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Communications Support For Joint Operations: Can MAGTF
C3 Systems Support A JTF Headquarters?
CSC 1993
                          EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:  Communications Support for Joint Operations: Can MAGTF C3
        Systems Support a JTF Headquarters?
Author:  Major Michael J. Vohaska, United States Marine Corps
Thesis:  Although a MAGTF is functionally well suited for joint
operations,  it  does not  possess the  C3 systems  capabilities
required to function as a JTF command element.   A MAGTF will
require significant external communications support for future JTF
missions unless its current C3 architecture is upgraded.
Background:  In the post-Cold War world, the JTF has become the
hallmark of U.S. military operations.  Future missions of a MAGTF
will include the role of a JTF command element during  joint
operations.  The complexity and sophistication of joint operations
require a very large and extensive C3 systems architecture to
support the JTF commander and his staff.  Although a MAGTF should
receive C3 support from CJCS and the theater CINC, such resources
may not be available to the JTF if more than one regional crisis
exists.  As a designated JTF, a MEF will be required to provide C3
support to the JTF, MARFOR, and MAGTF (MEF) headquarters.  The C3
capabilities organic to a MEF can only support one component
commander at a time.  The Marine Corps has been and still is very
dependent upon external support from other services for joint C3
connectivity.  One of the most significant MAGTF C3 shortfalls is
the  inability  to  provide  high  capacity,  digital  trunking,
switching, and technical control equipment needed to integrate into
the JTF C3 systems architecture.   Past and present experiences
during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Restore Hope continue
to demonstrate Marine Corps C3 deficiencies when interfacing with
joint C3 systems.
Recommendation:   If the Marine Corps is serious about assuming
future roles as a JTF command element, several modifications must
be made to existing MEF C3 systems architecture and capabilities.
DOD budget cuts will not allow large procurments of expensive C3
systems.   However, the lack of digital communications backbone
radio,  trunking, and message  switching  systems can be  off-set
through increased priority in POM initiatives, identification of C3
needlines based upon future JTF roles/missions a permanent transfer
of deactivated unit equipment from Europe, and joint C3 education
and training.
Thesis:  Although a MAGTF is very useful for regional stability
operations,  it  does not  possess the  C3 systems  capabilities
required to function as a JTF command element.   A MAGTF will
require significant external communications support for
future JTF missions unless its current C3 architecture is upgraded.
I.   Composition of C3 architecture for a JTF headquarters
     A. Joint C3 information requirements for a JTF
     B. Joint communications support package for a JTF
     C. JCSE C3 capabilities
II.   C3 systems support structure for a MAGTF
      A. External and internal C3 requirements
      B. C3 systems capabilities
      C. MAGTF C3 shortfalls
III.  USMC C3 deficiencies during Operation Restore Hope
      A. Marine Corps digital communications system backbone
      B. GMF and terrestrial microwave systems
      C. Circuit switching systems
      D. Message switching systems
      E. Interoperability
IV.   Recommended upgrades for future MAGTF C3 systems to
      support JTF operations
      A. Future MAGTF missions and C3 needlines analysis
      B. POM initiatives and Service memorandums of agreement
      C. Interoperability with Navy and Army forces
      Over the past three years, the Marine Corps has successfully
demonstrated its ability to integrate into joint warfare
operations.  The demanding nature of joint warfare in the new and
uncertain "new world order"  places a greater premium on the
capabilities of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) than any
other time in recent history.  A MAGTF is a closely integrated and
highly trained combined arms team that has become the nucleus by
which a theater commander can build a joint task force (JTF).  By
designating a MAGTF as a JTF, a unified commander can effectively
and  expediently  initiate  limited  joint  operations  in  crisis
response or transition from seapower to  landpower in a major
regional conflict. (9:25)
      The complexity and sophistication that are of joint operations
require a very extensive and complex communications architecture to
support the JTF commander and his staff.  CJTF must have command
and control and communications  (C3)  systems that can rapidly
exchange information vertically and horizontally and are fully
interoperable with theater and national commanders as well as field
commanders.   By designating a Marine Expeditionary Force  (MEF)
commander as CJTF during the initial stages of a regional crisis,
the commander will quickly discover that his organic C3 systems
support is inadequate.   Although a MAGTF is functionally well
suited for joint operations, it does not possess the C3 systems
capabilities required to function as a JTF command element.   A
MAGTF will require significant external communications support for
future JTF missions unless its current C3 architecture is upgraded.
     A Joint Task Force Commander (CJTF) has extensive information
exchange requirements with higher,  subordinate, and supporting
commanders, commanders of allied forces, and heads of government
agencies.  At the highest level, the CJTF exchanges information
with the theater Commander in Chief (CINC) under whose combatant
command the JTF is operating. CJTF also exchanges information with
Service component commanders regarding matters of administrative
and logistical support for forces under their operational control.
The CJTF also requires communications with the U.S. Ambassador of
the host nation involved.  The U.S. Ambassador needs to exchange
information with CJTF regarding the political cultural and economic
factors that may affect on operations within the host country.
(3:3-1)  Figure 1 depicts the Joint C3 connectivity requirements
for the CJTF.
      The Joint Communications Support Element  (JCSE)  is  the
primary source for joint C3 communications requirements support
provided to a JTF.   The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
controls the deployment of the JCSE.  The JCSE provides readily
available C3 support for a deployed JTF during contingency, crisis,
and wartime situations when the respective theater CINC does not
have the  theater  resources available  to  satisfy the  JTF  C3
requirements.   The JCSE, which includes two Air National Guard
Joint Communications Support Squadrons, must have the capability to
support two JTF headquarters and the Joint Special Operations Task
Force (JSOTF). (2:G-2)   JCSE support includes the installation,
operation, and maintenance (IOM) of communications systems and
facilities of these two headquarters.
      Communications  systems  and  their  associated  facilities,
equipment,  and  personnel  are  allocated  to  support  the  C3
requirements during predeployment,  advanced-echelon deployment,
main-force deployment, and employment phases.   To meet the JTF
mission, the JCSE has a variety of transmission media, primarily
satellite single-channel, ultra high frequency (UHF), and super
high frequency (SHF)  multichannel radio,  supplemented by high
frequency (HF) and terrestrial microwave radio equipment. (3:5-2)
When required, the JCSE will IOM satellite terminals at Service
components and supporting or supported CINC headquarters.
      The JCSE also establishes a signal center with the JTF
headquarters.  It provides automated circuit and message switching,
telephones,  facsimile,  General Service  (GENSER)  communications
center/Special Security Office (SSO) communications center, record
traffic terminals, Defense Switched Network (DSN), Defense Data
Network (DDN) connectivity, multiplexing capabilities, and a local
area network for staff use. (3:5-3)
      The JTF headquarters and each assigned component will provide
its own C3 systems and supporting communications.  Communications
support for a JTF headquarters is provided by JCSE or other CJCS-
control led assets when requested by the supported CINC and approved
by the CJCS.  CJCS assets are requested by submitting a Memorandum
of Policy 3 (MOP-3) from the CJTF to CJCS via the supported theater
CINC. (7)  However, if the JCSE is already committed, the supported
CINC may direct his Service components to provide the required C3
support to the JTF. (2:G-3)  It is possible that a MEF could be
required to support the CJTF, MARFOR (Component), and MAGTF (MEF)
headquarters simultaneously in an environment where all three
commands are geographically separated.  This becomes a significant
problem for a MAGTF commander who is designated as CJTF during a
crisis and must source most of his C3 resources from his own
      The MAGTF's warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare either
by land or sea requires an effective C3 architecture uniquely
tailored to meet the needs of the MAGTF commander and his staff.
The capabilities of a MAGTF C3 system must include deployability,
mobility,  survivability,  sustainability,  flexibility,  and  the
capability to integrate with the C3 systems of his own subordinate
commands, joint, national, and allied forces.  The vital role of C3
to a MAGTF commander is clear: it is the central nervous system
that tightly integrates and unifies the MAGTF. (1)
      At the MEF level, C3 support of the command is principally
provided by the Surveillance, Reconnaissance,  and Intelligence
Group  (SRIG).     The  primary  MAGTF  communications  support
organization is the communications battalion (CommBn) within the
SRIG.  The CommBn will task-organize the communications resources
required to support the MEF command element.  The CommBn provides
the direct communications support to the MAGTF command element and
general support to major subordinate commands (MSCs).  The CommBn
also provides the electronic  interconnectivity interface  into
national, joint, and combined C3 systems that are external to the
MAGTF.    Ground  Mobile  Force  (GMF)  satellite  (SATCOM)  and
terrestrial microwave communications equipment provides MSCs with
general support  from CommBn  resources.   This support  places
additional equipment and personnel constraints on the MEF.
      The Marine Corps is transitioning from analog to digital
communications technology that provides commanders with digital
data and automated information exchange systems.  MAGTFs currently
lack sufficient digital backbone  radio,  message,  and  circuit
switching equipment to perform  command and control  functions
associated with  JTF  operations  at  a MEF  level.    There  are
insufficient numbers of terrestrial and satellite multichannel
radio communications equipment to support medium and long range,
high capacity digital trunks. (6)  MAGTFs also lack the capability
to resist satellite jamming  in the SHF radio spectrum.   The
structure of a CommBn can only satisfy the C3 requirements for one
component command.
     The MAGTF C3 systems  interface into national,  joint,  and
combined C3 systems is limited to the number of manpower and
equipment resources within the MEF itself.  A MEF should not be
tasked with JTF missions that are outside the organic capabilities
of the MAGTF C3 system.  An important consideration is that joint
C3 connectivity demands a high capacity,  fully interoperable,
digital network.  Designating a MAGTF commander to become the CJTF
for missions that require division-size maneuver forces, operating
under combat conditions over vast distances, presents serious C3
problems for the MAGTF commander.   He does not possess  the
resources or the training required to operate as a JTF command
element.  The most recent JTF operation, Operation Restore Hope in
Somalia, highlighted these deficiencies when a MAGTF commander (CG
I MEF) was designated as the CJTF for the operation.
     The limitations of the C3 architecture for a MAGTF has been
well documented over the past several years.  A MAGTF lacks the
large digital communications backbone system required for extended
joint operations.   The need to pass digital information using
computers, facsimiles, secondary imagery dissemination devices, and
other data processing systems continues to exceed a MAGTF's organic
C3 capabilities. The Marine Corps owns some TriService Tactical
(TRITAC)  systems  that  provide  automated  voice  and  message
switching, terrestrial,  and satellite connectivity for a MAGTF
commander.  However, the fielding of these TRITAC systems to the
Marine Corps is uneven.  For example, each MEF has a suite of GMF
SATCOM equipment consisting of 1 AN/TSC-85B and 4 AN/TSC-93s.
(14:38)  GMF systems must provide a digital backbone capability to
geographically dispersed commands that are outside the range of
terrestrial systems.  This capability is essential to highly mobile
forces like those during Operation Desert Storm.  One suite of GMF
per MEF is not enough to support a MEF and is obviously  inadequate
to support a MEF that becomes a JTF command element.
     The Marine Corps' terrestrial microwave systems are old and
lack  the  range,  reliability,  and  capability  required  for
sustainment of joint operations.  AN/GRC-201s lack the required
range and experience  frequent equipment failure.   There is a
serious shortage of spare parts and experienced technicians for
AN/GRC-201s in the Marine Corps.  AN/TRC-170s are just now being
fielded to the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) and will replace the aging
AN/GRC-201 system.   This does not solve the current terrestrial
systems problem since AN/GRC-201s are still loaded on MPF shipping
and are in a poor state of repair.  MPF ships do not have AN/TRC-
170s on board; therefore a MAGTF must request these assets from the
Army and the Air Force to support joint operations. (4)
     Due to the expeditionary nature of a MAGTF, a MAGTF commander
should not become completely dependent upon external communications
support as a designated CJTF.  If two or more crisises exist at one
time, external C3 support from JCSE or other services will not be
available to the JTF commander unless he is the focus of effort for
national security resources.  This situation is very possible in
the new world order.   The Marine Corps must look closer at
providing a MEF with a greater capability for self-sufficiency.
     One of the most significant Marine Corps C3 shortfalls is the
component commander's lack of high capacity,  digital trunking,
switching, and technical control equipment.  Possession of these
assets allows the component commander to integrate into the JTF C3
architecture.   Current trunking and switching capability of the
component commander lacks the capacity and interoperability of
large Army and Air Force systems ( AN/TTC-39 and AN/TYC-39).  A new
digital technical control facility is needed to manage these
trunking and message switches.  Tactical message switching networks
need to process large volumes of real-time traffic in a manner that
is compatible with other services. No combination of vans ( TYC-5,
TYC-37,  UGC-74,  and MSC-63A  )  are  adequate  for  today's  the
requirements of a JTF headquarters. (11:44) These message switches
are outdated and should be replaced with a more capable switching
system that would provide built-in encryption and provide both
conditioned di-phase and analog modulation communications.  This
type of system must have the flexibility to provide reliable, high-
speed message switching service up and down the chain of command.
     Another C3 systems shortfall is that interoperability remains
a problem when interfacing C3 systems into a joint operation.
Commonality  and  interoperability  of  MEF  level  communications
equipment are vital to establishing theater C3 systems in either
combat or non-hostile crisis area of operations. (12:42)  Marine
Corps tactical automated telephone switching systems, such as the
SB-3865, cannot switch secure telephone calls through a TTC-39
located at a JTF/CINC level headquarters.  Both systems are part of
the  TRITAC  communication  systems  architecture  designed  to
facilitate C3 interoperability between all services. (13:42)
     Interoperability with naval forces continues to be a problem.
U.S. Navy ships do not have a robust and efficient system that is
capable of providing secure voice connectivity with forces ashore
during joint operations.  Telephone communications to ships must
complete a very complex route from tactical land systems, through
the  Defense  Communications  System  (DCS)  and  into  the  Naval
Telecommunications System (NTS) before a call reaches the ship. (8)
This method is not responsive and lacks the circuit quality
required for rapid secure voice and data communications in joint
     Operation Restore Hope provides the Marine Corps with an
excellent illustration of the C3 capabilities and limitations of a
MAGTF operating as a JTF command element.  This was the first time
a MEF commander. LtGen Robert Johnston, has led a four-Service
joint task force under a single commander.   This represents a
fundamental shift in military thinking by the NCA and theater
CINCs; the JTF has become the hallmark of U.S. military operations.
(10:33) The lessons being learned are a valuable resource for
determining what missions a MAGTF can really accomplish as a JTF
command element.  The following information addresses C3 issues
experienced during Operation Restore Hope and was compiled by
members of the JTF J-6 staff.
     JCS controlled assets were requested by United States Central
Command (USCENTCOM) in coordination with I MEF (CJTF SOMALIA). A
CJCS MOP-3 was submitted and approved for JCSE support from MacDill
Air Force Base  in Florida.   During the early stages of the
operation, 9th CommBn provided cable and telephone support to the
JTF headquarters, Canadian Forces, Commander, Army Forces (ARFOR),
and Commander, Marine Forces (MARFOR).  In addition, 9th CommBn
also provided all message center support for the JTF, Joint Support
Command, and ARFOR until ARFOR message center support arrived in
theater.  The traditional role of 9th CommBn to support the MEF
headquarters and provide GMF connectivity to each MSC using one
suite of equipment completely changed. (7:7) This support provided
by 9th CommBn far exceeded the organic C3 structure of a MEF and
was successful only through extensive equipment and personnel
augmentation from other Marine Corps units.
     The primary means of long haul communications during the first
several weeks of Operation Restore Hope was single channel UHF
SATCOM and HF  radio communications.   UHF SATCOM was somewhat
restricted in its use due to the limited number of satellite
channels  available  to  the  theater.     Several  commercial
International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) terminals were used to
provide leased commercial telephone service.   These terminals
provided support for C3, logistics, and intelligence coordination.
Widespread use and abuse of these terminals by joint and coalition
forces caused serious  interference  problems on the  satellite
constellations and interoperability with tactical force switches
was a problem. (7:22)  Soon an LST-8000 package arrived with the
JCSE  that  provided  3  long  local  telephones  and  an  AUTODIN
capability for the CJTF.  This service provided secure voice and
record traffic for the CJTF to communicate with the theater CINC
and gave limited capability to the JTF staff.  As forces pushed
into the interior of Somalia, forces maintained communications
through single channel radio and INMARSAT systems until the GMF and
terrestrial digital backbone systems were established. (7:29)
     I MEF GMF assets were inadequate to support all of the GMF
link requirements in theater.  Consequently, I MEF received a GMF
terminal (AN/TSC-93) from 7th CommBn in Okinawa. This provided a
link from Somalia into the Marine Corps Data Network (MCDN) through
Okinawa and a link through Ft. Buckner for additional DSN/AUTODIN
requirements.   I MEF also provided C3 support to JTF Provide
Relief, another JTF operating in a different country.  This left
only 1 AN/TSC-85B and 3 AN/TSC-93s to support Somalia operations.
While only one third of I MEF forces deployed to Somalia, all I MEF
GMF systems were committed to the operation.  The shortage of GMF
assets within the Marine Corps continues to surface as a problem.
A single suite of GMF SATCOM precludes displacement of the command
element and restricts the ability of communication planners to
provide for robust DCS support.  A failure in a single AN/TSC-85B
could have catastrophic consequences on a JTF/MEF commander's C3
capability. (7:9)  Had elements of the I MEF Rear been called out
in support of another mission, there would be no means of effective
long haul communications connectivity like GMF.
     Another C3 problem was terrestrial microwave communications.
The Marine Corps does not have the terrestrial microwave assets to
support an operation like Restore Hope.   The AN/GRC-201s used
during the operation could not complete the short link between
Mogadishu to Baledogle.  There were extensive problems with spare
parts and trained technicians required to maintain the AN/GRC-201s.
Although the new AN/TRC-170 is just now being fielded to the FMF,
piecemeal fielding across the Corps is not the answer.  Piecemeal
fielding will continue to cause future operational problems that
will require continued augmentation from units throughout the Corps
in support of operations such as Restore Hope and Desert Storm.
     Organic circuit switching was not adequate for support of
Marine forces in Somalia.  The Marine Unit Level Circuit Switch
(ULCS) system does not have the capability to terminate analog
STU-III telephone lines.  This service could only take place by
extending long local service from AN/TTC-39s or create hybrid
digital/analog switches using Marine SB-3865s and SB-3614s.   In
addition,  software  problems  precluded  the  extension  of  DSN
(AUTOVON)  services into the ULCS network.   There was another
problem with the encryption of MODEM 1 trunks from the AN/TTC-42 to
the AN/TTC-39. (7:8)  As a result, users could not complete secure
voice telephone (DSVT) calls from SB-3865s tied into AN/TTC-39s
over GMF.   These circuit switching problems are not new and
continue to surface as repeat interoperability problems during
joint operations.
     Recent experiences in Southwest Asia and Somalia continue to
reinforce the inherent Marine Corps C3 deficiencies when conducting
joint operations.  Future assignments to Marine forces to become
JTF command elements are very likely due to the expeditionary
nature of a MAGTF.  Finding ways for the MAGTF to work around C3
deficiencies is difficult and must rise to the top of the list of
Marine Corps priorities for conducting joint operations.  Without
the proper focus on interoperability, procurement and fielding, and
training of C3 systems, the Marine Corps will continue to repeat
the C3 problems of past joint operations.   Despite the large
drawdown in forces and cutbacks in defense spending, there are some
corrective measures that the Marine Corps is currently developing
or can pursue to offset the C3 deficiencies that exist today.
     The Marine Corps should avoid " force feeding " developmental
or newly fielded C3 systems in an effort to support a MAGTF in
joint operations.  Past experiences in Southwest Asia and current
operations Somalia have demonstrated the difficulties and problems
associated with such actions.  The introduction of new equipment,
training  requirements,  maintenance  support,  and  the  overall
complexity of installing, operating, and maintaining a new C3
system in support of JTF operations during a crisis places an
unnecessary burden the MAGTF/JTF commander.  The Marine Corps can
no longer afford to use a band-aid approach joint regarding C3
systems support to crisis response.
     Although there have been successful applications of new C3
systems during a crisis, the best way to provide a MAGTF commander
with adequate C3 for JTF operations is to make such resources part
of his table of equipment (T/E).  This can be accomplished through
a thorough C3 needlines analysis based upon what types of missions
a MAGTF must accomplish as a JTF.   These needlines should be
studied and prioritized in the order of research, development and
procurement that supports what the Marine Corps has identified as
critical requirements for the FMF. (4)
     If the MAGTF commander is deficient in the C3 systems support
that he needs to accomplish his mission, the C3 support must come
from the theater CINC's resources or CJCS.   Recent memorandums of
agreement with the Army and the Air Force provide MAGTF planners
with C3 support when a crisis occurs.   This support comes from
National Guard units and provides the GMF, message and trunk
switching services that a MAGTF will require for joint operations
as a JTF, component, and MAGTF headquarters.  This is an interim
solution until the procurement of AN/TYC-39s, AN/TTC-39s,  and
additional GMF systems are completed by 2000. (1,6)
     Army force reductions in Europe will make available several C3
systems to other services.  Among these systems are several AN/TTC-
39 trunk and AN/TYC-39 message switches and the Mobile Subscriber
Equipment system (MSE).  MSE is a large area communications system
that provides a battlefield equivalent of a commercial cellular
mobile telephone  system that includes secure voice,  data and
facsimile capabilities.  This system is employed at the corps (MEF)
and division level.  This transportable digital switching system
has vehicle-mounted radios and radio-telephones that provide the
corps  commander  with  continuous  communications  with  his
subordinates over a very large and mobile battlefield. (5:41)  If
a MAGTF could inherit the MSE and some AN/TTC-39s and AN/TYC-39s
from deactivated European Army units, interoperability and digital
switching with other services during joint operations would be
significantly increased for Marine forces.
     The deployment of the JCSE to Somalia in support of the CJTF
(I MEF) demonstrated several different ways that Marine Corps units
can package their own organic equipment.   This could have an
immediate  and  positive  impact  upon  several  Marine  Corps
organizations.  The JCSE arrived in theater with a communications
package mounted inside several Chevy Blazers (BCP).  The LST-8000
is a UHF SATCOM system that provides the commander with several
worldwide communications features. Each MEF should possess an LST-
8000 with the appropriate modems to modify An/TSC-93s for link
termination.  The JCSE Mobile AUTODIN Remote Terminals (MARTs) are
computers, printers, cryptographic equipment, and required software
packaged in a transit case and provides quick setup for AUTODIN
terminations.  A BCP can deploy with a commander and give him the
initial communications outside the theater of operations. (7:33)
The Marine Corps should look carefully at providing this capability
to each MEF.  FMF commands should submit  fleet operational needs
statements (FONS) through the chain of command that validate their
requirement for an LST-8000 or similar capability.
     A MAGTF commander's ability to communicate with his naval
component at sea is gradually getting better.  Traditionally, the
Navy has relied on either line-of sight UHF communications or HF
voice/teletype transmissions for C3.   The Navy's inability to
interface  with  SHF  satellite  systems  ashore  is  thoroughly
documented and will soon complement the worldwide UHF systems
presently on board Navy ships.  The Navy is making efforts to equip
Fleet flagships like the USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19), USS Coronado
(AGF-11), and the USS Nassau (LHA-4) with SHF terminals. (15:58)
Aircraft carriers are  also scheduled to be equipped with SHF
terminals.  SHF is less vulnerable to jamming than UHF and provides
a greater communications capacity for large volumes of information
like air tasking orders (ATOs).  Most important is that SHF will
provide better interoperability with ground forces for fire support
     JTF field training exercises are the best way to familiarize
staff principles with the capabilities and limitations of the
MAGTF's C3 systems and procedures and the other Services' systems.
Joint field  training exercises  allow commanders  to test  the
reliability and  feasibility  of C3  systems.   For  example,  a
commander could exercise the joint intelligence architecture by
making an imagery transfer from a carrier-based F-14 and get it
into the hands of a ground component commander quickly. (10:36)
Qualitative joint C3 education for Marine Corps officers is equally
important to the successful planning and employment of a joint C3
systems architecture by Marine  forces.   Joint education must
include a thorough understanding of joint C3 systems planning and
employment.   The Marine Corps is currently sending some field
officers to a joint C3 systems course taught at the Armed Forces
Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. (5)   This type of instruction
should be extended to company grade officers as well.
     In the coming years, the MAGTF will be vital to the Nation's
military strategy in dealing with a wide array of unpredictable
threats  to  U.S.  interests.    The  overall  capabilities  and
expeditionary nature of a MAGTF coupled with the willingness of a
theater CINC to employ a MAGTF in a crisis has almost guaranteed
future employment of a MAGTF as a JTF.   Although a MAGTF is
functionally well suited for joint operations, it still lacks the
C3 capability to function as a JTF command element.   Continued
dependency upon external agencies for C3 support as a JTF is a
dangerous practice in a world where the possibility of multiple
crisis contingencies exist.  If the Marine Corps is serious about
assuming  future  roles  as  a  JTF  command  element,  several
modifications must be made to MEF C3 systems architecture and
capabilities.    In  accordance  with  current MOAs,  the  MARFOR
component command will receive C3 support from other services for
joint operations.  Despite the continuing requirement for external
C3 support for joint operations, a MAGTF must become more self-
sufficient.    Past  performances  during  joint  operations  have
thoroughly identified the deficiencies in current C3 capabilities.
Marine Corps C3 planning,  structuring, and training for future
operations  as  a  JTF  is  critical  to  national  security,  and
commanders must not become content with the present C3 architecture
of a MEF.
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1.   Bradley, Gary, LtCol, USMC, Ground C3 Systems Officer, C4I
         Branch, Marine Corps Combat Development Center, Personal
         interview regarding future C3 systems requirements,
         Quantico, Virginia, February 12, 1993.
2.   Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Joint Task Force Planning
         Guidance and Procedures, Joint Pub 5-00.2  September
3.   Defense Information Systems Agency.  C3 Architecture for JTF
         Headquarters, JIEO (JTC3A) Report 8302.  July 13, 1992.
4.   Febuary, William, Maj, USMC, Course Development Instructor,
         Communications Officer School, Marine Corps Combat
         Development Center, Personal interview regarding JTF C3
         systems architecture, Quantico, Virginia, February 26,
5.   Goodman, Jr., Glenn.   Army Radio Modernization Programs Bear
         Fruit."  Armed Forces Journal International, July 1992,
         pp. 41-42.
6.   Ibanez, Gary, Maj, USMC, Terrestrial Systems Requirements
         Officer, C4I Branch, Marine Corps Combat Development
         Center, Personal interview regarding future C3 systems
         requirements, Quantico, Virginia, January 29, 1993.
7.   JTF Restore Hope J-6 Memorandum dated January 26, 1993. C4I
         Systems Issues/ Lessons Learned.
8.   Learn, Timothy, Maj, USMC, Course Development Instructor,
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