Lean
Production--A Focus For Defense Procurement Success
CSC
1993
SUBJECT
AREA - Logistics
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Title: Lean Production--A Focus For Defense
Procurement Success
Author: Major William B. Vance, United States Air
Force
Thesis: Undisciplined competition for scarce
resources, caused by both defense structure and
budget
reductions, could diminish America's ability to act as a world leader, and even
render us
unable
to defend our own national interests or to execute our international responsibilities. Our
most
pressing defense procurement issues can be addressed with one initiative--a
long term, first-
choice
commitment to the lean production concept in our acquisition strategies.
Background: The outcome of the Cold War has presented
the United States with a predictable
set
of circumstances: (1) Sole military-superpower status, (2) the freedom to
downsize the military
due
to the smaller size of any foreseeable adversary as compared to the former
Soviet Union, and
(3)
the ability and need to contribute the resultant excess defense dollars toward
servicing the
national
debt. Force structure reductions
enabled by this opportunity mandate fewer but smarter
weapon
systems. To that end, the Department of
Defense has described a new acquisition
approach
that no longer requires weapon systems to pass into the production phase. However, if
production
is allowed to decrease to unprofitable levels, contractors may elect to cease
operations:
their
technical bases, processes, and equipment may be lost forever. The reduction in absolute
numbers
of weapon systems is also a fact in this new era. Phasing out hardware faster than
manpower
will decrease the availability of hands-on training. Solutions are available, however,
that
provide varying degrees of relief; the most promising areas to examine are
changes to training
strategies
or acquisition strategies. Experience
shows that an increased emphasis on training via
simulation
is beneficial; but simulators do not project combat power, nor do they execute
national
policy. Further, increasing the emphasis on our
training strategy does improve readiness to a
degree,
but readiness is only one issue.
Rethinking acquisition strategies promises a better solution
than
changing our training strategy, although proposed fieldable prototypes or
shelved technologies
should
not be a part of every acquisition strategy.
Lean production, however, is a concept that
produces
small numbers of actual production platforms at an efficient and profitable
pace.
Conceptually,
at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, respectively, lean
production would
provide
the synergistic effect of enabling a viable defense industrial base to
facilitate reconstitution;
supplying
sufficient numbers of platforms, and maintaining proficient, combat-ready
operators.
Facing
drastic budget cuts and an ill-defined yet volatile threat environment, the
Defense
Department
must lean forward in joint fashion, acknowledging a deteriorating defense
industrial
base,
haphazard decreases in weapons platforms, and the potential for reduced combat
capability
as
a result of insufficient training time.
Significant changes must be made in our acquisition
strategies
to resolve these procurement issues.
Recommendation: All program managers should consider
choosing lean production in an effort
to
resolve our many defense procurement issues with only a single initiative. A lean-production
decision
would simplify the acquisition process, guard against abuse, and focus defense
dollars on
defense
programs. It would enable more hands-on
training on operational systems, supply
adequate
numbers of operational systems, and provide sufficient business volume and
incentive to
maintain
a viable industrial base. Broad
application of the lean-production concept would
contribute
synergistically to the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of our
preparation for war.
OUTLINE
Thesis:
Undisciplined competition for scarce resources, caused by both defense
structure and
budget
reductions, could diminish Americas ability to act as a world leader, and even
render us
unable
to defend our own national interests or to execute our international
responsibilities. Our
most
pressing defense procurement issues can be addressed with one initiative--a
long-term,
consistent
commitment to the lean production concept in our acquisition strategies.
I. Aftermath of the Cold War victory
A. Three predictable outcomes
B. Baseline for a future national
strategy
C. The reduction dilemma
II. Factors invalidating the historical approach
A. Loss of a Cold-War equivalent enemy
B. Budget and force reductions
C. New position on a acquisition
approaches
D. Increasing numbers of aging systems
E. Atrophy of defense industrial base
III.
The acquisition dilemma: tough answers to simple questions
A. Need for preserving the defense
industrial complex
B. Need for training on new systems
C. Need for fielding new systems
IV. Potential solutions
A.
Solution: training strategies
1. Advances in simulation
2. Growth in the training budget
3. Desert Storm lesson learned
B. Solution: acquisition strategies
1. Engineering-manufacturing
development(Milestone III tabled)
2. Fieldable prototypes (Advanced
Technology Demonstrators)
3. Lean production
V. Benefits for the war fighters
A. Desired acquisition strategy
attributes
1. Best-available technology
2. Fully-developed support equipment
and technical data
3. Optimized manufacturing process
4. Triggers to pull
B. Stable process benefits industry and
government
VI. Lean production: a vision for success
LEAN PRODUCTION--A FOCUS FOR DEFENSE
PROCUREMENT SUCCESS
About
the defense budget, I raise a hope and a caution. As we restructure
our military forces to meet the new
threats of the post-Cold War world, it is
true
that we can responsibly reduce our defense budget. Now, we may all
doubt what that range of reductions
is, but let me say that as long as I am
president, I will do everything I
can to make sure that the men and women
who serve under the American flag
will remain the best-trained, the best-
prepared, the best-equipped fighting
force in the world, and every one of
you should make that solemn pledge.
President Bill Clinton
State of the Union Address, 17 February
1993(25:14)
Aftermath
of the Cold War Victory
A
clear charter. The collapse of the
Berlin Wall in 1989 gave the world visual
confirmation
of a hidden suspicion. The United
States had just won the Cold War by sepending the
Soviet
Union into virtual bankruptcy. American
weapons acquisition decision, particularly those
made
in the post-Vietnam era, had forced the USSR to develop defensive counters an
initiate
new
offensive programs. The resultant arms
race was a classic war of attrition, yet one most
decisively
fought on an unconventional battlefield--the balance sheet. The outcome of the
Cold
War
has presented the United States with a predictable set of circumstances: (1) Sole military-
superpower
status, (2) the freedom to downsize the military due to the smaller size of any
foreseeable
adversary as compared to the former Soviet Union, and (3) the ability and need
to
contribute
the resultant excess defense dollars toward servicing the national debt.
Our national leadership must use
these new circumstances as a baseline for future strategy
decisions. Indeed, the National Security Strategy of
the United States acknowledges the realities of
these
circumstances in its introduction to Section V, the Defenses Agenda for the
1990's, which
"...will
guide our deliberate reduction to no more than the forces we need to defend our
interests
and
meet our global responsibilities." (22:25) Unfortunately, this reduced spending level for
personnel
and weapon systems suggests a very uncomfortable dilemma. We now have the best
military
force the United States has ever fielded, both in the quality of troops and
equipment.
However,
the passage of time and the nature of man, and, consequently, man's propensity
toward
conflict,
still remain unchanged. Weapon systems, provided by a robust defense industrial
base,
will
still need to be fielded. Quality people will still need to be trained. In contrast, money will still
need
to be saved. The national debt and the
now ambiguous threat mandate satisfaction of each of
these
needs, even through they are in conflict.
The resultant undisciplined competition for scarce
resources,
caused by both defense structure reduction and budget reductions, could
diminish our
ability
to act decisively as a world leader, and even render us unable to defend our
own national
interests
or execute our international responsibilities.
Factors
Invalidating the Historical Approach
The United States is witnessing the
need for a dramatic shift in military thinking.
Contemporary
military strategies must be based on the need for defending our national
interests
rather
than for defending against a Cold War superpower threat. The inherent reductions in force
structure
required by this shift in thinking mandate fewer but necessarily smarter weapon
systems.
To
that end, the Department of Defense (DoD) has described a new acquisition
strategy* that no
longer
routinely requires conceptual or developmental systems or technologies to pass
into the
production
phase. Emphasis will be placed on
developing technologies and production-level
manufacturing
techniques for future use. More
emphasis will be placed on technology insertion
and
improvement of current systems, rather than on initiating new starts.
(2:38) Further, to save
money
in the short term, many acquisition programs have been postponed, stretched
into future
years,
or canceled outright. Although this strategy is in compliance with the policy
of saving
*A few
definitions are appropriate for terms used in this paper:
Acquisition Strategy: A
program manager's written plan to satisfy the mission need. This paper also refers to
acquisition strategy as DoD's
overall approach to defense procurement. (20:8.4)
Acquisition Program: A
formal program that may result in the acquisition of a new defense procurement.
Establishment
of an acquisition program occurs at Milestone I, or Concept
Demonstration
Approval, and requires competitive prototyping, a step beyond
Advanced
Technology Demonstrators used during concept exploration. (3:3-10)
Production Concept: That
part of a program manager's acquisition strategy that defines the rate and
quantity
of item production.
Production Approval: Milestone
III of the Defense Acquisition Process. (3:3-23)
dollars
while still attempting to provide needed capability, at what cost to the nation
and our future
defense
industrial capability is DoD following this strategy?
One of the pillars of our National
Security Strategy is reconstitution, using our defense
technology
and the U.S. defense industrial base as the means. (22:30-31) Although funding levels
for
science and technology remain stable for now, our acquisition strategies of
necessity require a
large
reduction in production dollars. (7:18)
However, if production is allowed to decrease to
unprofitable
levels, contractors may elect to cease operations and their technical base,
processes,
and
equipment may be lost forever. General
Dynamics, for example, (prior to the sale of its
fighter
production line to Lockheed) required a minimum economic production run of 4 or
5 F-16s
monthly.
(1:35) Granted, processes may be
documented and manufacturing equipment
mothballed;
however, highly skilled and focused teams--such as Lockheed's Advanced
Development
Company, the "Skunk Works"--should they disband from lack of profits,
may be
impossible
to reassemble should the nation's military require reconstitution. Our reliance on
technology
as a force multiplier and ultimately as a battlefield lifesaver renders the
loss of the
defense
industry's brain power, complicated technical processes, and its highly trained
workers
strategically
unacceptable.
The reduction in absolute numbers of
weapon systems is also a fact in this new era.
Every
leader
must exercise careful judgment to decide how much reduction is too much, and
then
prevent
it. In a statement some critics might
call uncharacteristic, Air Force doctrine, though
generally
praising and usually depending extensively on high technology, specifically
acknowledges
the
fact that numbers do matter:
Advanced technology is crucially
important to aerospace forces, but
numbers are also important. A small, technically sophisticated force
could
be overwhelmed by a huge but
unsophisticated force--that is, at some point
quantity can overwhelm quality.
(19:253)
The
direct result of a policy that would reduce actual number of operationally
assigned systems
faster
than reducing manpower would be a decrease in the amount of hands-on training
available
to
the war fighters. Out-year DoD budgets
acknowledge this shortfall and propose large increases
in
training and simulation dollars for all the services as an attempt to
compensate. (6:45-49)
Nevertheless,
from an operator's viewpoint, there is nothing as good as the genuine article
to train
for
the fog of war.
Post-Cold War budget reductions have
truly put the defense establishment on the defensive
in
an effort to avoid another hollow-force era.
America is quite proficient at fielding high-
technology,
usable, stalwart weapons. The fall of
the Berlin Wall, quickly followed by the
military's
decisive Desert Storm performance, attests to the wisdom of our previous
approach to
defense
procurement. Now, however, facing
gutted budgets, DoD is constrained by decreasing
manpower
levels, decreasing numbers of weapons platforms, and the consequent erosion of
the
nation's
defense industrial base. Although some
sectors of the defense industry have begun to
consolidate
in an attempt to alleviate this erosion, this is not widely the case in the
aircraft
manufacturing
sector. Aviation Week and Space
Technology relates a recent market study released
by
Booz-Allen & Hamilton that implies
"the result is too many firms chasing too few programs.
The
study predicted that a 'hurricane' of consolidation and restructuring is in the
wind." (12:21)
Several
defense contractors, for example, are "...marked for extinction as fighter
builders..." if the
multi-service
A/F-X aircraft program is terminated. (1:34-35)
The
Acquisition Dilemma: Tough Answers to Simple Questions
Solutions are available, however,
that provide varying degrees of relief.
They also require
varying
degrees of commitment and an honest evaluation of which readiness
characteristics the
people
consider important for the future defense of our country's national
interests. Certainly, the
services'
budget increases for simulation will provide operators artificial
experience.* But what
policies
or circumstances will dictate how much simulation is too much? Further, technology
insertion
as a tenet of the new acquisition strategy will provide interim capability
improvements.
But
what happens when the receiving system's re-planned product improvement reserve
is filled
to
its physical capacity, and there truly is no room left for improvement? In addition, we can
*Artificial experience
is described by Ted Gold, Hicks & Associates, Inc., and Rich Wagner, Kaman
Corporation, in
"Long Shadows and
Virtual Swords: Managing Defense Resources in the Changing Security
Environment," June
1990, and its
essentially that experience gained through simulation rather than by training
on operational equipment.
emphasize
fieldable prototypes or execute acquisition programs through Engineering and
Manufacturing
Development, intentionally delaying the Milestone III production decision.
Technologies
could then be shelved, awaiting, when his profit generator--full-rate
production--is
removed?
Justification for our future defense
posture, and, therefore, justification for a predominant
acquisition
strategy, lies in the obvious answer to three questions. First, is it practical to regain and
maintain
a robust defense industrial base to enable the reconstitution pillar of our
National
Strategy? Second, is it necessary to provide fully
mission-capable training levels to our war
fighters,
rather than some ill-defined skills-maintenance training level? Finally, is it important to
have
actual equipment available to provide not only realistic training but also
quick-reaction force-
projection
capability? Of course. Analysis of this three-part problem when
viewed against a
defense
budget free-fall reveals two approaches to possible solutions--adjustments to
our training
strategies
and adjustments to our acquisition strategies.
Solution:
Training Strategies
Training strategies are composed of
three main inputs: money, time on equipment, and
time
on simulators. Declining budgets
combined with fewer weapons platforms result in reduced
hands-on
training time in operational systems. The clear solution to the resultant
decline in
operator
proficiency is an increased emphasis on simulation. State-of-the-art simulators provide
safety
(cats should have as may lives as I've used up in the F-16 simulator), superior
visual and
auditory
fidelity, six degrees-of-freedom motion, long-distance interface with other
simulators for
mock-combat
scenarios against live opponents or even another computer, and greatly reduced
operating
costs compared to an hour of flying time or M1A1 tank gunnery. DoD concurs:" ...The
Pentagon
has targeted training efficiency as a major concern of the post-Cold War
era....Playing a
big
part in the Pentagon's acquisition strategy are cost effective off-the shelf
part task trainers,
maintenance
trainers and mission rehearsal systems." (10:29)
The National Training Systems
Association in Arlington, Virginia, recently published a
marketing
research report that predicts steady growth over the next decade for worldwide
military
training
and simulation budgets, already estimated at $3 to $3.5 billion annually.
(6:45) Granted,
an
increased emphasis on training via simulation is beneficial: but simulators do
not project combat
power,
nor do they execute national policy.
Increasing the emphasis on our training strategy via
simulation
as a solution does improve readiness to a degree, but it is incomplete: every
hour spent
in
simulation is one less hour spent in the actual system. There is a tradeoff between simulator
training
and hardware training: the performance of a few National Guard units in
Operation Desert
Storm
clearly indicated that in many cases there is just not enough training time
available to keep
units
ready for the highly complex weapons and tactics of modern warfare.
(23:12) Furthermore,
if
only training and simulation are emphasized, the declining trend in the ability
of our defense
industrial
base to efficiently build combat hardware is not reversed. And obviously, actual aircraft
or
tanks are not added to the inventory to replace phased-out or unusable
articles. Training and
simulation
are not the complete answer. Again,
from an operator's viewpoint, there is nothing as
good
as the genuine article to train for the fog of war.
Solution:
Acquisition Strategies
Rethinking acquisition strategies
promises a more complete solution than a change in our
training
strategies. As specified in DoD
Instruction 5000.2, Part 3, the production and deployment
phase
(Phase III) of a DoD acquisition program has historically supplied the country
with aircraft,
tanks,
and other military hardware. (3:3-23)
Now, although reductions in force structure mandate
fewer
but smarter weapon systems, technological developments continue at ever-increasing
rates;
consequently,
this historical approach must change on a broad scale. DoD's new acquisition
strategy
addresses this need by no longer routinely expecting conceptual or development
systems
or
technologies to pass into Phase III.
Emphasis may be placed as appropriate on developing
specific
technologies and production-level manufacturing techniques for future use,
putting this
technology
"on the shelf" or "in the pipeline" until an emerging
threat mandates production. This
new
acquisition strategy consists of numerous elements, but the general trend is
toward an
approach
that, by design, leans heavily on research, development, test, and evaluation
rather than
on
production. In short, this approach
acknowledges both its current and future financial
environments. Concerning that financial environment, Phase
III, by design, has also provided
contractors
with most of their profits, as DoD contracts historically do not provide for
significant
profits
during earlier phases of the acquisition process. Consequently, the Aerospace Industries
Association
(AIA) takes exception to this new DoD approach:
The AIA has taken issue with the
Defense Dept. plan to perform research
and development and then put a
design 'on the shelf' and defer production.
LeRoy J. Haugh, vice president of
procurement and financial services at
AIA, said the shelf life of
technology is not very long, and it may not be
possible to keep a design on hold
unless there is at least some limited
production to demonstrate
feasibility. Under the current payment
schemes
for research and development, most
companies would have trouble making
any profit at all, he maintained.
(8:58)
Former
Defense Secretary Dick Cheney addressed this common aerospace industry concern
at a
press
conference held in January 1992 when he specifically said that not only do we
intend to
develop
selected technologies into weapon systems, but that we also intend to develop
the
manufacturing
processes to build those systems. He
further stated that the Defense Department
fully
intends to procure such items in sufficient quantity that users can acquire
operational
experience
with the systems as well as develop appropriate doctrine. "We are not talking about
just
building one or two items and putting them on the shelf," he summarized.
(2:40)
The construction of fieldable
prototypes is a production concept that takes advanced
technologies
a step further than a spot on the shelf.
This approach places Advanced Technology
Demonstrators
(ATDs), normally one-of-a-kind items used to assess program risk during the
Concept
Exploration Phase, into the hands of operators for evaluation in realistic
operational
environments. This is a superb idea for systems not
intended for procurement in large numbers; in
fact,
at this stage of the acquisition process, and acquisition program does not even
exist--no
production
concept has yet been formalized.
Consequently, we must realize that these ATDs are
immature,
development systems: maintenance and
operation must be accomplished by
experienced
personnel. A familiar example of the fieldable prototype concept in action is
the Joint
Surveillance
and Target Attack Radar System(JSTARS) used so effectively in Operation Desert
Storm. Unfortunately, with results similar to an
approach that just changes our training strategy, a
plan
that depends on building fieldable prototypes to keep assembly lines open and
profits flowing
is
not the answer. According to General
Lawrence Skantze, USAF(Ret), former Commander of
Air
Force Systems Command (now Air Force Materiel Command), Congress will
"need to be
convinced
of the credibility of the ATD project before it is even funded or put through
the pre-
Milestone
I [Concept Exploration] process."(17:15)
The uncertainty of extending a fieldable
prototype
into a reasonable production run invalidates the idea of using ATDs to train
personnel
and
provide operationally significant numbers of actual hardware.
Clearly, further development of ATDs
or shelving technologies at Milestone III are not the
ideal
production concepts to solve the dilemma of declining numbers of actual
hardware,
deteriorating
operator proficiency, and a decaying defense industrial base. Although Defense
Secretary
Les Aspin has articulated a four-point program to enhance the defense
industrial base,
maintenance
of that industrial base is only part of the requirement.* A more all-encompassing
acquisition
strategy might provide perhaps the best overall solution to this three-part
problem.
Low-rate
initial production, recently dubbed lean production by senior Air Force
officials, may
enable
the necessary synergistic effect of sufficient numbers of platforms; a capable
defense
industrial
base; and proficient, combat-ready operators.
Lean production is a production concept
that
supplies small numbers of actual operational platforms at an efficient and
profitable pace. A
summary
of the concept clearly identifies the advantage:
Lean
production recognizes that in order to have a true operational
capability,
the system must go beyond the prototyping
phase and on into an
operational
environment. Essentially, this concept
says you cannot put
technology
on the shelf and expect to produce it.
[It] implies that the forces
in
the field must have production items to train with in order to achieve
combat
readiness. (2:40)
*In a 12 February 92
address to the American Defense Preparedness Association, and later in his
confirmation
hearings for Defense
Secretary, Mr Aspin listed four acquisition concepts which would enhance the
defense
industrial base:
"selective upgrading, selective low-rate procurements; rollover plus,
which is continued research and
development of critical
technologies; and silver-bullet procurements, or purchases of highly capable
systems with
advanced
technologies." (16:42)
Benefits
for the War Fighters
It would appear that the war
fighters favor this approach. Lean
production, as a routinely
selected
production concept rather than as a band-aid for a budget crunch, would govern
the
procurement
of a system from the earliest stages of its acquisition cycle. The war fighters would
know
that they would be buying the best available technology. They would be buying
fully
developed
support equipment and technical data.
They would be buying an optimized
manufacturing
process. Most importantly, they would be buying sufficient numbers of platforms
on
which to train to mission-ready proficiency levels and to take to combat should
the need arise.
In
short, lean production as a part of the total acquisition strategy buys real
capability.
Moreover, the process is inherently
stable, a feature much desired by both the government
and
the defense industrial complex.
Conceptually, when a request for proposal is issued with a
reasonable
assurance that lean production will be the production concept, the contractor
will be
assured
that his efforts will produce a state-of-the-art product in sufficient
quantities to provide a
profit
level that will justify the bid. Our
defense industries are so fragile at this point in our history
that
very aggressive steps must be taken to ensure the undiminished effectiveness of
this national
asset. In fact, because this situation is so
critical, future acquisition programs may actually be
driven
more by the needs of the defense industrial base rather than by operational
needs. General
Mike
Loh, commander of Air Combat Command, addressed a group of over 800 industry
and
service
representatives at a 4 February 1993 Air Force Association Symposium with a
forceful,
precedent-setting
speech in which he said the Air Force intends to increasingly support the
defense
industry
by continuing upgrades to existing systems; by identifying new systems for
low-rate
production;
and by enabling prime contractors and their various subcontractors to develop
advanced
operational prototypes and their manufacturing processes as candidates for
future
production
systems. Specifically, according to
General Loh, "All future weapon systems will be
subject
to [italics added] low rate production, and the Air Force must work with
industry from the
beginning
to develop 'smart, realistic production strategies' that enable companies to
avoid
debilitating
overhead costs." (13:6) The war fighters are on board with the
lean-production
concept.
Lean
Production: A Vision for Success
A suitable vision of the way a lean
production program of the future should look in action
is
the formerly classified, award-winning* program run by the Skunk Works--the
F-117A Stealth
Fighter. In 1976, work began on the Have Blue
prototype, and in late 1978 Lockheed received the
full-scale
development contract. In just over a
decade, the Skunk Works would supply the country
with
59 Stealth Fighters. The program moved from design go-ahead to first
flight in thirty-one
months
and initial operational capability(IOC) in sixty months. Since the F-117A was essentially a
concurrent
development, production, and deployment program, test pilots conducted flight
tests
while
operators trained in the aircraft and developed tactics. The Skunk Works' Richard Silz stated
that
essential testing was completed by IOC in October 1983, but for several years
after that flight
test
continued to fill in missing data.
According to Silz, "While this approach to testing worked
and
is probably in the best traditions of the Skunk Works, flight test is just this
year finishing the
final
reports on the last of the original test plans written over ten years
ago." (11:27-28)
Although not a "lean-production"
program in the contemporary sense of the word, this
silver-bullet
procurement is a textbook example of the way an acquisition strategy should be
executed
using this production concept. Though
few procurements will have the various benefits
of
classified, or "black" program management oversight, all program
managers can learn from the
experiences
of the Skunk Works team and incorporate those lean-production lessons into
their
acquisition
strategies. A need was determined, a
technology was developed, prototypes were built
and
tested to reduce program risk, and 59 platforms and their attendant support
equipment and
technical
data were procured over the program's production run. During this production run, and
operational
squadron achieved IOC and refined its
combat tactics. An ongoing flight test
program
continued
to supply the operators with valuable data and product improvements. At a unit flyaway
cost
of under $43 million, the company produced a superb product at a fair
price. Any future
*Two test pilots from
the F-117A Stealth Fighter flight test program were awarded the Iven C.
Kinchloe Award at
the 1989 Society of
Experimental Test Pilots Symposium.
Each year, the award is presented in recognition of
outstanding
accomplishments in the conduct of flight test activities. The award was presented to Lt Col Ken Dyson,
USAF (Ret), Chief Test
Pilot for Rockwell International, and William C. Park, Jr., then Director,
Advanced
Development Products
Flight Operations at Lockheed. Both men
were preciously ineligible for consideration for this
award due to the
classification of their project. They were the only pilots to fly the radical
proof-of-concept aircraft
that pioneered current
stealth technology, and later, development and production of the F-117A.
(18:357)
acquisition
program using the Stealth Fighter paradigm will be complying with the intent
and spirit
of
the lean-production concept. Though
previous success is no guarantee of future performance,
imitation
is the sincerest form of flattery.
Conclusions
General Loh has stated that all
future weapon systems will be "subject to" low rate
production. Rather than having future acquisition
programs only subject to lean production, by
actually
adopting lean production as a first-choice production concept on appropriate
programs,
the
acquisition community would be able to keep contractor teams together and keep
assembly
lines
at least warm. The genuine article
would be available for operator training and operational
test
and evaluation. Finally, the services
would accumulate actual numbers of combat platforms in
sufficient
quantity to operationally employ them, though over a longer times period than
provided
by
full-rate production decisions.
The threat is surely ambiguous. The threat is decidedly volatile. The Middle East, the
Balkans,
and India are defined by centuries-old religious, racial, and ethnic conflict;
North Korea
may
finally field atomic weapons this year and may implode before the end of the
century; South
America
leads the world in drug production and distribution. Our own streets are filled with some
of
the most violent crime in the civilized world.
At the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution
of
the Warsaw Pact, America rejoiced at the realization of the Cold War
victory. Communism
was
declared bankrupt and the Soviet Union disintegrated into a confused collection
of fifteen
independent
states, some of which discovered they were now custodians of quite large
conventional
and nuclear arsenals. The media hailed
President Boris Yeltsin as a visionary capable
of
bringing the new confederation out of its moral and economic decay and into the
light of
democracy
and freedom of religion. Unfortunately,
it would seem that the window of opportunity
to
assist democratic reform in the former Soviet Union may be about to close as
the various
countries
assess and consolidate their holdings and define their strategic goals. Recent
observations
indicate that some of these states are beginning their own defense industries
with the
remnants
of the ex-Soviet Union's defense industrial complex. An intelligence community study
indicates
that Russia, Ukraine, Georgia Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan are all producing
major
weapon
systems and other military hardware. (21:A1)
Just months ago an invincible media
darling,
Mr Yeltsin now enjoys only a tenuous political future at best, if at all. America cannot sit
on
the sidelines and simply watch the world go by, hoping no threat will emerge
that might disrupt
our
defense conversion:
[Secretary
of State, Mr Warren] Christopher warned that if Russia were to
fall
into anarchy or return to despotism the U.S. would pay a 'frightening'
price. 'Nothing less is involved than the
possibility of a renewed nuclear
threat;
higher defense budgets; spreading instability; and a devastating
setback
for the world-wide democratic movement....'(9:A8)
Many
actors in the world community are not sympathetic with our desire to reduce our
military
forces
or resolve our economic problems.
Clearly, as we monitor the numerous threats throughout
the
world, we must as a nation remember there are those states who
opportunistically relish our
impending
diminished capability to respond anytime, anywhere, to any crisis. Until recently not an
issue,
our Cold War and conflict-tested military power may soon be compromised, and
with that,
our
most important national interests may be indefensible and our treaty
obligations unhonorable.
Facing drastic budget cuts and a new
threat environment, DoD must lean forward in joint
fashion,
acknowledging a deteriorating defense industrial base, haphazard decreases in
weapons
platforms,
and the potential for reduced combat capability as a result of insufficient
training.
Defense
Secretary Aspin, during his confirmation hearings, stated that the DoD
acquisition system
is
"increasingly complex and adversarial." He intends to streamline and simplify the process while
protecting
it from new abuses. (15:B6A) In an
interview with the Air Force Times that same
week,
then Defense Secretary Cheney, pointing out that $1 billion was set aside this
year for
defense
conversion, said, "There is a new tendency in Congress to spend money on
what are
essentially
domestic programs and call it defense."(24:3)
The first production concept the
program manager should consider as he writes his
acquisition
strategy should be lean production, as its application could solve many
contemporary
defense
procurement problems with only a single effort. A lean-production decision would
simplify
the acquisition process for defense procurement programs, guard against abuses,
and
focus
defense dollars on defense programs. It
would enable more hands-on training on operational
systems;
supply adequate numbers of operational systems; and provide sufficient business
volume
and
incentive to maintain a viable defense industrial base, each attribute a
critical and necessary
component
of any future acquisition strategy. In
short, by directly addressing these issues, a broad
application,
of the lean-production concept would contribute synergistically to the
strategic,
operational,
tactical levels of our preparation for war.
If the acquisition community is to
become
part of the solution and assist the president in making the men and women who
serve
under
the American flag remain the best-trained, the best-prepared, and the
best-equipped fighting
force
in the world, we must acknowledge the many threats to our national interests
and focus our
defense
procurement efforts on the protection these interests. Simply, to solve many of our
most
pressing contemporary defense procurement issues, one initiative stands out--a
long-term,
first-choice
commitment to lean production as the production concept of choice in the
program
manager's
acquisition strategy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Bickers, Charles. "U.S. Fight for
Survival." Jane's Defense Weekly, 12 September 1992,
pp. 34-35.
2. Cochrane, Charles B. "DoD's New
Acquisition Approach: Myth or Reality?" Program
Manager, 21 (July-August 1992),
38-46.
3. Department of Defense. Department of
Defense Instruction 5000.2: Defense Acquisition
Management Policies and Procedures,
February 1991.
4. Dunlap, Charles J. Jr., "The
Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012." Parameters,
XXII(Winter 1992-93), 19-20.
5. Gold, Ted, Hicks & Associates,
Inc., and Richard Wagner, Kaman Corporation. "Long
Shadows and Virtual Swords.:
Managing Defense Resources in the Changing Security
Environment." June 1990, as
described in Cochrane, Charles B. "DoD's New Acquisition
Approach: Myth or Reality?"
Program Manager, 21(July-August 1992),39.
6. Griffin, Louisa. "Simulation and
Training: A Well-Protected Piece of the DoD Budget Pie."
Defense Electronics, 24 (April
1992), 45-49.
7. Holzer, Robert, and George Leopold.
"Technology Programs Elude DoD Budget Ax."
Defense News, 22-28 February 1993,
p.18.
8. Hughes, David. "Use of Consultants
Grows as Industry Restructures." Aviation Week and
Space Technology, 4 January 1993,
pp. 58-60.
9. Ignatius, Adi, and Carla Anner
Robbins. "Russian Crisis Eases as Court Considers Issues." The
Wall Street Journal, 23 March 1993,
Section A., p.8.
10. Lesser, Roger. "Pentagon Targets
Training as Critical Asset." Defense Electronics,
24 (November 1992), 29.
11. Lynch, David J. "How the Skunk
Works Fielded Stealth." Air Force Magazine,
75(November 1992), 22-28.
12.
Morrocco, John D.
"Lockheed Buys Shares in Future." Aviation Week and Space
Technology, 14/21 December
1992,pp.20-21.
13. Opall, Barbara. "Loh: Industrial
Base to Guide AF Weapon Plans." Defense News,
8-14 February 1993, p.6.
14. Payne, Kieth B., Linda H. Vlahos, and
Willis A. Stanley. "Evolving Russian Views on
Defense: An Opportunity for
Cooperation." Strategic Review, XXI(Winter 1993), 61-72.
15. Ricks, Thomas E. "Aspin Sidesteps
Questions at Hearing on His Nomination to be Defense
Chief," The Wall Street
Journal, 8 January 1993, Section B., p.6A.
16. Silverberg, David. "Clinton
Takes First Steps to Guide New Procurement Policy." Defense
News, 8-14 February 1993, p. 42.
17. Skantze Lawrence. "Restore Sense to
Acquisition." Defense News, 23-39 November 1992,
p. 15.
18. Thirty-Third Symposium Proceedings.
Lancaster, California: The Society of Experimental
Test Pilots, 1989.
19. United States Air Force. Headquarters US
Air Force. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the
United States Air Force, Air Force
Manual 1-1, Vol II. Washington DC, March 1992.
20. United States Air Force. Headquarters
Air Force Materiel Command. "Acquisition
Plans/Strategy Panels. "
Intermediate Systems Acquisition Management-SAS006, Volume I.
Brooks AFB, Texas: Systems
Acquisition School, October 1991.
21. "What's News-World Wide." The
Wall Street Journal, 4 March 1993, Section A., p.1.
22. The White House. National Security
Strategy of the United States, August 1991.
23. Willis, Grant. "A New Generation of
Warriors." Navy Times, 18 March 1991,p.12.
24. Wolffe, Jim. "Concern Voiced That
Drawdown Could Worsen." Air Force Times,
11 January 1993, p. 3.
25. "Word for Word." Defense News,
22-28 February 1993, p.14.
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