The
Utility Helicopter Mission Is Still Essential
CSC
1993
SUBJECT
AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: The Utility Helicopter Mission is Still
Essential
Author: Major Joseph G. Doyle, United States Marine
Corps
Thesis: The Marine Corps must replace or upgrade the
UH-1N and purchase enough
aircraft
to meet operational tempo.
Background: The utility helicopter mission is essential
to support MAGTF operations.
The
UH-1N has been performing this mission for almost 20 years and because of limited
capabilities
and inadequate numbers presently cannot conduct it satisfactorily. The
Huey's
replacement, VMAO, is projected to enter the fleet in 2015. Considering the
likelihood
of increased reliance on the Marine Corps to conduct operations ranging from
low
intensity conflict to humanitarian relief, the demand for a utility helicopter
will also
increase. The UH-1N will not be able to support this
high operational tempo in the
future.
Recommendations: The Marine Corps should purchase the H-60
Black Hawk and
maintain
a T/E of 12 utility helicopters in each HMLA squadron.
OUTLINE
Thesis: Due to limited capabilities and insufficient
airframes, the UH-1N cannot
effectively
conduct the utility mission for the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF);
therefore,
a new aircraft must be purchased or a mid-life upgrade conducted and
adequate
numbers of aircraft purchased.
I. Evolution of the UH-1N
II. Utility mission is essential to MAGTF
operations
A. MAGTF
aviation assets
B. Validity
of the utility mission
C. Missions
assigned to UH-1N
Ill. Dwindling assets
A. Out-of-production
model
B. Aircraft
attrition
IV. Continued high operational tempo
A. MEU
deployments
B. Training
V. Aircraft structural deterioration
VI. Limited capabilities
A. Airspeed
B. Payload
C. Endurance
VII. Utility platform options
A. UH-1N
mid-life upgrade
B. Purchase
a new aircraft, H-60
C. Procurement
factors
D. Analysis
VIII. Insufficient aircraft to support
demand
IX. The politics of procurement
Due to limited capabilities and
insufficient airframes, the UH-1N cannot effectively
conduct
the utility mission for the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF); therefore, a
new
aircraft must be purchased or a mid-life upgrade conducted and adequate numbers
of
aircraft purchased. The
"Huey" has had a distinguished history. A workhorse in
Vietnam,
it proved versatile and enduring in a variety of assigned missions. As a mix of
helicopters
was added to the Marine Corps inventory, the UH-1 continued to prove
invaluable
at "filling the gaps." The
Huey performed the crucial mission tasks for which
the
other aircraft were neither configured nor suited.
In the early 1970's the Marine Corps
received the latest model, the UH-1N, which is
still
in service after almost 20 years. In
the 1980's the Huey performed well but in
recent
years there has been a marked reduction in the quality of its performance. High
utilization
with no mid-life upgrade or service-life-extension program (SLEP) has resulted
in
airframe fatigue and limited capabilities.
Compare the Huey to the capabilities of new
model
helicopters in avionics, airspeed, and cargo load and a wide gap is
obvious. The
replacement
for the UH-1N, the Advanced/Attack/Observation/Utility/Platform (VMAO),
is
due to enter the fleet circa 2010-2020.
Considering future budget constraints and
project funding competition this date could
be
much further out. Several questions
must be answered. Is the utility
mission still
essential? Can the remaining three Marine helicopters,
CH-53, CH-46 and AH-1,
accomplish
the utility mission? Can the Huey stay
in service until 2010 without an up-
grade? Would it be more cost effective to conduct a
mid-life upgrade or purchase a
new
type aircraft to perform the utility mission?
Is the utility mission still
essential? MAGTF aviation employs a
complete assault
support
helicopter capability. Heavy logistics
is performed by the CH-53 while the bulk
of
the troop transport is assigned to the CH-46.
Anti-mechanized operations, helicopter
escort
and close-in-fire-support (CIFS) are tasked to the AH-1 W. ln any operation there
are
numerous tasks which, although simple, are essential to the success of MAGTF
operations. These tasks are assigned to the utility
helicopter. The UH-1N's primary
assigned
mission is command and control for the helicopter assault element. The Huey
accompanies
the helo assault wave to the objective with the assault support coordinator
(airborne)
(ASC(A)) and often the heloborne unit commander (HUC) onboard. During the
landing
and consolidation phase, if tactically feasible, the UH-1N enables the ground
commander
to observe his objective and, when ready, land at his command post. The
ASC(A)
ensures the smooth flow of aircraft into the objective area.
The Huey is also assigned several
secondary missions that include troop transport,
medical
evacuation, search and rescue (SAR), armed escort (ground and airborne), CIFS
and
airborne supporting arms coordinator. (3:1)
These missions can be performed by
the
other Marine helicopters, but the UH-1N provides flexibility and allows the
most
economical
use of aviation assets. The airframe is
relatively cheap to fly and in the
high-demand
periods of pre-assault, assault, post-assault the other aircraft can be used
for
their primary missions. It is not
economical to task a CH-46 to transport the ground
commander
around the battlefield when that aircraft could be used to transport essential
troops
and supplies.
Another example is armed escort of
transport aircraft to the landing zone (LZ).
An
AH-1
could be assigned the mission but this would prevent it from being used in an
anti-mechanized
role. Considering there are only four
AH-1W in a typical deployed
MEU,
where would they be best utilized?
Tasking UH-1Ns to escort sorties releases the
Cobras
for other critical missions. Assigning
utility missions to other assault support
aircraft
would result in task overload and a significant loss of flexibility. The Huey
ensures
no mission gaps occur within the helo assault support element; therefore, the
UH-1N
in the utility mission provides necessary versatility and flexibility that is
essential
to
the MAGTF. Tasking this mission to the
UH-1N allows for efficient use of other
helicopters. However, the question is: Can the UH-1N continue to perform the
utility
mission
until it is replaced in 2010?
The UH-1N is an
"out-of-production-model"; therefore, new UH-1Ns cannot be
purchased. Flight time continues to add up on the
existing airframes and with an
attrition
of so many aircraft per year due to accidents the use of the remaining aircraft
increases. As an example, MEU deployment requirements
on the east coast squadrons
(HMLA
167, 269) are demanding. Frequently
between chops, which is the assignment
of
personnel and aircraft to deploying HMM squadrons, the squadrons are left with
only
two
to four aircraft for a month or two until the MEU detachment being relieved
returns.
This
type of demand has started programs like Aircraft Service Period Adjustment
(ASPA),
which in simple terms is an inspection to determine if the aircraft must be
sent
for
rework at its normal interval. However,
it is not the detailed inspection and rework
performed
at depot level. If an aircraft passes
inspection, the minor discrepancies are
corrected
and the aircraft remains in the fleet for another year until its next ASPA
inspection. This is good for fleet and MEU demands but
it accelerates airframe fatigue.
Many
aircraft have now passed ASPA inspections two and in some cases three times.
Not
surprisingly, the aircraft have shown significant airframe fatigue such as
engine
deck
deterioration and liftbeam cracks. The
liftbeam is the main attachment point
between
the transmission and the airframe.
Airframe fatigue may also cause
transmission-to-driveshaft-misalignment
which is possibly linked to two recent fatal
mishaps. This being the case, how is this airframe
expected to last another 20 years?
When it was introduced in the 1970's, the
"N" had increased capabilities over older
models
but with little change in maximum airspeed.
Entering the 1990's its
performance
has fallen far behind modern helicopter technology and, in respect to
current
MAGTF helos, it is the least capable.
The UH-1N lacks airspeed compatibility
with
other assault platforms. Its maximum
rated speed is 130 knots (kts) but at
maximum
gross weight the velocity-never-to-exceed (VNE) becomes 110 kts at sea
level
and decreases rapidly at higher altitudes. (6,1-4-5) ln contrast, the CH-46 has a
cruise
airspeed of 130 kts, CH-53 150 kts, and the AH-1W 130 kts. To capitalize on
surprise
from over-the-horizon launch positions, 20 to 30 kts makes a significant
difference. The UH-1N's limitations force the helo
assault wave to fly at 90 kts vice a
capability
of 130 kts. Speed is a tactical
advantage that must not be squandered.
The cabin capacity is rated for 13
passengers, 8 combat troops or 6 litters, a useful
capability. This is based on the standard fuel load that
equates to approximately 1.5
hrs. To complete a typical command and control
mission, the Huey requires a flight
endurance
time of roughly 3 hours. To compensate
for the fuel shortfall, an auxiliary
fuel
bag (aux bag) was developed and is now standard for most missions. The bag is
installed
in the interior aft cabin. The fully
loaded weight is 1000 lbs. and takes up two
passenger
seats. Although this solves the flight
endurance problem, it significantly reduces
the
cargo-carrying capacity. The maximum
gross weight for the aircraft is 10,500 lbs.
The
basic weight is approximately 6800 lbs.
With full fuel for three hours (2400 lbs would
be
internal, 1000 lbs. in the aux bag), and crew of three (600 lbs), a quick
calculation
comes
9800 lbs., leaving only 700 lbs for cargo and passengers. (Table I)
With the
command
and control radio package weighing 100
lbs, there is room for only three
passengers.
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At
a maximum air speed of 110 kts this doesn't provide much capability. Then, too,
calculations
for an ordnance load also impose restrictions.
Without a comprehensive upgrade, the
UH-1N will become insupportable long before
the
2015 planned retirement date. A utility
platform, by nature of its multi-mission
capability,
the Huey provides increased efficiency and productivity. These mission tasks
are
essential to the success of the MAGTF.
Therefore, the Marine Corps has two
options: (1) either conduct a mid-life upgrade of the
UH-1N or (2) purchase a new
helicopter. A mid-life upgrade must significantly
increase the Huey's capabilities to be
compatible
with the existing Marine helicopters.
As for a new aircraft, there are several
existing
"off-the-shelf" helicopters that could satisfy the combat utility
role, e.g., the
UH-60
Black Hawk, the Bell 412, or the Sikorsky S-76.
The objective of Bell Helicopter's UH-1N
Mid-Life Upgrade (MLU) program is to
extend
the service-life of the UH-1N until VMAO introduction, expand mission
capability,
reduce vulnerability, lower life-cycle costs, be affordable, and increase
safety.
(5) The MLU would increase power to the main
rotor by 25%. This would be
accomplished
by installing GFE T400-402 engines (1970 SHP from 1800 SHP);
upgrading
the transmission (1593 SHP from 1290 SHP); installing a composite four-
blade,
manual-folding, main rotor; and installing a new KAFLEX main driveshaft. The
maximum
gross wt. would then be increased from 10,500 lbs. to 11 ,900 lbs. with a
decrease
in the empty wt. by 150 lbs. The useful
cargo load would thus be 2100 lbs.
for
the MLU vice 700 lbs. for the UH-1N.
This is calculated for a three-hour mission
and
is a significant improvement in capability.
The installation of the four-blade rotor
would
increase maneuverability and safety, reduce vibrations by 40% and lower
maintenance
costs. The reduction in vibrations
would reduce pilot fatigue and increase
the
life of critical components. The cruise
airspeed would increase to 130 kts. with a
VNE
of 140 kts. (5) This speed improvement
would enable the Huey to keep up with
the
assault helicopter wave allowing utilization of the CH-46's full airspeed
potential.
Fuel capacity is increased by 113 gals.,
giving an endurance of 3.0 hrs. and a
combat
radius of 170 nm. An improved auxiliary
fuel system designed by the USAF
can
also be incorporated for specified missions, further increasing the Huey's
range and
endurance. New energy attenuating crew and passenger
seats will increase survivability
in
a crash. Ballistic improvements will be
minor but include improved pilot seat armor
and
main rotor blades that will tolerate a 14.5mm hit. In addition, the airframe will be
strengthened
and the liftbeams replaced. (5)
The second option is to replace the UH-1N
with a new-type helicopter. The Vietnam
experience
changed the Army's requirements for the next generation utility helicopter.
High
performance, survivability, reliabilty, availability, and maintainability
became the
goal. The Huey had performed remarkably but it had
many shortcomings. In 1974
Sikorsky
was awarded the Army contract to build the H-60A Black Hawk and the first
production
helo was delivered in 1978.
The Black Hawk is now in all five
branches of the US military service.
The USMC
flies
the VH-60 at HMX-1 for Presidential support.
Besides the missions assigned to
USMC
utility role, the Army also employs the Black Hawk for electronic warfare,
anti-
tank
warfare and mine-barrier operations, thus proving its versatility. The Black Hawk
has
undergone several variations to accommodate different missions within the
services.
Of
particular interest is the Navy's SH-60B Sea Hawk because of its shipboard
compatibility
which is necessary for all USMC helicopters.
The Sea Hawk is used as a
light
airborne multi-purpose system (LAMPS) Mark III with primary missions of anti-
submarine
warfare (ASW), and ship surveillance and targeting (ASST) with secondary
missions
of SAR and logistics support. Although
the H-60 is larger than the UH-1 its
footprint
would have minimal effect on LHAs and LHDs.
The Black Hawk variation designed for the
USMC is the H-60L. It is a
single-rotor,
twin-engine
helo large enough to carry 15 troops plus a crew of 3 for normal combat
operations. Up to 20 troops could be carried in a high
density configuration. Empty
weight
is 13,027 lbs., mission gross weight is 16,600 lbs. (crew and full fuel) with a
maximum
gross weight of 22,000 lbs. This allows
for 5,400 lbs of cargo load. The
max
load that can be carried on the external sling is 8000 lbs., thus lifting a
fully loaded
HMMWV
with its crew. (1:18)
The Black Hawk's endurance is
admirable. With 12 troops and the
remaining cargo
capacity
used for fuel it has a combat radius range of 225 nm. With the External Stores
Support
System (ESSS) an additional 2500 lbs. of fuel can be carried giving a total
flight
of six hours and extending the combat radius to 400 nm. (1:24) This is a
significant
advantage over the MLU in the comand and control role.
Cruise airspeed for the H-60L is 145 kts
with a VNE of 165 kts. This speed
advantage
over the UH-1N will not only allow the utility helo to stay up with the assault
helo
wave but also will give it a sprint advantage to reconnoiter the landing zone
prior to
the
transports landing.
Another impressive feature of the Black
Hawk is its ballistic tolerance. There
are no
areas
vulnerable to a 7.62mm round. This is
accomplished through strategic placement
of
redundant systems and protection of all critical components. No matter where a
bullet
penetrates the flight controls, it is impossible to cause separation. The entire
four-blade
main rotor is also ballistically tolerant.
The hub is invulnerable to 12.7mm
hits
while the blades will not fail after a single 23mm high explosive incendiary
(HEI)
round
in the spar. (1:21) The pilot seats are
armored and the transmission gear box is
designed
to operate for 30 minutes without any oil.
The Black Hawk incorporates a
suction
fuel system on the engines in contrast to the UH-1N which has fuel pumps that
feed
the fuel into the engine. If a fuel
cell is penetrated by a bullet it will not leak; air
would
be ingested but fuel would not be sprayed as in a pressure system. Fuel lines are
flexible,
self-sealing, and incorporate self-sealing break-away valves. The fuel tanks are
self-sealing
to 12.7mm ballistic damage. (1:14)
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As shown in the Table II, the Black Hawk
provides a significant increase in capability
but
at a price. There are some additional
costs such as maintenance support
equipment,
parts, and mechanic and aircrew training that will affect the decision also.
Currently
the HMLA squadrons have the UH-1N and the AH-1W, both Bell products.
This
allows the use of many common systems.
By electing the MLU option vice buying
the
H-60 the support structure remains in place.
Of the 195 pieces of support
equipment
required for the MLU, 121 are common to the UH-1N. Likewise, many parts
will
be common and the distribution system the same. (5)
Mechanic training will only need
upgrading with the MLU instead of the complete
retraining
for a new type aircraft. Since the HMLA
squadrons have two Bell helicopters,
many
mechanics are qualified on both aircraft because of common systems. On the
other
hand, buying a new aircraft might require additional maintenance
personnel. Pilot
training
for a new type aircraft would also be significant. Pilots would have to be
retrained
to become flight qualified and then continue training until combat qualified.
This
transition would be at a high cost for schools, fuel, parts and maintenance
manhours
just to combat qualify the aircrews. Is
the increased capability of the Black
Hawk
over the UH-1N MLU worth the cost?
The tiltrotor concept will bring a
significant leap in technology and capability but there
is
no guarantee when it will arrive. The
V-22 which is to replace the CH-46 must be
funded
and fully fielded before the VMAO can become a competing priority with other
projects. Is 2015 a good guess or just a shot in the
dark? There is one remaining
question: When can these options be fully
fielded? The current POM cycle is for
1996.
If
Sikorsky was awarded the contract for POM 1996 the first Black Hawk would be
introduced
in 1998 and fully fielded in 2001. As
for the UH-1N MLU, Bell states the
helicopter
is ready now for evaluation and can upgrade all the USMC Huey's by 1999.
If
the VMAO is due in 2015 which option is more cost effective? The MLU will have
17
yrs. of service in the fleet while the Black Hawk only 15 yrs. With a service-life of
20
yrs. the H-60 would not be ready for retirement in 2015. This would probably mean
the
VMAO as a replacement for the utility mission would not occur because of budget
conflicts.
When 2015 comes and the VMAO is ready to
enter the fleet, opponents may argue
that
the Black Hawk still has 10 yrs. of useful service-life left and it would be a
waste
of
taxpayers' dollars to retire a good aircraft.
This might postpone the VMAO for
another
10 yrs. If the MLU will extend the
UH-1N service-life another 15 yrs. then it is
the
proper choice. If, on the other hand, the
Marine Corps selects the MLU and in
2015
no VMAO funding is available and the UH-1N MLU is no longer flyable, we will
again
be forced to apply band-aids to keep it flying. ln contrast, by spending the extra
dollars
now for the H-60 we will receive a capable helicopter with a service-life that
will
allow
flexibility while waiting for the eventual VMAO arrival. This poses a tough
dilemma. Although the logical and most inexpensive
choice is to plan on the VMAO in
2015
and purchase the MLU, the safest
decision is for the Marine Corps to buy the
Black
Hawk H-60.
The second reason the UH-1 cannot
effectively conduct its mission is because there
are
not enough aircraft to meet operational tempo.
Past table of equipment (T/E) for the
HMLA
squadrons was 12 UH-1Ns and 12 AH-1s but the planned reorganization will
change
the T/E to 9 UH-1s and 18 AH-1s. The
increase in Cobras addresses the need
for
more anti-mechanized weapon systems.
With only nine Hueys in a squadron there
are
not enough utility aircraft to fulfill mission demands. On the west coast at Camp
Pendleton,
Ca., there are three FMF squadrons with a fourth deployed overseas for six
months. There is also a training squadron,
HMT-303. The HMLAs with a typical T/E
will
have a total of 27 Hueys. The HMT will
have an additional 9 aircraft, which could
be
used if required, thus 36 utility helos are at Camp Pendleton. This number of helos
enables
an even and manageable tasking to all the squadrons. On the east coast it is a
different
story.
At MCAS New River there are only two HMLA
squadrons. These provide all the
requirements
for the Second Marine Division, the Wing and LF6F deployments. The
squadrons
must also provide training and proficiency flights for their aircrews.
According
to the T/E the two squadrons combined would have 18 utility helicopters. To
see
how critical the situation is the aircraft numbers must be broken down. Each
squadron
alternates in providing personnel and aircraft that will chop to an HMM
composite
squadron that deploys with a MEU(SOC) in support of the LF6F. An HMLA
will
normally chop four AH-1 s and two or three UH-1 s for approximately 12 to 14
months
to a HMM squadron. This will occur
every year. Therefore, there are always
at
least
two and possibily three UH-1s attached to another HMM squadron. Then prior to
their
return the HMLA squadron must prepare and chop another detachment for the
following
LF6F deployment.
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The next detrimental input on aircraft
availability is maintenance. As stated
earlier
the
Huey is almost 20 years old and through its life-cycle each aircraft must
undergo
standard
depot level maintenance (SDLM) for inspection and rework. On average this
happens
every 4 to 5 years depending on flight time on the airframe and overall
condition. This maintenance period lasts approximately
eight months. That now leaves
the
squadron with five or six aircraft to fulfill missions generated by higher
headquarters
and
to provide training and proficiency flights to keep the aircrews combat
qualified. At
the
organizational level, a squadron may have 100% aircraft availability under
ideal
conditions
but normally 80% is a good planning estimate.
This would drop another
aircraft
out of the daily schedule.
Squadrons also provide detachments for
annual exercises such as Ocean Venture,
Teamwork
and Combined Arms Exercises (CAX).
These exercises last from six to eight
weeks
requiring two to three UH-1 s. For a
CAX he whole squadron will normally deploy
Table III
A/C
AVAILABILITY CHART
LF6F 3
SDLM 1
Maint 1
MAWTS 1
TOTAL 9
to Twentynine Palms. Upon return, because of heavy use during the
exercise
and
transit, most of the aircraft are sent immediately into maintenance and are
not
available for 3 to 5 days with some aircraft even longer. A unique situation
arises
when a 2nd MAW HMLA deploys to CAX and then immediately after
must
support a Marine Aviation Weapons Tactics School (MAWTS) class with
four
UH-1 s for two months. By the time the
squadron arrives home from CAX
the
returning aircraft, usually the weakest, go into maintenance, often for an
extended
period. This can leave the squadron
without any UH-1s to fly for four
to
sometimes six weeks. Finally, when the
aircraft return home from MAWTS
and
maintenance is back up to speed the vicious cycle starts again. Considering
these
availability problems, could the squadron support a short notice
contingency
plan with two to four UH-1s? Although
the HMLA T/E and T/O are
designed
to support three deployments simultaneously, there may not be enough Hueys.
Another factor to consider is the future
missions of the Marine Corps. We have
seen
in the last two years the mission for the Marine Corps broadened to
include: a
major
conflict such as SWA; peacemaking/peacekeeping in Somalia; humanitarian relief
in
Bangladesh; a possible low-intensity conflict (LIC) in some Third World
country; and
participation
in counter-drug operations. What demand
will these roles have for a utility
helicopter? Are there enough UH-1s to fulfill all the
requirements?
The UH-1 was one of the many unsung
heroes of Desert Storm. Major Steve Jones,
a
MAWTS instructor wrote:
That the utililty helicopter was a vital
part of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM is without
question. Every HMLA and HML (Reserve) unit in the
Marine Corps either deployed to SWA or
was
assigned another regional contingency.
ln fact so in demand were UH-1s in SWA that the
existing
HMLA squadron configuration of 12 UH-1s was not adequate to support all of the
operational
requirements commanders had for these aircraft. The Reserve squadrons luckily
were
able to provide the additional aircraft and crews needed to meet the increased
requirements
of the situation. Daily tasking and
operational tempo continued to rise for the
HMLA
squadrons during the course of the war, demonstrating an increasing requirement
for
utility
support within the MAGTF. (2:52)
ln a low intensity conflict a MEU (SOC)
may be tasked to conduct support operations.
Many
of the exercises the HMLAs annually provide support to have LIC scenerios.
Although
scenarios differ with each exercise the composite helicopter training varies
little. During Teamwork 92, HMM-263 deployed to
Norway as the composite helicopter
squadron. The ACE afloat consisted of HMM-263, which
included two UH-1Ns, on a
LPH
and the Harrier squadron on a LHA. SAR
was provided by the Navy with two SH-
3s
on the LPH and one UH-1 on the LHA.
During the transit the amphibious ready
group
encountered bad weather and high seas and was forced to take two separate
routes. One Marine UH-1 was transferred to the LHA
to support SAR with plans to
rejoin
the helicopter squadron upon entering the amphibious operation area. At this time
the
second UH-1 was down for maintenance awaiting a part from CONUS. Upon
entering
the fjords of Norway the Huey returned and went down for maintenance for
three
days. The other Huey came up but was
immediately tasked to support the
MAGTF
commander for the duration of the exercise and was sent to the LHA. Ironically
this
Huey was down for maintenance for most of the exercise. Back on the LPH the
one
Huey which was to support the regimental landing team (RLT) was also down and
missed
the first three days of the assault. It
became obvious that a third Huey would
have
provided the necessary depth to support the operation.
The latest operation the Marine Corps has
been involved in is peacemaking in Somalia
for
Operation Restore Hope. To support the
MAGTF the Huey is proving its full
versatility
from command and control and support missions during the initial assault to a
variety
of utility roles as the situation calms.
The Huey conducts vital sorties such as
armed
reconnaissance of highways to determine trafficability and assess possible
threats
then returns to escort the relief convoys to their destinations. In situations
involving
significant distances and poor communications, the Huey is used for courier
missions.
Considering the lack of aerial imagery
collection platforms in the MAGTF, the Huey
can
be used to fly combat photographers to identify and photograph arms caches and
gang
headquarters. The digital cameras used
can develop a print on the spot. The
Huey
can then land at the tactical commander's location and provide real-time
intelligence. Another mission, although not deemed
tactical, is VIP transport. ln a
situation
like Somalia political visability is high.
Support for visiting delegations
becomes
a priority. Two and often three
helicopters are dedicated to support them for a
full
day, possibly two. Again the commander
cannot afford to waste valuable CH-53s
and
CH-46s to move 200-400 lbs of cargo and one or two people, so the Huey is
tasked.
ln humanitarian relief operations, as
during Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh and
Provide
Comfort in northern Iraqi, emphasis will be on logistical support. The CH-53
will
take the burden, supported by CH-46s. Here
again the UH-1 will be indispensable
in
the utility role, transporting medical teams, conducting SAR and carrying light
cargo.
Using
valuable transports for the numerous simple missions would waste limited
assets.
Are there enough UH-1s in a deployed MEU
to fulfill demand? NO. The ACE must
be
able to support all the versatile and demanding missions required of the MEU
(SOC).
If
the threat is high, the Cobras will be expected to perform in an
anti-mechanized role.
With
only four AH-1s per MEU and with one usually down for maintenance, there will
only
be three available for an operation. To
ensure sufficient CIFS coverage a UH-1 will
be
sent to complete the second section of gunships. This leaves one UH-1 left to fill
the
command and control role and any other add-on missions. This is betting on 100%
availability. To fulfill the demand of a MEU(SOC), the T/E
must be increased to a
minimum
of 3 UH-1s and ideally 4.
Where does this all leave the
squadron? With the additional Hueys
attached to the
MEU
the squadron will have only four Hueys to support assigned missions and the
essential
training to keep the aircrews current.
The typical pilot T/O excluding the
detached
pilots is 26. These pilots must share
the remaining four aircraft. Many of
the
missions
tasked by the Division and Wing are routine and afford only limited training.
Training
assets to hone skills like night vision goggles, air combat maneuvers and
ordnance
delivery are severely limited. These
are highly perishable skills. At times
flying
is referred to as being similar to riding a bicycle: it comes back quickly, but not so
with
these skills. No matter how much
experience a pilot has, he must perform these
missions
frequently or his expertise level drops quickly. Couple these critical skills with
missions
like hovering at 50ft. for 20 minutes to recover a downed pilot in the trees; a
highspeed
low-level approach into a zone to fast-rope a recon team; or night confined
area
landings and shipboard landings. Then
step this up with two or three helicopter
tactics
and the essential skills to be a proficient utility helicopter pilot become
vast
indeed. A typical UH-1 pilot may only perform a
specific mission but once in 3 or 4
months,
yet he is considered qualified and expected to perform it with expertise. This
all
comes back to aircraft availability.
The HMLA squadrons must retain 12 UH-1Ns.
So the cycle goes on and the frustration
is felt most at the unit level. The
pilots
cannot
remain proficient at their required tasks and the small unit leader is deprived
of a
valuable
asset. We all realize the immediate
future will bring budget restraints and stiff
competition
for project funding. Publicity follows
the high-tech and glorified roles of the
F-18,
the Harrier or the Cobra attack helicopter.
Consequently, projects like the UH-1
seldom
reach the top priority list. However,
one fact is clear, the Huey will not last
another
20 years, so a decision must be made soon and the project actively pursued.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. International Defense and
Aerospace. Pamphlet published by
International Defense
Images,
Ltd. Volume 1 Number 3.
2. Jones, Maj. Steven M. "The Future of the UH-1: Will it be Around the Next Time
it's
Needed?" Marine Corps Gazette May
92: 52-53.
3. Mission Need Statement for an Interim
Utility Helicopter. APW-53,
USMC
17 Jun 92.
4. Sikorsky Baseline USMC H-60. Pamphlet published by Sikorsky Helicopter.
Dec
89.
5. UH-1N Mid-life Upgrade (MLU). Pamphlet published by Bell Helicopter
Textron.
Aug
92.
6. UH-1N NATOPS Flight Manual, NAVAIR
01-110HCE-1, 1 March 88. take the burden,
supported
by CH-46s. Here again the UH-1 will be
indispensable
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