, "the "Man in the Dark' Theory of Infantry Tactics and the "Expanding

Torrent System' System of Attack" Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, February 1921, p. 1-

22

16Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook p.19

17ibid p.13

18Moore, p.6

19Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook p.13

20ibid p. 20-23

21Moore, p. 7

22Lind,Maneuver Warfare Handbook p.21

23ibid p.23

24ibid p.23

25ibid p.34.35

26Moore, p.7

27Col William E. Mendal, USA and Col Lamar Tooke USA, Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of

Gravity, Military Review, June 1993, p.3

28Micheal Geyer, German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare 1914-1945, Makers of Modern

Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Modern Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press,

1968), p. 585-586

29Edward Luttwak, Operational level of war, International Security, Winter 1980/1981, p.67-73

30CDR Terry Pierce, Maneuver Warfare From theory to Practice, Proceedings, November 1992 p.62-63

31Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook p.37

32Maj Robert E. Milstead, Defending the ATF, Maine Corps Gazette, September 1987, p.64

33COMSEVENTHFLT TACMEMO PZ 1010-I-91, Battle Groups/Battle Forces in Support of

Amphibious Operations (U) (U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet, 30 April 1991) Confidential. The section included

is unclassified. p4-3

34Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook p.39

 

Chapter III

35Naval Doctrinal Publication (NDP)-1 Naval Warfare (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, June

1994), p. ii

36NDP-1 p.27

37Interview with Admiral Picotte conducted by the author on 31 October 1994

38Joint Publication 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, (Washington Dc: Joint Chief of

Staff, 8 October 1992), p. I-4

39Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), Doctrinal and Operational Issues in Naval Command and Control,

Alexandra VA, 30 September 1994, p. 8

40Joint pub 3.02 I-1

41ibid I-3

42ibid I-5

43ibid Chapter II. These concepts are discussed throughout chapter two of the publication.

44ibid p. II-11 to II-12

45ibid p. II-16

46ibid chapter V

47ibid p. I-5

48ibid p V-3

49ibid p. XI-2

50ibid p. I-8

51ibid p. I-7

52ibid p. II-18

53ibid p. VI-1

54ibid p. IV-3

55CNA study p.1

56Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 10-1 REV A, Composite Warfare Commander's Manual (U),

(Norfolk VA: Department of the Navy, August 1993) Confidential, p.1-1 All portions of this document

presented in this paper are unclassified.

57ibid p. 2-1

58ibid p. 2-3

59ibid p. 3-1

60ibid p. 11-1

61ibid p. 2-1

62Capt Robert C. Powers, USN, Commanding the Offensive, Proceedings, October 1985 p.62

63COMTHIRDFLT Tacmemo PZ1010-1-91, Composite Warfare Doctrine in Amphibious Operations,

(U.S. Navy Third Fleet 23 May 1991), p.14

64Joint Pub 3.02 p. A-4

65ibid p. A-5

66ibid p. A.S

67ibid p.21

68ibid p.26

69ibid p.37

70Seventh Fleet Tacmemo p. 4-19

71Third fleet Tacmemo p.13

 

Chapter IV

72Interview with Admiral Picotte on 31 October 1994

73Naval Doctrinal Command Point Paper, Naval Expeditionary forces Commander: A concept for Naval

Integrated Forces, p.2

This is an unpublished paper that is the proposed structure of future forces forwarded by the Naval

doctrinal command

74Major Thomas C. Linn, USMC, Blitzing the Beach: Over-the Horizon Assault, Armed  Forces Journal

International, August 1988, p.2

75Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and

Company Inc, 1983), p.59

76ibid p.114

77ibid p.119

78Peter M. Dunn and Bruce W. Watson, eds, Military Lessons of the Falklands War: Views From the

United States, (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1984) p.59

79David Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War, (Annapolis Md: Naval Institute Press, 1987) p.

173-174 The British Harrier is unlike the US Harriers in that they were the sea harrier version. This

design was for the defense of the battle group versus the close air support design of the U.S. Harriers. The

large difference was in design with the sea harrier being equipped with an air to air radar.  For more

information see Defending the ATF.

80Hastings p.207

81Brown p. 187

82Hastings p.12O

83Brown p.174

84Hastings p. 121-123

85ibid p. 206-210

86ibid p.216

87Brown p.302

88ibid p. 280-283

89Hastings p.123

90James G. March and Roger Weissinger-Baklon, Ambiguity and Command: Decision Making in

Military Organizations, (Mansfield MA: Pitman Press, 1985), Chapter II

This book is a study of the command structure in relationship to the trash can theory. This chapter is a

specific contribution and narrative by Admiral Metcalf concerning the command relationship of Grenada.

91Capt Richard M. Butler, USN, Command Structuring Amphibious Forces. thesis, Newport RI, Naval

War College, June 1986 p. 1-5

The author of this thesis, Captain Butler, served as the chief of staff of Amphibious Squadron Four for

both the Grenada invasion and the bombing of the Beirut embassy. His insight is the only one fully

documented of the amphibious staff perspective.

92Major Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Press, 1989)

p.250-254

93ibid p.188

94Butler p.4-5

95Adkin p. 245-248

96CDR Roger R. Burbrink, USN, Integrated Carrier Battle Group and the Amphibious Group Command

Structure, Thesis, Newport RI, Naval War College, November 1989 p. 16

This section of this paper is an Unclassified restatement of the secret lessons learned from Grenada.

97Heinl p. 53

98Heinl p. 50-59

99LCDR Bruce Belcher, USN "Operation Chromite": What Lessons are Applicable to our Current

Amphibious Warfare Strategy, Thesis, Newport RI, Naval War College, March 1988 p12-14.

100Heinl p.78-86

101ibidp.116

102Belcher p.17

103CNA study p.25

104ibid p.24-26

105ibid p.26-27

106ibid p.29

107ibid p.32

108ibid p.34

109ibid p.33

110This ideas is based on both the CNA study and my own experiences during this operation where I

served as the IA TAO for USS Fort Mchenry.The exercise took place from 18 April 94 to 3 May 94.

 

Chapter V

111Owens p.126

112Col William M. Rakow, USMC, MAGTF Operations With the Fleet in the year 2000, Marine Corps

Gazette, July 1990 p.18

113William S. Lind, Light infantry tactics, Marine Corps Gazette, June 1990 p. 47

114Rear Admiral Leonard P. Picotte, USN, Fighting Joint, Proceedings, January 1994 p.43

115Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook p.2

116LCDR Terry C. Pierce, Maneuver warfare: The Gators Play Too, Proceedings, November 1989 p.49-50

117John J. Kelly, RADM John B. Laplante, MGEN Harry W. Jenkins, Amphibious Warfare: Round Table

Discussion, Marine Corps Gazette, August 1992 p.38

118LCDR Thomas M. Clemons, USN, Command and Control ....From the Sea: Organization of the Naval

Expeditionary Force, Thesis, Newport RI, Naval War College, February 1994 p. 4-7

119 Edward N. Luttwak, The Operational Level of War, International Security, Winter 1980/81 p.63.

This is one of the best summations of the considerations of operational war to be published to date that

this author has come across

120FMFM 1 P.77

121Milan N. Vego, Soviet Naval Tactics, (Annapolis Md: United States Naval Institute, 1992) p.45

122Owens p.133

123LtCol John Thornell, USMC, The Expeditionary Task Force, Amphibious Warfare Review, Summer

1990, p.50

124NDP 1 p.60

125Forward... from the Sea p.6

126Interview with Admiral Laplante By the Author on 11 November 1994

127ibid

128USS Antietam Wardroom, Aegis and the Third World, Proceedings, September 1990, p.63-64

129Radm James Fitzgerald, USN and John Benedict, There is a Submarine Threat, Proceedings, August

1990 p. 57-63

130Owens p. 133

131Picotte p. 41

132Interview with Admiral Laplante

133Naval Doctrinal Command p. 6

134NWP10-1 rev A p.3-1

135Powers p.63

136lessons learned for Desert storm

137Interview with Admiral Laplante and Interview with admiral Picotte. Both indicated that traditional

doctrine used the tenets of amphibious warfare and proved successful when applied in that manner.

138LCDR Terry C. Pierce, USN, Tactical Strategic Link, Proceedings, September 1990, p.67

139LCDR Terry C. Pierce, USN, Who's in Charge, Proceedings, August 1991, p.36

 

 

 

Chapter VI

140 Surface Warfare and the Surface warrior, Proceedings, October 1985 p.76-77

This quotation was taken from an interview concerning the current status of surface warfare conducted

with Admiral Metcalf.

141CDR Terry Pierce, USN, Maneuver Warfare from Theory to Practice, Proceedings, November 1992,

p.64-65

142LtCol Robert E. Ball, USMC, CATF is Doctrine Sufficient, Thesis, Newport RI, Naval War College,

May 1983, p.24

 

 

ANNEX A

143 JCS Pub 3-02 p II-11-12

 

                                  BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

 

Interviews

Rear Admiral Leonard P. Picotte, Commander Amphibious Group Two, interviewed by

author, 31 October 1994

 

"Surface Warfare and Surface Warriors". Interview with Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf

Vice CNO for Surface Warfare, Proceedings, October 1985 p.65-80

 

"The Path Ahead for 'Gators and Marines'" Interview with Rear Admiral J. B. LaPlante,

U. S. Navy, Vice-Director Logistics, on Joint Staff. Proceedings, November 1992, 34-38

 

Vice Admiral J.B. Laplante, J-4 Joint Chiefs of Staffs interviewed by author, 11 November

1994

 

Government Publications

U. S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3.02. Joint Doctrine For Amphibious

Operations. 8 October 1992. Washington D.C. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

 

U. S. Department of the Navy. Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-1. Campaigning.

Washington D.C.: GPO 1989

 

U. S. Department of the Navy. Fleet Marine Force Manual 1. Warfighting. Washington

D.C.: GPO 1989

 

U. S. Department of the Navy. Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-2. The Role of the Marine

Corps in the National Defense. Washington D.C.: GPO 1991

 

U. S. Department of the Navy. Forward ...From the Sea. Washington D.C.: Department of

the Navy

 

U. S. Department of the Navy. Naval Doctrine Publication 1. Naval Warfare Washington

D.C.: GPO 1994.

 

U. S. Navy Third Fleet, COMTHIRDFLT TACMEMO PZ1010-1-91. Composite Warfare

Doctrine in Amphibious Operations. (U), 23 May 1991. Confidential

 

U. S. Navy Seventh Fleet, COMSEVENTHFLT TACMEMO PZ 1010-1-91. Battle

Groups/Battle Forces in Support of Amphibious Operations (U) 30 April 1991.

Confidential

 

U. S. Office of Naval Operations, Composite Warfare Commander's Manual. NWP-10-1

REV(A) (U) August 1993. Confidential, Norfolk, VA: Department of the Navy

 

Unpublished Thesis's

Baker, Capt Micheal D., USN, "Analysis of Amphibious Warfare Command and Control"

Thesis. Newport RI. Naval War College, May 1987

 

Ball, LtCol Robert E., USMC, "CATF-Is Doctrine Sufficient?" Thesis. Newport RI.

Naval War College 1991

 

Belcher, LCDR Bruce R., USN, "Operation Chromite: What Lessons are Applicable to

our Current Amphibious Warfare Strategy" Thesis. Newport, R.I. Naval War College,

March 1988

 

Butler, Capt Richard M., USN, "Command Structuring Amphibious Forces" Thesis.

Newport, R.I. Naval War College, June 1986

 

Burbrink, CDR Roger R., USN, "Integrated Carrier Battle Group and Amphibious Group

Command Structure--An Estimate of the Situation" Thesis. Newport, R.I. Naval War

College, November 1989

 

Clemons, LCDR Thomas M., USN, "Command and Control ... From The Sea:

Organization of the Naval Expeditionary Force" Thesis, Newport, RI. Naval War College.

February 1994

 

Gilmore, CDR Stephen D., USN, "Bringing Gators Into the Fold--A Look at Amphibious

Doctrine" Thesis. Fort Leavenwoth, KS. Army Command and General Staff College, May

1990

 

Goertzen, LCDR Stephen L., USN," The Feasibility of Over-the-Horizon Amphibious

Assault for U. S. Navy and Marine Corps Forces" Thesis. Fort Leavenworth KS. U.S.

Army Command and General Staff College 1993.

 

Hastings, Maj Thomas M., USMC, " Command Relationship in Amphibious Operations:

The Integration of the Composite Warfare Commander Concept and Expeditionary

Forces" Thesis. Newport,RI. Naval War College, June 1992

 

Herbert, LCDR Edward W., USN, "Amphibious Warfare and The Composite Warfare

Doctrine" Thesis. Newport, R.I. Naval War College, February 1990

 

Joy II, Capt Ernest H., USN, "Integration of the Amphibious Force with the Carrier

Battle Group" Thesis. Newport, RI. Naval War College, May 1990

 

Moore, Capt Richard S., USMC, "Blitzkrieg From the Sea: Maneuver Warfare and

Amphibious Operations" Thesis. Newport, R.I. Naval War College, May 1983

 

Oxford, Maj Donald G., USA, "Command and Control Considerations for Amphibious

Operations in Limited Warfare" Thesis. Fort Leavenwoth, KS. Army Command and

General Staff College, May 1990

 

Rivad, Moor David T., USAF, "An Analysis of Operation Urgent Fury" Thesis, Maxwell

AFB, AL. Air Command and Staff College June 1985

 

Studies

Center for Naval Analyses, "Doctrinal and Operational Issues in Naval Command and

Control" Alexandra, VA. 30 September 1994

 

Unpublished Point paper

Naval Doctrinal Command Point Paper. Submitted for Amphibious Expeditionary

Conference November 1994 Subject "Naval Expeditionary forces Commander: A

Concept for Naval Integrated Forces" 31 October 1994

 

Unpublished Manuscripts

Owens, Admiral William A., USN, "High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted

World." (Unpublished Book, Scheduled to be published in April 1995)

 

Books

Adkin, Major Mark. Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada, Lexington MA. Lexington

Books 1989

 

Brown, David. The Royal Navy and the Falklands War. Annapolis Md. Naval Institute

Press. 1987

 

Dunn, Peter M. and Bruce W. Watson, eds. American Intervention in Grenada: The

Implications of Operation "Urgent Fury". Boulder CO. Westview Press 1985

 

Dunn, Peter M. and Bruce W. Watson, eds. Military Lessons of the Falklands War: Views

From the United States. Boulder CO. Westview Press 1984

 

Geyer, Micheal. German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare 1914-1945. Makers of

Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age ed. Peter Paret. Princeton NJ

Princeton University Press 1986

 

Hastings, Max and Simon Jenkins. The Battle for the Falklands. New York NY. W.W.

Norton and Company Inc. 1983

 

Heinl, Col Robert D. USMC. Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign,

Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America 1979

 

Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Boulder CO. Westview Press 1985

 

March, James G. and Roger Weissinger-Baylon. Ambiguity and Command: Decision

Making in Military Organizations. Mansfield MA: Pitmen Press, 1986

 

Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Trans. Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford. Oxford Press 1963

 

Vego, Milan N. Soviet Naval Tactics. Annapolis Md: United States Naval Institute, 1992

 

Periodicals

Alexander, Col Joseph H., USMC, "The Next Assault Amphibian," Proceedings,

November 1989, 38-43

 

Bevilacqua, Maj Allan C., USMC, "Reinventing Amphibious Operations" Marine Corps

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