Military

JFACC:  Operational Asset Or Joint Force Dilemma

 

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SUBJECT AREA - Aviation

 

 

 

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                              EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: JFACC: Operational Asset or Joint Force Dilemma

 

Author:  Major Michael C. Barton, United States Air Force

 

Thesis:: The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept evolved to

correct operational deficiencies. Is the JFACC a joint force asset or liability?

 

Background: Commanders attempt take advantage of the full range of military

capabilities of their forces. Since World War II, they have relied on theater air

commanders to integrate the air power capabilities of different nations and services into

an effective theater air campaign. The consolidation of air assets, fuctionally, was the

United States Air Force's justification for independence from the United States Army in

1947. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 26, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair

Operations, confirmed the joint force commander's authority to designate a Joint Force

Air Component Commander to coordinate the joint air operations campaign. The

emerging joint doctrine revived old tensions between the services over the control of

theater air power. The 1986 Omnibus Agreement ignited a controversy between the Air

Force and the Marine Corps. The controversy centered on Air Force, not joint, doctrine

advocating centralized control of all theater tactical aircraft under a single air component

commander (fuctional componency). The results of the air campaign in Operation

DESERT STORM demonstrate the operational utility of the JFACC. The command and

control, synchronized planning, and unity of effort missing in the Vietnam conflict were

evident in the Gulf War.

 

Recommendation:   Unity of effort through centralized control of theater air assets is the

most effective way to employ air power. Coordination is best achieved by vesting a

single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of

a common goal. Joint force commanders should designate a Joint Force Air Component

Commander when a joint force consists of two or more services with fixed wing aircraft.

 

                                    OUTLINE

I.    Introduction

 

II.   Joint Warfare

 

III.  JFACC Defined

 

IV.   The Debate

 

V.    Case Studies

 

             A. Vietnam

 

             B. DESERT STORM

 

VI.   Conclusions

 

                JFACC: Operational Asset or Joint Force Dilemma

 

      "The use of military, naval, and aerial forces in war should be directed toward a

 

single end, to win...The three forces should fuction as ingredients--or factors--of a

 

single product in which the best results can be obtained only by a proper apportioning of

 

the ingredients used." Is this a recent comment by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

 

Staff or a Combatant Commander-in Chief (CINC)? No, they are the words of Giulio

 

Douhet, an Italian general and early airpower theorist, published in his book, The

 

Command of the Air, in 1921. Nevertheless, the theory is as valid today, and just as

 

applicable, as it was seventy-four years ago. As the United States (US) Armed Forces

 

continue to downsize, joint warfare is the "US way of war."

 

      In the joint community, nothing created more controversy than the Joint Forces

 

Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept. Roles and missions, parochialism, and

 

doctrine were all factors in this emotional issue. Additionally, misconceptions about the

 

responsibilities and authority of the JFACC exacerbated the dissension among the

 

services. At the heart of the dispute is the opertional utility of centralized command

 

of theater air assets under an air component commander. What is the JFACC and what

 

authority does he wield? Does history offer any lessons pertaiing to unity of air effort

 

and theater command of the air campaign? Finally, do the advantages of centralized

 

command and decentralized execution, if there are any, outweigh the disadvantages? The

 

answers to these questions lie in joint and service doctrine, the results of previous air

 

campaigns, and the principles of war.

 

JOINT WARFARE

 

      Any student of US military history can confirm that joint warfare is a long

 

standing practice in the nation's armed forces. From the Revolutionary War, the very

 

birth of our country, to the Persian Gulf War, our armed forces traditionally fight as

 

members of joint and/or combined forces. However, some dramatic changes in the last

 

thirty years have changed the way our armed forces train, organize, and fight The

 

Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Bill of 1986, more than anything else, has

 

brought "jointness" to the forefront of military awareness. Among other things, the act

 

empowered the National Command Authority (NCA) to establish combatant commands

 

to plan and conduct joint operations.

 

      A combatant command, according to Joint Pub 3-0, is a command with a broad

 

continuing mission under a single commander. Combatant commands typically have

 

geographic or funtional responsibilities. A number of command relationships are

 

available to strengthen unity of effort in joint force operations. The combatant

 

commander can control the conduct of military operations or may delegate that authority

 

to ajoint force commander (JFC). Joint force commanders establish command

 

relationships and assign missions to achieve their objectives efficiently. To that end, the

 

JFC may establish funtional component commanders

 

      to provide centralized direction and control of certain fuctions and

      types of operations when it is feasible and necessary to fix

      responsibility for certain normal, continuing funtions, or when it is

      appropriate and desirable to establish the authority and responsibility

      of a subordinate commander. These conditions apply when the scope

      of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of

      forces from more than one service be directed toward closely related

      objectives and unity of command and effort are primary

      considerations.1

 

A Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) is an example. Functional

 

component commanders normally exercise operational control (OPCON)2 over assigned

 

and attached forces and, based on the commander's decision, tactical control (TACON)3

 

over additional military capabilities or forces.

 

      Joint forces usually organize with a combination of service and functional

 

components exercising operational responsibilities. Service components provide logistic

 

and administrative support for their forces. Clear and uncomplicated command lines are

 

one of the main advantages of operating through service components. Nonetheless, JFCs

 

normally designate a JFACC when a joint force consists of two or more services with

 

aviation assets, especially if more than one service has fixed wing aircraft. The

 

commander establishes the JFACC's authority and responsibilities, and designates

 

supported or supporting relationships among components, based on his concept of

 

operations.

 

      The commander may employ forces through his functional components or he may

 

choose to use them primarily to manage and coordinate selected functions. In either

 

case, an effective functional component staff is joint and individual service

 

representation is proportional to the mix of forces. Functional component staffs normally

 

cannot operate efficiently without prior training and seldom get the opportunity to train

 

together. Therefore, functional component staffs must identify critical billets and then

 

ensure joint staffs contain not only the personnel, but also the expertise, to fill these

 

positions. Additionally, liaison elements to and from other components facilitate

 

coordination.4

 

JFACC DEFINED

 

      The idea of a joint air component commander is not new. There are numerous

 

examples from World War I and World War II5 of a single airman successfully

 

exercising centralized control of theater air forces. Unfortunately, US airmen ignored

 

their predecessor's lessons learned in the Korean and Vietnam Wars6. There are two

 

common lessons learned from the Korean and Vietnam air wars. First, and foremost,

 

service parochialism dominated the air wars. And second, disregarding the lack of a

 

single air commander, both wars lacked an air campaign plan with a clear set of

 

objectives. The latest joint doctrine, and the subsequent formalizing of the JFACC

 

concept, emerged to overcome these shortcomings.

 

       Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

 

Associated Terms, defines the joint force air component commander:

 

      The joint force air component commander derives authority from the

      joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational

      control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate

      commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the

      accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander will

      normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint

      force air component commander's responsibilities will be assigned by

      the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be

      limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the

      joint force commander's apportionment decision). Using the joint force

      commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with other

      service component commanders and other assigned supporting

      commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend

      to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various

      missions or geographic areas.7

 

      A quick analysis of several key phrases in the definition clarifies several common

 

misconceptions about the JFACC's authority and responsibilities. First, the JFACC

 

clearly derives any and all of his authority from the JFC. He is a tool available to the

 

JFC: Joint Pub 0-2 states that the commander establishes the specific command

 

authority, i.e., OPCON or TACON, assigned to the JFACC. Second, a support

 

relationship (or TACON) is normally the command authority the JFACC needs to

 

employ augmentmg forces. The Air Force's JFACC Primer states, "JFACCs typically

 

will exercise OPCON over assigned and attached forces, and TACON over the other

 

forces made available for tasking."8 Finally, the JFC assigns the JFACC's

 

responsibilities which typically include an apportionment9 recommendation and the

 

allocation10 of apportioned sorties. The JFC determines the apportionment in

 

consultation with component commanders based on his objectives. It is obvious that the

 

joint staff wrote the JFACC definition very carefully in an attempt to appease all

 

services. However, the definition makes one thing perfectly clear: the combatant

 

commander is in charge.

 

      One of the most critical funtions a JFACC performs is the development of a

 

concept of air operations to meet the JFC's objectives. The concept of air operations,

 

and subsequent air campaign plan and master attack plan, integrates the employment of

 

air forces to "maximize their contribution to the combatant commander's intent"11 The

 

essence of the concept of air operations is the ability of the JFACC to synchronize the

 

operational functions in an air campaign plan that achieves strategic goals with limited

 

resources. The commander's priorities are the basis for the air campaign. The plan

 

provides airmen with broad concepts of operations, focuses on the enemy's strategic and

 

operational centers of gravity, prioritizes objectives, and defines the commander's

 

desired end state. Conceptually, an air campaign's first priority targets are enemy

 

center(s) of gravity.12 This decidedly US Air Force point of view caused great

 

consternation among its sister services, especially the Navy and Marine Corps, and fueled

 

a debate that raged for years.

 

THE DEBATE

 

      The 1986 Omnibus Agreement ignited the controversy between the Air Force and

 

the Marine Corps. The JCS approved the policy in response to concerns raised by the

 

approval of JCS Publication 26, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations. This

 

publication confirmed the JFC's authority to designate a JFACC to coordinate the joint

 

air operations campaign. The controversy centered on Air Force, not joint, doctrine

 

advocating centralized control of all theater tactical aircraft under a single air component

 

commander (functional componency). The Marine Corps adheres to a philosophy of

 

"joint force mission attainment through employment of service components consistent

 

with their designed warfighting capabilities."13 The Omnibus Agreement addresses the

 

command and control of USMC Tactical Aircraft (TACAIR) in sustained operations

 

ashore:

 

             The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commander will

      retain operational control of his organic air assets. The primary mission

      of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground

      element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally

      be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF Commander will

      make sorties available to the Joint Force Commander, for tasking

      through his air component commander, for air defense, long-range

      interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of

      MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the Joint Force

      Commander for tasking through the Air Component Commander for the

      support of other components of the joint force, or of the joint force as a

      whole.

             Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the Theater or

      Joint Force Commander, in the exercise of operational control, to assign

      missions, redirect efforts (e.g., the reapportionment and/or reallocation

      of any MAGTF TACAIR sorties when it has been determined by the

      Joint Force Commander that they are required for higher priority

      missions), and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders

      to insure unity of effort in accomplishment of his overall mission' or to

      maintain integrity of the force, as described in JCS Pub 2, Unified

      Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).14

 

      In March 1989, the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development

 

Command circulated a letter asserting the Corps' support for JFACC concept.15 The

 

letter acknowledged the "operational compatibility" of Marine Corps and Air Force

 

doctrine and stated that the services' philosophical differences were "necessary and

 

correct." The letter went on to outline four general doctrinal and philosophical

 

differences between the services: (1) basic orientation to war; (2) doctrinal world views;

 

(3) battlefield development; and, (4) philosophy of joint integration. The first two

 

differences are "necessary and correct" based on the roles and missions of each service.16

 

The battlefield development and joint integration issues evoke a great deal of emotion as

 

both services cite history to support their position. While the letter accurately portrayed

 

service doctrine and the Corps' vision of the JFACC, it did nothing to diffuse the

 

growing tensions.

 

      The letter explains that the USMC views the battlefield "vertically" with

 

emphasis on extensive close air support (CAS) consisting of integrated combined arms

 

operations in the MAGTF area of operations. This concept is significant because the

 

Marine Corps organizes, trains, and equips to provide the combatant commander with a

 

Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), a combines arms team. The letter

 

characterizes the USAF view as "horizontal" with the focus on interdiction beyond the

 

FSCL and the Air Force controlling all tactical aircraft. Part of this is true: according to

 

Air Force doctrine a campaign plan places a higher priority on interdiction missions than

 

CAS missions. However, AFM 1-1 recommends that an airman or air component

 

commander, not an Air Force officer, should exercise centralized control over aerospace

 

forces. For instance, Air Force doctrine conforms with Joint Pub 3-04, Joint Maritime

 

Operations (Air), which states, "In the maritime environment, if the JFC designates a

 

JFACC, he will normally be a naval commander." In any case, the air component

 

commander's service is not an issue because the JFACC "recommends" and the JFC

 

"approves." The point is, the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy should concentrate on

 

complementing and not competing with each other. If the Air Force develops the

 

battlespace "horizontally," Marine Corps aviation can focus on integrated combined arms

 

operations in the MAGTF area of responsibility. As the Air Force, augmented by

 

available Army, Navy, and Marine Corps assets, shapes the deep battle beyond the fire

 

support coordination line (FSCL), the MAGTF's aviation maneuver element pounds

 

targets short of FSCL in the close battle. These are overly simplified examples of very

 

emotional issues; nonetheless, in the "doctrinal" battlespace, the MAGTF, Naval

 

aviation, and the Air Force can reinforce one another.

 

      The thrust of the friction regarding joint integration centers on the USAF's

 

preference for functional componency with an air component commander.17 It is the Air

 

Force's position that allotting available airpower to individual ground units does not

 

allow for concentration on a decisive part of the overall theater campaign. The Marine

 

Corps holds to

 

      a philosophy of joint operations which focuses on overall joint force

      mission attainment through employment of service components

      consistent with their designed warfighting capabilities and in a manner

      designed to exploit those capabilities. It supports the integration of

      force at the joint level through mission planning, coordination, and

      direction of forces, rather than through consolidated command of

      subordinate components' organic assets.18

 

      This philosophy is not logical relative to aviation assets in a joint task force.

 

Consider the following example: The commander of a two division Marine

 

Expeditionary Force (MEF) decides to concentrate at the decisive time and place. After

 

consulting with his major subordinate commanders, the MEF commander decides to

 

place the preponderance of his aviation assets in direct support Division "A" (the ground

 

combat element's main effort). How does the commander of Division "B" react? His

 

only real option is to support the commander to the best of his ability. The JFC expects

 

nothing less from the MEF Commander, or MARFOR as the supporting commander,

 

regarding the apportionment and allocation of JTF aviation assets in the JTF scenario.

 

      The range, speed and firepower inherent to airpower make it the JTF's most

 

flexible and versatile asset. As such, the commander must have access to available air

 

forces at the decisive time. These concepts apply equally to the JFC and the MAGTF

 

commander. As the JFC's primary air defense and strategic strike capability, Air Force

 

doctrine places the highest priority on gaining and maintaining air superiority and

 

destroying the enemy's ability to produce or sustain military forces. The MAGTF

 

commander relies on organic aviation assets in direct support of ground forces to

 

compensate for a lack of heavy artillery. The Navy depends on its carrier air assets for

 

fleet defense. The joint force commander must carefully consider the risks and payoffs

 

associated with his apportionment decision. Is a JFACC the JFC's best option to resolve

 

these issues, and, if so, what considerations will he use in balancing these conflicting

 

demands? First, each service must keep in mind that doctrine is nothing more than basic

 

guidance. Next, the JTF mission and the nature of the enemy (including capabilities,

 

vulnerabilities, and intent) are always the critical factors in campaign decisions. And

 

finally, the JFC's priorities, not service doctrine, determine the air commander's

 

operational focus of effort.

 

CASE STUDIES

 

      The JFACC's responsibilities will normally include the planning, coordination

 

and tasking based on the commander's apportionment decision. The planning fimction

 

includes the development of a theater air campaign plan. The foundation of the air

 

campaign is the planning, coordination, and employment of airpower to achieve

 

campaign objectives that support the commander's mission and intent. An effective plan

 

will create opportunities for air and ground forces to exploit and then capitalize on these

 

opportunities. The following case studies analyze the command and control of air assets

 

in the US's two most recent major conflicts. The analysis will focus on the command

 

relationships, planning, and air war unity of effort.

 

 

VIETNAM

 

      National security bureaucracy, political-military conflict, and interservice rivalry

 

dominated a dysfunctional command and control system in the Vietnam conflict. US

 

civilian and military leaders could not choose a strategy to achieve their objectives.

 

Without an agreement on how to fight, or what kind of war they were fighting, the war in

 

Vietnam became a conflict among US military and civilian elements. Even within the

 

administration there was a debate over the prosecution of the war, and especially the air

 

campaign. The disagreement pitted senior military leadership against Secretary of

 

Defense McNamara. The JCS favored a forceful and decisive air campaign. Military

 

planners envisioned an intense two to three month bombing operation targeting and

 

neutrauung the enemy's ability to wage war. The Secretary favored a controlled,

 

graduated application of air power. Generally, civilian leadership lacked a sense of what

 

air power was and what it could and could not accomplish.

 

      Service parochialism dominated air operations in Vietnam. "Pentagon rivalries

 

were transplanted to Saigon where Army officers worked to exclude the USAF from

 

decision-making positions."19 Bitter disputes over rolls and missions, doctrine, and

 

interservice rivalry prevented a unified command structure. Air Force bomber and fighter

 

training focused on nuclear war while the Navy concentrated on fleet defense and power

 

projection. The Army and Marine Corps gravitated toward expanding the role of rotary

 

wing aviation. In Vietnam, the concept of a "single manager" air component commander

 

caused the service commanders (Army, Navy, and Marine Corps) a great deal of anxiety

 

over the possibility of losing control of their aviation assets. The USAF did little to ease

 

their minds: Air Force doctrine, planning, and training emphasized the strategic offensive

 

and gave low priority to supporting ground and sea forces.

 

      The leadership of the Air Force and Navy would not accept their aircraft falling

 

under the operational control of the other service. In an attempt to preserve roles and

 

missions, each service maintained control over itsown assets. This problem was not just

 

between the Air Force and the Navy.

 

      Control of air power over the battlefield kept the Army and Air Force

      at odds. Rooted in genuine concerns, this issue had many practical

      consequences. Air space had to be allocated usefully, scarce air assets

      had to be used to the greatest effect, and maintenance(reliability had to

      be considered...The heart of the matter was that failure to set out a

      clear vision of the war frustrated the effort to determine clear and

      agreed means of fighting it. And without unity, the separate and

      specialized perspectives of the service branches all but inevitably

      retained great force.20

 

General William Momyer, the 7th AF Commander, claimed, "Army and Navy

 

commanders mistook the flexibility of air power as a justification to fragment it. Instead,

 

its flexibility and effectiveness depended of the centralized control of air power in a

 

theater war."21

 

      CINCPAC, Admiral U.S. Sharp, the "theater commander,"22 did little to establish

 

clear lines of command. Despite repeated requests from General Momyer "to unite the

 

air effort under one air officer, CINCPAC refused to appoint a subordinate theater air

 

manager."23 Instead he delegated operational control to PACAF and PACFLT.

 

      The PACAF units that participated...were part of the Seventh Air

      Force and were directed from Seventh Air Force Headquarters in

      Southeast Asia. Seventh Air Force aircraft operating within South

      Vietnam were assigned to the Military Assistance Command,

      Vietnam. The same organizational structure was applied to the United

      States Navy forces operating in Indochina. Air Units of PACFLT

      participating...were directed from Seventh Fleet headquarters at sea

      (yankee station-about a hundred miles offshore from Da Nang, South

      Vietnam) while those units providing support for activities in South

      Vietnam were assigned to MACV.24

 

MACV controlled all air operations in South Vietnam and exercised operational control

 

over USMC aircraft. Strategic Air Command (SAC) retained operational control of B-

 

52s based in Guam, and 13th AF25 commanded USAF units stationed in Thailand.

 

Finally, all air operations in Laos came under the surveillance and control of the

 

embassy. "In effect, the embassy air attache fuctioned as an air commander since he

 

could determine 7th AF employment through the authority of the Ambassador."26

 

Clearly, even the Air Force was not complying with its first tenet of airpower, centralized

 

command (see Figure 1).

 

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      Further complicating command and control, CINCPAC delegated coordination

 

authority to CINCPACAF who in turn delegated that authority to the Commander of the

 

2d Air Division in South Vietnam. Rather than attempting to unify the air effort,

 

CINCPAC granted coordination authority to "preclude mutual interference of friendly

 

forces during strike and armed reconnaissance missions." The coordinating authority had

 

the power to "exchange information on strike plans, request support for a particular

 

operation, and establish procedures to prevent conflicting activities."27 CINCPAC

 

believed this system conformed to accepted doctrine for unified control. In reality, the

 

entire command and control structure violated the most basic tenet of airpower --

 

centralized control/decentralized execution.

 

      In his book, Storm Over Iraq, Richard P. Hallion states, "air power was misused

 

in Vietnam, with that misuse often clouding the results attributed to the limits of air

 

power when they really stemmed from limits on air power."28 The fragmented

 

command and control structure and lack of an organized air campaign mirrored the

 

administration's lack of unity and inability to clearly articulate its objectives.

 

      The claims of airmen (including Navy aviators) that one airman

      should be in charge of the air campaign dissolved in the face of

      interservice bickering that finally divided the air war against North

      Vietnam into two separate theaters. The level of cooperation between

      those two campaigns was often minimal, particularly when

      headquarters got into the act. But even within the framework of the

      Air Force's own efforts, the organizational structure hardly bore any

      semblance to that tired but still crucial principle of unity of

      command.29

 

      In an attempt to deconflict strike missions, 2d Air Division and Task Force-77

 

agreed to divide North Vietnam into six route packages (see Figure 2). Each route pack

 

was a geographic area with the Air Force and Navy assigned responsibility for specffic

 

portions of the route packs. Although this type of arrangement works well for ground

 

forces, the division of air power into exclusive geographic areas squelches flexibility and

 

versatility. "Dividing North Vietnam into route packages compartmentalized our [US]

 

air power and reduced its capabilities."30 This system of "control" promoted antagonism

 

between the services and degraded the air effort. Moreover, an absurd targeting process

 

exacerbated an already convoluted situation.

 

      Senior civilian decision makers, often against the advice of their military

 

advisors, controlled targeting in Vietnam (see Figure 3). President Johnson published

 

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weekly target lists, dictated weapons and tactics, and limited the number of dedicated

 

sorties. Pilots, and the JCS, often complained that restrictions prevented strikes on the

 

most important military and war supporting targets and ultimately precluded attauiment

 

of strategic and campaign objectives. The President believed limiting the scope and

 

location of targets reduced the risk of escalation 31 and minimized adverse political

 

repercussions in the United States. As the war continued, President Nixon lifted

 

restrictions and CINCPAC had more freedom to control air operations.

 

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      In 1965 the US initiated ROLLING THUNDER, the first of three air campaigns

 

executed in the Vietnam War. ROLLING THUNDER had three objectives:

 

(1) demonstrate US resolve and defend South Viemam from communist insurgency;

 

(2) improve morale in the Government of South Vietnam; and, (3) compel the

 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam to cease support of insurgency in the South. When US

 

military and civilian leaders could not agree on a strategy to accomplish their objectives,

 

President Johnson and his advisors compromised on a phased interdiction program

                                             

relying on constant and gradually increasing pressure.32

 

      The JCS recommended a list of nearly 100 key targets in North

      Vietnam as part of a coordinated air effort to paralyze their war

      making capabilities. The JCS submitted a 12-week bombing program

      built around the interdiction concept, but neither McNamara nor

      Johnson was prepared to approve a multi-week program. They

      preferred to retain personal control over the attack concepts and

      individual target selection. Hence throughout the bombing campaign

      proposals were approved in individual weekly (later bi-weekly)

      packages.33

 

Throughout the three and a half years of ROLLING THUNDER, the USAF, and the JCS

 

continued to believed an aggressive air campaign could "break the [enemy's] will and

 

war-making capability, but the policy was to affect the will and change behavior."34 The

 

initial JCS target list was as close as the US came to having an air campaign until

 

President Nixon approved LINEBACKER I in April of 1972. This was in response to

 

North Vietnam's invasion of the South during the US drawdown.

 

      LINEBACKER I was an interdiction campaign against North Vietnam that had

 

three objectives: "(1) reduce the flow of supplies into North Vietnam from external

 

sources; (2) destroy existing stockpiles; and, (3) reduce the flow of supplies to units in

 

the South."35 President Nixon approved missions in previously strike-free zones and alsc

 

mined key ports. Unlike ROLLING THUNDER, US military commanders in Vietnam

 

had the authority to prosecute the air war. New rules of engagement slashed bombing

 

restrictions and the introduction of precision-guided munitions improved the flexibility

 

and efficiency of the air effort. LINEBACKER I effectively isolated North Vietnam and

 

brought the North Vietnamese to the bargaining table. The bombing halted in October

 

1972.

 

      When peace negotiations broke down in December 1972, President Nixon

 

ordered the resumption of air operations. Code named LINEBACKER II, the air forces

 

"executed a contingency plan which called for all-weather, around-the-clock operations

 

and continuous attacks on North Vietnam."36 The air campaign intensified the attack on

 

military targets throughout the North.

 

      During the night of 26 December, 120 B-52s hit a variety of targets

      nearly simultaneously. The raids were over within a 15-minute

      period. An additional 100 aircrait, including F-111s, F-4s, and Navy

      A-6s struck SAM [surface-to-air missile] sites and radar before,

      during, and after the B-52 raids...All in all, the 'eighth day of

      Christmas' was a rousing success, quite possibly the single most

      successful day of bombing in the history of aerial warfare when you

      consider it led to the end of America's longest war.37

 

LINEBACKER II, an eleven day campaign, destroyed the North Vietnamese air defense

 

system: North Vietnam was at the mercy of US air power. This air campaign "was much

 

more in accordance with traditional concepts of strategic bombing in that it had a

 

psychological impact in Hanoi's leadership."38 The air effort compelled North Vietnam

 

to return to serious negotiations that eventually marked the end of the war.

 

DESERT STORM

 

      Operation DESERT STORM was the US's first major conflict since the

 

Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. President Bush gave General

 

(Gen) Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander US Central Command (CINCCENT), the

 

following objectives:

 

      (1) force Iraq out of Kuwait; (2) destroy Iraq's nuclear, biological,

      and chemical (NBC) capability (5-10 year set back); (3) minimize loss of

      life (but do not draw out the war); and, (4) minimize civilian casualties.39

 

Gen Schwarzkopf selected Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Charles Horner, the Commander

 

of 9th AF and US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF), as his JFACC. This

 

marked the first time since World War II that all the fixed wing tactical air forces of the

 

US services were under the tactical control of a single theater air commander (see Figure

 

4). CINCCENT then "designated Horner the CENTCOM forward commander, placing

 

him in charge of the beddown of forces that began flowing into theater."40 Gen

 

Schwarzkopf next asked the USAF Vice-Chief of Staff to develop an air campaign plan.

 

The result was a strategic air campaign code named INSTANT THUNDER. The plan

 

targeted key Iraqi military capabilities and was CENTCOM's only viable offensive

 

option for months.

 

Click here to view image

 

 

     Gen Schwarzkopf and Gen Colin Powell, the Chairman of the JCS, approved the

 

concept of INSTANT THUNDER. "At the Chairman's direction, planning for the air

 

campaign was made ajoint effort at that time, and representatives of the other services

 

and the Joint Staff were included."41 Lt Gen Horner was the central point for all air

 

campaign planning and employment decisions. He did not agree with the initial version

 

of the air campaign because he felt it did not focus enough effort on the Iraqi ground

 

forces. Lt Gen "Horner selected Brigadier General (Brig Gen) Buster Glosson...to direct

 

a secret planning effort for an offensive air campaign."42 INSTANT THUNDER

 

eventually became a four phase air campaign developed around the four phases of

 

DESERT STORM, Gen Schwarzkopf's theater campaign plan. The air campaign

 

planners determined it would take 32 days to complete the following phases: (1) strategic

 

air campaign; (2) air superiority in the Kuwait theater of operations;(3) battlefield

 

preparation; and, (4) ground offensive campaign.43

 

      Air Force doctrine, as previously discussed, focuses on the enemy strategic and

 

operational centers of gravity and gaining and maintaining air superiority. Phase I, the

 

strategic air campaign, concentrated primarily on the Iraqi air defense system, command

 

and control, weapons of mass destruction, and the Republican Guard forces. This phase

 

was "nearly a textbook application of USAF doctrine, with the other services playing

 

important supporting but not staring roles."44 The concentration of airpower, as

 

opposed to the gradual escalation used Vietnam, allowed the coalition air forces to seize

 

the initiative and exploit early success. Coalition air forces severed Iraqi command and

 

control and gained air superiority (Phase II objective) in the first week of the campaign

 

and achieved air supremacy within two weeks.

 

      Phase III, battlefield preparation, began almost immediately.

 

      Gen Schwarzkopf directed the JFACC to concentrate initially on

      second and third echelon forces -- the heavy divisions and the

 

      Republican Guards making up the operational and strategic reserves of

      the Iraqi Army.45

 

The JFACC, based on the CINC's apportionment, concentrated his effort on the Iraqi

 

reserves. The perceived strategic focus of the JFACC's air campaign quickly became a

 

point of contention with the ground commanders. This created a great deal of friction

 

between the JFACC staff and the ground commanders, who felt the JFACC was ignoring

 

front-line units. The "problem" with interdiction is ground commanders do not "see"

 

the results. It takes time for ground units to realize the potency of interdiction. Airmen

 

understand interdiction is more efficient than close air support (CAS) because it is easier

 

to destroy combat forces and equipment enroute to the front than it is to attack them once

 

they deploy. Some ground commanders feared the Air Force "strategic mentality" was

 

taking over the targeting process and criticized the JFACC's focus of effort. In reality,

 

the JFACC was responding to the CINC's apportionment and intent. "Corps

 

commanders were concerned with breaching front-line Iraqi units while the CINC was

 

concerned with reducing the Republican Guard theater reserves to less than 50

 

percent."46 This was the beginning of a series of problems and misperceptions related to

 

targeting, battle damage assessment (BDA), and the Air Tasking Order (ATO).

 

      A break down in communication between the CINC and his ground commanders

 

caused uneasiness between the ground commanders and the JFACC.

 

      Tensions between the Air Force and American ground commanders

      persisted because the commanders did not understand that many

      decisions causing them problems were Gen Schwarzkopf's and not

      Horner's.47

 

Ground commanders were not aware of the CINC's preference for attacking the

 

Republican Guards and armor. Despite the ground commanders' concern with Iraqi

 

artillery, the CINC "directed the JFACC not to attack front-line artillery until 3 or 4 days

 

before G-day to prevent it from being replaced."48 Additionally, the CINC did not want

 

to bomb too much in front of VII Corps and give away his plan.49 The Army and Marine

 

Corps perceived the JFACC's focus as a reluctance to shift phases from strategic

 

targeting to battlefield preparation.

 

      Gen Schwarzkopf determined a key to the success of the ground campaign

 

was destroying 50 percent of the occupying Iraqi forces before starting the ground

 

offensive. For the first time in the history of air power, a CINC's theater ground

 

campaign depended on air forces attriting a significant portion of the ground forces.

 

As the air campaign progressed, the CINC directed the JFACC to stop bombing Iraqi

 

combat units with a reported combat effectiveness of 50 percent or less. "General

 

Schwarzkopf based his target priorities on overall theater needs, rather than the

 

individual tactical needs perceived by any one subordinate ground commander."51

 

Once again, American ground commanders began to feel the JFACC was

 

unresponsive to their targeting priorities. It is apparent the ground commanders were

 

not aware of the CINC's guidance.

 

      As the ground campaign neared, the American ground commanders voiced

 

their concerns to the CINC. To ensure the ground commander's concerns and

 

priorities received consideration during the targeting process, the CINC directed his

 

Deputy (DCINC), Lt Gen Waller, to develop a Joint Targeting Board (see Figure 5).

 

Lt Gen Waller "was given the responsibility of reviewing the targets nominated by

 

the ground commanders and apportioning aircraft."52 The DCINC would modify the

 

target list and brief the CINC each evening. The CINC would make his own

 

modifications and then forward the target list to the JFACC. Unfortunately, this process

 

did not resolve targeting problems.

 

Click here to view image

 

      The target nomination process contributed to the ground commander's

 

dissatisfaction with the JFACC. Each day a corps could nominate up to 40 targets,

 

prioritize them, and then forward the prioritized list to US Army headquarters

 

(ARCENT). ARCENT would compile all target lists, prioritize them, and forward a

 

single ARCENT target list to the DCINC. Then the DCINC and CINC would modify

 

the list before making the apportionment decision and tasking the JFACC. According

 

to a VII Corps air liaison officer's report, there were typically several problems with

 

the corps' target lists: (1) inappropriate targets; (2) excessive time between target

 

submission and its validation; (3) no revalidation criteria was set to remove dated

 

mobile targets, such as surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft weapons; and (4) no

 

attempt to correlate targets the JFACC reported as destroyed and remove them from

 

the list.53 The BDA issue caused numerous problems throughout the air campaign.

 

Gen Schwarzkopf made MARCENT and ARCENT responsible for BDA in

 

their areas. CENTCOM established no standard rules for defming battle damage

 

assessment and MARCENT and ARCENT applied different criteria to determine a

 

kill. MARCENT relied heavily on A-10 and AV-8 mission reports, while ARCENT

 

used only A-10 mission reports and confirmed imagery reports to track BDA.

 

ARCENT even discounted aircraft video film of laser guided bombs scoring direct

 

hits. They would only use the data in BDA reports "if each claimed kill was verified

 

by the unit ground liaison officer and submitted by separate report directly to the

 

513th Military Intelligence Brigade."54 In addition, the only factors used to

 

determine the combat strength of an Iraqi unit were tanks, APCs and artillery.

 

      CENTAF was using pilot mission reports and aircraft video to verify BDA

 

and determine the combat strength of Iraqi units. The large discrepancy between

 

CENTAF's BDA figures and the ground units' estimates frustrated the JFACC staff

 

planners. Relying on intelligence agencies for BDA was just as discouraging.

 

      Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) derived its BDA using overhead and

      medium-altitude sensors. After analyzing only a single division, DIA

      forced ARCENT into increasing overall combat effectiveness

      assessments and changing their BDA kill criteria.55

 

The Central Intelligence Agency assessments were also very cautious. Approaching

 

G-day, CENTCOM claimed 1,700 tank, 900 APC, and 1,400 artillery kills. The CIA

 

briefed President Bush that it could validate only 500 kills.56 The following excerpt

 

from Storm Over Iraq describes the JFACC's predicament regarding accurate BDA:

 

      On the eve of G-day, CENTAF's planners estimated (CENTCOM

      concurred) that air attack had destroyed approximately 40 percent of

      Iraqi tanks, 40 percent of Iraqi artillery, and one-third of Iraqi armored

      vehicles in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. The intelligence

      community estimated that losses were no greater than 20 to 30

      percent, and some analysts declared them as low as 15 percent;

      USCENTCOM in general and CENTAF in particular were accused of

      exaggerating the effectiveness of the air campaign. In fact,

      CENTAF's estimates were in error -- they were conservative: the

      actual losses to the Iraqi's by the eve of G-day were much higher -- on

      the order of 60 percent of tanks, 60 percent of artillery, and 40 percent

      of armored vehicles.57

 

      From the start of the air campaign, battle damage assessment gave the JFACC

 

planning staff problems. BDA was essential to producing the Air Tasking Order and

 

CENTAF/Intelligence support was generally two to three days behind the planning

 

cycle.58 To expedite the planning process, the JFACC's staff relied on intelligence

 

sources in the US, aircraft video, and pilot mission reports. When BDA was not

 

available the air campaign planners assumed targets were still valid; and, they often had

 

to schedule additional missions to reattack the same targets.

 

      Imperfect knowledge about the effectiveness of strikes led to

      unnecessary restrikes, the waste of munitions, and to placing crews

      and equipment unnecessarily at risk. Unnecessary restrikes also

      kept...planners from allocating aircraft and munitions on other

      targets.59

 

      Retasking a strike, through the ATO, took at least three days. The JFACC's

 

Current Operations Division had the ability to immediately retask missions, but short

 

notice retasking of interdiction missions should only occur for high priority targets or

 

emergencies.60 "Last minute" ATO changes caused a great deal of concern at the unit

 

level. The Air Force's F-15E community contended:

 

      Time needed to plan air interdiction missions is critical. Aircrews

      need to have ATO changes at least six hours prior to take-off in order

      to plan interdiction package missions properly. On several occasions

      ATO changes were received with little or no time to plan, brief; and

      upload the appropriate munitions. Aircrews became less effective in

      executing interdiction missions when there was insufficient planning

      time. Changes to the ATO should be the exception, and changes that

      are not time critical should be incorporated in the follow-on ATO.61

     

             The Air Tasking Order (ATO) disseminated the air campaign plan to all theater

     

air forces. It coordinated the attacks and support assets of all aircraft, and cruise missiles,

 

operating in the Persian Gulf The information in the ATO included targets, munitions,

     

timing and deconfliction, and airspace control measures. All this information went into a

     

single integrated plan as a piece of a comprehensive air offensive to meet the CINC's

     

objectives. It took three days to plan, produce, and execute an ATO. Richard P. Hallion

     

equated the planning cycle to a war:

 

      At any given time, CENTAF's planners were running three wars; one

      was the execution war (what's being done today); another was the

      ATO war (what will happen tomorrow); the third was the planning

      war (what will happen the day alter tomorrow).62

 

      The ATO served a purpose other than just tasking and coordinating. It was the

 

JFACC's vehicle to ensure the concept of air operations supported the CINC's strategic

 

objectives while retaining the flexibility to respond to the constantly changing

 

battlespace. The JFACC integrated and synchronized joint air operations by providing

 

daily guidance, and centralizing planning and decision making. Although the JFACC did

 

not command all the air forces, the ATO allowed the JFACC to integrate the CINC's air

 

assets into a unified air effort. James Winnefeld and Dana Johnson, in their article

 

"Unity of Control: Joint Air Operations in the Gulf," state,

 

      ATOs approved by the JFACC guided the actions of the relevant

      service component commanders. This was a manifestation of tactical

      control of sorties (but not components), an authority much more

      encompassing and rigorous than the..."mission direction" supposedly

      operative in Vietnam.63

 

      There were claims that the ATO was difficult to work with and too rigid. The

 

Army's preference was an allotment of daily sorties for use at the corps commander's

 

discretion. The Army felt its corps commanders could make the best decisions

 

concerning interdiction and shaping operations in front of their units. The Joint

 

Targeting Board was the corps commander's opportunity to influence the shaping of the

 

battlespace. The VII Corps air liaison officer's report mentioned earlier suggests that the

 

JFACC, not the corps commanders, was best suited for targeting airpower.

 

      The JFACC received a steady stream of criticism regarding almost every aspect

 

of the ATO. Integrating all theater air assets in one comprehensive document was a

 

complex operation. The daily ATO was a large document, hundreds of pages in length,

 

and took several hours to transmit to flying units. In addition, the Navy did not have the

 

required computer equipment to receive the ATO and had to fly it to their carriers each

 

day.

 

      Some critics of the ATO complained that it took too long not only to

      transmit and receive but also to prepare. After the war, one report on

      the Marine experience said that the ATO was "an attempt to run a

      minute-by-minute air war at a 72-hour pace." This criticism was not

      entirely warranted because most Marine sorties went into the Kuwait

      theater of operations, and many were handled by airborne controllers

      on a minute-by-minute basis. Indeed, in the case of fixed targets in

      Iraq, the opposite complaint was made; instead of permitting the ATO

      process to plan at least two days in advance, Glosson was prone to

      calling wing commanders with last minute changes.64

 

Finally, Winnefeld and Johnson contend that the ATO conformed to the Air Force's

 

desire for centralized control but did not suit the Navy and Marine concept of

 

decentralized control and mission type orders.65

 

      An ongoing dispute between the ground commanders and the JFACC was the fire

 

support coordination line. The Department of Defense defines the FSCL as

 

      a line established by the appropriate ground commander to insure

      coordination of fire not under his control but which may affect current

      tactical operations...Supporting elements may attack targets forward

      of the fire support coordination line, without prior coordination with

      the ground force commander...Attacks against surface targets behind

      this line must be coordinated with the appropriate ground

      commander.66 (emphasis added)

 

This definition raises several questions for the airman. First, how far forward from the

 

forward edge of the battle area do current tactical operations extend? Next, are

 

supporting elements required to coordinate with the JFACC for attacks forward of the

 

FSCL? And finally, does the ground commander assume the responsibility for providing

 

a means to control the airspace behind the FSCL when he establishes it?

 

      The first question contains too many variables to answer in a single sentence. It

 

is suffficient to say that the ground commander must weigh risk against the maximum

 

tactical effective range of his weapons. For unity of command, the responsibility for the

 

control and synchronization of the interdiction effort should abide with the most capable

 

commander. The commander with control of the battlespace forward, and behind, must

 

provide the means for other units to strike targets in their area of responsibility. In any

 

case, it is the Air Force's belief that

 

      the most reliable way to maximize the enemy's risk is to place the

      FSCL at the range where artillery and missiles stop being the greatest

      threat to the enemy and air attack becomes the greatest threat.67

 

      The FSCL issue came to a head on the final day of the war. During the ground

 

offensive, the JFACC tasked air assets to block retreating Iraqi forces. Unfortunately, the

 

Army had no controlling agency to clear aircraft to attack targets behind the FSCL. This

 

situation created a sanctuary for retreating Iraqi forces. Keaney and Cohen, in Gulf War

 

Air Power Survey, state that one of the major blunders of the Gulf War was allowing the

 

Republican Guards to escape destruction.

 

      One aspect of this interdiction failure was a dispute over the proper

      use of the FSCL...In the area between Coalition ground forces and the

      FSCL, Coalition aircraft could only attack under direction from

      ground or airborne controllers. As the JFACC corollary to this rule,

      helicopters and tactical missiles beyond the FSCL would be controlled

      by the JFACC. The FSCL definition said little about coordination of

      weapons employment beyond the FSCL, however, and the corps

      commanders considered supporting fires beyond the line as

      "permissive," requiring no further coordination. That is, they resisted

      any restrictions on employing missiles or helicopters beyond the line

      and saw attempts to include such strikes in the air tasking order as

      efforts to put their organic firepower under JFACC control. To avoid

      JFACC control, XVIII Airborne Corps advanced the FSCL well north

      of the Euphrates River... and thus reserved an area for attack

      helicopter operations unconstrained by any requirement to coordinate

      with the JFACC. The effect of this use of the FSCL was to hamper air

      power's ability to destroy escaping Iraqi ground forces until the FSCL

      was finally pulled back after several hours.

 

Despite the overwhelming success of US forces in DESERT STORM, this incident

 

highlights the remnants of the service parochialism and bickering over roles and missions

 

so prevalent in Vietnam. The inability of the JFACC and the ground commanders to

 

resolve the FSCL issue prevented the Coalition forces from achieving one of the CINC's

 

objectives, destruction of the Republican Guard.

 

 

CONCLUSIONS

 

      The principles of war and the tenets of aerospace power are the foundations of

 

effective air power employment Centralized control is the most basic tenet of American

 

air power. Divided air forces throttle the inherent flexibility and versatility of air power,

 

prevent concentration, and violate several principles of war. Therefore, an airman should

 

exercise centralized control over aerospace forces to ensure unity of effort. The

 

following passage from AFM I-I captures the essence of the JFACC concept:

 

            To develop full combat power...forces must be coordinated through

            unity of effort. Coordination may be achieved by cooperation; it is,

            however, best achieved by vesting a single commander with the

            requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a

            common goal. 69

 

A commander with the responsibility and authority to prosecute the air war retains the

 

flexibility to create mass at the decisive time and place. Furthermore, a single

 

commander ensures the air campaign remains focused on the commander's military

 

objectives and the desired end state.

 

      The initial controversy regarding the JFACC centered on the operational utility of

 

centralized command of theater air assets under an air component commander.

 

Unfortunately, the dispute quickly degenerated into a debate encompassing roles and

 

missions and Air Force doctrine instead of the operational implications of a JFACC. The

 

JFC designates a JFACC, or any functional component commander, to provide

 

centralized direction and control when unit of command and effort are primary

 

considerations. The JFACC's role is to advise the commander on "how to best exploit

 

the versatility of aerospace power."70 His value to the joint force is the ability to

 

synchronize the commander's air assets into an integrated air effort.

 

      The JFACC exercises the operational art to support the commander's intent and

 

accomplish the mission. It would be naive to assume that service doctrine, training, and

 

personal experiences do not influence the JFACC's air campaign plan and apportionment

 

recommendations. However, the JFACC does not function in a vacuum. A joint staff

 

develops the concept of air operations and the air campaign plan, with its associated

 

master attack plan, to satisfy the commander's priorities and focus the air effort. In

 

addition, service component commanders have the means available to influence the

 

JFACC's daily apportionment recommendation and the subsequent allocation of air

 

assets. The Joint Targeting Board and component liaison elements serve as the service

 

component commander's conduit to the apportionment and targeting process. The

 

JFACC develops courses of action and makes recommendations based on the

 

commander's priorities, individual experience, and his staff's inputs. It is the

 

commander's responsibility to determine the best course of action and make the

 

apportionment decision that supports his concept of operations.

 

      Operation DESERT STORM validated the JFACC concept. A single air

 

commander was a key element in the execution of a devastating air campaign. The

 

command and control, synchronized planning, and unity of effort missing in the Vietnam

 

conflict were evident in the Gulf War. Most of the ground commanders' criticism of the

 

JFACC's "strategic focus" and the targeting process was the result of poor

 

communication. Gen Schwarzkopf ordered the JFACC to concentrate on the Republican

 

Guards and gave specific instructions to avoid bombing certain front-line units. The lack

 

of communication between the CINC and his ground commanders caused a great deal of

 

unnecessary tension between the JFACC and the ground commanders. In addition, the

 

authors of the Gulf War Air Power Survey contribute much of the ground commanders'

 

petulance to decisions made by the CINC. "Schwarzkopf made decisions which

 

displeased his ground commanders and caused grumbling about the JFACC's execution

 

of those decisions."71

 

      Proper staffing and training can solve several of the problems that hampered the

 

JFACC in DESERT STORM. First, the JFACC must ensure that his staff is joint, fully

 

manned, and individual service representation is proportional to the mix of forces;

 

moreover, it is critical that the staff has the opportunity to refine their combat skills in

 

custom-built exercises. Second, training in target nomination and battle damage

 

assessment is essential for all ground commanders. Ideally, this training would cover not

 

only the nomination process, but also the types of targets appropriate for air strikes, and

 

the command's standardized target validation and BDA criteria. All air liaison officers

 

should receive similar training to ensure they advise the ground commander properly.

 

Finally, professional military education must prepare officers for joint staff duty. As a

 

minimum, service mid-level schools should ensure students understand the capabilities

 

and limitations, primary war-fighting unit, and basic doctrine of all the services.

 

      The results of the air campaign in Operation DESERT STORM demonstrate the

 

operational utility of the JFACC. Following the Gulf War, the Chairman of the Joint

 

Chiefs of Staff commented that "...command and control of Joint Air Operations was the

 

best in US military history." However, claims that DESERT STORM marked a

 

revolution in modern warfare are not warranted. The Iraqis allowed the coalition to build

 

a powerfull air armada and ample time was available to prepare for combat. Additionally,

 

the desert environment and the disposition of enemy forces were conducive to the

 

effective use of air power.

 

      Finally, with the coalition's overwhelming air superiority, the JFACC never had

 

to deal with a scarcity of tactical assets. Winnefeld and Johnson maintain that Gen

 

Horner seldom had to make any truly difficult decisions. They claim the problems he

 

dealt with "were traffic separation and mutual support, not hard choices between

 

missions for scarce assets (tankers and SEAD excepted)."72 Indeed, Gen Horner, in a

 

post-war interview, acknowledged that the reason the war was easy was

 

      because we weren't stressed. Let's be truthful about it. We never had

      to make a decision as to whether the French brigade died of the

      Marine brigade died or the Saudi brigade died. If we had had to make

      those kinds of decisions, it would have been a lot more difficulty.73

 

                                     NOTES

 

       1 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations

(Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), ll-17.

      

              2 Operational control (OPCON) may be exercised by commanders at or below the

level of combatant command. OPCON is the authority to perform those funtions of

command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and

forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction

necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON is normally exercised through service

component commanders. Joint Pub 3-0, II-8.

 

       3 Tactical control (TACON) may be exercised by commanders at or below the

level of combatant command. TACON is the detailed and usually local direction and

control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.

TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of

force of tactical use of combat support assets. TACON is typically exercised by

functional component commanders over military capability or forces made available for

tasking that are not assigned or attached to the functional component. Joint Pub 3-0, II-

9.

 

       4 Joint Chiefs, Joint Pub 3-0, ll-17.

 

       5 World War I-- American Air Service at St. Mihiel: By concentrating the almost

1500 Allied aircraft directly supporting the forces in the St. Mihiel offensive, General

Biliy Mitchell achieved both mass and unity of effort.

       World War ll -- North Africa: The US military entered North Africa with its air

power split between the Army Air Force and "support" air power assigned as organic air

power for individual Army units. The decentralized forces concentrated on providing

"umbrella" air cover and direct support for specific ground force units. German ground

and air forces gained strength in the face of the decentralized American air effort. The

American defeat at Kasserine Pass in February 1943 forced a fresh look at air

organization. Shortly thereafter, General Spaatz centralized control in the Northwest

African Air Forces. The immediate success of American air power underscored the

value of unifying theater air power under a single air commander. US Air Force, Deputy

Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, JFACC Primer (Washington DC: Government

Printing Office, 1994), 2,3.

 

      6 Korean War: Disagreement between the services over air asset allocation

centered on the centralized control concept of the Air Force and the dedicated air assets

concept used by the Marine Corps. Eventually, Marine air assets were assigned to Far

East Air Forces to allocate as required. In contrast, Naval Task Force 77 operated

independently throughout the war, even to the extent of carving our a separate

geographic area of operations...The lack of a unified and integrated air campaign plan

resulted in incoherent operations...In addition, land and air campaign planning lacked

coordination.

      Vietnam War: In Vietnam the individual services, for the most part, controlled

their air arms...Even within the Air Force there was no single air commander. Seventh

Air Force was responsible for Air Force operations in Vietnam, while Thirteenth Air

Force was responsible for Thailand, and Strategic Air Command never relinquished

command or control or its bombers...The targeting process ether complicated the

patchwork of responsibility...The result was a major misuse of air power. Air power

application came to be simply the servicing of targets, with little regard for whether or

not they were the "right" targets, and without an air campaign plan. JFACC Primer, 4, 5.

 

       7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary

of Military and Associated Terms (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1989),

197.

 

       8 JFACC Primer, 9.

 

       9 Apportionment is the determination and assignment of the total effort by

percentage and/or priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or

geographic operations for a given period of time. JFCs normally apportion by priority or

percentage of effort into geographic areas, against mission-type orders, and/or by

categories significant for the campaign. Alter consulting with other component

commanders, the JFACC makes the apportionment recommendation to the JFC. JFACC

Primer, 16,17.

 

       10 Following the JFC apportionment decision, the JFACC allocates apportioned

air sorties to the funtions, areas, and/or missions they support. Components report the

number of sorties available for tasking by assigned mission and type aircraft (an Air

Allocation/Request or ALLOREQ). The JFACC reviews the component's request and

prepares a Sortie Allotment (SORTIEALOT) message back to components. The

SORTIEALOT confirms and modifies (if necessary) the ALLOREQ and provides

general guidance for planning operations. JFACC Primer, 17.

 

       11 US Air Force, AFM 1-1: Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air

Force (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1992), 129.

 

      12 Conceptually, the appropriate priorities are clear and logical. Because

aerospace forces are the only military forces that can strike virtually any target anywhere,

their first-priority targets should be those whose destruction can have the greatest effect

on the war as a whole -- in short, the enemy's centers of gravity. Second-priority targets

should be those which affect the outcome of an entire campaign within the theater of

operations. The last priority should be those targets affecting only the outcome of

individual battles. (These three priorities parallel those outlined in Army Field Manual

(FM) 100-20: Command and Employment of Air Power, July 1943. This was not an

Army Air Forces publication: it was a War Department Field Service Regulation signed

by George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff.)...Although priorities form an elegant

template for a commander's operational decisions, reality provides several impediments

to mechanistic solutions...in certain situations the outcome of a single battle could

determine the outcome of the entire war. AFM 1-1, 117.

 

       13 General P.X. Kelley, USMC, White Letter 4-86, "1986 Omnibus Agreement

for the Command and Control of Marine TACAIR in Sustained Operations Ashore,"

Headquarters USMC, Washington DC, 18 March 1986.

 

       14 Kelley, White Letter 4-86.

 

       15 General M.P. Sullivan, USMC, letter, "The Joint Force Air Component

Commander and Command and Control of Marine Air-Ground Task Force Tactical

Aviation," Headquarters Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico,

Virginia, 9 March 1989.

       This letter is outdated; however, it highlights the root causes of the debate

between the USMC and the USAF. Although many Marines and Airmen still clash over

these issues, both services support the JFACC concept.

 

       16 Sullivan, letter.

       The letter describes the basic orientation of the two services. For the Air Force,

the air battle takes precedence. The consolidation of air assets, functionally, was its

justification for independence from the US Army in 1947. The Marine Corps considers

organic MAGTF aviation a supporting arm in operations where the ground battle is

paramount. Marine aviation is organized, trained, and equipped to be the aviation

combat element of a MAGTF that is immediately responsive to the needs of the Marine

ground combat element.

       Air Force doctrine tends to be aligned with international doctrine. The Air Force

has maintained a significant commitment to the defense of NATO Europe since 1945,

and its doctrine understandably is linked closely to high-intensity, coalition warfare on a

crowded battlefield. Marine Corps doctrine is oriented to the naval campaign and to

expeditionary operations of varying intensity in which widely dispersed, operational

maneuver forces are more the norm. Nonetheless, its doctrine, organization, and systems

are designed to be flexible and able to interoperate with other forces on the high-

intensity, coalition battlefield.

 

      17 Sullivan, letter. The letter addresses the air component commander exercising

OPCON over all TACAIR assets. At the time the letter was written, 1989, this was an

issue. Actual experience in Desert Storm refutes this concern. The JFACC in Desert

Storm exercised TACON over Marine aviation made available for tasking. Furthermore,

the USAF's JFACC Primer (dated 1994) states, "Normally, the JFACC needs only

TACON or a supported relationship to conduct operations employing augmenting forces

that remain assigned to other components."

 

      18 Sullivan, letter.

 

      19 Earl H. Tilford, SETUP: What the Air Force did in Vietnam and Why

(Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1991), 68.

 

      20 Donald J. Mrozek, Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam (New York:

Pregamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1989), 36.

 

      21 General William W. Momyer, USAF, Airpower in Three Wars (Washington

DC: Government Printing Office, 1978), 31.

 

      22 CINCPAC was the overall theater commander. However, the Commander,

MACV, reported directly to the JCS and to the President At one point, the Commander,

MACV, challenged the authority of CINCPAC to direct the bombing of North Vietnam.

CINCPAC refused to appoint a subordinate theater air manager; authority over air assets

was dispersed and therefore negotiable. Furthermore, CINCPAC's air component

commander (Commander, Pacific Air Forces, CINCPACAF), was not the theater air

commander or CINCPAC's primary air advisor. Thomas A. Hone and Mark Mandeles,

Gulf War Air Power Survey: Command and Control. Volume I (Washington DC:

Government Printing Office, 1991), 354, 355.

 

      23 Hone and Mandeles, 355.

 

      24 James Clay Thompson, Rolling Thunder: Understanding Policy and Program

Failure (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 28.

 

      25 In 1961 PACAF had two subordinate numbered Air Forces, 5th AF in Japan

and 13th AF in the Philippines. In November 1961, 13th AF activated an advanced

echelon (ADVON) headquarters of its 2nd Alr Division (AD) at Ton Son Nhut airfield.

The 2nd AD became 7th AF in March 1966. Momyer, Chapter 3.

 

      26 Momyer, 85.

      The control of aircraft in both Laos and Thailand was a political compromise.

Command relationships with the Ambassador in Laos were complex and difficult. The

Ambassador to Laos, as the senior United States official, was responsible for all US

military activities. Likewise, the Ambassador in Thailand was responsible for all

activities of US forces based in Thailand. A separate position, Deputy Commander, 7th

AF/l3th AF, was developed to act as the primary liaison for the 7th AF Commander in

dealing with the Ambassadors in Laos and Thailand. The Deputy Commander, 7th

AF/l3th AF, had logistical and administrative responsibility for all units located in

Thailand and he reported to the 13th AF Commander on both these matters. However,

the 7th AF Commander in Saigon did not pass operational control of the forces in

Thailand to the deputy.

 

      27 Momyer, 90.

 

      28 Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power in the GulfWar (Washington

DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 19.

 

      29 Williamson Murray, "Air Power since World War ll: Consistent with

Doctrine?" The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War (Maxwell AFB,

Alabama: Air University Press, 1992), 107.

 

      30 Momyer, 95.

 

      31 The struggle in Vietnam was essentially an outgrowth of the US policy of

containment of communism around the world. Wars of national liberation, and support

for them, had become a point of competition between the two communist powers, the

USSR and the Chinese People's Republic. Many constraints on the military emanated

from misperceptions of what either China or the Soviet Union might do. Following the

US experience in Korea, the possibility of Chinese involvement seemed very real. Thus,

the US defined its objectives not in terms of defeat of the North Vietnamese, but in the

more restrained terms of preventing the fall of the South Vietnamese to hostile forces,

out of fear of antagonizing the Chinese and Russians. W. Scott Thompson and

Donaldson D. Frizzell, The Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Crane, Russak & Company,

1977), 11-15.

 

      32 Gradualism resulted in committing forces piecemeal with initial employment at

low intensity and increasing the tempo in a slow and deliberate fashion. Many important

targets were not on the approved target lists. Gradualism allowed the North Vietnamese

time to build up their air defenses once the bombing began. This resulted in much higher

losses. It also granted sanctuaries to the enemy and allowed them time to disperse their

people, supplies, and industries. Thompson and Frizzell, 135.

 

      33 Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press,

1978), 378.

 

      34 Tilford, 93.

 

      35 Thompson and Frizzell, 164.

 

      36 Thompson and Frizzell, 168.

 

      37 Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North

Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989) cited in Tilford, 262.

 

      38 Tilford, 263.

 

      39 Colonel Richard B.H. Lewis, USAF, "JFACC: Problems Associated with

Battlefield Preparation in Desert Storm." Airpower Journal (Spring, 1993), 4.

 

      40 Thomas PL Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary

Report (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1993),3.

 

      41 James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson, "Unity of Control: Joint Air

Operations in the Gulf." Joint Forces Quarterly (Summer, 1993), 91.

 

      42 Keaney and Cohen, 37.

 

      43 Hone and Mandeles, 175.

 

      44 Winnefeld and Johnson, 89.

 

      45 Keaney and Cohen, 152.

 

      46 Lewis, 19.

 

      47 Keaney and Cohen, 155.

 

      48 Lewis, 13.

 

      49 Keaney and Cohen, 156.

 

      50 H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York:

Dell Publishing, 1992), 319.

 

      51 Hallion, 207.

 

      52 Lewis, 6.

     

      53 Lewis, 17-19. VII Corps claimed that only 200 (300 according to the author)

of 2,000 targets were actually targeted by air. Lewis details poor targeting practices as

the main reason only 15 percent of the nominated targets were selected. Furthermore,

the author writes that at least four sorties were fragged against every target submitted by

the DCINC. Lewis uses the Corps' target list from 31 January as an example. The list

contained 6 valid targets out of 42 targets nominated (15 percent). See Lewis' article for

VII Corps' 31 January target list

 

      54 Lewis, 12.

 

      55 Lewis, 13.

      The Iraqi's attempt to "hide" tanks by burying them in the desert made accurate

BDA assessment very difficult The DIA (and CIA) was also very conservative with its

BDA kill criteria derived from pilot mission reports.

 

      56 Lewis, 13.

 

      57 Hallion, 205.

 

      58 Hone and Mandeles, 207. The authors note that because of informal

communications channels, the JFACC's staff received information from Washington

twenty-four to forty-eight hours before CENTAFI/Intelligence.

 

      59 Hone and Mandeles, 283.

     

      60 The tactical air control system has many "built-in" agencies to handle

immediate requests for air support. Some of the controlling agencies available to handle

short-notice requests are: Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC),

USAF Airborne Command Element, Air Support Operations Center, Battlefield

Coordination Element, Direct Air Support Center, Forward Air Controllers, Tactical Air

Control Center and Tactical Air Control Party.

      Close air support was also provided by "push CAS". Flights of aircraft would

arrive at locations within the anticipated target areas continuously, sometimes as

frequently as every seven minutes. Without waiting for a ground commander to request

support, the aircraft sorties were "pushed" to his location. If the commander had no need

for the aircraft, they would orbit for a short time, then proceed to attack a planned back-

up interdiction target, and another flight of aircraft would arrive. Keaney and Cohen, 51.

 

      61 Hone and Mandeles, 230.

 

      62 Hallion, 204.

      The JFACC planning staff was divided into four divisions: Airborne Command

Element (ACE)/Current Operations -- "what's being done today"; Air Tasking Order

(ATO) -- "what will happen tomorrow" ; and, Guidance--Apportionment--Targeting

(GAT) -- "what will happen the day after tomorrow"; and, Component Liaison.

      The air planning cycle was 72 hours or three days. Occasionally the cycle is

referred to as thirty-six or forty-eight hours long. The difference is where the clock starts

and stops. For example, if measured from the first hour rather than the last hour of the

twenty-four ATO period, the cycle is forty-eight hours. Hone and Mandeles, 150.

 

      63 Winnefeld and Johnson, 92.

 

      64 Keaney and Cohen, 150.

 

      65 Winnefeld and Johnson, 93.

 

      66 Hone and Mandeles, 344.

 

      67 JFACC Primer, 34.

 

      68 Keaney and Cohen, 156,157.

 

             69 AFM1-1,12.

 

             70 AFM1-1,128.

 

             71 Keaney and Cohen, 155.

 

             72 Winnefeld and Johnson, 99.

 

             73 Hone and Mandeles, 264.

 

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-END-