ASPJ: Victim Of Friendly Fire
CSC 1993
SUBJECT AREA - Electronic Warfare
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: ASPJ: Victim of Friendly Fire
Author: LCDR David Baranek, United States Navy
Thesis: The Airborne Self-Protection Jammer is a capable
electronic warfare system which faltered because of poorly-
defined goals and faulty evaluation procedures.
Background: Electronic warfare has become an important component
of modern combat. Advances in electronics and computer software
in the mid-I97Os promised small, effective jammers that could
cope with an intense surface-to-air threat, and the Airborne
Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) was to use these advances to
provide state-of-the-art protection for American combat aircraft.
While it demonstrated jamming effectiveness, ASPJ experienced
problems with reliability and other real-world concerns.
Congressional interest, stimulated by Sen. David Pryor (D-AR),
highlighted further problems based on poorly-defined performance
goals and test procedures. ASPJ did not meet the goals set for
it, but is superior to the alternatives and provides acceptable
performance.
Recommendations:
I. ASPJ development and limited production should have
been continued or reviewed rather than canceled.
2. The ASPJ experience should be analyzed by service
planners as an example of the importance of well-
founded performance specifications.
OUTLINE
Thesis: Development of the Airborne Self-Protection Jammer
(ASPJ) required substantial investments in time and money, then
the program was canceled rather than put into production. The
effort was appropriate for this complex and capable system, whose
failure was precipitated by poorly-defined performance goals and
uncertain evaluation procedures.
I. Origin of self-protection jamming
A. First used in bombers
B. Later applied to fighters
II. Promise of ASPJ
A. Multi-service use
B. Application of newest
technology
C. Ambitious performance goals
III. Early challenges for ASPJ
A. Space limitations
B. Integration into different
aircraft
C. Program delays
IV. Flight testing and continued problems
A. Generally good jamming
performance
B. Problems with other
specifications
C. Erratic support by Navy, Air
Force
D. Performance goals poorly
defined
V. Program cancellation
A. Senator Pryor's involvement
B. Further evaluations added
C. Failure caused by flawed
specification
VI. Uncertain future for ASPJ
In the mid-197Os, U.S. Navy planners conceived
of a fully-automatic system that would completely protect combat
aircraft from enemy radars and missiles. Soon the Air Force was
a partner to the enterprise, and by 1977 six U.S. electronics
companies were conducting research on the project. The services
intended to put this system into thousands of tactical aircraft
starting in 1985; the program was estimated to be worth $3
billion. This program was called simply the "airborne self-
protection jammer," and was soon known as ASPJ.
On 10 December 1992, the Navy announced cancellation of ASPJ
after nearly sixteen years of work. One publication estimated
that the Pentagon had spent $1.5 billion on the program, and
about 100 pre-production systems had been delivered. Should ASPJ
have been canceled, or should it have been put into production
while improvements continued?
U.S. aircraft have used electronic
countermeasures (ECM) almost as long as radar has been associated
with war: World War II B-17s first employed jammers in 1943 to
confuse German air-defense radars.(2:71) After the war, jammers
were standard equipment on U.S. bombers, to counter radar-
intensive Soviet defenses should the Cold War turn hot.(11:325)
Somehow, fighter and attack aircraft were neglected when it came
to jammers.
Then, in June 1965, the first Soviet surface-to-air missile
(SAM) brought down a U.S. fighter over North Vietnam.(24:15)
This event shocked the military, which began a priority program
to fit existing ECM equipment into fighter aircraft, to give them
a self-protection jamming capability similar to that of bombers.
Since the mid-1960s, ECM has been a consideration for combat air-
craft of all sizes and missions, worldwide.
One response to U.S. use of jammers in Vietnam was
modification of the radars used by Soviet SAMs, changing their
transmitting frequency.(11:326) This would negate our jammers
effectiveness. The U.S. then revised the hammers and developed
new systems, and "electronic warfare" (EW) became an important
component of modern combat.
Besides self-protection jammers, other components of
electronic warfare are summarized in the figure. Properly
integrated, these components can substantially degrade enemy
radars, as demonstrated in the successful U.S. air strikes In
Libya in 1986, and more impressively in Operation DESERT STORM.
While the Navy was sorting out its Vietnam
experiences, Congress was calling for greater commonality of EW
systems among the armed forces.(27:56) This had a profound
influence on ASPJ, for in January 1977 the Air Force announced it
would also use the new jammer.(5:245) Multi-service use meant
that ASPJ would equip up to seven different types of Air Force,
Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft,(6:120) and production could
reach 4,000 systems. Besides being a large program, ASPJ
development would be a technical challenge, so the six interested
Click here to view image
firms formed three teams--an unusual step among companies that
were normally competitors. (26:68) The program, however, was
expected to be worth $3 billion, so there would be enough profit
to share. And considering the complexities anticipated in
developing ASPJ by 1985, even the heavyweights in the electronics
field wanted partners (6:120-121)
In practice, a jammer must degrade the performance of some
element of a surface-to-air weapon system to improve the
survivability of a friendly aircraft. Elements of a surface-to-
air weapon system include search radar, tracking radar, and
missile guidance equipment. A typical jammer in use In the late
1970s was capable of countering one or a few systems at a time,
which it did by transmitting complex signal patterns, each
tailored to disrupt a specific weapon system. Limitations
included memory space to store the signal patterns, and
transmitter power to jam multiple threats.
ASPJ was intended to counter dozens of threats
simultaneously. To deal with basic enemy efforts such as using
different frequencies, ASPJ would be effective over a broad
frequency range. Rather than storing and using a specific signal
for each threat, ASPJ would analyze enemy radars, generate
effective responses, and transmit the jamming. ASPJ would be
software-intensive, which is the most efficient way to achieve
these performance goals plus retain a growth potential.(26:68)
Specifications set for the new jammer included:
- occupy no more than 2.3 ft3 of space,
- operate an average of 200 hours between failures, and
- cost $350,000 per system.(26:68)
The size requirement would allow ASPJ to use the space where some
Navy aircraft carried the ALQ-126, a much less-capable jammer.
The other two specifications can be evaluated against the Air
Force ALQ-131 jammer, also less capable than ASPJ: after years of
refinement, ALQ-131 averaged about 50 hours between failures; and
in 1986, ALQ-131s were sold for $1.9 million apiece.(1:182) All
concerned knew that ASPJ was an ambitious project, so plans
called for "a continuing technology insertion program" to ensure
that improvements could be included in an orderly fashion.(26:68)
Against this background, it is of interest to consider the
thoughts of a leader in the field around this time. Dr. Malcolm
Currie, director of Defense Research and Engineering, in 1976
commented that a balance of countermeasures was needed, including
stand-off jammers, anti-radiation missiles, and other systems.
Unfortunately, he said, each new system was "being designed to
cope with the whole sophisticated threat, almost as if no other
(ECM) system were in existence." Dr. Currie predicted, before
ASPJ was defined, that the armed forces would require greater
commonality among their EW efforts and that they would have more
modest performance objectives. (4:14) Unfortunately, his
observations were correct and his predictions were not.
After more than four years of groundwork, a
winning team was selected from those seeking the ASPJ contract:
ITT Defense Inc. and Westinghouse Electronic Systems Group,
announced in September 1981.(9:20) About the same time, the date
production was expected to begin was slid one year to 1986,
(27:56) although this was announced with less fanfare. The
Industrial teaming arrangement was considered "novel" at the
time. Benefits, however, Included the increased research and
development experience brought by two companies, as well as two
production sources. (12:55) As the program became beleaguered,
all sources agreed that the ITT-Westinghouse "joint venture. .
worked exceedingly well,"(13:60) and was not a source of
problems.
One cause of the one-year delay in expected production was
the volume requirement: that ASPJ occupy no more than 2.3 ft3.
Although ASPJ would have much greater capability than the ALQ-126
jammer that already occupied this space, advances in
miniaturization and software seemed to promise success. By 1986,
however, an ITT program official commenting on ASPJ characterized
the volume constraint as "the most challenging."(27:56)
Another challenge to the designers was the plan to integrate
ASPJ into the complex electronic systems of seven different
aircraft. The aircraft were designed over a twenty-year period
during which there were tremendous changes in electronic systems.
The number was later reduced to five types (USAF F-16, and
USN/USMC FA-18, F-14, A-6, and AV-8),(22:91) but still
represented a diverse group.
A fundamental difference in philosophy further complicated
the matter of integration: the Air Force preferred jammers that
were mounted in pods carried under the wings of its aircraft,
while the Navy favored internally-mounted jammers.(5:245) Each
service had valid reasons for its preference, and there is still
no consensus on which way is better. ITT-Westinghouse accepted
this as simply another challenge.
A one-year delay in a complex program was not unusual. The
Air Force's EF-111 stand-off jammer aircraft had been delayed
over a year, and the High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM)
survived a three-year delay of initial operational capability.
(4:14) Both, incidentally, were developed in the 1970s and
became vital components of the balanced, integrated approach to
electronic warfare. In addition to delayed introduction, ASPJ
shared another characteristic with complex systems: increased
projected cost. ASPJ had been projected to cost $350,000 per
set, but by 1983 this was up to $800,000.(7:102)
Flight testing of ASPJ finally began in
September 1985, on an Air Force F-16. The Navy flew the jammer
in an FA-18 in February 1987.(1:161) Starting production in 1986
was obviously no longer expected. Early flight tests were
relatively simple, and revealed only small problems that were
corrected relatively easily. By this time, the new jammer had
been designated "ALQ-165" in conformance with standard
nomenclature for ECM equipment, but the term ASPJ remained more
prevalent.
While engineers and pilots flogged ASPJ in the air,
challenges also developed on the ground. In March 1986,
Secretary of the Navy Lehman and his staff announced that they
were reconsidering the cost effectiveness of self-protection
jamming in general, ASPJ in particular. This led to postponement
of firm decisions on ASPJ development, a reexamination of
electronic warfare by the military, and speculation by the media.
Many insisted that self-protection jamming was still required,
forming one more layer of protection from surface-to-air weapon
systems.(20:46-49) Air Force support also remained strong. USAF
Director of Electronic Combat Maj. Gen. Corder, in a February
1987 interview, supported the system and said "ASPJ has never
been in a stronger position... "(3:50) The program survived.
Two years after the Navy had second thoughts, it was the Air
Force's turn. Inspired partly by extensive problems with the EW
equipment of the B-1B strategic bomber, the Air Force initiated
an "independent technical assessment" of ASPJ; It could not
afford another embarrassing, expensive, and very public problem
with a new system. Composed of military and industry experts,
the review team reported in September 1988 that it found no
"high-risk" issues with ASPJ development, and only a few "medium-
risk" issues for which corrective measures were being
introduced. (10:55-59)
After clearing these hurdles placed by its sponsors, ASPJ
faced another set of challenges. In the more than ten years
since the requirement was announced, the electronics and defense
industries had made significant progress. Developments that
threatened ASPJ included:
- "stealth" technology, which reduces the requirement
for all ECM equipment;
- more capable expendable countermeasures, ejected from
aircraft to decoy enemy weapons; and
- new technology, especially monopulse radars and
missile seekers specifically intended to defeat
jammers. (23:44)
These developments were not confined to Soviet and other
potential threat systems; stealth and monopulse, for example, had
become integral to American weapons. Some reduced the need for
ASPJ (stealth and expendables), others challenged its
effectiveness (monopulse). In general, time was eroding the
promise of what had once seemed just around the corner.
The persistence of ASPJ through these
challenges can be explained to some extent by the legitimate need
for such a jammer, but also by its impressive performance. Early
flight tests of the prototypes were successful enough to prove
the concept.(3:50) Soon more demanding runs were held, in which
ASPJ-equipped aircraft flew over test ranges sprinkled with
radars designed to emulate enemy surface-to-air defenses. Most
of the tests remain classified, but some results have been
unofficially released.
In a published interview, a person with access to the
information summarized ASPJ flight testing by saying that at Navy
and Air Force ranges, ASPJ detected 98% of the threat emitters it
faced--a total of nearly 300. For each of the those detected,
ASPJ correctly analyzed the signal and transmitted the intended
jamming. (17:27) These are most impressive accomplishments,
registered under very demanding conditions. But full acceptance
of ASPJ would require other demonstrations of performance, such
as reliability and self-diagnosis of faults.
Early flight tests were, in fact, halted for reliability
problems, but ITT-Westinghouse refined "manufacturing process
control" and improved the power supply, and testing resumed.
Tests were generally satisfactory, for in November 1986 the Joint
Resources Management Board authorized the next phase of
development, Production Verification.(22:91) To date, tests had
involved hand-assembled prototypes; the next phase would use
production-standard designs.
Despite this progress, the senior Navy official working on
ASPJ, Capt. Small, admitted in a 1989 interview that some test
results were "not as good as expected." He attributed this to
techniques used to assess jammer performance.(21:91) This is
difficult to imagine in view of a 98% correct response rate, but
the following scenario, paraphrased from the authoritative
publication Aviation Week and Space Technology illustrates the
point:
On the EW test range, an aircraft without a jammer
flies a combat-type mission. The number of simulated
SAN launches is counted, and the estimated number of
hits is calculated. From these numbers, enemy
effectiveness is calculated. The aircraft then flies
the same mission with a jammer and missile
effectiveness is again calculated. If, on the first
mission, there were 20 chances for missile launch and
five were estimated to be hits, the enemy is given a
25% effectiveness. On the second mission--with
jamming--if there were only eight launch opportunities,
and jamming degraded the missiles so that only two
would have hit, the enemy is again scored as 25%
effective. Thus, despite a significant reduction in
threat to the friendly aircraft, the jammer could be
judged as having no effect.(21:91)
This scenario was presented in a September 1989 article on ASPJ.
In October 1989, it was reported that the Department of Defense
was reviewing procedures to measure effectiveness. One result of
the review would be the use of computer simulations to evaluate
jammer performance. (14:62)
Such issues notwithstanding, the Production Verification
phase revealed significant progress. ASPJ prototypes, for
example, had been built with a technologically risky component
called a hybrid microcircuit. This allowed realization of the
2.3 ft3 volume limit, but at a cost in reliability. Components
that were later available (monolithic gate array microcircuits)
promised better reliability and satisfied the size requirement.
(14:62) Such developments allowed units submitted for production
verification testing to pass an incredible 222 out of 225
performance tests. Problems with the other three tests were
identified, and corrections enacted.(15:109) With such positive
results, despite confusion about how to measure effectiveness,
the Department of Defense in October 1989 approved a limited
production contract for 100 systems.(14:59) The jammer was about
four years behind schedule, but appeared on-track. Then Sen.
David Pryor (D-AR) seemed to discover ASPJ.
Sen. Pryor is chairman of the Governmental affairs
Committee's subcommittee on Federal Services, Post Office, and
Civil Service. This appears to have little to do with the
military or electronic warfare, but the senator quickly became a
vehement critic of ASPJ. In October 1989, in hearings on the
jammer before his subcommittee, Sen. Pryor said that ASPJ was
"seriously flawed" in terms of capability, reliability,
maintainability, and built-in testing. Using the most dramatic
language, he asserted that a pilot flying an F-16 using ASPJ
would likely be "blown out of the sky." He failed to note two
important points: the deficiencies listed were found in early
prototypes, and many had already been corrected; and the
alternatives for the hypothetical F-16 pilot were the less-
capable ALQ-131 or no jammer at all.(14:59-62)
Despite these faults, Sen. Pryor's remarks moved his
colleagues. The Senate approved an amendment to the FY 1990
Defense Appropriations Bill prohibiting obligation of any funds
for ASPJ until new tests demonstrated corrections that Sen. Pryor
required. This seems to ignore a standard series of tests still
ahead, known as Developmental Testing, Operational Testing, and
Follow-on Test and Evaluation.(14:59-62)
On top of this new challenge, in December 1989 the Air Force
withdrew its interest in ASPJ. Forced to make substantial cuts
in future budgets, the Air Force included money for ASPJ among
its sacrifices. DoD directed the Navy to investigate
alternatives to the system, intending to cancel the entire
effort. The Navy replied that it had examined the options and
would proceed alone with ASPJ.(19:114) Without the Air Force,
with force reductions and other changes, total production was now
estimated at about 750 units,(25:62) quite a drop from the
earlier prediction of 4,000.
In further hearings before Sen. Pryor's subcommittee, In May
1990, the Navy gave ground on ASPJ. Navy agreed not to go beyond
the existing contract for 100 units unless ASPJ met eighteen
specific "exit criteria" for performance, (16:62) thus adding
further to the established evaluation procedures for new systems.
The eighteen "exit criteria" must begin the
final portion of any report on ASPJ, for in April 1992 the
General Accounting Office reported that ASPJ missed one of the
new standards: "instantaneous mean time between failures, a
measure of reliability. The goal agreed upon was 75 hours.
Ironically, the failure came in a series of laboratory tests
designed to improve reliability. What's more, the Navy said that
the failure was nothing more than an erroneous report; software
conducting self-test concluded ASPJ had failed, while it
continued to perform properly. The Navy said the jammer at this
time was good for 84 hours between failures.(16:62)
In fact, during flight tests in 1991, ASPJ had operated 106
hours without failure, and during another test series the figure
was over 90 hours.(25:62) These numbers were well below the 200-
hour goal reported earlier: as with other specifications, mean
time between failures had been revised downward, to 110 hours,
but this was still too much.(21:89)
Regardless of the actual numbers, the Navy salvaged ASPJ on
a technicality. The Military Standard for software failures
exempted those that were corrected and verified during
reliability testing. Verification was not complete when a board
met in June 1991 to consider further production, but several
senior officials testified as to circumstances and the board
approved a second batch of 36 jammers.(16:63)
Sen. Pryor's next round of hearings was more indicative of
the future. In April 1992 he charged "waste and management
actions that border on fraud," and held more hearings before his
subcommittee. These charges were not substantiated,(16:62) but
they revealed his flare for dramatic language and the tenacity of
his opposition to ASPJ.
ASPJ survived these now-familiar trials, but another loomed.
The catalyst for cancellation was a 1992 report on measure of
effectiveness by the DoD Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, The report noted that ASPJ failed to demonstrate the
required effectiveness in combat simulation studies, among other
less-important shortcomings. According to language in the FY
1993 Defense Authorization Bill, if ASPJ failed operational
tests, "none of the funds available to the Department of
Defense. . may be used for the procurement of the Airborne Self
Protection Jammer. . . ." In view of this stipulation, the Navy on
10 December 1992 canceled its contract for 36 more systems and
terminated ASPJ.(17:27)
Reporting the termination, Aviation Week and Space
Technology quoted unnamed sources who said the criterion not met
was a 30% increase in survivability over a non-ASPJ-equipped
aircraft.(17:27) This evaluation used an opposite point of view
from the "reduction in threat effectiveness" addressed earlier.
The specific test run was a computer simulation, for it had
become too expensive to outfit the test ranges with enough
threat-type radars to provide an adequate test. In the computer,
the non-ASPJ aircraft "flew" at low altitude while other
components of an integrated EW effort countered most enemy
radars. These are realistic tactics; as before, however, the
interpretation of results is the problem. The non-ASPJ aircraft
achieved 90% survivability. Navy evaluators concluded that a 30%
increase meant 117% survivability--117% of the aircraft launched
on a mission would have to return; an impossible condition to
meet.(17:27) Incredible as this reasoning may seem, this
published account was endorsed as correct by the Navy ASPJ
project officer. (18)
An internal memorandum from the Navy ASPJ office provides
greater insight. It indicates that the recurring "30%" value is
one of the earliest specifications associated with ASPJ, and one
of the least-rational. Apparently, 30% was arbitrarily selected
in the belief that applying such a measure would be years in the
future, and the specification could then be revised to an
appropriate number. As discussed by Capt. Small in 1989, it
first indicated a decrease in enemy missile effectiveness: if an
enemy system had an 80% probability of killing a non-ASPJ
aircraft, then ASPJ had to reduce this to 50% to meet the
specification.(8:1) No one apparently considered the possibility
of an enemy system with only 25% effectiveness to begin with,
much less how to define "effectiveness" to eliminate ambiguity.
As ASPJ progressed, about the time Sen. Pryor developed
interest in the program, Naval Research Laboratory realized the
flawed logic of this measure and attempted to revise the entire
effectiveness criteria. After all, other standards had been
revised, and with less reason. Sen. Pryor, however, took note
and chided the Navy for trying to change the rules to hide a
failure. Rather than correct the flawed measure, the Navy
accepted a new interpretation, "30% improvement in aircraft
survivability," precipitating the ultimate failure.(8:2)
An industry observer speculated that the Navy gave up on
ASPJ. He theorized that "top Navy brass decided that the
service, whose image had suffered because of the Tailhook scandal
and its handling of the A-12 program, needed to placate Pryor"
and enhance relations with the new Clinton administration.(17:27)
Such a comment can only be speculation. It becomes believable,
however, when considering the background of several important
decisions.
In review, the performance goals set for ASPJ were too
ambitious. The system certainly demonstrated impressive
capability by some measures, but by others it was deficient when
evaluated against specifications--particularly reliability and
effectiveness. Lessons from ASPJ include specification
definition. Some of the original criteria, such as the volume to
be occupied, were technically challenging but well-founded. The
same cannot be said of other criteria, including both reliability
and effectiveness, which seem to have been arbitrarily chosen and
poorly defined.
Further, Sen. Pryor's interest complicated the matter.
Although ASPJ failed to meet specifications, this should have
been acceptable since the system is clearly superior to
alternatives, and prospects were good for effective service and
future improvement. Precedents include the B-1 bomber and F-111,
both of which progressed from inauspicious beginnings. In the
case of ASPJ, however, Sen. Pryor's scrutiny made the
deficiencies unacceptable.
The Navy now owns around 100 ASPJ systems, enough to
equip a quarter of its F-14 fleet. This leaves most Navy
aircraft with other jammers, or none at all.(9:20) To fill the
holes will take years of developing specifications, selecting
systems, testing, modification, and production.
DoD has spent an estimated $1.5 billion to get to this point
in the program,(17:27) paying for years of development and
testing. The cost could only be recovered if full-scale
production resulted. In any case, the program has had indirect
benefits, for components and processes from ASPJ have been
incorporated into other systems.
One source says the Navy intends to "review the need for an
integrated electronic warfare system, "(9:20) which could indicate
that the requirement for ASPJ may have expired, in the Navy's
view. Meanwhile, Korea, Finland, and Switzerland appear
interested in ASPJ for F-16s and FA-I8s operated by their air
forces. (17:27)
Finally, it is interesting to note another set of remarks
made by Maj. Gen. Corder as turbulence built around ASPJ. In
October 1990, as the Air Force Tactical Air Warfare Center
commander, he said that he believed a new approach to electronic
warfare was needed. He felt that airborne jammers had become too
vulnerable to counter-countermeasures, too complex, and too
costly.(28:42) These are remarkably similar to Dr. Currie's
remarks fourteen years earlier. ASPJ could be said to exemplify
the best and worst of electronic warfare, a combination that
proved unacceptable.
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