Analysis Of Joint Doctrine:
Should It Remain Directive?
SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy
CSC 95
ANALYSIS OF JOINT DOCTRINE:
Should it Remain Directive?
by
Mark A. Alred
CG-12
Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Marine Corps Command and Staff College
in fulfillment of the requirement for a Military Issues Paper
April 1995
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and
do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the U.S. Government
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ii
ANALYSIS OF JOINT DOCTRINE: 1
SHOULD IT REMAIN DIRECTIVE? 1
DEFINING DOCTRINE: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE 2
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 2
THE CURRENT STATUS O DOCTRINE 4
FUTURE OF DOCTRINE 6
DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT DOCTRINE 7
FROM RELEARNING LESSONS TO WRITTEN GUIDANCE 10
EARLY EXPERIENCES WITH JOINT OPERATIONS 10
DEVELOPMENT OF JOINTNESS 12
COLD WAR EFFECTS ON JOINT DOCTRINE 13
POST COLD WAR PRIORITIES 13
EXPERIENCING JOINT DOCTRINE 15
JOINT DOCTRINE'S EFFECT ON WAR SCENARIOS 16
JOINT DOCTRINE IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR 17
DIRECTIVE JOINT DOCTRINE: USE IT WITH JUDGMENT 23
BIBLIOGRAPHY 26
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, General John M.
Shalikashvili, USA, made joint doctrine directive in the summer of 1994.
This may not seem to be a radical decision, but the ramifications are far-
reaching. Does directive joint doctrine improve the efficiency of joint
operations? By looking at several instances of military employment, this
paper examines the effect joint doctrine played in the success or failure of
the following operations; Operation Desert Storm (Iraq), Operation
Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq), Operation Restore Hope (Somalia),
Operation Restore Democracy (Haiti), and Operation Proud Shield
(Somalia II). It may be too early to determine if directive joint doctrine is
beneficial, but the effect is unequivocal on the outcomes of these
Operations.
ANALYSIS OF JOINT DOCTRINE:
SHOULD IT REMAIN DIRECTIVE?
Employment of United States military force is taking on new
dimensions in today's global environment. Many potential situations do
not fit traditional roles of the military and will result in joint operations.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower said, "Separate ground, sea, and air
warfare are gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we
will fight it in all elements, with all Services, as a single concentrated
effort."1 What degree of doctrinal direction is required for the United
States military to operate as a single concentrated force?
Today, Eisenhower's "efforts" typically lead to establishment of a
Joint Force Commander who acquires operational control of forces from
multiple Services. What is available to the Joint Force Commander to
enable not just the effective, but efficient employment of these forces? The
answer lies in joint doctrine, but how does the United States military
ensure joint doctrine guides these efforts? Does making joint doctrine
directive improve the efficiency of joint force employment? This paper will
attempt to prove that making joint doctrine directive improves the
efficiency of joint operations.
DEFINING DOCTRINE: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE
Doctrine is the fundamental set of principles by which military
forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national
objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.2 In
layperson's terms doctrine is the publication of lessons learned in an effort
to prevent duplication of mistakes and enhance the successes of previous
operations.3 Doctrine encompasses all areas of the military and provides
guidance to help streamline routine as well as special situations.
Historical Perspective
Keeping in mind the philosophical nature of doctrine as a guiding
force to employment of forces, a review of history shows the basics of
doctrinal thought as early as the 17th century. King Louis XIV initiated
the organization and discipline that could be viewed as the beginnings of
doctrinal philosophy.4 Vauban, one of Louis XIV's military architects has
been credited with the doctrinal overlay of 17th century siege combat.
Although this fact is disputed by some researchers, substantial evidence
exists showing doctrinal guidance for the conduct of warfare during this
period.5 This time frame also coincides with the beginnings of civilian
administration of the military. Documentation of military activity may
have improved civilian understanding of the tasks associated with military
operations.
Moving into the Napoleonic era, major advancements in military
success came from an understanding of previously written accounts of
employment options. Napoleon used written accounts of previous battles
to enhance French capability in battles at Ulm and Austerlitz.6 His
success in combat was a result of careful study of the art and science of
warfare that allowed him to adjust combat maneuvers and exploit weak
areas in enemy defenses. His written accounts of battles were essential
doctrinal publications.
In the 1860s, Prussia was believed to be one of the most powerful
forces on the European continent.7 This was possible even though the
Prussians had not participated in combat for nearly two generations.
Organization, training, and doctrinal study of previous wars' successes
and failures made this possible. This perspective was provided by the
experiences of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Scharnhorst.
As warfare continued to evolve, so to did the capture of successes
and failures into written publications. This process continued into the
development of modern doctrine branches by each Service. These doctrine
publishing divisions still exist in all Services. Although doctrine is derived
from the same basic tenets, each Service views doctrine in substantially
different ways.
The Current Status of Doctrine
The difference in each Service's definition of doctrine demonstrates
how varied the opinions are on the subject of doctrine, its purpose, and its
value. Each Service adheres to the belief that doctrine provides the
guidance with which to employ forces. Doctrine provides the commander
with a baseline from which to operate. It philosophically frames
operations and allows understanding among a larger base of individuals.8
Doctrine does not limit operations and should not be thought of as a
prescribed means of accomplishing a stated objective. With that in mind,
how does each Service reflect its doctrine?
Service doctrine varies widely from Service to Service. Much of this
difference may be attributable to the level at which it is employed and the
degree with which tactics, techniques, and procedures are interspersed in
doctrinal publications.
The Marine Corps, with its mission of opposed amphibious assault,
has very detailed doctrine. This doctrine is divided into parcels covering
every conceivable unit and function both on the battlefield and in the rear
area. The Marine Corps has incorporated tactics, techniques, and
procedures into many of the documents it considers doctrine.9 This
provides philosophical understanding and the knowledge of employment
techniques that allows objective accomplishment.
The Army describes doctrine as the condensed expression of the
fundamental approach to fighting.10 Field Manual (FM) 100-5 does an
excellent job of describing the area, personnel, and psychology of modern
warfare. It describes concepts of employment while staying clear of tactics
discussions. The remaining 100 series publications are more detailed than
100-5 and are used to clarify intended means of accomplishing stated
objectives.
Air Force doctrine closely mirrors the philosophy of Army doctrine
with a discussion of laws of war, followed by a brief explanation of the
need for aerospace forces and the missions accomplished by those forces.11
To completely understand Air Force doctrine, missions, and capabilities
one should also read Major Command Manual (MCM) 3-1.12 The
combination of these publications allows a better understanding of how air
assets are employed to accomplish the Commander in Chiefs objectives.
The Navy has recently published its first volume of doctrine and is
surging to catch up with the abundance of doctrine being published by all
Services. Navy Doctrinal Publication 1 is an esoteric document
expounding the virtues of the laws of war, but says very little about
expectations of Navy capability.13
Each Service's doctrine is slanted toward justifying its roles and
missions. All Services duplicate effort on the esoteric portion of doctrine
preceding the description of Service specific capabilities. Each volume of
doctrine has served a vital purpose in the past, but analysis of future
employment opportunities has provided the catalyst for development of
joint doctrine.
Future of Doctrine
"Rare is the contingency plan that calls for a military Service to
operate completely independent of another service. Most situations
require interaction between two or more Services."14 General Horner,
Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) during Desert Storm,
added to this thought during a visit to Marine Corps Command and Staff
College. He discussed the need for military forces to join beyond Service
lines to resolve future problems involving National Security Objectives.
His historic perspective of Desert Storm has ingrained a positive viewpoint
of joint operations. In that conflict a knowledge of all Services and their
capabilities was required in order be successful as the JFACC.15
DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT DOCTRINE
Joint doctrine is the fundamental set of principles that guide the
employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward
a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in coordination with the Combatant Commands,
Services, and Joint Staff.16 How do Unified Commanders ensure joint
doctrine is used during joint force operations? The CJCS, General
Shalikashvili, has taken the lead in this area by making joint doctrine
directive.17 Does making joint doctrine directive provide the best solution
to the unorthodox situations today's military finds itself in? Or does
authoritative doctrine with room for manipulation by critical thinking
commanders make the most sense?
Although manning, equipping, and training is a Service
responsibility, Title 10 of United States Code establishes the Joint Chief
of Staff as the primary office of responsibility for the development of joint
doctrine.18 Currently, responsibility for joint doctrine resides in the Joint
Doctrine Division, Joint Plans and Interoperability, J-7, Joint Staff at the
Pentagon. This evolution began with the Department of Defense (DoD)
Reorganization Act in September 1986. This Act placed authority for
development of joint employment doctrine for the armed services in the
CJCS. In April 1987, DoD Directive 5100.1, in conjunction with Joint
Chiefs of Staff Pub 2, directed the CJCS to accept responsibility for joint
doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. It also required
coordination with all Services, Unified and Specified commands, and the
Joint Staff.19 (see Figure 1.1) This ensured all warfighting elements were
brought into the developmental stage of doctrine development.
Click here to view image
What is more, these directives required Service doctrine to be
consistent with joint doctrine established by the CJCS.21 This was a
significant change and to date has not been fully complied with by any
Service.22 A large portion of the hesitation by the Services is the length of
time required to bring a joint publication to fruition. Due to the review
and coordination requirements, joint publications take four to six years to
travel from thought to written guidance.23
Joint doctrine has made tremendous strides in the past five years.
From the belief the CJCS should provide written guidance for the
employment of joint forces, joint doctrine expanded to include 54 volumes
of doctrine and 42 volumes of tactics, techniques, and procedures. There is
also a Joint Electronic Library which encompasses all current and
proposed joint doctrinal publications.24 Does this mean joint doctrine is
being used to guide the unique situations America's military finds itself
called upon to execute? Does the CJCS's requirement for directive joint
doctrine have anything to do with effective employment of joint forces?
Looking at the development of doctrine will lead to better understanding of
the CJCS's position on making joint doctrine directive.
FROM RELEARNING LESSONS TO WRITTEN GUIDANCE
"Joint military operations involve the use of significant elements,
assigned or attached, of the Army, the Navy or Marine Corps, and the Air
Force, or two or more of these Services, operating under the single
commander authorized to exercise operational control."25
Throughout history land armies have fought by pitting forces
against each other in often brutal, face-to-face confrontation. These
armies advanced toward one another, weapons raging in a torrent of
carnage until one army could no longer stand the force of the other.26
Weapons development has widened the distance between warriors, but has
not eliminated this phenomenon Even with the advent of Naval forces,
the competing navies would line up and do battle until one ship sunk or
was driven away.
Early Experiences with Joint Operations
One of the earliest recorded instances of joint Navy and Army
operations occurred during the Battle at Hampton Roads.27 This battle
culminated with the Merrimac and the Monitor exchanging blows in an
effort to support the respective Armys' campaign at Yorktown. The Battle
at Hampton Roads began a revolution in warfare, bringing the Navy to the
forefront as a viable means of disseminating combat power ashore.
Three dimensional thought was brought to warfare early in World
War I, when Baron von Reichtofen's flying circus was used to propagate
the essence of aerial warfare.28 What began as aerial observation soon
turned to combat employment to exploit the advantage of the third
dimension. Many years passed as the Services learned how to work
together during combat.
Early in Vietnam, few operations required the employment of joint
forces. Ground units were generally segregated by Service and mission.29
Even air operations, which are easily integrated, were divided by firm
boundaries separating areas of employment into Navy, Air Force, and
Marine activity.30 This led to many instances of aircraft being jeopardized
by surface to air missile sites located in another Service's area of
responsibility. It also prevented one Service from attacking targets within
another Service's area of responsibility.81 The rules of engagement for
Operation Rolling Thunder, March 1965-October 1968, were directed by
the Joint Chief of Staff and added to at virtually every level below until
they reached the pilots flying the aircraft. These rules established
sanctuaries in North Vietnam which were soon used to employ and protect
North Vietnamese military assets. Other portions of these rules prevented
the closure of Haiphong harbor, and required US aircraft to attack in
daylight, during clear weather until very accurate bombing systems, like
laser guided bombs, could be fielded.32
Development of Jointness
As the war progressed, President Nixon's objectives led planners
toward joint employment of forces. The scope and complexity of missions
like Rolling Thunder and Linebacker led some military leaders to consider
written guidance for joint employment of forces.33 Increased firepower
and survivability convinced individual Service members that fighting as a
joint force was a better way to continue operations.
Development of doctrine has come a long way since the end of
Vietnam, but it is a slow process. There is a natural resistance to change
that Robert Heilbroner referred to as the viscosity of history.34 This
resistance may be viewed as a desire to continue doing things the way they
have been done in the past. Military Services heighten this desire through
parochialism and size. This creates a natural slowness with respect to the
development of joint doctrine. The bipolar world after Vietnam also
effected the resistance to joint doctrine development.
Cold War Effects on Joint Doctrine
The Cold War created an environment conducive to maintaining
large forces. Defense of the United States was based on use of
conventional forces combined with a heavy forward presence.35 These
force levels made it cumbersome for individual Services to cross Service
boundaries to operate as joint forces. With forces large enough to handle
operations without joining across Service boundaries, there was little
motivation to develop joint doctrine. This says nothing about the internal
motivation to remain within a single Service due to Service parochialism.
Post Cold War Priorities
The end of the Cold War brought an end to an entire strategy of
military employment. The status quo of employing military organizations
in traditional manners ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The global
security environment deteriorated from the known entity of forty years
and American military leaders were left to determine the means with
which the military would accomplish its mission. This post Cold War
mission has been much less defined than the bipolar world before 1989. It
is no surprise the Goldwaters-Nichols Act and Defense Reorganization Act
roughly coincided with the fall of the Berlin Wall.36
Many guests to Marine Corps Command and Staff College have
stated that future employment of forces would require crossing Service
boundaries. Downsizing military organizations is part of the perceived
peace dividend brought on by the end of the Cold War.37 It is a long term
divestment of assets that spawns resistance as Services perceive their
portion of the military budget dwindling. The early 1990s saw the largest
decrease in American assets stationed in Europe since World War II.38
Record percentages of US military assets were returned to US soil. This
leads to the question of whether the United States military has retained
the power and capability to employ with little or no notice. The Service
Chiefs clearly believe meeting the security needs of the National
Command Authorities will require operations in a joint environment.39
This heightens the importance of joint doctrine as the guiding force to joint
employment.
EXPERIENCING JOINT DOCTRINE
Knowledge of joint doctrine and understanding how to employ it has
become increasingly important as the global environment continues to
skew traditional roles and missions of the armed services. The cumulative
effect of joint operations has been understood for many years.
"The allied air campaign of the Pacific from 20 August to 15
November 1942 provided a shining example of what joint employment of
air power from a joint airfield could do. It all centered around the men of
Cactus Air Force defending Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. The Navy,
Marine, and Air Force fliers set aside Service rivalry, adapted their
Service doctrine, employed a single air component "commander", and
overcame overwhelming odds to defeat the Japanese."40
Since 1989, the United States has found itself committed to a
national emergency and numerous situations protecting national security
interest or the rights of fellow nations. The Gulf War was the only one of
these that followed traditional expectations of military operations. The
remainder have required interpretation and manipulation of traditional
roles in order to satisfy the National Command Authorities. How has joint
doctrine affected the outcome of these situations? A brief look at
Operation Desert Storm (Iraq), Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq), Restore
Hope (Somalia), Restore Democracy (Haiti), and Proud Shield (Somalia II)
may reflect some insight on joint doctrine's usefulness.
Joint Doctrine's Effect on War Scenarios
Much has been published concerning Operation Desert Storm. Most
of these accounts have projected a positive light on military activity in the
Gulf region. Some critical issues preceded the successes of Desert Storm;
one of them will be explored here.
A key component in the success of Desert Storm was military and
political leadership with a memory of Vietnam. An explicit desire to avoid
the mistakes of Vietnam reverberated through many decisions during the
planning and execution of Desert Storm.41 This advanced the idea of
keeping military decision making as close to the war as possible. But
making decisions 8,000 miles from the Beltway42 required extreme
confidence in the leaders making the decisions. An approved format for
making these decisions made this long-distance confidence a little easier to
nurture.43
This format was joint doctrine and where it was applicable to Desert
Storm, it served a valid purpose. As early as August 1990, theater
guidance messages referenced JCS publications as a source of guidance.
These ranged from OPSEC awareness guidance to policy and planning
guidance for theater construction. Even where joint publications did not
exist, references to joint messages and joint directives were incorporated
into Desert Storm directives.44
The activities supporting war scenarios are immense. World War II
required full mobilization of US industry and the economy.45 Desert
Storm required a substantial mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces as
well as substantial mobilization of the transportation industry.46 These
mobilization activities do not just happen by accident. Well-documented
joint doctrine as well as joint tactics, techniques, and procedures defined
the road to success for mobilization of Desert Storm forces.47 Would
making joint doctrine directive enhance its use by Desert Storm
commanders? The military leaders of Desert Storm possessed an obvious
appreciation of the value of joint activities that would take place in the
ensuing months. To obtain the level of success that is generally bestowed
upon Desert Storm, joint doctrine and a working knowledge of joint
operations must be credited with helping to achieve that success.
Joint Doctrine in Operations Other Than War
Many Operations Other Than War (OOTW) have been placed upon
the military since the termination of Desert Storm. Operation Provide
Comfort (OPC) was initiated at the conclusion of Desert Storm in an effort
to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq. OPC was both a peacekeeping and
pseudo-nation building mission managed out of headquarters in Turkey.48
The nature of these operations resulted in the development of non-specific
objectives by the Unified Commander responsible for these activities. The
time relationship to Desert Storm also influenced the manner in which
operations were established. Little emphasis was placed on joint doctrine
as the guiding principle for establishing tactics, techniques, and
procedures for joint operations.49 This resulted in incongruous activities
every time units were replaced on their normal rotation schedule. Often,
the entire concept of operations was re-invented with each rotation of units
supporting OPC. The Marine Corps elected not to use joint doctrine,
"Because of our familiarity with [Marine Corps] rapid response planning
and confirmation brief." All Marine Corps plans were briefed using
Marine doctrinal format.50 Joint doctrine could have clearly helped by
adding a stabilizing effect to the continued operations in northern Iraq.
The most sobering incident during OPC was the mistaken shoot
down of two US Army helicopters by two US Air Force F-15Cs. Better
understanding of the procedures established in joint publications could
have led to better control of the assets available and might have prevented
this horrible incident.51 To make matters worse, a similar situation
occurred four months earlier, but was diffused before the situation turned
to catastrophe.52 If joint doctrine had been directive, planners would have
been persuaded to research joint procedures and terminate the helicopter
sequence of events before it began. This has not been the only example
where joint doctrine could have been used to improve a given situation.
The situation in Somalia turned sour in January 1991. Lack of
stability resulted in an enormous shortage of food which led to fighting
between rogue factions, further reducing the stability of Somalia. The US
embassy requested immediate evacuation and the actions that followed
began Operation Provide Relief and led to Operation Restore Hope.53
Provide Relief was fraught with problems from the very beginning. Forces
were employed out of Mombassa, Kenya to fly food into the southern half
of Somalia. The instability between warring factions within Somalia
prevented safe passage of the relief flights. The inability to establish relief
facilities in Somalia forced the President to initiate Operation Restore
Hope.
A Unified Task Force consisting of coalition members from 21
nations embarked on a plan to secure sea and aerial port facilities. These
would allow the import of humanitarian relief supplies so that starving
Somalis could begin the process of stabilizing their country. Due in part to
the lack of formalized direction, this operation was filled with honor
stories about lack of guidance toward the troops trying to accomplish the
mission.54
Failure to use joint doctrine, or some formalized guidance, resulted
in numerous problems. Extreme amounts of time where used to set up the
relief effort, relief supplies did not get to the people needing it, and US
Marines and Soldiers were put at peril trying to feed a starving nation.
The Humanitarian Assistance Newsletter published an article about
command and control during Operation Restore Hope. The newsletter
claimed individuals brought together on the joint staff for Operation
Restore Hope could not understand the unique relationships between
members of this staff.55 This is an example where use of joint doctrine and
joint definitions would have eliminated problems. The only question
remaining is how to get tasked forces to use and understand joint doctrine.
This is a special problem when dealing with coalition forces in
humanitarian relief situations. Since coalition forces do not fall into the
US chain of command, it is difficult trying to prescribe joint doctrine.
Early in 1995, the United Nations (UN) forces commanding
operations in Somalia asked for assistance in leaving Somalia. Lieutenant
General Anthony Zinni, USMC, was assigned as the Commander of the
Combined Task Force (CCTF) and began preparations for the orderly
withdrawal of UN forces from Mogadishu. The Combined Task Force
consisted of forces from a variety of nations that were brought into the
planning cycle and introduced to joint doctrine.56 Joint doctrine was the
cornerstone for the successful extraction of UN forces from Mogadishu. It
is important to note General Zinni has been involved in five operations of
this type over the last three years. His unique experience level could be
the determining factor in the success of Proud Shield. Not all of these
situations occur half way around the world. In 1994, the President
committed US troops to duty in Haiti.
Operation Restore Democracy has presented yet another interesting
scenario for US forces. Re-inserting Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the
President of Haiti hardly sounds like a mission for US military forces.
However, in the fall of 1994, that is exactly where the 10th Mountain
Division found themselves. This mission, nation assistance, is defined in
joint doctrine.57 This operation presented several unique situations
worthy of discussion.
The tempo of operations throughout the military has stretched
deployable units to their limit trying to satisiy the directives of the
National Command Authorities. This was a contributing factor in the
selection of an Army unit to board naval vessels and proceed toward Haiti.
The coordination required to make this operation a possibility was
immense. There were also numerous problems that had to be resolved
through the cooperative efforts of Army and Navy forces. Did joint
doctrine specifically play a major role in this success?
The push for joint understanding spawned by the development of
joint doctrine made this operation possible. Joint doctrine provided the
basis for being able to plan and execute in an environment unfamiliar to
the participants. Understanding joint doctrine put all elements into a pool
of common understanding and played a part in being able to do something
as unprecedented as putting Army helicopters onboard Navy vessels.
DIRECTIVE JOINT DOCTRINE: USE IT WITH JUDGMENT
Joint doctrine is not the perfect solution to all situations. The
success of non-traditional employment of forces will vary with the level of
critical thinking skills and the ability to adjust to the situation.58 There
has been and will continue to be a remarkable change in the role of
military forces as we approach the 21st century.59 Traditional warfare is
transcending a revolution that may skew our view of what the military is
all about. Alvin and Heidi Toffler raise pertinent questions as to the
applicability of guns and bullets forces when future wars may be waged on
the techno-battlefield. As the United States progresses through the
revolution in warfare, great minds may take precedence over great
strength. The ability to think critically about the situation and determine
the best avenue of approach will play an ever stronger role in situations
experienced by US forces.
This ability to select the best approach does not happen without
direction and purpose. Critical thinking skills may be nurtured and
improved, but until everyone thinks on the same plane, written guidance
will have to be available to increase the level of understanding among all
participants. Joint doctrine, in conjunction with Service doctrine, plays a
critical role in leveling the playing field.
When joint doctrine was virtually ignored during Operation Provide
Comfort, additional work was required to establish procedures with each
rotation of assigned personnel. The lack of purpose and direction could
have been solved by viewing the previously learned lessons that exist in
joint doctrine. This was restated clearly by General Shalikashvili when he
said the military should be compelled to prepare to fight as a joint force.
Improving interoperability will "prevent tragedies inherent in hasty
planning and lack of preparation."60 Relearning those lessons at a cost of
two aircraft and 26 lives is not a viable option in today's environment.
Public opinion, which is directly tied to funding dollars, must not be
allowed to wane in the face of poor decisions.
Desert Storm is a great model for study, not because so much was
done so well, but because so much was done. The leadership involved in
the Gulf War realized very early the importance of not learning by bad
experiences. They turned quickly to joint doctrine to deter the
opportunities for failure and built a model of success by viewing the past
as having value in the future. Although joint doctrine was not directive
during Desert Storm, the commanders were smart enough to use available
help, in the form of joint doctrine, to ease the stresses involved in
designing a military campaign.
In Somalia and Haiti, planners have used joint doctrine to pursue
opportunities that may have been missed otherwise. These non-military
uses of armed forces create the greatest potential for disaster, particularly
when the media is involved. Many of these unorthodox situations are
addressed in joint doctrine, and although specific details may not be found,
broad guidance exists in these documents. The United States cannot
afford to disregard prior experiences in a world so fraught with
uncertainty.
In the past five years, the US military has enjoyed an ever
increasing knowledge and understanding of joint doctrine. The success of
missions based on joint understanding cannot be denied. But, until all US
military personnel acquire an understanding of joint doctrine and how it
should be employed, it should remain directive from the CJCS. This
emphasis builds the knowledge base and allows greater opportunities for
the military when it finds itself in a unique situation somewhere around
the globe.
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Washington DC: US Government Printing Press. 1994.
Shalikashvili, John M., General, USA, Chairmen of the Joint Chief of
Staff. "A Word from the Chairman." Joint Forces Quarterly.
Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies. Summer
1994.
Sowell, Lewis C., Jr. "Base Development and the Rapid Deployment Force:
A Window to the Future." National Security Affairs Monograph
Series 82-5. Washington DC: National Defense University Press.
1982.
Sullivan, Gordon R., General, USA, Chief of Staff of the Army. "America's
Army: Strategic Force for Today and Tomorrow." Defense 95, issue
1. Washington DC: US Government Printing Press. 1995.
Title 10, United States Code, as Amended by the DoD Reorganization Act
of 1986.
Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. War And Anti-War. Boston: Little Brown. 1993.
Turner, Steven L., Colonel, USAF, Vice Wing Commander, Operation
Provide Comfort, Incerlik AB, Turkey. Interviewed by author 9
January 1995.
Zinni, Anthony, General, USMC, Commander Combined Task Force,
Operation Proud Shield. Lecture given to Marine Corps Command and
Staff College, QuantLco, VA. 3 April 1995.
NOTES
1 Armed Forces Staff College PUB 1, x. This statement and many like it have
been repeated by numerous guests at Marine Corps Command and Staff College 1994-95,
to include General Horner, Air Component Commander of Desert Storm, and General
Zinni, Joint Force Commander, Somalia.
2 Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms, 23 March 1994, 121.
3 Captain George M. Moore, USN, Colonel Vic Budura, USAF, & Joan Johnson-
Freese. "Joint Space Doctrine: Catapulting into the Future." Joint Forces Quarterly, no.
5 (Summer 1994): 71.76.
4 Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy (New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1986), 64-66.
5 Paret, 82-86.
6 Paret, 128-142.
7 Paret, 281-290.
8 General George H. Decker, USA, Chief of Staff of the Army, 1960-62. Taken
from the inside front cover of "Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 94.
9 LTC Crookston, USMC, Commander, School for Advanced Warfighting,
interviewed by author, 22 March 1995.
10 Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the
Army, June 1993)
11 Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States
Air Force, Volume 1, (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, March 1992)
12 MCM 3-1 is a series of tactical employment documents that provide guidance
for the employment of fighter aircraft. Volumes cover general employment concepts and
aircraft integration, threat analysis, and tactics, techniques, and procedures for the
employment of specific aircraft types.
13 Navy Doctrine Pub (NDP) 1, Naval Doctrine (Washington, DC: Department of
the Navy, March 1994). More volumes of NDP are planned, but not available at the
publication of this paper.
14 Lewis C. Sowell Jr., (1982), "Base Development and the Rapid Deployment
Force: A Window to the Future.", National Security Affairs Monograph Series 82-5, p. 21.
National Defense University Press, Washington, DC
15General Charales Horner, "Air Operations During Operation Desert Storm,"
lecture presented to Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 6
December 1994. General Horner was candid about the need for all Services to
understand not only their own doctrine, but the need to understand the historical
perspective of each Service's doctrine, You got to know where they come from."
16 Joint Pub 1-02, 201.
17 General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, "Strategy at the Heart of the Budget"
Defense 94, issue 3.
18 Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the DoD Reorganization Act of
1986, 52.
19 Title 10, 52.
20 Reprinted from Joint Publication 1-01.1, 2.
21 Title 10, 52.
22 LTC Daly, Joint Doctrine Division, Joint Plans and Interoperability, J-7, Joint
Staff, interviewed by author, November 1994.
23 Joint Publication (JP) 1-01.1, Compendium of Joint Doctrine Publications
Abstracts (Washington DC, Joint Doctrine Division, J-7, Joint Staff, January 1994), 6.
24 Joint Pub 1-01.1, i
25 Joint Pub 1-02, 203.
26 Paret, 11-120
27 James M. McPherson, The Atlas of the Civil War (New York: Prentice Hall
Macmillan, 1994), 60-65.
28 Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Case Studies in the Achievement of Air
Superiority (Washington DC: Center for Air Force History, 1991), 1.60.
29 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York, Viking Press, 1983), 349.380.
Geographic boundaries were established in Korea and Vietnam. The same thought was
proposed by the Navy during Operation Desert Storm planning. This idea was
terminated by General Norman Swartzkopf, USA, CENTCOM Commander.
30 Karnow, 388-412.
31 Cooling, 505-519.
32 Cooling, 514-516.
33 Karnow, 500-580.
34 David Jablonsky, "US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military
Affairs", Parameters, volume XXIV, (Autumn 1994): 18-36.
35 General Gordon R. Sullivan, "America's Army: Strategic Force for Today and
Tomorrow" Defense 95, issue 1, 7-15.
36 Lieutenant Colonel Peter W. Chiarelli, "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols", Joint
Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1993, 71-81
Many factors were involved in the development of Goldwater-Nichols. The need
for Defense Department reorganization goes back to World War II. The failings in
Korea, Vietnam, Desert I, and even the success in Grenada were driving factors in
developing the Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986.
37 W. McKinley, "Decreasing Organizational Size: To Untangle or not to
Untangle?", Academy of Mangement Review, 17(1), 112-123.
38 General Charles Horner, 6 December 1994.
39 Defense 95, Issue 1.
40 Colonel Micheal T. Probasco, Joint Force Air Component Commander or
Coordinator?, Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, AL, (1994), 1.
41 General Charles Horner, 6 December 1994.
42 Beltway is a term used in the Washington DC area to encompass the decisions
and activities of Congress, the Senate, the White House, and the myriad of special
interest groups that effect policy decisions.
43 Author served as the 4th Wing, Provisional, primary Desert Storm planner
and advisor to the Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) Staff.
44 Operation Desert Shield/Storm inter-theater directive messages, compiled by
Marine Corps University Research Center, Southwest Asia section.
45 Stephen E. Ambrose, D.Day June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War
II, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 22-26.
46 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: An Interim Report to Congress,
(Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, July 1991), 21-1.
47 Joint Pub 1-01.1, ii-v. and Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 15.1.
48 Colonel Steve Turner, Deputy Wing Commander, Incerlik AB, Turkey for a
three month rotation during Operation Provide Comfort, interviewed by author 9
January 1995.
49 Major Robert Harvey, USAF and Major Jim Drew, USAF, interviewed by
author 2 February 1995.
50 Operation Provide Comfort, BLT 2/8 Narrative Summary, 19 April 1991.
51 Joint Pub (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington DC, Joint
Doctrine Division, J-7, Joint Staff; 9 September 1993).
Also see General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, A Word from the Chairman, Joint Forces Quarterly, (Washington DC, Institute for
National Strategic Studies, Summer 1994), 4-5.
52 Harvey, 2 February 1995.
53 JP 3-0, v14-v16.
54 Major Tim Kolb, USMC, interviewed by author, 7 March 1995.
55 Center for Army Lessons Learned, US Army Combined Arms Command,
Humanitarian Assistance Newsletter, No. 92-x, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1992).
DALIS, the Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System has stated that use
of joint doctrine would have expedited the employment of humanitarian relief in Somalia.
56 Admiral Gage, Commander Amphibious Task Force-Proud Shield, lecture
presented to Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 3 April 1995.
57 JP 3-0, v-10.
58 Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, "Proud Shield," lecture presented to
Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 3 April 1995.
59 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 11,
64-79.
60 General John M. Shalikashvili, 5.
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