Naval Surface Fire Support: How Can We Get There From Here?
CSC 1993
SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Naval Surface Fire Support: How Can We Get There From
Here ?
Author: LCDR Clarence Todd Morgan, United States Navy
Thesis: The United States Navy does not have the capability to
effectively conduct the NSFS mission with its current
force structure. However, the new littoral battlespace
and the emerging doctrine in ... From the Sea requires a
flexible and lethal naval weapon system that can
successfully conduct sustained NSFS missions.
Background: U.S. Navy surface combatants are unable to conduct
effective NSFS to influence events ashore. This NSFS deficiency
significantly hinders the successful completion of expeditionary
missions. Current 5"/54 and 76-mm guns lack adequate range,
penetration capability, or accuracy. Near-term solutions to
correct NSFS deficiencies include: improved 5-inch ammunition,
a new 8-inch gun with improved ammunition, a missile delivery
system for guided submunition payloads, and limited battleship
re-activation. Interim period solutions include: 5- and 8-inch
extended range projectiles that deliver guided submunitions, a re-
designed 8-inch gun, and adaptation of the Army's MLRS and TACMS
systems. Long-term NSFS corrective actions will examine
advanced technology 5- and 8-inch guns as well as additional
missile delivery systems. The Navy-Marine Corps team's
expeditionary response and power projection capabilities are
severely degraded by the fleet's inadequate NSFS capabilities. To
support the National Military Strategy, combat effective NSFS
platforms are absolutely crucial to successfully conduct maneuver
warfare from the sea.
Recommendations: The United States Navy must develop and procure
an effective and lethal NSFS capability for surface combatants.
OUTLINE
Thesis: The United States Navy does not have the capability to
effectively conduct the NSFS mission with its current force
structure. However, the new littoral battlespace and the emerging
doctrine in ... From the Sea requires a flexible and lethal naval
weapon system that can successfully conduct
sustained NSFS missions.
I. Surface combatants unable to influence events ashore
A. Adaptive force package replaces CVBG
B. Maritime Action Group provides support to MEU
II. Effective NSFS critical to expeditionary force
A. Deficient NSFS inhibits troop maneuvers
B. Poor NSFS forces reliance on other fire support
III. Lethal NSFS performs significant role in
expeditionary mission
A. 24 hour on-call capability
B. Amphibious assault support
IV. NSFS in battlefield interdiction role
A. Greater ordnance on target in 24 hours
B. Adjunct to air power
C. Requirements
1. Range
2. Penetration
3. Accuracy
V. Current NSFS systems
A. 5"/54
B. 76-mm
VI. NSFS solutions in the near-term
A. 5"/54 Deadeye ammunition
B. 8"/55 MK 71 gun
C. SMASHR missile delivery system
B. Battleship
VII. NSFS solutions in the interim period
A. ANSR 5- and 8-inch projectiles
B. 8"/60 MK 71 gun
C. Army MLRS and TACMS systems
VIII. NSFS solutions in the long-term
A. LP and ETC gun
B. Sea Bear
NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT: HOW CAN WE GET THERE FROM HERE ?
... From the Sea articulates the United States Navy's future
vision of its role in an extremely dynamic world. As America
engages the post-Cold War world's new international realities,
two elements are clear: fewer resources are available in military
budgets and emerging threats are diverse as well as
unpredictable. These guidelines will dictate tomorrow's force
structure and operational doctrine. As a result, joint and
combined operations are becoming routine with the Navy-Marine
Corps team concentrating on expeditionary missions. The National
Security Strategy's emphasis on regional threats demands flexible
and effective Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS), previously known
as Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS), for these increasingly important
expeditionary missions. NSFS encompasses all weapon systems
capable of delivering supporting fire ashore such as guns,
missiles, and rockets.1 Today's fleet faces a dilemma of grave
proportions. The United States Navy does not have the
capability to effectively conduct the NSFS mission with its
current force structure. However, the new littoral battlespace
and the emerging doctrine in ... From the Sea requires a flexible
and lethal naval weapon system that can successfully conduct
sustained NSFS missions.
During a future regional crisis, the inability of surface
combatants to directly influence events ashore will inhibit the
on-scene Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander in the completion of
his mission. As the number of carrier battlegroups (CVBG) is
reduced, innovative force combinations, known as adaptive force
packages, will fill the void of the traditionally forward
deployed CVBG. The newest force structure developed for this
role is the Maritime Action Group (MAG), which has 2 to 4 units
consisting of cruiser, destroyer, frigate, submarine, and land-
based long-range naval patrol aviation assets.2 With no carrier
airwing or Air Force tactical air support available, the vital
importance of a sustainable and lethal NSFS capability on surface
ships in a MAG cannot be ignored. In the future, an urgent
embassy evacuation or other humanitarian operation could require
a Marine Expeditionary Unit and its Amphibious Ready Group to
conduct this operation under hostile fire with a MAG for support
and no fixed-wing air cover. In such a scenario, only the NSFS
capabilities inherent in the MAG provide the JTF Commander deep
on-call fire support.
Effective NSFS capabilities on Navy vessels are crucial to
fully realize an expeditionary force's combat potential when
reacting to regional crises in support of our National Military
Strategy. Inadequate NSFS places constraints upon troops
operating ashore. Enemy defenses that could have been suppressed
or destroyed by effective NSFS will inhibit the troops' freedom
to maneuver. Without the necessary NSFS capabilities, troops
ashore become even more dependant upon close air support, heavy
armor, and artillery for fire support. Marine units or Army
airborne forces reacting to a crisis will not have these types of
equipment in sufficient numbers for some days or weeks placing
them at great risk. With the Navy-Marine Corps focus on the
expeditionary mission, some small-scale conflicts would not
require Army heavy forces to be moved from the continental United
States. In this situation, adequate fire support becomes even
more critical with effective NSFS filling the firepower void
rather than relying solely on carrier air power.
A lethal NSFS weapon system can significantly assist the
successful prosecution of the expeditionary mission. A ship's
inherent mobility and sustainability provides a unique NSFS
weapon platform capability to the commander operating in the
littoral battlespace. NSFS supplies on-call fire support in bad
weather and around the clock against enemy forces or strong
points. Shore bombardment prepares the amphibious objective area
for assault and assists advancing ground forces along a
coastline. The ground force commander must have this capability
readily available, particularly during establishment of an
amphibious lodgement when combat power buildup is slow and troops
are most vulnerable. Unnecessary ground casualties or aircraft
attrition can be avoided when NSFS provides afloat fire support.
Operating independently, NSFS can play a substantial role in
battlefield interdiction by targeting enemy units, installations,
supplies, and communications in a littoral region. Currently,
targets in the littoral area can only be effectively attacked by
air strikes or Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles which are
expensive and limited in number. These systems could concentrate
on high-value deep targets if an effective and lethal NSFS weapon
system with the ability to perform the interdiction or strike
role within 100 NM of any coastline can be developed. NSFS is
not a replacement for air power, but it can provide continuous
on-station fire support placing a greater amount of ordnance on
target compared to the number of air sorties available from a
CVBG during a 24-hour time period. NSFS is viewed as an adjunct
to air power: more suitable for some targets in dense air defense
environments and invulnerable to attrition or capture. To
accomplish battlefield interdiction missions, NSFS weaponry
requires adequate range, penetration capability, and accuracy to
be combat effective. A capable NSFS weapon system is a combined
arms combat power multiplier.
The current inventory of Navy NSFS weaponry lacks sufficient
range, accuracy, or penetration capabilities to be effective in a
fire support mission. The primary naval guns available for NSFS
are the 5"/54 caliber MK 45 and MK 42 found in Spruance, Kidd,
and Arleigh Burke class destroyers; Ticonderoga, California,
Virginia, and Belknap class cruisers; and Tarawa class amphibious
assault carriers. These 5"/54 guns are inadequate for effective
NSFS. The maximum range for the 5-inch gun is 12 NM.3 Adequate
sea room for safe navigation further reduces the inland reach of
either gun. Such a short range fails to provide the required
fire support for troops ashore and severely limits the littoral
area that can be influenced. All 5-inch ammunition types are
designed for blast effect and maximum fragmentation, which is
ideal for soft targets or anti-aircraft fire. Another naval gun,
the OTO Melara 76-mm MK 75, is mounted in Oliver Hazard Perry
class frigates and Pegasus class hydrofoils and is capable of
conducting NSFS as a secondary mission. The 76-mm gun's range is
9 NM, and its ammunition is similarly designed for blast and
fragmentation rather then penetration.4 None of these guns
can successfully engage hardened emplacements such as block
houses, pill boxes, and deep dug-in positions. With the possible
exception of a mobility kill, current naval guns would not be
effective against main battle tanks or other armor. Additionally,
existing guns with available unguided ammunition have a circular
error of probability (CEP) of 300 meters, which necessitates
large quantities of ammunition be expended to hit even area
targets.5 Current NSFS weaponry is inadequate to support
expeditionary missions contemplated in the littoral battlespace.
Recent events provide an illustration of current NSFS
capabilities. During the Persian Gulf engagements in April 1988,
over one thousand 5"/54 rounds were fired to destroy an oil
platform.6 Such an inordinate expenditure on one small
undefended target proves the unsuitability of today's 5-inch
gun weapon system for NSFS. Considering the finite capacity of
ammunition magazines, large ammunition expenditures against a few
targets is unacceptable. By contrast, the battleship's 16-inch
guns have the capability to penetrate 27 feet of reinforced
concrete or 16 inches of armor plate.7 The 16-inch gun's range
is 20.8 NM and extended range ammunition, already designed,
increased its range to approximately 40 NM.8 USS Missouri and
USS Wisconsin demonstrated their highly effective NSFS
capabilities during sustained fire support missions conducted in
Desert Storm. The comparison of 5"/54 and 16-inch gun
performance underlines the inadequacy of current NSFS weaponry in
the fleet with the withdrawal of the battleships from active
service.
A combination of near- and long-term solutions is required
to correct the Navy's NSFS deficiencies. While combat
effectiveness must be the primary consideration in addressing the
NSFS problem; sustainability, flexibility, cost-effectiveness,
maximum use of existing technology, as well as hardware should be
the driving criteria in guiding NSFS weapon system procurement
decisions. In the near-term (3 to 5 years) the focus of
corrective effort must concentrate upon making existing NSFS
weapon systems more effective. Interim (6 to 9 years) and longer
term (10 to 12 years) solutions must examine new technologies and
adaptation of other services' weaponry for use in the NSFS
mission. The Navy's goal must be a comprehensive, long-term,
multi-faceted plan to address current surface ship NSFS
deficiencies, and to provide NSFS systems with enhanced
capabilities as new ships enter the fleet.
In order to achieve maximum improvement in fleet NSFS
capability, any near-term solutions to the NSFS problem must
minimize technological risk and cost. Improving the capabilities
of the 5-inch gun weapon system would be an outstanding initial
step. The 5"/54 guns are in more than one hundred active ships
or ships under construction. Any significant improvements in
range, accuracy, or penetration capabilities will pay high
dividends in increased NSFS effectiveness and flexibility.
Specifically, 5-inch ammunition requires the development of
extended range projectiles with hard-target penetration
capability and precision guided accuracy. Such ammunition has
already been developed. The 5-inch semi-active laser guided
projectile (SALGP), named Deadeye, successfully completed
operational testing at sea and was approved for fleet use in
1982.9 The round has a combination high explosive/conical shape
charge warhead allowing it to penetrate approximately 27 inches
of rolled homogeneous armor or the equivalent of a T54-type tank;
and it is highly accurate with laser designation giving the round
a 2 meter CEP.10 Deadeye is a rocket assisted projectile (RAP),
which increases 5-inch gun range to 15 NM.11 The 5-inch SALGP
round was designed using an earlier 5-inch infra-red guided
projectile body that optimized flight in an anti-air warfare
role. However, if the 5-inch SALGP body is redesigned to
aerodynamically optimize surface to surface flight, the range can
be increased to 30 NM, and the addition of Global Positioning
System (GPS) guidance would yield a 16 meter CEP independent of
laser designation.12 The Deadeye fell victim to budgetary cuts
in FY 1989, and was not funded for production.13 Re-introduction
of the Deadeye program and its redesign would be the most rapid
route to give the fleet a highly accurate shipboard hard-target
kill capability.
A second near-term solution has already been developed that
can significantly improve current NSFS capabilities. The 8"/55
caliber MK 71 gun successfully completed its at sea operational
evaluation in USS Hull (DD-945) in 1976, and was approved for
fleet use in 1977.14 Program funding was subsequently canceled.
The MK 71 gun was specifically designed for installation in
Spruance class destroyers as its forward gun mount and could also
be fitted in Ticonderoga cruisers and Arleigh Burke destroyers.
Available 8-inch projectiles are either high capacity or high
explosive; existing armor piercing rounds cannot be fired from
the 8"/55 because of recoil system limitations.15 The current
ammunition gives the 8"/55 a maximum range of 20 NM with each
round having a 600 meter CEP.16 Although existing ammunition
would return some enhanced area suppression capability to NSFS,
improved 8-inch ammunition will significantly upgrade NSFS
capability. Concurrent with the 8"/55 MK 71 development and
testing, a 8-inch SALGP was also developed and successfully test
fired at sea. With laser designation the 8-inch SALGP has a 2
meter CEP, a maximum range of 30 NM, and its combination conical
shape charge/high explosive warhead can penetrate approximately
43 inches of rolled homogeneous armor or the equivalent of a T72-
type tank making it comparable to the Hellfire missile's
capability.17 Installation of the 8"/55 in new construction
ships, a selective backfit program for existing cruisers and
destroyers, and the production of the 8-inch SALGP would
alleviate the current lack of effective NSFS in the fleet.
Another near-term solution uses existing hardware and can
be widely distributed among fleet combatants with STANDARD
Missile capabilities. The STANDARD Missile Autonomous Strike
Homing Round (SMASHR) would use SM-1 MK 56 motor assemblies with
GPS midcourse guidance and deliver either 550 M46 dual purpose
submunitions or a BULLPUP A warhead.18 The M46 submunition has
a combination conical shape charge/high explosive warhead capable
of defeating armor found on various armored personnel carriers
such as a BMP.19 The SMASHR would have a 60 NM maximum range
and a 16 meter CEP, which can be improved to 2 meters with the
addition of a Low-Light-Level TV seeker for terminal guidance.20
Using the SM-2's MK 104 motor assembly, the SMASHR maximum range
could be increased to 140 NM.21 SMASHR would be able to
incorporate new guided payload advances, like Sense and Destroy
Armor (SADARM) submunitions, to improve its anti-armor lethality.
Although fewer missile rounds could be carried and each shot
would be much more expensive than a gun projectile, the added
range and accurate area coverage make SMASHR a very attractive
NSFS weapon system.
A final near-term solution is to recommission two Iowa
class battleships, one per coast, for the sole mission of NSFS.
Operating costs can be minimized by only deploying a battleship
in case of a regional crisis and maintaining unit proficiency by
operating in U.S. coastal areas. A different variation would
place two of the battleships in the Naval Reserve with much lower
manning levels. Manpower costs also could be minimized by either
deactivating or removing the remaining six secondary 5"/38 gun
mounts allowing additional room for other NSFS weaponry.22
Continued battleship operation would maintain a critical
near-term capability and maintain an experienced personnel cadre
in the event of a contingency requiring re-activation of the two
remaining inactive battleships. The ongoing availability of a
survivable battleship platform with its 16-inch guns would give
NSFS a highly robust capability, which is now lacking.
During the interim time frame, newer technological
improvements to current systems must be examined. The Autonomous
Naval Strike Round (ANSR) concept proposes improved ammunition
for both the 5-inch and 8-inch naval guns. A 5-inch ANSR
would use existing 5"/54 MK 45 MOD 1 gun mounts but achieve
significant range improvement using RAP technology. The 5-inch
ANSR carries 35 M46 submunitions to a maximum range of 50 NM or
56 M46s to 30 NM using a combination GPS/inertial navigation
system (INS) guidance to maintain a 16 meter CEP.23 The 8-inch
ANSR, using the 8"/55 MK 71 gun mount, delivers 133 M46s to a
maximum range of 100 NM or 247 M46s to 60 NM and also achieves a
16 meter CEP.24 A 175 pound unitary warhead in a 8-inch ANSR
could be fired to 100 NM and strike a point target with a 2 meter
CEP if semi-active laser, infra-red, or other terminal guidance
features were added.25 ANSR significantly extends the inland
reach of Navy ships in littoral areas, greatly enhancing NSFS
capability.
An improved 8-inch gun design could be deployed in the
interim period. The 8"/60 MK 71 gun would add numerous
technological improvements, such as a monoblock gun barrel
design, that enhance production and maintenance characteristics
of the current 8"/55.26 The newer design upgrades the recoil
system allowing growth in ammunition capabilities while
increasing the gun's caliber.27 These improvements allow the use
of current armor piercing rounds and increase the range of all
existing projectiles by 10 percent to approximately 22 NM.28
The new 8-inch gun design would provide much improved NSFS
firepower with a variety of ammunition; giving the JTF Commander
the ability to influence events more than 75 NM inland.
Several missile and rocket systems are possible alternatives
in the interim time frame to fill the NSFS role. The Army's
Multi-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and Tactical Missile System
(TACMS) are likely candidates. Each delivers a large payload of
submunitions that are well-suited to attack large area soft
targets. New guided submunitions with hard-target kill
capability that are under development, such as SADARM, also are
compatible. MLRS rounds can reach targets 16 NM away and
saturate an area greater than four football fields using 12
rockets.29 Each MLRS rocket carries 644 M77 submunitions but is
unguided.30 Improved MLRS rocket range and guidance would be
necessary for NSFS use. TACMS can strike targets out to 80 NM
with each rocket carrying approximately 1000 M74 submunitions
and with GPS achieve a 16 meter CEP.31 Adaptation of missile or
rocket systems can give tremendous area shock and suppression
capabilities to NSFS but the cost per round and the number of
available rounds on board ship raise sustainability questions.
In the long-term, new evolving technologies must be
investigated to correct NSFS deficiencies. Two new propellant
types can substantially increase both the 5-inch and 8-inch gun
range and performance. Liquid propellant (LP) and electro-
thermal chemical (ETC) technologies combined with RAP can
increase 5-inch gun ranges to 50 NM.32 The 8-inch LP or ETC gun
would have a 100 NM range using RAP.33 Both the 5-inch and
8-inch ammunition would still carry M46 submunitions achieving
a 16 meter CEP with GPS guidance. These advanced technology guns
provide the required extended range critical for NSFS
effectiveness in the littoral battlespace.
Numerous missile systems can be examined in the long-term
time frame for employment in a NSFS mission. However, cost,
on-call capability, and sustainability are principal concerns
with missile systems. One proposal, the Sea Bear concept, is a
relatively low cost guided missile configured for launch from a
Vertical Launch System canister or Harpoon launcher.34 Sea Bear
would carry a 500 pound warhead or submunitions to 100 NM and
achieve a 16 meter CEP with GPS/INS guidance, and if a fiberoptic
guidance system is utilized a 2 meter CEP can be realized to a
range of 20 NM.35 For a high priority target nearby or as an
area suppression weapon Sea Bear could add a significant
dimension to NSFS.
To successfully achieve ... From the Sea's vision and
conduct the expeditionary mission, the Navy requires a lethal
NSFS weapon systems capable of sustained fire support against a
diversity of targets. The battleship's decommissioning removed
the Navy's only effective NSFS weapon. New construction programs
continue installation of the 5"/54 despite the existence of off-
the-shelf improvements and emerging technologies that promise
highly capable NSFS systems in the near future. If the Navy is
serious about littoral warfare, the deplorable state of NSFS must
be addressed. Budgetary pressures are immense and funding will
remain limited into the foreseeable future. An investment in
NSFS capability is a great combat multiplier and highly cost
effective. The Navy-Marine Corps team's expeditionary response
and power projection capabilities are severely degraded by the
fleet's inadequate NSFS capabilities. To support the National
Military Strategy, combat effective NSFS platforms are absolutely
crucial to successfully conduct maneuver warfare from the sea.
ENDNOTES
1. Scott C. Truver and Norman Polmar, "Naval Surface Fire
Support and the Iowas," Proceedings, Nov. 1985, p. 130.
2. Captain Robert O. Crawshaw, U.S. Navy, "What Is a Maritime
Action Group?" Proceedings, Jan. 1993, p. 28.
3. Bernard Prezelin, ed., Combat Fleets of the World 1993,
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 786.
4. Ibid.
5. J.G. Ferrebee, S.E. Anderson, and O.K. Blosser, "Naval
Surface Fire Support Study," Report by Naval Surface Warfare
Center (Dahlgren, Va.: Dahlgren Division, Jul. 1992), p. 31.
6. "U.S. Sinks or Cripples Six Iranian Warships," The Washington
Post, 19 Apr. 1988, p. A22.
7. Prezelin, p. 786.
8. Ibid.
9. J.D. Hagan, "Naval Surface Fire Support Concepts," Report by
Naval Surface Warfare Center (Dahlgren, Va.: Dahlgren Division,
1992), p. 6.
10. Interview with J.D. Hagan, Naval Surface Warfare Center G30
Guided Munitions, Dahlgren, Va., 18 Feb. 1993.
11. Interview with R.D. Cooper, Naval Surface Warfare Center G32
MK 45 5"/54 Improvements, Dahlgren, Va., 18 Feb. 1993.
12. Ibid.
13. Prezelin, p. 786.
14. Scott Gourley, "US Naval Surface Fire Support: The Gun
Factor," Military Technology, Aug. 1992, p. 35.
15. "Preliminary Assessment of 8-Inch Gun Ammunition Availability
and Development Status," Report by FMC Corporation (Minneapolis,
Mn.: Naval Systems Division, 5 Jun. 1992), p. 7.
16. Ferrebee, p. 36.
17. Interview with J.D. Hagan.
18. Hagan, p. 13.
19. Ibid., p. 21.
20. Ibid., p. 19.
21. Ibid., p. 13.
22. Commander Robert W. Selle, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired), "The
Best Kept Secret in Pentagon Room 4E-686," Proceedings, Nov. 1992,
p. 103.
23. Hagan, p. 14.
24. Ibid., p. 13.
25. Ibid.
26. Interview with J.D. Hagan.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Truver and Polmar, pp. 130-131.
30. Ibid.
31. Hagan, p. 13.
32. Ferrebee, p. 33.
33. Interview with Tom Doran, Naval Surface Warfare Center G33
Electrothermal Gun Program Manager, Dahlgren, Va., 18 Feb. 1993.
34. Ferrebee, p. 22.
35. Ibid.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Crawshaw, Captain Robert O. U.S. Navy. "What Is a Maritime
Action Group?" Proceedings, Jan. 1993, pp. 28-31.
2. Ferrebee, J.G., S.E. Anderson, and O.K. Blosser. "Naval
Surface Fire Support Study." Report by Naval Surface
Warfare Center. Dahlgren, Va.: Dahlgren Division, Jul.
1992.
3. Fickett, Richard K. "LCACs Can Support Shore Bombardment."
Proceedings, Feb. 1993, pp. 88-89.
4. Gourley, Scott. "US Naval Surface Fire Support: The Gun
Factor." Military Technology, Aug. 1992, p. 35.
5. Hagan, J.D. "Naval Surface Fire Support Concepts." Report by
Naval Surface Warfare Center. Dahlgren, Va.: Dahlgren
Division, 1992.
6. Herrmann, Second Lieutenant Fred K. U.S. Marine Corps.
"Closing the Gun Gap." Proceedings, Nov. 1988, pp. 104-107.
7. Interview with Don Wilson, Naval Surface Warfare Center G30.
Dahlgren, Va., 18 Feb. 1993.
8. Interview with J.D. Hagan, Naval Surface Warfare Center G30
Guided Munitions. Dahlgren, Va., 18 Feb. 1993.
9. Interview vith R.D. Cooper, Naval Surface Warfare Center G32
MK 45 5"/54 Improvements. Dahlgren, Va., 18 Feb. 1993.
10. Interview vith Tom Doran, Naval Surface Warfare Center G33
Electrothermal Gun Program Manager. Dahlgren, Va., 18 Feb.
1993.
11. "Preliminary Assessment of 8-Inch Gun Ammunition Availability
and Development Status." Report by FMC Corporation.
Minneapolis, Mn.: Naval Systems Division, 5 Jun. 1992.
12. Prezelin, Bernard, ed. Combat Fleets of the World 1993.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993.
13. Selle, Commander Robert W. U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired). "The
Best Kept Secret in Pentagon Room 41-686." Proceedings,
Nov. 1992, pp. 102-105.
14. Truver, Scott C. and Norman Polmar. "Naval Surface Fire
Support and the Iowas." Proceedings, Nov. 1985, pp. 130-
133.
15. "U.S. Sinks or Cripples Six Iranian Warships." The Washington
Post, 19 Apr. 1988, p. A22.
GUN AND AMMUNITION PROGRAMS
GUN PROGRAMS:
1. PHALANX CIWS - POC PETER ADAMS, Program Manager, F1O7, x7587
Block Improvements: Adams
Other Improvements: POC Tommy Harkins, G32, x8493
a. Enhanced Lethality Penetrator
b. Extended Barrels
c. RAD HAZ Primer - POC StanGriscavage, G32, x8868
2. Electrothermal Gun - POC Tom Doran, Program Manager, G33,
x8318
a. 6Omm Gun - POC R.D. Coooper, G32, x7656
b. Guided Munition - POC John Fraysee, G33, x8318
c. Systems engineer - John Copley, G33, x8318
3. Advanced Minor Caliber Gun System - POC Jim McConkie, G32,
X7861
4. MK 45 5"/54 Improvements - POC R.D. Cooper, G32, x7656
5. MK 71 8"/55 Major Caliber Lightweight Gun - POC R.D. Cooper,
G32, x7656
6. Naval Surface Fire Support Study - POC Don Monn or Sam
Burnley, G32, x8868
7. NATACMS - POC Larry Spangler, G33, X8318
AMMUNITION:
1. Guided Munitions- POC Dennis Hagan, G3O, x8141
a. Terminal Defense Round - Hagan
b. Small Caliber Smart Munition - POC John Fraysee, G33,
x8318 (This is a part of the 6Omm Electrothermal Gun Program.)
c. Autonomous Naval Support Round (ANSR) - POC John Fraysee,
G33, x8318
2. Cast Projectile - POC O.J. Huey, G32, x8493
3. Navy in-Service Ammunition Improvements - POC Bev Jablovskis,
G32, x8493 (All Up Round Design Agent Program)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
G31 - Light Weapons Branch - Head - Joe Monolo, x8891
G32 - Gun System Branch - Head - Don Monn, x8868
G33 - Smart Munitions Branch - Head Fred Perrine, x8318
Fire Support COEA - Gary Ferrebee, x8538
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