Partnership for Peace: Discerning Fact from Fiction
Authored by Dr. William T. Johnsen, Dr. Thomas-Durell Young.
August 15, 1994
21 Pages
Brief Synopsis
The authors analyze and assess Partnership for Peace (PfP) from the perspective of the political realities which govern NATO. They counter the critics of PfP with an analysis of its exact provisions. Moreover, by drawing on the Alliance's historical record regarding expansion, they argue that PfP is the best and most realistic means available to resolve the prickly issue of NATO enlargement. The authors do not ignore existing and potential shortcomings in PfP and specify where conceptual, as well as practical, problems will require the Alliance's immediate action.
Introduction
The January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels could arguably be called one of the most important, if not momentous, meetings in the Alliance's history. Labeled privately by some only a few months prior to its convening as "a summit without a theme," the subsequent meeting proved the pessimists incorrect and once again reinforced NATO's relevance. The Alliance endorsed a common approach toward future political and military integration of its former adversaries to the East ("Partnership for Peace"–PfP, in NATO parlance). This includes a framework for conducting future military operations between NATO and the militaries of partnership countries. Moreover, the Alliance accomplished these far reaching agreements while maintaining consensus that NATO will continue to function as a collective defense, vice collective security, organization. Hence, far from being moribund, the Alliance demonstrated its contemporary vitality by adopting a policy which could well expand its membership at some future date, as well as providing a practical means to assist in that process.
As is usually the case whenever national leaders confront important issues, these efforts have been subjected to widespread and vigorous criticisms. Some detractors complained that the Alliance's initiatives were too strongly influenced by the Clinton administration's anxiety over Russian, and Boris Yeltsin's, rather than Central and East European concerns. Others faulted NATO's refusal to extend immediate security guarantees and membership offers to reforming states in the east. The lack of a stated timetable for membership of partnership countries also troubled some former officials and commentators. Conversely, others feared expansion would dilute NATO and transform it from a collective defense body into a collective security organization. Outside the Alliance, summit results did not fulfill the expectations of many Eastern European leaders, who still find their individual and collective security concerns far from resolved.
These arguments are not altogether without merit. If nothing else, the Alliance can be accused of having disappointed many states to its east as regards the prospect for future membership. However, it is still too early to pass definitive judgment on the success or failure of the PfP initiative. Moreover, these criticisms fail to place the program in its proper context. The purpose of the essay, therefore, is to assess PfP comprehensively. This paper provides a broader understanding of the workings of NATO and the immensely difficult challenges it faces in conducting cooperative relations with former adversaries in Eastern and Central Europe.
Access Full Report [PDF]: Partnership for Peace: Discerning Fact from Fiction
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
