Missing The Deep Battle
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Missing The Deep Battle
Author: Major R. S. Trout
Thesis: Due to equipment, weapons, and doctrinal
shortcomings, Marine commanders do not have the means to
guickly detect and attack targets in the deep battle area;
thus forfeiting to the enemy the advantages of surprise,
concentration, and maneuver.
Background: For the past forty years the Marine Corps has
held a Tactical Orientation of the battlefield. This
orientation has influenced education, training and, weapons
procurement. Recent developments indicate that this narrow
tactical focus is no longer viable on today's battlefield.
In order to maintain its forcible entry capability, the
Corps must develop a means to strike deep at a potential
enemy. Two operational means to do this are Operational
Fires and Maneuver. These two methods, as demonstrated
during Desert Storm, will allow a smaller force to stand-off
and dislocate or defeat a larger foe. In order to pursue
this deep strike capability, the Marine Corps must rewrite
outdated doctrine, update command capabilities, procure
additional long-range weapons, and educate its officers
in the operational art.
Recommendation: As the Marine Corps restructures to meet
a shrinking defense budget, it should do so in such a manner
as to gain the ability to fight in the deep battle area.
MISSING THE DEEP BATTLE
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement: Due to equipment, weapons, and doctrinal
shortcomings, Marine commanders do not have the means to quickly
detect and attack targets in the deep battle area, thus
forfeiting to the enemy the advantages of surprise,
concentration, and maneuver.
I. Evolution of Deep Battle Theory
A. Follow On Forces Attack
B. Operational Maneuver
C. Operational Fires
II. Importance of Deep Battle to the USMC
A. Shrinking defense budget
B. Economy of force
C. Maneuver Warfare From The Sea
D. Medium force mission
E. Larger battlefield
III. USMC Inability To Conduct Deep Battle
A. Intelligence gathering systems
B. Fire support
C. Command and control
D. Education and doctrine
IV. USMC Solutions
A. Education and doctrine
B. ACE Command and control
C. Fire support
MISSING THE DEEP BATTLE
On 31 January 1991, preceded by heavy jamming and
using infrared countermeasures to protect their tanks,
the elements of three Iraqi mechanized brigades moved over
eighty-six miles and attacked thirty-seven miles into
Saudi Arabia to strike the port city of Khafji. During
the ensuing twelve-hour firefight -- much of it at night
-- United States Marines and Qatari soldiers
counterattacked, destroyed over one hundred Iraqi armored
vehicles, and retook the city.(4:160-166,14:197-203,333)
All in all, it was a superb coalition victory -- or was
it? How, on today's modern technologically-advanced
battlefield, could a force of over three hundred armored
vehicles move in excess of one hundred miles, and not be
detected or attacked en route? How could surprise have
been achieved? The answer, unfortunately, is very simple.
Due to equipment, weapons, and doctrinal shortcomings,
Marine commanders do not have the means to quickly detect
and attack targets in the deep battle area; thus forfeiting
to the enemy the advantages of surprise, concentration,
and maneuver.
The concept of deep battle is to deny the enemy
commander the ability to employ his forces not yet engaged
at the time, place, or in the strength of his choice.
(11:19) It is to hit him as deep in his own territory as
possible, thereby preventing those yet-to-be-committed
forces from reaching the battlefield. The depth of these
strikes may range in excess of 100 kilometers from the
Forward Edge Of The Battle Area. The two primary means
to strike deep at the enemy are by using Operational Fires
or Operational Maneuver.
Operational Maneuver is the disposition of forces
to create a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign
or major operation by either securing the operational
advantages of position before battle is joined, or
exploiting tactical success to achieve operational or
strategic results.(24:13) Originally created by the U.
S. Army in the mid-1980s, Operational Maneuver or Follow-On
Forces Attack, was seen as a method to dislocate and defeat
the second and third echelons of a Soviet attack into
Europe. (8:47) It was this concept of deep and rapid
maneuver that was demonstrated by the 101st Air Assault
Division when they struck the Euphrates valley, some 250
kilometers from the front line trace, during Desert
Storm.(4:197) Figure 1, taken from Richard Simpkins Race
To The Swift and modified to a Marine Expeditionary
Force-size-force, is a graphical portrayal of Operational
Maneuver. (22:305)
Click here to view image
Operational Fires are another deep strike method.
They are not fire support in the traditional sense. They
are stand alone fires that are designed to achieve a single
operationally significant objective. (24:12) They can be
delivered by surface-to-surface means or by aircraft.
The intention is to delay, disrupt, or channelize enemy
forces so that they conform a to predetermined plan. An
example of such is shown in Figure 2.
Click here to view image
The enemy commander in Figure 2 finds that, even though
he is more than one hundred kilometers from his objective,
increasingly his routes of advance are being blocked by
scatterable mines and submunitions. In addition to losing
equipment, his time tables are upset and his logistic
support is being disrupted. Even though he is not in direct
contact with his foe, he is losing the ability to dictate
events. Like flowing water his forces choose the path
of least resistance, unaware that this is precisely the
intent of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Commander.
Upon reaching the close battle area, not only has his force
been attrited, but his command and control system is in
disarray. This leaves open other avenues to exploit:
electronic means, psychological warfare or conventional
counterattack.
In both Operational Fires and Maneuver, not only is
the enemy force attacked, but so is the mind of the enemy
commander. Both are presented with situations that are
influencing them to act in predictable patterns. They
are being shaped in such a way that their weaknesses are
becoming more open. This shaping of the battlefield has
a synergistic effect, an effect that is greater than the
sum of the effects taken independently. It can be likened
to a pebble dropped into a pool of water. While the pebble
quickly drops out of sight, the concentric rings it created
continue to grow and influence in an ever-increasing size.
It is this type of action which will allow a smaller force
to stand off and dislocate or defeat a larger foe.
The enviable performance of the Army's 101st Air
Assault Division in Operational Maneuver and the use of
the long-range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) in
Operational Fires during Desert Storm has demonstrated
the Army's proficiency at deep battle operations.(1:42,5:44)
On the other hand, as the Marines observed at Khafji,
the deep battle is difficult to accomplish and requires
long-range intelligence-gathering systems, an integrated
decision-making complex, and a long-range deep strike
capability. Of the three essential ingredients for deep
battle, only a long-range deep strike capability is
possessed by a MEF size unit.
In today's joint arena, the Marine Corps's lack of
a deep battle capability would appear to be irrelevant.
The army has demonstrated its proficiency at the operational
level of war and the Corps tactical prowess remains
unquestioned. It would seem that both services compliment
each other. The army heavy and air mobile units backed
by long-range fires penetrate deeply into the enemy1 s rear
areas, while the tactically proficient and less
operationally capable Marines clear strongpoints, bunkers,
and tie down enemy forces. Each service plays to each
other's strengths. While this argument is correct, it
is only partially so, and it misses the point.
The point is that for various and well-known reasons,
both the Marine Corps and the Army are undergoing
significant and far-reaching fundamental changes. As the
services become smaller and somewhat less capable, and
airlift and sealift continues to shrink, the current
operational/tactical disparities will no longer be
practical. A corollary to this is that while the services
are losing capabilities, their potential foes are gaining
new ones. Only by equipping both services across the
operational/tactical spectrum can the national military
strategy imperatives be met.(6:14)
In addition to the above there are four other reasons,
all interrelated, why it is important to change the Corps's
tactical outlook.
First, the Marine/Navy Team is the only credible
forcible entry capability possessed by the United States.
As Marine numbers decrease and as amphibious ships are
being decommissioned, that capability is being further
reduced. In order to maximize the inherent strength in
the Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF), the enemy must
be struck at all depths from the tactical to the strategic.
This serves as an economy of force function and will open
up more of the battlefield to a fewer number of forces.
The following example demonstrates this concept.
When faced with an amphibious operation, an enemy
commander located some seventy-five kilometers from a likely
landing beach will not sit back and let his forces be struck
by long-range fires. Nor will he let his primary axis
of advance become blocked by submunitions or by deep
maneuver forces. He will move, and when he does, he has
opened himself up to further attack. He has also indicated
to the amphibious commander some of his intentions, which
can be exploited. Additionally, by encouraging movement
the amphibious commander is encouraging the enemy to make
mistakes. Hence, the battlefield has opened up just a
little more.
Second, Deep Strike Operations complement Maneuver
Warfare From The Sea. This strategy envisions amphibious
operations being conducted from over the horizon (both
the visual and sensor), and into a vulnerable enemy rear
area or lightly defended sector. The strategy, although
not new, takes advantage of the technology incorporated
in the Landing Craft Air Cushioned and the V-22 Osprey
to rapidly concentrate forces in space and time. This
ability to rapidly concentrate forces and deliver deep
operational fires lends more credibility to the United
States strategy of forward presence/deterrence. (6:21)
Third, as the Marine Corps attempts to pursue the
medium-force mission, the bridge between light and heavy
forces, it must be prepared to meet all contingencies.(2:28)
This includes stabilizing a situation until heavy forces
arrive. In order to do this, a capability must be developed
to keep the threat as far away as possible from a port
of entry. If the Marine Corps cannot do this, for at least
10 days (time needed to unload a heavy division), then
their ability to be a medium-force bridge is in question.
This line of reasoning leads to the obvious conclusion
that the Marines need some means to strike out at the enemy
from great distances.
Fourth, due to the mobility and lethality of modern
weapons, battlefield density will continue to decrease
and depth will continue to increase. The historic trend
noted in Figure 3 will accelerate even faster as modern
weapons technology becomes more readily available.(7:173)
This has three implications for the Marine Corps.
Click here to view image
One battles will be fought at ever-increasing ranges
with increased requirements for dispersion and command
and control.
Two, the ability to rapidly concentrate forces at
a specific point in time and space will encourage rapid
breakthrough operations.
Three, smaller forces operating from a doctrine that
emphasizes rapid force concentration and long-range strikes
will prevail.
As Marines strive to be viable on today's battlefield,
ignoring the operational level of war, in which deep battle
plays a large role, is ludicrous. Operational Fires and
Maneuver work, as demonstrated from World War II to Desert
Storm; they offer a means to win with fewer casualties
and in less time. As Marines strive for budget dollars,
roles and missions, they should take a hard look at their
capabilities now and what they want them to be in the
future. The Army certainly has, and in its new draft copy
of FM 100-16, ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS, there is a large segment
on the army's conduct of amphibious operations.
Despite the benefits that it would accrue -- greater
operational reach, increased lethality, and fewer casualties
-- the Marine Corps has not pursued deep battle operations.
This was not an intentional decision, merely one based
in reality. The lack of long-range intelligence gathering
systems, insufficient long-range surface weapons, a poor
Command, Control, and Communications (C3) infrastructure,
and a lack of doctrine has forced the Marine Corps into
a narrow tactical orientation. To understand this
orientation, a closer look at the four issues mentioned
above is warranted.
First, Intelligence Gathering Systems. Although on
the surface it would appear that large Marine Air Ground
Task Forces (MEF size) would have a correspondingly large
integrated and sophisticated intelligence gathering array,
this is not so. For ground-based information gathering,
Marine units rely on foot-mobile reconnaissance forces,
sensor employment platoons, and remotely piloted vehicles.
While all of these assets do provide intelligence
information, they are by their very nature (foot mobile,
limited range, small payload) circumscribed.
The Air Combat Element (ACE) of the MAGTF does not
suffer significant range or payload limitations. It
provides an unparalleled ability to range the battlefield
and to attack targets deep within enemy territory. But,
like its ground brethren, it also suffers inherent
limitations. It is vulnerable to enemy surface-to-air
missiles, aircraft, and electronic countermeasures.
Additionally, at least during the initial phases of an
amphibious campaign, the aviation component may be
sea-based aboard navy aircraft carriers which, even in
a mid-intensity conflict, may be occupied with their own
survival. Finally, although aircraft can carry myriad
reconnaissance pods, neither the Marine Corps nor the Navy
has acquired them for its front-line deep strike fighters
(F/A-18s). Additionally, with the retirement of the last
reconnaissance capable RF-4B Phantoms prior to Desert Storm,
the Marine Corps has no aerial reconnaissance
capability. (17:33)
Even if reconnaissance pods were available for the
aircraft, the ability to exploit them is questionable.
There are three reasons for this:
One, Desert Storm aside, on a mobile mechanized
battlefield the luxury of a static target is a rarity.
It is common practice to change positions at random times
and when detection is suspected.
Two, when targets such as large armor formations are
stationary, they are covered by air defense systems, making
aerial reconnaissance a difficult task.
Three, a corollary with reasons one and two. Primary
areas of interest are targeted and imaged first, secondary
targets last. Modern reconnaissance pods operate much
like VCRs. What is recorded first is at the beginning
of the film and last at the end. However, film and other
data is processed from the end to the beginning. Hence,
it could take up to 24 hours to record, process, and attack
a detected primary target, by which time the target would
be far gone.(9:4-71)
The inability to detect a mobile target deep in the
enemy's rear is only part of the problem. Even if detected
in a timely manner, the Marine Corps would be unable to
attack it by surface fire means.
Second, Fire Support. Although the Marine Division
contains more artillery than an army armored or mechanized
division, it suffers from range deficiencies. (10:3-8) With
the phasing out of the 175mm and the 203mm guns from the
inventory, the Corps's only long range artillery is the
M198. The M198 155mm howitzer has a range of approximately
30 kilometers when a rocket assisted projectile is used.
This is simply not enough range to cover the depths a MEF
size unit is expected to fight on (15K Security Zone, 20K
Main Battle Area, 20K Rear Area X Frontage Width), let
alone prosecute deep operational fires up to 55 kilometers
away. Even as late as Desert Storm, the Corps had to rely
on artillery raids to compensate for range limitations.
Looking towards the Navy to provide far ranging surface
fires is becoming less and less likely. The mothballing
of the last IOWA class battleship, with its 45+ kilometer
range 16 inch guns, has left a significant void in Naval
gun fire support. This leaves only the 5"/54 gun mounts
with their 21 kilometer range to support Marine operations
ashore. (16:248)
Although the Marine Corps has recognized its deficiency
in providing deep fires, its attempts to procure long-range
systems have been met with little success. The request
for the long-range Multiple Launched Rocket System (MLRS,
which can fire the ATACMS) has been terminated by the
Department Of Defense.(18:8) This leaves the Corps with
artillery similar in range to World War II era howitzer's,
while at the same time, naval fire support ships are
reaching new lows.(3:64)
Currently, as mentioned above, the Marine Corps has
no weapons, other than aircraft, able to reach beyond thirty
kilometers. And unless the aircraft is carrying
target-specific weapons, its success will be problematic.
Hence, the Marine Corps is on the horns of a dilemma.
It cannot detect nor can it attack a deep target with
any certitude.
Now, on the surface it would appear that both
problems could be solved. By taking valuable and scarce
reconnaissance teams and flooding the enemy's rear areas,
detailed information on enemy positions and movements
could be obtained. Couple the reconnaissance teams with
dedicated aircraft for deep strikes and the Marine Corps
could actively fight a deep battle operation. But, by
pursuing this course of action, a third and more subtle
problem arises -- that of integration.
Third, Integration. The integration of battlefield
systems into a cogent whole, or Command, Control, and
Communications (C3), is difficult to perform even under
the best of circumstances. It is particularly difficult
for the Ground Combat Element (GCE) of the MAGTF whose
field Command Posts look much like their World War II
counterparts; flapping canvas, hissing radios, and grease
board maps abound. (25) Nowhere in evidence are modern
data displays, communication systems or sensor links.
While sending radio-laden reconnaissance teams to find
targets sounds appealing, the Command Post would find that
they are difficult to control. And, due to intrinsic radio
limitations (range, power available, band width), well
nigh difficult to communicate with. Additionally, radios
emit electromagnetic radiation which can be detected, jammed
and located. The solution to the conduct of deep-battle
operations does not lie here but in a system-wide approach.
But before the Corps can develop this system it must first
educate its officers in the Operational Art Of War and
develop doctrine to support it.
Fourth, Education and Doctrine. At no level of
schooling does the Marine Corps demand that its officers
learn the Operational aspects of war. From the Amphibious
Warfare School (AWS) for captains, where cookbook solutions
abound, to the Command and Staff College (C&SC) for majors,
where one Marine General stated, "I don't understand this
operational stuff and you don't need to, just concentrate
on the tactical," operational aspects and techniques are
frowned at.(25) This lack of operational schooling may
also have the unintentional effect of locking out the Marine
Corps from future Joint Task Force Command.
Marine warfighting doctrine reflects the Corps's
tactical orientation -- which is woefully out of date.
Take for example FMFM 6-1 MARINE DIVISION, last updated
in 1978. There is no mention of Operational Maneuver,
Operational Fires, or even deception. It is a
straightforward tactical manual that, interestingly enough,
contains no less than seventy pages on marking equipment
for rail transport.(13:191-261) There is no mention of
Light Armored Vehicles or their roles. There is, however,
a detailed description of listening post employment.(13:166)
In order to pursue deep battle options, the Corps must
first develop the doctrine and then build from there.
An attempt has been made to produce a document that
would cover the operational level of war. FMFM 2 MAGTF
DOCTRINE (Draft) is now being circulated for comment.
It contains several sections on the MAGTF at the operational
level of war.(12:4-6) Operations, capabilities, and deep
strike methods are discussed in detail. Even though this
document has been criticized by some, it points the way
to the future. If the Marine Corps is going to keep its
forcible entry capability on the modern battlefield, it
must start with doctrine first and build from there. The
Marine Corps cannot compete with the other services for
budget dollars; it must make do with less. But this should
not limit intellectual development -- it should stimulate
it. FMFM 2 is a step in that direction.
To continue in the proper direction, Operational
doctrine should then be refined at AWS and the C&SC. Both
schools possess in their students and faculty ample
experience and more than a modicum of common sense.
Following the doctrine review, it should then be
incorporated into one of the many war games played at both
schools. This will uncover any hidden flaws and will lead
to further refinement. In this fashion, the Corps will
perform two vital functions: education and doctrine
development. However, what this will not do is correct
an inadequate Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence (C3I) infrastructure.
To prosecute rapid and deep maneuver and fires, the
Marines need to develop an integrated C3I structure that
can effectively handle deep aircraft strikes, long-range
surface-to-surface fires, and rapidly moving ground and
helo-borne forces. This structure must also include the
ability to see the battlefield at levels from the tactical
to the strategic. The GCE of the MAGTF does not have,
nor will it have in the near future, the ability to do
this. However, the ACE does not suffer from this
limitation.
Two data links possessed by the ACE -- the Tactical
Information Digital Information Link A and B (TADIL A/B)
and NATO LINK-1 -- can allow the MAGTF Commander to
literally see the battlefield. (21:10-3) Unlike the C3
structure used by the GCE, the Marine Air Command and
Control System is one of the most modern in the world.
Able to interface with all of the services' surveillance
data systems, it has the ability to see what they are
seeing. The system is secure and extremely jam resistant.
It can also handle large amounts of data and provide control
over large sections of the battlefield. From here a deep
operation can be planned and executed, integrating all
aspects of deep maneuver and fires. As we have seen, only
the ACE can provide deep strikes with its aircraft and
only they can, through helo lift, deploy deep maneuver
forces. When this capability is coupled with the recently
developed aircraft-launched long-range RPV, the Ryan
BQM-145A, the ACE will have all of the essential
ingredients (long-range intelligence-gathering systems,
integrated decision-making complex, long-range deep strike
capability) to fight the deep battle. (15:42) Perhaps the
ACE Commander should be given the responsibility of
conducting the deep battle while the GCE conducts the close
battle.
Unfortunately, the ACE suffers from limitations
(weather, deployability, threat) that may preclude it from
carrying out deep battle operations. To circumvent these
limitations, the GCE also needs the ability to seek out
and strike the enemy by using Operational Fires and
Maneuver.
MLRS aside, there have been some developments that
could allow the GCE to conduct long-range fires. The Navy
has slowly been procuring a land attack version of its
Harpoon ship-to-ship missile. The Standoff Land Attack
Missile (SLAM) has a range of over 100 kilometers, and
can carry a terminally-guided warhead or submunitions.
It is also cheaper than a Tomahawk cruise missile and takes
up less deck space. The Navy has also begun trials on
a 5" gun system (Advanced Gun Weapon System Technology)
that will provide long range ship-to-shore fire support.
This new system is capable of attacking land targets at
ranges of up to 180 kilometers, with the munitions
containing automatic target-recognition systems. (23:228)
These fire support advances will allow the GCE to
conduct strikes at all ranges -- from the tactical to the
operational -- without the ACE present on the battlefield.
This increase in combat power will in turn create conditions
conductive to deep maneuver.
As the Marine Corps restructures for the mid-1990s,
it has proposed to field a Combined Arms Regiment. This
regiment, which is to contain M1A1 Tanks, Light Armored
Vehicles (LAVs), and Combat Engineers, would be a highly
mobile self-contained fighting unit. The speed and
firepower of the regiment's tanks, combined with the
flexibility of the LAVs, gives the GCE a structured deep
maneuver capability. Additionally, for the first time,
the Marine Corps will have an armored force -- trained
and equipped to conduct mechanized operations -- under
a single integrated command structure. This type of unit
would also strengthen Maritime Prepositioning Force
Operations with its sea based compliment of tanks and
LAVs. (20:C-2)
By the mid-1990s, with increased long-range weapons,
a highly mobile mechanized, force and the ability to see
the battlefield through the recently acquired Joint
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System ground terminal,
the GCE should be able to conduct deep operations.(19:25)
This will compliment the already formidable capability
possessed by the ACE. It will also provide to the MAGTF
Commander a list of options he may employ as the situation
dictates. Additionally, together each will present an
attacking force with a multitude of threats to defend
against. An enemy commander will be unable to attack
one without fearing a strike from another. Neither the
ACE nor the GCE can win alone on today's highly mobile
and deep battlefield. Only by having mutually supporting
Combat Elements can the MAGTF fight deep and win.
As the Corps restructures to conform to today's budget
constraints, it needs to consider the battlefield of
tomorrow. Given long procurement lead times, as the
industrial base shrinks, what the Marine Corps does today
will have an effect years from now. To remain viable on
the deep maneuver battlefield of tomorrow, the Corps must
educate, train, and equip itself for deep battle operations.
A failure to do this now will, as with Desert Storm, leave
the Corps outclassed not only by the Army but by its
potential foes as well. If this should be the case, the
Marines will surely miss the deep battle.
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