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Entering The Golden Age With The Composite Warfare/ Amphibious Doctrine Dilemma
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA Warfighting
				EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE:    ENTERING  THE  GOLDEN AGE WITH THE COMPOSITE WARFARE/
          AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE DILEMMA
AUTHOR:   Major T. D. Waldhauser, United States Marine Corps
THESIS:      What  must the Marine Corps do to ensure amphibious
operations   are compatible with how the fleet fights today and
in  the  future?  It must move aggressively towards developing
effective  command  relationships  under the Composite Warfare
Commander     (CWC)   concept,  resulting  in  updating  current
amphibious    doctrine  and  a  continuing  peacetime  training
environment that will refine the CWC initiatives.
BACKGROUND:   Force structure reductions and continued intense
operational  commitments  will require naval forces to be much
more  efficient in the years ahead.  This, of course, includes
amphibious forces.   As the aircraft carrier will continue to
be  the  centerpiece  for  forward  deployed naval forces, the
requirement   for  amphibious   forces to be able to rapidly and
effectively   integrate with    the carrier battle group is more
important  than  ever before.  Consequently, the time has come
for  the  amphibious  forces to get onboard with how the fleet
fights  today  and how  it  intends  to  fight  into the next
century.    This  means  that  amphibious  forces must come to
grips  with  the  CWC doctrine.  Amphibious doctrine, which is
an  outgrowth  of World War  II,  and CWC doctrine, an early
1980S  development, have never had any connection with each
other.    If  Marines, coming from the sea, are to exploit the
capabilities  of  amphibious  forces  in  both traditional and
nontraditional  roles,  we must begin in earnest in attempting
to  find  ways to demonstrate the Marine Corps' aggregate use-
fulness  through  the  CWC  doctrine.    As the Commandant has
said,  the  time is now to "challenge many of our ground rules
and  assumptions"  regarding  the  employment of naval expedi-
tionary forces.
RECOMMENDATION:     The Marine  Corps  must  lead  the  way in
integrating  CWC    principles  into current amphibious doctrine
where appropriate.
                  ENTERING THE GOLDEN AGE WITH THE COMPOSITE
                      WARFARE/AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE DILEMMA
                                    OUTLINE
Thesis:   What  must the Marine Corps do to ensure amphibious
operations  are compatible with how the fleet fights today and
in  the  future?  It must move aggressively towards developing
effective  command  relationships  under the Composite Warfare
Commander   (CWC)   concept,   resulting  in  updating  current
amphibious  doctrine  and  a   continuing  peacetime   training
environment that will refine the CWC initiatives.
I.  	The issues
A. Importance  of  efficient  and  effective amphibious integration
		B.  	Traditional amphibious doctrine
      	C.    Current Navy fleet operations
II. 	The "two-doctrine dilemma"
      	A.  	CWC operations
      	B.  	Concerns for Marines
III.  Integration of amphibious operations into CWC
      	A.  	OTC/CWC/CATF proposal
      	B.  	Component/OTC/landing force commander relations
      	C.  	The importance of the MCLF (when required)
IV.  	Update/revision of amphibious doctrine
      	A.  	AOA
      	B.  	Strike warfare and amphibious operations
V.  	Peacetime operations to refine CWC initiatives
    		A.  	Non-traditional MAGTF requirements
    		B.  	Traditional amphibious MAGTFs
    		C.  	Cost-effective simulations
                  ENTERING THE GOLDEN AGE WITH THE COMPOSITE
                      WARFARE/AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE DILEMMA
    	I   can't  think  of a time in our history when such a
    	topic   (Naval  Expeditionary Forces and Power Projec-
    	tion:     Into  the 21st Century) was more relevant to
    	our  Nation, or when the future was more conducive to
    	the  employment  of  naval expeditionary forces, than
    	today.
                              		General Carl E. Mundy, Jr.
                              		20 November 1991
    	The   nation's  naval  forces  are  currently  working  in
earnest  on  developing  a maritime strategy that will take us
into  the  next  century  and  beyond.    Our  Commandant  has
indicated  that we are entering a "golden age" for the utility
of  naval  forces.    To  say that this is a time to challenge
many  of  our  "ground  rules  and  assumptions" about Marines
coming from the sea is probably an understatement.  (15:15)
    	Current  force  reductions serve to underscore the need to
demonstrate  the  aggregate  usefulness  and  ability  of  our
amphibious   forces   to   significantly   contribute  to  the
national    maritime  strategy.    Consequently, what must the
Marine   Corps   do   to   ensure  amphibious  operations  are
compatible  with  how  the  fleet  fights  today  and  in  the
future?      It  must  move  aggressively  towards  developing
effective  command  relationships  under the Composite Warfare
Commander   (CWC)   concept   resulting  in  updating   current
amphibious  doctrine,  and  a  continuing  peacetime   training
environment that will refine the CWC initiatives.
    	Although  the  demands  of  our evolving maritime strategy
require  naval  forces that possess a wide variety of capabil-
ities,   the   aircraft   carrier   will  remain  the  primary
warfighting  element  and the centerpiece of a balanced fleet.
Moreover,  during  the  l990s, it will probably become common-
place  to  adjust  the composition of forward deployed carrier
battle  groups and amphibious ready groups routinely, in order
to  suit  specific  situations.  (5:42)  In effect, this means
that  small  Marine  forward-deployed  expeditionary forces, or
large  powerful  amphibious  MAGTFs  must  be  able  to  adapt
quickly,    demonstrate    true   operational   and   tactical
flexibility,   and  be  innovative in their employment methods.
Accordingly,   the  question  becomes how can amphibious forces
along  with   the  evolving  carrier  battle  group forces join
together  to   achieve more efficient and effective integration
that  will  ultimately  contribute to the overall success of a
"naval campaign?"
    	As   most   readers   know,  today's  naval  forces  fight
utilizing  the CWC doctrine.  Further, the issue of amphibious
forces  integrating  in  a CWC environment is not new.  Never-
theless,  it  still  remains  an  emotional argument where, in
many   cases,  "doctrine  purists  take  their  stand  against
doctrine  radicals."    (6:3)    In order to better understand
some  of  the important issues regarding amphibious forces and
CWC, a brief look at this two-doctrine dilemma is required.
    	Current  amphibious doctrine is contained in JCS Pub 3-02,
formerly  NWP-22-B/LFM-01.    Although  this  current doctrine
remains  an  outgrowth of World War II fighting concepts where
hundreds  of amphibious and support ships were assigned to the
Commander,  Amphibious  Task  Force  (CATF), it remains sound.
(18:17)    First  written  in  1958  and  issued  in 1962, the
current  revision  of  JCS  Pub 3-02 is dated 1 November 1986.
Figure 1 provides the current basic amphibious relationships.
Click here to view image
    	Current   Navy   fleet  doctrine  is  quite  a  few  years
"younger"  than  amphibious  doctrine.   During the 1970s, the
Soviet  Armed Forces made significant improvements in weapons,
sensors,  and  missile  delivery systems for use against naval
forces.    Consequently, a new concept for our naval forces to
defend  against  this  credible  threat  that  greatly reduced
friendly  force  reaction  time  was  necessary.    Past fleet
doctrine  did not provide adequate flexibility to counter this
threat.   A realignment of surveillance and reaction responsi-
bilities  with  greater  emphasis  on  decentralized authority
resulted  in  the  Navy's development of the composite warfare
commander (CWC) concept.  (11:29-1)
    	NWP  10-1,  Composite  Warfare  Commander  Manual  of June
1985,   is  the  confidential  publication  which  promulgates
standardized  doctrine,  organization,  and general procedures
for  the  command  and  control  of  U.S. naval forces afloat.
Although  this  document has been modified by various Tactical
Memorandums  (Tac  memos),  this is how the fleet fights today
and will continue to do so into the next century.  Therefore,
it  is  easy  to  see  that the CWC concept evolved much later
than  amphibious doctrine.  Moreover, these two doctrines have
never had any connection with each other.
    	This  "two-doctrine  dilemma" goes right to the heart of a
principal  obstacle  in  the  utilization  of Marine forces in
today's   amphibious  operations.    In  his  article,  "MAGTF
Operations  with  the Fleet in the Year 2000," Colonel William
Rakow states the following:
    	Command   relationships   and   "rice  bowl"  battles
    	inevitably  hinder  efforts to solve the current two-
    	doctrine  dilemma.    The  amphibious  Navy  and many
    	Marines  cling  to  a  separate  document  to protect
    	their  identity and status.  Unfortunately, this is a
    	"head  in  the sand" approach because the rest of the
    	Navy  is  pressing  on  developing  the  tactics  and
    	operational  concepts  on how it intends to fight the
    	next  battle.    Amphibious  forces, Navy and Marine,
    	are  being  left  behind,  and few in the rest of the
    	Navy are very concerned about it.
    	The  amphibious Navy and the Marine Corps have not come to
grips  with  this  ever-widening  gap.   Further, Marines must
take  the  lead  to  move quickly to develop effective command
relationships  that  will facilitate the conduct of amphibious
operations  under  the  CWC  concept.   This is certainly more
important  than  ever  before in view of future carrier battle
group/amphibious  ready  group operations that were previously
discussed.
    	Before  citing  several  examples  of  problems associated
with  the CWC/amphibious doctrine dilemma, a brief description
of  composite warfare is appropriate.  It is not the intention
of  this  paper  to make readers CWC experts, but to provide a
framework  to  better  understand  the  problem  that has been
alluded to thus far.
    	The  battle  group  commander, normally called the officer
in  tactical  command  (OTC),  has  overall responsibility for
successfully   accomplishing   the   mission   of  the  force.
Subordinate  to  the  OTC,  the CWC directs the efforts of the
force    in  tactical  sea  control in the manner best suited to
the  tactical  situation.     In most cases with only one battle
group,   the  OTC  and  CWC  are the same individual.  (This may
not  be   the  case  in   battle  force  operations.)   Separate
warfare   commanders are  responsible to the CWC for recognizing
and  effectively  countering rapidly developing threats to the
force  in  their warfare area.  These warfare commanders have
tactical  control  over  assigned  assets.    Some examples of
warfare  commanders  are  anti-air  warfare  commander (AAWC),
anti-surface   commander   (ASUWC),   anti-submarine   warfare
commander (ASWC), and strike-warfare commander (STWC).
    	The  OTC/CWC  may retain any or all warfare functions, but
generally,  the function is delegated to that subordinate best
equipped   to  accomplish   it,  such as the AAWC.  The CWC then
controls   by  negation.    A  significant principle of the CWC
doctrine   is  that  "when  authorized  by the CWC, the warfare
commanders  have  tactical  control  of resources assigned and
may  autonomously initiate action."  (4:2-2)  Accordingly, the
OTC/CWC   expects   the  individual  actions  of  the  warfare
commanders  to  have  a  synergistic effect that results in an
effective  defense  behind  which  the  task  force can safely
carry out its primary mission.
    	In  addition  to  the  primary warfare commanders, the CWC
will   assign  supporting  coordinators  (electronic  warfare,
submarine  element,  air  element)  who  support  the  CWC and
warfare  commanders  by  executing  policy,  but  who  are not
authorized to initiate autonomous action.
    	To  illustrate,  a carrier, with a two-star Admiral as the
Carrier  Group  Commander  embarked,  could  be  the CWC.  The
remainder   of   the  force  could  be  a  Destroyer  Squadron
Commander  (0-6)  embarked  on  a  Spruance Clear Destroyer as
AWSC,  the  commander  (0-6)  of an Aegis class cruiser as the
AAWC,  and  the  commander (0-6) of the carrier as ASUWC.  The
various  ships, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and submarines
would  be  allocated  to  the warfare commanders, based on the
threat.    It  is  also possible for one ship to work simulta-
neously for two warfare commanders.  (6:10)
    	Perhaps  the  central  theme  of  the CWC doctrine is best
summarized  in  chapter  four  of NWP 10-1 that indicates this
doctrine  provides  for  varying  degrees  of decentralization
while  the  CWC  oversees  and  coordinates  these  individual
efforts.    Additionally,  the  CWC  keeps  warfare commanders
appraised  of  information from external sources, maintains an
overall  picture  of  the  battle,  and intervenes to redirect
operations  where  appropriate.  Figure 2 provides the current
CWC organization.
Click here to view image
    	What  should  be  clear  by now, especially to Marines, is
that  amphibious  forces  are  not  always  an "easy fit" into
current  fleet  operations.    Moreover,  Lieutenant Commander
Terry  Pierce,  in  his  article  titled,  "MAGTF Warlords:  A
Naval  Perspective,"  goes  so  far as to say that the command
relations  issue  is  the  obstacle  that  must be overcome in
order  to  achieve  one doctrine for all naval forces.  There-
fore,  any  solution  to  the  "two  doctrine dilemma" command
relations issue must take these factors into consideration.
    	Figure  3 illustrates a proposed solution to the doctrinal
and  command  relationship  issues  indicated  above.  This is
done  by  inserting  an  amphibious warfare commander into the
CWC  organization.    Further,  the command relationships that
are  shown  complement  the operational authority and unity of
command that the OTC/CWC provides to the naval forces.
Click here to view image
    	Discussion  of  this  proposal  begins  with  what Colonel
Rakow  referred  to  as a "rice bowl."  Specifically, the role
of  CATF.    The  amphibious navy has gone to great lengths to
"protect the   identity  and  status"  of  this  individual.
Memories  of  large-scale  amphibious  operations during World
War  II  are just that--memories.  This is not to say that the
amphibious  operation  is  a  military  capability  that is no
longer   relevant.     Quite  the  contrary.    As  previously
indicated,  the expeditionary nature and crisis-response value
that   the   Navy/Marine  team  contributes  to  our  national
military  strategy  is  more important today than ever before.
The  fact  is  that  today's amphibious task force would  only
have  been   a small transport group in the Pacific Campaign of
World  War   II.  This point, combined with how the Navy fights
today  with  its  advanced  tactical  systems  under  the  CWC
concept,  clearly  places the CATF in a diminished role in the
overall process.
    	Hence,  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  proposed command
relations  facilitate  the  use  of  amphibious  forces,  this
solution,  which  is  similar to some fleet Tac memos, changes
the  name  of  CATF  to an amphibious warfare commander (AWC).
This  would  provide  the same "status" to the AWC as given to
the  other  warfare  commanders.    The  AWC  will  retain the
majority   of   his  current  responsibilities/functions  with
respect  to  the  landing  force.   (This will be discussed in
greater detail later.)
    	It  is  important  to  point  out  that by designating the
"integrated"  task   force  OTC/CWC  as  "CATF," the amphibious
task  force   (ATF)  now  comprises  the  carrier  battle group
(CVBG)  and all warfare commanders and coordinators, including
the  landing  force.  And, of course, all are working toward a
common  objective.    As a result, because the OTC/CWC has the
primary  mission  of  successfully  conducting  the amphibious
operation,  he should be more inclined to provide the AWC with
the  assets  he  needs to accomplish the amphibious operation.
(10:9)
    	Simply  stated,  the AWC, upon receipt of a mission, would
plan  and  execute  an  amphibious  operation in much the same
manner  as has been done in the past.  The AWC is a functional
warfare  commander who  exercises  operational  control  over
amphibious  shipping  and  naval gunfire ships.  Additionally,
he  is  responsible for the planning, embarkation, transporta-
tion,   landing,  and  support for the landing force during the
ship-to-shore movement.
    	Further,  the significant difference is that under the CWC
concept,   the   requirement   for  the  establishment  of  an
amphibious  objective  area  with significant assets "chopped"
to  the  AWC  probably would  not  be required.  Changing the
present-day  CATF  to  a  warfare commander raises more issues
than  will be addressed here.  However, several points warrant
brief discussion.
    	It should be readily apparent why this issue is so contro-
versial.    The  illustrious  heritage  of amphibious doctrine
does  not  easily  lend  itself  to distinct and major change.
What  must  be  kept  in mind is that while this proposal may
negate  some  of the status of the former CATF, it would allow
amphibious  forces improved opportunities to contribute on the
battlefield.
    	Under  this  proposal,  the  Landing Force Commander (LFC)
would  be  a  MAGTF  commander  of general officer rank.  This
role/function  would be much the same as is the current CLF in
amphibious  operations.    The LFC would work in close coordi-
nation  with  the  AWC in preparing detailed landing documents
for   review/approval   by  the  OTC  (CATF)  and  the  Marine
Commander  Landing  Force.   This would maintain key doctrinal
relationships  established  in JCS Pub 3-02.  Furthermore, the
LFC  would  be  coequal  with  the  AWC  for planning and then
become OPCON until termination of the amphibious operation.
    	The  final  item  to  be discussed in this proposal is the
Marine  Commander  Landing  Force (MCLF).  The requirement for
this  two-or-three star general officer to participate may not
always  exist.    This  could  be  the case where the scenario
called  for  component  commanders,  to  include  the Navy and
Marine  Corps  or  all  services  to  be colocated ashore.  By
being  together  ashore,  these two components could establish
the  command architecture that would be most efficient for the
OTC  and  MAGTF  commander  to  operate within.  Incidentally,
this  is  a  prime  example of how components actually "shape"
the  battlefield  for  the warfighters.  Nevertheless, if this
billet  is  "institutionalized"  in  doctrine,  the ability to
"insert" the MCLF when appropriate will be easier.
    	Under  this  proposal, the MCLF has a very important posi-
tion  of  responsibility.  He would embark on the same ship as
the  OTC  and  be  the MAGTF commander's direct representative
for  coordination.    This would be especially true if a large
portion  of the MEF was already established ashore.  His staff
would  be  extremely small--less than 10 Marine officers.  His
function  is  not  to  plan  details of amphibious operations.
This  would  remain  with  the  LFC/  AWC.    His  reason  for
existence  is  to  personally  "advise" the OTC on how best to
task/exploit   Marine  forces.    If  additional  support  for
Marines  afloat  or  ashore  becomes  an  issue,  he  would be
collocated  with the OTC and in position to properly influence
the  action.    And,  after all, the OTC has "all the bats and
balls."
    	Critics  of  this type of proposal say that establishing a
"MCLF"  is  redundant  and  adds  an  unnecessary layer to the
Marine  command  structure which will ultimately slow down and
complicate  planning.  Based on the MCLF's functions described
above,   this   billet  in  the  overall  structure  can  only
positively   contribute  to  overall  mission  accomplishment.
Furthermore,   this  is especially important for "education" at
the OTC level.
    	Historically,  the  requirement  for Marines  to  apprise
naval  officers  on the employment and capabilities of Marines
to  execute  a  wide  spectrum  of  missions  has  always been
prevalent.    Desert  Storm was  no  exception.   In official
after-action  reports,  one  senior Marine commander indicated
that  his biggest frustration of the war was trying to get the
Navy  staff/commanders  to  understand  how to employ Marines.
(21:320)   Additionally, it seemed that those few officers who
did   understand  the  amphibious  assault  had virtually  no
innovative  ideas on how to exploit the training, organization
and  equipment that Marines currently possess.  Granted, there
have  been  some  positive   steps  taken  regarding the formal
education   of  more  Navy  and Marine officers in each others'
tactics,   priorities  and  concerns.    However,  the need for
landing   force  personnel  to provide insight to Navy planners
on  the  operational and tactical capabilities of MAGTF forces
will  always exist.  The MCLF and his staff proposed in Figure
3 can accomplish this very important requirement.
    	The  proposal  indicated  here  is  certainly not the only
solution  for more efficient integration of amphibious/carrier
forces.    Additionally,  it  must be pointed out that the CWC
doctrine  is   certainly still evolving as well.  The number of
point  papers  and  Tac  memos written on this issue are many.
Regardless  of  which  particular way  the  command relations
wire-diagrams  are  drawn, the most important item to remember
about   the  CWC  structure  is that CWC is situation dependent
based   on  platforms available, commander's personalities, and
functions   that   need  to  be  performed.    Indeed,  it  is
interesting  to  point  out  that  just  prior to the start of
Desert  Storm  in  January 1991, a two-star Marine General was
"introduced"  onboard USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19) as COMUSMARCENT
(FWD).    In  addition to providing coordination between I MEF
Marines  ashore  and  NAVCENT Marines afloat, he and his staff
performed  many  of  the  same functions that are outlined for
the "MCLF" in the above paragraphs.
    	From  the discussions thus far, it should be apparent that
amphibious  doctrine  would  need  to  be  updated or changed.
Current  concepts of determining basic decisions, coordinating
supporting  arms,  and  conducting  ship-to-shore  movement as
well   as  many  others  are  sound  and  should  not  change.
Doctrine  that  is  outdated or that is valid but will not fit
into the CWC structure should be discarded.  (18:19)
    	The  word  doctrine many times evokes strong emotions from
Marines   and   Naval   officers--especially  when  discussing
amphibious  operations.    After  all, amphibious doctrine was
written  and  refined  during the "glory years" of the Pacific
Campaign  during  World War II.  For purposes of this paper, I
would  like  to provide two illustrations of where our current
doctrine  needs  to  be updated or changed in order to achieve
the  integration  under  the CWC concept that will be required
from amphibious forces in future conflicts.
    	The  first  issue deals with the amphibious objective area
(AOA).    Current  amphibious doctrine has CATF supreme in the
AOA  and  in  command  of all units and forces.  This does not
allow  for the CWC to be the one in charge of all battle group
forces  per  CWC  doctrine.  If CATF and CWC are not the same,
who  is  really  in  charge  of  the  AOA?   In today's world,
amphibious  doctrine  says  CATF,  but the CWC in actuality is
the  one  who  has  all  of  the  battle  group  assets at his
disposal.  (6:13)
    	An  example  that  somewhat  illustrates  this point comes
from  Operation Desert Storm.  This particular situation deals
with  the  fundamental  issue  of  the  establishment  of  the
amphibious   objective  area  (AOA)  for  a  limited  duration
mission,  where  fleet  operations  utilizing  the CWC concept
were ongoing.
    	Although  never executed, amphibious forces were tasked to
conduct  a  destruction  raid  on  Faylaka Island prior to the
commencement  of  ground  operations.    As  stated in the ATF
concept  of operations, an AOA would be activated at H-3.  All
events  prior  to  H-3  were to be controlled and deconflicted
without   an  AOA  by  CWC  commands  external  to  the  CATF.
Further,   the   raid   was   to   be   conducted  within  the
air/sea-space covered by established CWC commanders.
    	Clearly  in  this case, the OTC and CWC were going to need
some  convincing  that  the  best  way  to operate under these
circumstances  was to give up AAW and ASUW responsibilities to
the  CATF  within  the AOA.  Numerous questions arise, not the
least  of  which   is CATF's capability to prosecute an AAW war
with  organic  assets.    In  the  case  of this operation, it
appeared  this  was to be accomplished by a theoretical "chop"
of  AAW  carrier-air  to the CATF.  While this works well as a
solution  on   paper, a major shift in well-established command
and  control   just three hours prior to the raid should not be
underestimated.    Was  the  CATF clinging dogmatically to the
amphibious  doctrinal  requirement for the establishment of an
AOA?    Would  the  establishment of an AOA have been counter-
productive  in  this  case?  In the extreme, was the execution
of  the  raid  mission  put  in serious jeopardy over this AOA
issue?
    	The  second issue of regarding doctrine update or revision
that  I  would  like to briefly discuss is that of the role of
strike  warfare and amphibious operations.  No one pretends to
have  all of the answers in this area.  However, I think it is
important  to briefly address the issue because any discussion
of  updated  amphibious  doctrine needs to consider the offen-
sive capibilities of strike warfare.
    	As  previously  stated,  CWC  was  initially  a "defensive
oriented"  doctrine.    It  was  not  until late 1986 when the
strike  warfare  commander formally became part of the overall
CWC  chain  of  command.   Evolutionary improvements in strike
warfare   training   and   responsibilities  have  moved  this
position  to  be  expanded  significantly  into the amphibious
operations  arena  and  controlling  air sorties in support of
the  CATF.   The carrier air group (CAG) staff has the experts
that  can  properly  plan  the  type  of close air support and
interdiction  strikes  that  are mandatory during a successful
amphibious assault.  (8:9)
    	Currently,  there  is  no Marine on the CAG staff.  (8:14)
Additionally,  the  tactical air control group (TACGRU) staff,
which   provides  CATF  expertise  in  air  support  planning,
routinely  lacks  adequate  expertise to ensure the amphibious
task  force  has  integrated  strike  warfare support.  Conse-
quently,  there  are  some that feel that the STWC needs to be
in  a position to be better able to provide the CATF/CLF their
 strike   support  requirements.  In  order to have a feel and
understanding  of  these requirements, especially those of the
 landing  force,  it  has  been  suggested that the STWC embark
 onboard  the  CATF  flagship  for amphibious operations.  This
 idea  is  obviously a major point of contention.  Nonetheless,
it  should  be pointed out that just prior to the start of the
ground  war  during  Desert  Storm, a briefing team from I MEF
was  dispatched  to  each  carrier  in  the Persian Gulf.  The
purpose  of  the  team's  briefing was  to  ensure that naval
commanders  and  pilots  clearly  saw  how their "strike" role
contributed  to  the  MEF ground campaign.  The issues of fire
support  control measures, target identification, synchroniza-
tion,  and  flank protection of the First Marine Division were
discussed.   Most important was the need for the intent of the
MAGTF commander to be understood by these naval aviators.
    	Simply  put,  our  amphibious  doctrine  needs  to address
"head-on"  the  issue  of effective and efficient use of naval
aviation in support of the overall "naval campaign."
    	It  has  been  said  that  the  purpose  of doctrine is to
provide  the  theoretical  basis for which decisions on how to
fight  or conduct the battle can be made.  Therefore, the next
step  in  improving  the  integration of amphibious forces and
carrier  battle  groups  under  the  CWC  doctrine would be to
pursue  peacetime  training  operations that will refine these
CWC/doctrinal revision initiatives.
    	The  first  aspect  of training that needs to be addressed
is  that  of  the  nontraditional MAGTF.  Within recent years,
the likelihood of the deployment/employment of nontraditional
amphibious  MAGTFs  has  been  prevalent.   As a result of the
previously  stated  force  structure reductions, this trend is
very likely to continue.
    	A  recent  example  of  how CWC procedures and a nontradi-
tional   MAGTF  "integrated"  was  in  1988  during  Operation
Earnest  Will  in  the  Persian  Gulf.  During this period, in
order  to  combat  what  General  George  Crist referred to as
"guerrilla  warfare  at  sea," the Navy made the unprecedented
move  to  make  the  commander  of  contingency  MAGTF 2-88, a
warfare  commander  within  the  CWC concept.  Coincidentally,
Colonel  Rakow,  who was quoted earlier in this paper, was the
commanding  officer  of  this  nontraditional  MAGTF.  Accord-
ingly,  he  was  a  major warfare commander provided with wide
latitude  to  accomplish  assigned  missions.  In his article,
"Marines  in  the  Gulf-1988,"  Colonel  Rakow  points out how
teamwork  and  cooperation  among  the warfare commanders kept
conflicting  situations  to  a minimum.  Also, good communica-
tions  with  the  OTC  allowed  the  "flag  to be raised" when
necessary.
    	In    short,   we   must   institutionalize   "operational
experiences"  such  as  this  through peacetime training.  Not
only  for the purpose of refining CWC initiatives, but also to
begin  to  develop  concepts  and  tactics for other nontradi-
tional  operations  such  as the potential sea control mission
utilizing   the   LHD/LHA   when  a  carrier  is  not  readily
available.
    	The  second  area of training that continually needs to be
stressed  is  the integration of large and powerful amphibious
forces  for  use  in  forcible-entry  missions.   As you might
expect,  this  effort  has  been  ongoing.    Third Fleet, for
example,  where  much  of the initial integration with amphib-
ious  forces and CWC operations began, has carried out several
large-scale  naval  operations over the past decade.  Further,
many  of  the  concepts  discussed  in  this  paper  have been
attempted--   especially   in  the  RIMPAC  and  KERNAL  BLITZ
exercise series.
    	Emphasis   in   these   exercises   must   go  further  in
challenging  all  concerned  with  the  most likely scenarios,
missions, and  command relations issues possible.  An example
might  be issuing  an Initiating Directive that arrives while
the  CVBG  and  ATF  are  at sea.  This would require the OTC,
CWC,  CATF  and  CLF  to hammer out the best possible means of
conducting  the assigned missions in a time sensitive environ-
ment.    And incidentally, the day of the Initiating Directive
providing  all  of  the  answers  to all concerned is probably
long past anyway.
    	Finally,  in  a  time  where  fiscal  constraints, intense
operational  tempo,  and  the  elimination  of  standing MAGTF
staffs  are  the norm, Navy and Marine staffs must continue an
aggressive  program  of  "amphibious  integration" wargames in
order   to   discuss,   refine,   and   adopt  or  reject  CWC
initiatives.
    	This  paper  began with a quote from our Commandant on the
utility  of  naval  expeditionary forces as we enter a "golden
age"  for  the  use of naval forces.  General Mundy also indi-
cated  the necessity to challenge many of our ground rules and
assumptions  in  the employment of these forces.  The concepts
and  changes  proposed  in  this  paper  will  take some basic
rearranging  in the mind-set of Marines and Navy officers from
within   the   various   warfare  communities.    Revision  of
amphibious  doctrine  is an emotional issue.  Nonetheless, the
time  has  come  to make evolutionary change to our amphibious
doctrine.    In view of what the future may hold regarding the
size  and  structure of the Naval service, these concepts must
be  tried  and adopted in the spirit of true naval integration
and  joint  warfighting.    Ultimately,  it is the Marines who
move  swiftly  to  spearhead  these revisions.  Exploiting the
capabilities   of  our  amphibious  forces  is  what  is  most
important.    Clinging  to doctrine that is no longer relevant
and  doing  things  the  same way as always because of a "rice
bowl" mentality is simply foolish.
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