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Military

Missing The Deep Battle
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA Warfighting
				EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:    Missing The Deep Battle
Author:   Major R. S. Trout
Thesis:   Due   to   equipment,   weapons,   and   doctrinal
shortcomings, Marine commanders do not have the means to
guickly detect and attack targets in the deep battle area;
thus forfeiting to the enemy the advantages of surprise,
concentration, and maneuver.
Background:  For the past forty years the Marine Corps has
held  a  Tactical  Orientation  of  the  battlefield.   This
orientation has influenced education, training and, weapons
procurement.  Recent developments indicate that this narrow
tactical focus is no longer viable on today's battlefield.
In order to maintain its forcible entry capability, the
Corps must  develop a means to strike deep at a potential
enemy.  Two operational means to do this are Operational
Fires  and Maneuver.   These two methods,  as demonstrated
during Desert Storm, will allow a smaller force to stand-off
and dislocate or defeat a larger foe.  In order to pursue
this deep strike capability, the Marine Corps must rewrite
outdated  doctrine,  update  command  capabilities,  procure
additional  long-range weapons,  and educate  its  officers
in the operational art.
Recommendation:   As the Marine Corps restructures to meet
a shrinking defense budget, it should do so in such a manner
as to gain the ability to fight in the deep battle area.
                            MISSING THE DEEP BATTLE
                                    OUTLINE
Thesis  Statement:  Due  to  equipment,  weapons,  and  doctrinal
shortcomings, Marine commanders do not have the means to quickly
detect  and  attack  targets   in  the  deep  battle  area,  thus
forfeiting   to   the   enemy   the   advantages    of  surprise,
concentration, and maneuver.
I.   	Evolution of Deep Battle Theory
     	A. 	Follow On Forces Attack
     	B. 	Operational Maneuver
     	C. 	Operational Fires
II.  	Importance of Deep Battle to the USMC
     	A. 	Shrinking defense budget
     	B. 	Economy of force
     	C. 	Maneuver Warfare From The Sea
     	D. 	Medium force mission
     	E. 	Larger battlefield
III. 	USMC Inability To Conduct Deep Battle
     	A. 	Intelligence gathering systems
     	B. 	Fire support
     	C. 	Command and control
     	D. 	Education and doctrine
IV.  	USMC Solutions
     	A. 	Education and doctrine
     	B. 	ACE Command and control
     	C. 	Fire support
                            MISSING THE DEEP BATTLE
     	On  31  January  1991,  preceded by heavy jamming and
using   infrared  countermeasures  to  protect  their  tanks,
the elements of three Iraqi mechanized brigades moved over
eighty-six  miles  and  attacked  thirty-seven   miles  into
Saudi Arabia to strike the port city of Khafji.  During
the ensuing twelve-hour  firefight -- much of it at night
--	United   States   Marines   and   Qatari   soldiers
counterattacked, destroyed over one hundred  Iraqi armored
vehicles,  and  retook  the  city.(4:160-166,14:197-203,333)
All in all, it was a superb  coalition victory -- or was
it?   How,   on  today's  modern  technologically-advanced
battlefield, could a  force of over three hundred armored
vehicles move in excess of one hundred miles, and not be
detected or attacked en route?  How could surprise have
been achieved?  The answer, unfortunately, is very simple.
Due  to  equipment,  weapons,  and  doctrinal  shortcomings,
Marine commanders do not have  the means to quickly detect
and attack targets in the deep battle area; thus forfeiting
to  the  enemy the advantages of surprise,  concentration,
and maneuver.
     	The  concept  of  deep battle  is  to  deny  the  enemy
commander the ability to employ his forces not yet engaged
at  the  time,  place,  or in the strength of his choice.
(11:19) It is to hit him as deep in his own territory as
possible,  thereby  preventing  those  yet-to-be-committed
forces from reaching the battlefield.  The depth of these
strikes  may range in  excess of 100 kilometers from the
Forward Edge Of The Battle Area.  The two primary  means
to strike deep at the enemy are by using Operational Fires
or Operational Maneuver.
     	Operational  Maneuver  is  the  disposition  of  forces
to create a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign
or  major  operation  by  either  securing  the  operational
advantages  of  position  before  battle  is  joined,  or
exploiting  tactical  success  to  achieve  operational  or
strategic  results.(24:13)   Originally  created by  the  U.
S.  Army in the mid-1980s, Operational Maneuver or Follow-On
Forces Attack, was seen as a method to dislocate and defeat
the  second  and  third  echelons  of  a Soviet attack into
Europe.   (8:47)  It  was  this  concept  of deep and rapid
maneuver that was demonstrated by the 101st Air Assault
Division when they struck the Euphrates valley, some 250
kilometers  from  the  front  line  trace,  during  Desert
Storm.(4:197)  Figure 1, taken from Richard Simpkins Race
To  The  Swift  and  modified  to  a  Marine  Expeditionary
Force-size-force, is a graphical portrayal  of Operational
Maneuver. (22:305)
Click here to view image
    	Operational  Fires  are  another  deep  strike  method.
They are not fire support in the traditional sense.  They
are stand alone fires that are designed to achieve a single
operationally  significant  objective. (24:12)   They  can be
delivered   by  surface-to-surface  means  or  by  aircraft.
The intention is to delay,  disrupt,  or channelize enemy
forces so that they conform a to predetermined plan.  An
example of such is shown in Figure 2.
Click here to view image
     	The enemy commander in Figure 2 finds that, even though
he is more than one hundred kilometers from his objective,
increasingly his routes of advance are being blocked by
scatterable mines and submunitions.  In addition to losing
equipment,  his  time  tables  are  upset  and his  logistic
support is being disrupted.  Even though he is not in direct
contact with his foe, he is losing the ability to dictate
events.   Like  flowing water  his  forces choose the path
of least resistance,  unaware that this is precisely the
intent of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Commander.
Upon reaching the close battle area, not only has his force
been attrited,  but his command and control system is in
disarray.   This  leaves  open  other  avenues   to  exploit:
electronic  means,  psychological  warfare  or  conventional
counterattack.
     	In both Operational Fires and Maneuver, not only is
the enemy force attacked, but so is the mind of the enemy
commander.   Both  are presented with situations that are
influencing  them  to  act  in  predictable  patterns.   They
are being shaped in such a way that their weaknesses are
becoming more open.  This shaping of the battlefield has
a synergistic effect, an effect that is greater than the
sum of the effects taken independently.  It can be likened
to a pebble dropped into a pool of water.  While the pebble
quickly drops out of sight, the concentric rings it created
continue to grow and influence in an ever-increasing size.
It is this type of action which will allow a smaller force
to stand off and dislocate or defeat a larger foe.
     	The  enviable  performance  of  the  Army's  101st  Air
Assault Division in Operational Maneuver and the use of
the  long-range Army Tactical Missile System  (ATACMS)  in
Operational  Fires  during  Desert  Storm  has  demonstrated
the Army's proficiency at deep battle operations.(1:42,5:44)
On the other hand,  as  the Marines observed at Khafji,
the deep battle is difficult to  accomplish and requires
long-range  intelligence-gathering  systems,  an  integrated
decision-making  complex,  and  a  long-range  deep  strike
capability.   Of the three essential ingredients for deep
battle,  only  a  long-range   deep  strike  capability  is
possessed by a MEF size unit.
     	In today's joint arena,  the Marine Corps's lack of
a deep battle capability would appear to be irrelevant.
The army has demonstrated its proficiency at the operational
level  of  war  and  the  Corps  tactical  prowess  remains
unquestioned.  It would seem that both services compliment
each other.   The army heavy and air mobile units backed
by long-range fires penetrate deeply into the enemy1 s rear
areas,   while   the   tactically   proficient   and   less
operationally capable Marines clear strongpoints, bunkers,
and tie down enemy forces.   Each service plays to each
other's  strengths.   While  this  argument  is  correct,  it
is only partially so, and it misses the point.
     	The point is that for various and well-known reasons,
both  the  Marine  Corps  and  the  Army  are  undergoing
significant and far-reaching fundamental changes.  As the
services  become  smaller  and  somewhat  less  capable,  and
airlift  and  sealift   continues  to  shrink,  the  current
operational/tactical   disparities   will   no   longer   be
practical.  A corollary to this is that while the services
are losing capabilities, their potential foes are gaining
new ones.   Only by  equipping both services across the
operational/tactical  spectrum  can  the  national  military
strategy imperatives be met.(6:14)
     	In addition to the above there are four other reasons,
all interrelated, why it is important to change the Corps's
tactical outlook.
     	First,  the  Marine/Navy  Team  is  the  only  credible
forcible  entry capability possessed by the United States.
As  Marine  numbers  decrease  and as amphibious ships are
being  decommissioned,  that  capability  is  being  further
reduced.  In order to maximize  the inherent strength in
the Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF), the enemy must
be struck at all depths from the tactical to the strategic.
This serves as an economy of force function and will open
up more of the battlefield to a fewer number of forces.
The following example demonstrates this concept.
     	When  faced with  an  amphibious  operation,  an  enemy
commander located some seventy-five kilometers from a likely
landing beach will not sit back and let his forces be struck
by long-range fires.   Nor will he let his primary axis
of  advance  become  blocked  by  submunitions  or  by  deep
maneuver  forces.  He will move, and when he does, he has
opened himself up to further attack.  He has also indicated
to the amphibious commander some of his intentions, which
can be exploited.  Additionally,  by encouraging movement
the amphibious commander is encouraging the enemy to make
mistakes.   Hence,  the  battlefield has opened up just a
little more.
     	Second,  Deep  Strike  Operations  complement  Maneuver
Warfare From The Sea.  This strategy envisions amphibious
operations  being  conducted  from over  the  horizon  (both
the visual and sensor), and into a vulnerable enemy rear
area or lightly defended sector.  The  strategy, although
not  new,  takes advantage of the technology incorporated
in the Landing Craft Air Cushioned and the V-22 Osprey
to  rapidly  concentrate  forces  in space and time.   This
ability to rapidly  concentrate  forces and deliver deep
operational   fires  lends more credibility to the United
States strategy of forward presence/deterrence. (6:21)
     	Third,  as  the  Marine Corps attempts to pursue the
medium-force mission,  the bridge between light and heavy
forces, it must be prepared to meet all contingencies.(2:28)
This includes stabilizing a situation until heavy forces
arrive.  In order to do this, a capability must be developed
to keep the threat as far away as possible from a port
of entry.  If the Marine Corps cannot do this, for at least
10 days  (time needed to unload a heavy division),  then
their ability to be a medium-force bridge is in question.
This  line  of  reasoning  leads to the obvious conclusion
that the Marines need some means to strike out at the enemy
from great distances.
     	Fourth, due to the mobility and lethality of modern
weapons,  battlefield  density  will  continue  to  decrease
and depth will continue to increase.  The historic trend
noted in Figure  3 will accelerate even faster as modern
weapons technology becomes more readily available.(7:173)
This has three implications for the Marine Corps.
Click here to view image
     	One battles will be fought at ever-increasing ranges
with  increased  requirements  for  dispersion  and  command
and control.
     	Two,  the  ability  to  rapidly  concentrate  forces  at
a specific point in time and space will encourage rapid
breakthrough operations.
     	Three,  smaller forces operating from a doctrine that
emphasizes rapid force concentration and long-range strikes
will prevail.
     	As Marines  strive to be viable on today's battlefield,
ignoring the operational level of war, in which deep battle
plays a large role,  is ludicrous.  Operational Fires and
Maneuver work, as demonstrated from World War II to Desert
Storm;  they offer a means to win with fewer casualties
and in less time.  As Marines strive for budget dollars,
roles and missions, they should take a hard look at their
capabilities now and what they want them to be  in the
future.  The Army certainly has, and in its new draft copy
of FM 100-16, ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS, there is a large segment
on the army's conduct of amphibious operations.
     	Despite the benefits that it would accrue -- greater
operational reach, increased lethality, and fewer casualties
-- the Marine Corps has not pursued deep battle operations.
This  was  not  an  intentional decision,  merely one based
in reality.  The lack of long-range intelligence gathering
systems,  insufficient long-range surface weapons,  a poor
Command,  Control,  and Communications (C3)  infrastructure,
and a lack of doctrine has forced the Marine Corps into
a  narrow  tactical  orientation.    To  understand  this
orientation,  a closer look at the four issues mentioned
above is warranted.
     	First,  Intelligence Gathering Systems.   Although on
the surface it would appear that large Marine Air Ground
Task Forces (MEF size) would have a correspondingly large
integrated and sophisticated intelligence gathering array,
this is not so.  For ground-based information gathering,
Marine  units  rely on  foot-mobile  reconnaissance  forces,
sensor employment platoons, and remotely piloted vehicles.
While  all  of  these  assets  do  provide  intelligence
information, they are by their very nature (foot mobile,
limited range, small payload) circumscribed.
     	The Air Combat Element (ACE) of the MAGTF  does  not
suffer  significant  range  or  payload  limitations.   It
provides an unparalleled ability to range the battlefield
and to attack targets deep within enemy territory.  But,
like  its  ground  brethren,  it  also  suffers  inherent
limitations.   It  is  vulnerable  to   enemy  surface-to-air
missiles,   aircraft,   and   electronic   countermeasures.
Additionally,  at least during the initial  phases of an
amphibious   campaign,   the  aviation  component    may   be
sea-based   aboard navy  aircraft  carriers  which,  even  in
a mid-intensity conflict, may be occupied with their own
survival.   Finally,  although  aircraft   can  carry myriad
reconnaissance pods, neither the Marine Corps nor the Navy
has acquired them for its front-line deep strike fighters
(F/A-18s).  Additionally, with the retirement of the last
reconnaissance capable RF-4B Phantoms prior to Desert Storm,
the     Marine   Corps   has   no   aerial   reconnaissance
capability. (17:33)
     	Even  if  reconnaissance pods were available for the
aircraft,  the  ability  to  exploit  them  is  questionable.
There are three reasons for this:
     	One,  Desert  Storm  aside,  on  a  mobile  mechanized
battlefield the luxury of a static target is a rarity.
It is common practice to change positions at random times
and when detection is suspected.
     	Two, when targets such as large armor formations are
stationary, they are covered by air defense systems, making
aerial reconnaissance a difficult task.
     	Three, a corollary with reasons one and two.  Primary
areas of interest are targeted and imaged  first, secondary
targets  last.   Modern  reconnaissance  pods  operate  much
like VCRs.    What is recorded first is at the beginning
of the film   and last at the end.  However, film and other
data is processed from the end to the beginning.  Hence,
it could take up to 24 hours to record, process, and attack
a detected primary  target, by which time the target  would
be far gone.(9:4-71)
     	The inability to detect a mobile target deep in the
enemy's rear is only part of the problem.  Even if detected
in a timely manner, the Marine Corps would be unable to
attack it by surface fire means.
     	Second,  Fire Support.  Although the Marine Division
contains more artillery than an army armored or mechanized
division, it suffers from range deficiencies. (10:3-8) With
the phasing out of the 175mm and the 203mm guns from the
inventory,  the Corps's only long range artillery is the
M198.  The M198 155mm howitzer has a range of approximately
30 kilometers when a rocket assisted projectile is used.
This is simply not enough range to cover the depths a MEF
size unit is expected to fight on (15K Security Zone, 20K
Main Battle Area,  20K Rear Area X Frontage Width),  let
alone prosecute deep operational fires up to 55 kilometers
away.  Even as late as Desert Storm, the Corps had to rely
on artillery raids to compensate for range limitations.
     	Looking towards the Navy to provide far ranging surface
fires is becoming less and less likely.  The mothballing
of the last IOWA class battleship, with its 45+ kilometer
range 16 inch guns, has left a significant void in Naval
gun fire support.  This leaves only the 5"/54 gun mounts
with their 21 kilometer range to support Marine operations
ashore. (16:248)
     	Although the Marine Corps has recognized its deficiency
in providing deep fires, its attempts to procure long-range
systems have been met with little success.  The request
for the long-range Multiple Launched Rocket System  (MLRS,
which  can  fire  the  ATACMS)  has  been terminated by the
Department Of Defense.(18:8)   This leaves the Corps with
artillery similar in range to World War II era howitzer's,
while  at  the  same  time,  naval  fire support  ships are
reaching new lows.(3:64)
     	Currently,  as mentioned above, the Marine Corps has
no weapons, other than aircraft, able to reach beyond thirty
kilometers.    And   unless   the   aircraft   is   carrying
target-specific  weapons, its success will be problematic.
Hence,  the Marine Corps is on the horns of a dilemma.
It cannot  detect nor can it attack a deep target with
any certitude.
        	Now,  on  the  surface  it  would  appear  that   both
problems could be solved.  By  taking valuable and scarce
reconnaissance teams and  flooding the enemy's rear areas,
detailed  information  on  enemy  positions   and  movements
could be obtained.  Couple the reconnaissance  teams with
dedicated aircraft for deep strikes and the Marine Corps
could actively  fight  a  deep battle operation.   But,  by
pursuing this course of action, a third and more subtle
problem arises -- that of integration.
     	Third,  Integration.   The  integration of battlefield
systems  into  a  cogent whole,  or  Command,  Control,  and
Communications  (C3),  is difficult to perform even under
the best of  circumstances.  It is particularly difficult
for the Ground  Combat Element  (GCE) of the MAGTF whose
field Command Posts  look much    like their  World War II
counterparts;  flapping canvas, hissing radios, and grease
board  maps  abound. (25)   Nowhere  in evidence are modern
data  displays,  communication  systems  or  sensor  links.
While  sending  radio-laden  reconnaissance  teams  to  find
targets sounds appealing, the Command Post would find that
they are difficult to control.  And, due to intrinsic radio
limitations  (range,  power  available,  band  width),  well
nigh difficult to communicate with.  Additionally, radios
emit electromagnetic radiation which can be detected, jammed
and located.  The solution to the conduct of deep-battle
operations does not lie here but in a system-wide approach.
But before the Corps can  develop this system it must first
educate its officers  in the Operational Art Of War and
develop doctrine to support it.
     	Fourth,  Education  and  Doctrine.   At  no  level  of
schooling does the Marine Corps demand that its officers
learn the Operational aspects of war.  From the Amphibious
Warfare School (AWS) for captains, where cookbook solutions
abound, to the Command and Staff College (C&SC) for majors,
where one Marine General stated, "I don't understand this
operational stuff and you don't need to, just concentrate
on the tactical," operational aspects and techniques are
frowned  at.(25)  This  lack of  operational  schooling may
also have the unintentional effect of locking out the Marine
Corps from future Joint Task Force Command.
     	Marine  warfighting  doctrine  reflects  the  Corps's
tactical  orientation  --  which  is woefully out of date.
Take for example FMFM 6-1  MARINE DIVISION, last updated
in  1978. There  is  no mention of Operational Maneuver,
Operational   Fires,   or   even   deception.   It   is   a
straightforward tactical manual that, interestingly enough,
contains no less than seventy pages on marking equipment
for  rail  transport.(13:191-261)  There  is  no mention  of
Light Armored Vehicles or their roles.  There is, however,
a detailed description of listening post employment.(13:166)
In order to pursue deep battle options,  the Corps must
first develop the doctrine and then build from there.
     	An attempt has been made to produce a document that
would cover the operational level of war.  FMFM 2 MAGTF
DOCTRINE  (Draft)  is  now  being  circulated  for  comment.
It contains several sections on the MAGTF at the operational
level of war.(12:4-6)  Operations, capabilities, and deep
strike  methods are discussed in detail.  Even though this
document has been criticized by some, it points the way
to the future.  If the Marine Corps is going to keep its
forcible  entry  capability on the modern battlefield,  it
must start with doctrine first and build from there.  The
Marine Corps cannot compete with the other services for
budget dollars; it must make do with less.  But this should
not limit intellectual development -- it should stimulate
it.  FMFM 2 is a step in that direction.
     	To  continue  in  the  proper  direction,  Operational
doctrine should then be refined at AWS and the C&SC.  Both
schools  possess  in  their  students  and  faculty   ample
experience  and  more  than  a  modicum  of  common  sense.
Following   the   doctrine  review,   it  should  then  be
incorporated into one of the many war games played at both
schools.  This will uncover any hidden flaws and will lead
to further refinement.   In this  fashion,  the Corps will
perform  two  vital  functions:  education  and  doctrine
development.   However,  what this will not do is correct
an   inadequate   Command,   Control,   Communications   and
Intelligence (C3I) infrastructure.
     	To prosecute rapid and deep maneuver and fires, the
Marines need to develop an integrated C3I structure that
can effectively handle  deep aircraft strikes, long-range
surface-to-surface  fires,  and rapidly moving  ground  and
helo-borne forces.   This structure must also include the
ability to see the battlefield at levels from the tactical
to the strategic.  The  GCE of the MAGTF does not have,
nor will it have in the near future, the ability to do
this.   However,  the   ACE  does  not  suffer  from  this
limitation.
     	Two data links possessed by the ACE --  the Tactical
Information Digital Information Link A and B (TADIL A/B)
and  NATO  LINK-1  --  can  allow  the  MAGTF  Commander  to
literally  see  the  battlefield. (21:10-3)   Unlike  the  C3
structure  used by  the  GCE,  the Marine Air Command and
Control System is one of the most modern in the world.
Able to interface with all of the services'  surveillance
data  systems,  it has the ability to see what they are
seeing.  The system is secure and extremely jam resistant.
It can also handle large amounts of data and provide control
over large sections of the battlefield.  From here a deep
operation  can be  planned and executed,  integrating  all
aspects of deep maneuver and fires.  As we have seen, only
the ACE can provide deep strikes  with its aircraft and
only  they  can,  through helo lift,  deploy deep maneuver
forces.  When this capability is coupled with the recently
developed  aircraft-launched  long-range  RPV,  the  Ryan
BQM-145A,  the  ACE  will   have  all  of  the  essential
ingredients   (long-range  intelligence-gathering  systems,
integrated decision-making complex, long-range deep strike
capability)  to fight the deep battle. (15:42)  Perhaps the
ACE  Commander  should  be  given  the  responsibility  of
conducting the deep battle while the GCE conducts the close
battle.
     	Unfortunately,   the  ACE  suffers  from  limitations
(weather, deployability, threat) that may preclude it from
carrying out deep battle operations.  To circumvent these
limitations,  the GCE also needs the ability to seek out
and  strike  the  enemy  by  using  Operational  Fires  and
Maneuver.
     	MLRS  aside,  there have been some developments that
could allow the GCE to conduct long-range fires.  The Navy
has slowly been procuring a land attack version of its
Harpoon  ship-to-ship missile.   The  Standoff Land Attack
Missile  (SLAM)  has a range of over 100 kilometers,  and
can  carry  a  terminally-guided  warhead  or  submunitions.
It is also cheaper than a Tomahawk cruise missile and takes
up less deck space.   The Navy has also begun trials on
a 5" gun system  (Advanced Gun Weapon System Technology)
that will provide long range ship-to-shore fire support.
This new system is capable of attacking land targets at
ranges  of  up  to  180  kilometers,  with  the  munitions
containing  automatic target-recognition systems. (23:228)
     	These  fire  support  advances  will allow the GCE to
conduct strikes at all ranges -- from the tactical to the
operational -- without the ACE present on the battlefield.
This increase in combat power will in turn create conditions
conductive to deep maneuver.
     	As the Marine Corps restructures for the mid-1990s,
it has proposed to field a Combined Arms Regiment.  This
regiment,  which is to contain M1A1  Tanks, Light Armored
Vehicles (LAVs), and Combat Engineers, would be a highly
mobile  self-contained  fighting  unit.   The  speed  and
firepower  of  the  regiment's  tanks,  combined  with  the
flexibility of the LAVs, gives the GCE a structured deep
maneuver  capability.   Additionally,  for  the  first  time,
the Marine Corps will have  an armored force -- trained
and  equipped  to  conduct mechanized operations  --  under
a single integrated command structure.  This type of unit
would   also   strengthen  Maritime   Prepositioning  Force
Operations  with  its  sea  based compliment of  tanks  and
LAVs. (20:C-2)
     	By the mid-1990s, with increased long-range weapons,
a highly mobile mechanized, force and the ability to see
the  battlefield  through  the  recently  acquired  Joint
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System ground terminal,
the GCE should be able to conduct deep operations.(19:25)
This  will  compliment  the  already  formidable  capability
possessed by the ACE.  It will also provide to the MAGTF
Commander a list of options he may employ as the situation
dictates.   Additionally,  together  each  will  present  an
attacking  force  with  a multitude  of  threats  to  defend
against.   An  enemy  commander will be  unable to attack
one without fearing a strike from another.  Neither the
ACE nor the GCE can win alone on today's highly mobile
and deep battlefield.  Only by having mutually supporting
Combat Elements can the MAGTF fight deep and  win.
     	As the Corps restructures to conform to today's budget
constraints,  it  needs  to  consider  the  battlefield  of
tomorrow.   Given  long  procurement  lead  times,  as  the
industrial base shrinks, what the Marine Corps does today
will have an effect years from now.  To remain viable on
the deep maneuver battlefield of tomorrow, the Corps must
educate, train, and equip itself for deep battle operations.
A failure to do this now will, as with Desert Storm, leave
the  Corps  outclassed  not  only by  the Army but by its
potential foes as well.  If this should be the case, the
Marines will surely miss the deep battle.
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