Stinger
In The Emergency Defense Of The Amphibious Task Force:
An
Accident Waiting to Happen
CSC
1993
SUBJECT
AREA - Warfighting
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Title:
Stinger in the Emergency Defense of the Amphibious Task Force: An Accident
Waiting to
Happen
Author:
Major Jeff S. Vogel, United States Marine Corps
Thesis:
Although Marine Low Altitude Air Defense units practice Emergency Defense of
the
Amphibious
Task Force, they lack effective integration into the Navy's air defense system.
Background: In an emergency the Commander of the
Amphibious Task Force may use
embarked
Marine air defense units to provide air defense protection for the task force.
However,
the
ship's captain has taken away the authority of the Stinger gunner to engage
aircraft. This may
deny
the Stinger gunner enough time to complete an engagement because he has to
request
permission
to engage from higher authority. This violates the concept of decentralized
control.
Additionally,
there is a lack of Standard Operating Procedures for the Emergency Defense of
the
Amphibious
Task Force (EDATF) above the MEU level. In the event an EDATF occurs, ships
often
lack the radio assets required for Stinger team integration into the Navy air
defense system.
Ideally,
the LAAD Commander should be in the ship's Combat Information Center using
organic
Navy communication assets to control LAAD teams. In controlling the teams the
most
desirable
situation would be to adapt for seaborne use the procedures that guide LAAD
gunners
ashore.
During operations ashore the final authority to engage aircraft is normally
delegated to
the
LAAD firing team leader. This procedure agrees with the concept of maneuver
warfare where
only
a decentralized military can have a fast decision cycle. There are many actions
that must
come
together in an emergency to ensure success. These actions are preplanned by
SOPs. This
gives
the capability of the LAAD gunner to act on his own and to perceive the bigger
picture.
SOPs
delineate procedures that reduce the doubts in the LAAD gunners mind about what
to do
during
an engagement process.
Recommendations: The key requirement for command and control
of Marine air defense units is
centralized
command and decentralized control. The authority to fire or not to fire should
reside
with
the Stinger team leader. The Commander of the Amphibious Task Force and
Commander of
the
Landing Force should be responsible for general coordination and program
responsibility for
EDATF
SOPs. Joint coordination will ensure common use of communication equipment,
organization
and training.
OUTLINE
Thesis:
Although Marine Low Altitude Air Defense units practice Emergency Defense of
the
Amphibious
Task Force, they lack effective integration into the Navy's air defense system.
I.
Evolution of the EDATF
A.
Unprovoked attacks on U.S. warships
B.
Kamikaze style tactics
C.
Ship air defense assets unable to cope with air threat
D.
Use of embarked Marine air defense units
II.Rules
of engagement
A.
Captain of the ship restrictions
B.
Iraqi aircraft attacks U.S. Navy Frigate Stark
C.
OODA loop
D.
German World War II independent decision-making process
E.
Concept of centralized command and decentralized control
III.EDATF
Standard Operating Procedures
A.
CATF/CLF relationships
B.
Control afloat procedures
C.
Standard operating procedures
IV.Navy
and Marine communication assets aboard ship
A.
Navy doctrinal communication nets
1. Shipboard communication assets
2. Landing force communication assets
B.
Deck mounted Marine air defense communication assets aboard Navy ships
1. Deck mounted impact on real time
reporting
2. Combat Information Center
integration
STINGER
IN THE EMERGENCY DEFENSE OF AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE:
AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN
Protection of the Amphibious Task Force
from enemy air attacks continues to be a challenge
for
air defenders. Unprovoked attacks on U.S. warships have occurred throughout our
national
experience.
"In 1807, the U.S. Frigate
Chesapeake was cannonaded and
boarded by His Britannic
Majesty's Ship Leopard, and four U.S.
seaman were seized. In 1898, the
battleship Maine exploded in the
Havana, Cuba harbor. Although the
explosion was caused by a
magazine detonation, the
immediate U.S. reaction was to blame
Spanish saboteurs. In 1937, the
gunboat Panay was bombed and
strafed by Japanese aircraft
while escorting U.S. tankers up China's
Yangtze River. Each of these
assaults was (or believed to be)
deliberate and deadly. Each
occurred outside of U.S. waters, and
each came "out of the
blue" while U.S. ships and crew were
engaged in peaceable
activity." (5:64)
Many
U.S. citizens considered each assault a cause for war; in fact, the Japanese
attack on U.S.
warships
at Pearl Harbor in 1941 brought America into World War II.
Today, with the end of the Cold War and
the United States emerging as the only military
superpower,
kamikaze style tactics may increase. A surge effort by an enemy employing all
available
aircraft and reinforced with suicidal zealots could tax the ships' air defense
system. The
penetration
of shipboard air defenses by several sorties of aircraft could result in
moderate to heavy
losses.
The sinking of a large surface combatant may have serious consequences in
accomplishing
the
immediate mission and deal a serious blow to national prestige.
When conditions suggest a surprise or
surge attack, the Commander of the Amphibious Task
Force
(CATF) will use all available means to protect his assets. The Emergency
Defense of the
Amphibious
Task Force (EDATF) uses embarked landing force assets. Embarked Marine air
defense
units such as the Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) battalion could provide
short-range air
defense
with its shoulder launched stinger missile. During the movement phase afloat,
LAAD
teams
will man predetermined firing positions aboard ship. Each team will have
binoculars,
Stinger
missiles, and a communications link with either a LAAD Officer/Noncommissioned
Officer
located
in the Combat Information Center (CIC) of their respective ship. Each team will
be given a
specific
quadrant of airspace to search. Although Marine Low Altitude Air Defense units
practice
Emergency
Defense of the Amphibious Task Force, they lack effective integration into the
Navy's
air
defense system.
The ship's captain or his representative
usually reserves the right to authorize LAAD teams to
engage
a hostile threat Under normal conditions, the Tactical Air Control Center
(TACC) afloat
will
set air defense warning conditions and weapon control status. However, the concept
of
centralized
command and decentralized control is the most efficient use of Stinger air
defense
assets.
The Marine Stinger team has the final authority to engage aircraft. The
responsibility to
fire
or not to fire resides with the team leader.(10:5-3) In the EDATF, the ship's
captain retains
full
control and the command to fire is by his authorization only. This violates the
concept of
decentralized
control. If the enemy bases his attack on surprise, getting timely
authorization to fire
may
be a problem.
"On the evening of 17
May 1987, the U.S. Navy-guided
missile Frigate Stark (FFG-31)
was attacked by an Iraqi aircraft
while on a radar picket station
in the Persian Gulf. The ship was
struck by two Exocet missiles -
37 U.S. sailors were killed. The
Stark was stationed in
international waters well outside the war
zones declared by Iraq and Iran.
At 2000 local time, the Stark was
warned of the approach of an
Iraqi F-1 Mirage by an E-3 Airborne
Warning and Control System
(AWACS) aircraft, via Navy Tactical
Data System (NTDS). The Stark's
Commanding Officer was
informed of the Iraqi aircraft's
presence by 2005, when the aircraft
was about 200 nautical miles
away. At 2102, the radar signature of
the F-1's air intercept radar was
detected, and for several seconds,
the radar locked onto the Stark.
At 2103, the ship's air-search radar
operator requested permission
from the Tactical Action Officer
(TAO) to transmit a standard
warning to the F-1. The TAO said,
"No, wait." At 2105,
the F-1 turned toward the Stark at 32.5
nautical miles out. This move was
missed by the Stark's Combat
Information Center (CIC). The
first missile from the Iraqi F-1 was
launched at 2107, 22.5 nautical
miles from the Stark. The TAO
observed the F-1 course change at
2107. The Captain of the ship
was called, but could not be
found. At 2108 the Stark contacted the
F-1 on the military air distress
frequency, requesting identification
At that moment, however, the F-1
pilot was firing his second
Exocet. Another warning was radioed to the F-1 at about 2108, and
the Stark's Phalanx Gatling gun
was placed in the "stand-by mode."
A Stark lookout reported an
inbound missile to the CIC, but the
report was not relayed to the TAO. The first missile hit the
Stark at
2109, and she went to general
quarters. As the ship's captain
entered the CIC, the second
incoming missile observed from the
bridge, struck 20 to 30 seconds
after the first." (5:64)
The Stark was always a step behind the
Iraqi aircraft. Its command, control, and
communication
structure was too centralized to cope with the problem. Instead of focusing on
the
threat,
it focused on internal procedures. The F-1 was on an attack profile, but the
TAO was
unable
to recognize it. The TAO should have put a missile on the rail and armed the
Stark's chaff
launchers.
The crew was not ready to use her weapons even if a decision had been made to
use
them.
In order to win an engagement, we should
operate at a faster tempo than our adversaries or
get
inside our adversary's Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action cycle (OODA
loop). As
commanders,
we need to decentralize decisions to encourage lower level commanders to shape,
direct,
and take sudden actions necessary to quickly exploit opportunities as they
present
themselves.
If you give your commanders room for independence, how do you direct them to
make
the right decision in your absence? You communicate to a schwerpunkt (point of
main
effort).
It is the center around which everything is focused. Schwerpunkt is applied at
all levels
from
platoon to theater. All supporting elements; air, logistics, and artillery have
a schwerpunkt
This
meshes together the initiative at the tactical level with the intent of the
strategic.(3:30) In
other
words, you don't tell a Marine what to do, you communicate to the schwerpunkt.
It is appropriate to recall that Field
Marshal von Moltke was known for giving orders
sticking
to a clear-cut direction only. Within that direction he left freedom of action
to his junior
leaders.
Five thousand miles away his contemporary, General Robert E. Lee, held the
opinion that
the
mission of the leader was only to put his troops into the right direction for
the decisive battle,
the
junior leaders should do the rest. Both Moltke and Lee wanted freedom of
decision for their
junior
leaders so as to enable them to make independent decisions without losing sight
of the total
concept(5:6)
An example of making independent
decisions can be seen in Rommel's North African
campaign
during World War II. Rommel's G3 and G2 were at Tobruk while Rommel was away
at
the front lines for five days. Rommel had great success at Sidi Rezegh, and
consequently
Rommel
gave the order to go over to the pursuit near the Egyptian border with only a
few forces
left
at Tobruk. However, the pursuit was too early and the developments near Tobruk
became
very
dangerous, and nearly untenable. Rommel was not at Tobruk and could not be
located at the
front.
There was no other decision but to call off the German offensive from the
eastern frontier,
call
back the German forces, and give them an order to attack the enemy in the rear
near Tobruk.
That
means the G3 cancelled Rommel's order and ordered all the troops back from the
front line to
Tobruk
to relieve the situation. When Rommel returned from the front, after an
explanation about
the
situation, he agreed with the decision. This is the type of decision-making
that we should
foster
in the military of today.(6:6) In a
dangerous situation, even the most junior officer must
have
the courage to make clear-cut independent decisions. The commander of the Army
could not
be
found, a decision had to be made, and if you wait until the Commander gets
back-the battle is
lost,
therefore, you have to make an independent decision.(6:6)
The full potential of Low Altitude Air
Defense (LAAD) units cannot be realized without
effective
command and control.(2:50) The key requirement for command and control of LAAD
units
is centralized command and decentralized control. With the enemy employing high
speed,
low-level
tactics to penetrate our air defense coverage, LAAD teams may not have enough
time to
request
permission to engage from higher authority. Therefore, the most desirable
situation would
be
to adapt (for seaborne use) the normal weapons condition that guides LAAD
gunners ashore.
The
control of a land-based Stinger under normal air defense doctrine is through
setting weapons
control
conditions: Weapons Free ("FREE"-engage all aircraft not positively
identified as
friendly),
Weapons Tight ("TIGHT"-engage all aircraft positively identified as
hostile), and
Weapons
Hold ("HOLD"-engage aircraft only in self-defense).(8:C-11) The high
degree of
visual
aircraft recognition training afforded LAAD teams facilitates the rapid
decision-making that
is
a necessity in the effective engagement of enemy aircraft in an emergency.
Visual recognition of
targets,
accompanied by an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) check, is the primary
method of
aircraft
identification. This procedure agrees with the concept of maneuver warfare
where only a
decentralized
military can have a fast decision cycle. The Navy's integrated air defense
system
must
have positive control of all aircraft and LAAD teams as a baseline during
operations. To
preclude
fratricide, positive communication with all aircraft and LAAD units is a
requirement. The
CIC
passes hostile aircraft locations to LAAD teams positioned aboard the ship.
LAAD teams do
not
engage if they are ever in doubt as to the identification of the aircraft.
However, the right to
self-defense
is never denied if attacked.
EDATF plans lack Standard Operating Procedures
(SOP) necessary in an emergency. The
LAAD
commander's initiative and assertiveness frequently decides air coordination
matters. A
joint
understanding is lacking between the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force
(CATF) and
the
Commander of the Landing Force (CLF) concerning the roles, responsibilities,
and training
requirements
for embarked LAAD units. The normal CATF/CLF command relationship exists.
Under
any circumstances, embarked assets remain operational under the control of the
Marine Air
Ground
Task Force (MAGTF) Commander. Assignment of all emergency defensive missions
involving
MAGTF assets are through the MAGTF Commander. Control afloat procedures vary
dependent
upon the size of the MAGTF supported, and the composition and operational
displacement
of the Amphibious Task Force. EDATF roles and responsibilities for embarked
LAAD
personnel and weapon systems are not formulated at any level above the Marine
Expeditionary
Unit and Amphibious Ready Group.(4:11)
Good emergency SOPs reduce mistakes by
anticipating command decisions necessary in a
time-compressed
situation. An emergency by definition is a sudden unexpected occurrence
demanding
immediate action. Realistic emergency training for LAAD teams would be to find,
interrogate,
track, and carry out an engagement sequence against an enemy aircraft under
emergency
conditions. A successful engagement would require the Stinger gunner to know
what
to
do in a variety of situations. These situations could vary; from attack profiles
by many hostile
MIG's
or unmanned aerial weapons, to a political activist in a single engine plane.
There are many
actions
that must come together in an emergency to ensure success. These actions are
preplanned
by
SOPs. SOPs delineate procedures that reduce the doubts in the LAAD gunners mind
about
what
to do during the engagement process. SOPs allow the team leader to make
decisions on his
own.
That is, he understands the commander's "schwerpunkt". This gives the
capability of the
LAAD
gunner to act on his own and to perceive the bigger picture. Consequently, the
team leader
is
able to observe the target and control the fire, otherwise, the response may be
too slow. The
CATF/CLF
should be responsible for general coordination and program responsibility for
EDATF
SOPs.
Joint coordination will ensure common use of equipment, organization and
training.
In the event an EDATF occurs, ships often
lack the radio assets required for Stinger team
integration
into the Navy air defense system.(1:5)
Amphibious operations comprise the most
complex
form of warfare. An amphibious assault is an attack launched from the sea
against a
hostile
shore. Initiated with zero combat power ashore, it requires the rapid build-up
of forces and
equipment
to enable further combat operations. By far the most difficult amphibious
operation
which
we must be prepared to execute is the Over the Horizon (OTH) assault. It will
exert
extraordinary
stress on our command and control. An OTH assault is only one option when
conducting
an amphibious assault. In those instances where the threat is less capable or
not
sophisticated,
the CATF may launch a close shore assault. This greatly simplifies
ship-to-shore
movement
and, command and control.(9:9) The close-to-shore assaults were commonly
initiated
with
the line of departure from 2.5 to 5 nautical miles offshore. With the advent of
the OTH
concept,
this distance could be up to 150 nautical miles. Since this type of assault is
scenario
dependent,
the communications equipment aboard the ship must meet the needs of traditional
and
OTH
assaults. Table One depicts the radio circuits required by a MEF Forward:
TABLE ONE
RADIO
CIRCUIT REQUIREMENTS
OTH
Assault Close
Assault
HF 37 26
VHF-FM
Transceivers 6 17
UHF-LOS
Transceivers 25 25
UHF
SATCOM Transceivers 5 5
Source: Communications Handbook for
Expeditionary Operations
The amphibious assault ship (LHA) Tarawa
is capable of supporting Maine air defense
units.
The LHA is the most common substitute for the amphibious command ship LCC. The
LCC's
were designed to support the CATF and the CLF during amphibious operations,
however,
they
were designated as flagships for the U.S. Second and Seventh Fleets in 1978.
The LHA has
a
primary mission "to embark, deploy, and land elements of an attack force
in an assault by
helicopters,
amphibious vehicles, landing craft, or by a combination of these
methods."(11:1150
(SRI)-15) If the LHA is used as a command ship, it
must also perform its primary mission as a
helicopter
platform. Table Two depicts the shortages of radio circuits for an LHA during a
MEF
forward
size operation:
TABLE TWO
LHA RADIO CIRCUITS
Shortage Shortage
On-Hand Over-the-horizon Close
HF 20 17
6
VHF-FM
Transceivers 23 0 0
UHF-LOS
Transceivers 18 7 7
UHF
SATCOM Transceivers 4 1
1
Source: Communications Handbook for
Expeditionary Operations
The Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD)
battalion usually supports a MEF forward with a
Battery-sized
unit. The following communication requirements would be needed to sustain a
Battery
operation: 4 HF nets and 9 VHF nets.(7:3-1)
Comparing the previous tables, the main
problem
is a lack of HF communication nets aboard amphibious shipping. Using VHF may be
an
alternative,
but it is a line of sight radio. In the Over-the-Horizon assault, the VHF radio
will not
meet
the communication needs of the situation due to a lack of range. In the close
assault VHF can
work,
but it is heavily terrain dependent. If the terrain blocks your line of sight,
you can set up
relay
stations, but this action consumes limited communication assets.
During an amphibious assault, if an
emergency occurs, Stinger teams may be ashore and
aboard
ship simultaneously. If the ship does not have the required radio assets, the
LAAD teams
on
shore cannot pass threat information to the ship. The ship's captain is
hesitant to allow LAAD
units
to piggyback on Navy doctrinal air defense nets. This forces the LAAD units to
use its
organic
communication assets aboard ship. Deck mounted Marine radios on the outside of
the ship
usually
require authorization by the ship's captain or his Communications Officer. The
location of
the
deck mounting is a compromise between communication effectiveness with the LAAD
units
ashore,
shipboard regulations, and deck space available. Deck mounting separates the
LAAD unit
from
the Combat Information Center (CIC). The CIC processes air defense information.
This
separation
requires another communication link between the LAAD unit at the deck-mounted
radio
and
the CIC. This additional communication link requires the use of more Marine
communication
equipment,
or if available at the deck-mounted location, the use of internal ship
communications.
An
additional communication link diminishes the near-real time report of threat
aircraft. Without
adequate
early warning, Stinger air defense systems become reactive. This degrades air
defense
for
the Amphibious Task Force. The ability of sea-based surface and air search
radars is minimal
in
detecting low altitude aircraft over-land. This sea-based detection shortfall
coupled with the
diminished
real-time passage of threat information may allow enemy aircraft to penetrate
the
Amphibious
Objective Area (AOA). The high speeds of today's military jet aircraft do not
permit
untimely
exchange of threat information. This adhoc situation degrades the air defense
protection
of
the ship.
Ideally, the LAAD Commander should be in
the ship's CIC using organic Navy
communication
assets to control LAAD teams. The CIC provides for 24-hour operations. Deck-
mounted
radios are not practical in rough seas. Being located in the CIC ensures
unification with
the
Navy's integrated air defense system. Close coordination between LAAD and the
CIC's
Tactical
Action Officer ensures coordination of weapons engagement by naval gunfire,
Stinger
weapons
and the Close-In Weapons System (CIWS). The CIC provides target designation,
weapons
condition, range, bearing, speed and altitude information to the LAAD gunners
in firing
positions
located on the ship. It also reduces near-real time reporting of hostile air
tracking
information
by eliminating an unnecessary communication link if the LAAD commander is
located
outside
the CIC. This provides for the prompt engagement of hostile aircraft. It also
unites the
CATF/CLF
air defense personnel into a cohesive system which provides for more efficient
use of
command
and control assets. In the future, the Navy and Marine Corps should ensure
joint crew
positions
aboard ships which are budgeted and planned with enough communication assets
for
joint
doctrinal communication requirements.
The ability to integrate Marine Corps
Stinger teams into the EDATF will continue to be a
challenge.
The biggest is that the ship's captain has removed the LAAD teams' authority to
engage
aircraft.
The execution of LAAD's air defense mission now becomes centralized. This
leadership
philosophy
is incongruent with the intent of maneuver warfare. Centralized thinking may be
more
efficient,
but is less effective. Centralized procedures connotes low trust. The right of
self-
defense
has been taken away when the ship's captain has centralized the engagement
procedures.
The
battlefield can be a confusing environment. Friendlies may get intermingled
with hostile
aircraft
Commanders and air defenders have only split seconds to decide whether to shoot
or not
to
shoot. With the unprecedented lethality of modern weapons, the commander that
hesitates may
pay
a steep price for indecision. Flexibility is the best posture when confronted
with an
emergency.
To maximize the freedom of action requires organization to meet an emergency.
Clear
lines
of responsibility focus on enemy actions, vice-service parochialism that may
impair effective
combat
performance. The use of Navy communication assets, rules of engagement that
allow
decentralized
control, and integrating doctrine with the Navy are keys to success. The
Goldwater-
Nichols
act has challenged the military to conduct operations in a joint environment.
By planning
jointly
and anticipating the problems of integrating LAAD units into the EDATF, these
problems
can
be overcome.
BIBLOGRAPHY
1. Conroy, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC. Marine
Corps Lessons Learned System number:
71053-91656 (01516) and number
71053-34698 (01514), submitted by 28 MEU.
PHIBEX OCEAN VENTURE 90 conducted by
USCINCLANT On 07/10/90.
2. Davis, Dale R., Captain, USMC.
"Employing LAAD in the Offense." Marine Corps
Gazette, October 1992, 49-51.
3. Proceedings of Seminar on Air Antitank
Warfare, May 26-26, 1978. Battelle Columbus
Laboratories, Tactical Technology
Center, 505 King Avenue, Columbus, Ohio.
4. Storey, J., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC.
Marine Corps Lessons Learned System Number:
40533-63384 (01161), submitted by
MAG-90. PHIBEX TEAM SPIRIT 90
conducted by CG, 9TH MEB on
03/22/90.
5. Vlahos, Michael, "The Stark
Report" Proceedings/Naval Review, March 1988, 64-67.
6. Von Mellenthin, F.W., General Major, German
Army. Conference on Armored Warfare in
World War II, May 10, 1978, Battelle
Columbus Laboratories, Tactical Technology
Center,505 King Avenue, Columbus,
Ohio.
7. USMC, LAAD Platoon Commander's Handbook, OH
5-5C, August 1986.
8. USMC, Antiair Warfare, FMFM 5-50
(Coordinating Draft), 20 December 1991.
9. USMC, Over-The-Horizon (OTH) Amphibious
Operations Operational Concept, FMFRP
14-7, 15 March 1991.
10. USMC, Employment of the Low Altitude Air
Defense Battalion, FMFM 5-52, October
1990.
11. USMC, Communications Handbook for
Expeditionary Operations, Basic Communication
Officers Course, United States
Marine Corps Communication Officers School.
NEWSLETTER
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|