Operational Readiness In Army National Guard Contingency
Force Pool Units
SUBJECT AREA - Training
CSC 95
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Operational Readiness in Army National Guard Contingency Force Pool Units
Author: Major Peter M. Aylward, United States Army National Guard
Thesis: Army National Guard Contingency Force Pool units must successfully validate pre-
mobilization training to meet their early deployment schedules by focusing the limited amount
of training time available on mission essential tasks necessary to accomplish their wartime
mission.
Background: Changes to the force outlined in the Bottom-Up Review demand that the Active
Component rely on the Reserve Component to provide the flexibility needed to meet the force
requirements of fighting two Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs). It is important to note the
Reserve Component provides more than 53% of the combat support and 69% of the combat
service support units that the Army needs to sustain itself in combat. Unless Congress brings
back conscription, the Reserve Component, including the Army National Guard and the Army
Reserve, remain the primary means of rapidly enlarging the force. Of even greater importance is
the fact that some units exist exclusively in the Reserve Components. Subsequently, today's
force structure does not allow for any other possibility except to include Army National Guard
Contingency Force Pool units among Active Component early deployers.
This paper focuses on how the Army National Guard is meeting the challenges of today's
force structure while contributing to the prosecution of our National Security Strategy. First, it
gives a historical perspective of how our nation has used Guard units in the past to meet our
nation's crises. Next, it outlines how the Army Guard's early deploying Contingency Force Pool
units are part of today's power projection strategy. Third, it gives a brief overview of the
Guard's roles and missions and describes the training requirements necessary to meet pre-
mobilization and post-mobilization standards. Fourth, it delineates some of the constraints early
deploying units face when conducting training. Fifth, it highlights how these units can
maximize the limited training time available to them. Finally, this paper cites several ways the
Active Component training associations can help their Army Guard counterparts prepare and
train for their wartime missions.
Recommendation: A successful strategy for improving the Operational Readiness in Army
National Guard CFP units requires the full cooperation and coordination of both the CFP units'
chain of command and Active Component counterparts. Successful execution of both pre-
mobilization and post-mobilization plans depends on that unity of effort. Army and Guard
leaders can facilitate improvements in the Operational Readiness of Contingency Force Pool
units in several ways. First, State Area Commands (STARCs) can provide both assistance and
relief that will enable CFP units to focus on conducting METL related training. Second,
Readiness Groups (RGs), Reserve Training Detachments (RTDs) and Readiness Training Teams
(RTTs) can provide much needed expertise to develop comprehensive training strategies and
workshops that provide insight to tackling deployment and pre-mobilization training problems.
Third, commanders, who are ultimately responsible for the readiness posture of their unit, must
focus their soldiers to meet the high pre-mobilization training challenges. Fourth, non-
commissioned officers must know the published Army standard based on current doctrine and
insure that their soldiers are training to that standard.
Optimizing training time during pre-mobilization is essential to successful mobilization and
deployment. The Guard is working to provide soldiers, leaders and units that are technically and
tactically proficient in the execution of their specific mission. Yet, problems still remain.
Overcoming the inherent training constraints of personnel, time, equipment and terrain while at
the same time working on noted unit deficiencies is a monumental task. Guard leaders must
optimize the limited training opportunities by focusing on METL related tasks that support
their wartime mission. In the end, not only will America's Army benefit from this mutual
cooperation, but our nation will be able to execute its national strategy while reaping the peace
dividend the end of the Cold War offers.
OPERATIONAL READINESS IN ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
CONTINGENCY FORCE POOL UNITS
by
Peter M. Aylward
Major, USARNG
CG#4
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for
the Degree of
Master of Military Studies
April 1995
The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author
and do not necessarily represent the view of either the Marine Corps Command and Staff
College or any other Government Agency. References to this study should include the
foregoing statement.
Contents
Section Page
Preface 1
Historical Perspective 4
Colonial Beginnings 4
Turn of the Century to WWII 6
Korea to Vietnam 7
The Evolving Total Force Policy 8
Partners in the Total Force 10
Old CAPSTONE 10
New CAPSTONE 12
Force Structure Changes 14
Roles and Missions of the Army National Guard 17
Federal Role 18
State Role 19
Training Requirements 19
Training Readiness 19
Pre-Mobilization Training 20
Post-Mobilization Training 20
Training Constraints - Limitations 22
Personnel 22
Equipment 23
Time 24
Terrain 25
Operational Readiness Initiatives 26
Bold Shift 27
Project Standard Bearer 28
Title XI - The Army National Guard Readiness Reform Act 28
FY95 national Defense Authorization Act 29
Operational Readiness Evaluation 30
Training Opportunities-Capabilities 33
Promoting Prosperity at Home 34
Promoting Democracy Abroad 35
Peace Operations 36
Recommendations for Improving Operational Readiness 39
State Support 40
Readiness Groups, Resident Training Detachments
and Reserve Training Teams 41
Unit Commanders 42
Non-Commissioned Officers 42
Conclusion 43
Appendixes
Appendix A: Acronyms 46
Appendix B: Glossary of Terms 47
Appendix C: Chronology of Significant Events 50
Appendix D: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Combat Support
and Combat Service Support Contributions to the Army 51
Appendix E: Army National Guard Soldiers'
Participation in American Wars 52
Appendix F: Mobilization Categories and Situations 53
Notes 54
Bibliography 59
Preface
Since the early 1970's, many authors have written concerning the inability of Army
National Guard units to mobilize and conduct their wartime mission. Many argue the
reason for the inability of the Guard to deploy in a timely manner stems from the
limitations imposed by time and other training restrictions. Others simply argue the poor
leadership of the Guard is to blame. Still others cite a lack of political will necessary to
exercise call-up authority, or lack of courage to assume the risks of mobilizing Army
National Guard units, as reasons for precluding these units from the list of early
deployers. In the end, the majority of these articles conclude that too many problems
exist to consider Army National Guard units ready for early deployment.
Is there a choice? Changes to the force outlined in the Bottom-Up Review demand
that the Active Component rely on the Reserve Component to provide the flexibility
needed to meet the force requirements of fighting two Major Regional Contingencies
(MRCs). It is important to note the Reserve Component provides more than 53% of the
combat support and 69% of the combat service support units that the Army needs to
sustain itself in combat. Unless Congress brings back conscription, the Reserve
Component, including the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, remain the
primary means of rapidly enlarging the force. Of even greater importance is the fact that
some units exist exclusively in the Reserve Components. (Appendix D lists the Combat
Support and Combat Service Support contributions that the Army National Guard and
Army Reserve make to the Total Army). Subsequently, today's force structure does not
allow for any other possibility except to include Army National Guard Contingency
Force Pool units among Active Component early deployers. Therefore, Army National
Guard Contingency Force Pool units must successfully validate pre-mobilization training
to meet their early deployment schedules by focusing the limited amount of training time
available on mission essential tasks necessary to accomplish their wartime mission.
This paper does not examine the controversial issues surrounding the roundout/
roundup units. The Rand Corporation, Brookings Institute, Department of the Army
Inspector General, Government Accounting Office and others have all conducted
extensive reviews and detailed analysis identifying shortfalls involved when integrating
these units into the Active Force.1 On one side of the argument are critics who feel that
National Guard combat units' lack of proficiency poses an unacceptable risk for these
units to be considered capable of early deployment. On the other side are critics who
contend that DOD has inflated enemy capabilities, has used inadequate performance
measures to assess reserve capability and has downplayed roundout unit capability. In
between are critics who feel roundout units are a necessary and acceptable risk.
Nor does this paper examine the controversial issues surrounding the inherent trade-
offs associated with deploying National Guard units in terms of cost or a Presidential
decision to selectively call-up the Reserve Components. Congress decides the
controversial tradeoff issues surrounding capability, time, responsiveness and dollars
when funding the force structure. Likewise, while the National Command Authority has
access to the Reserve Components for period of 270 days under a Selective Call-up to
execute our National Security Strategy, what happens after that is subject to
Congressional debate. (Appendix F provides a list of the different mobilization
categories as well as several mobilization situations when the National Command
Authority would call the Reserves). Recent history has demonstrated this debate can and
does influence the way forces flow into theater (as was the case with Desert Shield).
Needless to say, while this debate occurs, forces must react and prepare to execute
assigned missions. When forces arrive on scene, they must have the combat power and
capability to provide the National Command Authority a strategic option while Congress
continues the debate over use of military force.
Instead, this paper focuses on how the Army National Guard is meeting the challenges
of today's force structure while contributing to the prosecution of our National Security
Strategy. First, it gives a historical perspective of how our nation has used Guard units in
the past to meet our nation's crises. Next, it outlines how the Army Guard's early
deploying Contingency Force Pool units are part of today's power projection strategy.
Third, it gives a brief overview of the Guard's roles and missions and describes the
training requirements necessary to meet pre-mobilization and post-mobilization
standards. Fourth, it delineates some of the constraints early deploying units face when
conducting training. Fifth, it highlights how these units can maximize the limited
training time available to them. Finally, this paper cites several ways the Active
Component training associations can help their Army Guard counterparts prepare and
train for their wartime missions. In the end, not only will America's Army benefit from
this mutual cooperation, but our nation will be able to execute its national strategy while
reaping the peace dividend the end of the Cold War offers.
This paper is exclusively concerned with the Army National Guard. Whenever the
term Guard appears, it is in reference to the Army National Guard and not the Air
National Guard. Understanding the organization, roles and missions of the Army
National Guard is not an easy task. Also confusing are the differences between the
Active and Reserve Components. Appendix B provides selected definitions that will
enable the reader to follow this text with minimum hindrance. Furthermore, Appendix A
lists all the acronyms found in the manuscript for easy referral. Finally, the bibliography
identifies the sources that provided the most useful information when writing this paper.
Historical Perspective
For more than 350 years, the Army National Guard has been a part of a unique
American military tradition. Since its birth, the United States has relied on the citizen-
soldiers of the Army National Guard, previously titled the Militia, to answer its call in
times of domestic and international crisis. Changes in recent years, with the end of the
Post-Cold war world and diminished global but increased regional threats in the face of
declining budgets, offer a new challenge to our military forces. Part of that challenge is
the increased responsibility that force structure changes place on the Army National
Guard.
The force structure debate has long been a politically sensitive issue. On one hand,
Reserve component forces are less expensive. On the other hand, reserve component
forces tend to be less ready than active component forces and, consequently, require
more time to respond to national emergencies. Defining the relative costs and
capabilities have made it difficult for national decision makers to come to grips with an
appropriate active-reserve force structure mix.
Colonial Beginnings
Formed in 1636, the first militia regiments protected the early settlers from hostile
Indians. As time passed, militia men fought the Pequot War in New England (1637), and
still later the French and Indian War (1754-1763). By 1774, the political situation
between Great Britain and Colonial American had deteriorated to the point where local
volunteers began to arm themselves against the standing British army. Expected to turn
out in a moment's notice, these volunteers were called "minutemen." Days before the
Battle of Bunker Hill, Continental Congress took control of the war effort as the
volunteer force structure gave way to the newly formed Continental Army. After the
Revolutionary war, Congress adopted the Constitution of the United States. Provisions
of the Constitution explicitly granted Congress the power to raise and maintain forces in
peacetime, and in time of war. The same document also gave Congress the power to
employ these forces for internal and external security. A debate ensued concerning the
size and type of force this nation would employ. Weary of the large standing armies in
Europe that were expensive to maintain, Congress opted for a more equitable solution, a
solution that would not require the increase levying of taxes to pay for such an Army.
In 1792, Congress passed the Militia Act that established the force structure Congress
felt necessary to meet the requirements of the infant democracy. This act allowed the
states to maintain standing militias composed mainly of volunteers. Unfortunately, the
Militia Act left the affairs of raising and equipping the militia up to the individual states.
In many states, volunteer militia men paid for their own uniforms and equipment and
served without pay. Other states simply ignored the act, because it had no provisions for
non-compliance with the law.
In 1898, the Spanish-American war raised the question over the President's right to
"federalize" the militia. Largely dependent on the militia-volunteers, the Spanish
American war uncovered serious flaws in the military's ability to mobilize and deploy.
Success as a world power required the United States to consider serious reforms of its
military. Charged to modernize the Army, Elihu Root, Secretary of War under President
McKinley, knew that money to affect such a change would have to come from Congress.
Once again, Congress would decide the fate of our nation's Armed forces.
Turn of the Century to World War II
Since the turn of the century, Congress has decided the debate between costs versus
capability. In 1903, the Dick Act formerly established the National Guard as the nation's
primary reserve component force. The Dick Act established formal procedures for the
federal government to take a more active role in organizing, training and equipping the
National Guard in line with the standards of the Regular Army. In 1916, in response to
the war in Europe and the revolution and political unrest in Mexico, again a debate
ensued concerning the difficulty in mobilizing the state militias. Subsequently, Congress
passed The National Defense Act which guaranteed the state militia's status as the Army's
primary reserve force and mandated the title: National Guard.
Throughout this century the National Guard has responded to our nation's wars,
declared or undeclared and other national emergencies. During World War I, the
National Guard provided eighteen combat divisions, about 40% of the entire American
Expeditionary Force.2 Many of these Divisions, notably the 26th and 42nd Divisions
were among the best trained divisions in the Army and served as first-line troops.
According to captured records, Germans listed eight American Divisions as excellent or
superior. Six of the eight were National Guard units. Again in World War II, the
National Guard provided a significant contribution to the Allied victory.3 Divided
between the Pacific and European theaters, nineteen National Guard Divisions engaged
in combat and earned more than 148 Presidential Unit Citations. Guardsmen fought in
every battle from Bataan to Berlin, and fourteen National Guardsmen received the Medal
of Honor.
Korea to Vietnam
Between World War II and the Korean War, the National Guard acted as an
expansion force for a total and prolonged mobilization. in June 1950, the outbreak of
hostilities on the Korean peninsula found the United States once again unprepared for
war. The president did not mobilize the first Army National Guard units until August of
that year. This partial mobilization of the reserves put eight National Guard divisions on
active duty.4 Two National Guard divisions deployed to Korea, two went to Germany
and the rest provided a rotation and replacement base back in the States. When it was
over, National Guard units returned home having maintained a reputation for patriotism,
courage and competence equal to the reputation earned during World War II.
Following the Korean experience, a rapid-response role for the reserve began to take
shape.5 The high political costs and dramatic consequences associated with mobilizing
citizen-soldiers made them exceptionally effective as an instrument for signifying United
States' resolve. President Kennedy played this political card in the early '60s, calling up
more than 45,000 National Guard soldiers to active duty for the Berlin Crisis and another
14,000 during the intense, albeit brief, Cuban missile crisis. Using reserves as
instruments of diplomacy has its downside. Reservists mobilized during this period
became disgruntled and complained to the press about their ill-defined military mission.
Conversely, failure to use the reserves also has its negative side. Seeking to limit the
expanding war in Vietnam, President Johnson astounded the defense establishment by
refusing to call up the reserve components. Failure to call up the reserves had
disastrous consequences. First, failure to mobilize the National Guard dissipated the
Army's leadership and experience levels as the war progressed. Failure to mobilize also
forced the Army to take "out of hide" the forces it could not get from the National Guard.
The Army debased the forces stationed in other theaters to fill the ranks in Southeast
Asia. Second, once it became apparent that the president was not going to call up the
Guard, it became a haven for those seeking to avoid military service. Dedicated
Guardsmen agonized over the disintegration of their units that took years for the impact
to diminish. More importantly, Johnson's policy"...without involving the larger
community, meant that the general populace had no stake in it, and therefore no
motivation to ensure that the sacrifices of those that did serve were in some way
validated by the eventual outcome."6
The Evolving Total Force Policy
General Creighton Abrams, when he served as Chief of Staff of the Army, tried to
avoid repeating the same mistake. He adopted a force structure that would never again
allow the United States to go to war without the reserves. A highly decorated hero of
three wars, Abrams saw first hand how"... unprepared America was for each of them."7
Both the Military Service Act of 1971 and the Defense Authorization Act of 1973
publicly reaffirmed the nation's reliance on the reserve component. These congressional
actions sought to integrate the Reserve Component with the Active Component and
became the foundation for the Total Force Policy.
In 1976, Congress passed Section 673b of Title 10 U.S.C., which gave the president
access to the Reserve Component without having to declare a national emergency or even
partial mobilization. Section 673b authority also allowed the president to meet
deployment requirements for major contingencies without stockpiling military capability
in the active force. More importantly, Section 673b authority allows the president to
augment the active forces for a limited time without a debate with Congress. (See
Appendix F). Finally, access to the reserve's capabilities allowed planners to rely more
on the Reserve Component for inclusion in operational missions. This reliance is such
that some military capabilities exist solely in the reserve forces and thus are unavailable
without at least a selected call-up (unless individual soldiers willingly volunteer for
active duty).
In 1983, the Total Force structure became a reality, when approximately 50% of the
Army's combat support and 70% of the combat service support units were in the Army
National Guard and Army Reserve. Seven years later in August 1990, when Iraq invaded
Kuwait, the President promptly mobilized selected National Guard combat support and
combat service support units. The Department of Defense eventually federalized 398
Army National Guard units and 62,411 soldiers for Operation Desert Storm.8 In his
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, summarized the contributions of these soldiers:
The success of the Guard and Reserve participation in Desert Shield cannot be
overemphasized. Their participation has been a significant factor in affording us
flexibility and balance and reinforces the policies and decisions made over the last ten
years to strengthen the Total Force concept.9
Recently, the sources and nature of the global threat, the emerging realities of fiscal
constraints and the lessons learned from Desert Storm have forced Congress to open this
debate again. Inevitably Congress and the Department of Defense must make
adjustments to cope with the realities of new policy, and the global strategy and missions
required to achieve it. The current down sizing of our military establishment, coupled
with the simultaneous increase in world deployments, demands even more of the reserve
components. Today, the reliance on the National Guard, in particular the Contingency
Force Pool (CFP) units, is part of our national strategy. Designated as early deploying
units, CFP units provide the theater Commander in Chief an accessible, available and
capable rapid augmentation and reinforcement force. In times of a national crisis,
National Guard Contingency Force Pool units must be capable of meeting pre-
deployment standards and, ultimately, capable of performing their wartime mission.
Partners In the Total Force
Following the experience of fighting an unpopular war in Vietnam, the Army
leadership sought to embrace the will of the American public by mobilizing the National
Guard. First articulated in 1970, the "Total Force" policy sought to integrate Active and
Reserve component units. In 1974, under the titles CAPSTONE and Directed Training
Association (DTA) (See Appendix B), the Army aligned Active component units with
Reserve component units into wartime organizations. Designed to support the Cold War
era strategy, these programs focused on supporting requirements of a Unified or
Specified Commander in Chief in specific Outside Continental United States. (OCONUS)
areas.
Old CAPSTONE
Also created to permit rapid integration of Reserve Component units into a cohesive
fighting organization, Reserve Component units would conduct wartime planning during
peacetime with the assistance of an Active Component counterpart. Under the titles
Cortrain, Roundout/Roundup and Affiliation, these formal relationships sought to
improve the training proficiency of Reserve Component units. CAPSTONE planning
associations tied the Reserve Component unit to a specific war plan.
Reserve Component units received initial mission planning guidance from their
CAPSTONE wartime command. Unit planning and training focused on this wartime
mission guidance. CAPSTONE guidance had to be specific enough for the unit to
formulate its Mission Essential Task List (METL). Pre-mobilization and post-
mobilization training would generally focus on wartime missions that had specific
Reserve Component/Active Component alignments based on a CINC's OPLAN.
Roundout/Roundup units were centerpieces of this strategy. Only selected Active
Component divisions participated in this program. Under this concept, an Active
Component division would consist of two Active Component brigades augmented by a
third Reserve Component "Roundout" brigade that would bring the division up to full
strength.10 Using this approach, the Army planned to fight on future battlefields with the
Reserve Component at its side and the support of the American people behind its cause.11
This had one major and significant implication: America would never again go to war
without mobilizing the Reserves.
The first real test of the "Total Force" strategy was Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm. While successful in deploying more than sixty Colonel/Lieutenant Colonel Army
National Guard commands to South West Asia, the Army failed to deploy combat
Roundout/Roundup maneuver brigades and battalions.12 Although the Army military
leadership may be partly to blame for undercutting a well conceived and meticulously
planned strategy, they do not shoulder all the blame.13 Part of the blame goes to the
Department of Defense and the incremental way in which it mobilized National Guard
units for federal service. Because Operation Desert Storm was a selected call-up, Army
planners worked under restrictions imposed by law (See Appendix F). Back then, a
fundamental flaw in the law, under Title 10, United States Code 673b, limited the
President's Selected Reserve call-up to 200,000 reservists for 90 days, with the possible
extension of another 90 days. Consequently,"...the Army lacked specific plans for
correcting personnel and equipment shortages under a limited call-up...."14
However, except for roundout units,15 the Army's overall implementation of the Total
Force policy resulted in a high degree of success. This successful integration of reserve
units was the result of years of considerable efforts to meet high standards of readiness
and deployability. Working relationships, particularly between reserve component units
and VII Corps, endured the change of mission from Europe to Southwest Asia and
contributed to the smooth transition into the new theater.16
New CAPSTONE
To project power worldwide on short notice, today's force must be adaptable and
accessible. In attempting to achieve this agility, the new force structure strategy
redefines CAPSTONE. CAPSTONE no longer reflects a wartime relationship.17 The
new CAPSTONE strategy orients the pooling/force generation concept to support
deploying corps and major contingency requirements based on the requirements of a
unified or Specified Commander in Chief (CINC). Designed to support the CONUS-
based contingency strategy, the new CAPSTONE shifts the focus from specific OPLAN
traces to contingency operations under a CONUS based corps. Oriented on fighting
and winning two simultaneous major regional contingencies, CAPSTONE now aligns
force packages based on geographical and functional factors. Rapid force generation and
force power projection worldwide provides the CINC with strategic agility.
Essentially, both Active and Reserve Component combat support and combat service
support units form a pool designed to support the Crisis Response Force. Called the
Contingency Force Pool, these units are no longer tied to any single war plan or theater
of operation. Rather, Army planners have developed force packages designed to meet
worldwide requirements based on the warfighting CINC's requirements. A unit's
capabilities determine its selection to fill a requirement in a force package. The National
Guard Bureau closely monitors the readiness posture of all its early deploying units. If
the unit is not ready when required, the Bureau may substitute another unit in its place.
Additionally, the Army has discontinued the Roundout/Roundup concept. In its place,
a new concept, the Enhanced Readiness Brigade, seeks to generate sufficient combat
power to meet worldwide needs based on current unit readiness. No longer do these
units fill a structurally aligned divisional organization with two Active Component
brigades and one Reserve Component brigade. Rather, the new Enhanced Readiness
Brigade concept calls for separate brigades with a self-sustaining force structure
apparatus that enables the warfighting CINC to increase his combat capability. As part
of an Early Reinforcing Force (ERF), these enhanced brigades"...will be able to deploy
worldwide to reinforce active Army combat units with less than 90 days of post-
mobilization training."18
National Guard Contingency Force Pool and Enhanced Readiness Brigades are funded
and staffed at a level that improves their early deploying capability. These units maintain
a higher degree of readiness to meet pre-deployment standards than was previously
authorized prior to Desert Storm.19 By meeting pre-deployment standards, the units
theoretically should be able to complete post-mobilization training within deployment
schedule timelines. The goal is to deploy according to the Time Phased Force
Deployment Data (TPFDD) schedule. (See Appendix B).
More importantly, the new CAPSTONE provides a unit alignment (Active
Component to Reserve Component) that coincides with the pooling of forces concept. It
designates Active Component forces as Directed Training Associations to the
Contingency Force Pool unit or units. Active Component units may have to sponsor
more than one Contingency Force Pool unit because of the limited combat support and
combat service support units currently in the Active Component. Because this concept
does not tie Contingency Force Pool units to any one war plan, the integration of these
units creates significant problems.
Force Structure Changes
First, force structure changes disrupt habitual relationships established between DTA
sponsors and CFP units. Several times a year, Management of Change reviews update
the Contingency Force Pool. Unit changes to the Contingency Force Pool result from
unit inactivation or sustained poor readiness ratings.20 Force structure actions or
Department of the Army (DA) guidance, drive these changes with inputs from NGB,
USARC, Corps and CONUSA headquarters and approval by Forces Command
(FORSCOM). Changes to the CFP list insure the most combat capable forces are
available from the National Guard and Army Reserve.
Simultaneously, these reviews may also result in changes in Directed Training
Associations. These changes may have negative impacts in the way Contingency Force
Pool units prepare and train for their wartime missions. National Guard Contingency
Force Pool units rely on their Directed Training Associations for wartime guidance. This
guidance helps develop training plans that support wartime missions. Directed Training
Associations assist National Guard units in the development of the unit's Mission
Essential Task List (METL) and associated Battle Tasks.
Guidance received by the Contingency Force Pool unit drives unit training. Mission
guidance must be sufficient for the National Guard unit to formulate its METL. The
Mission Essential Task List is a compilation of mission essential tasks that an
organization must be able to successfully perform to accomplish its wartime mission.21
Similar to the old CAPSTONE concept, National Guard units must have their METL
approved by its Directed Training Association.
Unfortunately, the fluid environment of the current force structure draw down,
coupled with force structure changes, "throws the guidance into the wind."22 The
Bottom-Up Review outlined a force structure strategy that would enable the United
States to fight and win two simultaneous, major regional conflicts. Until the force sizing
and re-stationing that achieve this strategy are complete, changes to the force structure
will continue to occur. Consequently, many units are receiving very little or no guidance
from their wartime alignments.23
Second, non-habitual relationships with Directed Training Associations adversely
affect the Contingency Force Pool unit's ability to conduct peacetime training necessary
to accomplish their wartime missions. There is a direct link between the METL
development process and the deployability of a unit. METL task development and the
subsequent selection of Battle Tasks24 allow commanders to focus limited resources on
essential warfighting tasks. Commanders at the separate company level and above
publish their yearly training guidance to the next subordinate level of command.
Commanders issue their yearly training guidance directed at attaining a desirable level of
proficiency based on their METL.
Accordingly, commanders plan and schedule their Yearly Training Plans focused on
Battle Tasks derived from their METL. Undoubtedly, units suffer without a clear
statement of the wartime guidance. Subsequent commander's guidance may miss the
mark. Training priorities may lead the unit to focus on non-critical battle tasks. Lack of
a focused effort, designed to accomplish the commander's intent, squanders valuable
resources and time.
Third, this lack of focus during pre-mobilization training may disrupt the post-
mobilization training. Ultimately, post-mobilization training suffers without clearly
focused wartime guidance. In turn, Post-Mobilization Training Support Requirements
(PTSR) may not accurately reflect the degree and length of training required to achieve
deployment standards. Hence, units may require additional training which has the
potential for upsetting the time schedule for follow on forces who would compete for the
same training areas and support resources at the mobilization station.
Finally, these structure changes create a void for the reserve commander who relies
heavily on the Active Component DTA for external directives to develop the METL.
For a select number of Contingency Force Pool units there are a shortage of doctrinally
correct, up to date Mission Training Plans.25 Mission Training Plans are descriptive
training documents that describe the "what" and "how to" train to achieve wartime
mission proficiency. They provide comprehensive training outlines that list the tasks,
conditions and standards required for successful mission execution. Commanders must
know the published standard for the supporting collective tasks derived from their unit's
METL to assess unit proficiency. The commander develops his training program to
sustain unit strengths and correct unit deficiencies based on this assessment.
In the absence of current doctrinally correct standards from the Mission Training
Plan, and a lack of specific Direct Training Association guidance, development of
tactical standing operating procedures becomes a tricky proposition. Like a football team
without a play book, during the game there may be some good blocking and tackling, but
without a synchronized team effort chances for victory are marginal. National Guard
leaders must not only have the correct play book (MTPs); they must also know the plays
(standards) based on the overarching game strategy (wartime guidance). Anything less
invites disaster.
Increased reliance, force structure changes, force modernization efforts and a myriad
of new training programs and requirements demand a high state of individual and unit
readiness. The Bottom-Up Review provided the impetus for further clarifying service
roles, missions and functions. As the transition continues from a base-force designed to
win the Cold War fight, to a power projection force, the role of Army National Guard
Contingency Force Pool units is even greater. Faced with these unprecedented
challenges, National Guard leaders and soldiers strive to achieve excellence and
accomplish the mission under severe constraints. Knowing their missions and
understanding these limitations will help planners develop an enhanced, unsentimental
appreciation of Army Guard capabilities when integrating National Guard units into the
OPLAN.
Roles and Missions of the Army National Guard
The National Defense Authorization Act of 1994 established the Commission on
Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces to review the current allocation of roles,
missions, and functions among the services. Within the next year this commission will
report its independent findings to Congress, Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The National Defense Act charged the commission with defining
broad mission areas and key support requirements in an attempt to reduce duplicating
overhead while achieving dynamic effectiveness.26
With the end of conscription in July 1973, the reserves provide the National
Command Authority the principal means for rapidly expanding the military in times of
national emergency. The basic rationale for maintaining a strong reserve force rests on
economic grounds.27 Within a given budget level, Reserve forces provide the maximum
military capability at a minimum cost. Barring any unforeseen changes by the
Commission on Roles and Missions, the Guard's role as a strategic force supporting
United States foreign policy will remain unchanged.
Since 1789, the Army National Guard has provided that capability at an affordable
cost. Formally established by the United States Constitution and further amplified by the
United States code, the Army National Guard serves as both a Federal Reserve force and
State militia. The federal government determines the number of authorized personnel
and the force structure mix across the country. The states reserve the authority to locate
units and their headquarters. Under this dual role, the Army National Guard is accessible
to both the National Command Authority and to state governors.
Federal Role
The Federal Role of the Army National Guard is to support U.S. national security
objectives. When ordered to Federal duty, the Army National Guard becomes a
component of the active Army. Organized into 54 separate state and territorial
commands, the Army National Guard's end strength (1994) is roughly 410,000 soldiers.
Currently, the Army National Guard provides 53% of the combat, 34% of the combat
support and 34% of the combat service support for the total Army.28
State Role
The State Role of the Army National Guard is to protect life and property, and to
preserve peace, order and public safety. Its community role is to participate in local,
state and national programs that add value to America. Army National Guard soldiers
provide trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies as well as community
relief efforts. Each year, Army National Guard soldiers provide assistance to
communities besieged by civil disturbances, snow emergencies, floods, hurricanes and
forest fires. Called to state active duty29 by the governors of 47 states, approximately
34,000 soldiers participated in 326 military support missions in Fiscal Year 1993.
Additionally, Army Guard soldiers participated in 4,182 drug interdiction operations in
all 54 Guard jurisdictions during that same-year.
Training Requirements
Army Regulation 350-41 outlines training requirements and identifies a training
strategy that provides a framework for meeting those requirements. "The goal of Army
training is to produced a force trained to mobilize, deploy, fight, and win anywhere in the
world. The objective of Army training is unit readiness."30 Yet, the Army has
continually had difficulty in clearly delineating what "unit readiness"is and how to
measure it.31
Training Readiness
Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication One, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
refers to readiness as military capability. Milltary cability is the ability to achieve a
specific war time objective. (It includes four components: force structure,
modernization, readiness and sustainability.) The same document refers to operational
readiness as the capability of a unit to perform the missions for which it was organized
or designed. Force structure decisions and funding constraints, beyond the control of the
unit, drive personnel and equipment authorizations. A unit is ready if it has the necessary
personnel and equipment authorized by its Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE),
can conduct its organizational mission and can sustain itself in the field. Effective
training is what shapes soldiers and leaders into cohesive units that can perform their
wartime mission and sustain themselves in combat.
Pre-Mobilization Training
All National Guard units conduct pre-mobilization training. The goal is to be trained
on all pre-mobilization tasks prior to mobilization. The objective of that training"...is
to establish a level of proficiency that provides the foundation for the execution of the
post-mobilization plan culminating in validation for deployment."32 Pre-mobilization
training concentrates on training critical collective and individual tasks derived from the
Mission Essential Task List to the established standard. Guidance provided by the next
higher wartime commander focuses this training effort.33 Pre-mobilization task
proficiency provides the foundation for the next level of unit training during post-
mobilization.
Post-Mobilization Training
National Guard units use post-mobilization training to complete training on critical
Mission Essential Tasks not trained to proficiency during pre-mobilization training.
When the unit arrives at the mobilization station, the mobilization station commander
conducts an assessment to determine the level of proficiency the unit has achieved in
mission essential tasks. The unit commander works with the mobilization station
commander and identifies unit weaknesses that require post-mobilization training. Units
use post-mobilization training time to correct noted deficiencies and conduct post-
mobilization training identified in the FORSCOM Mobilization and Planning System
(FORMDEPS). Throughout this process the active component mobilization station
commanders, augmented by active component Readiness Group training teams, assist the
unit in preparation for deployment.
Units often need additional resources to conduct post-mobilization training required
for their wartime mission. The mobilization station commander provides these
resources. Each year, units must identify Post-Mobilization Training Support
Requirements (PTSR) in accordance with FORMDEPS. Resources such as training
ammunition, ranges, training areas and billeting are some of the many items units need to
complete post-mobilization training. The unit commander's assessment of the unit's
ability to conduct its wartime mission will determine these resource requirements.
Without wartime guidance from the Active Component war trace, the unit commander's
PTSR may not accurately reflect post-mobilization training requirements.
Designing a training strategy that focuses on wartime METL related tasks and
enhances unit capabilities is a challenge. The commanders training strategy results from
his interpetation of the war trace guidance, coupled with his assessment of unit
capabilities. Training strategies determine who, what, where and when to train.
Planning training strategies ensures that training focuses on critical METL related tasks;
that training frequency for a given tasks is sufficient; and that adequate resources support
the training requirements. For the Army Guard CFP unit commander, this challenge is
even greater because of the significant training constraints he must consider when
developing his training strategy.
Training Constraints-Limitations
In developing training strategies that enhance unit capabilities, CFP unit commanders
must consider training constraints that their units must overcome. Four of the key
considerations include personnel, equipment, time and terrain. If managed properly, they
can become combat multipliers that enhance a unit's warfighting capability and ability to
deploy early. On the other hand, if neglected, they can undermine all the effort put into
developing a comprehensive training strategy and impede early deployment.
Personnel
The first factor that impedes Guard deployability is individual readiness. A recent
(1994) Rand Study defined individual readiness as"...available and qualified to
perform assigned missions and functions." As a member of a unit, soldiers become
available by law once they are ordered to federal duty. During Desert Shield, 100% of
the soldiers called-up reported for Active Duty.34 For National Guard units then;
personnel problems result mainly from the soldiers that are not qualified in their duty
Military Occupation Skill (MOS). The National Guard receives unqualified soldiers into
Guard units in several ways. Inter-service transfers, unit reflagging as a result of the
Bottom-Up Review, lateral transfers and even career progression contribute to the
problem of soldiers not being duty MOS qualified. Non-duty MOS qualified soldiers35,
affect unit readiness to the extent that they detract from unit collective training. Units
must overcome individual readiness or duty-MOS proficiency shortfalls before the unit
can execute aggressive collective training.
Equipment
Next, three significant problems arise concerning equipment for the National Guard:
Equipment maintenance, equipment mismatches (Active Component to Reserve
Component) and equipment availability. Funding constraints36 and the procurement
process both hinder the resolution of the first two problems.37 Equipment modernization
efforts in the National Guard to achieve interoperability with the Active Component will
probably take years to remedy and never fully be resolved. Therefore, deployment
sequence as identified in the TPFDD must dermine the priority of effort for these units.
This will ensure that the Army equips early deployers with the best and most modern
equipment available. Moreover, it will allow decision makers to upgrade follow-on
forces as time permits, as was the case in Desert Storm. The third problem, however,
needs some thoughtful consideration, because it impedes a unit's ability to complete post-
mobilization training to standard which could influence a CINC's plans for that unit when
it arrives in theater.
Contrary to the doctrinal maxiinum38 of training to standard and not to time, Desert
Storm mobilization experiences showed just the opposite. In fact, a March 1992 General
Accounting Office report found that the Army tailored training to time rather than
specific proficiency levels. The problem stemmed from meeting equipment deployment
dates. The Army established equipment "deployment dates to coincide with airlift and
sealift capability, with the result that a unit's equipment often had to be sent to the Gulf
before the unit had completed its training at the mobilization site."39 These early
shipment dates also influenced the quality of training units received. Units interrupted
collective training at the company level and above to satisfy shipping equipment before
the unit achieved training standards. Whenever a unit was unable to complete its training
deployment, the unit commander received guidance on the skills the unit needed to
improve and instructions to continue training once the unit arrived in the Gulf.
Time
Another principal factor hampering the assignment of selected National Guard units
to early deployment missions is the lack of training time. The typical Army National
Guard unit has 39 days a year available to conduct training. Units divide this training
time into two categories: Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and Annual Training (AT).
Inactive Duty Training normally occurs on a weekend, with units training one weekend a
month for a total of 24 days. The focus for IDT training encompasses individual and
collective skills, with most of the time devoted to the former. The AT period usually
occurs in the summer and consists of one 15-day period where the focus of training is on
collective skills. By regulation, the 39 days a year that National Guard soldiers train is
the minimum time required.
During these 39 days, the Army leadership expects National Guard units to
accomplish all the individual and collective tasks required by their wartime mission.
Often these tasks are too many and too complex to master in the time available.
Consequently, National Guard leaders devote a significant amount of additional time to
accomplish their mission. Therefore, the extremely limited amount of actual training
time within the constraints of a 39 day training year net severe readiness implications.
Mandatory and recurring training that detracts from progressive building of acquired
knowledge further exacerbate these limitations. Individual soldier proficiency training
competes with other unit operational and training requirements. Tasking from higher
headquarters to participate in community related operations such as parades, crowds out
training at the organizational level. In addition, units lose valuable training time
traveling to and from training areas that units require to conduct maneuver training.
Because of all these time-to-train constraints, National Guard units generally focus
training at lower levels, such as company and platoon.40
Terrain
Finally, two problems Army National Guard units face every time they train are unit
dispersion and lack of sufficiently diverse maneuver space to accommodate realistic
tactical training. In the first instance a study by the Brookings Institute on the Army
National Guard and Army Reserve found:
On average, a reserve unit (battalion or separate company) is located more than 100
miles from its headquarters, about 130 miles from its major equipment site, more
than 150 miles from its major training area, over 65 miles from a rifle range, and
close to 10 miles from a motor pool.41
What that equates to is that a unit would need to spend two plus hours on the road just to
get to the Unit Equipment Maintenance Site (UTES) in order to draw the equipment
using buses driving the speed limit (55mph). Once the unit has drawn the equipment,
traveling to the training areas could take another three plus hours (at 55 miles an hour,
range regulations may allow for 35 miles an hour for wheeled vehicles, 25 an hour for
track vehicles). Hence, the unit spends much of the weekend's prime training time on the
road traveling to and from training.
Once the unit arrives at the training site, the training area itself presents the second
problem. Most of platoon and company level ARTEP tasks require a maneuver box that
supports the condition within which the unit can accomplish those tasks. For example,
ARTEP 17-57-10-MTP requires a maneuver box of 6 kilometers by 12 kilometers for a
scout platoon to conduct the screening mission.42 Bowling alley training areas and
environmental restrictions limit the amount of maneuver space. Consequently,
insufficient terrain hampers ARTEP training which results in degradation of unit
readiness.
Operational Readiness Initiatives
During the Gulf War, the call-up of National Guard units uncovered various critical
problems that mobilization regulations and prior mobilization planning failed to address.
First, Department of the Army wrote Army Mobilization and Operations. Planning and
Execution System (AMOPES) and FORMDEPS regulations based on partial and full
mobilizations and not for a selected call-up such as Desert Shield. (See Appendix F).
This caused problems for the smooth transition of units at the mobilization station in the
areas of personnel mobilization, clothing, finance, dental and health records. Much of
the confusion concerned the standard required for unit deployment. Second, selected
Combat Support and Combat Service Support units required a significant amount of
personnel and equipment cross leveling. The Army had resourced many of these units at
a level of authorized fill that allowed only 65% of their equipment on hand. At the same
time, several units had personnel who were non-deployable for one reason or another.
Third, in some cases, when units reported at the mobilization stations, mobilization
station personnel ignored previous training documentation that certified a particular level
of proficiency. This required the unit to revalidate tasks that they had already
successfully completed. Fourth, the mission required some Combat Support and Combat
Service Support units during the early phases of Operation Desert Shield before the
selected call-up. Because the president had yet to call the reserves, these units were not
available to the warfighting CINC. Finally, war planners selectively chose units because
of the limitations imposed by the law under Title 10, United States Code 673b. War
planners sought to fill force requirements with Active component instead of Reserve
component units, in the event Reserve Component units would not extend beyond the
180 day limit imposed by law. (See Appendix F).
All these problems delayed or prohibited the smooth transition of units at the
mobilization station which disrupted plans to focus their post-mobilization training on
warfighting tasks. Resolving these problems required units to use time that they might
have otherwise spent training on critical mission essential tasks. Recognizing these
limitations and other training restrictions, Regular Army and National Guard leaders
actively sought programs and legislation that would rectify the myriad of problems units
identified when the Guard mobilized for Desert Storm. These leaders established the
Bold Shift program, Project Standard Bearer, Operational Readiness Evaluations, Army
National Guard Readiness Reform Act of 1992 and National Defense Authorization Act
for FY95, to improve the readiness and accessibility of the Army National Guard
Contingency Force Pool units.
Bold Shift
Bold Shift is a series of seven Army initiatives that were the first of many aimed at
integrating the National Guard, active Army and Army Reserve and improving the
readiness of reserve forces. Two overall objectives of Bold Shift included: (1)
establishment of the validation standards and criteria to be used across the Total Army
for deployment (2) identification of resource shortfalls and readiness enhancements that
require intervention at higher levels of command. Instituted to validate the operational
readiness of early deploying units and the ability of those units to conduct their wartime
mission, Bold Shift focuses on critical personnel, logistics and training tasks mainly at
the company and platoon level.
Project Standard Bearer
Simultaneous to the Army initiatives, the National Guard has instituted Project
Standard Bearer. Project Standard Bearer focuses on developing, coordinating and
institutionalizing policy and programs that ensure the Guard is ready to be a full partner
in the Total Force.43 Project Standard Bearer ensures that early deploying units can
attain and sustain required levels of readiness through priority resourcing. The goal for
Contingency Force Pool units and enhanced readiness brigades is to maintain C-1
readiness in personnel and equipment. Results of this program have shown a notable
improvement in sustained readiness of these early deploying units. The current
deployability rate of the Contingency Force Pool units is 97 percent.44
Another Project Standard Bearer initiative makes the 55 earliest deploying
Contingency Force Pool units45 available for deployment in a volunteer federal status.
Called the Operational Unit Program, it provides the gaining CINC with fully mission
capable units within seven days of an alert. State Adjutant Generals volunteer units for
this program. The Guard can mobilize these soldiers with their consent and the consent
of the governors. It provides the gaining CINC a unique force surge without having to
invoke any of the mobilization levels.
Title XI - The Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act
In 1992, Congress passed the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act to
get Guard units into the battle early and to provide decisive reinforcing forces. Also
called Title XI legislation, this act was a series of 18 initiatives that enhanced the Guard
deployability, made Guard units more compatible with Active component units,
improved the development of Guard leaders, ensured the medical readiness of Guard
soldiers and improved the Army's capability to assess Guard capabilities. Title XI to a
large degree formalized the training enhancements and initiatives that were part of both
the Bold Shift and Operation Standard Bearer programs. Leadership in the Guard and
the Army aggressively desired to eliminate all obstacles that would inhibit early
deployment Central to this goal was the integration of Active component Officers,
Warrant Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers with the early deploying units. This
extremely important initiative assigns 3000 Active component soldiers to the Army
National Guard as Resident Training Detachments (RTD) or Reserve Training Teams
(RTT) to enhance the readiness posture of the early deployers. Well under way, the
Army will have filled these positions by October 1996.
Undoubtedly, increased Active Component support, integrated with ongoing
programs, provides a mission-focused structure that enhances individual and collective
training. Active Component Reserve Training Teams provide assistance to Contingency
Force Pool units on an area basis. Active Component Resident Training Detachments
located with National Guard Enhanced Readiness Brigade subordinate units provide
dedicated training support and assistance. Unlike Readiness Groups that have an
advisory role, the Reserve Training Teams and Resident Training Detachments have a
direct role in the conduct and execution of unit training. Officers and soldiers assigned
to the Resident Training Detachments are physically located with the unit. In addition,
Reserve Training Teams and Resident Training Detachments provide invaluable
experience and expertise to developing comprehensive training stragies aimed at
correcting unit deficiencies.
FY95 National Defense Authorization Act
Besides the steps taken to enhance the readiness of the National Guard, the Army has
recently established measures to improve the accessibility of those units. The FY95
Defense Authorization Act incorporated two key pieces of legislation that make Army
National Guard units more accessible to the National Command Authority. Call-up
Authority under"...Section 673b title 10 United States Code, is amended in subsection
(a) by striking out '90 days' and inserting in lieu thereof '270 days'..."46 This change
permits the President to authorize the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
Transportation to order up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve to active duty for
a single 270 day period, at times other than war or national emergency. Keep in mind
the 270 day period allows the President to selectively call-up the reserve without a
Congressional debate. Any time after that would require Congressional approval. (See
Appendix F).
Another provision in the FY95 National Defense Authorization Act is the Reserve
Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA). ROPMA provides for the call-up of
Army National Guard "elements" as needed to provide a balanced force. It implies that
the Guard may deploy squads or platoons or companies or detachments piecemeal. In
other words, it gives a unique surge capability without deploying entire companies,
battalions or brigades. At last, this act may have removed barriers to deploying National
Guard units early in a crisis.
Operational Readiness Evaluation
Finally, to ensure these units gained and maintained the level of readiness required for
early deployment, the Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE) program evaluates units
slated for early deployment. Active Component, Army National Guard and Army
Reserve early deployers all are subject to an ORE. Started in 1992, this program
provides commanders with an external, objective evaluation of their unit's ability to
perform its wartime mission in a peacetime environment. Also, the ORE evaluates post-
alert and post-mobilization plans as well as identifying systemic problems that would
prevent a unit from deploying and performing its wartime mission. The ORE divides
the evaluation into three phases.
First, the Compliance Phase evaluates the unit's ability to mobilize and deploy.
Evaluators check personnel qualification records, personnel mobilization readiness files,
personnel administrative files, training management records, unit mobilization files,
supply management records and maintenance management records. In each area,
evaluators screen critical items of information, including mission essential equipment, to
identify any shortfalls that would preclude the unit from meeting its scheduled
deployment dates. Readiness areas that are consistent with deployment validation
receive a "GO" or "NOGO" rating depending on how well they meet evaluation criteria
identified in the evaluator checklist.
Second, the Training Phase consists of two parts: collective task evaluation and
individual task evaluation. The ORE builds the collective task evaluation around a
scenario driven, situational training exercise using the unit commander's METL in tasks
that he has rated the unit (T) trained or (P) needs practice. Evaluators measure unit
performance against collective supporting task extracts from the associated ARTEP or
MTP to determine the overall unit proficiency. A unit receives a "GO" or "NOGO"
based upon a 65% pass rate.47 The individual task evaluation consists of Common Task
Testing (CTT), Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT), Preventive Maintenance Checks and
Services (PMCS) and verifying the battle sight zero of the soldier's individual weapon.
Evaluators grade the individual phase according to published Army standards. To
achieve an overall "GO", 65% of the soldiers tested must pass the event.
Third, the Report Phase generates several reports that identiy unit shortfalls which
require corrective action. At the conclusion of the evaluation, the unit commander
receives an outbrief and a complete copy of the evaluation results. Within 30 days the
first general officer in the unit's chain of command receives an executive summary of the
ORE results which highlight resource shortfalls and unit deficiencies. Other reports
include quaterly and annual reports that keep the chain of command abreast of the trends
and problems in the force. These reports require the chain of command to take action.
Commands must submit corrective action plans and take appropriate follow-up actions to
fix unit weaknesses and correct systemic deficiencies that impair unit readiness. The
whole process takes time, but the results have demonstrated the effort is worth it.
Since the inception of this program, Army National Guard early deploying units have
continually made headway, alleviating many of the mobilization and deployment
problems that preclude them from meeting deployment schedules. In fact, a recent First
Army ORE Annual Report suggested that "standards are being...""and that"...
most units are maintaining a high readiness profile which support mobilization and
deployment requirements." Yet, results also suggest that Army National Guard units are
continuing to experience significant problems with collective tasks and are making
negligible progress during individual task evaluation. Across the Total Army, soldiers'
individual skills have fluctuated, with only marginal improvements in the Army National
Guard. But since 1992, Guard Contingency Force Pool units repeatedly have
demonstrated their inability to conduct collective training to standard. Junior leaders do
not know the published Army standard for the supporting collective tasks that support
company operations. Lack of understanding METL development is the underlying
problem.
On one hand the ORE results indicate an improved ability to quickly mobilize. On
the other hand ORE results also indicate that Guard CFP units are incapable of
conducting wartime mission essential tasks upon mobilization. At first, these results
appear contradictory. In essence, what they indicate is a problem common to many units
undergoing evaluation during peacetime. That problem is one of perception.
No combat ready unit has ever survived inspection and
No inspection ready unit has ever survived combat.
Author Unknown
Training Opportunlties-Capabilites
Changes to the national security environment have challenged this nation to develop a
mix of military forces to meet future defense requirements at an affordable cost. Beyond
fighting and winning two simultaneous major regional conflicts, our national security
strategy of Engagement and Enlargement calls on the military to do even more.
Promoting prosperity at home, promoting democracy around the world and conducting
peace operations are three goals of this overall strategy. As we try to maintain a military
presence throughout the world, operational commitments and deployment exercises
continue to strain our already heavily burdened forces. Dwindling budgets and
manpower compel planners to rely often on integrating Army National Guard units into
these worldwide missions.
Since the Army implemented its Total Force Policy, the Army National Guard has
achieved enhanced levels of capability and readiness. This readiness has been the critical
factor in the ability of the National Guard to successfully respond to these other type
missions. Moreover, recent readiness initiatives removed legislative limitations that
previously restricted guard units from roles traditionally assigned exclusively to Active
Component units. Besides answering the call to the Persian Gulf, the Army National
Guard has successfully executed numerous domestic, humanitarian and peacekeeping
missions around the world.
Promoting Prosperity At Home
A central goal to the Engagement and Enlargement strategy is to promote America's
prosperity through efforts at home.48 The Army National Guard has taken this challenge
head-on. In the Fiscal Year 1993 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress
authorized and funded the National Guard to enter agreements with the nation's
governors to conduct pilot programs targeting youth at risk and medically under served
communities.49 The goals of these programs included providing young people with the
values, self-esteem, skills, education and discipline to succeed in life. Playing a leading
role in civil-military drug demand reduction programs, the Army National Guard reached
more than 445,000 young people last year. Guardsmen and women participated in this
community based training effort by sponsoring anti-drug fairs, presentations and events.
Since its inception the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program has evolved
into 532 programs nationwide.50 National Guard leaders and soldiers served as mentors
and role-models for these troubled youth.
In addition, the Army National Guard has been a key player in the drug interdiction
effort. Unlike the active component, the National Guard is not subject to restrictions of
the Posse Comitaus Act, except when called into federal service. In 1982, and again in
1988, Congress enacted exceptions to the Posse Comitaus Act to give the National Guard
an enhanced drug interdiction and law enforcement role.51 The success of this effort has
been noteworthy. During Fiscal Year 1993, Army Guard soldiers participated in 4,182
counterdrug support operations. Working in support of various law enforcement
agencies, these operations resulted in over 44,619 arrests. Moreover, these operations
seized over 485,233 pounds of marijuana, 127,248 pounds of processed cocaine, 1,378
pounds of heroin, 906 pounds of opium and 29,702 pounds of hashish. In addition,
Guard seized more than 5,145 vehicles, 9,218 weapons and $98,834,239. Typical
missions included ground surveillance, reconnaissance and training law enforcement
agencies.
Promoting Democracy Abroad
Promoting democracy abroad is another key part of our national security strategy.
America protects its strategic interests by enlarging and assisting the community of
democratic and free nations and checking global threats abroad. The same strategy seeks
to promote democracy through host nations that have sufficient power to influence other
nations in a region and the potential to act in accordance with United States' interests.
Establishing relationships with countries that have the potential for stronger and more
responsive democracies, economic growth, social reform and greater cooperation
between the United States and host nations come from several key sources. Established
democracies, emerging democracies and embattled or endangered democracies are the
focus of this strategy.
Humanitarian support, disaster relief and nation-building operations are nothing new
to the citizen-soldiers of the Army National Guard who traditionally provide this
domestic capability. Doctors, dentists, mayors, engineers, lawyers, firefighters, police
officers, businessmen and women who make up the various Army National Guard units
are exceptionally qualified to help emerging democracies cope with the difficult task of
nation building. In 1993, 25,000 Army Guardsmen and units provided mission support
to overseas combatant commands in support of each regional CINC's strategies for nation
assistance.
Primary to this effort, to support democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and
former satellite republics of the defunct Soviet Union, the National Guard participates in
European Commnand's (EUCOM) Joint Contact Team Program.52 This program pairs
individual states with Central and Eastern European countries to assist in community to
community and people to people program goals. Army Guard soldiers provide Military
Liaison Teams in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland,
Bulgaria, Slovenia, Romania, and Ukraine. Military Liaison and Traveling Contact
Teams spend one to two weeks briefing host nation military personnel in non-lethal areas
such as medical, legal, staff and management.
Similarly, the Army National Guard provided security assistance, humanitarian and
disaster relief to the Republic of Maldives and Bangladesh. Moreover, deploying in
support of U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Pacific
Command, approximately 7,500 Guard medical personnel provided medical and dental
care for local populations. Finally, almost 7,500 Guard soldiers deployed to U.S.
Southern Command to support humanitarian operations and host nation missions. This
resulted in the construction of over 37 kilometers of roads, 54 schools, seven medical
clinics, 12 bridges, 360 culverts and 36 wells.53
Peace Operations
A third part of the Engagement and Enlargement strategy is peace operations. This
policy seeks to conduct peacekeeping, peace enforcement and multilateral peace
operations along with other nations and agencies in the international community
whenever possible. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations seek to"...prevent,
contain or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly and deadly."54 These
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations generally require larger concentrations
of combat support and combat service support forces than combat units. Under the
current force structure, the Army National Guard is equipped to support the unique
missions.
As the Active Army downsizes, the Army Chief of Staff has called on the Army
National Guard to assume a greater role in missions traditionally performed by the
Active Component. One example of this is the Operational Integration Program.
Designed to enhance the Army's capability to perform peacekeeping and forward
presence missions, this program provides composite units of volunteers from the Army
Guard and the Army Reserve. Formed this past summer, the Army organized, trained
and deployed soldiers from the Active Component, United States Army Reserve and
Army National Guard as a composite battalion. Later this year, this battalion will
perform a traditional six-month Multinational Force and Observer Sinai mission.
Seventy-five percent of the battalion will be Army Guard soldiers, including over half
the leadership positions.
Sometimes conducted instead of Annual Training, some may view these other
operations as training distracters rather than training opportunities. Yet, repeatedly,
Army National Guard units and soldiers prove they can successfully perform required
mobilization activities within prescribed time frames that have the potential for reducing
theater arrival dates. Undoubtedly, many of these domestic and overseas activities have
operational objectives as their primary goal, with accompanying training sustainment
benefits. When conducting these operational missions, the Army normally assigns
National Guard units missions that are consistent with their military unit's mission55 and
individual military specialties.56 Consequently, units conduct collective training tasks
that are essential to conducting any military operation.
All these programs require a plan, logistics support and usually deployment, possibly
across the street, or in some cases across the oceans. To execute these programs, units
must mobilize, deploy, plan and conduct operations, and then redeploy, tasks that are
inherent in wartime scenarios. Collective subordinate tasks are also similar to tasks that a
unit would perform in a wartime environment. Units move to and secure their area of
operations. They communicate with local authorities and report to their chain of
command. They sustain themselves and their equipment throughout the operation.
Simultaneously, multi-echelon training takes place, as leaders and soldiers at all levels of
the chain of command participate in operations. Leaders conduct current and future
planning while soldiers conduct critical Military Occupation Skill training.
Upon examination, these operational missions allow Army National Guard units to
participate in unique training opportunities that enhance their overall military
capabilities. Like conducting wartime operations in a peacetime environment, these
operations have planning considerations based on the commander's METL. Whether the
Army Guard is participating in joint or combined operations to promote prosperity at
home, promote democracy around the world, or conduct peace operations, the focus is
the same. "The training focus for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives ... [is]
the combatant commander's [Joint] Mission Essential Task List (JMETL)."57 Yet, while
participation in Joint and Combined exercises has significant training value, these
exercises in non-traditional military operations still do not provide the gaining CINC an
appreciation of a unit's true warfighting capability.
Furthermore, while the National Guard CFP unit's overall capability improves from
responding to many of these non-traditional missions, like their Active Component
counterparts, they too suffer the inherent tradeoffs in diminished warfighting skills.
Although the perception is that these operations have been successful, a closer analysis
confirms the same results exposed during the ORE. Citizen-soldiers excel at tasks
closely related to their civilian occupations. Yet, repeatedly, they struggle with the
METL-related warfighting tasks. Bridging the gap between the results in the field and
ORE results, and overcoming the diminished warfighting skills is essential for future
deployments to combat environments.
Recommendations for Improving Operational Readiness
Just how does a National Guard contingency Force Pool unit commander focus pre-
mobilization training to concentrate on conducting METL related warfighting tasks?
Personnel, equipment, time and terrain constraints limit the amount of options available
to the commander. Because most unit commanders already have a "full plate", any
successful strategy requires the full cooperation and coordination of both the CFP units'
chain of command and Active Component counterparts. Successful execution of post-
mobilization plans depends on that unity of effort. Besides the enhancements that the
Guard has already made, it can facilitate improvements in the Operational Readiness of
Contingency Force Pool units in several ways.
First, State Area Commands (STARCs) can provide both assistance and relief that
will enable CFP units to focus on conducting METL related training. Second, Readiness
Groups (RGs), Reserve Training Detachments (RTDs) and Readiness Training Teams
(RTTs) can provide much needed expertise to develop comprehensive training strategies
and workshops that provide insight to tackling deployment and pre-mobilization training
problems. Third, commanders, who are ultimately responsible for the readiness posture
of their unit, must focus their soldiers to meet the high pre-mobilization training
challenges. Fourth, non-commissioned officers must know the published Army standard
based on current doctrine and insure that their soldiers are training to that standard.
State Support
State Area Commands (STARCs) can help Contingency Force Pool units in three
ways. First, STARCs must actively seek resources that will enhance Contingency Force
Pool readiness. One offshoot of the ORE program has taught CFP units how to
maximize the limited terrain available for training. Yet, environmental awareness
programs will continue to crowd out unrestricted use of training areas. Funding training
simulation systems, training aids and other devices will help CFP units maximize the
limited training time and training areas that are available to them. Second, STARCs
should pursue personnel management policies that steer the best soldiers the state has to
offer to these early deploying units. CFP units should receive priority of filling critical
shortages as well as priority for funding Military Occupation Skills school. Finally, State
Area Commands can help Contingency Force Pool units by alleviating time consuming
training distracters such as administrative requirements or outside taskings. STARCs
should provide contact teams to the units to update records or conduct administrative
assistance to keep the soldier's personnel mobilization files current. State Area
Commands also need to minimize the outside tasking for these units to participate in
parades and community events that rob the unit of valuable training time.
Readiness Groups, Resident Training Detachments and Reserve Training Teams
Readiness Groups, Resident Training Detachments and Reserve Training Teams can
provide invaluable training assistance and advice to Contingency Force Pool units in
several ways. First, help the CFP unit commanders develop unit Standing Operating
Procedures that standardize procedures for routine and recurring events that support
individual and collective METL related tasks. This time-consuming task is something
separate company commanders, which make up the bulk of the CFP units, desperately
need. More importantly, when DTA wartime guidance is lacking, Standing Operating
Procedures can best facilitate the transition to new missions. Fundamental individual and
collective tasks that support such common missions as Conduct a Tactical Road March,
Occupy an Assembly Area and Establish a Perimeter Defense rarely change.
Second, teach unit commanders and junior leaders how to conduct an assessment of
training and how to incorporate that feedback into fixture training plans. Conduct this
workshop simultaneously with regularly scheduled training, not in addition to it.
Commanders and junior leaders need to see how the results of their training plans
successfully support or detract from training METL related tasks to standard. Leaders
should use additional training workshops conducted during periods other than primetime
training for specialized functional training.
Third, use specialized workshops to train junior officers on deployment plans and
specific additional duty requirements, such as Unit Movement Officer. Unit commanders
often task a junior officer to fill one of these additional duties but have neither the
expertise nor time to develop the necessary skills that junior leader will require in that
position. Finally, train the trainers. Junior leaders, both officer and noncommissioned
officers, need assistance not just advice. Demonstrate, through example, by conducting
one on one training, or when possible concurrently with other scheduled training. When
assigned to an RTD or RTT, "remember, you are the expert when you arrive at this
assignment; thus, the unit will expect you to provide them with the correct answers."58
Unit Commanders
Commanders should capitalize on these external experts to help them develop training
strategies that meet pre-deployment goals of attaining a desirable level of proficiency on
related warfighting METL tasks. Once commanders have tapped into this network of
expertise, they should begin to develop an aggressive training program that sustains unit
strengths and works on unit weaknesses. Primary to this undertaking is integrating multi-
echelon critical soldier and leader skills necessary to accomplish the mission during
prime time training that is battle focused and METL related.
Focusing on fundamentals and executing them to the proper standard provides the
critical link between individual training proficiency and collective training that units
must emphasize in all training plans. Commanders must know the published Army
standard, then hold their subordinates accountable to execute training to that standard.
Commanders must then assess the unit's training proficiency guided by the feedback
received from junior leaders and NCOs. Based on this feedback, the commander can
better focus resources and adjust training strategies that capitalize on unit strengths and
overcome unit weaknesses. This will allow the commander to maximize the limited
training time.
Non-Commissioned Officers
Non-commissioned officers must take charge of their soldiers and develop their
sections and squads into cohesive fighting units. NCOs also must ensure they know the
published Army standard. NCOs must take the lead in helping the commander train the
trainer by training their immediate subordinates. Like all leaders, they must demand that
their soldiers conduct performance oriented training to the Army standard. They should
provide feedback to the commander, ensuring the number of tasks to be trained is
realistic. More importantly, NCOs should assess the strengths and weaknesses of their
soldiers and provide this feedback to the commander so that he can adjust his plans
accordingly. Finally, they should ensure that they do not waste their soldiers' time by
selecting random soldiers to conduct hip pocket training (short informal classes) that
reinforce supporting METL-related individual skills.
Conclusion
This nation's military will continue to undergo critical realignments and resource
reductions for the foreseeable future. The scope of our vital interests and the growing
uncertainty of the international environment demand that today's Army be flexible,
deployable and lethal.59 Desert Storm served as a wake-up call for our nation's leaders to
the issue of actively seeking to integrate National Guard Contingency Force Pool units
into war plans to provide the CINC that flexibility. Combatant Commanders need units
with National Guard soldiers that are accessibLe, ready and capable. The leadership of
the Army National Guard has risen to the challenge. Working to provide soldiers and
units that are accessible, ready and capable, the Guard has made significant inroads to
meeting that challenge.
Legislation and chain of command involvement have eliminated the myriad of
problems Army National Guard units encountered when mobilized for Desert Storm.
Most of these solutions sought to correct unit deficiencies before the unit arrived at the
mobilization station. The focus so far has been on facilitating pre-mobilization training
with the ultimate goal of achieving proficiency on METL tasks. Unlike Desert Storm,
the next conflict may not allow for lengthy post-mobilization and in-theater training
opportunities. Optimizing training time during pre-mobilization is essential to successful
mobilization and deployment.
Today, the Guard is working to provide soldiers, leaders and units that are technically
and tactically proficient in the execution of their specific mission. Yet, problems still
remain. Overcoming the inherent training constraints of personnel, time, equipment and
terrain while at the same time working on noted unit deficiencies is a monumental task.
Guard Leaders must optimise the limited training oportunities by focusing on METL
related tasks that support their wartime mission. More importantly, they must train to
the published Army standard and demand that their soldiers meet these same high
standards.
At the same time, Guard leaders must work in conjunction with their Active
Component counterparts to make the power-projection force strategy work. Our nation's
leaders realize that growing dependence on the Guard carries an element of risk, but one
that is necessary and acceptable. Active Component leaders should actively embrace
training opportunities with their National Guard counterparts and develop realistic
training strategies that support their early deploying capability. National Guard soldiers
need commanders who have enough trust and confidence, to use them according to that
capability. Failure to use them in that manner erodes confidence in their ability to
accomplish the mission and utterly demoralizes them.
More than any other time in history, "America's Army," is truly a seamless
organization of Active Component, Army National Guard and Army Reserve units
designed to prosecute this nation's strategy. Central to that strategy are the National
Guard Contingency Force Pool units. They have proven through successive domestic
and international crises that they can perform superbly when called upon to do so. In the
final analysis, today's force structure does not allow for any other possibility but to send
Army National Guard units along with Active Component early deployers.
Appendix A: Acronyms
AC Active Component
AMOPES Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution
System
APFT Army Physical Fitness Test
ARNG Army National Guard
ARTEP Army Training and Evaluation Program
AT Annual Training
CAPSTONE FORSCOM alignment of Reserve Component Units with AC force
for training, evaluation and deployment
CFP Contingency Force Pool
CINC Commander in Chief
CONUS Continental United States
CONUSA Continental U.S. Army
CTT Common Task Testing
DA Department of the Army
DTA Directed Training Association
ERF Early Reinforcing Force
EUCOM European Command
FORSCOM Forces Command
FORMDEPS FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System
FY Fiscal Year
IDT Inactive Duty for Training
METL Mission Essential Task List
MRC Major Regional Contingency
MTP Mission Training Plan
NGB National Guard Bureau
OCONUS Outside Continental United States
OPLAN Operations Plan
ORE Operational Readiness Evaluation
PMCS Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services
PTSR Post-Mobilization Training Support Requirements
RC Reserve Component
RG Readiness Group
ROPMA Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act
RTD Resident Training Detachment
RTT Reserve Training Team
STARC State Area Command
TPFDD Time Phased Force Deployment Data
TOE Table of Organization and Equipment
USARC United States Army Reserve Command
UTES Unit Training Equipment Site
Appendix B: Glossary of Terms
Army National Guard - A Reserve component of the Army, the portion of the
organized militia of the 50 states, Commonwealth of Puerto and District of Columbia,
whose units and members are federally recognized.
Component - A part of a whole, as for example, the Regular and the Reserve
components of the Army are the Regular Army, the Army National Guard and the Army
Reserve. Each service element is a component of the total force.
Contingency Force Pool - Units, both Active Component and Reserve Component,
consolidated to provide a surge capability that are required to support the Crisis Response
Force. The Crisis Response Force reacts to worldwide missions.
Old CAPSTONE - Active Component and Reserve Component units aligned into
wartime organizations oriented toward major contingency requirements. Units were
aligned based on the requirements of a Unified or Specified Commander in Chief as
defined in his Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). These planning
associations were designed to permit rapid integration of units into a cohesive fighting
organization by accomplishing wartime planning during peacetime.
New CAPSTONE - Establishes peacetime relationships among Active Component and
Reserve Component units and CONUS-based corps or theater Army, based on
geographic and functional factors. CAPSTONE integrates activities of warfighting
CINC's, Corps, CONUSA and peacetime chains of command in training the total Army
in support of the Contingency Strategy. It facilitates implementation of Title XI
requirements and provides Active Component support to Reserve Component Training
previously provided under DTA.
Crisis Response Force - Active and Reserve component units, including forward
presence units, trained and configured to deploy anywhere in the world, based on the
unit's deployability posture.
Directed Training Associations (DTA) - A formal relationship between selected
Reserve Component units and similar Active Component units with the objective of
improved training readiness of the Reserve Component unit. DTA provides Active
Component training assistance in attainment of proficiency in the Reserve Component
units wartime mission and evaluation during Annual Training. They also provide branch
specific functional guidance, advice and support with Mobile Training Teams during
Inactive Duty Training periods and exercise opportunities based on the Time Phased
Force Deployment Data.
Early Reinforcing Force-Primarily Active component divisions and associated
echelons above division and echelons above corps support elements (both AC and RC) as
well as enhanced readiness brigades that are available to add combat power to a theater
commander.
Enhanced Readiness Brigade- The Principal Reserve Component ground combat
maneuver forces of the United States Army. Their primary federal peacetime function is
to sustain the level of readinees necessary to serve as the Nations's strategic hedge against
the potential of an adverse major regional conflict in a two nearly simultaneous major
regional conflict scenario. In this role, they are expected to reinforce, augment, and/or
backfill active component units as required by the theater commander to which thery are
assigned upon validated by the Secretary of the Army. The term "enhanced" refers to
increased resource and manning priorities with improved training strategies during pre-
mobilization that ensure their ability to be ready to deploy at at a readiness rating of C-1 by
90 days after call-up. The brigades will be organized, equipped, and sustained to be
doctrinally employable, control compatible, and logistically supportable, by any US
Army corps or division.
FORMDEPS-FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System
Mission Essential Task List (METL)-Contains the specific tasks critical to wartime
mission accomplishment. METL is derived from wartime mission guidance and external
directives, and is developed without consideration of resource availability, unit manning
levels, equipment on hand or the ability to train.
National Guard-The Army and Air portion of the organized militia of the 50 states,
Commonwealth of Puerto and District of Columbia, whose units and members are
federally recognized.
Reserve Component-Individuals and units assigned to the Army National Guard or the
U.S. Army Reserve who are subject to call to active duty.
Roundout-A Headquarters Department of the Army managed program that brings
major combat units up to a designated structure by filling organizational voids from a
different component.
State Area Command (STARC) - A mobilization entity within the Army National
Guard State Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment that is ordered to active duty
when Army National Guard units in that state are alerted for mobilization. The STARC
provides the command and control of mobilized Army National Guard units from their
home station until arrival at the mobilization station. It is also responsible for planning
and executing military support for civil defense and land defense plans under the
respective area commander.
Time Phased Force Deployment Data(TPFDD) - Identifies specific units for wartime
requirements under gaining CINC's approved OPLANs and provides the basis for
wartime planning and exercises.
Title IX - Also known as the Army National Guard Combat readiness Reform Act of
1992. Congressional Legislation that established eighteen initiatives to get the Guard
into battle early and to provide decisive reinforcing forces. The initiatives enhance
Guard deployability, improve the active Army's capacity to assess Guard capabilities,
make Guard units more compatible with active forces, improve the readiness of Guard
leaders, and ensure the Guard's medical readiness.
United States Army Reserve - A Federal force, consisting of individual reinforcements,
combat support, combat service support and training type units organized and maintained
to provide military training in peacetime, and a reservoir of trained units and individual
reservists to be ordered to active duty in the event of a national emergency.
Appendix C: Chronology of Significant Events
Year Significant Event
1792 Militia Act provided for two categories of militia: a volunteer force and a
common militia The volunteer force provided their own uniforms and
equipment and were willing to undertake additional training at no pay.
Unfortunately, the act did not call for any inspection of a state's militia by
the Federal government. Nor did it specify any penalties for non-
compliance. Consequently, in some states a once a year muster of
untrained, un-uniformed militia men became the source for ridicule.
1903 Dick Act replaced the Militia Act which stood for 111 years, reaffirmed
the militia as the Army's primary organized reserve.
1916 National Defense Act of 1916 guaranteed the state militias' status as the
Army's primary reserve force and mandated the term "National Guard" for
that force.
1970 Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird outlines the Total Force Concept to
guide decisions for planning for and using active and reserve forces.
1973 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger made Total Force Concept
official policy of the Department of Defense.
1976 Initial Section 673b of Title 10 USC allows the president to activate
Selected reserve units for 90 days up to a maximum of 50,000 reservists.
1980 Amended Section 673b allows the president to activate Selected reserve
units for 90 days up to a maximum of 100,000 reservists.
1986 Amended Section 673b allows the president to activate Selected reserve
units for 90 days with a possible 90 extension up to a maximum of
200,000 reservists.
1990 First major test of the Total Force Policy is Operation Desert Shield.
1992 Army National Guard readiness Reform Act of 1992. Eighteen initiatives
designed to improve readiness of the National Guard. Highlights include:
increasing the percentage of qualified active component personnel in the
ARNG; review of ARNG officer promotions by the commander of
associated active duty unit; transfers non-deployable personnel to
Non deployable Personnel Account; ensures early deploying units are
medically and dentally ready for deployment; and improve the equipment
compatibility between the active component and the Army Guard.
1992/1993 National Defense Authorization Acts of 1992 and 1993 require the
Secretary of Defense to assess alternatives for the structure and mix of
future active and reserve forces.
1994 National Defense Authorization Act of FY95 amended Section 673b to
allow the president to activate selected reserve units for 270 days, with no
extension for up to a maximum of 200,000 reservists. Also allows Army
National Guard units to be deployed as elements.
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Notes
1 Most of these arguments centered on fighting the Russian "hordes" in the Fulda Gap using
combat arms units from the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Some make extremely valid
arguments that within the constraints of the 39 days that combat arms units have to train they just could
not sustain proficiency with the weapons systems organic to combat arms units. Others argue that these
models make false analogies comparing apples to oranges (Active Component units that are ALO-1 and
equipped and manned at C-1 to Army Guard units that were ALO-3 and equipped and manned at C-3).
see footnote 15 for a more detailed appreciation.
2 National Guard Bureau, Research and Staff Support Office, 1995 Posture Statement,
(Washington: National Guard Bureau, 1994), 40.
3 By 1918, the distinction between regular Army divisions (numbered 1-25), National Guard
divisions (numbered 26-50), and Army Reserve divisions (numbered 51 and above) was an artificial one.
Regulars, reservists, draftees and Guardsmen served in all. However, for unit lineage's, histories and
morale the difference is important. Two exceptions to the numbering system are the 101st and 82nd
Divisions which are Active Component.
4 National Guard Bureau, Office of Public Affairs, A Brief History of the Militia and the
National Guard, (Washington: National Guard Bureau, 1986), 50.
5 Martin Binkin, US Reserve Forces: The Problems of the Weekend Warrior, (Washington:
Brookings Institution, 1974), 20.
6 Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime," Parameters.
XXI no. 2. (Summer 1991): 35.
7 Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime," 42.
8 National Guard Bureau, Research and Staff Support Office, After Action Report: Operation
Desert Shield: Operation Desert Storm, (Washington: National Guard Bureau, 1991), 1.
9 NGB, After Action Report Operation Desert Shield: Operation Desert Storm, 5.
10 Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime," 47.
11 Harry G. Summers Jr., "The Army After Vietnam." in Against All Enemies. Eds. Kenneth J.
Hagan and William R. Roberts, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press Inc. 1986), 363.
12 NGB, After Action Report: Operation Desert Shield: Operation Desert Storm, 2-6. Note:
Two Field Artillery Brigades and 6 Field Artillery Battalions deployed to Southwest Asia in support of
Desert Storm. The rest of the National Guard commands were Combat Support or Combat Service
Support units.
13 Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime," 49.
14 U.S. General Accounting Office. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. Operation Desert Storm: Army Had Diffuculty
Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces, (Washington DC: GPO, 1992), 2.
15 For an enlightening insight to the Roundout debacle see Lewis Sorley, "National Guard and
Reserve Forces." in 1991-1992 American Defense AnnuaL Ed. Josepb Kruzel, 183-201. (New York:
Macmillan Inc. 1992). Also see Marygail Brauner, Roger Brown and Harry Thie. Assessing the
Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Effectiveness of Total Force Policy During the
Persian Gulf Conflict. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1992), 22-32, 39-40, 50-51 and 64-67.
16 NGB, After Action Report: Operation Desert Shield: Operation Desert Storm, 8.
17 G-3, XVIII Airborne Corps. Information Paper. Subject: "CAPSTONE Terms of
Reference." 2 March 1993.
18 NGB, 1995 Posture Statement, 13.
19 Prior to Desert Storm the majority of Army National Guard Combat Support and Combat
Service Support units had Authorized Levels of Organization (ALO) 3, which indicate peacetime
resourcing priorities. The ALO represents the authorized level of personnel and equipment for an
individual unit. ALO 3 authorizes a unit to be equipped at 78 to 87 percent of its wartime requirements.
As a result of Desert Storm and recent legislative changes Army National Guard Contingency Force Pool
units are resourced at ALO 1, this equates to 98 to 100 percent of their wartime requirements.
20 Criteria established by FORSCOM requires a unit that is projected to be in the force structure
through the end of FY95, that has maintained a C-3 rating and is organized at ALO-1. The National
Guard Bureau nominates units for removal from the CFP list based on the ability of the Chain of
Command to fix the noted unit deficiencies. Management of chronic and marginal units by the National
Guard Bureau identifies units that have been identified as non-deployable for eight consecutive months.
These units are consider candidates tor force structure reductions.
21 Definition FM 25-101, Training the Force: Battle-Focused Training, September 1990.
22 A significant part of the force structure changes includes the recent "Off Site" agreement
between the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. This unit exchange between the Army
National Guard and the Army Reserve swapped all the combat units from the Army Reserve to the
National Guard in exchange for combat support, and combat service support units. The Memorandum of
Agreement between these two components took effect 1 October 1994.
23 Commander, First United States Army. Memorandum to Commander, Forces Command and
others. Subject: "America's First Army Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE) Yearly Report." 4
November 1994.
24 FM 25-101, reminds us that Battalion Level is the lowest level that has Battle Tasks.
Companies focus on collective training tasks that support the company METL. Company METL tasks
support the Battalion METL tasks. 2-17.
25 Commander, First United States Army. Memorandum to Commander, Forces Command and
others. Subject: "America's First Army Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE) Yearly Report." 4
November 1994.
26 "Roles and Missions." Joint Force Quarterly, no 5. (Summer 1994): 117.
27 Martin Binkin. U.S. Reserve Forces: The Problems of the Weekend Warrior. (Washington,
Dc: Brookings Institution, 1974), 19.
28 NGB, 1995 Posture Statement, 3.
29 When called to State Active Duty for a federally declared disaster emergency, the Federal
government picks up the costs.
30 Army Regulation (AR) 350-41, Training in Units, (Washington, DC: Department of the
Army, March 1993), 6.
31 Thomas F. Lippiat and others, Mobilization and Train-Up Times for Army Reserve
Component Support Units. (Santa Monica, CA: Rend Corp., 1992), 1. See also Martin Binkin, and
William W. Kaufman. Studies in Defense Policy: U.S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities.
Risks. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989), 37. See also Neal P. Curtin, Military Readiness:
Current Indicators Need to Be Expanded for a More Comprehensive Assessment. 2.
32 AR 350-41, 28.
33 AR 350-41, 28.
34 NGB, After Action Report: Operation Desert Shield; Operation Desert Storm, 21.
35 For purposes here, soldiers includes junior officers below the rank of Captain that are not
branched qualified and enlisted that have not been to Advanced Individual Training (AIT). Officers,
Captain and above generally have been to their basic course for qualification and have received
additional schooling necessary to artain the rank of Captain and above. Senior NCOs also generally have
attended the requisite schooling necessary fbr promotion and billeting.
36 Congressional Affairs Officer, National Guard Bureau. Memorandum for the Director Army
National Guard. Subject: "Joint Authorization Conference Committee Report on the FY 95 National
Defense Authorization Act." 16 August 1994, 8.
37 Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufman. Studies in Defense Policy: US Army Guard and
Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, 104.
38 The Army doctrinally trains to standard. Training is not time sensitive. Soldiers and leaders
must execute the planned training until the Army standards are met. The standard for the Army is to train
according to publish Army standards found in Army Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP) and Mission
Training Plan (MTP) manuals.
39 U.S. GAO, Operation Desert Storm: Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and
Reserve Support Forces, 38.
40 Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann, 98.
41 Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann, 99.
42 Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) and Mission Training Plan (MTP)
descriptive training documents which provide units a clear description of "what" and "how to" achieve
wartime mission proficiency. They elaborate on wartime missions in terms of comprehensive training
outlines that highlight the tasks, conditions and standards a unit must meet to achieve combat
proficiency.
43 National Guard Bureau, Research and Staff Support Office. Army National Guard of the
United States 1994 Posture Statement. (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau. 1993), 7.
44 NGB, Army National Guard of the United States 1995 Posture Statement, 22.
45 These Contingency Force Pool combat support and combat service support units (support
packages one and two) are desigiied to provide echelons above division and echelons above corps support
for the employment of the Crisis Response Force.
46 Congressional Affairs Officer, National Guard Bureau. Memorandum for the Director Army
National Guard. Subject: "Joint Authorization Conference Committee Report on the FY 95 National
Defense Authorization Act." 16 August 1994, 2.
47 Units must pass all tasks that are identified as "critical", and they must pass 65% of the
collective supporting tasks to achieve an overall "GO". Units that fail a critical task but achieve greater
than or equal to the 65% criteria will still receive a "NOGO" because they failed a critical task.
Collective supporting tasks also have critical sub-tasks that, if a leader or unit fail to accomplish, will
also give them an overall "NOGO" for that particular task.
48 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,
(Washington: The White House, 1994), 15.
49 Department of Defense, Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs Fiscal
Year 1993, (Washington: Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1994). 47.
50 NGB, 1995 Posture Statement, 42.
51 NGB, 1995 Posture Statement, 42.
52 National Guard Bureau, Operations, Training and Readiness Directorate, 1995 Gold Book,
(Washington: National Guard Bureau, 1994), 19.
53 NGB, 1995 Posture Statement, 30.
54 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 13.
55 For purposes here, the unit's military mission may not necessarily be the same mission as
specific wartime guidance would provide. For example an engineer construction unit may be given an
over seas operational assignment as part of a Humanitarian mission to build a school. This same unit's
wartime guidance may be to repair a damaged runway.
56 DOD, Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1993, 6.
57 Department of Defense, A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts, 23
November 1992, O-I to O-30; reprint in Operational Level of War Readings, (Washington, DC: Marine
Corps Command and Staff College, 1994), O-10.
58 Leon I. Smith IV, "Resident Training Detachment: Captain's Perspective - Two Years
Hence" Armor 103, no. 6 (November-December 1994): 49.
59 Carl E. Vouno, A Strategic Force For The 1990s And Beyond, (Washington, DC: GPO.
January 1990), 17.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
Aspin, Les. The Bottom-Up Review: Forces For A New Era. Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, 1 September 1993. (Author's Note: Good overview
that highlights the force structure changes required by the Bottom-Up Review).
Chief, Readiness Division National Guard Bureau to Director, Army National Guard and
others. Subject: "3RD Quarter FY94 Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE)
Summaries." 1994. (Author's Note: Excellent compilation of the collective
training problems National Guard CFP units experience during the Operational
Readiness Evaluation).
Commander, First United States Army. Memorandum to Commander, Forces Command
and others. Subject "America's First Army Operational Readiness Evaluation
(ORE) Yearly Report." 4 November 1994. (Author's Note: Good source. This
document highlights the lingering problems experienced by Contingency Force
Pool units, within the 20 state First Army area, two years into the ORE program).
Congressional Affairs Officer, National Guard Bureau. Memorandum for the Director
Army National Guard. Subject "Joint Authorization Conference Committee
Report on the FY95 National Defense Authorization Act." 16 August 1994.
(Author's Note: Good source. This document highlights the most recent
legislative changes that impact the Army National Guard).
Congressional Affairs Officer, National Guard Bureau. Memorandum for the Director
Army National Guard. Subject "FY95 Department of Defense Appropriation
Act, HR 4650." 3 October 1994
Department of Defense, A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts,
23 November 1992, O-1 to O-30; reprint in Operational Level of War Readings,
Washington, DC: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1994.
Field Manual (FM) 25-101, Training The Force: Battle Focused Training.
Washington, DC: Department of the Army. September 1990.
Field Manual (FM) 350-41, Training in Units. Washington, DC:
Department of the Army. March 1993.
FORSCOM Regulation 220-2, Operational Readiness Evaluation.
Washington, DC: Department of the Army. February 1994.
FORSCOM Regulation 220-3, Reserve Component Training Assessment.
Washington, DC: Department of the Army. April 1994.
G-3, XVIII Airborne Corps. Information Paper. Subject: "CAPSTONE Terms of
Reference." 2 March 1993. (Author's Note: Excellent reference. This is one of
the only documents that explains the recent changes to the CAPSTONE program.
It includes a breakout of the Force Package lists and how the Directed Training
Associations support the CFP units).
National Guard Bureau, Operations, Training and Readiness Directorate. Gold Book
1995 Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, 1994.
National Guard Bureau, Research and Staff Support Office. Army National Guard After
Action Report: Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm.
Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, 1991.
National Guard Bureau, Research and Staff Support Office. Army National Guard of
the United States 1995 Posture Statement. Washington, DC:
National Guard Bureau, 1994.
National Guard Bureau, Research and Staff Support Office. Army National Guard of
the United States 1994 Posture Statement. Washington, DC:
National Guard Bureau, 1993.
National Guard Bureau, Research and Staff Support Office. Title XI Army National
Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992. Washington, DC:
National Guard Bureau, 1994. (Author's Note: Good source. This document
highlights the legislative changes of the Army National Guard Readiness Reform
Act of 1992 and gives some insight to the impact of those changes).
Office of the Secretary of Defense. Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board
Fiscal Year 1993. Washington, DC: GPO, 1994. (Author's Note: Good
source. This document provides an overview of all the Reserve Components
(Army, Navy, Air force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard Reserve), the current
programs, and the future direction these forces will take).
The White House. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.
Washington, DC: GPO, 1994.
U.S. General Accounting Office. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness,
Committee on Armed Services., House of Representatives. Operation Desert
Storm: Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support
Forces. March 1992. GAO/NSIAD-92-67. (Author's Note: Researchers
interested in Army related Desert Shield/Desert Storm problems will find this
document helpful).
U.S. General Accounting Office. Report to the Congress. Reserve Components:
Opportunities to Improve National Guard and Reserve Policies and Programs.
November 1988. GAO/NSIAD-89-27.
U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff. United States Army Posture
Statement FY95. Washington, DC: GPO, 1994.
Vouno, Carl, E. A Strategic Force For The 1990s and Beyond. Washington, DC:
Department of the Army. January 1990.
Secondary Sources
Books
Binkin, Martin. US. Reserve Forces: The Problems of the Weekend Warrior.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974.
Binkin, Martin, and William W. Kaufmann. Studies in Defense Policy: US. Army
Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, 1989. (Author's Note: Excellent source for those
interested in the political controversy surrounding a decision to mobilize the
Guard and Reserve.).
Brauner, Marygail, Roger Brown and Harry Thie. Assessing the Structure and Mix of
Future Active-and Reserve Forces: Effectiveness of Total Force Policy During
the Persian Gulf Conflict. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1992. (Author's
Note: Excellent source. A comprehensive undertaking by Rand that addresses
the performance of Guard and Reserve units during Desert Shield/Desert Storm).
Lippiat, Thomas F., Michael J. Polich, and Ronald E. Sortor. Post Mobilization Training
of Army Reserve Component Combat Units. Santa Monica, CA:
Rand Corp., 1992. (Author's Note: Interesting source. This document by Rand
gives the impression that it is justifying why the Army did not deploy Round-Out
units instead of conducting an unbiased analysis of the problem. For a different
perspective see Sorley in "National Guard and Reserve Forces." in 1991-1992
American Dense Annual).
Lippiat, Thomas, F., and others. Mobilization and Train-Up Times for Army Reserve
Component Support Units. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1992.
National Guard Bureau, Office of Public Affairs. A Brief Histoty of the Militia
and the National Guard. Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, 1986.
Sorley, Lewis. "National Guard and Reserve Forces." in 1991-1992 American Defense
Annual. Ed. Joseph Kruzel, 183-201. New York: Macmillan Inc. 1992.
(Author's Note: Good source for those intersted in the Round-Out/Round-Up
controversy.
Summers, Harry, G., Jr. "The Army After Vietnam." in Against All Enemies.
Eds. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts, 361-373.
Connecticut: Greenwood Press Inc. 1986.
Journals
Beveridge, Reid. "Force Structure/Force Mix: The Rand Study Still Leaves Open-ended
Questions." National Guard, 47, no. 4. (April 1993) 48-52.
Newland, Samuel, J. "The National Guard: Whose Guard Anyway?"
Parameter, 18 no. 2.(June 1988): 40-50.
"Roles and Missions" Joint Force Quarterly, no 5. (Summer 1994): 117-119.
Sharp, Benjamin, F. and Donald B. Skipper. "The Reserve Component Dilemma:
Mission versus Time." Military Review, 64 no 11. (November 1984): 62-79.
Sorley, Lewis. "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime."
Parameters, 21 no. 2. (Summer 1991): 35-50.
Smith, Leon, I. IV, "Resident Training Detachment: A Captain's Perspective-Two
Years Hence." Armor 103, no. 6 (November-December 1994): 47-49.
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