Re-Clawing
The Bear, Russia's New Military Doctrine
AUTHOR
Major Mark E. Kipphut, USAF
CSC
1993
SUBJECT
AREA - National Security
OUTLINE
Thesis: The Russian government is developing a new
military doctrine designed to
lead
it into the next century. While it rejects Gorbachev's 1987 defensive doctrine,
it
is rediscovering its traditional Russian nationalist roots. While not a
precursor of
a
return to the Cold War, it will present specific challenges for the West once
Russia's
political and economic situation improves.
I. General Russian Security Strategy
Concepts
A. Foundations of Policy
B. Foundations of the Russian Armed Forces
C. Declared Russian Vital National Interests
II. Development of Military Doctrine
A. Military's Role in National Security
B. Soviet versus Neo-Russian Concepts
C. Interrelationship of Interests and Doctrine
D. Perceptions of Future Wars
III. Past, Present, and Future Doctrinal
Views
A. "Reasonable Sufficiency" and Defensive Doctrines
B. Preeminence of Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1970
C. Strengthening Conventional Doctrine, 1970s
D. Rise of the Orgarkov Doctrine, 1980s
E. Gorbachev Defensive Sufficiency Doctrine, 1987
F. New Russian Doctrine, 1992
IV.
Current Major Russian Defensive Principals
A. Repulsion and Defeat of Any Aggressor
B. Flexible Forces
C. Acceptable limits on Nuclear Warfare
D. Strategic Offensive Operations
V.
Status of Russian Armed Forces
A. Role in CIS and Independent Operations
B. Reform Timetables
C. Future Priorities
IV. Summary
A. Doctrinal Developments
B. Components of Armed Forces
C. Short- and Long-term Challenges
RE-CLAWING THE BEAR,
RUSSIA'S NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE
by Major Mark E. Kipphut,
United States Air Force
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union
many strategists have argued that the
strategic
threat posed by it no longer exists and therefore the United States should
redirect
its
national defense efforts away from the former Soviet Union and focus more on
the
Third
World. In my opinion this would be in folly because while the direct East-West
challenges
posed by the Cold War no longer exist, we are challenged by the chaos existing
throughout
the former Soviet Union combined with and by the enormous military might its
successor
republics inherited. Also, the fall of the communist government in Moscow has
unleashed
long-standing ethnic, territorial, and economic disputes both among its former
republics
and throughout many of its former neighbors. In greater numbers these republics
are
resorting to violence to settle their disputes and if conflicts go unchecked,
or if
confrontations
were to involve the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction, a regional
conflict
could quickly develop a global character.
The breakup of the USSR created 15
politically independent republics. While most
attempted
to maintain some unity through the rapidly created Commonwealth of
Independent
States (CIS), many have demonstrated they are not interested in maintaining
either
close economic or military ties. Instead they are trying to lay claim to the
few
"riches"
the Soviet Union had acquired, including its massive military structure. This
has
created
a situation of great uncertainty for the West because the CIS, primarily the
Russian
Federation,
remains a nuclear superpower that has been in the midst of a political and
economic
revolution since 1991 -- a situation unparalleled in history.
Of the 15 republics that comprise the
territory of the former Soviet Union, the
Russian
Federation is clearly the most significant and has become the de facto
replacement
for
the Soviet Union in the international arena. It is the largest former Soviet
republic,
consisting
of 76 percent of its territory, 51 percent of its population, and 62 percent of
its
industrial
output. (19:26) However, unlike the past 75 years, the role of its armed
forces,
still
the largest in Europe, is not clearly defined.
Created by presidential decree on 7 May
1992, the Russian military has been beset
by
a multitude of transitional problems which are compounded by political
instability and
the
deteriorating economic situation in the Russian Federation and CIS. Within these
conditions,
the military is attempting to articulate a new doctrine and force structure
designed
to lead the Russian Federation into the next century. Given the uncertainty of
the
political
situation within Russia, it is critical we understand the capabilities of the
military
and
what it views as its primary doctrine.
During late May 1992, the new Russian
Defense Ministry held a four-day
conference
in Moscow at the General Staff Academy to define the underlying threats to the
Russian
state, its political-military doctrine, and how the force structure should be
comprised.
(11:1) Leading theorists were assembled and the conference was chaired by
General
of the Army P. Grachev, the newly installed Russian Federation Minister of
Defense. Results from this conference were made
public in July 1992 when the
presentations
given were published in Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought), the monthly
journal
of the CIS Armed Forces. (8:56) The principles agreed to at this conference
will
set
the course for the Russian military until after the turn of the century,
including its
structure,
general types of weaponry, doctrine, strategy, operational art, and tactics.
(11:1)
The key tenets of Russia's new military
policy discussed at this conference ranged
from
continued acceptance of Mikhail Gorbachev's dovish philosophy of only using the
military
to prevent wars to older, more aggressive philosophies previously used by pre-
Gorbachev
governments. Today's Russian military
leadership, like virtually all former
communists,
believe the main mission of the armed forces consists of maintaining the
sovereignty,
integrity, and independence of the Russian Federation; ensuring the stability
of
state institutions; and protecting the rights of Russia citizens in former
non-Russian
Soviet
republics. (10:3)
The political fundamentals of Russia's
new military doctrine finds its genesis in the
policies
of the last regime; it has formally rejected the first use of military force to
resolve
political
disputes and has announced it "will not impose its ideology on anyone and
recognizes
the preservation of peace as a priority goal." (20:3) At the same time, it
sets a
more
aggressive tone on the role and use of conventional and nuclear forces in
regional
conflicts.
In many ways the new doctrine combines
the enduring principles maintained by the
previous
communist state with traditional Russian nationalist convictions. The current
Russian
military leadership has rediscovered its pre-Gorbachev roots and is again
embracing
the beliefs developed by such legendary Soviet military strategists as Marshal
Nikolai
Ogarkov. While not a precursor of a return to the Cold War era, this new
doctrine
will
present specific challenges to the West once Russia's political and economic
situation
improves
given the forecasted size of its military and the potential that our vital
interests
inevitably
will conflict.
To understand the current state of the
Russian military and the significant changes
taking
place, it is necessary to first consider the traditional role and structure of
this
institution.
Throughout the Cold War period, military power was the main basis for the
USSR's
claim to superpower status. The military's traditionally huge size of over four
million
men and women, 200-plus maneuver divisions, four fleets, tens of thousands of
aircraft,
and powerful arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons projected a tangible symbol
of
strength
to the rest of the world, and ensured Moscow would be a player in the major
events
that unfolded in the international arena. (19:7) Its presence in Eastern Europe
served
to maintain Soviet dominance over its wartime conquests and to secure a buffer
zone
between it and what was perceived as the hostile West. The military also
provided a
conduit
for the spread of influence into the Third World through a network of military
arm
sales
and advisors which projected political influence into non-communist dominated
areas.
Domestically, the military also played a
significant role as a source of national
pride
and unity in a country of diverse nationalities and cultures. As a lasting
symbol of
the
defender of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany, the armed forces served to
maintain
a sense of unity and patriotism in a country plagued with austere economic and
social
conditions. Through universal conscription, the military functioned as a means
of
assimilating
the many diverse ethnic groups into a society dominated by Slavs.
The Soviets placed their highest priority on being prepared to
wage and win a war
with
the West, a war they viewed as the "decisive clash" between two
opposing
socioeconomic
ideologies - communism and capitalism. (11:8)
Their military doctrine
was
based upon the assumption that a war with the West would be waged on a global
scale
in
which only fundamental political and strategic goals would be pursued. They
believed
they
were encircled by an anti-Soviet coalition and any war would be waged along
most of
the
periphery of the USSR.
The changes of the political make-up in
Russia has forced a reexamination of the
military
doctrine. The very planning assumptions relied upon for the past 45 years are
no
longer
valid and must be completely revised.
Additionally, along with the collapse of the
communist-led
government in Moscow, we witnessed the breakup of the Soviet military
and
the Warsaw Pact defense alliance. As a
result, the vast strength of the military has
been
divided by the republics of the former Soviet Union and the additional security
offered
by the East European buffer states has been lost. While Russia retains the
largest
share
of the former Soviet force structure, it by no means is nearly as powerful as
the
USSR.
The military doctrine of the new Russian
leadership, as articulated during the May
1992
conference, is attempting to define its requirements based on its perception of
existing
and
future threats to Russian vital national interests. As would be expected, doctrinal
requirements
are therefore being defined using the enduring beliefs carried over from
previous
governments matched against Russia's current perceptions of its interests and
its
military
capabilities.
Since early last year, senior leaders in
Moscow have been describing Russia's "vital
national
security interests." These encompass the continued neutrality of former
Warsaw
Pact
states, the assurance that republics separating from the CIS do not become
buffer zone
for
Asian or Western European alliances, and the continued survival of Russian
capabilities
to
maintain mutually advantageous economic relations with all countries of the
Middle
East,
South Asia, and the Far East. Implicit
is the principle that Russian vessels are
guranteed
free use the world's oceans for navigation and economic activity. (20:3-4)
Moreover,
Russian nationalist leaders are attempting to force President Yeltsin to accept
a
"Monroe
Doctrine" concept as a way to permit Moscow to begin to rebuild an empire
consisting
of most of the former republics. This movement, led by Parliament Speaker
Khasbulatov,
aims to protect the 26 million ethnic Russians who live in the former non-
Russian
Soviet Republics. (20:4 and 7:A23)
The General Staff firmly endorses the
definition of vital interests used by the
current
government and believe Russia's military doctrine must clearly identity all
potential
threats,
as well as the probability future wars may erupt due to violations of these or
other
"global,
regional, or national interests of Russia." (12:59) Russian military leaders,
probably
with full agreement from their political masters, believe the very
expansiveness of
the
state pre-determines that its vital interests on the Eurasian land mass extend
from the
Atlantic
to Pacific Oceans. (20:3) Overall, they clearly view Russia as both a
continental
and
oceanic power; therefore, they believe that the military doctrine adopted by
the state
must
reflect this theme.
"Doctrine" is a term requiring
explanation, since it was used differently by Russian
and
American armed forces. In the Russian sense it represents a formal
political-military
consensus
of the external threats facing the state, the ways by which these threats are
countered,
and the resources and organization needed by the armed forces to eliminte
them.
(19:9) It is viewed as a "contract" between the government and the
military which
defines
a state-approved system of views on the essence, goals, and character of a
future
war;
on the preparation of the armed forces and the country for war; and on the
means of
conducting
war. (20:3) Ultimately, it reflects the political goals of the state, as well
as,
the
military, economic, social, and legal means of achieving these goals during a
future
war.
The new doctrine was first described by its chief architect,
Colonel-General I.
Rodionov,
Chief of the Russian General Staff Military Academy, at the May 1992
conference.
His views were based on ideas strongly endorsed by the Russian leadership,
including
General Grachev, and the leaders of the various republics of the CIS. (12:58)
This
doctrine includes some "new" approaches, but it reflects many points
found in Soviet
ideology.
(21:1146)
Grachev's doctrine identified two
primary military threats to Russia's vital interests:
the
introduction of foreign troops in adjacent states (such as the Baltic states or
former
Soviet
republics not belonging to the CIS) and/or the buildup of military forces near
Russian
borders (re former states of the Warsaw Pact). Additionally, the Russian
leadership
views violations of the "rights" of Russian citizens and persons
"ethnically and
culturally"
identified with Russia living in the other republics of the former Soviet Union
as
"a serious potential source of conflicts, specifically among former Soviet
republics."
(20:3)
According to General Rodionov, local
wars (low-intensity conflicts) are becoming
the
most probable type of warfare; however, he is equally concerned that
large-scale
conventional
wars could develop should local conflicts escalate or if adjacent nations or
alliances
use them as a pretext to mobilize and carry out large- scale aggression.
(20:4-5)
Russian
leaders are greatly concerned with the situation in southern and Asian CIS
republics,
specifically where outside influences can provoke further ethnic tensions.
Should
a foreign power be identified as instigating or exploiting ethnic divisions
within a
former
Soviet republic for its own benefit, Moscow would probably respond militarily
by
citing
a nationalist-inspired "Monroe Doctrine" as justification for
intervention. (20:4 and
7:A23)
To deal with these threats, Rodionov
described four distinct components of the
Russian
armed forces: operational-strategic
nuclear forces, a limited number of
conventional
forces in permanent readiness in the theaters to repel local low-level
aggression,
rapid-response conventional forces capable of quickly deploying to any region
to
reinforce permanently stationed forces to repel mid-level aggression, and
strategic
reserves
capable of being rapidly mobilized during a period of international tension to
conduct
lage-scale theater or global combat operations. (20:5-6)
A comparison of Russia's new doctrinal
approaches with previous Soviet doctrines
reveals
several major changes. Most importantly, the new doctrine restates older
concepts
adopted
by pre-Gorbachev Soviet governments which called for not only repelling
aggression,
but also decisively defeating any aggressor. (20:5) This is a marked change
from
the 1987 Gorbachev-inspired doctrine which focused solely on war prevention.
Its
fundamental
tenets included a defensive orientation for its basic concept of operations
("defensive
defense") combined with a belief that overall force structures should be
reduced
to the bare minimum to deter aggression ("defensive sufficiency").
(21:1146)
Gorbachev's
goal was to immediately reduce defense spending and create conditions to
further
ease the defense burden on the economy by giving the Soviet military a less
menacing
appearance to the West and China. These five principles were later reaffirmed
in
1990 and included (19:10):
* Prevention of war as the primary
function of armed forces;
* A pledge not to initiate
military actions against any state;
* A strategy only to repel an
aggressor outside existing borders;
* A pledge never to be the first
to employ nuclear weapons; and
* Rejection of the concept of
quantitative force superiority.
Gorbachev's military doctrine contrasted
markedly with that adopted by previous
Soviet
leaders. Beginning in the 1950s and lasting through the late 1970s, the basic
tenets
of
Soviet doctrine remained relatively stable. Essentially, the communist leaders
believed
the
primary threat to the Soviet Union came from the west, specifically what they
viewed
as
an American-dominated NATO alliance. They further believed any war with NATO
would
be of relatively short duration and would most likely incorporate the use of
nuclear
weapons.
Their doctrine called for the Soviet military to be capable of achieving
victory
through
the survival of the USSR combined with the defeat or neutralization of Western
governments.
(26:10-11)
By the late-1960s, Soviet statements
began to reflect the belief that any NATO-
Warsaw
Pact conflict would begin with a conventional phase, followed by an extended
nuclear
exchange. These perceptions resulted in a wide-ranging conventional force
modernization
lasting from the late-1960s through the mid-1980s. It focused on improving
the
initial survivability of Warsaw Pact conventional forces and their capability
to operate
on
either a non-nuclear or a nuclear battlefield.
Beginning in the late-1970s, due in
large part to acknowledged nuclear parity with
the
West, the Soviets began contemplating the possibility of an extended
conventional war,
and
even the possibility that a war between the two alliances might not resort to
nuclear
exchanges.
This doctrinal shift was due in part to technological developments in advanced
conventional
weaponry and the adoption by NATO of a strategy of "flexible
response."
This
greater emphasis on conventional war was reflected in continued force
modernization,
force
training, and development of a strategy designed to extend the conventional
phase of
a
conflict. Overall, doctrine had matured
to the point where neither nuclear nor
conventional
forces alone were viewed as "decisive," but each only achieved maximum
effectiveness
when used in concert.
By the early-1980s military writing
began to reflect the view that improvements in
nuclear
weaponry by both sides, specifically in accuracy and command and control
systems,
virtually eliminated the possibility that nuclear warfare was winnable and
fostered
the
theory that any conflict with NATO could be waged at conventional levels. This
was
the
area where the Soviets believed they had a "decisive" advantage over
NATO forces.
As
a result, they viewed the war's initial phase as the critical period, a theory
championed
by
Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, former Chief of the Soviet General Staff, when he
wrote in
1984:
"There is a sharp expansion in the zone of possible combat operations, and
the role
and
significance of the initial period of war, and its initial operations become
incomparably
greater."
(26:12) This emphasis was also discussed in the 1984 book, M.V. Frunze -
Military
Theorist, by Colonel General M. Gareyev, a former deputy chief of the Soviet
General
Staff and presently the leading developer of the new Russian doctrine.
In 1984 Gareyev stressed "the
initial period of war will increase further and this
may
be the main and decisive period which largely predetermines the outcome of the
entire
war."
(26:12) Despite all of the dramatic changes which have occurred since the mid-
1980s,
he reiterated this theme at the May 1992 Russian doctrine conference and
restated
his
view that Russian forces must be large enough to respond to challenges from the
west
and
conduct major, large-scale, sustainable operations from the start of any
conflict.
(10:21)
Strategists like Ogarkov and Gareyev
believed the Warsaw Pact could fight and win
a
war against NATO without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. They argued
that by
applying
conventional combat power properly it was possible to neutralize NATO's nuclear
response
mechanism and minimize the impact from the two areas where they believed
NATO
possessed an advantage over Warsaw Pact forces: air power and rapid
reinforcement
from North America. (26:12) These views were reflected throughout
doctrinal
themes and Warsaw Pact exercises through the early-to-mid 1980s.
By the mid-1980s, the Soviets had begun
to incorporate defensive operations into
their
overall offensive strategy. This was done in response to what they perceived as
the
West's
adoption of offensive concepts, such as Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) and
AirLand
Battle, as well as the modernization of NATO's conventional forces under
President
Reagan's leadership. Warsaw Pact
planning thus incorporated theater-wide
defensive
operations for a short period of time until "conditions" could be
created which
would
allow for a shift to massive counter-offensive operations designed to
decisively
defeat
any aggressor.
Initially the Gorbachev government
adopted these views; but, by late-1987 the
situation
in Afghanistan and the faltering Soviet economy forced a major modification in
doctrine. The Soviets adopted a Gorbachev-inspired
defensively orientated military
doctrine
and strategy which only allowed operations designed to defeat an invasion force
and
restore pre-hostility borders. The Soviet General Staff was prohibited from
planning
operations
that would employ forces beyond its borders. (20:5) No large-scale offensive
operations
could be conducted and the Soviet military leadership was denied use of one of
its
primary employment strategies - the use of preemptive strikes to eliminate the
enemy's
initiative.
However, a comparison of the doctrine
being developed in today reflects a shiit
back
to the early-1980s and reaffirms the beliefs held by Ogarkov. Russia's new
doctrine
contrasts
with the Gorbachev doctrine in at least four respects. (8:77) First, there is a
shift
back
to traditional Soviet beliefs that the military must "repel
aggression," as well as defeat
the
opponent. This position clearly rejects
the "defensive sufficiency" and implies the
military
will not be restricted by minimizing cross-border operations. Apparently this
will
include
lifting the restrictions imposed by Gorbachev that prohibited preemptive
strikes.
The
recent shift in philosophy may be linked directly to our success in operation
DESERT
STORM.
(15:19-20)
Military scientists in Russia now argue
the Persian Gulf War validated the beliefs of
Ogarkov
-- that emerging technologies are generating a revolution in warfare and
advanced
technology
warfare now serves as the pivotal paradigm for future mid-to-high intensity
conflicts.
Currently Russian theorists submit that future wars between industrialized
states
will
consist of an "electronic-fire operation" -- an operation which will
consist of massive
and
prolonged missile, aerospace, electronic, and naval strikes conducted for
extended
periods.
(15:19) The objectives are not direct
seizure and occupation of the enemy's
territory,
but instead are aimed at "suppressing the opponent's political and
economic-
military
potentials, thereby ensuring the victor's supremacy in all arenas." (4:12)
Although
Russian military leaders do not believe Iraq could have defeated the Coalition,
they
argue Hussein should have attempted to deliver a preemptive strike against
multi-
national
forces while they were building-up their combat power and not simply have
conceded
the initiative to his enemies. (15:20)
The second departure shows Russian
leaders want to develop forces optimzed for
all
possible wars and combat missions, unlike Gorbachev who only wanted to
structure the
force
to provide strategic deterrence and to repel an invading NATO force.
Specifically,
General
Rodionov believes Russian forces must be prepared for all types of missions and
must
be capable of successfully waging any type of conflict along the spectrum of
warfare.
He
envisions light quick-reaction forces which are reinforced by heavier
formations from a
rapid
deployment force, a nuclear deterrence force, and strategic reserves.
Grachev insists Russia must have mobile,
air-transportable forces capable of
moving
to any region adjacent to Russia's borders in a short period of time. These
forces
would
counter local aggression and prevent it from escalating into medium-to-high
intensity
conflicts. Despite almost a decade in
Afghanistan, low-intensity conflict is a
relatively
new area for Russia leaders because the Soviet-led military devoted virtually
all
of
its training and resources to medium-to-high intensity conflicts. However, the
break up
of
the former Soviet Union has left a number of small ethnic conflicts raging in
Armenia-
Azerbaijan,
Tajikistan, and in other republics. Nationalists in the Russian Parliament and
military
believe sooner or later these wars will explode and ruin the Russian Federation
if
it
is not prepred to intervene. In the future we can expect greater doctrinal
emphasis on
low-intensity
conflicts designed to support the government's desires to conduct operations
to
restore internal stability and respond to localized disputes along her borders.
(20:4)
The third, and very possibly the
greatest departure from recent Soviet doctrinal
beliefs,
is rejection of the assumption nuclear war would be catastrophic for all
mankind.
Gorbachev,
with complete agreement from his military advisers, believed it was impossible
to
limit the use of nuclear weapons once introduced into a conflict. The 1987 doctrine
assumed
any nuclear exchange would "assume a global character" and attempting
to limit
the
use of nuclear weapons to a single region was untenable. (13:84-85) Yet, current
Russian
leaders question this assumption, and their most recent statements imply they
believe
it is possible to successfully wage a limited nuclear war.
Unlike Gorbachev who rejected the use of
any nuclear weapons, current Russian
leaders
support the contention "Russian armed forces must be capable of conducting
military
operations of any nature and on any scale." (20:5) Specifically, they want to
restrict
the discussion of the use of nuclear weapons to a simple pledge that Russia
would
never
attack another nation unless provoked and would not be the first to employ
weapons
of
mass destruction, including chemical, biological, or nuclear. However, they
have also
made
it clear that by any potential aggressor would make a serious mistake assuming
that
Russia
would not "employ all means it has to protect its interests once
attacked." (12:59)
Beyond retaining the right to use
nuclear weapons, Grachev and Rodionov support a
view
that conventional strikes on nuclear and other "dangerous" targets
within Russia are
analogous
to the use of "weapons of mass destruction" and therefore constitute
conflict
escalation.
(9:43-44) This leaves the door open for
Russia to respond with nuclear
weapons,
especially if the aggressor attacks nuclear power plants or weapons production
facilities.
(20:4) These shifts in views of nuclear warfare most likely stem from the
leadership's
response to the growing proliferation of nuclear weapons on Russia's borders,
specifically
in Iran and Iraq, which increase the plausibility of a limited exchange
scenario.
Finally, Gorbachev's doctrine of
"sufficiency" meant that no large-scale offensive
or
counter-offensive operations could be mounted by Soviet forces. This view has been
rejected. As proposed, Russian doctrine will
"clearly and unequivocally reflect the
position
that if an enemy has begun aggression, conflict prosecution must proceed from
the
laws
of warfare." (20:5) In other
words, if Russian vital interests are threatened, the
armed
forces will conduct military operations aimed at destroying and defeating the
enemy
no
matter where located. General Rodionov unambiguously specifies these strikes
will be
directed
against the aggressor's territory and his most important military and economic
targets.
(20:5)
Overall, what should be apparent is that
the doctrine being adopted by Russia is not
revolutionary
but evolutionary and reflects themes present throughout Russian and Soviet
history.
While currently constrained by economic realities, the Russian government is
setting
the stage for a potentially more aggressive military posture five-to-ten years
in the
future,
especially along its periphery where some nationalist leaders want to restore
the
grandeur
of previous Russian empires.
Following the break up of the former
Soviet Union, three major military powers
emerged:
Belorus, the Ukraine, and Russia. Of these three republics, only Russia
retained
both
the forces and support structure necessary to maintain large, modern forces.
Following
the forced division of the former Soviet military, Russia retained
approximately
65
percent of maneuver elements and combat aircraft, over 75 percent of strategic
nuclear
weapon
delivery systems and naval vessels, in addition to control of all tactical
nuclear
weapons.
(19:32 and 51) Beyond simply retaining control of most fielded weapons, Russia
has
90 percent of all combat aircraft plants, 85 percent of the armored vehicle
production
facilities,
80 percent of military educational institutions, plus virtually all scientific
and
research
facilities. (24:57) Obviously, should Belorus and/or the Ukraine attempt to
chart
an
independent defense policy, they would either have to invest billions in the
development
of
support structures or become dependent upon other nations, such as France, to
acquire
equipment
to replace existing Soviet-produced systems.
It is a current Russian policy to
develop a mutual defense relationship with the other
republics
of the CIS. This position was stated by
General Rodionov and endorsed by
Defense
Minister Grachev, as well as Marshal of Aviation Shaposhnikov, the current CinC
CIS
Combined Armed Forces. They perceive
this new security arrangement as being
based
upon a NATO model while integrating existing Soviet-based structures. (20:4)
Although
this concept has been embraced by some republics, several critical ones, such
as
the
Ukraine, have rejected the principle. Until a mutual defense relationship is
established
among
all primary former Soviet republics, Shaposhnikov believes "centralized
direction
and
unified control of strategic forces...coordinated responses to local conflicts
on the
borders
of the Commonwealth...or joint troop operations in repelling large-scale
aggression"
against CIS states is impossible. (24:58)
Consequently, until the political
differences
between CIS members are resolved or the Commonwealth matures into a
stronger
institution, Russia will continue to develop its own independent defense policy
and
military
structure.
Given this situation, the Russian
Defense Ministry, under specific direction from
President
Yeltsin, has developed a basic strategy to transition the Russian-controlled
elements
of the Soviet military structure into the Russian Federation Armed Forces.
(12:60)
This reform will initially take place in three stages over the next 6-8 years.
In the
first
stage (1-2 years), the Ministry of Defense will finalize doctrinal concepts and
establish
force
structures. The second phase (2-3 years)
will emphasize the final withdrawal of
remaining
forces outside of Russian territory, establishment of "three strategic
force
groupings,"
and reduce the overall manpower total to 2.1 million. The final stage (3-4
years)
will complete the restructuring of the military force while reducing total
strength to
1.5
million by 2000. (12:61)
According to General Rodionov, the
Russian military not only must reorganize, but
it
must also improve its ability to wage modern warfare. In his view the force
must move
toward
qualitative improvements by giving top priority to developing new and more
effective
means of warfare, specifically aerospace weapons, precision guided weapons,
modern
command and control systems, and reconnaissance equipment. (20:5) Defense
Mister
Grachev agrees with this position and stated:
...[the] priority must be given to
development of highly mobile forces,
strategic arms, air defense weapons,
military-space weapons, long-
range precision weapons, army aviation,
and reconnaissance, EW, and
command and control equipment.
..........................................................................
...our theory of conducting military
operations in continental theaters
bears an infantry-tank character... we
must increase the role of offensive
weapons and other including precision
weapons... and bring it [method
of warfare] into line with today's
demands. (11:60-61)
In summary, while the risk of
large-scale East-West conventional war is minimal,
Russia
leaders are intent upon developing a doctrine to lead them into the next
century.
They
are rediscovering pre-Gorbachev themes by embracing beliefs advocated by
earlier
theorist,
including Marshal Ogarkov. Russia's 1992
doctrine proceeds from a stance
requiring
civilian-military consensus on the requirements for war and the future
directions
for
near- and long-term developments of Russian military strategy and force
structure.
Russia's
new doctrine is moving simultaneously in two directions: modernizing tenets
dealing
with mid-to-high intensity warfare while creating doctrinal guides to improve
Russia's
capability to prosecution low intensity regional conflicts.
For the near-term, we will see a Russian
transition from a large, relatively
unwieldy
force structure designed to engage NATO forces to a smaller, more mobile and
modern
military capable of waging conflict across the spectrum of warfare. At the same
time,
while Russia wants to retain and strengthen its ability to fight
high-intensity, global
warfare,
it is also more aware of the troubling problem of local wars. It recognizes its
need
to improve its ability to stress nationalist, religious, or ethnic-based low
intensity
conflicts,
either within Russian territory or in areas directly adjacent to it.
To contend with these problems Moscow
intends to develop four distinct
components
for its armed forces:
* Global and theater nuclear deterrence
forces
* A limited number of permanent forces
stationed in one of three regions to repel
low-intensity
aggression
* Mobile reserves consisting of light
"quick reaction forces" reinforced by heavier
"rapid
deployment forces" to augment regional forces to repel mid-intensity
aggression
* Strategic reserves mobilized to
respond to a broad-based, high-intensity threat
While Russia will continue to retain a
formidable force structure through the end of
this
decade, the greatest challenges for the west will probably be in the
long-term. To
support
the new military doctrine under development, Defense Minister Grachev is
calling
for
the development of advanced technology to prepare for the "technological
wars" of the
future.
These types of weapons, when combined with an aggressive foreign policy, will
create
direct challenges for the west.
The future of Russia's economy and
defense industry, as well as the nature of its
political
leadership, will determine if and when Russia will implement the
future-oriented
aspects
of its doctrine; however, the current leadership believes an economically
stable,
renewed,
and prospering Russia needs a military capability governed by a revived
doctrine
to
ensure long-term survival and protection of vital interests.
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