From
The Sea - - To Where?
CSC
1993
SUBJECT
AREA - General
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Title:
From the Sea--To Where?
Author:
Lieutenant Commander E.T. O'Brien, United States Navy
Thesis:
The issuance of the Navy white paper From the Sea is a positive and significant
step
forward.
It reflects the Navy's changing strategy and focus, conforming with the effects
of the
changing
world. This new maritime strategy must be a viable and credible
"vision" for the Navy
as
it focuses on expeditionary operations conducted from the sea instead of the
Mahanian doctrine
of
blue water/open ocean warfare. The Navy's commitment must be strong with a
corresponding
shift
in doctrine and force structure to support this strategy as we operate into the
1990's and
beyond.
Background: From the Sea was issued changing the focus
of the Navy's strategy to
expeditionary
warfare. The Navy's commitment to this new strategy will be tested as future
force
structure and doctrine are developed in these austere financial times. Recent
decommissioning
of cruisers and destroyers have increased the percentage of amphibious ships
in
the surface force. This coupled with
rapid improvements in fast sealift shipping are
indications
that the Navy has initially moved in the right direction. Reduction in the total
number
of amphibious ships will create problems in meeting the 12 ARG requirement set
forth
by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Training is the one area where immediate changes can
be made.
Changes
in the curriculums of the Naval War College and Marine Corps Command and Staff
College
to include expeditionary warfare is necessary to provide parent services and
joint staffs
with
the expertise required to implement the concepts of From the Sea.
Recommendations: The Navy must commit to From the Sea as the
basis for future force
structure,
doctrine and training.
From the Sea -- To
Where?
OUTLINE
Thesis.
The issuance of the Navy white paper From the Sea is a positive and significant
step
forward. It reflects the Navy's changing strategy and
focus, conforming with the shift in
National
Security Strategy and the effects of the changing world environment. This new
maritime
strategy must be a viable and credible "vision" for the Navy as it
focuses on
expeditionary
operations conducted from the sea instead of the Mahanian doctrine of blue
water/open
ocean warfare. The Navy's commitment must be strong with a corresponding shift
in
doctrine and force structure to support this strategy as we operate into the
1990's and beyond.
I. Navy changed Maritime Strategy to
expeditionary warfare
A.
OPNAV Staff realignment
B.
Implementation of new strategy
l. Done within precepts of
civilian controlled military
2. Budgetary Considerations have
considerable impact
II. Expeditionary Warfare is centerpiece
of new strategy
A.
Define expeditionary warfare
B.
Focus of expeditionary warfare is amphibious capability
C. Many missions already being conducted
III. Force structure must change
A.
Recent decommissioning of cruiser/destroyers
B.
Future force structure will be difficult to build
C.
Shift current acquisition policies to buy more amphibious ships
D.
LX construction
E.
Adaptive force planning as influence of future platforms
IV. Amphibious shipping and lift
requirements
A.
Navy/Marine Corps requirement for 2.5 MEB lift
B.
JCS requirement for 12 ARG (3.0 MEB) lift
C.
Amphibious force structure to meet 12 ARG requirement
D.
Fast Sealift shortages
V. Training
A.
Development of expeditionary warfare experts
B.
Expeditionary warfare not being taught in any school
C.
Develop pipeline training for all levels
D.
Accession and career paths
From the Sea - To
Where?
From the Sea, The Department of the
Navy's white paper giving the Navy's new
vision
of the future, is a positive and significant step forward. It reflects the
Navy's
changing
strategy and focus, conforming with the shift in National Security Strategy and
the
effects
of the changing world. Vice Admiral William A. Owens, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations
for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments, stated that From the Sea
"
is the most significant change in direction with regard to how we use the Navy
that we
have
seen since World War II."1 This "new" strategy must provide a
viable and credible
"vision"
as the focus shifts to expeditionary operations conducted from the sea, instead
of the
Mahanian
doctrine of blue water/open ocean warfare.
Operating expeditionary forces from the
littorals of the world is not a new concept for
the
Navy/Marine Corps team. Previously, the focus of national strategy has not been
on this
capability;
as the events of the last two years have demonstrated, that focus needed to be
changed.
From the Sea is the first public acknowledgement of the shift in Maritime
Strategy
to
expeditionary warfare, in order to respond rapidly to world crises.
What is new, however, is building a
naval strategy around the expeditionary warfare
concept
that drives future procurement and force structure. The first step in this
process was
the
reorganization of OPNAV staff in order to align with the Joint Chiefs of Staff
organization
and facilitate implementation of expeditionary warfare into the budget and
procurement
process.2 Currently, the Director for Expeditionary Warfare, Major General
Harry
W. Jenkins, works under Vice Admiral Owens in his N-8 organization. As
expeditionary
warfare concepts evolve crossing many operational specialties and service roles
and
missions, the role of the Director of Expeditionary Warfare could eventually
expand to
the
point of becoming the deputy chief of naval operations for expeditionary
warfare.
Close scrutiny of From the Sea raises
many questions and potential problem areas
concerning
the Navy's commitment to expeditionary warfare as the focal point of a new
Maritime
Strategy. How and why was the maritime strategy changed? What is the future
force
structure and how do we build it with a tighter defense budget? Have training
pipelines
been
changed to reflect the concepts put forth in From the Sea? These are three
questions
that
need to be answered in order to ascertain the Navy's commitment to
expeditionary
warfare.
The Navy Department's change of strategy
follows the precepts of the civilian
controlled
military system. The National Security Strategy was changed in May 1992 to
reflect
the post-Cold War world situation.3 This dictated a corresponding shift in the
National
Military Strategy to conform with National Security Strategy providing guidance
for
future
force structure and deployment. The Maritime Strategy then was changed to
become
aligned
with the new Military Strategy. This new Maritime Strategy was From the Sea
Recent
world crises in Somalia and Bosnia have validated this shift to expeditionary
warfare
as
the building block of our Maritime Strategy. Concepts and visions developed
during
President
Bush's administration have been carried forward and embraced by President
Clinton
and
his administration.
The centerpiece of the new maritime
strategy is expeditionary warfare.4 It is difficult
to
write a strategy with "expeditionary warfare" as a centerpiece when
it has not been defined
in
even general terms. What From the Sea does outline are the general principles
to be
considered
in defining expeditionary warfare. Amphibious warfare, mine warfare, aircraft
carrier
and air wing operations, surface warfare, submarine warfare and land warfare
are all
areas
which comprise expeditionary warfare. Also, From the Sea uses the terms littoral
warfare
and expeditionary warfare interchangeably. Initially, this does not seem to be
a
problem;
however, failure to distinguish the two terms will lead to different
interpretations of
From
the Sea. Littoral warfare is that which is conducted in the coastal regions of
the world
and
is a subset of expeditionary warfare. One theme that does emerge is that there
will be a
shift
in focus to the amphibious force and embarked Marines.
The amphibious force and
expeditionary capability have been around for many
years
with Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) continuously deployed in the Atlantic and
the
Pacific
for many years. They have conducted Non Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)
and
humanitarian missions professionally in support of CINC and national taskings.
Marine
Expeditionary
Units (MEU) have been designated Special Operations Capable (SOC) since
1987,
completing arduous workup periods in achieving SOC designation. From the Sea,
has
not
discovered a new form of warfare - it has rediscovered the capabilities of the
Navy/Marine
Corps team.
In government as in business, one
proof of commitment is the allocation of
money
to a project or strategy. Recent cuts in the defense budget have tested the
Navy's
commitment
at a much faster pace than anticipated. The decommissioning of
cruiser/destroyer
assets while limiting cuts to the amphibious forces, mine forces, and the
Marine
Corps has shown the Navy's initial adherence to the tenets of From the Sea.
Force composition is a visible sign
of the Navy's commitment to expeditionary
warfare.
Future force structure is the key factor in having a flexible force that can
transition
into
the 21st century. Building a force with expeditionary warfare as guidance is a
difficult
transition
from the historic blue water focus of the past fifty years. Battlespace
dominance in
the
littorals and open ocean is assumed in From the Sea. This may be true in 1993;
however,
failure to have a force which will continue this domination across the range of
warfare
specialties will significantly decrease the survivability of ships, aircraft
and ultimately
the
ability to conduct expeditionary warfare.
Recent force cuts in surface ships have
increased amphibious and mine warfare ships
as
a percentage of the total force. This indicates that senior Navy planners are
using
guidelines
and concepts contained in From the Sea. Taking this to the next step would be a
hard
assessment of exactly what is needed to maintain our control of the open ocean.
There
has
been no reduction in acquisition of Arleigh Burke class destroyers. The money
saved
from
not building one Arleigh Burke destroyer could be used to construct a large
deck
amphibious
ship (LHA/LHD), mine warfare ships, or develop Naval Fire Support Systems
replacing
the firepower lost with the decommissioning of the battleships. Not only would
this
enhance
the ability to conduct expeditionary warfare missions it would send an
important
political
sin to the Navy and Congress that senior Naval leadership is committed to
expeditionary
warfare.
The recent approval of the LX class as
the replacement for LST and LPD class ships
being
decommissioned is a large step in solving the shortages currently experienced
in
amphibious
lift.5 This replacement program has been a lengthy process which has extended
the
service life of aging ships whose systems and propulsion plants were designed
in the
1950's
and 1960's. The uncertainty in finalizing details and delays in building the LX
on
line
reflect shortfalls in the programming and acquisition processes during the
1980's. The
aggressive
pursuit of a viable and well thought out future force structure is key to
keeping a
vibrant
and capable modern force.
New and innovative ideas have arisen in
addressing shortfalls in amphibious lift and
transitioning
to an expeditionary warfare focus. The most current idea implemented is that of
adaptive
force planning. A recent example of this process entails placing a Special
Purpose
Marine
Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) on an aircraft carrier for a deployment.
Ideally,
this force would be able to respond as quickly and effectively as the ARGs
currently
deployed
with the addition of carrier based aviation for support. As this process
matures,
different
combinations of forces will be tried in order to maximiie available assets and
respond
to specific threats.
In theory this would seem to be a
good idea; however, there are serious issues that need
to
be addressed. The first is the likelihood of a CINC permitting a national asset
to be tied
to
supporting a small force ashore for an extended period of time. During
Operation Sharp
Edge,
the evacuation and support of the American Embassy in Liberia, one amphibious
ship
was
used to support a MAGTF ashore. It is difficult to imagine that a CINC would
permit
the
carrier assigned to the Mediterranean to sit off the coast of Africa for 3-4
months
providing
logistical support for forces ashore. The second issue is that amphibious ships
are
built
to support the landing force ashore. Communication suites, supportability and
the
experience
of the USMC/Navy Amphibious team are key factors in deploying MAGTFs on
amphibious
ships for scheduled deployments.
Adaptive force planning is for a range
of contingencies rather than concentrating on
providing
a more robust capability in one area. In doing this, there could be a mismatch
between
available forces and the mission assigned. The 1986 Libyan strike by forces of
the
Sixth
Fleet could not have been conducted if the carrier had been loaded with a
SPMAGTF
instead
of the notional carrier air wing. Many lessons have been learned in the
employment
and
sustainment of troops ashore through years of ARG deployments. There has been a
force
specifically
built to do amphibious operations and it should be used. The primary purpose of
amphibious
ships and their embarked troops is amphibious warfare, not conducting NEO or
humanitarian
missions. Future force and operational planners must keep this in mind as an
attempt
to try a variety of lesser options is considered.
Amphibious lift is the critical factor
in expeditionary warfare in order to support
National
Security objectives. Forward presence and crisis response are two of the
pillars on
which
National Security Strategy is built.6 The Navy/Marine team has based lift on
USMC
warfighting
requirements which translate to having the capability to lift 2.5 Marine
Expeditionary
Brigades (MEB). This 2.5 MEB lift does not factor forward presence into the
equation.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has dictated a 12 ARG requirement to
support
Marine Corps warfighting requirements and forward presence. This translates
into a
3.0
MEB lift equivalent. The Navy has
rightfully brought forth the point that it would be
difficult
to meet the 3.0 MEB requirement within present financial constraints.7 The
solution
in
meeting the 12 ARG requirement was using large deck amphibious ships (LHA and
LHD)
which
have been built or bought and building bigger ships (LX) to meet lift
requirements.
There
will be a reduction in the total number of amphibious ships from 60 to 36 by
the year
2007.
There will be 12 ARGS, each consisting of 3 ships - LX, LHA or LHD, and LSD.8
Correcting these lift shortages in these
times of austere funding is difficult at best.
Budget
constraints have necessitated the 36 ship amphibious force to support the 12
ARG lift
requirement.9
Decreased flexibility will necessitate more time deployed for amphibious ships
or
dictate less worldwide coverage. These are difficult choices. More time at sea
will take
its
toll on both the ships and its crew which could negatively impact retention and
recruiting
efforts
as well as maintenance.10 Lessening coverage, thereby increasing response time,
would
be a risk that national policy makers would have a tough time accepting.
Another
important part of the lift equation is Fast Sealift shipping. These ships are
either
owned
or chartered by the Navy and Maritime Administration (MARAD) with civilian
crews
from
the Merchant Marine. These ships provide lift for Army heavy forces, USMC
Assault
Follow-on
Echelons (AFOE) as well as providing sustainment for forces ashore and supplies
for
humanitarian operations.11 Desert Storm and operations in Somalia have proven
the
value
of these ships. However, the U.S. Merchant Marine has been in decline and the
shortage
of merchant seamen coupled with a reluctance of civilian companies to commit
profit-making
assets to be ready to convert to military support operations on short notice
requires
a hard look at the Fast Sealift program and its ability to support lift
requirements.
The Navy has also addressed the Fast
Sealift problem as well. Present programs to
add
an additional 20 Fast Sealift ships have begun.12 These ships will be
instrumental in
providing
the required lift. More importantly, they provide more jobs for the U.S.
Merchant
Marine.
Another important benefit from the acquisition of these ships is that shipyards
will
be
provided with necessary work in the construction and maintenance of these ships
to
maintain
vital skills such as welding and machinery repair to keep the industrial base
current.
Another demonstration of commitment is
the allocation of personnel to a project or
strategy.
Simply put, people cost money, therefore a commitment of personnel is in fact a
commitment
of money. Expeditionary experts must be developed (both Navy and Marine) in
order
to provide guidance and information to operational and administrative staffs
and must
be
directly involved in the decision making process. The Navy needs to take
immediate steps
in
correcting this problem. Initial actions in implementing the tenets of From the
Sea are
critical
in providing credibility and substance to the new strategy.
One area that can be addressed
immediately is training. The first step in this process
is
defining expeditionary warfare. From the Sea describes many of the factors that
need to
be
considered in defining expeditionary warfare. Amphibious warfare, mine warfare,
anti-
submarine
warfare (ASW), anti-air warfare (AAW) and land warfare are all components in
the
expeditionary warfare equation. Currently there is no formal traing in
expeditionary
warfare
in any pipeline or school.13 There have been no changes to the curriculums at
the
Naval
War College or Marine Corps Command and Staff College since the issuance of
From
the
Sea. If the concepts and tenets of From the Sea are to put into practice then
officers must
be
formally trained early in their careers with their fleet experience reinforcing
principles
learned
"in the schoolhouse."
Due to the broad spectrum defined by
expeditionary warfare, the Naval War College
should
be the lead agency in developing and instructing the concepts of expeditionary
warfare.
Inclusion in the curricula of the Naval Command and Staff and Senior courses
would
present expeditionary warfare in an academic background where innovative
concepts
could
be tried and existing doctrine and attitudes could be validated or changed. The
development
of the expeditionary ward curriculum must be done in tandem with the
Marine
Corps War College and Command and Staff College in order to ensure that there
is a
common
approach to expeditionary ward and it agrees with published joint and service
doctrine.
If we are to embrace expeditionary
warfare as the future of the Navy/Marine team
then
we must rapidly train "experts" and get them in the fleet and also in
the schoolhouse.
Surface
Warfare Officers School (SWOS) should teach expeditionary warfare at all levels
of
instruction
including Division Officers Course, Department Head School, Prospective
Executive
Officer (PXO), Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO), and Major Command
Course.
This would provide the fleet with the academic principles of expeditionary
warfare
while
providing the "schoolhouse" feedback on how it is done in the fleet.
This aggressive approach to training at
all career levels of the surface warfare officer
coupled
with force reductions will make a more "complete" surface warfare
officer who is
better
equipped to operate in the expeditionary environment. This will pay dividends
as
officers
are trained across a variety of mission areas providing them with a better
understanding
of the team concept that is so vital in these operations. The biggest
beneficiary
of
this training pipeline are the joint staffs who would be assigned officers who
understand
the
theory and practice of expeditionary warfare.
Accession policy for expeditionary
warfare officers in the Navy is critical in getting
quality
people whose ideas could make the difference in future developments in
expeditionary
warfare.
A viable and credible career path for these officers must be provided in order
to
permit
retention and upward mobility in the Navy and the joint arena.
Historically, the Navy has abdicated its
role in amphibious warfare to the Marine
Corps.
At operational and administrative staffs above the Amphibious Group (PHIBGRU)
level,
Marine officers have been the point of contact for amphibious or expeditionary
matters.
This
would not appear to be a problem at first glance, however, there are many
problems
related
to expeditionary warfare: Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and ARG interoperability,
mine
warfare, and protection of the ARG against air and subsurface threats are just
some of
the
problems that must be solved. The landing force is just one component of
expeditionary
warfare
and in a truly joint environment the landing force could be Army or Marine. The
Navy
must provide experts to staffs in order that all aspects of the expeditionary
warfare are
adequately
represented to Commanders.
From the Sea has provided the Navy with
guidance for the force of the future.
Implementation
will prove to be an extremely complex and difficult problem on almost every
level.
Expeditionary warfare crosses every warfare and service boundary with
far-reaching
consequences.
The key factor in "changing the face" of the Navy is a well developed
implementation
plan. This is crucial in today's austere fiscal environment; every decision
costs
money, and bad decisions cost the most.
Rapid development of a professionally
trained cadre of expeditionary experts is the
critical
first step that must be taken. These experts must take existing and future
force
structures
and meld them to produce the Navy of the future. Rapid response by the Navy on
fast
sealift issues and finalizing amphibious lift requirements and shipping are
indications that
the
Navy is adhering to the concepts and tenets of From the Sea.
From the Sea to where? It is the question
that the Navy hierarchy must answer today.
The
Navy has taken initial steps that demonstrate a commitment to expeditionary
warfare as
the
centerpiece of maritime strategy. There must be a sustained effort to continue
structuring
a
total force that will include the proper mix of surface ships, aircraft,
submarines, and
supporting
programs. It is impossible to maintain this momentum without a core of
visionary
professionals
who are trained and educated in expeditionary warfare. The next step in
moving
From the Sea to the future is committing scarce dollars and personnel who will
be
able
to develop the concepts and nuances of expeditionary warfare. During the late
1980's
and
early 1990's, the Navy's oversight of amphibious warfare and associated
programs
caused
more concern in Congress than in the Navy. If the tenets and precepts
identified in
From
the Sea are to be the basis of future strategy and policy-making, the Navy must
carefully
and wisely take the next step in bringing the Navy into the next century.
ENDNOTES
1. Vincent C. Thomas, "The Most
Significant Change Since World War II," Sea Power, March
1993,
p. 11.
2. Ibid., p. 12.
3. Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President
and Congress, January 1993, p. 3.
4. From the Sea, September 1992,p. 2.
5. Interview with Commander John Maloney, USN,
OPNAV N-853, Expeditionary Warfare,
Washington,
D.C., 9 March 1993.
6. Cheney, p. 3.
7. Department of the Navy, Report to Congress
on Amphibious Shipping Requirements, March
1993,
p. 2.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10.
Sean O'Keefe, "Be Careful What You Ask For...", Proceedings, January
1993, p. 73.
11.
Interview with Captain Jenkins, USN, OPNAV N-853, Sealift Requirements,
Washington
D.C.,
11 March 1993.
12.
Ibid.
13.
Interview with Captain Paul Odell, Jr., USN (Ret), Naval War College, Newport,
Rhode
Island,
Curriculum changes as a result of issuance of From the Sea, 24 March 1993.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Cheney,Dick. Annual report to the President
and the
Congress, January 1993
2. Department of the Navy. From the
Sea--Preparing the Naval
Service for the 21st Century, September
1992.
3. Department of the Navy. Report to Congress on Amphibious
Shipping Requirements, March 1993.
4. Interview with Captain Jenkins, U.S. Navy,
OPNAV, N-853,
11 March 1993.
5. Interview with Rear Admiral J.B. LaPlante,
U.S. Navy, Deputy
Director for Logistics, Joint Staff, 16
March 1993.
6. Interview with Commander John Maloney, U.S.
Navy, OPNAV, N-853, 9 March 1993.
7. Interview with Captain Paul Odell, Jr.,
U.S. Navy (Retired), Naval War College,
Newport, Rhode Island, 24 March 1993.
8. LaPlante, Rear Admiral J.B., U.S. Navy.
" The Path Ahead for `Gators and Marines."
Proceedings, November 1992, pp. 34-38.
9. Mundy, General C.E., U.S. Marine Corps.
"Something Old for Something New."
Proceedings, November 1992, pp. 12-14.
10. O'Keefe, Sean. "Be Careful of What You
Ask for...." Proceedings, January 1993, pp.
73-76.
11. Pierce, Commander Terry C., U.S. Navy.
"Maneuver Warfare - From Theory to
Practice." Proceedings, November
1992, pp. 62-67.
12. Thomas, Vincent C. "Most Significant
Change Since World War ll." Sea Power, March
1993, pp.11-17.
13. Trainor, Lieutenant General Bernard E., U.S.
Marine Corps (Retired). "Still Go-ing...
Amphibious warfare." Proceedings,
November 1992, pp. 30-33.
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