Peacekeeping
Is Training For War
CSC
1993
SUBJECT
AREA - Training
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:
Peacekeeping is Training For War.
Author:
Major Robert J. Heatly, Royal Marines
Thesis:
Military support for national goals short of war does, in many cases, provide
realistic,
practical and relevant training for combat.
Background: Many military officers and analysts argue
that participation in certain forms
of
low intensity conflict, such as peacekeeping, can be detrimental to the
military's combat
effectiveness.
Deployment on such missions can lead to a reduction in conventional
training
excessive time spent away from the home base and a subsequent negative effect
on
morale. On the other hand, these forms of military operations have, not only
positive,
but
training enhancing aspects to consider as well. The British counter-insurgency
experiences,
gained through 25 years of peacekeeping operations in Northern Ireland, have
demonstrated
that all the operational functions can be enhanced by relevant and realistic
training
achieved on operations. Centralized planning and decentralized execution are
practiced
daily with a resulting high standard of junior leadership and a coordinated
intelligence
system. British military forces have not been found lacking over the past 25
years,
having successfully participated in almost the full spectrum of conflict from
general
war
to humanitarian assistance. This success has been enhanced by their experiences
of
peacekeeping
rather than despite it.
Recommendations: Military officers and analysts should
acknowledge the positive aspects
of
peacekeeping operations.
OUTLINE
Thesis:
Rather than reducing effectiveness, military support for national goals short of
war
does,
in many cases, provide realistic, practical and relevant training for combat.
Despite
certain
disadvantages, experiences gained conducting peacekeeping operations enhance
all
of
the operational functions and provide commanders with sound practice in
centralized
planning
and decentralized execution.
I.
Outline of the British Army's deployed forces
II.
The counter argument
A. Reduction in training
B. Overstretch and the British military drawdown
C. Morale
III.
How peacekeeping enhances the operational functions
A. Maneuver
B. Mobility
C. Tempo
D. Intelligence
E. Surprise
F. Logistics
G. Leadership
IV.
Other recent British military experiences
A. General and limited war
B. Peacemaking, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance
PEACEKEEPING IS TRAINING FOR WAR
by Major Robert
J. Heatly, Royal Marines
Today, some 11,500 regular British
troops and 6,200 members of the Royal Irish
Regiment
are serving in support of the civil power in Northern Ireland. The young men of
all
three British services continue the relentless battle against terrorism on the
streets, in the
countryside,
in the air and on the sea. This battle is a test of tolerance, nerves,
endurance
and
sound leadership.
The modern approach to defeating terrorism
has changed much since the start of
the
current round of problems in 1968. The arrogant and occasionally heavy-handed
techniques
of the early days have given way to a subtle and calculated approach; the
modern
way places more exacting demands on the peace keepers. The serviceman has to
take
on the role of policeman, diplomat, social worker and customs officer as well
as the
more
conventional role of combatant.
For the Royal Marines the dilemma is
similar to that of the infantry. We train our
recruits
and young officers to be warriors who have the capability to deploy combat
power
to
achieve military aims by aggressive means. Do we then ask too much of these
young
men
by placing them under the microscope and demanding that they run the gauntlet
of the
media
and politicians every time there is a complex incident in Northern Ireland?
Perhaps
more
importantly, is it irresponsible of our leaders to allow warfighting skills to
deteriorate
during
the conduct of missions involving control, caution and compassion when these
skills
could
be called upon at any time to deal with a conventional contingency? These
arguments
concentrate on the disadvantages of service in Northern Ireland and fail to
consider
the overall benefits to be gained from operations in the province. Rather than
reducing
effectiveness, military support for national goals short of war does, in many
cases,
provide
realistic, practical and relevant training for combat.
For the British Army and the Royal
Marines there are three principal problem areas
associated
with service in Northern Ireland. The length of time spent there, particularly
for
infantrymen,
leads to a reduction in conventional training and these two factors combine to
contribute
to a subsequent reduction in morale.
At present there are six resident
battalions in Northern Ireland, that is to say they
would
be based there in normal circumstances. Four battalions serve six-month
roulement
tours,
normally based in the "harder areas," and there are seven battalions
of the Royal
Irish
Regiment (full-time and part-time members of the former Ulster Defence
Regiment).
In
addition there are presently two additional infantry battalions deployed for a
shorter, but
as
yet undermined, period.(1)
Although training time is allocated
within the programs of the resident battalions,
in
reality the main focus of the unit is on its primary mission. Leadership and individual
training
does take place but normally very little in the way of collective training.
For the roulement battalions the
situation is different. The unit's focus is entirely on
the
job in hand and almost no conventional trail takes place during the six-month
deployment
due to the high tempo of the patrolling program. Soldier's memories of rural
tours
in the border areas of Fermanagh or South Armagh tend to comprise mainly of
battling
with thorn hedges and bogs with little concrete evidence of success before
returning
to their bases mentally irritable and physically drained. In addition, the
number
of
specialist skills required by the roulement unit forever increase. For 45
Commando
Royal
Marines to deploy to South Armagh in 1991 it took 50 man-training days, the
majority
spent away from the unit's home base location.
The British Army is reducing from 55 to
38 infantry battalions by 1998. (2) This
will
include two Gurkha battalions who do not serve in Northern Ireland. The three
Royal
Marines
Commandos join the infantry battalions in the Emergency Tour Plot (ETP), which
is
the program for deployment of units on roulement tours to Northern Ireland and
Belize
(where
one infantry battalion is deployed) as well as to Cyprus and the Falkland
Islands
(where
fully manned infantry battalions are not deployed.) The management of the ETP
has
a requirement for a minimum interval of 24 months between emergency tours but
this
is
becoming harder to fulfill. The potentially long term British military
involvement in the
former
Yugoslavia can only add to this overstretch.
Morale is another problem area. If
fighting terrorism was merely a case of shooting
gunmen,
life would be simple. The complexities of the terrorist machine the British
Army
faces
are immense. The soldier has to endear himself to the local population one
moment
and
at the same time be equally prepared to open fire; these two facets do not
provide an
environment
which is tactically sound. The terrorists are well versed in manipulating
events,
often via the media. Following an incident the press will cover controversial
statements
by so-called "eye witnesses" to counter a legitimate action by the
security forces.
As
the matter is sub judice, the Army Information Service and the Police Press
Desk are
unable
to expand on short press releases, leading to much speculation. The soldiers
involved
then see the national newspapers running dubious interpretations of events and,
at
times,
seriously questioning the integrity and actions of the soldiers concerned. It
is
difficult
for an 18-year-old soldier to understand why the press is making out that he is
a
murderer
and why his leaders do not appear to defend him in public.
It has been several years since there
were more than 100 murders in Northern
Ireland
in any single year. Irish American columnist Kevin Cullen of the Boston Daily
Globe
noted that he was more at risk working at home because "there were almost
twice as
many
murders in Boston than in Northern Ireland last year, even though Boston has
just
one
third of the population." (3:87) Whilst it is true that terrorist tactics
have tended to
avoid
attacks on the general public within the province, the serviceman remains a
"valid"
target.
This creates a dilemma for soldiers and the stress of living and working in
this
atmosphere
can sometimes affect morale.
These problem areas evolving from the
peacekeeping role are real and should not
be
understated, however, a similar analysis is required of the more positive side
of the
situation.
Let us look at the role in the context of the operational functions.
Maneuver is the employment of forces to
secure an advantage or leverage over the
enemy
to accomplish the mission. Tactical maneuver aims to gain an advantage in
combat,
however,
operational maneuver impacts beyond the realm of combat as it aims to reduce
the
amount of fighting necessary to accomplish the mission. (4:64) With only around
17,000
regular and part-time troops this function is exercised regularly in the
planning and
execution
of operations. The British Government bases it's security strategy on the three
tiers
of deterrence, reassurance and attrition. The "quick fix" approach of
the army in the
early
70's leaned too heavily on the third tier but as the campaign has progressed a
more
balanced
approach has been developed. Political and military leaders strive to keep
security
in
perspective alongside political, economic and social strategies in the war
against the
terrorist.
Confrontation with the civilian population is not what is required and there is
a
constant
challenge to commanders at all levels to maneuver their forces in such a way as
to
satisfy
all three tiers.
Mobility, the second function, is a key
ingredient in maneuver. The capability to
move
from place to place while retaining the ability to perform the mission is
vital. (5)
Heavy
use of helicopters by significant forces provides operational mobility and
these
assets
are put to good use in Northern Ireland with 45% of the Royal Air Force's
helicopter
hours
taking place there. (1) Due to the terrorist's possession of surface to air
missiles and
heavy
machine guns (three helicopters have been shot down or sustained serious hits
in the
past
three years) no better training scenario could be produced for our pilots or
planners.
Tempo is a rate or rhythm of activity.
(6:72) The mobility prodded by support
helicopters
and vehicles allows for multiple tactical actions to be undertaken in rapid
succession
in support of local operations. In addition, rapid response to potential
situations
often
stops them before they can develop. At certain times in Northern Ireland,
troops
work
at a high tempo for sustained periods which tests the endurance of men and
equipment--another
facet of combat that is difficult to stimulate in peacetime.
Intelligence is without doubt the key
function in a peacekeeping or insurgency
operation.
In Northern Ireland, as in most other similar situations, the Government forces
are
clearly unbeatable in the field. The problem is that this is not a match-up
that will ever
take
place. Defeat of the British Government's present aims could only ever come
about
through
the democratic process or public opinion. As a result the silent, intelligence
war
continually
moves on at a high tempo. The cards that intelligence collectors, collators,
analysts
and operators play with may be different, but the mental and physical processes
of
assessing
the opposition's capabilities are the same as for war. When we fight we fight
to
win.
Another key facet of the intelligence
war in Northern Ireland is the experience that
is
being gained daily in terms of inter-agency cooperation. As terrorists are
legally
criminals
with no special privileges, the lead agency on a day to day basis is the
Special
Branch
(SB) of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). They liaise at every level with
military
intelligence personnel in the planning of joint operations. At the highest
level the
Prime
Minister has appointed a Director and Coordinator of Intelligence (DCI) who is
the
right
hand man of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland regarding intelligence
matters.
He takes the lead in strategic intelligence and provides the Chief Constable of
the
RUC
and the Army's General Officer Commanding with advice on, or taskings for,
national
intelligence assets. Military forces are used in a wide variety of levels of
conflict,
often
as part of the diplomatic process, and inter-agency operations could be as much
a
feature
of the 90's as joint operations were of the 80's.
Surprise is a state of disorientation
which is the result of unexpected events and
which
degrades ability to react effectively. (7:75) Surprise, be it the product of
deception
or
speed of mobility, is as important in Northern Ireland as in general war.
Troops have
been
deployed in support of the police for nearly 25 years and commanders have to
work
hard
not to fall into the "same old routine." Deterrence, as mentioned
earlier, is one of the
three
tiers of the British security policy and random helicopter inserted patrols and
snap
vehicle
check points are among the methods used to contribute to this tier through
surprise.
As in general war, logistics often
determines what is and is not possible. Certain
security
force bases on the borders of South Armagh are only resupplied by air to avoid
the
manpower-intensive
and pattern-producing route clearances required by convoys.
Resources
may not be as limited; however, responsiveness and anticipation are as
important
as ever.
Leadership is the personal ability to
influence the performance of others in pursuit
of
a goal. (8:82) In Northern Ireland, the difficulties of identifying the enemy
lead to
uncertainty.
With inexperienced or poorly led troops this can in turn lead to one of the
extremes
of under-or over-reaction. The stakes are different--one fatality can mar an
otherwise
faultless six-month tour of the province--but the ability to energize and unify
the
efforts
of groups of men continues and the "loneliness of command" syndrome
can weigh
heavily
on some commanders' shoulders. The campaign in Northern Ireland is a classic
example
of centralized planning and decentralized execution. At the tactical level fire
teams
operate independently either as the principal or supporting element of a patrol
of
about
half-platoon strength. This has tested the corporals and lieutenants to a high
level
and
these junior leaders, with their operational experience, are seen as one of the
strengths
of
the British Army.
The United Kingdom has participated in
military operations overseas throughout
the
past 25 years whilst the problems in Northern Ireland have persisted. These
operations
have
covered almost the full spectrum of conflict, from general war to humanitarian
assistance,
and on no occasion has its armed forces been found lacking. In Northern
Ireland
a peak occurred in the level of violence in 1981, during the IRA's hunger
strike
campaign,
when ten convicted terrorists died in prison due to self-imposed starvation.
Despite
an increase in troop levels over the following months, Britain was able to
mount a
large
scale amphibious operation to recapture the Falkland Islands, some 8,000 miles
from
home
bases. Junior leadership was again cited as a key factor and a large proportion
of the
landing
force had previously served in the province. Likewise in the war in Southwest
Asia,
a large number of the British troops had Northern Ireland experience.
By definition contingency operations
occur at short notice. This was again the case
when
the Royal Marines' 3rd Commando Brigade was deployed to carry out relief
operations
in northern Iraq, as part of the multi-national coalition, in April 1991. These
operations
were essentially humanitarian in nature, but due to the threat, significant
combat
power
was included lest robust peacemaking became necessary. Reassurance to the Kurds
and
deterrence to the Iraqis were features of the operation that were nothing new
to the
British
servicemen. Robin Ross, the Royal Marines General in command of the British
forces
stated "that our experience in internal security operations gave us an
excellent
understanding
of how to cope with the problems in a highly volatile situation." (9:208)
A
volatile
situation is exactly what the 2,000 British troops deployed in the former
Yugoslavia
are
facing now.
Participation in peacekeeping operations
is not as alienated from conventional
combat
as some would have us believe. When planning to conduct these operations,
degradation
of skills in certain specialist skills in areas such as armor, artillery and
fixed-
wing
aviation may be unavoidable, but the overall military functions can be tested
at all
levels
to a greater or lesser degree.
In whatever form it comes, leadership is
leadership, teamwork is teamwork and
operational
planing is operational planning. Morale can be affected by excessive or
unnecessary
separation but when a real job is there to be done, when real danger is a
possibility
or when a noble cause is being engaged in with the benefits clearly visible,
servicemen
are not only happy to do the job but will receive realistic training for their
primary
mission. Outside the combat zone, the decision-making and logistic processes
during
conventional military operations are not that dissimilar to those for
peacekeeping for
the
military and civilian high commands. Sometimes the matter of training needs to
be
considered
for them as well as for the foot soldier.
Defense of the national security rests
first with the concept of deterrence and
secondly
with winning the nation's wars. Military support for national goals short of
war,
be
it general military service to the nation or any of a wide range of actions
abroad in
support
of foreign policy, should not be viewed as a problem in itself. On the other
hand it
can
be looked at more as a training exercise, providing relevant and realistic
training to the
military,
however undesirable the overall situation is. As long as specialist training is
not
forgotten
and the military keeps the flexibility to change roles quickly, most
operational
functions
can be enhanced by the experience gained during peacekeeping operations.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Milne, Major S. S. Military Situation
Briefing. Headquarters Northern Ireland. 15
February 93.
2. The British Army Of The Future. Pamphlet
published by M.O.D. October 91.
3. Cullen, Kevin. "Northern Ireland:
Safe -- And Worth Seeing." Boston Globe 21
January 93: 87.
4. FMFM 1-1 Campaigning. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990: 64.
5. JCS Pub. 1-02. U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1987.
6. FMFM 1-1 Campaigning. U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1990: 72.
7. FMFM 1-1 Campaigning. U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1990: 75.
8. FMFM 1-1 Campaigning. U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1990: 82.
9. Ross, Maj. Gen. R. J. "Operation
Haven." The Globe and Laurel July/August
1991: 208.
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