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Marine Expeditionary Unit Aviation Forces And The Integrated Air Defense
System Threat
CSC 1993
                        EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:    Marine  Expeditionary  Unit  Aviation  Forces  and  
          the Integrated Air Defense System Threat
Author:   Major Mark D. Mahaffey, United States Marine Corps
Thesis:   MEU aviation forces  lack an adequate capability to
          penetrate a hostile integrated air defense system (IADs).
Background:    The end of the Cold War has signaled a dramatic
improvement in the prospects for peace, security, and economic
progress, but it must be remembered that we still live in a very
troubled world with danger, uncertainty, and instability in many
regions.  Crises, war, and challenges to U.S. vital interests will
continue to be very real possibilities.  With the decline of the
Soviet Union and a shift in focus from a bipolar to a multipolar
world, the Department of the Navy (DoN), with the release of the
White Paper entitled From The Sea, has officially endorsed an
emphasis in warfare away from blue water to littoral operations.
Yet, with all these changes, there still exists a "business-as-
usual" mentality within certain branches of the DoN.  With the
cancellation of the Sidearm missile program by the DoN, over the
objections of the Marine Corps, and the reluctance of the Navy's
Air Warfare Department to favorably endorse the requirement for the
replacement weapon, the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile
(AARGM), there appears to be a dichotomy in the official position
of the DoN.   Without a standoff jamming capability, adequate
defensive  electronic  countermeasures  (DHCM)  systems,  or  a
compatible anti-radiation missile capability,  the forces most
likely to become engaged in littoral conflict, i.e., MEU aviation
forces,  will  remain  extremely  vulnerable  to  any  potential
adversary's IADS.
Recommendation:   The Naval Air Warfare Department should set aside
past parochial interests and fully support continued enhancements
concerning USMC aircraft DECM equipment and the development and
procurement of the AARGM.
Thesis:   Though formidable in nature, Marine Expeditionary Unit
(MEU) aviation forces lack an adequate capability to penetrate a
hostile integrated air defense system (IADS) or to protect airborne
assault support forces from an adversary's air defense weapons.
     I.   Threat
          A.   Demise of the Soviet Union
          B.   Proliferation of lethal air defense systems
     II.  Commitment of MEU Forces
          A.   Flexible response
          B.   Composition of the ACE
          D.   Reliance on carrier-based aircraft support
     III. Navy's Air Warfare Department and USMC at odds
          A.   Navy's position:  Dedicated CVBG support
          B.   USMC position:  Autonomous capability
               1.  Dedicated jamming platform for the MEU
               2.  Enhanced DECM equipment for MEU ACE
               3.  Requirement to replace the Sidearm
     IV.  Advanced (Helicopter Compatible) Anti-Radiation Guided
          Missile (AARGM)
          A.   Historical overview
          B.   Capabilities
          C.   Congressional support
          D.   . . . From The Sea
                                   by Major Mark D. Mahaffey, USMC
     While the end of the cold war is the end of a well defined
threat from a known direction, it is not the end of worldwide
threats.  The shift resulting from the demise of the Soviet Union,
from a bipolar to a multipolar world, creates an unpredictable
future threat with regard to direction, technology, capability, and
motivation.  In his January 1993 Annual Report to the President and
the Congress, the then Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, made the
following statement concerning the security of the United States:
     The world is still a dangerous place.  In addition to a
     major regional conflict in the Persian Gulf, we have seen
     renewed ethnic,  religious,  and national violence in
     Europe, Asia, and elsewhere.  It is true that the United
     States no longer faces the threat of a global war
     beginning in Europe, a conflict that might have resulted
     in a nuclear confrontation between superpowers.  But we
     do face serious regional contingencies - threats that may
     be triggered by any number of events, are difficult to
     identify in advance, and could be made more dangerous by
     the spread of high-technology weapons.  As a result, the
     challenges of the next few years are likely to be complex
     and difficult. (2:vi-vii)
     As mission profiles of the Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) expand, countering the enemy's capability will become
increasingly complex.   This will be further compounded by the
proliferation of high technology weaponry and equipment available
to Third World nations.  Marine Aviation is acutely aware of the
threat posed by adversary integrated air defense systems (IADS).
Verification of this statement can be found in the MAGTF Threat
Summary section (Appendix A) of the final reports entitled, Marine
Corps Mission Area Analysis MA-33 Assault Support and Marine Corps
Mission Area Analysis MA-34 Offensive Air Support, dated November
1991 and February 1992, respectively: "At any level of conflict,
integrated air defense networks, whose capabilities vary with the
level  of  sophisticated  communications  networks,  present  the
greatest threat to assault support and offensive air support (OAS)
operations." (10:A-1) (11:A-1)
     Regardless of the spectrum of conflict (low, medium, high), it
is apparent that any potential adversary will be armed with
relatively inexpensive, easily obtainable, highly mobile, lethal
air defense gun and missile systems.  These weapons, in conjunction
with their associated search, acquisition, and target track radars,
are becoming increasingly effective in detecting and engaging low-
flying aircraft employing terrain flight techniques while also
becoming  less  susceptible  to  currently  fielded  on-board
countermeasure systems.  In this regard, it is imperative that we
never equate or confuse Low Intensity Conflict with Low Technology
Conflict. (12:1)
     Historically,  commitment  of  our  forward deployed Marine
Expeditionary Units (MEUs) has been this nation's first response to
crisis or contingency situations. Traditionally, these forces have
been called on when U.S. lives and property are threatened abroad.
In recent decades, these protection responsibilities have included
deterring and countering the threat of international terrorism to
American citizens,  conducting noncombatant and hostage rescue
evacuations, and providing humanitarian assistance to countries
suffering natural or man-made disasters.  It is important to note
that not only must these forces provide responsive and capable
evacuation lift, but they must also be prepared to conduct these
operations in the midst of armed conflict. (18:12)  The unique
composition of the MEU, providing a fully integrated air-ground
component, provides our National Command Authority (NCA) with such
a capability, while also affording a degree of flexibility and
latitude of employment options not offered by other forces.
     The standard composition of a MEU aviation combat element
(ACE) is 12 CH-46 medium lift helicopters, 4 CH-53E heavy lift
helicopters,  4  AH-1W  attack  helicopters,  2  UH-1N  utility
helicopters,  and 6 AV-8B vertical/short take-off and landing
(VSTOL) jet aircraft.  Though formidable in nature, MEU aviation
forces  lack  an  adequate  capability  to  penetrate  a  hostile
integrated air defense system (IADS) or to protect airborne assault
support forces from adversary air defense weapons.
     Regardless,  principal  tasking  for  the  conduct  of  these
missions has been assigned to the AV-8B and the AH-1W.  Unlike Navy
and Marine Corps carrier-based attack aircraft, such as the F/A-18
Hornet that is capable of employing the high speed anti-radiation
missile (HARM), or the EA-6B Prowler, electronic warfare (EW)
aircraft,  that is capable of both HARM employment and radar
jamming, neither the Harrier nor the Cobra is capable of employing
the HARM or of jamming radars.  Conversely, unlike the Harrier and
the Cobra, neither the Hornet nor the Prowler is capable of
conducting operations from amphibious ships.  Support from these
aircraft is available only when the MEU is conducting operations in
conjunction with a carrier battle group (CVBG).  Given the existing
world threat and the likelihood that a forward deployed MEU could
be employed without the support of carrier based aviation, it is
imperative that MEU aviation forces possess an organic capability
to engage and destroy adversary air defense systems. (1:1)
     With this deficiency identified, Headquarters Marine Corps
(HQMC), in the early 1980s, drafted an operational requirement for
a short range, quick reaction, anti-radiation missile suitable for
employment off Marine AH-1, AV-8, OV-10, and F/A-18 aircraft.
Approval of the Operational Requirement Document (ORD) was given by
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in May 1982.   Subsequent
development and procurement resulted in the initial fielding of the
AGM-122 Sidearm missile in February 1990.  Forward deployed MEU
aviation forces would now possess the much sought after autonomous
capability required to suppress threat radar directed air defense
systems.   Over the objections of Marine Aviation, however, the
Department of the Navy (DoN) terminated funding support for the
Sidearm missile program during the Program Objective Memorandum
(POM) 90 budget appraisals.   With an identified requirement of
nearly 5000 weapons, the Navy suspended fielding after delivery of
fewer than 800 missiles.
     Today, as a result of the actions taken by the DoN, the Marine
Corps finds itself once again in the position of being unable to
provide adequate protection to the embarked aviation platforms and
the vital cargo they transport, i.e., Marines and sailors, aboard
Amphibious Ready Group  (ARG)  ships,  from threat air defense
weapons.  Solutions on how best to provide this protection also
find the Navy's Air Warfare Department (N88) and the Marine Corps
at odds. (1:2)
     With the publication of the Navy and Marine Corps White Paper
entitled From the Sea, which expresses a shift in the focus of
Naval warfare from blue water to littoral operations, N88 would
have the Marine Corps believe that a CVBG will always be readily
available to support MEU operations.  With carrier-based aircraft
on  station,  the  Navy  contends,  the  requirement  for  an  air
suppression weapon suitable for employment off AV-8Bs and AH-1Ws is
no longer valid.  With regard to this contention, several points
have been erroneously omitted.
     Ongoing discussions concerning DoD force structure downsizing
and the likely reduction in the number of aircraft carriers in the
DoN inventory from the existing twelve to possibly nine, or even
eight, will have a significant impact on the Navy's ability to
provide dedicated carrier support to the MEU.  This point seems to
have been overlooked by N88.  Given the recent historical examples
of forward deployed MEUs conducting operations without carrier
support, such as occurred during operations "Eastern Exit" and
"Sharp Edge," and the even more recent witnessing of the withdrawal
and repositioning of the carrier task force supporting Marines
during the ongoing "Restore Hope" operation, USMC concerns about
the validity of N88s contention are highlighted.  It is important
to note the underlying message contained within the publication
From the Sea: "Even with the end of the cold war, regions of the
world remain extremely hostile and volatile." (14)  The potential
therefore continues to exist for the necessity to employ forward
deployed MEU  and  carrier  forces  simultaneously  in different
regional areas.  If the Navy could not provide dedicated carrier
support to Marine forces with twelve active carriers, then it must
be concluded that the Navy will be less likely to provide the
requisite support with fewer assets.
     For the purpose of discussion, however, let's consider a
scenario that supports the Navy's view that adequate carrier-based
aircraft will be provided to support MEU operations.   In this
scenario,  the critical  issue  is  the validity of  the Navy's
contention concerning the employment of anti-radiation missiles
from attack helicopters and VSTOL platforms.  Recall that the Navy
contends such a capability is not required, given the presence of
air suppression fixed-wing platforms.  A recent classified study
conducted by the Center for Navy Analysis (CNA), a Naval research
organization and "think tank," suggests that the view held by the
Navy Air Warfare Department concerning this issue is in error.
Unclassified references to this report highlight the fact that an
anti-radiation missile (ARM) autonomously employed by an attack
helicopter is superior to any other weapons system at protecting
transport  helicopters  against  pop-up  threat  radar  systems.
Further, the report strongly endorsed the requirement for ARM
employment from attack helicopters and VSTOL aircraft even when
employed   in   conjunction   with   other   air   suppression
weapons/platforms. (8:1)
     Though not  formally addressed  by  either  N88  or Marine
Aviation, a possible alternative to the CVBG solution, that could
correct the IADS penetration deficiency, would be to field a
dedicated  airborne  jamming platform  for  deployment with our
amphibious forces.  In concept, this platform would provide similar
capabilities and support to our amphibious forces as the EA-6B
presently provides to our carrier forces.   Given the existing
fiscal constraints and declining defense budget, one might ask how
the DoN could afford to develop such a platform.   While the
Department of Defense (DoD) continues to drawdown force structure
and to "neckdown" infrastructure where possible and prudent, it is
conceivable to foresee a single type, model, series, aircraft being
introduced by the DoN to replace the ageing inventory of E-2C
Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft, S-3 Viking antisubmarine
warfare aircraft, and KA-6s, tanker variant of the Intruder
all-weather attack aircraft. (7:28)  The up-front cost associated
with development and procurement of this new,  common, multi-
role/multi-function aircraft, would be offset by the reduction in
costs associated with the maintenance and support of one, vice
several, different aircraft types.  Of the technologies presently
available to satisfy such a requirement, the tilt-rotor concept
appears most feasible and mature. (7:28)  Given that the MV-22
tilt-rotor is still a primary candidate in the Marine Corps search
for a medium lift helicopter replacement (MLR), it appears viable
that this one platform could satisfy the Corps' MLR requirement,
the Navy's neckdown replacement requirement,  and additionally
fulfill the requirement for an organic amphibious airborne early
warning and jamming platform for our forward deployed MEU forces.
     Through development and employment of an appropriate role-
in/role-out package compatible with the MV-22, each deploying MEU
could be provided with a much desired and heretofore lacking,
capability.    The  inherent compatibility of  the   MV-22 with
amphibious shipping, coupled with the extended on-station-time
provided by a tilt-rotor aircraft, make it the ideal candidate to
perform this mission.   Conversely, limitations associated with
currently fielded rotary-wing assets, such as limited range, poor
on-station-time, and slow airspeeds, make this idea unsuitable for
implementation on existing platforms.  Though this approach would
not alleviate the deficiency highlighted with threat air defense
systems today, because of the time frame necessary for program
initiation, it is an approach that warrants additional discussion,
debate, and future consideration.
     Another point to address is the necessity to provide our MEU
aviation forces with enhanced defensive electronic countermeasures
(DECM) capabilities. The antiquated DECM equipment employed on our
MEU aviation assets has failed to keep pace with the technological
advances of threat air defense weapons systems.  (10:20)   The
currently fielded radar warning receivers (AN/APR-39 and AN/APR-44)
provide only minimal cuing against threat continuous wave (CW)
radar systems and no warning against adversary millimeter wave
systems.  (13:VIII-21-1)   Given the proliferation of potential
threat systems that operate in this region of the electromagnetic
spectrum, such a limitation could prove disastrous.
     The countermeasures dispensing system (AN/ALE-39), consisting
of two dispensers with a combined dispensing capacity of only 60
expendables, is woefully inadequate given the existing threat and
the average  sortie duration of  an assault  support or VSTOL
platform. Additionally, the AN/ALE-39 is complicated to use, lacks
an adequate inventory of expendable types (chaff, jammers, flares)
necessary to decoy modern air defense systems, lacks adequate
interface with other on-board DECM systems, and relies solely on
manual initiation for expendable release.  (13:VIII-21-1)   The
currently employed active countermeasure systems (AN/ALQ-144 and
AN/ALQ-157) lack the requisite capability to decoy modern state-of-
the-art missile systems. (17:51) When combined with the previously
mentioned   deficiencies   concerning   radar   detection   and
countermeasures dispensing, the lack of a sufficient on-board
active system compounds an already extremis situation.
     In fairness to the DoN, numerous programs currently exist that
will rectify many of the deficiencies noted.  Programs such as the
AN/APR-39(V)2 will correct major deficiencies with the existing
radar detector while providing an enhanced capability concerning
operational frequency coverage and threat prioritization.   The
AN/AAR-47,  which has been in development  for  several years,
promises  to  provide  an  automatic  flare  ejection  capability
eliminating the manual-only capability of today's system. (17:50)
Also, a new family of expendables, including those with kinematic
and nonvisible properties, are presently under development and will
soon be procured to provide enhanced protection to our aircrew and
aircraft.  Much has been accomplished but more remains.  Given the
existing  fiscal  realities  and  the  competing  priorities  for
increasingly scarce funds,  these programs stand in jeopardy.
Continued, stronger, and more vocal support from fleet squadrons
will be necessary if our forward deployed aviation forces are to be
outfitted with the identified DECM systems they require.
     A final issue that must be addressed is the requirement to
develop and field a new weapon to replace the canceled AGM-122
Sidearm.   As identified, relying on carrier-based aircraft to
provide the requisite support to our MEU forces would be imprudent.
Also,  while appreciating that standoff  jamming platforms and
installation of state-of-the-art DECM equipment on our aircraft
would provide enhanced protection to our forces from threat radar
systems, neither capability would eliminate the threat or prevent
the system from operating in regions of  the electromagnetic
spectrum,   i.e.,   the  visible  spectrum,   not  affected  by
countermeasures.  To preclude this situation, a requirement exists
for our forces to possess a "hard kill" capability.  To provide
this capability, a weapons system designed from inception for
accomplishing this mission is required.  In the November/December
1991 Vertiflite, Lt. Gen. Duane A. Wills, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Aviation (DCS/A), U.S. Marine Corps, made the following statement
concerning this requirement:
          New/improved weapons systems for our Assault Support
     Aircraft are also being pursued.  These systems include
     . . . a follow-on to the Sidearm missile which [sic] will
     provide increased range, seeker frequency coverage, and
     seeker field of view. . . . (19:11)
     On 15 January 1992 the Assistant Commandant of the Marine
Corps (ACMC) approved the proposed mission need statement (MNS) for
an Advanced (Helicopter Compatible) Anti-Radiation Guided Missile
(AARGM) as a replacement for the Sidearm. (12:1) The proliferation
of advanced air defense weapons systems being exported throughout
the Third World, coupled with the realization that our carrier-
based assets are unable to provide the degree of protection
necessary  during  the  conduct  of  amphibious  operations  and
subsequent  operations  ashore,   overwhelmingly  supports  the
requirement for fielding the AARGM.
     Proven advances in the fields of miniaturization as related to
missile seeker technology and the ability to incorporate dual-mode
sensors into common seeker assemblies will provide the AARGM with
significantly enhanced operational  capabilities.  (9:3)    Such
advances will correct the operational limitations associated with
the AGM-122 seeker while providing the AARGM with an enhanced
threat detection range, a robust countermeasures capability, a wide
field of view, an expanded frequency coverage, and an off-axis
delivery capability.
     Additionally,  as Lt.  Gen.  Wills identified,  requirements
exist for the AARGM to correct range and time-of-flight (TOF)
deficiencies currently identified with the Sidearm missile.   By
utilizing tail or thrust vector control (TVC) technologies on
standard  5-inch MK  36  Sidearm missile motors,  industry has
demonstrated that range envelopes, given a 0 kt./25 ft. above
ground level (AGL) delivery profile, of greater than eleven miles
are obtainable.   Further, given delivery profiles that better
typify fixed wing (AV-8B) employment, i.e., 450 kts./>10,000 ft.
AGL, range envelopes in excess of 15 miles can be expected.
Figure 1 depicts test data obtained from actual launches of MK 36
motors utilizing tail control technologies. (16)
Click here to view image
     Representatives of the major industrial firms associated with
these advanced missile design technologies postulate that even
greater ranges are obtainable in the AARGM if the existing aluminum
body of the MK 36 motor were replaced with a lightweight composite
structure  and  the  new  seeker  dome  incorporated an enhanced
aerodynamic design.   By minimizing drag, the same enhancements
being incorporated to extend the missiles range, also serve to
increase the AARGMs down-range velocity and decrease the TOF.  The
tactical advantage gained by these enhancements will provide the
capability to engage hostile air defense systems under advantageous
situations that significantly reduce aircrew exposure to threat
envelopes.   Such improvements,  as described, would more than
satisfy the operational requirements as identified in the AARGM
     Even  in  this  era  of  declining  defense  dollars  strong
Congressional support for this program exists.  In the fiscal year
1993 Congressional Authorization Summary recently released, both
the  House  and  the  Senate  Congressional  Armed  Services  and
Appropriations  Committees  recommended  an  increase  of  $10.077
million in support of the AARGM program. (1:1)  That being the
case,  support within the Navy's Air Warfare Department still
remains questionable at best.  More than one year has elapsed since
ACMC approved the AARGM MNS and, as is required, forwarded his
approval and recommendations to the Chief of Naval Operations for
staffing.  As of this date, the N88 staff has failed to endorse the
program.  Because of this "stonewalling," the DoN stands to lose
the $10.077 million dollars recommended by Congress in support of
this program as well as the opportunity to provide a much needed
warfighting  enhancement  to  U.S.   forward  deployed  forces.
Referencing again the Navy and Marine Corps White Paper, From the
Sea, it becomes difficult to comprehend why the Navy Air Warfare
Department is reluctant to support this requirement:
     We must structure a fundamentally different naval force
     to respond to strategic demands, and that new force must
     be sufficiently flexible and powerful to satisfy enduring
     national security requirements. The new direction of the
     Navy and Marine Corps team, both active duty and reserve,
     is to provide the nation naval expeditionary forces
     shaped for joint operations, operating forward from the
     sea and tailored for national needs. (15:2)
     The time has come  for N88 to set aside past parochial
interests and fully support development and procurement of the
AARGM.  The threat to Navy and Marine Corps aircraft from adversary
air defense weapons is well documented and the requirement for a
helicopter compatible anti-radiation missile has been confirmed by
the Navy's own center for analysis.  With the fundamental shift
away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward littoral
operations conducted from the sea, it seems only prudent that the
DoN would provide those forces most likely to become engaged in
littoral conflict, i.e., forward deployed MEU's, with the weapons
and systems necessary for successful mission prosecution.  Only
through a much needed reprioritization of warfighting requirements
and the dedicated support of the CNO and his staff will we achieve
the identified goal of becoming a true "sea-air-land" team.
     Lest we forget, we still live in a very troubled world with
danger, uncertainty and instability in many regions.  Crises, war
and challenges to U.S. vital interests will continue to be very
real possibilities.   While plans exist that will enable us to
respond to numerous world contingencies, the real threat we now
face  is  that  of  the  unknown  and  the  uncertain.    Regional
contingencies are many and varied and could arise on extremely
short notice.  Our forward deployed forces must be able to respond
rapidly and decisively in order to deter or combat aggression.
Such requirements as are outlined in our National Military Strategy
support the need to provide our forward deployed aviation forces
with enhanced capabilities to penetrate hostile IADS and the
equipment necessary to protect our airborne assault support forces
from threat air defense weapons.  The need for these systems exist
now, today!  In the past we have been fortunate.  Next time, we may
not have the opportunity to play catch up.  As Commander John B.
Nichols said in his book On Yankee Station, "And next time is one
day closer with every sunrise." (14:88)
1.   Bamberger, Maj.  Mark H.   OPNAV Invalidation of Advanced
     (Helicopter  Compatible)  Anti-Radiation  Guided  Missile
     (AARGM)/Reprogramming of AARGM Funds to Generic HARM Upgrades.
     Position Paper, Headquarters United States Marine Corps,
     APW-23, 21 December 1992.
2.   Cheney, Dick.  Annual Report to the President and the Congress
     January 1993.
3.   FMFM 5-1 (Advanced Copy) Organization and Function of Marine
     Aviation.  Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico,
     Virginia, 16 October 1991.
4.   FMFM 5-30 (Coordinating Draft) Assault Support.  Marine Corps
     Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia, 13 May 1992.
5.   FMFM 5-40 Offensive Air Support.       Marine  Corps  Combat
     Development Command Quantico, Virginia,  27 March 1992.
6.   FMFM 5-41 Close Air Support and Close-In Fire Support. Marine
     Corps  Combat Development  Command Quantico,  Virginia,  28
     October 1992.
7.   Holzer,  Robert.   "U.S.  Mulls Rebirth of V-22 Program."
     Defense News March 15-21 1993: 28.
8.   Mahaffey, Maj. Mark D.  Sidearm II.  Briefing Paper for the
     ACMC, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, APW-23,
     29 May 1991
9.   Majumder, Dr. P. Robert. "SBIR for Dual Mode ARM Self Protect
     Weapon (SPW)."  Overview of SBIR Phase II Program for NAVAIR
     Science and Applied Technology, Incorporated March 4, 1992.
10.  Marine Corps Mission Area Analysis MA-33 Assault Support Final
     Report.    Document  published  by  the  MAGTF  Requirements
     Integration Section Proponency and Requirements Branch, MAGTF
     Warfighting Center, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,
     Quantico, Virginia, November 1991.
11.  Marine Corps Mission Area Analysis MA-34 Offensive Air Support
     Final Report.  Document published by the MAGTF Requirements
     Integration Section Proponency and Requirements Branch, MAGTF
     Warfighting Center, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,
     Quantico, Virginia, February 1992.
12.  Mission Need Statement  (MNS) for an Advanced (Helicopter
     Compatible) Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM)  (No. AAS
     34.3).   Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico,
     Virginia, 28 January 1992.
13.  NATOPS Flight Manual.  Navy Model AH-IW Helicopter.  Naval Air
     Systems Command 3 September 1987: VIII-21-1--VIII-21-8.
14.  Nichols, Commander John B. USN (Ret.) and Barrett Tillman,
     On Yankee Station.  United States Naval Institute July 1987.
15.  O'Keefe, Sean, Admiral Frank B. Kelso II and General C.E.
     Mundy Jr.  . . . FROM THE SEA.  Navy and Marine Corps White
     Paper September 1992.
16.  Overton, Chris.    Boxoffice Program Highlights.    Raytheon
     Company Missile Systems Division March 1993.
17.  Richardson, Doug.   "Airborne Electronic Warfare After the
     Storm."  Armada International April/May 1992: 42-51.
18.  "The   Changing   Strategic   Environment."     Defense   92
     November/December: 2-13.
19.  Wills, Lt. Gen. Duane A., "USMC Assault Support Aviation -
     Today, Tomorrow, and Beyond."  Vertiflite November/December
     1991: 8-12.

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