The Regimentalized Division
CSC 1993
SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: The Regimentalized Division
Author: Major Paul B. Malone IV, United States Army
Thesis: With the collapse of the communist block, the United
States Army needs to reorganize, not just downsize, into a more
flexible organization to meet the many challenges expected in the
21st Century. That structure is the "regimentalized division."
Background: The Army is undergoing a reduction of approximately
one half its peak strength of 781,000 personnel. Although, the
Warsaw Pact is gone, the Persian Gulf War demonstrated the need
to retain the dynamic heavy armored capability that decisively
won the land war with such few losses. The Army also needs to
retain the capability to respond to contingency operations with
quick strike forces such as the light forces that conducted the
invasions of Grenada and Panama. In the past, approximately half
of the Army divisions were focused upon heavy operations while
the other half was focused upon light operations. The tactics,
equipment, operational tempo, logistics and strategic
deployability made heavy and light forces incompatible on the
same battlefield. This was not terribly important when the Army
could field ten heavy divisions to an armored crisis and another
eight light divisions to contingencies around the world. Now the
Army will have to be able to accomplish both missions with
between eight to twelve divisions. This paper is about the Army
becoming more flexible and, in the process, maintaining a multi-
mission capability with reduced resources.
Recommendations: Recommend that the Army reorganize its
divisions, with the exceptions of the airborne division and air
assault division, into regimentalized divisions.
OUTLINE
Thesis: With the collapse of the communist block, the United
States Army needs to reorganize, not just downsize, into a more
flexible organization to meet the myriad of challenges expected
in the 21st Century.
I. Why change?
A. Congress and the President has directed the
reduction in forces of as low as one-half its peak
size
B. Luxury of structuring the force to meet separate
threats in separate environments
C. The remaining force must be flexible enough to
respond to threats in all environments
II. Historical perspective of U.S. Army Structure
A. Militia regiments prior to Revolutionary War
B. Continental Army regiments
C. Regiments from the end of the Revolution to
Civil War
D. Regiments in the Civil and Spanish American Wars
E. Regiments in World War I and the "square
division"
F. Regiments in World War II and the "triangular
division"
G. Regiments in the Korean War
H. The Pentomic Division and the end of the regiments
I. The ROAD Division, Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars
III. Current Situation, a heavy and a light Army structure
A. Reductions to 12 divisions, seven heavy and five
light
B. Heavy force structure
C. Light force structure
D. Reserve components
E. Training
F. Downsizing versus commitments
IV. Solution, regimentalize
A. Flexibility and maximized combat potential
B. Light force restructuring
C. Heavy force restructuring
D. Reserve force restructuring
E. Improvements in training
F. Meeting our commitments
V. Conclusion
A. Historical legacy, a "hollow Army"
B. Heavy comparison of current downsized structure
versus regimentalized structure
C. Light comparison of current downsized structure
versus regimentalized structure
D. Flexible yet, capable
THE REGIMENTALIZED DIVISION
I. WHY CHANGE?
On 3 November 1992, the American people voted for change and
elected Bill Clinton, the 42d President of the United States.
Among the many promises that he made as a candidate were an
increased peace dividend and a reduction of the deficit.
President Clinton vowed to reduce the military from President
Bush's floor of 1.6 million personnel to 1.4 million. Pressures
to reduce the military below that number and increase savings
from the Department of Defense abound in Congress and around the
country. The final reduction figure is, as yet, unknown.
The Army's expected reduction from 781,000 to 535,000
personnel under President Bush will be much greater now.
The 535,000 personnel number envisioned 12 divisions in the
active Army. The true number of divisions may be closer to eight
or ten before the reductions are finished.
Before the initial drawdown, the Army consisted of 18
divisions: ten heavy divisions (armor, mechanized infantry,
armored cavalry) designed to combat a Soviet-style threat on the
plains of Europe and eight light divisions (infantry, light
infantry, airborne, air assault) designed for contingency
operations and operations in restricted terrain. Historically,
the heavy divisions and light divisions experienced great
difficulty operating and interacting on the same battlefield
because of differences in strategic mobility, firepower, tempo,
logistics, tactical mobility, and protection. The solution in
the past was to field a heavy army for one environment and a
light army for another. The result is two incompatible armies.
The United States Army needs to reorganize, not just
downsize, into a more flexible and integrated organization to
meet the myriad of challenges expected in the 21st century. The
organization that most economically ensures that the division can
operate in all environments and against all known threats is the
"regimentalized division." This proposal is, that with the
exceptions of the 82d Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne
Divisions (Air Assault) which have unique capabilities, the
remaining divisions would be organized into three basic combat
maneuver regiments with appropriate supporting units. One
regiment would be armor, the next mechanized, and the last
infantry. (See figure 1) The mechanized regiment would have no
dismounted infantry assigned. When mechanized infantry forces
are required, units from the mechanized and the infantry
regiments would be task organized. The flexibility and savings
of this proposal is that the infantry can be deployed
independently as light infantry. Further, the dismounted
infantry positions in the mechanized regiment do not exist. This
savings allows a greater number of positions in additional active
divisions and regiments. The division, or elements thereof, has
the capability to operate in all land combat environments after
task organizing. (See figure 2)
To illustrate the need, the utility, and importance of this
structural change this paper is subdivided into three sections.
The first is a historical perspective on the regiments which
traces the structural organization of the Army since 1775. The
second section is a discussion of the current situation in regard
to the incompatible heavy light mix of divisions. The last
section discusses restructuring the force, both active and
reserve components, as regimentalized divisions.
This proposal brings back the regiment to the permanent Army
structure. The regiment is the traditional home of Army units
and was lost during previous structural changes. Some brigades
have become unofficial regiments to reestablish their lineage,
honors, history, and cohesiveness. Brigades will become ad hoc
organizations (task forces) formed for specific missions with a
regiment or parts of regiments as their bases. These brigade
task forces will be commanded by brigadier generals or colonels
depending upon the mission.
While recognizing that modern ground combat forces include a
complex array of interdependent components, the particular focus
of this paper is upon infantry forces. Throughout the history of
warfare and into the foreseeable future, in combat of all
intensities and in all types of terrain, there will be a critical
need for ground combat infantryman to seize and hold terrain,
control populations and close with and either capture or destroy
the enemy. Whether they travel to the battle area by land, sea
or air; whether they move within the battle area by foot, wheeled
vehicle, snowmobile, armored personnel carrier, or helicopter;
infantrymen will be required. In order to add clarity to the
proposal in this paper, the roles and missions of other combat,
combat support and combat service support elements will not be
discussed in detail. There is no intention to denigrate their
vital contribution to victory in combat. This paper focuses on
maximizing the utility of the Army's "all purpose weapon," the
infantryman.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF U.S. ARMY REGIMENTAL STRUCTURE
The history of the regiments in America is older than the
United States itself. It began with the British system of
universal military service through the colonial militia during
the period of 1607 through 1754.
The American colonies in the seventeenth century were much
too poor to permit a class of able-bodied men to devote
themselves solely to war and preparation for war.. .no colony
could afford to maintain professional soldiers. Yet...
colonies remained subject to military danger, potentially
from Spain and France and actually from the Indians.
Therefore, every colony needed military protection, and
every colony ... obtained[ed] it by invoking ... universal
obligation to military service... to create a military force
of armed civilians. (31:4)
During this period, there were four major conflicts
including King William's War (1689-97), Queen Anne's War (1702-
13), King George's War (1739-49) and the French and Indian War
(1754-63). Despite these conflicts, the British committed no
sizable force to the colonies until after 1755. The colonies
were essentially on their own in regard to their own security.
The militia was generally organized into companies ranging from
65 to 200 personnel, and, in some states, these companies were
grouped into regiments. The regiments were primarily infantry
because artillery and cavalry seemed too extravagant.(25:10)
Despite some notable exceptions such as Roger's Rangers,
most militia units did poorly in combat, and the system was
deteriorating when the Massachusetts Minutemen met General Gages'
British Regulars at Lexington and Concord beginning the American
Revolutionary War. On 14 June 1775, the Continental Congress
joined in the cause with the New England colonies and authorized
the formation of ten companies of riflemen and absorbed the New
England Colonial Militia thus giving birth to the Continental
Army. (25:12-14)
The organizations used during the Revolution varied from
colony to colony, but the basic two that were present were
companies of 50 to 100 soldiers and regiments that consisted of
eight to ten companies. Battalions were synonymous with
regiments for most of the next century. The greatest challenge
that General George Washington, Commander-in-Chief of the
Continental Army, had was keeping his army in the field. The
colonies and the Continental Congress failed to authorize the
long-term enlistments for the army (most were for three months),
and as soon as the troops were trained their enlistments
terminated. (25:15-17) The Continental Army eventually raised 88
regiments of infantry from the colonies and an additional 16
regiments of federal troops. Their effectiveness was suspect
because they were continually consolidated and absorbed into
other organizations due to losses in battle, desertions and
short-term enlistments. When Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown
on 18 October 1781, there were 60 regiments of infantry in the
Continental Army; by November 1783 there remained only one. On 2
June 1784, the Congress eliminated the last regiment of infantry,
leaving only 80 artillerymen in the Continental Army. (3:8)
From 3 June 1784 to the present, the Army has had Regular
Army infantry troops normally organized into regiments and
companies. The oldest regiment, the 3rd Infantry, the Old Guard,
traces its lineage back to the First American Regiment, which was
known until 3 March 1815. The consolidation of 46 infantry
regiments into eight after the War of 1812 was done according to
the seniority of the commanders of the surviving eight regiments.
The old 1st Regimental Commander was the third most senior thus
the 3d Infantry became the oldest regiment in the Army. (3:12-15)
Between the Mexican and the Civil Wars, the concept of
platoons (half companies), sections (half platoons), and squads
(half sections) emerged due to the increasing lethality of the
weapons. This increased range and accuracy resulted in more
dispersion and required a more active chain of command and
increased subordinate initiative. (3:16,17)
When the Civil War began in 1861, there were only ten
regiments in the Regular Army scattered in company outposts
primarily in the West. Only nine more Regular infantry regiments
were raised for the Civil War, while the rest were volunteer
regiments from the states. These regiments numbered over 1,700
for the North. (3:21) Brigades were groupings of four or more
regiments, while divisions consisted of three or more brigades
and, finally, corps consisted of several divisions. (26:97) The
South had 642 regiments, each with companies of around 100
enlisted. (3:23)
After the Civil War, the Regular Army expanded to 45
regiments to preside over the South and fight the Indians in the
West. In 1869, the 45 regiments were reconsolidated into 25
which lasted until the Spanish American War. (3:26,27)
In 1898, the United States found itself at war with Spain
with only 13,000 Regular infantry troops. Due to the
improvements in range, accuracy, volume of fire of repeating
rifles, and command and control difficulties from increased
dispersion, the ten company regimental organization appeared
obsolete. Thus, three battalions of four companies of 127
enlisted each became the new regiments. The new regimental
strength was 1309 as compared to 878 during the Civil War. The
new battalions compared to Civil War regiments in regard to
dispersion and firepower. The Regular Army did not expand in
regard to structure; it stayed at 25 regiments. A total of 141
regiments (mostly Volunteer) served in the war although many of
these for less than a year. (3:28-30) The Army raised was formed
into seven corps. A corps consisted of three divisions, while a
division consisted of three brigades and a brigade consisted of
three regiments. (25:140)
During World War I, 297 infantry regiments were eventually
raised. This war was the first in which the machine gun was used
extensively, and it forced another change in the structure of the
Army. Due to the trench warfare and emphasis on attrition, the
United States Army developed a very personnel intensive "square"
division concept. A division of 28,000 men consisted of two
brigades of infantry (8,500 men each). Each brigade consisted of
two infantry regiments (3,800 men each) and a machinegun
battalion. Each regiment consisted of three battalions, and
headquarters, supply and machinegun companies. The battalion
still consisted of four rifle companies (250 men each).
Companies consisted of four platoons (58 men each). During the
18 months that the United States was a belligerent in the war, 42
divisions entered Europe and 29 actually fought. (25:160,161)
Between the World Wars, the Army shrank drastically in size.
In 1939, on the eve of World War II, the Army had only 189,832
troops organized in five divisions but scattered in smaller
organizations across the country. The Army had reverted back to
the "triangular" division organization which eliminated brigades
and had three regiments subordinate to the division. This was
done because it was believed that the larger square organization
of World War I would be too awkward and immobile on the more
fluid battlefields of World War II. The tank was part of the
infantry at this time, and the cavalry still included 12
regiments on horse back. (4:4,5,30,35,58,66)
Within the infantry regiment there were some changes. In
the battalion, the fourth company became the heavy weapons
company and included machine guns and mortars. The remaining
rifle companies consisted of three rather than four rifle
platoons and a weapons platoon containing 60 mm mortars and 30
caliber machineguns. Squads increased from eight to twelve men
with both a sergeant and corporal as squad leader and assistant
squad leader respectively. At the regimental level, there was an
anti-tank company. By the end of the war, there were 288
infantry regiments and the strength of each one was almost 4,000
troops. (3:45-47)
By July 1940, tanks were no longer part of the infantry and,
in fact, there were no tanks in an infantry division. There were
several new types of divisions including armored, airborne,
mountain, light and motorized. The armored and airborne
divisions were considered extremely effective while both the
motorized and light divisions were discontinued before any
serious commitment to combat. The mountain division arrived late
to the Italian theater and saw limited action. Light infantry
served successfully at the battalion and regimental levels in the
1st through 6th Ranger Battalions and in other special operating
units. However, the 67 infantry divisions bore the brunt of the
combat action in all Army theaters. (3:47-61)
Between World War II and the Korean War, the reduction of
the armed forces to balance the national budget, particularly the
Army, was severe to the point of disastrous. The Army had
591,000 troops spread among ten under-strength divisions in the
Far East, Europe and the United States. The divisions consisted
of three regiments of only two battalions. The equipment was
left over from World War II, and the remaining units were
undermanned and undertrained.(6:25-28) Major General Matthew B.
Ridgway described the Army before the Korean War, "We were, in
short, in a shameful state of unreadiness."(6:28)
Unlike World Wars I and II, this was a "come as you are
war." On 24 June 1950, the North Korean Army invaded South
Korea. By 1 July, an under-strength infantry battalion task
force, from occupation duty in Japan was being mauled in
Korea. (11:89-101) It was followed by the rest of the division.
Then three more divisions and several separate regiments were
committed. All were threatened with being thrown into the sea.
It was truly a desperate time for the Army and attached Marine
units. (6:94.95)
The organization that the Army used during the Korean war
was essentially the same one that had been used during World War
II, the triangular division. All of the divisions committed to
the war were infantry divisions, and eventually all were restored
to their three regiments of three battalion structure.
Regimental Combat Teams (RCT), which were left over from World
War II, were integrated back into divisions to bring them to full
strength. The divisions did not have organic tank battalions but
six tank battalions were sent from the United States to be
attached to divisions. (21:36) There was only one armored
division on active duty in the Army and it was kept in reserve
because Korea was considered poor tank country. (6:182.183,212)
The Soviets detonation of an atomic bomb contributed to the
creation of an atomic structure, the Pentomic Division. This
radical and short-lived structure eliminated, for the first time,
regiments from the Army. The three regiments of the division
were replaced by five battle groups. The battle group not only
eliminated the regiment but also the battalion so that command
could be held at the grades of captain and colonel only. Five
huge companies reported directly to the battle group commander.
This unwieldy organization lasted only four years. (21:36-38)
In 1962, the new division emerged the Reorganization
Objective Army Division (ROAD). The ROAD division came in five
"flavors;" the old, infantry, armored, airborne, and the new,
mechanized infantry and airmobile. All of the divisions had a
common base of combat support and combat service support units.
The triangular structure was retained but major maneuver
headquarters were called brigades instead of regiments. The
allocation of battalions was flexible (mixing armor and
mechanized infantry) with regard to combat maneuver
battalions. (21:38-47)
The ROAD division endured during the Vietnam War, the Cold
War, and the Persian Gulf War and, in fact, is the basis for the
organization that is in use today. The weapons systems have
changed in the past 20 years and there is an aviation brigade
where there once was a battalion, but otherwise the changes have
been minor only. (29:1-1-1-4)
III. CURRENT SITUATION, A HEAVY AND A LIGHT ARMY STRUCTURE
On 22 March 1993, the Army Times announced the deactivation
of the 6th and 7th Infantry Divisions (Light) and the 11th
Armored Cavalry Regiment. These reductions bring the active
force to 12 divisions. The current breakout of remaining
divisions include four mechanized infantry (1st, 3d, 4th, and
24th), two armored (1st and 2d), one cavalry (1st), one Infantry
(2d), two light infantry (10th and 25th), one airborne (82d), and
one air assault (101st).(5:12) This force structure is seven
heavy divisions (four mechanized infantry, two armored, one
cavalry) and five light divisions (one infantry, two light
infantry, one airborne and one air assault). Only seven of these
12 divisions have all three active brigades. This compares to
the ten heavy and eight light divisions that were available in
the 18 division structure.
The ROAD armor and mechanized infantry divisions developed
the current organization that heavy divisions operate under
today. The brigades normally consist of three battalions, two
armor and one mechanized infantry, or vice versa. These
organizations were ideal when the mission, enemy, terrain, troops
available and time were all known and could be assumed. These
heavy organizations were extremely successful against a second
class opponent in the Gulf War. In fact, they were so successful
that it has given people a false sense of security believing that
it will always be that easy.(See figure 1, Current Heavy
Division) (29:1-2)
Heavy forces differ from light forces in several significant
ways. Heavy forces, the most potent land combat organizations
that the United States possesses, are designed for the highest
intensity conventional conflict in open terrain. They have
tremendous firepower, tactical mobility (speed and tempo), and
armor protection. The disadvantages of heavy forces include slow
strategic projection into theater, the tremendous logistics
required to sustain a heavy operation, and limited capability to
operate in restrictive terrain such as mountains or jungle.
Fielding a force capable of decisive victory in high intensity
combat is a requirement that must be met.
Light infantry forces are units that possess no organic
heavy equipment, fight on foot, in restricted terrain, often at
night, and are strategically mobile.(able to be easily airlifted
into a theater of operation)(19:xi) By design, there are four
characteristics that should distinguish light infantry from other
infantry. These are self-reliance, mastery of the environment
and infantry skills, versatility and high esprit. Light infantry
units learn to operate in an austere environments and are tied
logistically to whatever they can carry on their backs. Due to
their firepower and transportation inferiority, they must be
masters of terrain and organic weapons and must often operate at
night in rugged terrain. This training and attitude develops
unique versatility and initiative over time; thus they may
accomplish a variety of missions. Finally, this training,
superior physical fitness and stamina, and ability to do without
significant logistics breeds a high degree of esprit.(19:219-220)
The reserve components have served with the Regular Army in
every war. They have been criticized for their lack of training,
discipline, and professionalism each time. Despite this, the
United States has been unable in the past to maintain a Regular
Army force large enough to respond to any large scale conflict
without the assistance of the reserve components. The reserve
component is the professional military's link with the American
people. They bring the commitment of the American people to
support the war when the citizen soldiers have to leave their
jobs and families and go to war. This dependence on the reserve
components also tends to dispel some "elitism" images in the
Army. The heavy involvement of the reserve components during
Desert Shield/Storm helped to cement America's commitment to
victory. As successful as the combat support and combat service
support units of the reserve were, the combat units were not
combat ready. This points to a flaw in the way reserve combat
units are trained, evaluated, and integrated into the National
Defense Strategy.
Training is the glue that keeps the Army together. Units
train on their Mission Essential Tasks List (METL) which are the
missions that they are expected to perform in combat. Heavy
units have different METL tasks than light units do. All
infantrymen in the Army are trained at Fort Benning, Georgia, the
Home of the Infantry. The average enlisted infantry soldier gets
the same training for the majority of his combined basic and
advanced infantry training. At the end of the training cycle,
the troops are divided by their military occupational specialties
and become light infantry, mechanized infantry, indirect fire
infantry [mortars], or heavy anti-armor infantry [TOW missile].
The remainder of their training is accomplished on-the-job at
their permanent duty station in their units. Officers and
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the infantry receive extensive
training on both light, mechanized, and combined arms operations
during their required educational schooling periodically during
their careers.
One of the problems with mechanized infantry is that
training is centered around operating and maintaining the
vehicle. The squad consists of nine men at full strength. This
requires a three-man crew to operate the vehicle and leaves six
men to operate as the dismounted element. Most often, the squads
do not have the nine men authorized and tactics require that the
infantry stay close to the vehicle to be mutually supporting.
Thus the training of the dismounted infantry suffers as a result
of being dependent upon the vehicle.
Light infantry units emphasize their infantry training
because they are more people intensive than equipment intensive
and have less restrictions in training areas. Additionally,
light infantry units cost less to train because of less overhead
for fuel and repair parts and thus can afford to conduct unit
training more often. Light infantry troops train on their
infantry skills much more often than mechanized troops as a rule.
The opportunities to maximize their training time is much greater
for the light infantry.
With the downsizing of the Army, its commitments have not
been reduced. For contingency operations, the best force
normally is a light infantry unit since the mechanized infantry
cannot be separated from their vehicles and the expense of moving
heavy forces is normally considered not cost effective. While
most contingency operations are short term, the Army has provided
an infantry battalion to the Multinational Force and Observers in
the Sinai since 1982 and habitually, provides infantry companies
to Central America, Honduras and Cuba, for security missions.
Humanitarian relief missions are on the rise in Somalia and in
the United States. The ideal force to send to these operations
has been light forces. There will be an increasing demand to
provide light forces to contingency operations in the future.
IV. SOLUTION, REGIMENTALIZE
The United States has committed itself to reduced investment
in defense. Despite the fact that World War III appears
unlikely, future demands on military forces may be severe and
unpredictable. With manpower reduced to approximately half of
the 1980s strength, the Army must turn to flexibility to maximize
the combat potential of its surviving operational units. One
approach to increased flexibility is the regimentalized division.
The ground maneuver core of a regimentalized division consists of
three regiments: an infantry regiment, a mechanized regiment and
an armor regiment.
The regimentalized division eliminates the light infantry
division but retains a light infantry regiment in each division.
This provides each division the capability to provide a light
brigade size task force to a contingency operation as rapidly as
airlift can move them. If required, these can be combined into
light division equivalents. (See figure 2, Light Contingency).
The regimentalized division is designed for heavy operations
after task organization across the three regiments. The
mechanized regiment task organizes with a like number of units in
the infantry regiment. Each regiment exchanges half of its
strength, vehicles for infantry, to form two mechanized
regiments. Further task organization with the armor regiment
results in three combined arms brigades, the same as in a ROAD
division.(See figure 2, Heavy Contingency)
The reserve components will be structured in the same
manner. The reserve regiments will be affiliated with an active
duty division. If one of the active regiments is on a
contingency operation, then a reserve regiment will be put on a
higher state of readiness to deploy with the active division as
one of its regiments. This will improve the interaction between
active and reserve components. This will also help the reserves
concentrate their training time on the skills required for their
type of regiment instead of trying to satisfy multiple MOS
training requirements.
Regimentalized divisions will improve training. The weapons
systems today are so sophisticated and the training schedule is
so full that it is impossible to train on all of the METL tasks
properly. The mechanized regiments can concentrate on gunnery,
maintenance, and mounted movement techniques while the infantry
regiment concentrates on infantry skills, small arms
marksmanship, self reliance, and physical fitness. The
mechanized MOS would only be for the crews of the vehicles. All
dismounted infantry would be trained to operate out of vehicles,
helicopters, or on foot. Leaders would continue to be educated
in both heavy and light operations. The National Training Center
and the Joint Readiness Training Center would continue to be the
standard for large unit training for heavy and light operations
respectively.
The light divisions assist in meeting our low intensity
commitments throughout the world. This proposal eliminates the
light divisions. The light regiments of each division will
ensure those commitments are fulfilled and the reserve component
regimentalized divisions will backfill the active regiments
during other contingencies. Using this proposal the capability
of a division is enhanced.
V. CONCLUSION
The Army has no idea how much more it will be told to
reduce. Historically, the United States has drastically reduced
the size of the beyond what was prudent. Each time this resulted
in an "hollow Army" that either met disaster during its first
enemy encounter or took years to get ready while other allies
bore the brunt of battle. Regimentalized divisions ensure the
flexibility to operate in all land environments and across the
spectrum of conflict with all of our divisions. This concept
will also ensure that the reserve components will be better
integrated to back up and fight along side the active component.
Take the example of an Army of eight divisions. This
proposal yields one airborne, one air assault, and six
regimentalized divisions. The current organization, reduced to
eight divisions would yield one airborne, one air assault, one
light division, and five heavy divisions. (1:77) Using the Desert
Storm model, the current organization would leave only one light
division uncommitted while the regimentalized concept would have
one more regimentalized division than was necessary for Desert
Storm. (7:US Army 29) Regimentalized divisions could be further
enlarged if merged with reserve regiments.(Compare figures 3+4)
Consider a light infantry scenerio using the same eight
division Army. The six regimentalized divisions could field two
composite divisions from their infantry regiments and the
airborne and air assault divisions for a total of four. The
current organization would only be able to yield three light
divisions: an airborne, an air assault, and a light. The current
organization would again be short a division. (Compare figure 3+4)
The smaller Army must change its structure to a more
flexible one to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. It must
continue to meet its missions and responsibilities in an
uncertain world, while retaining the decisive combat capability
that shattered the Iraqis in the Persian Gulf. The
regimentalized division provides the flexibility and retains the
decisive punch to meet the threat across the entire spectrum of
potential conflict.
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