Military

Interservicing Of U.S. Military Air Bases

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Manpower

 

 

 

 

                               Executive Summary

 

                    Interservicing of U.S. Military Air Bases

 

      Introduction. The 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Report (BRAC III) proposed the closure and realignment of 17 major military air bases

located throughout the United States. Of these 17 recommendations, neither the

Department of Defense (DoD) nor BRAC III recommended that a single air base be

intentionally structured as a joint installation.

 

      Proposal. The proposal set forth in this document is that DoD should consider

the interservicing of military air bases by realigning them to a joint structure. The

BRAC process of downsizing forces and combining military bases gives DoD the

opportunity to permanently locate joint military forces together at the same geographic

location.

 

      Argument. The obstacles associated with the organization of a joint air base are

all within the scope of resolution. They simply require the will and motivation to

overcome them. Downsizing, rightsizing, and budget constraints have and will dictate

that the military train and fight as a single force. If we will fight the next war as a joint

force, why not physically locate those joint forces in the same geographic location during

peacetime? The best way to learn how to operate together is to be physically located

together. DoD should, however, recognize and preserve the unique perspectives and

contributions that the individual services bring to the modern battlefield. It is in our best

interest to preserve those unique service perspectives, while at the same time, reaping the

synergy and economy that come from living, operating and training together in the same

physical location.

 

      Recommendation. In Part 4 of this paper, the author lists 10 characteristics of

the "ideal" military air base and lists some existing bases that possess many of the 10

characteristics to one degree or another. He recommends that DoD relocate units based at

underutilized airfields to a few "super" airfields that could easily accommodate a

significant increase in the number of users. These "super" airfields would be structured

jointly with the intention of giving a joint force a permanent "joint home."

 

                   Interservicing of U.S. Military Air Bases

 

 

 

       Major John Crook                                         CG 12

 

 

 

    "...we learn from history that men never learn anything from history."

 

            -George Bernard Shaw, in the preface to Heartbreak House

 

 

                                 Introduction

 

      The 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report (BRAC

 

III) proposed the closure and realignment of 17 major military air bases located

 

throughout the United States. (see Fig. 1) Of these 17 recommendations, neither the

 

Department of Defense (DoD) nor BRAC III recommended that a single air base be

 

structured as a joint installation. The Commission did, however, consider the basic

 

theory of interservicing with the following statement:

 

 

      "The Department of Defense has been attempting for approximately 20

      years without significant success to interservice depot maintenance

      workload. In his testimony before the Commission in March, 1993, the

      Secretary of Defense stated DoD did not have adequate time to address the

      interservicing issue or to compile the necessary data to submit

      recommendations to the 1993 Commission....Committed to streamlining

      depot maintenance workload to achieve maximum efficiencies, the

      Commission determined the following five commodities should be

      reviewed for interservicing potential: wheeled vehicles, rotary-wing

      aircraft, tactical missiles, and ground communications; the fifth,

      fixed-wing aircraft, was ultimately deferred from further analysis due to a

      lack of reliable or comparable cost and capacity data ....The Commission's

      recommendations to consolidate depot maintenance workload through

      interservicing represent only an initial attempt at achieving cost savings.

      The efficiencies to be realized from interservicing dictate DoD conduct an

exhaustive review and present its recommendations/actions during the

1955 round of the base closure process."1

    

 

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            Later in the BRAC process, the Commission recommended that Carswell AFB be

 

redesignated as NAS Ft. Worth. When DoD ultimately realigned several reserve units

 

from different services at NAS Ft. Worth, it marked the first time that squadrons from the

 

Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps had been permanently located at the same air field

 

during a peace time condition.  However, DoD realigned the squadron solely on the

 

basis of economics and not with the intent to foster joint interaction.3

 

                                     Part I

 

                               Critical Thinking

 

 

      The argument set forth in this document is that the initial theory of interservicing

 

does not go far enough. Not only should DoD consider the interservicing of maintenance

 

activities, but should also think innovatively "out of the box" and consider the benefits

 

and economies of interservicing the bases themselves by realignment to a joint structure.

 

Shortly after the end of WWII, General Dwight D. Eisenhower said, "Separate ground,

 

sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will

 

fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort."4

 

      The allied air campaign of the Pacific from 20 August to 15 November 1942

 

provided a shining example of what joint employment of air power from a joint airfield

 

could do. It all centered around the men of the Cactus Air Force defending Henderson

 

Field on Guadalcanal. The Marine, Navy, and Air Force fliers beat back four powerful

 

enemy attempts to seize the vital airfield. They set aside service rivalry, adapted their

 

service doctrine, employed a single air component "commander", and overcame

 

overwhelming odds to beat the Japanese.5 In spite of this success of a single air

 

component operating from a single air field, since those 87 days in the summer and fall of

 

1942 the services have let selfish rivalries, competition for budget dollars and "ricebowl"

 

doctrines obscure a common sense approach to the structuring of U.S. military air bases.

 

When the threat of a common enemy is absent, service parochialism takes root and

 

spreads as a smothering weed planting the seeds of misguided competition, bickering and

 

in-house fighting over roles and missions, instead of an efficient commonality of bases,

 

doctrine, language, and weapons systems.

 

      To operate effectively as a joint force, the U.S. military requires extensive joint

 

training that they can only conduct when the various forces are physically located

 

together. Fortunately for U.S. forces involved in Desert Storm, the enemy allowed them

 

a six month joint training hiatus to prepare for the ensuing battle. The enemy we face in

 

the next MRC may not be so accommodating.

 

      If we can only conduct joint training when the various forces are physically

 

together in the same geographic location, why do we continue to physically segregate the

 

military at service specific bases which afford little opportunity to operate, train, or even

 

think as a joint service? Why do we continue to physically separate the services when

 

they will not fight separately in the next war?

 

 

             Rare is the contingency plan that calls for a military service to

      operate completely independent of another service. Most situations

      require interaction between two or more services. Joint Chiefs of Staff

      publications reflect this reciprocity in their instructions on

      base-development planning. In reality, however, the services are still

      parochial. Each service department has its own "facility component

      system," base-development planner's manual, and interpretation of

      standards of living, standards of construction, and philosophy of

      base-development planning and execution. As a result, great differences

      often occur in the standards under which members of the different services

      live and work, even while they are near one another in a theater of

      operations. Without conscious effort, little change can be expected in the

      future. This parochialism results not only in a perception problem that can

      affect morale but also in serious logistical problems, since either

      overbuilding to an unrealistically high standard or underbuilding can

      diminish support for the mission. Service planners need to eliminate the

      possibility of these undesirable occurrences in base-development

      planning.6

 

      At a recent general officer symposium7, the panel lamented the fiscal dilemma

 

which left many military installations far short of the funds required to meet the support

 

requirements of the tenant operating forces. One general noted that MCAS Cherry Point,

 

North Carolina was $30 million dollars short of the amount required to meet projected

 

expenses. He also hinted that unless the base could acquire additional funding many base

 

services would have to be cut or employees would have to concede to pay cuts. The

 

panel suggested that the solution to all this was an internal Marine Corps program called

 

"Total Quality Leadership." A program, which in the opinion of the author, still keeps

 

thinkers too much "in the box" and treats symptoms and not the problem itself. A

 

member of the audience asked the question; "Can the Marine Corps benefit by combining

 

its bases with the other services, specifically Marine Corps air stations?" The responses

 

ranged from, "What do you mean?" to "The reserves are doing it." Although there was

 

no opposition to the idea, it was obvious the panel had never seriously considered the

 

alternative of combining a military base with another service. An alternative that might

 

do much to alleviate some of the budgetary crises facing the military services.

 

      The current inter-war lull, affords opportunity to train, think, and operate in a joint

 

environment. The ongoing BRAC process gives DoD the opportunity to organize

 

military bases within a joint structure outside parochial service boundaries. With

 

apologies to Eisenhower, a rephrased version of his quotation referenced earlier serves to

 

focus us on how we should really organize our military infrastructure: "Separate ground,

 

sea, and air bases are gone forever. If ever again we should organize a military base, we

 

will organize it in all. elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort."8 It is

 

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not beyond the scope of reasonable thinking and feasibility to realign military bases

 

within the structure of a Joint Task Force. (Fig. 2) It would then be a simple matter to

 

deploy "Joint Air Component Cherry Point" as a member of a quick reaction Joint Task

 

Force. All the elements of the force would already have trained together including the

 

commander and his staff. The ongoing BRAC process gives DoD, the Marine Corps and

 

all services the opportunity to combine military forces within the same framework that

 

they will fight. It is an opportunity that we cannot allow to evaporate in the heat of

 

interservice rivalry.

 

      The cycle of scarce military resources is upon us again much as it was just after

 

World War II and before the Korean War. There is a familiar deja vu developing as we

 

face decreasing military capabilities coupled with an increasing possibility of military

 

involvement on the Korean Peninsula Strategic planners must consider any action that

 

will contribute to joint capability while enhancing the economy and efficiency of its

 

military forces. A discussion of interservicing all military bases is beyond the scope of

 

this paper. Having said that, this paper explores the specific issue of interservicing

 

military air bases.

 

                                     Part 2

 

                         Why Interservice an Air Base?

 

 

 

      Air bases are unique from other military bases because of their inherent mission to

 

support aircraft and aircraft operations. Some of these unique characteristics include:

 

      1. Unique support requirements. (Weather services, air traffic control, etc.)

 

      2. Requirement for a runway.

 

      3. Proximity to military operating areas (MOA) or military restricted areas for

 

aviation training.

 

      4. Preferred isolation from heavy concentrations of human population.

 

      These unique characteristics encompass the broad spectrum of aviation

 

requirements of the four services. When analyzed thoughtfully, one must conclude that

 

there is no real justification for service segregation of air bases. A base that possesses all

 

or most of the aforementioned characteristics can accommodate any tactical aviation unit

 

equally well regardless of service identity. Service segregation of military air bases is

 

therefore apparently attributable to service parochialism and not because there are any

 

economies realized from organizing air bases as strictly Navy or Air Force.

 

      NAS Fort Worth, Texas. BRAC II recommendations directed the closure of

 

Carswell AFB, Texas which occurred on 30 September 1993. The primary mission of

 

Carswell AFB was to provide basing for the 7th Bomb Wing. The base also supported

 

the 301st AFRES Fighter Wing. The transfer and consolidation of the 7th Bomb Wing to

 

other Air Force bases was completed by fall 1993. BRAC III then recommended the

 

realignment of several DoD organizations from various bases to Carswell AFB. This

 

included the retention of the 301st Fighter Wing at the newly designated NAS Fort

 

Worth. The realignment is currently taking place and expected to be complete by the end

 

of CY 95 at a projected savings of $5.2 million per year for the next 100+ years.9 This

 

will have effectively transformed NAS Fort Worth into a joint reserve air base. A base

 

structure directed mainly for economic reasons forced upon DoD by congressional budget

 

constraints. DoD realigned NAS Fort Worth from two air bases that were operating well

 

below capacity to realize a substantial long term savings by spreading fixed operating

 

costs over a larger user base. The fact that NAS Ft. Worth turned out to be joint rather

 

than service specific was more by accident and necessity than design.

 

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      At the macro level, the purpose of a military air base is to provide essentially three

 

things: a runway, suitable maintenance and hangar facilities, and air traffic control. It

 

would also be helpful if DoD located the airfield near suitable aviation training areas and

 

if the operation of aircraft was unimpeded by civilian concerns such as noise abatement

 

and population encroachment. All other aspects deal with support. With these thoughts

 

in mind, DoD should direct the organization of a military air base around two basic

 

concepts:

 

      1. Capabilities of the air field facilities.

 

      2. Compatibility with tenant training requirements.

 

      These two concepts then become the critical factors for determining the number

 

and type of aircraft able to occupy a given facility. If the ATC facility and surrounding

 

training areas can support 800 close air support (CAS) aircraft in a given training day,

 

then the air base should have around 800 CAS aircraft resident so that the facility can

 

operate at or near capacity. It is not important that the 800 CAS aircraft be all Air Force

 

or all Navy.

 

      As we have argued, DoD should base the organization and tenancy of military air

 

bases upon capability and compatibility with number and type of aircraft. When

 

organized on these two basic principles, air bases will not only realize the economic

 

benefits of interservicing, but will also produce operational benefits as well in the form of

 

joint synergy.

 

      Economy. The single largest cost of building an air base is the construction of

 

the runway (Fig. 3)10. This is a fixed cost regardless of the number or type of aircraft that

 

might utilize the runway. The subsequent operation and maintenance of the runway also

 

incurs a major cost to the government. It can be argued that this is also a fixed cost that

 

remains almost constant regardless of the number of aircraft that take off or land in a

 

given time period.11 Therefore, to realize the greatest economy of utilization, DoD should

 

operate air bases at or near the capacity of their runways and ATC facilities. This

 

efficiently spreads the fixed costs of air traffic operations over a large base of user

 

activity.

 

      It can be argued that with rare exception, most military air bases could

 

significantly increase the number of tenant aircraft and still operate well within safe air

 

traffic control and operational limits. The only limiting factor would be the availability

 

of military operating areas (MOAs) and restricted areas to operate the aircraft. However,

 

even the availability of MOAs and restricted areas in most instances is not a prohibitive

 

factor because users of a single MOA often come from several surrounding military air

 

bases.

 

      To realize the efficiencies of spreading fixed operating costs, DoD should direct

 

closure of air bases that operate below capacity and combine affected tenant users at air

 

bases that most closely exhibit the characteristics suitable for an effective military air

 

base. The question then arises, "How do we combine users and where?" Not only should

 

decision makers view these opportunities in terms of economy and proximity, but also as

 

a way to enhance our ability to fight the next war. Realignment based solely on

 

economic motivation may lead to an inefficient training "mix" of tenants at the realigned

 

base. Realignment must also consider a mix of base tenants that will enhance joint

 

training and interoperability. To realize all of the possible benefits of interservicing, DoD

 

should realign base tenants based on an intelligent combination of the following three

 

categories:

 

      1. Manufacturer

 

      2. Aircraft type and mission.

 

      3. Composite joint force structure.

 

      Realignment by manufacturer. McDonnell Douglas Corporation manufactures

 

almost half of the tactical military aircraft used by the United States. Many of the parts,

 

technical requirements, and skills associated with the manufacture of these aircraft, even

 

though produced for different services, are common. It stands to reason then, that if

 

aircraft of common manufacture are co-located, the technical expertise to repair and

 

maintain these aircraft would also be co-located. Location by common manufacture

 

provides economies of spare parts distribution and avoids duplication of DoD funded

 

contractor support activities.

 

      Realignment by type and mission. It would be illogical to locate Air Force close

 

air support and air superiority aircraft at the same base if there were no CAS ranges

 

nearby. It however, would be completely logical to base Marine Corps and Air Force

 

CAS aircraft at the same facility if suitable ranges and capacity were readily available.

 

            Realignment by joint force composition (Composite Wing).  A joint force

                                                         

designed to operate on the scale of a major regional conflict would be composed not only

 

of smaller tactical aircraft but would also include tanker, early warning, and electronic

 

intelligence aircraft. The Air Force has successfully implemented the concept of

 

organizing air bases on the composite concept at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho.

 

 

             The composite wing is not a new idea. The logistics system has

      shown its ability to support composite wings throughout the history of the

      Air force. A number of current organizations are already composite and

      are easily supported. ... Composite forces will now be stationed as

      composite units within the US during peacetime, but with a designated

      mission of rapid deployment anywhere in the world. ... Composite wings

      will have an organizational flexibility that allows for rapid and easy

      change to meet any situation. They will have the ability to plug-in and

plug-out operational units so as to put together a viable composite force to

      meet any mission requirement. ... Today's composite wing has an

      increased responsibility for maintaining a rapid deployment capability

      from a peace time base.12

 

      The Air Force has provided the impetus of argument for the organization of

 

composite air bases. However, the concept of composite air bases will only be truly

 

effective as a combat force when organized jointly. Only joint organization provides the

 

opportunity for all services to benefit from the unique capabilities that each service can

 

provide. One small example argues for the Marine Corps to become actively engaged in

 

promoting the concept of the composite/joint base concept:

 

      The K-4 Debacle. The KC-10 multi-role Air Force tanker has long been a

 

mobility mainstay for USMC fixed wing squadrons. It can not only provide the fuel

 

required for a 12 plane TRANSPAC to Japan, but can also carry a majority of the

 

squadron's embarkation or half of its personnel. The only problem with the KC-10 is that

 

is has no ramp that descends from the rear of the aircraft so that personnel can load pallets

 

and equipment by conventional means. To physically insert a pallet into a KC-10

 

requires a special pallet jack that acts as an external elevator to lift the pallet almost 20

 

feet into the air. Cargo handlers then insert the pallet into the KC-10 through the forward

 

cargo door. The Air Force has designated this wonderful tool the K-4 loader. Mobility

 

experts have strategically located K-4 loaders at most major Air Force bases that host

 

KC-10s. The closest K-4 loader to MCAS Beaufort is in Charleston, South Carolina,

 

almost two hours by truck to the North. For a Beaufort squadron to load a KC-10

 

requires that the K-4 loader be moved to Beaufort at a cost of almost $10,000. The other

 

option is for the squadron to move all of its pallets and people overland at a significant

 

cost in time and equipment. The Marine Corps obviously would not move an entire

 

Marine Aircraft Group just to avoid this small mobility crisis, however, it illustrates just

 

one of the many "hidden" benefits of a joint/composite air base structure.

 

      The obstacles associated with the organization of a joint air base are all within the

 

scope of resolution. They simply require the will and motivation to overcome them. The

 

economic benefits provided by a joint air base may be hard to quantify and by itself may

 

not be enough to propel the argument to fruition. However, when combined with the

 

synergistic effects of joint base operations, one cannot ignore validation of the concept.

 

      Joint Synergy. With all the emphasis on operating jointly in today's military, it

 

would seem that DoD would interservice at least one military installation with the

 

intention of enhancing joint interoperability and not solely for economic reasons. The

 

next war we fight will be joint. How can we train like we are going to fight if the joint

 

forces are hundreds of miles apart? What professional football team would have their

 

offensive line, offensive backfield, quarterback and wide receivers all practice at different

 

fields during the two weeks leading up to the Superbowl? How many college or high

 

school teams would do such a thing prior to their most important game of the year? Then

 

why do we in the U.S. military do the very thing that we would consider ludicrous for any

 

sports team to do? Maybe in the future, if we don't constantly train together as a team,

 

someone is going to take our league championship away from us. A hypothetical, but no

 

unrealistic illustration provides an example of some of the benefits of joint integration.

 

             It was 6:00 am on a Monday morning. The Marine FA-18 pilot

 

      had just arrived at his squadron for the first flight of the day. He cleared

 

      his desk and then checked the flight schedule. He had a 7:30 brief with the

 

      Air Force F-16 squadron to conduct a joint, four plane CAS mission.

 

      They would be supporting a Marine battalion on maneuvers in vicinity of

 

      the G-10 impact area at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The Marine

 

      battalion, the Air Force F-16 squadron and the Marine FA-18 squadron

 

      were all part of a joint task force that was due to deploy to the Western

 

      Pacific in two weeks. At 7:15 he and his wingman walked out the front

 

      door of their squadron headquarters building, crossed the street and

 

      walked into the F-16 squadron headquarters for their brief. They greeted

 

      the F-16 pilots with first names and handshakes. The pilots had flown

 

      together several times in the last year since the Air Force Wing had

 

      relocated to the base now redesignated as Joint Air Base (JAB) Cherry

 

      Point. The Air Force pilots had recently gone through the USMC Air

 

      Combat Training Instructor (ACTI) program as a joint venture with the

 

      pilots from the FA-18 squadron.

 

            The fact that the two squadrons were on the same base was only a

 

            beginning. The Marine flight lead and the USAF flight lead were also

 

            neighbors in base housing and had discussed their Monday mission in

 

            detail over a barbecue at the Marine pilot's house on Saturday night. It

 

            was during the get together at the Marine's house that a serious discussion

 

            involving a joint aircraft for the USAF and USN hatched some novel ideas

 

            that both pilots thought required further investigation. They seriously

 

            considered the follow-on aircraft for the Navy, the EF-18, to also be a

 

            prime candidate to replace both the Navy FA-18 and the Air Force F-16.

 

            They also discussed the idea of implementing a dual drogue/probe

 

            refueling system in the aircraft. This would not only give Marine and

 

            Navy aircraft greater refueling options, but would also allow Air Force

 

            aircraft to utilize Marine KC-130s.

 

                 Following the brief at the F-16 squadron, the group walked another

 

            block down to the KC-10 squadron to brief the tanking evolution for the

 

            CAS mission to Camp Lejeune. The KC-10 squadron had recently fitted

 

            their aircraft with a wing-mounted drogue refueling system so it could

 

            refuel both the Air Force and Marine aircraft in the flight.

 

            After the flight, the subject of a common aircraft for the Air Force

 

            and Navy again came up. As the Air Force flight lead was driving his

 

            Marine neighbor home from work, they discussed the feasibility of

 

            developing common weapons systems that would be compatible across

 

            service lines. That night, the Marine made a mental note to call his Navy

 

     buddy in acquisition to see if anyone was thinking about selling the EF-18

 

     to the Air Force.

 

      A Revolution of Ideas and Structure. When all forces work towards a common

 

goal, the synergistic sum is potentially significantly greater than those same forces

 

working towards separate goals. The modern warplane provides a perfect example. The

 

Air Force and Navy shared a common aircraft when they both fielded the F-4 Phantom

 

(although many differences existed between the two versions). Commonality of

 

structure, parts and labor provided many economies. However, many inefficiencies

 

resulted from such things as separate weapons systems, aerial refueling systems, and

 

electronic countermeasures systems.

 

      The Naval requirement for aircraft to be carrier capable has long been a divergent

 

force in the development of aircraft. The sturdy landing gear, tailhook, and wing fold

 

capability are unique Navy requirements. But how do we explain other divergence's

 

which include the communications systems, radar warning systems, and electronic

 

countermeasures equipment? Even the air-to-air missiles that are the same physically are

 

not interchangeable between Air Force and Navy aircraft because of differences in the

 

launching rails, coolant systems, and electronic hardware.

 

      A corporate executive would be counting sheep if he had to deal with the

 

inefficiencies of so many different systems to achieve the same objective. It is only

 

through physically locating the fertile minds of the different services together in the same

 

place will the synergism of jointness be realized. A Navy pilot who recently attended

 

school at the Air Force War College wrote the following:

 

 

             "Perhaps most importantly, projected budgetary constraints

      demand that the Navy and the Air Force enter into joint tactical aircraft

      procurement programs. Fiscal realities will not allow the services to

      replace existing aircraft types on a one-for-one basis. .... 

             Follow-on technology is anticipated to be even less affordable.

      Joint procurement is the only way to maximize capabilities in the face of

      declining budgets and rising technology costs. As evidenced by

      comparing same generation F-16C and FA-18A aircraft, materials

      technologies have advanced to the point where aircraft capable of

      performing in the structurally demanding aircraft carrier environment do

      not suffer any significant associated performance penalties. Future

      advances in material technologies should only serve to improve matters.

             All future procurement of tactical aircraft must be done via joint

      Navy and Air Force programs in order to achieve the most military

      capability possible with the minimum cost to the taxpayer."13

 

 

If this is the type of thinking that comes from one officer's academic involvement at a

 

joint service school after 1 year, imagine the synergy that would be created from the

 

operational involvement of entire squadrons and battalions at a joint base after many

 

years. Joint military schools make sense. Joint military bases make sense. It is time

 

now for DoD and the BRAC Commission to translate this common sense into reality.

 

      Operational necessity during war often forces the services to conduct air

 

operations from a joint/combined airfield. This is due mainly to the relative scarcity of

 

suitable runways around the world that will accommodate the operational requirements of

 

a major military air force. After the war is over, the various services all go their separate

 

ways and the lessons learned collect dust in the hidden bowels of military university

 

libraries. We are then forced to learn everything anew during the next war. The airfield,

 

the runway, the ATC facility, the hangars, and the support equipment are all common.

 

Why shouldn't the location be common also so the doctrine, tactics, and operating

 

procedures become common as well?

 

       USMC Dividends, A Win-Win Situation. The Marine Corps has argued that the

 

thing that makes a Marine pilot unique is the fact that he has shared a common training

 

with his ground combat element counterparts. The theory is that if the pilot bails out and

 

finds himself with a leaderless platoon he can instantly take over and successfully lead

 

the platoon in combat. Why then shouldn't that same principle apply to the Marine pilot

 

left solo in the air after his wingman is shot down? While his wingman is on the ground

 

leading a fire team, he should be able to join on any of his Air Force counterparts and

 

they then should be able to operate effectively as a section because they shared common

 

training at a common air base. The only way to learn how to operate together is to be

 

physically located together. The Marine Corps said it best in its own FM-1:

 

 

             The purpose of all training is to develop forces that can win in

      combat. Training is the key to combat effectiveness and there fore is the

             focus of effort of a peacetime military.... All officers and enlisted

      Marines undergo similar entry-level training which is, in effect, a

      socialization process. This training provides all Marines a common

             comradeship. It is the essential first step in the making of a Marine. ....In

      general, the organization for combat should also be the organization for

      training. That is, units-- including MAGTFs -- should train with the full

      complement of assigned, reinforcing, and supporting forces they require in

      combat.14

 

 

      As the military forces face down sizing and budget cuts, it is important for the

 

Marine Corps to be proactive. The Marine Corps must make reasonable, intelligent

 

proposals before someone else makes them for us. There has been much talk recently

 

about the possibility of the Marine Corps losing its fixed wing, non-vstol aircraft

 

sometime in the near future. The MAGTF commander can ill afford to do without his

 

most capable asset in the aviation maneuver element, the FA-18 Hornet.15 The Air Force

 

has argued that there is no need for a third air force and the Navy proposes to assimilate

 

whatever FA-18 squadrons the Marine Corps has left to replace decommissioned Navy

 

squadrons. The integration of USMC, USN, and USAF assets at existing air bases may

 

provide the dollar savings and exposure necessary for the Marine Corps to retain its fixed

 

wing assets. Other benefits of this proposal include:

 

      1. Use of joint facilities would make it much cheaper to field a USMC fixed wing

 

capability which would satellite onto existing infrastructure.

 

      2. Joint basing would highlight the expertise of Marine pilots in such areas as

 

close air support and MAGTF integration.

 

      3. Joint basing would allow units to receive joint/combined training without

 

exhausting scarce dollars on costly deployments.

 

      4. Joint/combined command opportunities for Air Force, Navy, and Marine

 

commanders would provide valuable experience in the event of war.

 

      5. Centralized logistical efforts would make it more efficient to deploy joint forces

 

to a major regional conflict.

 

                                     Part 3

 

                                   Examples

 

 

       One Attempt at Interservicing that Failed. Controversy arose recently when a

 

USAF depot maintenance facility located at Hill AFB, Utah won a DoD contract to

 

rework Navy FA-18 aircraft. The Navy reviewed the contract after several aircraft had

 

been through the rework process at Hill AFB. In December of 1994, the Navy announced

 

it would not renew the contract due to cost overruns and inefficiencies at the Hill AFB

 

depot Service bickering and congressional district infighting resulted from the

 

accusations surrounding the decision.

 

 

      The Navy's decision to not renew its contract with Hill and return the work

      to the North Island Naval Aviation Depot in San Diego has the distinct

      smell of raw, unadulterated service parochialism. ... The Navy's decision

      is fraught with inconsistencies. It blamed Hill for costs exceeding the

      original bid. Yet, in nearly every instance where overcharges have been

      alleged, investigations conclude the higher costs were attributed to

      unnecessary Navy-imposed oversight. California Congressman Duke

      Cunningham, in whose district the Navy will take its FA-18 contract,

      alleged that Hill originally gained the work by low-balling, a charge

      vehemently denied by Colonel Kevin Sullivan of Hill's aircraft

      directorate.16

 

Rather than progress and cooperation among services, we see home town pork barrel

 

politics blocking the path to joint cooperation. Once again, we may conclude that it is

 

very difficult indeed to work together for the common good when not sharing a common

 

enemy.

 

       One Joint/Combined base that is Working. Aviano Air Base, Italy provides a

 

good example of how joint/combined forces can operate effectively and efficiently

 

without interservice rivalry. The following illustration provides an example of a common

 

occurrence at this NATO Air Base lying at the foot of the Italian Alps:

 

 

             "Storm 21, is 3 miles on final slightly above glide path and

 

      correcting. On course." The Marine pilot of the FA-18 peered intently out

 

      of the windscreen hoping to visually acquire the runway in the pouring

 

      rain. It was a very dark 3:30am on a Sunday morning and all the pilot

 

      could think about was getting his Marine Corps aircraft safely on the

 

      ground. He was returning to his NATO air base located at the foot of the

 

      Italian Alps after a 5 hour night cap mission in the Bosnian AOR. "Storm

 

      21, Caustic 55, an F-15E reports braking action fair." "Storm 21 copy."

 

      At 3/4 of a mile the Marine pilot could see the sequenced flashing lights of

 

      the runway and breathed a sigh of relief. He gently eased his aircraft onto

 

      the wet runway and tested his brakes. The anti-skid seemed to be working

 

      just fine but the pilot cautiously used every inch of the runway to slow his

 

      fighter down and turn onto the parallel taxiway. The darkened airfield was

 

      silhouetted here and there by hi-intensity lamps used to illuminate the

 

      aircraft parking ramps. On the west side of the runway a large

 

      wide-bodied aircraft was unloading supplies at the Army air terminal. It

 

      was parked next to a USAF KC-135 and a NATO E-3 early warning

 

      aircraft. On the western side of the airfield the Marine pilot continued to

 

      taxi his Hornet past the A-10 flight line. He glanced at the dark shapes of

 

      the tent city constructed next to the flight line and looked forward to

 

      getting back to his tent and some much needed sleep. The Marines had

 

      been sharing the tent city with the Air Force for six months now. They

 

      had experienced some growing pains at first, but now lived and worked

 

      together happily to provide 24 hour air support for Operation Deny Flight.

 

      He turned his aircraft into the revetted parking area and shut his aircraft

 

      down alongside an Air Force F-16 from the 555th Fighter Wing. The

 

      Wing had just completed its bed-down at Aviano and had immediately

 

      formed a close working relationship with the Marine squadron. Even

 

      though their operational command structures were separate, they shared

 

      many things in common, to include billeting, operations facilities,

 

      intelligence assets, and mobility resources. The pilot extracted his tired

 

      body out of the cockpit and headed for the debriefing tent. As he passed

 

      the F-16 he noticed the pilot preparing to man his jet. "Hey Bill," he

 

      called. "Be careful passing Udbina." "I got new SA-5 indications as I was

 

      coming out of the corridor." "Thanks Jed," replied Bill. "I'm glad you

 

      told me. We're going to bomb the place right now."  "Give 'em hell,"

 

      called Jed. He turned in the dark towards the debriefing tent with a joint

 

      smile on his face. The faint light in the east showed a clearing break in the

 

      dark rainy sky. It promised to be a pleasant day in Italy.

 

      During times of war or in peacekeeping operations, the services are often forced

 

to operate together out of the same airfield and fly together in the same battlespace. The

 

common enemy gives rise to common effort which slowly yields the synergy that had

 

been lying dormant in the separated confines of territorially segregated bases.

 

Operational staff frantically develop joint procedures and tactics during the rapid

 

planning process because geographic isolation had stifled the opportunity to productively

 

interact prior to the crisis. Attempts to address all the issues of interservicing air bases

 

will require analysis and intellectual thinking beyond the scope of this paper. However,

 

the generative process required to implement base interservicing may spawn the

 

innovative ideas that will give leaders the vision to carry the U.S. military into the 21st

 

Century.

 

                                     Part 4

 

                                Recommendations

 

 

 

      The ideal military air base must possess certain unique characteristics and

 

facilities to meet the needs of a large military air force. These include such things as:

 

     1.  An accurate weather reporting and forecasting facility.

 

     2.  Air traffic control.

 

     3.  Local ground controlled intercept (GCI) capability.

 

     4.  A runway capable of supporting high performance military aircraft.

 

     5.  Proximity to military operating areas (MOA) or military restricted areas for

 

aviation training.

 

      6. Preferred isolation from heavy concentrations of human population and urban

 

growth.

 

      7. Predominate weather conditions favorable to flight.

 

      8. Isolation from competing civilian air traffic.

 

      9. Littoral location to allow training with the naval component.

 

     10. Proximity to ground component bases to allow local training with the ground

 

component.

 

     In Part II, we argued for the combining of airfields into a few "super" airfields that

 

could easily accommodate a significant increase in the number of users. Some existing

 

bases possess many of the 10 requirements listed above to one degree or another and

 

would be capable of absorbing a significant increase in tenancy with the addition of

 

adequate ramp space, billeting and hangar facilities (Table 1). The examples in the table

 

show existing military air bases that may be suitable for interservice integration. It is by

 

no means comprehensive and is only an example of air bases that in the opinion of the

 

author, fill most of the desired characteristics of an ideal joint military air base.

 

Click here to view image

 

                                     Conclusion

 

     The long history of interservice rivalry over roles and missions is slowly digging

 

its own grave. The military community must realize that fiscal constraints and

 

downsizing will force us to fight the next major conflict and participate in the next

 

operation other than war with joint forces where service lines will be virtually seamless.

 

Downsizing, rightsizing, and budget constraints has and will dictate that the military train

 

and fight as a single force. However, DoD should recognize and preserve the unique

 

perspectives and contributions that the individual services bring to the modern battlefield.

 

It is in our best interest to preserve those unique service perspectives, while at the same

 

time, reaping the synergy and economy that come from living, operating and training

 

together in the same physical location.

 

     Rome was not built in a day and neither will the concept of joint military bases be

 

accepted in a day. There are many obstacles and perceptions to overcome. One

 

perception in particular is that there is nothing wrong with gaining advantage for a

 

particular service at the expense of another, even though it may not contribute to overall

 

military effectiveness. It is incumbent upon all of us to realize that we are first

 

Americans and second members of a particular branch of the military. What is

 

necessarily good for our service may not necessarily be good for America. A recent

 

squadron commanding officer commented on the concept of the joint basing concept:

 

 

      Basing USMC and USAF aircraft together will not insure joint training, it

      may increase the frequency of that training, but it will not mitigate toward

      true integration. The only thing that will drive that integration is a

      significant threat that all parties realize will require cooperation in order to

      defeat.17

 

 

Whether we, the military, realize it or not we do face a significant threat. It is the threat

 

of a rapidly dwindling supply of financial resources to support the basic military

 

infrastructure. A threat that will place our readiness, quality of life, and the ability to win

 

the next war at significant risk.

 

      Interservicing of military air bases is a step in the right direction. The BRAC

 

process is the ideal instrument to institute revolutionary and beneficial change in the

 

structure of U.S. military bases. It is in our best interest to ensure that we train like we

 

will fight and that the whole will be greater than the sum of its parts. Physically locating

 

military units together across service lines will not only provide certain economies, but

 

will also incubate the catalytic synergy required to win the next major conflict.

 

      Innovative ideas that dramatically change the way we do business will usually

 

meet with some resistance and skepticism in a military hierarchy that is traditionally

 

resistant to change.18 The idea of joint military bases may not be new, however, it is an

 

idea that has been virtually ignored. The author has found a tremendous lack of material

 

that analyzes the concept to either support it or refute it.19 The current fiscal and political

 

climate begs us to bring the idea to debate.

 

      1 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report,

1993. (Underline text added by author.)

      2 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report,

1993.

      3 Socioeconomic Impact Analysis Study, (March 1994).

"Disposal and Reuse of Carswell Air force Base, Texas."

Department of the Air Force.

      4 AFSC PUB 1 p. x.

      5 Colonel Michael T. Probasco, (1994) "Joint Force Air

Component Commander or Coordinator?",  p. 1.  Air University

Library, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

      6 Lewis C. Sowell, Jr., (1982) "Base Development and The

Rapid Deployment Force: A Window to the Future."  National

Security Affairs Monograph Series 82-5, p. 21. National

Defense University Press Washington, DC.

      7 Total Quality Leadership Panel Discussion, (9 March

1995).  Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico,

Virginia.

      8 Sowell (Quotation rephrased by the author with

apologies to President Eisenhower).

      9 Socioeconomic Impact Analysis Study, (March 1994).

"Disposal and Reuse of Carswell Air force Base, Texas."

Department of the Air Force.

     10 A.A. Barbour, (1969) "Estimating the Cost of Relocating

Military Bases."  Memorandum RM-5585-ISA, p. 51.  The Rand

Corporation. (Note: Costs have been adjusted on the

assumption that in a given 20 year period construction costs

will double as they did from 1950-1970. See p. 9.)

     11 The author was unable to obtain any historical data

specific to this argument from either GAO or any military

source.  It would be reasonable to assume that over time

more aircraft would require more maintenance of a runway,

however, the additional cost would be insignificant compared

to operating an entire additional base at marginal capacity.

     12 LtCol William L. Egge, (1993) "Logistics Implications

of Composite Wings,"  p. 74-77.  Air University Press,

Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

     13 Cmdr Kenneth T. Houck, (1994) "U.S. Navy Tactical

Aircraft Procurement into the Twenty-First Century," p. 40.

Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

     14 FMFM 1, p. 46 and 48.

     15 MajGen Fred McCorkle, (March 1995) "MEF in the Offense:

The Aviation Combat Element."  Presentation given at Marine

Corps Command and Staff College. Quantico, Virginia. MajGen

McCorkle indicated that the FA-18 Hornet was the most

capable CAS platform available to the Marine Corps.

     16 Ogden Standard-Examiner, (Friday, December 23, 1994),

p. 6A.

     17 LtCol Robert E. Schmidle, (March 1995).  In response to

an Email inquiry from the author regarding the subject of

this paper.

     18 In response to an Email inquiry from the author

regarding the subject of this paper, a former Commander of

Marine Corps Bases East wrote the following: "...I don't

think collocation on existing facilities is a real good

course of action, despite all the good reasons you posit.

Reason:  without additional construction we would run

ourselves out of operational surge capacity in crisis.

Additionally, only the East Coast would likely be able to

provide housing at reasonable rates to any additional troop

population."

     19 Julia Denman, Department Chief, Government Accounting

Office (February 1995). Phone conversations with Ms. Denman

indicated that the GAO has only recently begun to research

the feasibility of interservicing military operations and

only with regard to the maintenance of military equipment

(see endnote 1).  She knows of no research that addresses

the viability of intentionally restructuring military bases

into a joint architecture.  Attempts to elicit factual data

from other sources has been equally fruitless.  The reader

will therefore find many positions taken by the author that

can neither be proven nor disproven without extensive

government study.  It is the author's argument that it is

time now for DoD to seriously study the issue and either

totally discount the idea or implement it as sound military

policy.