Entering The Golden Age With The Composite Warfare/ Amphibious Doctrine Dilemma
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: ENTERING THE GOLDEN AGE WITH THE COMPOSITE WARFARE/
AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE DILEMMA
AUTHOR: Major T. D. Waldhauser, United States Marine Corps
THESIS: What must the Marine Corps do to ensure amphibious
operations are compatible with how the fleet fights today and
in the future? It must move aggressively towards developing
effective command relationships under the Composite Warfare
Commander (CWC) concept, resulting in updating current
amphibious doctrine and a continuing peacetime training
environment that will refine the CWC initiatives.
BACKGROUND: Force structure reductions and continued intense
operational commitments will require naval forces to be much
more efficient in the years ahead. This, of course, includes
amphibious forces. As the aircraft carrier will continue to
be the centerpiece for forward deployed naval forces, the
requirement for amphibious forces to be able to rapidly and
effectively integrate with the carrier battle group is more
important than ever before. Consequently, the time has come
for the amphibious forces to get onboard with how the fleet
fights today and how it intends to fight into the next
century. This means that amphibious forces must come to
grips with the CWC doctrine. Amphibious doctrine, which is
an outgrowth of World War II, and CWC doctrine, an early
1980S development, have never had any connection with each
other. If Marines, coming from the sea, are to exploit the
capabilities of amphibious forces in both traditional and
nontraditional roles, we must begin in earnest in attempting
to find ways to demonstrate the Marine Corps' aggregate use-
fulness through the CWC doctrine. As the Commandant has
said, the time is now to "challenge many of our ground rules
and assumptions" regarding the employment of naval expedi-
tionary forces.
RECOMMENDATION: The Marine Corps must lead the way in
integrating CWC principles into current amphibious doctrine
where appropriate.
ENTERING THE GOLDEN AGE WITH THE COMPOSITE
WARFARE/AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE DILEMMA
OUTLINE
Thesis: What must the Marine Corps do to ensure amphibious
operations are compatible with how the fleet fights today and
in the future? It must move aggressively towards developing
effective command relationships under the Composite Warfare
Commander (CWC) concept, resulting in updating current
amphibious doctrine and a continuing peacetime training
environment that will refine the CWC initiatives.
I. The issues
A. Importance of efficient and effective amphibious integration
B. Traditional amphibious doctrine
C. Current Navy fleet operations
II. The "two-doctrine dilemma"
A. CWC operations
B. Concerns for Marines
III. Integration of amphibious operations into CWC
A. OTC/CWC/CATF proposal
B. Component/OTC/landing force commander relations
C. The importance of the MCLF (when required)
IV. Update/revision of amphibious doctrine
A. AOA
B. Strike warfare and amphibious operations
V. Peacetime operations to refine CWC initiatives
A. Non-traditional MAGTF requirements
B. Traditional amphibious MAGTFs
C. Cost-effective simulations
ENTERING THE GOLDEN AGE WITH THE COMPOSITE
WARFARE/AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE DILEMMA
I can't think of a time in our history when such a
topic (Naval Expeditionary Forces and Power Projec-
tion: Into the 21st Century) was more relevant to
our Nation, or when the future was more conducive to
the employment of naval expeditionary forces, than
today.
General Carl E. Mundy, Jr.
20 November 1991
The nation's naval forces are currently working in
earnest on developing a maritime strategy that will take us
into the next century and beyond. Our Commandant has
indicated that we are entering a "golden age" for the utility
of naval forces. To say that this is a time to challenge
many of our "ground rules and assumptions" about Marines
coming from the sea is probably an understatement. (15:15)
Current force reductions serve to underscore the need to
demonstrate the aggregate usefulness and ability of our
amphibious forces to significantly contribute to the
national maritime strategy. Consequently, what must the
Marine Corps do to ensure amphibious operations are
compatible with how the fleet fights today and in the
future? It must move aggressively towards developing
effective command relationships under the Composite Warfare
Commander (CWC) concept resulting in updating current
amphibious doctrine, and a continuing peacetime training
environment that will refine the CWC initiatives.
Although the demands of our evolving maritime strategy
require naval forces that possess a wide variety of capabil-
ities, the aircraft carrier will remain the primary
warfighting element and the centerpiece of a balanced fleet.
Moreover, during the l990s, it will probably become common-
place to adjust the composition of forward deployed carrier
battle groups and amphibious ready groups routinely, in order
to suit specific situations. (5:42) In effect, this means
that small Marine forward-deployed expeditionary forces, or
large powerful amphibious MAGTFs must be able to adapt
quickly, demonstrate true operational and tactical
flexibility, and be innovative in their employment methods.
Accordingly, the question becomes how can amphibious forces
along with the evolving carrier battle group forces join
together to achieve more efficient and effective integration
that will ultimately contribute to the overall success of a
"naval campaign?"
As most readers know, today's naval forces fight
utilizing the CWC doctrine. Further, the issue of amphibious
forces integrating in a CWC environment is not new. Never-
theless, it still remains an emotional argument where, in
many cases, "doctrine purists take their stand against
doctrine radicals." (6:3) In order to better understand
some of the important issues regarding amphibious forces and
CWC, a brief look at this two-doctrine dilemma is required.
Current amphibious doctrine is contained in JCS Pub 3-02,
formerly NWP-22-B/LFM-01. Although this current doctrine
remains an outgrowth of World War II fighting concepts where
hundreds of amphibious and support ships were assigned to the
Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), it remains sound.
(18:17) First written in 1958 and issued in 1962, the
current revision of JCS Pub 3-02 is dated 1 November 1986.
Figure 1 provides the current basic amphibious relationships.
Click here to view image
Current Navy fleet doctrine is quite a few years
"younger" than amphibious doctrine. During the 1970s, the
Soviet Armed Forces made significant improvements in weapons,
sensors, and missile delivery systems for use against naval
forces. Consequently, a new concept for our naval forces to
defend against this credible threat that greatly reduced
friendly force reaction time was necessary. Past fleet
doctrine did not provide adequate flexibility to counter this
threat. A realignment of surveillance and reaction responsi-
bilities with greater emphasis on decentralized authority
resulted in the Navy's development of the composite warfare
commander (CWC) concept. (11:29-1)
NWP 10-1, Composite Warfare Commander Manual of June
1985, is the confidential publication which promulgates
standardized doctrine, organization, and general procedures
for the command and control of U.S. naval forces afloat.
Although this document has been modified by various Tactical
Memorandums (Tac memos), this is how the fleet fights today
and will continue to do so into the next century. Therefore,
it is easy to see that the CWC concept evolved much later
than amphibious doctrine. Moreover, these two doctrines have
never had any connection with each other.
This "two-doctrine dilemma" goes right to the heart of a
principal obstacle in the utilization of Marine forces in
today's amphibious operations. In his article, "MAGTF
Operations with the Fleet in the Year 2000," Colonel William
Rakow states the following:
Command relationships and "rice bowl" battles
inevitably hinder efforts to solve the current two-
doctrine dilemma. The amphibious Navy and many
Marines cling to a separate document to protect
their identity and status. Unfortunately, this is a
"head in the sand" approach because the rest of the
Navy is pressing on developing the tactics and
operational concepts on how it intends to fight the
next battle. Amphibious forces, Navy and Marine,
are being left behind, and few in the rest of the
Navy are very concerned about it.
The amphibious Navy and the Marine Corps have not come to
grips with this ever-widening gap. Further, Marines must
take the lead to move quickly to develop effective command
relationships that will facilitate the conduct of amphibious
operations under the CWC concept. This is certainly more
important than ever before in view of future carrier battle
group/amphibious ready group operations that were previously
discussed.
Before citing several examples of problems associated
with the CWC/amphibious doctrine dilemma, a brief description
of composite warfare is appropriate. It is not the intention
of this paper to make readers CWC experts, but to provide a
framework to better understand the problem that has been
alluded to thus far.
The battle group commander, normally called the officer
in tactical command (OTC), has overall responsibility for
successfully accomplishing the mission of the force.
Subordinate to the OTC, the CWC directs the efforts of the
force in tactical sea control in the manner best suited to
the tactical situation. In most cases with only one battle
group, the OTC and CWC are the same individual. (This may
not be the case in battle force operations.) Separate
warfare commanders are responsible to the CWC for recognizing
and effectively countering rapidly developing threats to the
force in their warfare area. These warfare commanders have
tactical control over assigned assets. Some examples of
warfare commanders are anti-air warfare commander (AAWC),
anti-surface commander (ASUWC), anti-submarine warfare
commander (ASWC), and strike-warfare commander (STWC).
The OTC/CWC may retain any or all warfare functions, but
generally, the function is delegated to that subordinate best
equipped to accomplish it, such as the AAWC. The CWC then
controls by negation. A significant principle of the CWC
doctrine is that "when authorized by the CWC, the warfare
commanders have tactical control of resources assigned and
may autonomously initiate action." (4:2-2) Accordingly, the
OTC/CWC expects the individual actions of the warfare
commanders to have a synergistic effect that results in an
effective defense behind which the task force can safely
carry out its primary mission.
In addition to the primary warfare commanders, the CWC
will assign supporting coordinators (electronic warfare,
submarine element, air element) who support the CWC and
warfare commanders by executing policy, but who are not
authorized to initiate autonomous action.
To illustrate, a carrier, with a two-star Admiral as the
Carrier Group Commander embarked, could be the CWC. The
remainder of the force could be a Destroyer Squadron
Commander (0-6) embarked on a Spruance Clear Destroyer as
AWSC, the commander (0-6) of an Aegis class cruiser as the
AAWC, and the commander (0-6) of the carrier as ASUWC. The
various ships, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and submarines
would be allocated to the warfare commanders, based on the
threat. It is also possible for one ship to work simulta-
neously for two warfare commanders. (6:10)
Perhaps the central theme of the CWC doctrine is best
summarized in chapter four of NWP 10-1 that indicates this
doctrine provides for varying degrees of decentralization
while the CWC oversees and coordinates these individual
efforts. Additionally, the CWC keeps warfare commanders
appraised of information from external sources, maintains an
overall picture of the battle, and intervenes to redirect
operations where appropriate. Figure 2 provides the current
CWC organization.
Click here to view image
What should be clear by now, especially to Marines, is
that amphibious forces are not always an "easy fit" into
current fleet operations. Moreover, Lieutenant Commander
Terry Pierce, in his article titled, "MAGTF Warlords: A
Naval Perspective," goes so far as to say that the command
relations issue is the obstacle that must be overcome in
order to achieve one doctrine for all naval forces. There-
fore, any solution to the "two doctrine dilemma" command
relations issue must take these factors into consideration.
Figure 3 illustrates a proposed solution to the doctrinal
and command relationship issues indicated above. This is
done by inserting an amphibious warfare commander into the
CWC organization. Further, the command relationships that
are shown complement the operational authority and unity of
command that the OTC/CWC provides to the naval forces.
Click here to view image
Discussion of this proposal begins with what Colonel
Rakow referred to as a "rice bowl." Specifically, the role
of CATF. The amphibious navy has gone to great lengths to
"protect the identity and status" of this individual.
Memories of large-scale amphibious operations during World
War II are just that--memories. This is not to say that the
amphibious operation is a military capability that is no
longer relevant. Quite the contrary. As previously
indicated, the expeditionary nature and crisis-response value
that the Navy/Marine team contributes to our national
military strategy is more important today than ever before.
The fact is that today's amphibious task force would only
have been a small transport group in the Pacific Campaign of
World War II. This point, combined with how the Navy fights
today with its advanced tactical systems under the CWC
concept, clearly places the CATF in a diminished role in the
overall process.
Hence, in order to ensure that the proposed command
relations facilitate the use of amphibious forces, this
solution, which is similar to some fleet Tac memos, changes
the name of CATF to an amphibious warfare commander (AWC).
This would provide the same "status" to the AWC as given to
the other warfare commanders. The AWC will retain the
majority of his current responsibilities/functions with
respect to the landing force. (This will be discussed in
greater detail later.)
It is important to point out that by designating the
"integrated" task force OTC/CWC as "CATF," the amphibious
task force (ATF) now comprises the carrier battle group
(CVBG) and all warfare commanders and coordinators, including
the landing force. And, of course, all are working toward a
common objective. As a result, because the OTC/CWC has the
primary mission of successfully conducting the amphibious
operation, he should be more inclined to provide the AWC with
the assets he needs to accomplish the amphibious operation.
(10:9)
Simply stated, the AWC, upon receipt of a mission, would
plan and execute an amphibious operation in much the same
manner as has been done in the past. The AWC is a functional
warfare commander who exercises operational control over
amphibious shipping and naval gunfire ships. Additionally,
he is responsible for the planning, embarkation, transporta-
tion, landing, and support for the landing force during the
ship-to-shore movement.
Further, the significant difference is that under the CWC
concept, the requirement for the establishment of an
amphibious objective area with significant assets "chopped"
to the AWC probably would not be required. Changing the
present-day CATF to a warfare commander raises more issues
than will be addressed here. However, several points warrant
brief discussion.
It should be readily apparent why this issue is so contro-
versial. The illustrious heritage of amphibious doctrine
does not easily lend itself to distinct and major change.
What must be kept in mind is that while this proposal may
negate some of the status of the former CATF, it would allow
amphibious forces improved opportunities to contribute on the
battlefield.
Under this proposal, the Landing Force Commander (LFC)
would be a MAGTF commander of general officer rank. This
role/function would be much the same as is the current CLF in
amphibious operations. The LFC would work in close coordi-
nation with the AWC in preparing detailed landing documents
for review/approval by the OTC (CATF) and the Marine
Commander Landing Force. This would maintain key doctrinal
relationships established in JCS Pub 3-02. Furthermore, the
LFC would be coequal with the AWC for planning and then
become OPCON until termination of the amphibious operation.
The final item to be discussed in this proposal is the
Marine Commander Landing Force (MCLF). The requirement for
this two-or-three star general officer to participate may not
always exist. This could be the case where the scenario
called for component commanders, to include the Navy and
Marine Corps or all services to be colocated ashore. By
being together ashore, these two components could establish
the command architecture that would be most efficient for the
OTC and MAGTF commander to operate within. Incidentally,
this is a prime example of how components actually "shape"
the battlefield for the warfighters. Nevertheless, if this
billet is "institutionalized" in doctrine, the ability to
"insert" the MCLF when appropriate will be easier.
Under this proposal, the MCLF has a very important posi-
tion of responsibility. He would embark on the same ship as
the OTC and be the MAGTF commander's direct representative
for coordination. This would be especially true if a large
portion of the MEF was already established ashore. His staff
would be extremely small--less than 10 Marine officers. His
function is not to plan details of amphibious operations.
This would remain with the LFC/ AWC. His reason for
existence is to personally "advise" the OTC on how best to
task/exploit Marine forces. If additional support for
Marines afloat or ashore becomes an issue, he would be
collocated with the OTC and in position to properly influence
the action. And, after all, the OTC has "all the bats and
balls."
Critics of this type of proposal say that establishing a
"MCLF" is redundant and adds an unnecessary layer to the
Marine command structure which will ultimately slow down and
complicate planning. Based on the MCLF's functions described
above, this billet in the overall structure can only
positively contribute to overall mission accomplishment.
Furthermore, this is especially important for "education" at
the OTC level.
Historically, the requirement for Marines to apprise
naval officers on the employment and capabilities of Marines
to execute a wide spectrum of missions has always been
prevalent. Desert Storm was no exception. In official
after-action reports, one senior Marine commander indicated
that his biggest frustration of the war was trying to get the
Navy staff/commanders to understand how to employ Marines.
(21:320) Additionally, it seemed that those few officers who
did understand the amphibious assault had virtually no
innovative ideas on how to exploit the training, organization
and equipment that Marines currently possess. Granted, there
have been some positive steps taken regarding the formal
education of more Navy and Marine officers in each others'
tactics, priorities and concerns. However, the need for
landing force personnel to provide insight to Navy planners
on the operational and tactical capabilities of MAGTF forces
will always exist. The MCLF and his staff proposed in Figure
3 can accomplish this very important requirement.
The proposal indicated here is certainly not the only
solution for more efficient integration of amphibious/carrier
forces. Additionally, it must be pointed out that the CWC
doctrine is certainly still evolving as well. The number of
point papers and Tac memos written on this issue are many.
Regardless of which particular way the command relations
wire-diagrams are drawn, the most important item to remember
about the CWC structure is that CWC is situation dependent
based on platforms available, commander's personalities, and
functions that need to be performed. Indeed, it is
interesting to point out that just prior to the start of
Desert Storm in January 1991, a two-star Marine General was
"introduced" onboard USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19) as COMUSMARCENT
(FWD). In addition to providing coordination between I MEF
Marines ashore and NAVCENT Marines afloat, he and his staff
performed many of the same functions that are outlined for
the "MCLF" in the above paragraphs.
From the discussions thus far, it should be apparent that
amphibious doctrine would need to be updated or changed.
Current concepts of determining basic decisions, coordinating
supporting arms, and conducting ship-to-shore movement as
well as many others are sound and should not change.
Doctrine that is outdated or that is valid but will not fit
into the CWC structure should be discarded. (18:19)
The word doctrine many times evokes strong emotions from
Marines and Naval officers--especially when discussing
amphibious operations. After all, amphibious doctrine was
written and refined during the "glory years" of the Pacific
Campaign during World War II. For purposes of this paper, I
would like to provide two illustrations of where our current
doctrine needs to be updated or changed in order to achieve
the integration under the CWC concept that will be required
from amphibious forces in future conflicts.
The first issue deals with the amphibious objective area
(AOA). Current amphibious doctrine has CATF supreme in the
AOA and in command of all units and forces. This does not
allow for the CWC to be the one in charge of all battle group
forces per CWC doctrine. If CATF and CWC are not the same,
who is really in charge of the AOA? In today's world,
amphibious doctrine says CATF, but the CWC in actuality is
the one who has all of the battle group assets at his
disposal. (6:13)
An example that somewhat illustrates this point comes
from Operation Desert Storm. This particular situation deals
with the fundamental issue of the establishment of the
amphibious objective area (AOA) for a limited duration
mission, where fleet operations utilizing the CWC concept
were ongoing.
Although never executed, amphibious forces were tasked to
conduct a destruction raid on Faylaka Island prior to the
commencement of ground operations. As stated in the ATF
concept of operations, an AOA would be activated at H-3. All
events prior to H-3 were to be controlled and deconflicted
without an AOA by CWC commands external to the CATF.
Further, the raid was to be conducted within the
air/sea-space covered by established CWC commanders.
Clearly in this case, the OTC and CWC were going to need
some convincing that the best way to operate under these
circumstances was to give up AAW and ASUW responsibilities to
the CATF within the AOA. Numerous questions arise, not the
least of which is CATF's capability to prosecute an AAW war
with organic assets. In the case of this operation, it
appeared this was to be accomplished by a theoretical "chop"
of AAW carrier-air to the CATF. While this works well as a
solution on paper, a major shift in well-established command
and control just three hours prior to the raid should not be
underestimated. Was the CATF clinging dogmatically to the
amphibious doctrinal requirement for the establishment of an
AOA? Would the establishment of an AOA have been counter-
productive in this case? In the extreme, was the execution
of the raid mission put in serious jeopardy over this AOA
issue?
The second issue of regarding doctrine update or revision
that I would like to briefly discuss is that of the role of
strike warfare and amphibious operations. No one pretends to
have all of the answers in this area. However, I think it is
important to briefly address the issue because any discussion
of updated amphibious doctrine needs to consider the offen-
sive capibilities of strike warfare.
As previously stated, CWC was initially a "defensive
oriented" doctrine. It was not until late 1986 when the
strike warfare commander formally became part of the overall
CWC chain of command. Evolutionary improvements in strike
warfare training and responsibilities have moved this
position to be expanded significantly into the amphibious
operations arena and controlling air sorties in support of
the CATF. The carrier air group (CAG) staff has the experts
that can properly plan the type of close air support and
interdiction strikes that are mandatory during a successful
amphibious assault. (8:9)
Currently, there is no Marine on the CAG staff. (8:14)
Additionally, the tactical air control group (TACGRU) staff,
which provides CATF expertise in air support planning,
routinely lacks adequate expertise to ensure the amphibious
task force has integrated strike warfare support. Conse-
quently, there are some that feel that the STWC needs to be
in a position to be better able to provide the CATF/CLF their
strike support requirements. In order to have a feel and
understanding of these requirements, especially those of the
landing force, it has been suggested that the STWC embark
onboard the CATF flagship for amphibious operations. This
idea is obviously a major point of contention. Nonetheless,
it should be pointed out that just prior to the start of the
ground war during Desert Storm, a briefing team from I MEF
was dispatched to each carrier in the Persian Gulf. The
purpose of the team's briefing was to ensure that naval
commanders and pilots clearly saw how their "strike" role
contributed to the MEF ground campaign. The issues of fire
support control measures, target identification, synchroniza-
tion, and flank protection of the First Marine Division were
discussed. Most important was the need for the intent of the
MAGTF commander to be understood by these naval aviators.
Simply put, our amphibious doctrine needs to address
"head-on" the issue of effective and efficient use of naval
aviation in support of the overall "naval campaign."
It has been said that the purpose of doctrine is to
provide the theoretical basis for which decisions on how to
fight or conduct the battle can be made. Therefore, the next
step in improving the integration of amphibious forces and
carrier battle groups under the CWC doctrine would be to
pursue peacetime training operations that will refine these
CWC/doctrinal revision initiatives.
The first aspect of training that needs to be addressed
is that of the nontraditional MAGTF. Within recent years,
the likelihood of the deployment/employment of nontraditional
amphibious MAGTFs has been prevalent. As a result of the
previously stated force structure reductions, this trend is
very likely to continue.
A recent example of how CWC procedures and a nontradi-
tional MAGTF "integrated" was in 1988 during Operation
Earnest Will in the Persian Gulf. During this period, in
order to combat what General George Crist referred to as
"guerrilla warfare at sea," the Navy made the unprecedented
move to make the commander of contingency MAGTF 2-88, a
warfare commander within the CWC concept. Coincidentally,
Colonel Rakow, who was quoted earlier in this paper, was the
commanding officer of this nontraditional MAGTF. Accord-
ingly, he was a major warfare commander provided with wide
latitude to accomplish assigned missions. In his article,
"Marines in the Gulf-1988," Colonel Rakow points out how
teamwork and cooperation among the warfare commanders kept
conflicting situations to a minimum. Also, good communica-
tions with the OTC allowed the "flag to be raised" when
necessary.
In short, we must institutionalize "operational
experiences" such as this through peacetime training. Not
only for the purpose of refining CWC initiatives, but also to
begin to develop concepts and tactics for other nontradi-
tional operations such as the potential sea control mission
utilizing the LHD/LHA when a carrier is not readily
available.
The second area of training that continually needs to be
stressed is the integration of large and powerful amphibious
forces for use in forcible-entry missions. As you might
expect, this effort has been ongoing. Third Fleet, for
example, where much of the initial integration with amphib-
ious forces and CWC operations began, has carried out several
large-scale naval operations over the past decade. Further,
many of the concepts discussed in this paper have been
attempted-- especially in the RIMPAC and KERNAL BLITZ
exercise series.
Emphasis in these exercises must go further in
challenging all concerned with the most likely scenarios,
missions, and command relations issues possible. An example
might be issuing an Initiating Directive that arrives while
the CVBG and ATF are at sea. This would require the OTC,
CWC, CATF and CLF to hammer out the best possible means of
conducting the assigned missions in a time sensitive environ-
ment. And incidentally, the day of the Initiating Directive
providing all of the answers to all concerned is probably
long past anyway.
Finally, in a time where fiscal constraints, intense
operational tempo, and the elimination of standing MAGTF
staffs are the norm, Navy and Marine staffs must continue an
aggressive program of "amphibious integration" wargames in
order to discuss, refine, and adopt or reject CWC
initiatives.
This paper began with a quote from our Commandant on the
utility of naval expeditionary forces as we enter a "golden
age" for the use of naval forces. General Mundy also indi-
cated the necessity to challenge many of our ground rules and
assumptions in the employment of these forces. The concepts
and changes proposed in this paper will take some basic
rearranging in the mind-set of Marines and Navy officers from
within the various warfare communities. Revision of
amphibious doctrine is an emotional issue. Nonetheless, the
time has come to make evolutionary change to our amphibious
doctrine. In view of what the future may hold regarding the
size and structure of the Naval service, these concepts must
be tried and adopted in the spirit of true naval integration
and joint warfighting. Ultimately, it is the Marines who
move swiftly to spearhead these revisions. Exploiting the
capabilities of our amphibious forces is what is most
important. Clinging to doctrine that is no longer relevant
and doing things the same way as always because of a "rice
bowl" mentality is simply foolish.
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