Are U.S. Military Forces Properly Prepared For Peacekeeping?
SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy
Title: Are U. S. Military Forces Properly Prepared for Peacekeeping?
Author: Lieutenant Commander Mark B. Finch, United States Navy
Thesis: Lack of fully understanding the peacekeeping mission has pre-
vented U. S. forces from being properly prepared for peacekeeping.
Background: Government and military leaders envision an increase in
the number of peacekeeping type operations the U. S. will be involved
in. The new world order has caused a change in the priority seen for
our forces. If the armed forces are expected to perform in a peacekeep-
ing type role, they should be assigned that specific mission. The armed
forces must train to fully prepare themselves for peacekeeping and
peace-enforcing. The goal is to achieve the desired expectations and to
avoid another catastrophic loss of life, as was experienced by the
Marines in Beirut.
Recommendations: The armed forces should train with the different
government departments and in a combined environment for the differ-
ent types of peacekeeping roles. They must develop a training program
which provides for a larger cultural, linguistic, and political base of
knowledge for our forces, keying on lessons learned from past peacekeep-
ing and peace-enforcing missions.
Are U.S. Military Forces Properly Prepared For
Thesis: Lack of fully understanding the peacekeeping mission has pre-
vented U. S. forces from being properly prepared for peacekeeping.
I. The peacekeeping mission
A. U.S. Doctrine
B. Peacekeeping operations and tasks
C. Authorization of the President
D. Historical peacekeeping efforts
1. UN sponsored missions
2. U. S. sponsored missions
E. Prospect for future operations
1. Presidential intentions
2. CINCLANTFLT intentions
II. Problems in peacekeeping
A. Rules of engagement
B. Remaining neutral
D. Language barriers
E. Recognizing the enemy
F. Command and control of forces
G. Cultural and political differences between force and host
H. What can realistically be achieved
III. Preparing for peacekeeping and peace-enforcement
A. Prioritizing for peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions
1. Specific mission area development
2. Defense policy support
3. Standards to train to
B. Training peacekeeping forces
1. Pre-arrival training
2. Arrival training
3. Post mission training and retraining
C. Training commanders for peacekeeping
1. Cultural training
2. Language training
3. Interagency training
4. Command and control with foreign and coalition commanders
5. Negotiation and mediation training
6. Wargaming peacekeeping and peace-enforcement type
D. Schools for peacekeeping forces
1. Mission related schools
2. Enhancing area level of knowledge
E. Measuring success
1. Applying lessons learned
2. Measures of success
Are U.S. Military Forces Properly Prepared For
The terrorist bombing of U. S. Marines in Beirut brought to the
forefront problems associated with a peacekeeping mission. The fact that
the mission was not well understood and was subsequently paid for by
the loss of human life, demands that we do not repeat the same mis-
take. Lack of fully understanding the mission has prevented U. S. forces
from being properly trained and prepared for the peacekeeping role. The
military must apply the lessons learned from peacekeeping operations
and properly train military forces for this mission.
ThE PEACEKEEPING MISSION
The term "peacekeeping" has been used to describe a number of
different tasks. To be consistent, the terms as defined by U. S. doctrine
will be used.
Peacekeeping - Operations using military forces and/or civilian per-
sonnel at the request of the parties to a dispute to help supervise a
cease-fire and separate the parties.
Peacemaking - Diplomatic process of arranging an end to disputes
and solving their underlying causes.
Peace-enforcement - Military intervention to forcefully restore peace
between belligerents, who may be engaged in combat. (8:GL-9)
Peacekeeping deals with situations where the parties involved request the
action to help or allow the parties to come to a resolution. Only peace-
enforcement deals with the use of force by a military power to establish
a path toward peace.
Peacekeeping Operations and Tasks
In any particular situation, the mandate describes the mission and
scope of operations for the peacekeeping force. The mandate is a doc-
ument that specifically defines the peacekeeping force's role. The scope
of any peacekeeping mission however, can be broken down into three
major areas: (1) peacekeeping support, (2) observer missions, and (3)
providing peacekeeping forces. Joint Pub 3-07. 3, Joint Tactics
Techniques and Procedures (JTTP) for Peacekeeping Operations, breaks
these areas down into "operations" and "tasks". Operations consist of
peace observation, internal supervision and assistance, and monitoring
terms of protocol. The tasks include supervision of free territories,
supervision of cease fires, supervision of withdrawals and disengage-
ments, supervision of prisoner of war exchanges, supervision of demili-
tarization and demobilization, and maintenance of law and order.
Authority of the President
The President of the United States has the authority to allocate re-
sources for peacekeeping.
Article 43 of the United Nations (UN) Charter, June 1945, called for
all member states to make armed forces available to the Security
Council to maintain international peace and security. The Congress,
in turn, granted the President authority under Section 7 of the UN
Participation Act of 1945 (P. L. 79-264), as amended, to detail up to
1,000 U.S. armed forces personnel to the UN in any noncombatant
capacity and to furnish and/or loan facilities, services, supplies, and
equipment to the UN. (2:30)
The President can authorize assistance outside the UN as well.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, codified in Title 22,
U. S. Code, authorizes the President to furnish assistance to friendly
countries and international organizations for peacekeeping operations
and other programs accomplished to further U. S. national security
Historical Peacekeeping Efforts
Peacekeeping is not a new mission. The UN alone has established 25
peacekeeping operations throughout the world since 1948. The peace-
keeping force concept was initiated in 1956 when the UN Emergency
Force (UNEF) was established to supervise the disengagement of forces
after the invasion of Egypt by Great Britain, France, and Israel in the
Suez War. (2:1-2)
Other multinational peacekeeping forces have also enjoyed some
success. The League of Arab States created an Arab League Force to go
into Kuwait in 1961 to preserve Kuwait's independence and integrity.
This force also facilitated British troop withdrawal from Kuwait. (2:1-2)
The Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, reports as of
November 1992, there are 13 UN sponsored operations with eight more
being proposed. Two operations are being conducted in the former
Soviet Union with three more being proposed. There are three non-UN,
non-Soviet sponsored peacekeeping operations currently in place.
To date, the U.S. has participated in UN sanctioned peacekeeping
operations primarily with material, financial, and general service sup-
port. The U. S. established the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)
in 1979 to serve on peacekeeping duties in the Sinai. In 1982, the U.S.
joined in a Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut to oversee the evacua-
tion of Palestine Liberation Organization guerrillas from Lebanon and
later returned to establish a presence in support of the Lebanese gov-
ernment. Since operations in Lebanon U. S. peacekeeping efforts have
been curtailed and only more specific, mission-oriented operations have
In order for a peacekeeping mission to work well, the following cri-
teria should be met:
a. Consent and cooperation of the authorities of the parties in the
b. An effective and responsive logistics support system, ready and
able to respond from the start of the operation.
c. A clear, restricted and realistic mandate, with specified rules of
engagement, understood by the chain of command.
d. Sufficient freedom of movement for the force to carry out their
e. An effective command, control, and communications (C3) sys-
f. Balanced, impartial and non-coercive forces, well trained in the
equipment they will be using and well briefed on the political situa-
tion, cultural background, religion, and have minimum language
skills in the host nation they will be placed into.
g. An effective and responsive all-source intelligence gathering ca-
Prospect for Future Operations
President Bush clearly wanted to expand the supporting role in
peacekeeping the U. S. played internationally and in support of the UN,
as indicated in his address to the 47th session of the UN General
Assembly on 21 September, 1992. He directed the Secretary of Defense
to ". . . place a new emphasis on peacekeeping." This includes
". . . training of combat, engineering and logistical units. . .", working
with the United Nations to ". . . best employ our considerable lift, logis-
tics, communications and intelligence capabilities to support peacekeeping
operations. . . ", and offering our ". . . capabilities for joint simulations and
exercises. . . ." Bush ". . . directed the establishment of a permanent
peacekeeping curriculum in U. S. military schools . . ." and offered U. S.
". . . bases and facilities for multinational training and field exer-
cises. . . . " (4:1-7)
Admiral Miller, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, also
sees expanded operations in the area of peacekeeping.
Consistent with the new national security strategy, the future-
oriented missions to explore and expand are:
-- Participation in peace-promoting, peace-making, peacekeep-
ing, and peace-enforcing activities as directed by our government or
in support of coalition or international organizational diplomatic ini-
It is unclear whether President Clinton will adopt Bush's desire to
participate more fully in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations;
however, it is clear that the issue needs to be openly discussed and the
military's role resolved as the U. S. remains the superpower others will
look to for guidance.
PROBLEMS IN PEACEKEEPING
Problems inherent to peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations
involve: (1) remaining neutral, (2) developing, understanding, and
carrying out the proper rules of engagement (ROE), (3) dealing with
terrorist activities, (4) overcoming language barriers, (5) recognizing the
enemy, (6) developing command and control of forces, (7) recognizing
and dealing with cultural differences between the host and the force,
(8) understanding what can realistically be achieved, and (9) realizing
the impact of political actions on the military force. The basic tenet of
peacekeeping, under the strict definition, is readily taken on, is cheap,
and the elements used to conduct peacekeeping are welcomed by the
parties involved. However, the peace-enforcement role is difficult,
costly, and usually not very successful. For instance, the introduction
of forces into a state violates the sovereignty of that state. One may be
able to conduct a peace-enforcement mission by introducing forces into a
country, however one may not be able to resolve the resulting political
Rules of Engagement
The ROE in effect at the time of the bombing of the Marine Battalion
Landing Team (BLT) Headquarters building may have been a factor in
the resultant loss of life. Consequently, the terrorists won a major po-
litical victory against the U. S. superpower and caused a significant loss
of credibility for U. S. effectiveness in peacekeeping abilities. The Long
Commission implied that the dual set of ROE used between the Marines
at the airport (ROE as written down on a white card and followed by
the Marines of the BLT) and the U. S. Embassy (ROE as written down
on a blue card and followed by Marines of the BLT serving at the
Embassy) contributed to a mind-set which detracted from the readiness
of the force to respond to a terrorist threat.
The ROE must be well understood and adhered to in order to be ef-
fective. As the situation changes the commander must have the ability
to rapidly access the chain of command and obtain authorization to
modify the ROE to meet the changing circumstances. It is important to
keep the actual ROE classified so the forces against the peacekeepers or
peace-enforcers do not know what limitations the peacekeepers/enforcers
are working under.
Peacekeeping forces have no mandate to prevent violations of an
agreement by the active use of force. The use of unnecessary or illegal
force undermines the credibility and acceptability of a peacekeeping
force. It may escalate the level of violence in the area and create a
situation in which the peacekeeping force becomes part of the local
problem. The use of force must be carefully controlled and restricted in
its application through clear ROE. When the ROE authorizes the use of
force, it must be carried out with total impartiality toward all sides in
A fundamental precept for a peacekeeping force is its ability to re-
main neutral. If at any time the peacekeeping force is perceived as
showing favoritism to one side the force will lose its effectiveness and
may be seen as part of the problem. The Marines in Beirut were seen,
initially, as neutral; however, they lost that neutrality when the U. S.
openly supported the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) through the use of
the naval gunfire against belligerents in Lebanon. Once the reputation
for impartiality is compromised, the usefulness of the force in a
peacekeeping mission is greatly degraded.
Military support for one party is only one way a peacekeeping force
can lose its reputation for impartiality. As Army Lieutenant Colonel
Ayers states in his paper Peacekeeping Tactics, Techniques, and
... the importance of not passing on information concerning the de-
ployment, positions, strengths, and equipment of one side to the
other deserves special emphasis. Peacekeepers must be neutral. If
one side suspects that the peacekeeping force, either deliberately or
inadvertently, is giving information to the other, the peacekeeping
force will face accusations of espionage, and one or both parties to
the dispute may become so uncooperative as to jeopardize the success
of the operation. (2:10)
Peace-enforcing missions face similar difficulties. Whereas the
peacekeepers were invited by the parties involved, this will most likely
not be the case of peace-enforcers. If there were a desire for peace by
all involved, the need for peace-enforcers would not exist. Therefore,
at least one of the parties in the conflict desires aggression more than
peace. The peace-enforcer's actions make them partial from the start,
from the perspective of the party who desires conflict.
Terrorism poses a significant dilemma for the peacekeeper and may
result in the cancellation of a peacekeeping mission or change the scope
Terrorism poses serious problems for the peacekeeper.
Suppressive action involves a political judgment, because the man
who is labeled a terrorist by one side may be hailed as a freedom-
fighter by the other. Only police and special operating forces are
effective, and their use by a peacekeeping force is normally unac-
ceptable to a host government. It would make the peacekeepers part
of the local problem, and peacekeeping troops would offer vulnerable
retaliatory targets. Countering terrorism is outside the scope of a
peacekeeping operation. (2:10)
The official language for peacekeeping operations is English; however,
understanding the local language in order to resolve disputes at the
lowest possible level demands some familiarity with the host country's
language(s). The courtesy shown by taking the time to learn someone
else's language can go far in breaking down barriers and relieving ten-
sions between the force and the public in the host nation. Further,
having some of the troops understand the local language can reap sig-
nificant intelligence benefits. Patrols can debrief intelligence collectors on
what the local populace was saying, particularly if the host civilians are
unaware that someone on the patrol understood their conversation.
Additionally, being able to directly interpret newspapers, articles, edi-
torials, etc., may allow a much more accurate interpretation than a
local translator may provide, as there may be a reluctance to accu-
rately translate derogatory information for fear of offending force
Recognizing the Enemy
Recognizing a potential enemy member can be difficult for the
peacekeeper and peace-enforcer. Peacekeeping forces are typically from
areas far removed from the geographical area in turmoil. This increases
the force's credibility for impartiality; however, it detracts from the
ability to ascertain the differences in outward appearance between the
separate belligerent parties. This becomes even more critical for the
peace-enforcer, who must be able to differentiate the enemy from those
Command and Control of Forces
Peacekeeping forces often involve multinational forces. Forces must
understand how to work for a commander that may not be from their
original national chain of command. Proper command and control of
these forces becomes crucial to effectively carry out the specific mission.
In order to ensure agreement by all sides of the mandate, it must be
worded such that it does not favor any particular side. As a result,
the mandate may become vague and interpreted differently by the
parties in the conflict and the countries contributing to the peacekeeping
force. The military commander must then enforce this mandate
through the use of his forces. If the mandate is not clear, the specific
mission may not be clear to the force, causing confusion at each level in
the chain of command.
Command and control problems are further compounded if there is
more than one commander in the theater.
The most effective command relationship has one force headquarters
and one force commander responsible for the peacekeeping operation.
The force commander has operational control over US military units
assigned to the peacekeeping force, to include directive authority for
logistics (less airlift and sealift) and has general responsibility to en-
sure parent forces take all necessary action for the good order and
discipline of the force. (8:III-3)
When the commander finds himself working for more than one chain
of command, confusion can occur. Original service military superiors
influence the peacekeeping/enforcing commanders even though they may
not be in the direct chain of command.
The theater combatant commander can provide national support
(as required), but does not have Combatant Command, of US mili-
tary personnel assigned to a peacekeeping force. Therefore the the-
ater commander does not have authoritative direction for any aspect
of the peacekeeping operation or the military personnel assigned to
the peacekeeping force. Rather, the theater commander and staff
monitor activities of the U. S. units and provide support to them
through Service components or supporting combatant commanders,
provided the support is in accordance with the peacekeeping force's
terms of reference. The theater combatant commander may coor-
dinate with the U. S. diplomatic mission (s) and/or the Country
Team (s) in the area of conflict to provide support to the U. S. con-
tingent or other portions of the peacekeeping force. (8:III-6)
Cultural and Political Differences Between Force and Host
Cultural and political differences between the peacekeeping forces and
the host nation can lead to misunderstandings. Forces raised in a free,
democratic society that teaches equality of race, religion, sex, and
human rights tend to apply that standard to other societies. These
values are foreign or unacceptable in many other cultures.
Donald Snow, in his paper Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-
enforcement: the U. S. Role in the New International Order, points out
that other political factors come into play as well.
First, there is the nature of the situations for which military
peacemaking may be deemed relevant. Normally, they will reflect
deep-seated animosities with historical, ethnic, religious and other
hatreds that layer upon one another as countries are torn apart and
regenerated. The problems that underlay the violence that is to be
suppressed are political and ultimately solvable only through political
agreements that cannot be imposed by outsiders. (15:16-17)
What Can Realistically Be Achieved By A Military Force
Military force can most readily achieve limited, short term objec-
tives. Early successes should not be interpreted as an implication that a
force can achieve objectives beyond its abilities.
Peace-enforcement will not solve the underlying problems in most
areas of potential application. It may have been possible in 1992 to
impose a peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the insertion of
adequate force, but a cease-fire so imposed would not address the
underlying animosities. Since the peace enforcers will eventually
leave, the problems may simply revert after their departure.
. . . They may be able to create conditions favorable for follow-on
peacekeepers in some instances; in other situations, they may not.
Put another way, a short-term objective--convoying food in
Somalia--may be easily achievable. The long-term objective--a
stable authority in that country--may not be.
Military force can act as a precondition for enduring peace
(short-term objective); it cannot create such a peace (long-term
The situation can change. The initial objective may be achievable
under certain circumstances; however, if there is a significant shift in
the conditions, the initial objective may no longer be achievable. For
instance, the Marines in Beirut readily established a presence by foot
patrols through the town; as the political situation deteriorated, this was
no longer possible without risking casualties. A less visible presence re-
sulted as the forces were required to become more defensive for self
PREPARING FOR PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE-ENFORCEMENT
Prioritizing for Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcement Missions
What American leaders expect and want the military to do must be
clarified and prioritized. Given the cut-backs and the new world order,
what are the roles and missions the military will have to perform? The
Secretary of Defense and his assistants must drive the issue to refine
long term, specific roles and missions for the armed forces. The relative
priorities among the missions must be determined (i.e., how much of
the training and work-up budget goes toward a specific mission?). With
this known, a training program can be established to train to meet the
requirements. War-fighting may take on a less significant role now
that the cold war is over. Peacekeeping and peace-enforcement opera-
tions may replace war-fighting as the priority. If so, then further
restructuring of the forces may be necessary to place more emphasis on
non-combat type forces (i.e., combat service support, military police,
nation building, humanitarian assistance, negotiation and mediating type
In the new world order, we must be careful to train for the missions
assigned in the priority given, not what the priority was during the cold
war. Many feel that the military's current training and the inherent
flexibility of the forces are sufficient to handle any mission and that
peacekeeping/enforcing operations and tasks are just extensions of what
the military already does and trains to do as war-fighters. But, if
war-fighting takes a secondary role behind peacekeeping or peace-
enforcement, then training standards for a portion of the armed forces
should shift to emphasize the evolutions that directly pertain to peace-
keeping/enforcement operations and tasks.
Training Peacekeeping Forces
Peacekeeping forces require specialized training to be able to shift
their focus from being combatants where force may be readily used, to
soldiers who either do not use force or use force only in self defense. It
is critical that the peacekeeping force be able to set up quickly and
operate well, or the host nation may lose confidence in the force. (7:78)
Major Ralf Schutte, the Canadian Liaison Officer, Marine Base,
Quantico, attributes the success of Canadian peacekeeping efforts to
training centered on a well-trained force for combat. Just prior to
deploying, the unit receives specialized training at all levels for two
weeks to a month, for the area of operations. (14)
Although several documents emphasize the need for specialized
training, Lt. Col. Ayers summarizes the requirements.
Peacekeeping calls for an adjustment of attitude and approach by the
individual to a set of circumstances different from those he would
normally find on the field of battle--an adjustment to suit the needs
of a peaceable intervention rather than an enforcement action . . . .
Good leadership at every level is absolutely essential. Training should
concentrate on individual military skills. Specifically, operating
checkpoints and observation posts, patrolling, map reading, weapons
and equipment identification, culture, language, habits, religion, and
characteristics of the local indigenous personnel, environment sur-
vival classes, first aid, civil disturbance training, rules of engage-
ment, search and seizure techniques, legal considerations, air-mobile
operations, explosive ordnance recognition (primarily land mines),
field sanitation and hygiene, communications, civil-military opera-
tions, NBC training . . . . Mission-oriented training should be conducted
prior to deployment. Include orientation of a unit to conduct oper-
ations in a multinational or as a unilateral peacekeeping force. The
unit must clearly understand its place in the force, its objectives,
and the implications of its presence in the force. (2:67)
The Army trains its Military Police to support roles similar to
. . . primary focus areas for Military Police (MP) training:
- Task and skill proficiency.
- Understanding the human dimension/attitudinal development.
- Camaraderie and team building.
- Leadership competence.
. . . Understanding the human dimension/attitudinal development
teaches the dynamics of dealing with people across the domestic and
international cultural spectrum, as well as instilling the core values
such as fairness, patience, compassion and caring, which become
pivotal determinates of success in situations of stress, conflict, con-
flict resolution and deterrence, and so many of the other-than-war
Upon arrival in the theater of operations, leaders must quickly learn
the politics at play as well as the habits, characteristics and customs of
the indigenous people. When new forces arrive in theater they should
be briefed and kept up to date on the following points:
- Status of forces agreement or legal documents.
- Rules of engagement.
- The potential threat.
- Closing checkpoints to prevent entry into a buffer zone.
- How to act in foreseeable emergencies when force may be used.
- How to handle individuals seeking political asylum. (16:II-18)
Training cannot stop upon arrival in-theater. Forces must hone
their skills as frequently as the mission allows. Particular attention
must be paid to ways of keeping alert and how to avoid establishing a
routine which might increase the individual's susceptibility to terrorist
attack. When operating with coalition or in a multinational force,
training with other nations improve skills.
Like any force deployed for a specific mission, some military skills
will be sharper at the end of a peacekeeping deployment, whereas others
will be significantly degraded. It is necessary to retrain the force in
general combat skills to ensure overall combat readiness following a
peacekeeping operation. Post mission briefings should also be held to
determine specific characteristics of note to pass on to the relieving
Training Commanders For Peacekeeping
Troops involved in peacekeeping must have a minimum level of
knowledge in the previously discussed areas, particularly since a major-
ity of the public in the host nation will deal with the troops, not the
officers. The officers, however, need special training in the cause, cul-
tural and political background of the conflict, and current developments
in order to make proper decisions and adequately lead the forces.
. . . the peace-enforcer must understand that even the most tactical
actions he takes (or orders) may have enormous strategic and po-
litical implications. Who is separated, how are they separated, and
where separation occurs in, say, a neighborhood, a town, or even a
street can affect local balances of power, and can implicitly align the
peace-enforcer with one side or another to the dispute. The average
soldier clearing a town or lifting a siege does not have to be con-
cerned with such matters; the peace-enforcer who does not can
change things without realizing what he is doing. In peace-en-
forcement everything is strategic. (15:31-33)
Effective command and control of multinational peacekeeping and
peace-enforcement operations requires good communication. The com-
mander must be able to effectively communicate with other nationali-
ties. If he is not familiar with the language of the other forces, he
must have liaison officers who are. Additionally, as the commander
becomes more involved with the negotiations and mediations associated
with peacekeeping/enforcing operations, linguistic skills will greatly en-
hance his effectiveness with other leaders.
As funding is cut, the draw down will require a more efficient use of
assets throughout the military, the state department, and other federal
agencies. The commander should be aware of the assets potentially
available to him. A state department representative, ambassador, or
diplomat can effectively act as a point man to facilitate negotiations and
solicit the appropriate organizations to assist in a particular operation.
Interagency organizations available are the U. S. Diplomatic Mission and
Country Team, the United Nations, U.S. and coalition embassies in the
host nation, Department of State Task Force, and the Red Cross.
Whatever organization is utilized, it is imperative that a chain of
command be established to ensure proper control of the assets, that
parties are kept informed, and that needs are being met.
Just as the language skills are important when dealing with multi-
national or coalition forces, understanding how the foreign militaries
operate can be beneficial. The more the commander knows of his allies
and of any existing cultural differences between the multinational or
coalition forces, the better the chance of integrating the forces to
achieve common goals. Likewise, a U.S. commander may find himself
subordinate to a foreign commander, and the more knowledge the U. S.
commander has of his superior's military force and tradition, the better
he will be able to serve the foreign commander and understand his in-
tent. This awareness may be enhanced effectively through coalition
command post or table top exercises.
Commanders may find themselves more involved in disputes where
they will need training in negotiating and mediating. Small unit leaders
will also need this training in order to deal more effectively with prob-
lems among the host nation's general public, thus solving problems at
the lowest possible level. Training in this area would also be beneficial
for situations where the commander is not the negotiator, but is assist-
ing a state department representative in the negotiating process.
Peacekeeping/enforcement missions are gaining more emphasis and
the professional military education system should incorporate more
training through the war-gaming of these scenarios. UN officers could
be brought in to conduct or participate in the exercises. This would
provide officers staff training in joint and coalition scenarios and better
prepare them to support their future commanders when dealing with
peacekeeping or peace-enforcing operations. These exercises should study
NATO operations carefully.
It is simply a fact that the forces of NATO's member states . . . are
among the best equipped and technologically adept in the world.
They have had the inestimable advantage of 40 years' experience in
developing a multinational operating capability--a common set of
procedures and terms for military communications, shared informa-
tion systems, common logistics and intelligence, an integrated com-
mand, mutually compatible military doctrine, and interoperable
. . . such compatible, interoperable systems are the essential in-
gredient of an efficient military force across national lines, and what
is required to develop them is common training. . . . an effective UN
enforcement capability for the 21st century will require a consider-
able commitment to planning at all command levels, interoperable
equipment, and training exercises that will help accustom the multi-
national forces to working with that equipment and (perhaps more
important) with each other. (11:35)
Schools For Peacekeeping Forces
Several schools currently exist to facilitate the training of peace-
keepers. The curriculum includes police officer training, international
logistics systems, cross-cultural communications, terrorism, and
counter-terrorism. Current training facilities should add courses in the
topics discussed here, or expand current curricula to include more de-
tailed information on peacekeeping and peace-enforcement.
One cannot expect every officer to be trained in every area of the
world or speak every language he may come across in a peacekeeping or
peace enforcement mission. However, each officer learning about a par-
ticular region would widen the base of knowledge in any given unit. A
progressive system of training could be implemented to build on previous
courses. Officers could first take a course on regional geography, fol-
lowed by the region's culture and then one or more of the region's lan-
guages. While developing a level of knowledge in a specific region, one
could become sensitive to the types of issues that may be present in
other regions and learn to ask the right questions of official regional
experts or foreign area specialists.
Because peace-enforcement operations are typically required on short
notice, some feel that ". . . a command structure should be predesig-
nated, like NATO's, to be activated at the [UN Security] Council's call in
a crisis, and operations should be run by commanders in the field."
Research by CINCLANTFLT's staff has shown that several lessons can
be learned from UN peacekeeping operations.
- Adaptive, flexible, and innovative approaches combining both
civilian and military components were the key to the resolution of
conflicts in early UN peace-keeping operations.
- When the core political or economic issues are not resolved,
peace-keeping missions, once undertaken, rarely are brought to a
quick conclusion. Mandates are extended automatically. (The
Middle East and Cyprus).
- The most recent attempts at peace-keeping operations involve
deterring acts of aggression within states. These operations have
proved more difficult than deterring act of aggression between states.
(Angola, Cambodia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Somalia). (13)
To apply these lessons we must have clear direction from the
President, Congress, state, and defense departments on the roles and
missions assigned to the military. We must have a government and
defense hierarchy that clearly understand what military forces can
achieve in a peacekeeping or peace-enforcing operation. We must have
forces, both officer and enlisted, well trained in the aspects of
peacekeeping and peace-enforcing.
Marjorie Ann Browne, Specialist in International Relations, in her
Congressional Research Service Report to Congress commented on mea-
suring success in peacekeeping operations.
Several methods or approaches might be used to measure success or
failure of UN peacekeeping operations. They include (1) determining
whether the mandate of the operation, as defined by the UN
Security Council, was fulfilled; (2) determining whether the opera-
tion led to a resolution of the underlying disputes generating the
conflict; or (3) determining whether the presence of the operation
contributed to the maintenance of international peace and security
by reducing or eliminating conflict in its area of operation. (3:19-20)
Although her report covered UN operations, it seems clear that these
could be applied to any peacekeeping or peace-enforcing operation.
If U. S. forces are to be successfuI, they must be prepared. To be
prepared, they must know the peacekeeping and peace-enforcing lessons
learned, be trained in the areas needed, and be ready to apply them to
future operations. Only then will U. S. forces be successful in peace-
keeping and peace-enforcing operations.
1. Abizaid John P., Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, "Lessons for
Peacekeepers," Military Review, March 1993.
2. Ayers, Charles M., Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, CLIC PAPERS,
Peacekeeping Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, Army-Air Force
Center for Low Intensity Conflict, April 1989, Langley Air Force Base,
3. Browne, Marjorie Ann, Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress, United Nations Peacekeeping: Historical Overview and Current
Issues, January 1990, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.
4. Bush, George, Address by the President of the United States of
America George Bush to the 47th session of the United Nations General
Assembly on 21 September, 1992.
5. Canadian Force Publication 301 (3) Peacekeeping Operations, first
draft, June 1992.
6. Chidichimo, Salvotre P., Brigadier General US Army, "Training
Leaders for a Force Projection Army," Military Review, March 1993.
7. Durch, William and Blechman, Barry, Keeping the Peace: The
United Nations in the Emerging World Order, March 1992, The Henry L.
8. Joint Pub 3-07. 3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP)
for Peacekeeping Operations, Final Draft Pub, December 1992.
9. Miller, Paul David, Admiral U. S. Navy, Both Swords and Plowshares:
Military Roles in the 1990s, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis National
Security Paper Number 10, (1992).
10. Parker, Steve, Colonel, US Air Force and Sutton, Mike, Major, US
Air Force, Personal interview 8 March, 1993.
11. Partners For Peace: Strengthening Collective Security for the
21st Century, A Report of the Global Policy Project, The United Nations
Association of the United States of America.
12. Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport
Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, December 1983.
13. Rosa, Frank, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Personal interview, 8
14. Schutte, Ralf, Major, Canadian Forces, Personal interview 23
15. Snow, Donald. Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-enforcement:
the U. S. Role in the New International Order, February 1993, Strategic
Studies Institute U. S. Army War College (SSI).
16. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Enforcement,
Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance, Joint/Combined/
Interagency Operations, 21 December, 1992, Strawman.
17. United Nations U. S. Participation in Peacekeeping Operations, Report
to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives
from the United States General Accounting Office, September 1992.
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