An Analysis Of Gulf War Psyops And Their Applicability To Future Operations
CSC 1993
SUBJECT AREA - Operations
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: AN ANALYSIS OF GULF WAR PSYOPS AND THEIR APPLI-
CABILITY TO FUTURE OPERATIONS
AUTHOR: Major Peter A. Whitenack, United States Marine Corps
THESIS: The many-faceted PSYOP contribution to victory in
the Persian Gulf War should be examined in more detail to
determine how its lessons may be better integrated into
preparations for dealing with conflicts in the lean times
ahead.
BACKGROUND: U.S. military planners were pivotal in
developing and executing a coordinated, multi-national
combined arms theater campaign that succeeded in defeating
Iraq. Time for planning and coordination was a decisive
determinant of this success, and this type of opportunity may
not be afforded us to prepare similarly for future opera-
tions. PSYOPS in the Persian Gulf War actively spanned the
conflict and supported all elements of the theater campaign.
While integration of PSYOPS into operational planning was not
conducted according to doctrine, it was nevertheless
effective in all mediums, significantly contributing to mass
capitulation of Iraqi forces and an overwhelming victory for
the Coalition. While PSYOPS efforts successfully comple-
mented operations in the field, planning was initiated from
the bottom up for approval.
RECOMMENDATION: That psychological warfare operations in
the Persian Gulf War be thoroughly studied for establishment
of future doctrinal concepts in order to realize the full
potential of this effective force multiplier.
AN ANALYSIS OF GULF WAR PSYOPS AND THEIR
APPLICABILITY TO FUTURE OPERATIONS
OUTLINE
THESIS: The many-faceted PSYOP contribution to victory
in the Persian Gulf War should be examined in more detail to
determine how its lessons may be better integrated into
preparations for dealing with conflicts in the lean times
ahead.
I. Foundation for Analysis
A. Time as a determinant for success
B. Concern with force reduction
1. PSYOPS to facilitate objectives
2. Offset degradation of force potential
C. Basis of Gulf War PSYOP analysis
II. Historical Overview of Gulf War PSYOPS
A. Genesis of command
B. Operational establishment
III. PSYOPS Planning
A. Campaign description
B. Tying operations to the mission
C. Regional sensitivities, the Coalition
IV. Propaganda Development
A. Traditional forms
B. New campaign initiatives
V. Product Application
A. Pre-air war dissemination
B. Pre-ground assault dissemination
C. Delivery systems discussion
VI. Impact and Potential
A. Results and interpretations
B. Views to the future
AN ANALYSIS OF GULF WAR PSYOPS AND THEIR
APPLICABILITY TO FUTURE OPERATIONS
U.S. military planners were pivotal in developing and
executing a coordinated, multi-national combined arms theater
campaign that succeeded in defeating Iraq. The U.S.-led
Coalition built a multi-national armed force capable of offen-
sive operations, and executed massive logistics preparations
in order to support and sustain it. Inasmuch as the
Coalition had sufficient time to plan and prepare for the
offensive, forces exploited the time available to reach the
highest possible levels of unit proficiency. Time, in this
case, as a decisive determinant of success, was a significant
advantage that may not be available in future crises. This,
coupled with the new politics of the defense budget and
ongoing force restructuring, is forcing us to think about
ways to fight more efficiently.
In searching for ways to maintain future mission
effectiveness in the face of force drawdown, it would be wise
to examine the impact that psychological operations (PSYOPS)
had in facilitating U.S. objectives in the Gulf War. Accord-
ing to the final report to Congress by the Department of
Defense, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, (3:87) the PYSOP
effort was focused on breaking the Iraqi will to resist, and
on increasing the fears of Iraqi soldiers. On G-Day,
24 February 1991, the Commander-in-Chief, Central Command
remarked that ".... .we were succeeding beyond our expecta-
tions...I was overwhelmed," (10:456) regarding his campaign
in which the first day of the ground offensive saw a shift
from deliberate attack to exploitation. The unexpected
degree of success enjoyed by the Coalition can be directly
attributed to the manner in which PSYOPS complemented the
overall conduct of operations against the enemy in the Kuwait
Theater of Operations.
As traditional "users of propaganda against the enemy,"
PSYOP units generated initiatives during the Persian Gulf War
which employed standard, dedicated communications assets
(principally broadcasting and printing equipment) in support
of combat operations. (8:25) Across the theater, these
activities complemented Coalition operations and directly con-
tributed to the unexpectedly rapid demise of Saddam's war
machine. Psychological warfare operations took on both
subtle and overt forms during the Gulf War. In combination,
they constituted a significant force multiplier in enabling
the Coalition to inflict a crushing defeat upon Iraqi forces,
and in decisively concluding operations with minimal loss of
life. The many-faceted PSYOP contribution to victory in the
Gulf War is worth examining in more detail to determine how
its lessons may be better integrated into preparations for
dealing with conflicts in the lean times ahead.
Before Coalition forces fired the first shots in the
Persian Gulf War, a different type of force had already been
assembled for months, and was engaged in a pitched battle for
dominance over Iraqi forces. Far away from headlines and
newscasts, PSYOPS initiatives were bombarding Saddam's empire
in the form of wave upon wave of leaflet and radio assaults.
Planing for psychological operations began immediately after
the invasion of Kuwait. In early August 1990, a PSYOP
planning group consisting of military and civilian personnel
from CENTCOM, SOCOM, and the 4th Psychological Operations
Group (POG) from Fort Bragg was formed at HQ, CENTCOM,
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. This group became the
nucleus of the PSYOP command and control element that
deployed to Saudi Arabia in late August. The 4th POG command
element was followed shortly thereafter in September by its
subordinate 8th PSYOP Battalion, task-organized with elements
of the PSYOP Dissemination Battalion (PDB), to form the 8th
Psychological Operations Task Force. The POTF's deployment
began what was to become a highly successful use of PSYOPS in
support of combat operations in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and
Iraq.
Persian Gulf War strategic and tactical field level
psychological operations supported the goals and conditions
set forth by President Bush and other Coalition leaders upon
an international scale. The field level implementation of
those international goals and conditions were, as a matter of
course, effected through theater level military operations.
Integral to those campaign executions were a series of well
established, time-tested precepts, judiciously applied by
CENTCOM psychological warfare operators. The Persian Gulf
War PSYOP campaign basically mirrored the missions of CINC,
US CENTCOM, and alternately the Saudi Armed Forces Commander,
Lieutenant General Kahlid Bin Sultan. Upon deployment, the
4th PSYOP began a comprehensive analysis of both of these
commanders' missions, as well as the combined missions of
units subordinate to their command, and developed a guideline
of probable PSYOP-based mission objectives.
During the initial stages of Operation DESERT SHIELD,
CENTCOM's principal goal was the defense of Saudi Arabia.
The rapid deployment of tens of thousands of U.S. and non-
Arab foreign forces to what had for almost 600 years been a
"closed kingdom", set the stage for complicating an already
extremely tense situation. In support of easing these
tensions, the 4th PSYOP augmented the commander's mission by
demonstrating to the regional Arab population that the United
States was only one member of a broader coalition force.
Further, through a portrayal of encompassed unity which
included Arab forces, the goal of the United States govern-
ment was not to conquer or dominate the Arab world as an
imperialist venture. This task was principally accomplished
during the initial months of DESERT SHIELD through the distri-
bution of a videocassette message to Saudi Arabian and other
regional television stations. The regional broadcast of this
multinational-power videotape was "designed to demonstrate
U.S. resolve and encourage support for Coalition efforts in
the region." (12:7) The format of the videocassette was
grafted from international news cuts which featured prominent
Arab and other international speakers at United Nations
councils and various Arab regional summits. First, it
demonstrated the political and military strength of the
combined forces which were arrayed against Iraq. Moreover,
the tape not only strengthened America's argument as to
Coalition partnership, but also assured in no uncertain terms
that the U.S. was there to do good things and, more
importantly, that the Iraqis were not. As Coalition force
levels in Saudi Arabia increased and missions changed with
respect to the changing political and military situation,
these videocassette supporting efforts similarly changed, by
phase, to reflect offensive, consolidation, and enemy
prisoner operations throughout Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq.
With closure of forces, the anticipation of hostilities
dictated the development of other, more traditional forms of
propaganda. Several specific campaigns were orchestrated,
including operations dealing with the individual Iraqi
soldier, elements within the Iraqi command and control
structure, and operations which exclusively addressed the
Iraqi civilian population. The campaign organized against
the individual Iraqi soldier was divided into specific time-
phased campaigns including pre-air war and several post-air
war segments. These distinct campaigns began development
simultaneously during early September, and were executed
variously as opportunities became available, or as required.
The Persian Gulf War PSYOPS campaign began with the
utilization of standard, doctrinal psychological warfare
processes. (4:54) The initial process of target analysis
allowed for development of PSYOPS campaign objectives in line
with military objectives, as determined and delineated by
CENTCOM. Probable psychological vulnerabilities of the
target audience were analyzed and projected over time to
determine a systematic methodology for delivery. An order of
relevant priorities was then established, which 4th PSYOPS
eventually utilized as a flexible baseline in the conduct of
its campaign. This target analysis effort culminated in a
PSYOP campaign which emphasized continual themes of "the
futility of resistance; inevitability of defeat; surrender;
desertion and defection; abandonment of equipment; and
blaming the war on Saddam Hussein." (1:16) The considera-
tion of national policy guidelines was also indoctrinated
within that process; a process which, in essence, is not at
all unlike a civilian advertising campaign, which attempts to
ascertain audience acceptance and appeal to any given topic
through analytical research.
Throughout the buildup period from September to December
1990, the majority of effort concentrated on target analysis
and campaign control efforts, with initial planning directed
toward easily coordinated and obtainable PSYOP dissemination
methods. In addition to the videocassette operation already
discussed, PSYOP materials were disseminated upon their
distinctive audiences through three basic methodologies. The
first method, and most effective, was aerial leaflet dissemi-
nation. Scripted field level radio transmissions, and a
combination of both ground and air loudspeaker broadcasts
provided the two additional techniques used throughout the
conflict.
Kuwait Theater of Operations-generated PSYOPS materials
were required to pass through several approval levels prior
to achieving final acceptance for target audience dissemina-
tion. These various acceptance levels included, but were not
limited to, the Commander, 4th PSYOPS, CENTCOM's J-3 staff
coordinator, as well as Headquarters for Saudi Arabian
General Khalid and General Schwarzkopf. Although General
Schwartzkopf did not personally approve or disapprove every
product type, there were specific instances where he
personally did become involved in the process. Streamlining
measures in the approval process were delegated to subordi-
nate echelons. Fail-safe approval mechanisms were estab-
lished to avoid the possible devastating, negative impact
which an improper message or appeal might incur upon an
already hostile Iraqi audience. If leaflets, tapes, radio
scripts or any other PSYOP materials did not meet specific
cultural, contextual or tactical criteria as defined by the
various levels of approval authority, they were returned for
modification, resubmission or destruction, as deemed
appropriate.
Leaflet development proved to be a very tedious process,
due in principle to the many layers of consideration and
acceptance as discussed, as well as the physical distance
between staffing and printing facilities. Actual leaflet
development occurred at Riyadh, with digitized imagery
transmission to PDB printing facilities at Dhahran. Although
leaflet themes were being continually generated since
September, the first officially acknowledged instance of
dissemination did not occur until the 12th of January, when
Kuwait City was targeted with two distinct leaflet variants.
(6:45)
Development of the 29.1 million propaganda leaflets which
were eventually printed for dissemination in the Kuwait
Theater of Operations took place within a jointly-
coordinated, combined propaganda cell in Riyadh. (12.7) The
combined cell established functional control over the genera-
tion of all leaflet, radio, script, deceptive, and other
PSYOP materials. Available within the combined cell were
experienced Saudi and Kuwaiti military PSYOP personnel, who
worked both in the development of new propaganda concepts and
in modifying many of the concepts which had already been
developed. Leaflet development was designed to foster and
expound upon key action points or "verbs" determined in
target analysis as enemy vulnerabilities. (6:42) These key
"verbs" were considered essential to successful execution of
the PSYOP campaign as it related to the operational scheme.
For example, during the pre-ground war campaign, key action
leaflet verbs were developed for exploitation such as:
Saddam--Death--Hunger--Bombing--Family--Cease Resistance--Be
Safe, etc. Key verbiage, multi- national expertise, PSYOP
themes integrated with operational planning, and high quality
printing control resulted in a viable PSYOP medium which was
extensively used throughout the Kuwait Theater of Operations.
While efforts for popular support of Saddam's overthrow
were being made by President Bush and other Coalition and
world leaders, PSYOP leaflet and radio broadcasting campaigns
disseminated parallel messages upon the Iraqi military and
civilian populations. The principal method for leaflet
dissemination was through aerial delivery. Prior to combat
operations, leaflets were disseminated by C-130 aircraft;
they were dropped from high altitudes along the southern
Kuwaiti border and followed wind patterns to cover the
majority of front-line Iraqi units in Kuwait. Specially
configured M-129E1 leaflet bombs were later utilized
effectively by B-52, F-16 and F/A-18 aircraft throughout the
theater.
Leaflet delivery supported both combat and deception
operations across the entire theater and had a significant
impact in contributing to degradation of enemy morale and
will to fight. The coordination of leaflet operations with
bombing of enemy front-line positions was particularly
effective. Leaflet deliveries warning of impending bombing
missions on specific units and sites were actually followed
by the promised bombings, making the PSYOP campaign credible
among Iraqi soldiers, and producing large numbers of
desertions and defections. (11:9) Leaflets warning of
impending amphibious invasion by U.S. forces were given
credence and likewise supported that deception and, even by
conservative estimates, helped to divert at least two enemy
divisions to the coast. (1:18) Leaflets overprinted with
VII and XVIII Airborne Corps' unit insignia were intention-
ally disseminated along avenues of approach into Iraqi
positions where CENTCOM wanted the Iraqis to believe the main
U.S. effort would be concentrated. Iraqi troop movements
were subsequently monitored, confirming the credibility which
the leaflets had in eliciting such a response.
Radio and loudspeaker operations similarly complemented
combat and deception operations. Throughout the Persian Gulf
War, many hundreds of hours of intrusive radio broadcasts
were made through both open and clandestine radio trans-
missions. "Voice of the Gulf" and the "Radio Free Kuwait"
campaigns are examples of such 4th PSYOP initiatives. "Radio
Free Kuwait," for example, communicated exclusively to the
Kuwaiti resistance movement with instructions to that
organization's operations in support of the Coalition's
invasion timetable.
Other PSYOP radio intrusions into Iraqi airspace were
physically accomplished by two methods. The first method to
be initiated entailed ground based Special Forces teams dis-
persed along the Saudi/Kuwaiti border in early October and
November. Utilizing vehicular mounted low power (AM)
transmitters, these early broadcasts targeted Iraqi military
personnel within occupied Kuwait. The second 4th PSYOP
broadcast initiative consisted of Voice of the Gulf (VOG)
transmissions, which typically broadcast 18 hours per day on
multiple AM and FM frequencies. Radio scripts were developed
within a distinct 4th PSYOP combined cell in Riyadh, with
emphasis that VOG not be identified as a PSYOPS station. In
that regard, the station's format consisted primarily of
regional Arabic music. The abundance of music was designed
to hold Iraqi and Kuwaiti target audiences' attention, with
only periodic interruption with selected script read by a
native Kuwaiti broadcaster.
A deficiency in U.S. Army active duty field-level loud-
speaker assets early in Operation DESERT SHIELD necessitated
the activation of reserve loudspeaker teams. Drawn primarily
from six locations in the U.S., they comprised a total of
sixty-six three-man, vehicular-mounted teams with 4th PSYOPS,
and were attached to virtually every brigade-level ground
maneuver unit within the Kuwait Theater of Operations. Once
assigned, loudspeaker teams were tasked with broadcasting
specific, audience taped messages upon the Iraqi military.
In addition to deceptive noises and sound effects, tapes were
used in issuing vocal appeals and instructions to the Iraqis,
to coerce them into surrendering. Limited PSYOP loudspeaker
support missions were also conducted by helicopter, but were
not acknowledged as efficient due to conflicting rotor
noise. A loudspeaker team from 9th POB, attached to the 1st
Marine Division's 300-man Task Force "TROY," contributed
significantly to that unit's deception mission. Deployed to
mask the movement of 2d Marine Division to its new assembly
area prior to the ground assault, the contribution of PSYOPS
loudspeakers to the Task Force's success was evidenced in
captured Iraqi intelligence documents. Three separate Iraqi
brigades in the Wafrah area listed Task Force TROY as a
division-sized unit, mechanized, preparing to attack. (7:77)
Operational and tactical considerations for theater-level
PSYOPS objective were, for the most part, collected and
staffed by planners and liaison officers affiliated with
major commands within the Kuwait Theater of Operations. One
prominent staff officer and participant within the Riyadh
coordination cell indicated that planning for PSYOP support
to operations was, more often than not, conducted from the
bottom up in formulating objectives. (1:20) Procedurally,
this deviates from established doctrine which states that
PSYOPS must be coordinated from theater to division level,
and that the G-3 is responsible for integrating psychological
and combat operations. (5:7-22, 23) During Operations
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM approval actually did occur
through the J-3. More aggressive, doctrinally correct
coordination may have produced even more successful results.
J-3 generation of PSYOP requirements to enhance the opera-
tional scheme would have not only streamlined propaganda
production, but could have ensured that maximum support would
be given during preassault, assault and consolidation phases.
The impact of the basic doctrinal forms of psychological
operations exercised against the Iraqi military in Kuwait was
complemented, and actually made possible, by forces, opera-
tions, and events. PSYOPS exploited the full potential of
these factors and acted as a force multiplier in regard to
establishing Coalition advantages which undoubtedly affected
the decision of many Iraqis to surrender. PSYOPS magnified
the presence of the Coalition in the eyes of the enemy and
amplified its potential and advantages to the maximum extent,
particularly in the following areas:
Sea Power
Amphibious Capability
Air Superiority
Weapons and Equipment Terminology
Night Operations Capability
Force Presence
Training State
Sense of Purpose, Just Cause and Coalition
NBC Defense
PSYOPS further contributed to the enemy's rapid demise by
exploiting the following perceived weaknesses common to many
Iraqi ground units in Kuwait:
Interrupted Command and Control
Isolation
Hunger
Morality of Invasion ("19th Province", Unjust Cause)
War Weariness
National Pride
Vulnerability of Tanks, Artillery, Equipment to Targeting
Lack of Confidence in Command Structure
Sleeplessness (Bombings and Repetitive Leafleting)
Susceptibility to Promises of Fair Treatment
Economic Homefront/Family
Fear of Death
Prior to military offensive operations, PSYOP efforts
prompted the individual Iraqi soldier to question the
validity of why he was physically stationed in Kuwait. In so
doing, soldiers were automatically and implicitly questioning
the judgment of their superiors in placing them there. Later
widespread lack of confidence in leaders, dwindling supplies
and a feeling of helplessness in the face of a perceived
superior foe, attrition and imminent threat of invasion all
contributed to incapacitate many units' combat effectiveness
with bad morale and lack of cohesion. PSYOPS supported the
operational scheme by enhancing the overriding atmosphere of
despair which had been made more acute through devastating
air attacks prior to commencement of the ground war.
Psychological operations not only channelled a common
emotional commitment from Iraqi combatants and provided sound
reasonings for ceasing the struggle, but demonstrated proper
surrender techniques so as to avoid needless death. Explicit
PSYOP verbal and visual direction was given to units of all
types with specific direction as to method of surrender for
dismounted or mechanized personnel when approaching Coalition
forces. In only one instance did this instruction result in
treachery, when elements of the Iraqi 5th Mechanized Brigade
used PSYOP surrender procedures as a ruse in order to
approach Al Khafji unmolested. (13:270) By demonstrating
that Iraqi military hardware, and not the combatants
themselves, were the object of Coalition targetings, Iraqi
soldiers quickly garnered a sincere respect for Coalition
motives and thereby found it easier to show commitment and
eventually engage in wholesale surrender. As a proven force
multiplier, the impact of PSYOPS on the Persian Gulf War was
perhaps best alluded to by Lieutenant General W. Boomer,
USMC, COM FOR MARCENT, on the day of the cease fire:
"...Their morale being extremely low in this case, the
clean-up didn't turn out to be the huge fight we had
anticipated." (2)
The effective manipulation of the enemy's tactical
perception of the battlefield helped create the degree of
security and cover needed to execute CENTCOM's flanking
maneuver. The result was the destruction of much of the
regular Army, significant damage to the Republican Guard,
overall mission accomplishment and minimal loss of life
through a supportive and complementary PSYOP campaign.
The Persian Gulf War has shown that psychological
operations are more than just a "minor appendage to military
operations." (9:9) Clausewitz saw war as "an act of force
to compel our adversary to do our will; .. .to impose our will
upon the enemy is the object." (14.3) In a world where the
potential for simultaneous involvement of U.S. forces in more
than one conflict is not unlikely, and at a time when we are
experiencing a seemingly irreversible reduction in force,
perhaps more attention to PSYOPS and its proper application
is warranted. Regardless of the environment and level of
conflict intensity, it would seem prudent to explore this
possibility further, and expand the lessons of the Persian
Gulf War PSYOP campaign to facilitate future operations,
integrated with this proven force multiplier.
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