Anti-Radiation
Missiles And The AH-1W Cobra In The SEAD Role
CSC
1993
SUBJECT
AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Title: Anti-radiation missiles and the AH-1W Cobra
in the SEAD role
Author:
Major Jeffrey L. Speer
Thesis:
The effectiveness of enemy air defenses may cause SEAD operations to be the
major
part of the commanders battle plan, so
victory requires close coordination between
intelligence planners, fire support
planners, and operational planners at each level of
the force. It also requires that all
assets be considered; however, these operational
planners have overlooked to a large
extent the AH-1W Cobra helicopter as an integral
element in the successful destruction
of enemy air defenses.
Background:
The proliferation of modern air defense systems will have a significant effect
upon any military operation. History
has shown that complacency in the development
of weapons and tactics against enemy
air defense systems can result in devastating
consequences. Fixed and mobile defense
systems provide a umbrella that attacking
forces must contend with. The
suppression of enemy air defense systems (SEAD)
represents a specific fire support requirement
that commanders must deal with.
The Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) realizes the importance of SEAD and
is fully capable of performing
campaign, localized, and complementary SEAD
operations. The MAGTF utilizes
anti-radiation missiles as the centerpiece of its
electronic SEAD. The AH-1W Cobra is
fully capable of supporting electronic SEAD
by employing the AGM-122A Sidearm
anti-radiation missile. Unified commanders
should consider the capabilities and
limitations of the AH-1W Cobra for employment
in the Joint- SEAD role. Proven
advances in the field of missile technology have led
to the development of a advanced
(helicopter compatible) anti-radiation guided
missile (AAGRM). This new weapon needs
to be fielded to enhance the combat
capability of the MAGTF and Unified
Commanders.
Recommendations:
Unified Commanders need the capabilities that the AARGM provides and
should push the Navy's Air Warfare
Department to field this weapon.
Anti-radiation missiles and the
AH-1W Cobra in the SEAD role
OUTLINE
Thesis:
The effectiveness of enemy air defenses may cause SEAD operations to be the
major
part
of the commanders' battle plan, so victory requires close coordination between
intelligence
planners,
fire support planners, and operational planners at each level of the force. It
also
requires
that all assets be considered; however, these operational planners have
overlooked to a
large
extent the AH-1W Cobra helicopter as an integral element in the successful
destruction of
enemy
air defenses.
I. Historical role of SEAD operations
A.
Korean War
B.
Vietnam War
C.
Yom Kippur War
D.
Falklands War
E. El Dorado Canyon Operation
II.
Significant mobile air defense systems
A.
SA-6
B.
ZSU-23-4
C.
South African Zumlac
III.Current
world situation
A.
Luftwaffa development of the ECR Tornado for the SEAD role
B.
U.S.Army requirements in Joint SEAD
C.
MAGTF requirements in Joint SEAD
IV.
SEAD operations in Desert Storm
A.
After action considerations
B.
Fratricide
C.
Task Force Normandy
V. Capabilities for the Unified Commander
A.
AH-1W employment implications
B.
Future developments
ANTI-RADIATION MISSILES AND THE AH-1W
COBRA IN THE SEAD ROLE
by Major Jeffrey L. Speer, USMC
Once man began to utilize the balloon and
airplane to create a three dimensional battlefield,
defense
supression became a critical concern. The ability to control the airspace above
one's
adversary,
whether for observation or the direct delivery of weapons, has proven
invaluable
throughout
recent military history. To prevent an enemy from controlling this airspace,
defense
systems
were developed. Then suppression of these systems became essential and has
developed
through the use of technology. My intent here is to deal with the concept of
suppression
of enemy air defense systems (SEAD), and show how joint staffs can utilize the
AH-1W
Cobra as a credible weapons system in the SEAD role.
The advent of radar in the second world war
heralded the beginnings of modern-day air
defense
systems. This use of the electromagnetic spectrum gave the defender some unique
capabilities
to counter the airplane. The concept married a small and mobile radar with the
actual
gun battery to direct aircraft and gunfire toward the inbound threat.(1:18)
Radar integration improved anti-aircraft
artillery accuracy many times over by providing an
effective
and efficient concentration of fire power. This improved lethality, forced
fighters and
bombers
to attack from higher altitudes to stay above the maximum effective range of
the
antiaircraft
guns.(1:19)
Developments in radar-directed antiaircraft
artillery created a defense system that had to be
dealt
with during the Korean War. An effective counter measure used during the Korean
War
included
TB-25J "Ferrets." These modified Mitchel Bombers performed radar
suppression
duties
while leading formations of B-26 Invaders. (3:113) The Korean War experience
demonstrated
how electronic combat could cut losses of attacking aircraft. Following the
conflict,
all major powers made great strides in producing new types of equipment for
bomber
protection.
This allowed aircraft to enter enemy airspace without detection by threat radar
and
ultimately
prevented engagement by the radar-guided weapons systems.(2:253)
Learning from the Korean War, both Soviet
Bloc and Western Nations during the cold war
used
World War II era developments in radar and missiles to form a formidable
antiaircraft
weapon.
The Germans had studied the concept of surface-to-air missiles as early as
1941, but
the
Soviet Union was the first to operationally employ this system against an enemy
aircraft.
During
a reconnaissance flight on 1 May 1960,the Soviet Union fired upon, and downed,
the U-
2
aircraft piloted by Francis Gary Powers.(2:15) The Soviets had developed the
surface-to-air
missile
system to counter medium altitude penetration tactics used by the United
States: (a
defensive
tactic designed as a countermeasure to the effective use of radar guided
antiaircraft
artillery).(1:18)
The Vietnam War was a
"watershed" in the development of the concept of SEAD. On 24
July
1965, during a raid over North Vietnam, a Soviet built SA-2 surface-to-air
missile shot
down
an American F-4 Phantom. This was not the first aircraft shot down in Vietnam,
nor the
first
time an American aircraft had been destroyed by Soviet missiles. It was,
however, the first
appearance
of Soviet built surface-to-air missiles in Southeast Asia. This introduction
into
North
Vietnam exposed the American fighters to a new and deadly threat when they had
previously
enjoyed air supremacy.(2:18) Until a new airborne electronic combat system
could
be
developed to neutralize the guidance system of surface-to-air missiles,
aircraft could only
evade
the missiles by violent maneuvers.(1:20)
Although the SA-2 had a probability of
kill of only 10 percent, the rising losses due to this
missile
were mounting. The United States lost about 160 aircraft by the end of 1972,the
majority
due to the SA-2.(1:29) To meet this threat the United States resurrected the
idea of
using
radar busters similar to those used during World War II. During Operation
Market
Garden,
P-47s used radar homing devices to attack antiaircraft artillery sites along
the coast of
Holland
and France.(18:30) Then in Vietnam the F-100F Super Saber was chosen and the
conversion
of seven aircraft began immediately for the "Top Secret" mission of
radar detection
and
location.(18:32) The F-100F Super Saber was joined with the F-105 Thunderchief
to form
a
hunter-killer team known as "Iron-Hand."(18:37) The concept would use
a F-100F to
identify,
locate and mark an enemy radar site for an attack by the F-105s. Additionally,
the F-
100F
would suppress the radar site with Shrike anti-radiation missiles while the F-105s
were
inbound
to a target. Thus the radar threat was prevented from detecting the killer
aircraft and
increased
their survival.(18:38)
During the 1972 Linebacker I operations,
the SA-2 brought down 11 B-52 aircraft. Tactics
were
modified and Wild Weasel aircraft were changed from the F-100's to the more
capable F-
4C
Phantom employing AGM-45 and AGM-78 anti-radiation missiles and a self
protecting pod.
(18:38)
The result was a sharp decline in losses because the North Vietnamese radar
operators
shut
down their radar once the hunter-killer team appeared in their sector.(18:38)
With the
success
of the Wild Weasels against the SA-2 missile system in 1966, the North
Vietnamese
incased
the number of radar controlled guns to a total of almost 10,000.(3:113) The
following
year, most aircraft losses were due to anti-aircraft fire rather than
surface-to-air
missiles.(18:40)
An increased emphasis on electronic counter measures and refinement of
tactics
contributed to a decreased in attrition to 2 percent, compared to the initial
phase of the war
when
attrition rates were nearly 14 percent.(2:269)
The concept of Wild Weasel operations has
traditionally relied on hunter-killer teams in
which
the critical factor is the ability to "transfer relative position of the
threat." Tactics and
equipment
would have to be developed to keep pace with the threat, especially since this
would
be
the last war which targeted only stationary or fixed radar sites. Intelligence
indicated the
Soviets
would introduce their newly designed mobile threats within a few years.(18:90)
While the Vietnam War was shaping the
future of SEAD, the 1967 war between Israel and
Egypt
was reinforcing the importance of air superiority. The Egyptians saw losses of
over 300
aircraft
on the ground and the destruction of 23 radar sites.(1:23) Using lessons
learned from
Vietnam,
the Egyptian air defense was reorganized by Soviet advisors who provided an
integrated
air defense system. Included were improved SA-2 missiles and the recently
introduced
SA-3. Mobile threats included the SA-6 missile system and ZSU-23-4, an
automatic
radar
guided anti-aircraft artillery gun. The concept of a radar controlled gun had
been taken
one
step further by placing the system on a tracked chassis to provide
mobility. The missile and
anti-aircraft
defense on the West Bank of the Suez Canal now provided an integrated and
mutually
protective system for the Egyptian forces.(19:313)
In 1973 the Yom Kippur War provided many
lessons for warfare. On the tactical side, the
Israeli
Air force was denied initial air superiority over the battlefield--not due to
enemy air
power
but to ground mobile air defenses.(10:5) The effectiveness of the mobile
surface-to-air
missiles
was only exceeded by that of self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery. This was
the first
employment
of mobile air defense system in support of an advancing army.(9:6) The plan of
the
Arab forces was to achieve a surprise attack across the Suez Canal without
using aircraft to
gain
local air superiority, so this had to be done by ground power:
To limit the effect of Israeli air
power, the ground force would not
venture for beyond the missile and
air defense system until the
Israeli Air force was exhausted by attacks
on that system, allowing
the Arab Air force to contend with
what was left. (17:135)
The Israeli Army could not stop the
Egyptian canal crossing. Within hours, tactical air
operations
would be restricted by darkness so the pilots were instructed to "ignore
the missile
batteries
and attack any and all targets." (17:145) Two hours later, the Israeli Air
force had lost
12
aircraft on the Egyptian front.(17:146)
Concurrently the Syrian thrust in the Golan
Heights was threatening Israel's heartland and the
Israeli
Airforce was directed to fly maximum strikes against the Syrian tanks until
sufficient
Israeli
armor could reinforce the front. The pilots disregarded the anti-aircraft
umbrella and
bore
the brunt of the initial onslaught at the cost of 39 aircraft.(17:150) For one
week the
Israeli
Air force was held in check by ground-based defenses. It was not until the
second week,
and
a favorable ground battle that pilots could focus primarily on defense
suppression.(17:151)
Of the 114 Israeli aircraft lost, 94 were
lost to ground-based air defenses.(17:152) The
ZSU-23-4
was the most effective anti-aircraft weapon of the war and was credited with
downing
38
Israeli aircraft despite being employed in small numbers.(13:81) The mobile
SA-6 was
responsible
for downing the majority of the remaining 53 aircraft with the SA-7 being
credited
with
only seven kills.
The result of the Yom Kippur War was the
fundamental altering of the relationship between
the
fighter and attack aircraft and the ground threat. Losses in this war were
largely due to a
conscious
decision to provide close air support before defense suppression had been
achieved.
The
mobile defense system was key in providing an overlapping umbrella that
advanced as an
integral
part of the army. However new technology and air power doctrine had to change
due to
this
increased lethal fire power across the spectrum of the battlefield.
Many nations failed to study the lessons
from the Vietnam and Yom Kippur Wars. The
British
and Argentine conflict over the Falklands showed how critical it was for
nations to keep
pace
with SEAD developments. The lessons learned from the Falklands conflict show
several
old
trends had re-emerged. The first was the occurrence of heavy losses of aircraft
on both
sides
during attacks on well-defended targets, because attacks focused only on the
targets rather
than
on the defenses which protected them.
The second was that the electronic combat
capability of both British and Argentine forces
was
inadequate as well as outdated. The British Sea Harrier's jamming pods were not
tailored to
the
Argentine radar threat. In addition, Argentine fighters had no electronic
countermeasures
capability,
resulting in the loss of over one third of their aircraft.(11:27)
During the conflict, the British attempted
to destroy the Argentine search radar by using
Vulcan
bombers carrying AGM-45 anti-radiation missiles. The mission was not sucessful
since
the Argentines would shut off their radar each time Vulcan aircraft approached
for the
attack.(11:29)
A key lesson learned was that proliferation of western built weapons makes it
likely
that fixture conflicts will see engagements by these systems in conjunction
with those of
the
Eastern Bloc countries and the Soviet Union.(11:32)
Taking the lessons learned from the Vietnam
War, Yom Kippur War, and the Falklands
Campaign,
the United States developed SEAD as a force multiplier for combat operations.
On
15
April 1986 the United Stated conducted a raid on Tripoli because of state
sponsored terrorism.
This
operation called El Dorado Canyon consisted of 25 bombers 70 support aircraft.
(20:44)
The attack provided the first opportunity for United States forces to apply
many new
technologies
and tactics incorporated since the end of the Vietnam War.(20:44) The attack
began
at 0154 Tripoli time. All electronic combat aircraft climbed from their low
level ingress
altitudes
and allowed the Libyan radar to target these aircraft. This deliberate
targeting allowed
the
A-7 and F/A-18 defense suppression aircraft to detect, locate and neutralize
the threat radars
with
a volley of almost 50 anti-radiation missiles. At the same time EF-111A's and
EA-6B's
began
jamming and confusing enemy defenses.(20:46)
At 0200, the simultaneous attack by A-6E
and F-111F strike aircraft began. The attack
lasted
only 12 minutes with not one enemy missile striking a U.S. aircraft.(20:47) The
only
combat
loss was a F-111F that was lost due to anti-aircraft gun fire. This loss in no
way
detracted
from the fact that without defense suppression against a layered defense
system,
aircraft
losses would have been much higher.
An analysis of several mobile defense
systems will show how technical developments made
them
a formidable threat to attacking aircraft. Mobile defense systems are
inexpensive and as
shown
in past wars are quite capable of shaping events on the battlefield. The SA-6
is a mobile
low
altitude weapon system with a unique integral rocket/ramjet propulsion system
that
appeared
a decade in advance of comparable western technology when it was combat tested
in
the
Yom Kippur War.(21:100) The launcher and radar/ control system are mounted on
separate
vehicles.
The two vehicles are linked by radio, rather than by the extensive cabling of
the U.S.
Hawk
system, to enhance mobility and reaction time. The system includes several
radars for
tracking,
guidance and command with several back-up modes, including IR or active radar,
as
well
as an optical tracking capability.(21:101)
The ZSU-23-4 is a mobile self propelled
anti-aircraft gun. When employed with surface to
air
missiles it provides a devastating punch. The quad-mounted guns can be guided
visually or
directed
by radar, aided by a moving target indicator. A small analog computer supplies
lead
angles
and the gyrostabilized mount on the gun allows for firing on the move. The real
significance
is that the tracked vehicle contains the acquisition and tracking radar, as
well as four
guns--
a truly independent system. Its combat debut, like that of the SA-6,in the Yom
Kippur
War
added a new dimension to air defense capabilities.(13:81)
Mobile air defense systems are produced by
small countries as well as superpowers.
Beginning
in 1993, a South African firm began world marketing of the Zumlac. The Zumlac
is
a
23 mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun system. It is essentially a Truckmakers
SAMIL 100
(6x6)
mine-protected truck, already used for a wide range of missions by the South
African
Defense
Forces, with a 23mm Zu-23-2 anti-aircraft cannon mounted at the rear. The
cannon
can
be changed to utilize 2Omm or 35mm ammunition. The system includes a fire
control unit,
acquisition
radar and a optical director enhanced by a laser-range finder. When purchased,
the
Zumlac
comes complete with a logistics package and a complete training system.(24:27)
The
world
demand for air defense systems will undoubtedly aid in the acceptance of this
weapon
system
and encouraged other developing industrial nations to export similar systems.
As the United States reduces its forward
deployed forces which are solely dedicated to
SEAD,
many countries realize the need to develop and employ their own aircraft in the
suppression
of enemy air defenses. Germany has seen the need to increase the capability of
the
Luftwaffe
by introducing the Electronic Combat and Reconnaissance (ECR) Tornado to its
inventory.
The Tornado ECR is the only dedicated battlefield electronic reconnaissance and
air
defense
suppression aircraft in service outside the United States.(4:615) Development
of this
project
began in 1986 in conjunction with the Italian Air Force. In January of 1992 the
final
aircraft
was delivered to the Luftwaffe, bringing their total to 35 ECR Tornado's. The
Italian
Air
Force also plans to retrofit 16 Tornados and received their first aircraft in
January of 1992.
These aircraft are not yet fully equipped
for the SEAD role, since several systems have not
yet
been installed. These systems do not detract from the SEAD role, but once
installed will aid
in
it being declared a SEAD or reconnaissance asset for NATO. The aircraft systems
that are in
short
supply are the Texas Instrument Emitter System (ECS) and a
Honeywell/Soundertechnik
Infra-Red
Imaging System (ILS). Both of these systems are under flight test and will be
fitted to
all
the Luftwaffe aircraft by the middle of 1993.
The importance of this development within
the German Air Force is critical due to U.S. cut-
backs
in equipment and personnel forward deployed in Europe. The reduction of U.S.
Wild
Weasel
aircraft make it in important that the ELS Tornado be at the heart of European
SEAD.(4:616) The AGM-88B High Speed Anti-Radiation
Missile (HARM) will be the
primary
weapon for use in this role. The ELS will allow the aircraft to operate as a
standoff
electronic
intelligence gatherer.
The ECR Tornado will not lose any current
capability that exists in the strike variant of
existing
Tornados. The aircraft complements the total NATO air defense system, providing
for
European
self reliance.(4:616) The German government could expand its SEAD capability by
introducing
helicopter anti-radiation missiles, like the Sidearm, to its inventory, and
thereby
provide
greater depth to its SEAD capability.
As the United States reduces its military
forces, joint operations are critical to the successful
completion
of future military actions. The joint suppression of enemy air defenses
(J-SEAD)
represents
that portion of SEAD which is conducted as an integrated effort by the U. S.
Air
Force
and the U. S. Army to locate and suppress army surface-to-air defenses.(22:59)
The
significance
of SEAD/J-SEAD operations is that they represent a specific fire support
requirement
that Army aviation brigades must address. Field Manual 1-112 succinctly
addresses
the
importance of SEAD for deep operations:
Attack helicopter Battalion
Commanders must use all available
means to suppress enemy air defense
artillery systems. Field
artillery as well as field
artillery aerial observer assets can be used
at crossing sites. U.S. Air Force
EF-111s and F-4Gs along with
attack helicopters from cavalry
squadron can be used in this role.(23:5)
The responsibility of Army and Air Force
assets in executing J-SEAD are clearly defined in
TT
100-44-1 and reiterated in FM 71-100. The lines of responsibility correlate to
the range
limitations
of the force to conduct SEAD. Essentially, the Army has primary responsibility
for
J-SEAD
operations from the forward line of troops to the limit of observed fires, and
Air Force
has
secondary responsibility in this are. However the Air Force has primary
responsibility for
J-SEAD
operations from the limit of observed fires forward.(22:59)
The Army has the capability to execute
destructive and disruptive operations in the
performance
of SEAD operations. The field artillery is the Army's primary asset to conduct
destructive
SEAD operations. Other assets include Attack helicopters, ground maneuver units
and
mortars. Electronic warfare (EW) is the Army's primary disruptive SEAD asset.
Typically,
EW
assets will be employed against air defense targets that are not precisely
located on or
beyond
the range of indirect fire systems.(23:8) To date the Army has not embraced
helicopter
anti-radiation
missiles for its SEAD role. Similar to the German Air Force, if the Army were
to
utilize
a weapon like Sidearm it would truly add depth to its SEAD capability.
While SEAD is not the only fire support
requirement of the Army aviation brigade, it is
certainly
the most important. The suppression of air defense is so critical to division
operations
that
any identified air defense weapon system will be designated as a high pay off
target for the
fire
support system.(23:8)
The Marine Corps supports J-SEAD
requirements set by the Joint Force Commander.(5:3)
The
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) integrates ground and naval power to
conduct
SEAD
operations. Applying fire support to accomplish SEAD, the MAGTF must be able to
plan
for campaign, localized, and complementary SEAD operations. To reduce the
overall air
defense
capability of the enemy, the MAGTF will conduct campaign SEAD operations as
J-SEAD.
This will aid the joint force commander in shaping the battlefield for fixture
operations.
To enhance ground maneuver operations protected by friendly air assets,
localized
SEAD
is conducted by the MAGTF.(5:3) Here specific threats around geographic areas
are
targeted
using MAGTF, joint or allied forces. Finally the MAGTF must be fully capable of
conducting
complementary SEAD. These operations are conducted against targets that do not
allow
for detailed planning, since they are generally pop-up in nature, providing
targets of
opportunity
that must be dealt with immediately.(5:4)
The MAGTF understands that dominance of the
battle space is critical for a successful
operation.
The greatest threat to assault support and offensive air support operations is
an
integrated
air defense system. As a result, the key to success is the destruction of enemy
air
defense
systems.
Effective SEAD saves lives and
aircraft.(12:49) High speed anti-radiation missiles are the
centerpiece
of electronic SEAD.(12:49) Until 1991, the only platform that could deliver
such
weapons
was fixed-wing aircraft. But now, with the development of the AGM-122A Sidearm
anti-radiation
missile, the AH-1W Cobra helicopter can be actively employed in the SEAD role.
The commander, subordinate element
commander, and staffs assess the enemy capability to
influence
the use of aircraft in support of the MAGTF. The effectiveness of enemy air
defenses
may
cause SEAD operations to be the major part of the commanders' battle plan, so
victory
requires
close coordination between intelligence planners, fire support planners and
operational
planners
at each level of the force. It also requires that all assets be considered;
however, these
operational
planners have not aggressively employed the AH-1W Cobra helicopter as an
integral
element
in the successful destruction of enemy air defenses.
The proliferation of mobile air defense
systems to third world nations has direct impact upon
the
threat to a MAGTF. No longer can a raid, rescue, evacuation or other minor
undertakings be
considered
without the thought of mobile or pop-up air defense systems. The result of this
threat
has been the development of new systems and tactics which will ensure
successful
missions.
The planning of suppression fires upon an
enemy tactical air defense system must be rapid,
requiring
a high degree of fire support to be effective. It is the responsibility of the
Unified
Commander
to insure that all levels of his staff understand the capabilities and
limitations of the
means
at hand, to include destruction, disruption, or the combination of the two.
Inflicting physical damage to an enemy air
defense system requires a MAGTF to utilize all
its
lethal weapons. These systems include the use of fixed-wing aircraft,
rotary-wing aircraft,
artillery,
mortars, and naval gunfire. Non-lethal disruptive means include electronic
countermeasures
and deceptive flight profiles. The most effective means of defeating an enemy
air
defense system is to utilize a combination of destructive and disruptive means.
The MAGTF
achieves
a combined armies effect by using all its combat capability. This combined
armies
effect
enhances the result while reducing the amount of risk.
Unified and Joint-Task Force Commanders can
achieve the same benefits as the MAGTF
commander
achieves by utilizing anti-radiation missiles fired from attack helicopters.
Electronic
warfare officers must know the capabilities and limitations of the Sidearm
missile and
exploit
its use for the unified commander.
The Sidearm anti-radiation missile is a
quick reaction missile designed to counter point
defenses
and complement high speed anti-radiation missiles carried on fixed-wing
aircraft. It is
a
short-range weapon, which can be carried by all sidewinder-capable aircraft and
attack
helicopters
without displacing other weapons from their normal stations. To date the AH-1W
Cobra
and the AV-8B Harrier are the only aircraft to utilize this weapon, however.
The use of anti-radiation missiles by
attack helicopters can readily improve the capability of
the
MAGTF. During the amphibious exercise Valiant Blitz in 1991, AH-1W Cobra
helicopters
were
combined with the Light Armor Infantry Battalion to act as a screening force.
These
forces
were employed at the most exposed flank of the MAGTF, providing a highly mobile
and
quick
reaction force possessing considerable firepower. Due to the nature of the
mission and the
distance
away from the main force, had it encountered a mobile air defense system the
quick
reaction
capability of attack helicopters using Sidearm anti-radiation missiles to
destroy enemy
radars
would have enhanced the success of the operation.(16:55)
Operation Desert Storm is a fine example of
how far our technology and training have come
in
defeating air defense systems. The mutual support provided by all the services
was essential
to
the destruction of the Iraq air defense system. The Joint Force Air Component
Commander
apportioned
SEAD sorties, guaranteeing a coordinated, effective, and prioritized effort in
suppressing
enemy air defense systems.
This Herculean effort does not come without
a price tag. After-action reports submitted by
Marine
Aircraft Group 11 after Desert Storm emphasize the difficulty in destroying
targets of
opportunity
versus pre-planned targets. As the threat is attrited, pre-planned missions
become
less
effective. This requires the placement of aircraft which shoot high-speed
anti-radiation
missiles
in front of the ground-attack aircraft to insure success. This could lead to
enemy air
defense
ambushes that would reduce the effectiveness of reconnaissance or strike
packages.
(14:73)
Another price paid for the destruction of
mobile air defense systems is that of "fratricide."
During
operation Desert Storm four instances occurred when high-speed anti-radiation
missiles
locked
on to friendly ground and ships radar. The result was one Marine killed, two
Army
solders
wounded, and valuable equipment either damaged or destroyed.(15:1243)
The ability of high speed anti-radiation missiles
to distinguish between friendly and enemy
radar
emissions depends on many human and technical variables. The type of aircraft
is
important
since some possess the ability to analyze the threat to a greater degree. The
human
factor
is just as important as knowing the ever-changing ground situation. The
fratricide
incident
on February 23, 1991, during Operation Desert Storm highlights this point. A
Marine
was
killed by a friendly high speed anti-radiation missile when it destroyed the
counter-battery
radar
he was working on. This incident was the result of a changing ground situation
combined
with
a breakdown in communication between higher ground and aviation headquarters.
The
result
was a lack of coordination between units that operate radar and those units
that search for
enemy
radar to destroy.(15:1255) AH-1W Cobra helicopters armed with Sidearm could
have
been
utilized for this mission, providing the ground commander better control over
fires that
occurred
in his area. Fixed-winged aircraft which shoot high speed anti-radiation
missiles
currently
do not contact ground commanders before they employ their weapons. Using AH-1W
Cobras
with Sidearm for threats close to friendly lines would reduce fratricide
incidents like the
one
that occurred above.
Incorporating the after-action reports of
Valiant Blitz in 1991, operational planners should
have
utilized the Sidearm anti-radiation missiles with Task Force Normandy. This
task force
utilized
the Air Forces MH-52J Pavelow, the Army AH-64 Apache helicopters and the 315th
Tactical
Fighter Squadron F-117 stealth fighter. The mission of the helicopter task
force was to
destroy
two Iraqi early warning radars that might detect low flying Lantirn-equipped
F-15E strike
aircraft
heading for Scud sites in western Iraqi. As planned, the attack helicopters
destroyed the
radar
vans, thus providing a radar hole which F-15E strike aircraft could pass
through.
Operational
planners could have increased the degree of success for this mission had they
incorporated
AH-1W Cobra aircraft armed with Sidearm anti-radiation missiles. An unplanned
encounter
with a ZSU-23-4 self propelled antiaircraft gum could have destroyed aircraft
or
delayed
the opening of the radar hole.(6:18)
Proven advances in the fields of missile
seeker technology have lead to the development of
an
advanced (helicopter compatible) anti-radiation guided missile (AAGRM). The
Marine
Corps
has embraced the AAGRM as a replacement for the AGM-122A Sidearm missile. The
importance
of this new weapon is underscored by the attention it received in the 1993
Congressional
Authorization Summary. The House Armed Services Committee report stated
the
following:
That evolving technology shows
significant promise for the Navy's
AAGRM project intended to come up with a weapon that would
counter the threat posed by the
proliferation of sophisticated defense
radar and missile systems through
the third world, a requirement that
was reinforced by forward
deployed aviation forces in Desert Storm.
The committee adds $10.1 million
to the Navy's $20.1 million request
and encourages top Navy brass to
fund planning FY'94
level of $19.7 million.(7:125)
To date the Chief of Naval Operations has
not placed any pressure upon the Navy's Air
Warfare
Department to move on this project. Current debate on budget cuts may cause the
loss
of
funds for the AARGM program. This would be a true loss, not only to the Marine
Corps but
to
the Unified Commanders who identified the requirement for anti-radiation
missiles on attack
helicopters
in the first place.(8:1)
The important point in this analysis is
that a viable plan for the destruction of mobile and
pop-up
enemy air defenses systems involves the skillful integration of all the
resources available
to
the Unified Commander. These resources should be utilized to collectively
degrade the
ability
of an enemy air defense system that would deny friendly aircraft operational
flexibility.
Operational
planners cannot destroy the entire enemy air defense network prior to the
commencement
of a mission (although that would be a desirable and noteworthy
accomplishment);
however, they should be able to reduce the quality of target data to the enemy
air
defense system. Operational planners need to understand capabilities and
limitations of the
AH-1W
Cobra along with the Sidearm missile. These are assets that are readily
available to a
Unified
Commander should the need arise. To aid in figure missions, Unified Commanders
need
the capability that the AARGM provides and should push for the fielding of this
weapon.
The AH-1W Cobra armed with Sidearm
anti-radiation missiles can fill the void that exist
for
operational planners in the destruction of mobile and pop-up air defense
systems. General
Gray,
the former Commandant of the Marine Corps, has been credited with this
statement: "It is
the
third world, the so called low-intensity conflict arena, where we are most
likely to be
committed
this decade." The widespread arming of the third world with sophisticated
aircraft,
armor,
artillery, and anti-armor weapons has created a situation which Colonel L.G.
Karch noted:
"The
most likely of conflicts will be not low level, but mid-intensity."(9:4)
Against this threat,
anti-radiation
missiles and the AH-1W Cobra will be a valuable asset to the National Command
Authority
and the Unified Commander in the SEAD/J-SEAD role.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. "Air Defence," Defense Update
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