The
Military Versus The War On Drugs: How Much To Do?
CSC
1993
SUBJECT
AREA - Topical Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE
:The Military versus the War on Drugs: How much to do?
AUTHOR:Commander
Boris LEYTON. Student,Chilean Marine Corps
THESIS:The
Department of Defense is affected in several ways
by the National Drugs Control Strategy;
therefore,the
Military should play a major role in
the war on drugs.
BACKGROUND: In September 1989, President George Bush
declared
war on drugs,and announced his first National Drugs
Control
Strategy. It seems logical that if a "war" on drugs
is
being waged,therefore,the military should play a major
role
in that war. To ensure proper execution of the military
role
in drug control,it is necessary to develop a coherent
strategy
according to the current times. There are many
alternatives
to solve the problem of military involvement,and
each
one with more or less probabilities of success. But,the
key
point is the right understanding of the nature of war on
drugs,and
the proper development of a Military Drug Control
Strategy
based upon a joint effort according to the current
doctrine.
RECOMMENDATION:Using
the successful experience of the Gulf
War,to
develop a joint effort at the highest level of the
Department
of Defense to build a Military Drug Control
Strategy,keeping
in balance the ENDS,WAYS,and MEANS,during
times
of dwindling budgets and force structure.
OUTLINE
THESIS
: The DOD is affected in several ways by the National Drugs
Control Strategy; therefore, the
military should play a major
role in the war on drugs.
I.- Military Advisors
A.-Historical role
B.-Present-day role
II.- Central and South America today
A.-Central America production and
trafficking
B.-South America production and
trafficking
III.- Narcotics Trafficking in Central
Asia
A.-A new Colombia?
B.-Consequences of Soviet disintegration
IV.- The Advisors'dilemma
A.-Mission without authority
B.-Questionable results
V.- Solutions
A.-Develop a Military Drug
Control Strategy
B.-Alternatives?
THE MILITARY VERSUS THE WAR ON
DRUGS : HOW MUCH TO DD?
THE INTENTIONAL TRADE IN DRUGS IS A MAJOR
THREAT TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. NO THREAT DOES
MORE DAMAGE TO OUR NATIONAL VALUES AND
INSTITUTIONS, AND THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE GENERATED BY THE
TRADE IN DRUGS IS ALL TOO FAMILIAR. TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS
UNDERMINE THE SOVEREIGN GOVERNME
NTS OF OUR FRIENDS AND WEAKEN AND DISTORT
NATIONAL ECONOMIES... DEMAND REDUCTION AT HOME AND
AN AGGRESSIVE ATTACK ON THE INTERNATIONAL
DRUG TRADE ARE THE MAIN ELEMENTS IN OUR STRATEGY.
THEY MUST BE PURSUED TOGETHER.(1)
President George Bush
National Security Strategy of
the United States
In September 1989, President George
Bush has declared war on drugs, and announced his
first
National Drugs Control Strategy (NDCS). The same month, Secretary of Defense
Dick Cheney
designated
the detection and countering of the production, trafficking, and use of illegal
drugs as
a
"high priority national security mission of the Department of
Defense."
The President's 1989 NDCS affected the
Department of Defense (DOD) in several ways. It
seem
logical that if a "war" on drugs is being waged, therefore, the
military should play a major
role
in that war. However, before jumping to that conclusion, several key questions
should be
answered. First, should the military be involved ?
Second, if involved, what is the proper
military
role ? And last, but not least, what are the constraints on military involvement
? To
answer
this questions, it is necessary to examine the military contribution to
achieving a NDCS.
Once
convinced that the military should be involved, the next step is to develop a
logical
Military
Drug Control Strategy (MDCS) that supports the national strategy.
Since NDCS publication in September
1989, two subseqent companion volumes have been
published,
with the latest dated February 1991. Furthermore, both the supply and demand
sides of the
drug
equation receive increased attention internationally, as well as domestically. In this
context,
a well balanced drug control strategy must attack both supply and demand.
However, the
military
can most affect the supply side of the equation.
Military involvement is justified, when
looking at drug control in the national context,
for
several reasons. Drug trafficking poses a national security threat, and in its
role as
protector
of the national interests against such threat, the military should definitely
be engaged.
Since
a national strategy has been developed to address this threat, the military, as
one of the
elements
of national power, should likewise develop a support strategy.
To ensure proper execution of the
military role in drug control, our military must
dovetail
with, and support, the national strategy. The military strategy must have
identifiable
objectives
(ends) that protect national interests; strategic concepts (ways) that
describes how the
job
will get done; and resources (means) that describe what it will take to support
the concept.
These
three elements of military strategy must be kept in balance. The further out of balance any
one
elements becomes, the greater the risk that the strategy will fail. Another
facet of military
strategy
is its two-dimensional existence in time : the current strategy is here and
now, while the
mid-range
looks ten years ahead.
A fully supportive MDCS would enhance
the likelihood of the president's achieving his
desired
end state for the year 2000 (2). The
MDCS would further detail the ends, ways, and means to
obtain
the goals. Along with this mid-range strategy, a current strategy should be
developed that
focuses
on the present and one to two years in the future.
In examining the current military
strategy, both the ends and the means are fairly
straight-forward
to develop, while the ways are much more difficult. In progessing to the
mid-range
military strategy, more time and effort will obviously be required, since the
ends, ways,
and
means projected to the turn of the century will be much harder to define.
There are many areas in which the
military can help support the drug control effort. Some
of
these involve the demand side of the drug equation such as providing
correctional facilities,
rehabilitation,
and training programs in the military and DOD schools. However, the military's
contribution
to supply-side reduction can produce the greatest results.
The military have definitely many more
things to do in the drug war. Though still evolving,
proper
military role in the war can, and will, be established over time. A logical
method for
determining
this military role is to first develop a MDCS with the traditional elements
ends, ways,
and
means, and the two time components (current and mid-range). Only by optimizing
both efficiency
and
effectiveness can we ultimately win the drug war.
The historical role of Military
Advisors has been, as part of the support of foreign
allies
(3), to train host-government personnel and provide operational support
activities where is
required.
But, the policy of the government, has been that DOD personnel will not
accompany
host-government
forces on actual field operations. The Department of State coordinates the
counter
narcotics
initiatives with the Host Nation via the respective ambassadors. Each
ambassador is
assigned
a representative from participant agencies. These representatives form part of
the
ambassador's
country team. As military advisor team, the United States military personnel
have been
training
host-nation police and counter-drug military units for individual and small
unit
leadership
an air mobile and riverine operations.
The present role of Military Advisors
has not many changes. DOD operational assistance
increased
in the form of mobile training teams, deployments for training and short
duration
exercises,
and medical engineering and civic action support were provided along with air
mobility
assets.
The DOD also augmented the country teams in
some countries such as Colombia, Bolivia and
Peru
by deploying intelligence personnel. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense
Reorganization Act reshaped
the
military organization and gave broad new powers to the regional
Commanders-in-Chief (CINC). For
the
first time in United States history the regional CINCs had both authority and
responsibility for
all
military forces within their region, which includes the military advisor teams
in each country,
but,
this has not changed the basic role of these.
Central America has a long history of
illicit drugs production, trafficking and associated
money
laundering. It is an increasingly
important area in the cocaine trade. The countries of
Central
America had to face an increasing flow of cocaine during the last years, as trafficking
oranizations
expanded and diversified their smuggling routes through the region. While the
United
States
government provided some assistance, several countries independently have taken
initiatives
in
recognition of the threat which drug poses to their own national security. All
seven Central
American
nations are now victims, to varying degrees, of the drug trade (4). The Central
American
nations
are attempting to respond, and with United States assistances such as detection
and
monitoring
operations, communications support, planning assistance, and intelligence
gathering have
had
some significant successes. Also, Mexico is a critical target in the counter
cocaine campaign.
A
substantial portion of all narcotics entering the United States comes through
Mexico (5).
The South America production and
trafficking is focused mainly in Colombia, Bolivia, and
Peru.
Considerable success has been achieved in Colombia in the interdiction of
cocaine products by
colombian
counter drugs forces. The DOD trained a great amount of military personnel in
Colombia
during
the last years, mostly in tactics, equipment maintenance and the use of small
arms. Several
significant
colombian operations have took place during the last two years. The United States
government
has continued working closely with the Colombian Ministry of Defense and
Department of
Administrative
Security to enhance the capabilities to interdict drugs and disrupt the
trafficking
infrastructure.
Bolivia is the world's second-largest
producer of coca leaf and may also be the second
largest
producer of refined cocaine. During the
last years, the United States government continued
to
cooperate to implement the long-term U.S. objective of reducing, and ultimately
eliminating, the
production
of refined cocaine products (6).
Law enforcement efforts resulting in
successful operations against some organizations that
supply
Colombian cartels. Law enforcement units increased their presence and control
in the
Chapare,
a region in central Bolivia that is the second largest coca cultivation area in
the world.
Peru remains the world's leading producer of coca with an estimated
121,300 hectares of
licit
and illicit cultivation (7). Because
Peru elected in August 1990 not to sign the grant-aid
agreement,
the United States provided no equipment or training support to that country
during
1991-92. DOD did provide training to 180 peruvian
police, under the auspices and in support of the
State
Department's Bureau for International Narcotics Matters. Peruvian narcotics-control law
appears
to be adequate, although the judicial system functions poorly and the law is
rarely enforced
in
a consistent manner. A third U.S. Special Force Mobile Training Team (MTT)
began training
peruvian
police in jungle operations in January 1991(8).
The drug war has expanded its
battlefield since the collapse of the former Soviet Empire.
Countries
that were formerly isolated to a degree from the West have now gained access to
the drug
markets.
The states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Ttajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan-which less
than
a year ago constituted those Union Soviet Socialist Republics collectively
termed Soviet
Central
Asia-incorporate rugged and remote areas that have long been associated with
narcotics use
and
smuggling activities of various types.
During most of the Soviet period, these traditional
activities
were seldom visible to western and, in any event, were confined largely to the
republics
themselves
and more or less limited interactions with Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. For many
specialists
in the former Soviet republics and neighboring states who had studied Central
Asia's
growth
and potential as a narcotics trafficking center, a striking metaphor increasingly
suggested
itself-Central
Asia as another Colombia.
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
in February 1989, the East European "revolutions"
and
virtual collapse of the socialist bloc that same year, followed by the eventual
disintegration
of
the Soviet Union and its centrally controlled security structures amidst acute
and continuing
interethnic
conflict, profoundly changed the status and future of the region at the start
of the new
decade.
New and reorganizing security organizations
in the now independents republics are faced
with
a host of problems, and the priority given to counternarcotics activities is a
complex issue
(9). Finally, potential involvement of foreign
drug trafficking groups appears greater now. This
may
particularly be the case in regard to Southwest Asian traffickers, who could
use ethnic and
religious
affiliations to develop new staging, processing or cultivation areas for drugs
ultimately
intented
for rich european and north american markets.
In the drugs world described, the Advisor's dilemma seems to be
the same : Mission without
authority,
and the questionable results. In fact,
since the Advisor's task began, their
responsibilities
have been limited to security assistance, counter drugs training, intelligence,
communications,
nations assistance and operational support. The Federal Government has
embarked,
over
the years, on a wide variety of drug interdiction programs to counter this
problem, with a lot
of
agencies participating without coordination or, at least, consideration for
other ongoing
programs.
The regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINC) have authority over the military
forces, however,
neither
the CINCs nor the ambassadors have directive authority or budgetary
responsibility for the
other
government agencies required to implement a given counternarcotics strategy
(10).
Without an effective command and
control structure in place, and without an effective
authority
in the host countries, the advisor's results has been questionable, and the
main concern
is
related to the lack of cultural sensivity and understanding of the host
countries. This includes
the
relative priority given to the country history, art, religion, myth, technology
and language.
To
ensure proper execution of the military role in drug control, our military must
develop
a
coherent strategy according to the current times. The development of this
strategy has progressed
somewhat
slowly. Possibly, this is attributable
to a reluctance among the Services to take another
mission
during times of dwindling bugets and force structure.
There are many areas in which the
military can help support the drug control effort. Some
of
these involve the demand side of the drug equation; however, the military
contribution to supply
side
reduction can produce the greatest results.
The military has definitely many more
things to do in the drug war, and the solution
should
be incorporated into a Joint Doctrine in order to have standard application for
all, and to
provide
a proper understanding of the doctrine during joint/combined operations. Three
alternative
solutions
would solve this problem
1.- To continue with the current policy
2.- To develop a strategy based upon
one Service
3.- To develop a joint strategy based upon the capabilities of
each Service
The first alternative is to continue
implementing solutions throughout the NDCS, prepared
within
the Executive Office of the White House by the Office of National Drug Control
Policy, and
leaving
to DOD the support throughout the different Services in single operations
according to the
current
requirements in each specific place. This current alternative has had some good
results,
employing
the single capabilities of each Service according with the goals of each
operation. Many
of
these operations are large scale efforts involving interagency planning and
civil-military
cooperation
in the execution of complex concepts of operation. Operations such as GREEN
SWEEP,
GREEN
MERCHANT, GHOST DANCER, GHOST ZONE, etc., have become highly visible to
citizens of the United
States
and South America, creating some curiosity as well as outright anger at
military involvement.
Even though all these operations have
had a certain degree of success, they remain within
the
area of immediate response strategy, and do not have the necessary two-time
components : current
and
mid-range. This fact, makes it necessary to answer the following questions:
1.- Have they had any real impact in
the drug threat?
2.- Do they fit our objectives?
3.- Are they backed with the requisite
resources and long-term commitments needed to make
their concepts work?
The second option, using the current capabilities
of the Services, is to develop a
counter-drugs
strategy based upon one of them, such as the Marine Corps which is uniquely
suited for
some
aspects of the United States national counterncotics effort. This solution
implies the fact
that
the DOD have to choose the Service that will be responsible for the military
side in the war on
drugs,
working jointly with other Agencies to develop and execute the proper strategy
that fulfills
the
goals of the NDCS.
This alternative could be a good
solution to centralize the efforts and to economy forces,
in
order to develop a proper Military Drugs Control Strategy based upon the most
adequate Service
capabilities,
but it is also a potential source of conflicts among the Services because of
the
selection
represents resources and means to be the axis of the MDCS.
The third option, using the successful
experience of the Gulf War, is to develop a joint
effort
at the highest level of the DOD to build an MDCS that has identifiable
objectives (ENDS) that
protects
national interests; strategic concepts (WAYS) that describe how the job will
get done in
its
two-dimensional existence in time (current and mid-range); and resources
(MEANS) that describe
what
it will take to support the concept. These three elements of military strategy
must be kept in
balance
. The DOD must employ the proper capabilities of each Service to maximize both
efficiency
and
effectiveness to win the drug war. Throughout this joint effort, and using the
best of each
Service
in this arena, attacking the drug at its source, in transit, and at the
distribution stage
in
the continental United States, the results could be definitive.
Although each of the three alternatives
would solve this problem with more or less
probabilities
of success, the third solution is clearly superior. Using an adequate MDCS based upon
a
joint effort according to the current doctrine, and using the best capabilities
of each Service
according
to the particular situation, it is clearly superior because it represents the
best use of
the
lessons learned, economy of effort, and joint thought during times of dwindling
budgets and
force
structure.
Finally, it is necessary to keep always
in mind, that the war on drugs it is not a problem
between
nations, or religions, or ideologies.
It is a social problem with no easy solution. The end
of
the Cold War and the consequently reduced national-security threat provides the
U.S. military
with
unprecedented opportunities to play non traditional roles. But, military action is not the
only
answer, the right MDCS must dovetail with the economical policies to support
the Host-Nation if
we
are seriously determined to "win" the drug war.
ENDNOTES
(1) The White House, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED
STATES, (Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Office,1991),
p.9O.
(2) Ibid. p.15.
(3) The White House, National Drug Control
Strategy,(Washington,
DC: Government Printing
Office,1991),p.90.
(4)
U.S. Department of State Bureau of
International Narcotics
Matters, International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report
March 1991,(Washington DC : Department of
State Publication
9853-A) ,p.3.
(5) Ibid.p.155.
(6) Ibid.p.2.
(7) Ibid.p.114.
(8) Ibid.p.118.
(9) Military Review December 1992, Narcotics
Trafficking in
Central Asia : A New Colombia
?,(Headquarters,Department of
the Army),p.62.
(10)
Kellner William Major USMC, The War on Drugs GET CONTROL OR
GET OUT!, Military Issue Paper Command
and Staff College
1992/93,p. 10.
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