Fratricide: Can It Be Stopped?
CSC
1993
SUBJECT
AREA - Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Fratricide: Can it Be Stopped?
Author: LCDR William Ayers, III, United States Navy
Thesis: The military must identify the causes of
Fratricide and seek to eliminate
them
through changes to institutional practices and through developing new and
more
sophisticated technology for identifying friend or foe.
Background: Fratricide is an age-old problem. Modem
warfare is high paced,
mobile,
and technologically advanced. There is an apparent increase in fratricide
because
of these changes and the impact it makes on society demands that steps be
taken
to determine the causes and seek solutions. The causes of fratricide are
multiple.
The human element constitutes the largest cause and includes such
problems
as the stress of combat, inadequate training, lack of experience and just.
plain
negligence. Environment plays an unalterable role, complicating war through
darkness,
weather and terrain. Finally, technology is becoming an increasing
problem.
Today's sophisticated weapons can malfunction, be too lethal and their
speed
and effective range reduces reaction time and decreases the ability to
distinguish
between friend and foe. Solutions rest in improving man and improving
machine.
Soldiers require education in fratricide awareness and prevention and
increased
training under conditions as close to real combat as possible. They also
need
improvement in command and control, specifically situational awareness and
fire
discipline. Improvements in technology revolve around "smart" weapons
and
electronic
identification devices that either emit a friendly status or can determine
friend
or foe.
Recommendations: It is essential that the Army's impressive
advances in training,
education
and the research and development of technology to counter fratricide
continue
and be initiated by the other services, allies and coalition forces.
Title: Fratricide: Can It Be Stopped?
OUTLINE
Thesis: The military must identify the causes of
Fratricide and seek to eliminate
them
through changes to institutional practices and through developing new and
more
sophisticated technology for identifying friend or foe.
I. Fratricide
A. Definition
B. Background
II. Effects on Society
A. Civilian
1. Media Coverage
2. Attitude Towards Military
B. Military
l. Outcome of Conflict
2. Troops'
Fighting Ability
III. Causes
A. Human
Factor
1. Stress
2. Inadequate Training
3. Lack
of Experience
B. Environment
C. Technology
I. "High-Tech"
2. Equipment Malfunction
3. Lethality
IV. Solutions
A. Institutional
I. Education
2. Training
3. Sound Doctrine
4. Command and Control
B. Technology
I. Visual Identification Devices
2. Electronic Identification Devices
3. Research and Development
Fratricide: Can It Be Stopped?
by LCDR William
H. Ayers, United States Navy
In
every conflict there are losses imposed by the enemy. Although tragic, it
is an accepted part of the process. What is
difficult to accept are those losses
inflicted by one's own or allied forces. This is
fratricide, sometimes referred to as
amicicide or friendly fire. It is defined
by Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary as "one who murders or kills his
own brother or sister..." A more
appropriate "military" definition,
developed by the 1991 General Officer Steering
Committee, defines fratricide as "... the
employment of friendly weapons and
munitions with the intent to kill the enemy or
destroy his equipment that results in
unforeseen and unintentional death or injury to
friendly personnel."
Fratricide
is not a new problem. It occurred in every American conflict, from
plaguing George Washington during the
Revolutionary War, to the mortal
wounding of Stonewall Jackson at
Chancellorsville.(8:29) It was documented in
both World War I and II, accounted for
approximately 2% of those killed in action
(KIA) in the Korean War and 2.9% of KIA's in
Vietnam. (l 1:39) Most recently
fratricide reared its ugly head during the
United States participation in Desert
Storm where almost 25% of the casualties were
from friendly fire.(3:46) Neither is
it limited to one particular culture. Amicicide
occurred in ancient Greek and
Roman armies, made untimely appearances during
Napoleon's conquests and is
documented in the highly professional Israeli
forces.(8:29)
In
the past, accurate figures for how many and how often friendly fire
casualties occurred were difficult to obtain.
The incidents received little recognition
or did not get reported at all because the
causes were undetermined, victims and
their survivors were protected, or there was
fear of causing a public outcry.(8:31)
Desert storm changed all of that. Sensational
news and media coverage broadcast
friendly fire incidents for the entire world to
see. Equally important was that the
proportion and percentage of fratricide
casualties was greater than that of any
United States conflict in recent history. (3:46)
Even though these figures are biased
because the war was short, more thoroughly
investigated and the total number of
casualties was small , the message it sends is
clear.(I 1:40) Modem warfare is high
paced, mobile, and technologically advanced.
With it comes an evident increase in
fratricide, which, spurred by instantaneous
worldwide communications has affected
society as a whole and begs for action. It now
becomes paramount that the military
unravel this age-old problem by examining the
effects of fratricide on both the
civilian and military population;
researching how the human element; the
environments and technology causes fratricide:
and finally seeking to eliminate
these causes through changing the
"institutional" (10:30) practices of the military
as well as developing new and more sophisticated
technology for identification of
both friendly and enemy targets.
Regardless
of the statistics for fratricide, even one incident is too many and its
impact is felt in both the civilian and military
communities. The public does not
expect friendly fire casualties to occur (
especially in this age of computers and
high-tech equipment) and finds them hard to
accept or understand when they do
happen. Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Schrader
(USA, Ret) explains public
reaction in the following-excerpt from
"Friendly Fire: The Inevitable Price:"
Most
soldiers understand that such incidents are an unfortunate but natural
part of warfare. The civilian populace
is less likely to understand. The news
media have a tendency to blow friendly
fire incidents out of proportion, and
an ill-informed public reacts with
distrust, demands for retribution, and
remedies which are generally unhelpful.
The families of victims of friendly
fire display excusable anguish and
suspicion, which are often translated
into demands for investigations and
explanations which cannot be provided
with any degree of speed or accuracy
and thus often lead to unwarranted
charges of cover-up and malfeasance.
(8:41)
From
the military standpoint, as Lieutenant Colonel Shrader said, soldiers
accept fratricide as a part of battle. This was
brought home in a conversation this
author had with the commander of a Light Armored
Vehicle (LAV) company just
prior to G-day during Desert Storm. When asked
how he and his men felt about a
recent episode where an LAV had been destroyed
and people killed by friendly fire,
he responded by saying that it was their mission
to be on the front lines. LAV's
were mixed up with the enemy, it was at night
and hard to see. Nether he nor his
men held any ill will towards the attacker, it
was "part of their job." It is also
conceivable that fratricide could cause the loss
of a battle or even an entire war.
Using Stonewall Jackson's death as an example,
some have said that his loss
unbalanced General Lee so much that it caused
him to abandon the principles of
war at Gettysburg, to lose the battle, and
possibly even to influence the outcome of
the war. On a smaller scale, the resulting confusion
from such casualties could
cause a unit to reach a premature
"culminating point" and delay a victory or give
the enemy a second chance. While this may not
always be the case, there is little
doubt that friendly fire casualties have a
definite influence on troops' fighting
capability. Psychologically, it causes loss of
confidence, fear and hesitancy, which
may lead to lower morale and loss of
effectiveness on the battlefield.(8:40)
Fratricide
incidents generally fall into three major categories: the human
element, the environment, and technology.
However, it is also possible to have any
combination of the three. The human element is
probably the biggest reason for
fratricide and exists in many forms. The most
commonly seen are combat stress,
inadequate training, lack of experience and just
plain negligence.
"No other single factor produces as many instances of friendly fire
as does the
stress of combat... from the nervous soldier who
fires his rifle before properly
identifying his target to the commander who
orders his tanks to turn the wrong way
in the confusion of an operation." (8:39)
With the tremendous increase in military
"high-tech" equipment, another factor
adds to the stress of combat. "Psychologists
call it the 'Glass Cockpit Syndrome' - referring
to the ubiquitous computer screens.
It is a situation where the combination of a
flood of technical information, faulty
communications among crew members and outside
stress lead to major judgment
errors that can cause errors." (9) Such was
the case when the crew of U.S.S.
Vincennes faced with multiple emergencies,
failed to verity information received
and mistakenly shot down an Iranian civilian
airliner.
Inadequate
training and lack of experience leads
to human error during
combat and results in fratricide. Colonel George
Harmeyer and Major John Antal
in "Fire Discipline and Fratricide"
state that "combat is a confusing, mad mess. Any
one who has not experienced the degree of fear
and uncertainty that accompanies
combat cannot understand the true dimension of
the problem of `friendly fire'."
(4:27) Clausewitz called it the "fog of
war" and said that lack of training and
experience was its greatest contributor to what
he called "friction." A recent army
study on fratricide seems to agree that human
error may be the greatest cause:
The nervousness of green troops, a
lack of control or fire discipline imposed
by calm and decisive leaders, the lack
of adequate coordination of operations
by commanders and staff officers, and
disorientation, confusion, and carelessness
of pilots, gunners, or crewmen were the
predominant causes of most incidents.
(4:27)*
An example where human error caused
amicicide occurred when incorrect
powder charges were used during an artillery harassment
and interdiction fire in
1967 Vietnam, causing the rounds to land in
another U.S. fire base with resulting
casualties. The attacked fire base returned
fire, killing and wounding several from
the original base.(8:35) Lack of experience
played a large role in friendly fire
______________________
*
Original quote from James A. Blackwell, Center for Strategic International
Studies, reported in Times Union, Albany, NY., 21 July, 1991.
incidents during Desert Storm because the
"100-hour" ground war did not allow
time for the troops to become combat hardened.
(8:31)
The
final aspect of the human factor has been classified as negligence. In a
recent article by Captain Robert Jones entitled,
"Friendly Fire: Where Is the Weak
Link?" , he described two incidents that
happened to him during Operation Desert
Storm. In the first incident an Air Force A-10
opened fire on a building only a
couple of hundred meters away from a unit
accepting the surrender of an enemy
soldier. The pilot was apparently unaware that the
building was in friendly territory
and a no-fire zone. (6:63). Fortunately there were no casualties. The
second
incident also involved two A-I 0's who strafed
his convoy, wounding a corporal and
a corpsman. The convoy was on the friendly side
of the sand berm delineating the
fire support coordination line and the lead
vehicle had been identified with a VS-I 7
panel.
In both cases there was no visibility problems, no darkness, no ground
combat and no surface to air combat. As Captain
Jones states; "This was negligent
friendly fire. Somebody screwed up." (6:63)
Throughout
history the environment has plagued man during war. Darkness,
weather, and terrain virtually invite
opportunities for fratricide. Stonewall Jackson
was shot because he was not recognized by his
own troops when he returned from
reconnoitering in the dark. Poor visibility
during air operations caused many
friendly fire incidents during World War II.
Desert Storm was a prime example of
the effects of environment. The featureless
terrain made it extremely easy to get
lost, end up out of one's sector and be targeted
as the enemy. This was magnified
by the fact that modern warfare emphasizes night
attacks. These factors, combined
with the heavy rainstorms, sandstorms, and smoke
from the oil fires, (3:46) were
responsible for 11 of 13 fratricide incidents
identified by the Army.(10:31)
Advances
in technology are seen by many as the newest and deadliest cause
of friendly fire casualties:
Warfare has changed. No longer do
opponents line up behind two clearly
definable neat lines and bang away
at each other. Modern American
warfighting is now frontless and
emphasizes night attacks with heavy doses
of firepower, fast maneuvering, and
deep penetration.(3:46)
Indeed, the high speed at which some machinery
and weapons operate reduces
reaction time and in some cases the effective
range of the weapons is further than
the ability to identity the target friend or
foe.(1 :39) Colonel Hackworth in
"Friendly Fire' Casualties" states
that "[at great distances] tank gunners looking
through thermal sights and pilots flying at 200
miles per hour using precision
munitions can easily mistake friend for foe,
especially if a friendly is in enemy
territory or somewhere he is not supposed to be.
"(3:46-47) An example of
increased technology problems occurred in Desert
Storm when one set of Abrams
tanks mistakenly attacked and destroyed another
set of Abrams tanks and Bradley
fighting vehicles while using thermal sights
during inclement weather.(8:37)
Adding to this complexity is that if one is
fortunate and can identity a vehicle as an
enemy (such as Soviet equipment), that may not
be good enough. In today's
worldwide market of arms sales, many nations may
own Soviet equipment. During
Desert Storm some Arab allies operated the same
kinds of Soviet equipment as the
Iraqi's.(10:33)
Additional
problems with increased technology are the potential for
equipment malfunction and the tremendous
lethality of armament. Mechanical
difficulty with a bomb-release mechanism in World
War II during Operation Cobra
air support caused the dropping of bombs on the
30th Infantry Division, resulting
in many deaths and casualties.(8:33) An example
of equipment failure occurred
during Desert Storm when an Air Force A-10
missile fired at an enemy target,
malfunctioned, retargeted itself and destroyed a
Marine LAV.(3 :47) The lethality
of modern ammunition presented special problems
during Desert Storm. In several
instances; antitank rounds, fired at Iraqi
vehicles, went entirely through them and
hit U. S. armored vehicles hundreds of meters
behind them.(3:47)
The
causes of fratricide are many and in the areas of weather and terrain
virtually unalterable. So what can be done to
solve this problem? It has often been
said that admitting there is a problem is the
first step to its solution. Such is the case
with fratricide. There was little research done
in the past to solve identification
problems. Most of the military's time, effort
and money have gone into developing
more sophisticated and more lethal weapons, thus
creating a gap between the two.
Adding to this is the fact that since there have
been long periods of time between
conflicts, identification problems become less
of a priority.(3:47) Lessons learned
from Desert Storm brought fratricide to the
surface, where it became a recognized
problem and now receives a higher priority in
the military. Solutions being focused
on have been divided into two areas:
institutional, to include education, training,
sound doctrine and command and control; and
technological, to include developing
better equipment for the identification of
friend or foe.(I0:30). Simplified, it means
improving man and improving machine.
What
is being done to improve man? For a start, educating the soldier has
changed. The United States Army created the
Combat Identification Task Force
(CIT) in May of 1991. It is a multiple service
Task Force seeking to minimize
fratricide.(I0:31). Improvements made include
such things as fratricide warnings in
training manuals (examples: U.S. Army Field
Manual FM 71-2 The Tank and
Mechanized Task Force and a video tape entitled
Fratricide Awareness and
Prevention that identifies problems and possible
solutions and includes a section on
identifying friendly vehicle patterns through
thermal sights).(1:63)(7:35-36) Not
only does educating the soldier help, but
ensuring this doctrine is standardized from
service to service and understood by our allies
and coalition forces will
undoubtedly lower the risk of fratricide. This
will necessitate the revising of Joint
and Combined Warfare Doctrine to include
fratricide identification and prevention
and the formation of liaison teams to coordinate
with allied forces.(I 3:37)
Interwoven
with education is training. This enables the soldier to put his
learned skills to work. It is also an area where
great progress in fratricide
prevention has been made. In order to accomplish
this two things must occur.
Military personnel must receive more "on
the job" training than ever before and it
must come as close as possible to simulating
actual combat conditions. Such
conditions are duplicated at the Joint Readiness
Training Center at Fort Chaffee,
Arkansas, and the National Training Center where
friendly vehicles "appear" with
enemy vehicles during live fire exercises and
vehicle marking systems and vehicle
recognition are stressed. These measures appear
to have been successful. Fratricide
rates during subsequent training exercises
decreased from 12% to 7% and from
15% to 10%.(7:36) The Army went a step further
by actually purchasing foreign
equipment to use in training exercises to allow
soldiers to see exactly how enemy
and friendly vehicles look when mixed together
on the battlefield.(I 1:41)
As
more and more military personnel receive this training, friendly fire
incidents should decrease even further. These
changes in training should translate
into progress on the battlefield. For example,
during Desert Storm the 2nd Armored
Tank force contacted and destroyed two Iraqi
T-55 tanks. Two other vehicles were
seen near the burning tanks and an Abrams tank
gunner was given the order to fire.
Because the gunner had attended a master
gunner's course, he identified the thermal
signature as that of a Bradley fighting vehicle.
He informed his commander who
retracted the order to fire. The Sergeant's
advanced education and quick reaction
saved the lives of two scout vehicles that were
lost and forward of their zone. (7:34)
With
increased potential, however, there comes added risk. Placing too much
emphasis on fratricide awareness may lead to
hesitation on the battlefield, giving
the enemy the advantage of the first shot.(7:36)
This problem was also discussed by
a senior officer review group and CIT
representatives in October 1991 who gave
the following warning: "...We might reduce
the effectiveness of our combat units
to such an extent that we'd take greater losses
from enemy fire than we would
prevent in avoiding fratricide."(l0:32)
Reducing this loss of effectiveness involves
developing good leadership abilities in both
commissioned and noncommissioned
officers. The Army, Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) is revising
leadership development courses and teaching
risk-assessment methodology to
create a "balance" between the two
ends of the scale.(I 0:33)
A
final institutional improvement is in the field of command and control. This
field is broken down into two parts: situational
awareness and fire control
discipline. Situational awareness is knowing
where one is in relationship to both
friendly and enemy forces and keeping one's
command informed of such
relationships. It is a key factor in reducing
friendly fire casualties because given the
range and lethality of modern weapons, real time
knowledge of both the enemy and
friendly positions keeps one from targeting the
wrong forces and therefore
decreases amicicide opportunities.(I
:62-63) Ways of improving situational
awareness
include increased education
and training in
land navigation,
standardization of communications equipment and
stressing the importance of
keeping the command constantly informed of
location and movement. This
facilitates real time plotting of friendly
forces. (7:36) This is a must in joint and
combined operations where standardized equipment
and doctrine are not yet the
norm. Progress was made during Desert Storm when
mobile training teams were
dispatched by the Army to each coalition
command. It was their job to educate the
allied commanders and their troops in
situational awareness.(I 0:32)
Fire
control discipline is another aspect of combat where improvements are
possible. Fire control is managing the targeting
and destruction of the enemy by
ground-to-ground, ground-to-air, air-to-ground,
and air-to-air weapons systems. In
the past, the majority of friendly fire
incidents were from artillery. During World
War I up to 75,000 friendly casualties came from
artillery fire. With the increased
use of artillery and air power in World War II ,
the Korean War and Vietnam, the
percentages went up.(4:26) Again, with the
increased range and lethality of today's
weapons systems, ensuring good fire control
discipline is vital in controlling
amicicide.
Planning
is a good place to start. Knowing the scheme of maneuver and
identifying decision points are mandatory for a
commander to maintain control. He
must also either designate or rename aware of
engagement areas and no-fire zones.
In addition, methods of starting and stopping
fires should be agreed upon before
operations begin. Paramount with good planning
is commander's intent. This is the
ability of the commander to make his intentions
understood from his staff all the
way down to the soldier operating the weapons
system. If every one in the unit
knows what to do, when to do it and rehearses
it, the plan will go well and friendly
casualties can be avoided. Another crucial
aspect of fire control discipline is the
coordination between the commander and the Fire
Support Officer (FSO). The
designated FSO has the authority to approve fire
support. lt is vital that when the
FSO must provide fire support outside his zone
he must coordinate with the
commander of that zone in order to prevent
premature fire or fire in the wrong
location. Finally, discipline must be enforced.
Modem combat is fast paced and
chaotic and oftentimes split-second decisions
are necessary. This is when the
chance for fratricide is greatest. Commanders
must display leadership under
pressure and ensure that their subordinates are
well trained and strict discipline is
maintained. (4:28)
The
second "avenue of approach" for solutions to fratricide resides in
technology, specifically the ability to identify
friend or foe. Attempts to identify
friendly forces to prevent fratricide appeared
in World War II. The only method of
identification at that time was visual. During
Operation Cobra, allied artillery
marked the northern limit of the target with
smoke, ground troops placed
identification panels in their area and all
vehicles had their white stars
repainted.(8:33) As recently as Desert Storm,
visual identification was utilized,
using fluorescent VS-I 7 panels and chemical
lights on U. S. vehicles and the upside
down `V' on coalition vehicles.(1-58) Visual
identification does, however, have its
limitations. One is the lack of visibility
caused by weather conditions and smoke.
This was painfully obvious by the number of
fratricide casualties the allies
sustained during Operation Cobra. Another
limitation is lack of visibility due to
sheer distance. Today's weapons systems often
identity and destroy targets at ranges
greater than can be visualized. Obviously, if a
soldier cannot see it he cannot
identify it as friend or foe.
A
second, more recent, technology involves the use of electronic identification
devices. These devices can either pick up or
receive infrared, light, or heat sources
that will help identity friendly or enemy
equipment and greatly reduce fratricide.
The most familiar of these is the Identification
Foe or Friendly (IFF). Currently
used on aircraft to identity other aircraft as
enemy or friendly, such a device used
with ground forces would enable them to send a
signal to any vehicle and
determine whether it is friendly or not.(7:35)
Other
devices used during Desert Storm include thermal tape, BUDD light,
DARPA light and Global Positioning System (GPS).
Thermal tape stands out
against the signature of tanks and other
vehicles. Its advantages are cost efficiency,
easy obtainability, and visibility only with night vision equipment. Its
disadvantages include invisibility when dirty
and vision limited to 10,000
meters.(7:34)
The
BUDD light is an infrared beacon named after its inventor at the Army
Night Vision Lab. It is powered by a nine-volt
battery and can be identified by both
air and ground vehicles. It is an effective
device but has a limited range. The
DARPA light, designed by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (hence
the name), is also an infrared beacon. It has an
adjustable light and can be
identified by thermal sensors at 5000 meters or
more. The DARPA light is larger
than the BUDD light and requires more battery
power.(7-34-35)
The
GPS uses overhead satellites and electronic signals to accurately identity
the locations of troops and vehicles. A smaller
version, Small Lightweight Global
Positioning System (SLGPS), was used extensively
in Desert Storm. Although few
in number, they were so successful that the Army
is doing its best to equip all its
contingency forces with the (SLGPS) in the near
future.(10:34)
Further
developments are in the works and should be off the drawing board in
the next few years. Such advances may include: A
tent shaped thermal beacon that,
when placed in a high position on combat
vehicles and rotated, emits alternating
hot and cold signatures; a computerized compass
that enables tanks to know in
what direction they are headed and the position
of their gun tubes; and a laser
system that warns vehicle crews they are being
targeted by friendly forces and
allows them to contact the emitter and prevent
the accident from occurring.(7:3 5)
Far
term solutions involve developing noncooperative target identification,
meaning that one could be identified as friend
or foe without initiating anything.
They would be identified passively using visual
means, a beam, radar or by
sound.(I 0:34) Solutions of this nature involve
programming "anti-fratricide"
hardware into vehicles and their weapons
systems(10:34) and equipping individual
weapons systems like TOW and DRAGON missiles
with the ability to identify
targets as friend or foe.(2: 11)
Looking
even further down the road, there are improvements being made in
the technology for the individual soldier. The
soldier of the year 2000 may be
wearing what is now known as the Soldier
Individual Protective Ensemble. One
such system, The Enhanced Integrated Soldier
System (TEISS), will contain
several "anti-fratricide" devices.
First is an integrated headgear system that will
provide advance target recognition and
acquisition, enhanced night vision, and an
indirect viewing system (seeing around corners).
In addition, the suit would contain
a computer with an 80 megabyte hard drive that
could display a GPS system,
digital maps, compass bearings and messages,
greatly increasing situational
awareness. Finally his rations would contain
flameless heaters to warm food and
act as a thermal identification device to
prevent friendly fire.(5 :49-50)
Whatever
the device, all should have the following in common. "... be simple,
not easily exploited by enemy forces, cost
effective, have a day or night all-weather
capability and be deployable to coalition
forces. "(13:39) This is a tall order and not
easily accomplished. At this point in time any
device that emits can be "heard" by
the enemy and targeted. In addition, just about
every military force has access to
night vision equipment. Add to these
difficulties the present situation where
military funding is at its lowest, research and
development of this technology will
become tough to accomplish. But as Brigadier
General Paul K. Van Riper stated;
"`Friendly fire' as in all wars, had tragic
results. This is a problem insufficiently
studied in the past. The time has come to devote
a significant effort to ensure that
we reduce incidents in future
conflicts."(12:61)
Many
factors contribute to fratricide and just as many solutions exist to
reduce its incidence. Broken down into its basic
elements, fratricide and fratricide
prevention center around two ideals: the human
element and technology. Advances
in machines and equipment are coming but when
and if they do arrive they must
still be operated and controlled by man, for
even "the best equipment poorly
employed will not lessen friendly fire
casualties." (13:39) There is no panacea for
fratricide. Machines malfunction and humans make
mistakes. There must be a
balance between the two. The Army has taken
significant steps in increasing the
amount of education and the level of
sophistication of training of its people. The
Army is also the forerunner in research and
development of electronic identification
devices. It is absolutely essential that this
new-found dedication spreads to the other
services, allies and coalition forces. Every
improvement, no matter how small, is
truly significant and brings one closer to the
" cure." Unless it continues
to be a
high priority and all the military branches
become involved, the act of killing one's
brother-- FRATRICIDE-- will hound us to the end
of time.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Dickson, Col. Dwight B. and Capt.
Elrin L. Hundley. "Avoiding Not So
Friendly
Fire." Military Review July 92: 57-64.
2. Directorate of Combat Developments, Army
Infantry School. "Combat
Identification."
Infantry July-August 92:10-12.
3. Hackworth, Col. David H.
"Friendly Fire' Casualties. " Marine Corps
Gazette
March 92: 46-48.
4. Harmeyer, Col. George H. and Maj.
John F. Antal. "Fire Discipline
And
Fratricide. " Army March 92: 26-28.
5. Hasenauer,. Heike. "Glimpsing
the Future Soldier. " Soldiers November
92:
49-50.
6. Jones, Capt. Robert A. "Friendly Fire: Where Is the Weak
Link?" Marine
Corps
Gazette June 92: 63.
7. Miles, Donna. "Fighting Friendly Fire."
Soldiers September 92: 34-36.
8. S.
Shrader, Charles R. "Friendly Fire: The Inevitable Price."
Parameters
Autumn
92: 29-43.
9. Squires, Sally. "The `Glass
Cockpit' Syndrome." Washington Post
11
Oct 88.
10 Steele, Dennis. "Keeping Friendly
Fire Friendly." Army March 92: 30-34.
11. Usry, Jr., Capt. Floyd J. "Stop
Killing Each Other!" Marine Corps Gazette
September
92: 39-41.
12. Van Riper, BGen. Paul K.
"Observations During Desert Storm." Marine
Corps
Gazette June 91:55-61.
13. Washabaugh, Maj. Bradford G.
"Friendly Fire: Time For Action." Marine
Corps
Gazette September 92: 37-39.
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