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Campaign Planning:  A Missing Piece In The Joint Planning Process
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA Operations
                               EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:   Campaign  Planning:  A Missing Piece  in the  Joint
Planning Process
Author:  Major Jeffrey J. Tierney, United States Army
Thesis:  To bridge the gap between national  and military
strategy, campaign planning should be integrated into the
joint planning process.
Background: The campaign plan provides the connection between
strategic objectives,  theater-level  strategy,  and highly
detailed operational plans.  Concepts outlined in this plan
link  together  various  and  seemingly  disparate  military
operations in and across theaters of operations to obtain
strategic goals.  Military actions not conducted as part of a
campaign plan may attain short-term military goals, but fail
to achieve more important long-term national objectives.  The
current joint planning process, known as JOPS, produces a
series of narrowly focused operational plans.  Each plan is
designed to address a specific contingency predicated on
certain assumptions.   The plans are not required to be
directly related to any other operations or tied to stated
national objectives.  The interdependence of plans and time-
sequencing, within or outside the theater, is not mandated.
The link between military operations and national objectives,
the timing of  these  operations,  the use of  nonmilitary
elements of power by the theater commander, and the overall
campaign architecture are not part of the planning process.
J0PS does not provide a campaign plan that  the theater
commander can use to evaluate his operations plans and their
relevance to national objectives.
Recommendation:   Campaign plans provide the critical  bond
between national objectives and operational-level planning.
Campaign planning must be integrated into the joint planning
process.
Campaign Planning: A Missing Piece in the Joint Planning Process
                                    Outline
Thesis:   To bridge the gap between national and military
strategy, campaign planning should be integrated into the
joint planning process.
I.   	Current definitions of campaign planning
     	A.  	Clausewitz linked military and strategic goals
     	B.  	Current joint definitions of campaign planning
II.  	The historical use of campaign planning
     	A.  	The Anaconda Plan, the Indian Wars, and the Philippine 				Insurrection
     	B.  	World War II and the Joint War Plans Committee
     	C.  	Lack of campaign planning after World War II
       		1.   	Korea
       		2.   	Vietnam
     	E.  	Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act
III. 	The current joint planning process
     	A.  	The National Security Strategy
     	B.  	National Security Decision Directives (NSDD)
     	C.  	The Joint Strategic Capability Plan
     	D.  	The Joint Operations Planning System
IV.  	Drawbacks to the current planning process
     	A.  	Plans have no direct link to national objectives
     	B.  	Interdependence of operational plans not addressed
     	C.  	Lack of time-sequencing within and between theaters
     	D.  	No use of other elements of power
V.   	Bringing campaign planning back into the joint planning process
     	A.  	Expanding the National Security Strategy and NSDD's
     	B.  	Development of regional strategies
     	C.  	The development of the campaign plan by the CINC
       		1.   	Anticipated spectrum of conflict
       		2.   	Use of other elements of power
       		3.   	Likely future military operations
       		4.   	Assistance required from other CINCs
       		5.   	Impacts on other areas of operations
       		6.   	Security assistance
       		7.   	Nonaligned nations
     	D.  	Time-lines
Campaign Planning: A Missing Piece in the Joint Planning Process
     	The  campaign  plan  provides  the  connection  between
strategic objectives,  theater-level  strategy,  and highly
detailed operational plans.  Concepts outlined in this plan
link  together  various  and  seemingly  disparate  military
operations in and across theaters of operations to obtain
strategic goals.  Military actions not conducted as part of a
campaign plan may attain short-term military goals, but fail
to achieve more important long-term national objectives.  The
current joint planning process makes no provisions for the
development of a campaign plan and hence creates a void
between the strategic and operational levels of planning.  To
bridge  the  gap between  national  and military  strategy,
campaign planning should be integrated into the joint planning
process.
     	Over  one  hundred  years  ago  Clausewitz  indirectly
addressed the campaign plan when he stated "The political
objective is the goal, war is the means of reaching it."
(8:87)   Clausewitz realized there must be a link between
national goals and military operations.  The designers of the
current joint planning process also recognized the need for
this link in the form of a campaign plan.  Joint Publication
1-02,  The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
defines the campaign plan as "a plan for a series of related
military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective,
normally within a given time and space."   (4:34)   AFSC
Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1991, further
refines this concept by stating:
     	The campaign plan takes a comprehensive view of the
combatant commander's theater of operations and defines the
framework in which an operation plan fits.  (1:1-5)
These definitions indicate that the framers of the joint
planning process realized that the campaign plan provided "an
analytical framework for applying forces and resources in time
and space within a theater of war to achieve strategic aims."
(6:43).  The campaign plan is designed to provide the link
between national objectives, theater strategy, and operational
plans. Unfortunately, the current joint planning system gives
no guidance nor makes any provision for this document.
     	The U.S. military has conducted numerous campaigns during
its history.   General  Winfield Scott's Anaconda policy,
formulated at the beginning of the Civil War, is an example of
a campaign plan.   This plan  integrated various military
operations, such as the Union's naval blockade along the
Atlantic seaboard and the splitting of the Confederacy along
the  Mississippi  River,  to  attain  the  national  goal  of
preserving the Union.  (9:93)  The Indian War between 1866 and
1890 was a campaign which utilized diplomatic, economic, and
military elements of power to achieve the national objective
of securing the western portion of the U.S.  Other examples of
U.S. military campaigns include the Spanish-American War and
the Philippine Insurrection.
     	The best  illustration of campaign planning occurred
during World War II when U.S. campaign planning reached its
zenith.  At the onset of World War II, the U.S. military had
an excellent strategic planning process, but little thought
had been given to the development of campaign plans.   The
Casablanca Conference  in 1943  revealed that,  unlike  the
British, the U.S. lacked a way to link strategic aims with
operational-level plans.   The Joint Chiefs of Staff  (JCS)
redressed this shortcoming by creating the Joint War Plans
Committee (JWPC).
     	The JWPC, formed in late 1943, was tasked by the JCS to
translate  "strategic  aims  into  operational-level  design
through the formulation and application of campaign plans."
(6:44)  The committee consisted of representatives from the
Army, Navy, and Army Air forces.  The JWPC performed three
main  functions:  first,  develop  and  refine  complementary
campaign plans for all theaters; second, develop and refine
major operations planning to support the campaign plans; and,
last, synchronize the efforts of the theater campaign plans in
time and space.  These three responsibilities led the JWPC to
become the focal point for developing joint campaign plans.
(6:44)
     	The JWPC planning process was very efficient in linking
the operational and strategic levels of war.  The first step
in the process was to formulate a strategic concept based on
the National Command Authority (NCA) directives. Further work
with this concept led to a draft global campaign plan.  The
strategic concept and the draft campaign plan were then
submitted to the JCS for approval.  Once approved, the JWPC
developed a campaign plan for each theater of war.   These
theater campaign plans provided the framework for operational
planning.  They informed theater commanders on how military
operations in their theater conformed to the overall campaign
architecture. Actual detailed planning of military operations
was left to the theater commanders.  The JWPC also addressed
other elements  of  power  in  its  campaign plans  such  as
diplomatic overtures.  The end result of the JWPC efforts was
a  series  of  time-sequenced campaign plans which  linked
military operations in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters to
national objectives.   (6:44,45)
     	Unfortunately, the JWPC and the campaign planning process
did not survive the end of the war.  The campaign planning
process, developed during time of conflict, was no longer
perceived as necessary in a time of peace.  The reorganization
of the military into the Department of Defense, under the
guidelines of the National Security Act of 1947, did nothing
to preserve the campaign planning process.  The act, however,
did bring a key new player into the planning process, the
National Security Council (NSC).
     	The NSC has  a variety of  roles.   One  of  its  key
responsibilities from a military planning perspective is the
following:
     	The NSC is responsible for advising the President with
respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military
policies relating to the national security so as to enable the
military services and other departments and agencies of the
government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving
national security.  (7:521)
The importance of the NSC is directly dependent upon the
personality and wishes of the president it serves, but there
is no doubt that it plays a key part in interpreting strategic
guidance.  The specific role the NSC plays in joint planning
will be addressed later in this report.
     	The period after the passage of the National Security Act
of 1947 was marked by the advent of a bipolar world where the
U.S.S.R. and U.S. were seen as the key players.  Conflict was
analyzed in the framework of superpower competition, no matter
how small the regional disturbance.  All military planning
centered on dealing with the threat posed by the Soviet Union.
In this period of superpower confrontation campaign plans
seemed superfluous and defense planners spent no time on
developing them.
     	Conflicts in Korea and Vietnam pointed out the dangers of
neglecting campaign plans.   These confrontations were not
conducted as part of an overall theater campaign, but were
ends to themselves.  These military operations, though having
defined goals, were not easily linked to national objectives.
For example, U.S. involvement in Vietnam was not part of a
campaign and the American public did not see the link between
military operations and national objectives.
     	The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 was
designed to address many of the shortcomings of military
planning and led to the development of the current joint
planning process, known as the Joint Operations Planning
System (JOPS).  JOPS is defined as an established, orderly way
of translating task assignments into an operations plan.
(1:24)   The main  input  for JOPS  is the Joint Strategic
Capability Plan (JSCP) which prescribes theater missions and
resources.  The JSCP is developed based on guidance provided
by the President and the NSC in the form of the National
Security Strategy and National Security Decision Directives
(NSDD).  The JOPS process places emphasis on deployment and
logistic data as well as the production of plans for major
operations.   Linkage of major operations within or across
theaters to attain strategic objectives is not addressed.
Furthermore, the consideration of other elements of power and
the development of a campaign plan are not required.
     	The final product of the JOPS process is a series of
narrowly focused operational plans.  Each plan is designed to
address  a  specific  contingency  predicated  on  certain
assumptions.   The plans are not required to be directly
related to any other operations or tied to stated national
objectives. The interdependence of plans and time-sequencing,
within or outside the theater, is not mandated.   The link
between military operations and national  objectives,  the
timing of these operations, the use of nonmilitary elements of
power by the theater commander, and the overall campaign
architecture are not part of the planning process.  JOPS does
not provide a campaign plan that the theater commander can use
to evaluate his operations plans and their relevance to
national objectives.
     	The current planning process is an excellent vehicle for
producing detailed operational-level plans.   The guidance
provided in the National Security Strategy and the NSDDs is
efficiently translated into military strategy. Unfortunately,
the clear  link between  the national  objectives and  the
operational-level strategy is lost because of the absence of
campaign plans. The analytical framework provided by campaign
plans which can be used to test the relevance of military
operations to national objectives is not available.   The
information needed to coordinate military operations in time
and space along with the use of the other elements of power is
not produced.  The strategic concepts and guidance provided by
the JWPC during WW II in the form of campaign plans is not
available today during peacetime.   The  link between the
strategic and operational levels is not clear; and military
operations risk the danger of being wasteful and irrelevant to
the accomplishment of national objectives.  There is no doubt
that campaign planning must be introduced back into the joint
planning process.
     	The first step in bringing campaign planning into the
joint planning process  is to expand the content of  the
National Security Strategy and NSDDs.  Each of these documents
should outline strategic goals,  regional  goals,  and  the
application of the various elements of power on a regional
basis.   Currently, both of these documents focus only on
strategic goals  and global  issues.   Little guidance  is
provided on specific regional objectives or the application of
the elements of power.   Planners from all agencies would
greatly benefit from knowing the regional goals and preferred
methods of the National Command Authority.
     	Once  the  proper  security  strategy  and  NSDDs  are
developed, the JCS can begin its part in campaign planning.
The JCS derives national military objectives and priorities
from national security objectives, major defense policies, and
guidance received from the President and the NSC.   (7:529)
The staff must refine and synthesize the national guidance
given by these sources.  This will be accomplished by taking
the variety of guidance and separating  it  into specific
regional strategies and goals.  Theater-level tasks will be
developed for  incorporation  into the JSCP.   Clear  links
between all possible military operations and national strategy
will be established. Coordination with outside agencies, such
as the Department of State and the Commerce Department, should
also be initiated at this time. The guidance developed during
this phase will then be given to each unified and specified
Commander in Chief (CINC).
     	Each CINC will be tasked to develop a campaign plan for
his  area of  operations which  addresses  regional  goals,
anticipated spectrum of conflict, security assistance, support
for treaties and agreements, the development of good relations
with nonaligned nations,  actions designed to expand U.S.
influence in the theater, specifics for various elements of
power, likely future military operations, assistance required
from other CINCs,  and likely  impacts on other areas of
operations. The campaign plan will apply to the CINC's entire
area of responsibility during periods of peace, crisis, and
conflict.  (5,43)  This draft plan will be coordinated with
the JCS, all unified and specified CINCs, and affected outside
agencies.  Final approval will rest with JCS.  Disagreements
between the Department of Defense and other agencies will be
remedied by the NCA.
     	Once JCS  approves a CINC's campaign plan,  it  will
returned to the CINC with an expected time sequence for
military operations in theater.  The CINC will review this
time sequence and provide comments back to the JCS.  Approved
time-lines will be provide to all CINCs.  In this way, each
CINC will have an understanding of the types and time-lines of
operations being conducted in other areas which may have an
impact on his particular region.
     	At this point in the planning cycle, there are a variety
of  products  available  to  assist  the  CINC  in  military
operational level planning.  There is a detailed NSDD, a JSCP
with specific taskings and apportionment of resources, an
approved campaign plan which provides an analytical framework
for evaluating the utility of a specific operation, and a
time-line to show where the operation should occur in relation
to other operations.   Furthermore, coordination conducted
during the campaign planning process will provide information
on the availability of all elements of power and the impact of
operations conducted in other theaters.  It is important to
note that incorporating campaign planning into the joint
planning process produces the following major benefits: the
production of a theater plan which establishes a link between
strategic and operational level goals, a campaign plan which
can be used as a basis for all other planning, and the process
itself which forces coordination between the CINCs, the JCS,
and other outside agencies.
     	Once the above steps are completed, the current JOPS
process can begin.  Emphasis during this stage is on preparing
specific operations plans to meet JSCP taskings.  The earlier
emphasis on campaign planning should provide many benefits to
this stage.  First, the JCS will insure that each tasking in
the JSCP can be justified within the context of the CINC's
campaign plan.  If a tasking cannot be justified within the
campaign plan, it is not relevant to national objectives and
will be eliminated.   Additionally, coordination conducted
during campaign planning will provide planning information of
great use now.  Coordination time during the JOPS process will
also be reduced due to the prior coordination conducted during
the campaign planning process. The campaign plan will provide
a convenient  starting point  for the  development of  all
operations plans.  Overall, the JOPS process will be greatly
enhanced by the addition of campaign planning.
     	Campaign plans provide the critical bond between national
objectives and the use of the elements of power.  History has
shown that effective campaign planning is critical to the
linking of military operations with national goals.  Given a
campaign plan, the theater commander will be able to develop
better operations plans  in less time.   A joint planning
process without campaign planning is inefficient and risks the
danger of producing military operations which are wasteful and
not firmly tied to national objectives.
                                 Bibliography
1.  	Armed Forces Staff College. The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1991.
AFSC Pub 1. Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991.
2.  	Drew, Dennis M., and Donald M. Snow.  Making Strategy: An
Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems. Maxwell AFB,
Alabama:  Air University Press, 1988.
3.  	Glantz, David M. "Challenges of the Future: Developing Security
Issues in the Post-Cold War Era."  Military Review, (December 1991), 2-9.
4.  	Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
JCS Pub 1. Washington D.C.:  U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986.
5.  	Mendel, William W. "Theater Strategy and the Theater Campaign Plan:
Both Are Essential." Parameters, (December, 1988), 42-48.
6.  	Rampy, Michael R. "Campaign Planning: Paradox or Paradigm." Military
Review, (August 1990), 42-49.
7.  	Reichart, John F., et al. American Defense Policy. 5th ed. Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.
8.  	Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.
9.  	Weigley,  Russell  F. The American Way of War. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1977.



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