Military

Friendly  Fire:  Reducing The Risk Of Future

Battlefield Tragedies

 

CSC 1992

 

SUBJECT AREA Warfighting

 

 

                        91 - 92

 

Friendly Fire: Reducing the Risk of Future Battlefield Tragedies

 

 

                   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

Title:    Friendly  Fire:    Reducing  the  Risk  of  Future

Battlefield Tragedies

 

Author:   Lieutenant  Commander Danny  A.  Shockley, United

States Navy

 

Thesis:   Developing  a means  to reduce  the  likelihood of

firing on friendly forces for  future conflicts is a problem

worthy of our full  attention; the solution may be  found by

improvements  in  three areas:    training,  technology, and

education.

 

Background:  Throughout history,  probably no major conflict

has  escaped the tragedy known as  friendly fire.  Countless

incidents  have been  documented.   First,  and of  greatest

significance,  the problem deserves our attention because it

is such  a tragic event.   But it is also  important because

friendly   fire  incidents  contribute   to  destroying  our

national    will   and   to   disrupting   our   operational

effectiveness on  the battlefield.   The causes  of friendly

fire may  be categorized  as either human  or technological.

The obvious solutions are to conduct  better training and to

obtain new  technology, but  Congress  and military  leaders

have  given a low priority  to the friendly  fire problem in

the past.   This is due to the  public's lack of information

regarding  the causes  of the  problem and  to the  military

leaders' attitude  that friendly fire is  just a battlefield

fact of life.

 

Recommendation:   Realistic training and new technology will

help to reduce the risk of future friendly fire.  The key to

obtaining  the  support to  buy   new  technology and  better

training  equipment is  through   the education  of both  the

public  and the  military leaders.   The  combination  of an

educated   general  public   and  an   enlightened  military

leadership  should  provide  the  support, as  well  as  the

impetus, to  pursue new technology and  to achieve effective

training programs.   This will  help to reduce  the risk  of

future  battlefield tragedies.

 

 

            Friendly Fire:  Reducing the Risk of

             Future Battlefield Tragedies

 

 

                     Outline

 

 

Thesis:   Developing  a means  to reduce  the  likelihood of

firing on friendly forces for  future conflicts is a problem

worthy of our full  attention; the solution may be  found by

improvements  in  three areas:    training,  technology, and

education.

 

I.                U. S. friendly fire history

 

     A.         Civil War example

     B.         World War I example

     C.         World War II example

     D.         Korean War example

     E.         Vietnam War example

     F.         Persian Gulf War example

 

II.            Importance of solving friendly fire

 

     A.         Tragic loss of life

     B.         Adverse affect to national will

     C.         Adverse affect to combat effectiveness

 

III.        Reasons for friendly fire

 

     A.         Human

     B.         Technology

 

IV.            Solutions to reduce friendly fire

 

     A.         Improve training

     B.         Improve technology

C.                Educate participants

 

                  1.         Inform the public

                  2.         Enlighten the military leaders

 

 

            FRIENDLY FIRE:  REDUCING THE RISK OF

                  FUTURE BATTLEFIELD TRAGEDIES

 

     The death  of a  soldier during  battle  is a  tragedy.

 

However, the  anguish is even greater  and more far-reaching

 

when  the  soldier is  mistakenly  killed  by his  comrades.

 

Throughout history,  probably no major conflict  has escaped

 

this  grave occurrence  known as  friendly fire.   Countless

 

incidents have been documented

 

 

     In 1863, General  "Stonewall" Jackson completed  one of

 

history's  greatest marches  around the  flank of  the Union

 

troops at  Chancellorsville.   Jackson went scouting,  as he

 

often  did, forward of his  battle line at  twilight.  After

 

determining the location of  the Yankee's defensive line, he

 

turned and hurried back  to order an attack that  might seal

 

General Hooker's  doom.  Suddenly, several  shots were fired

 

from    the   Confederate    lines.       Jackson's   mount,

 

uncharacteristically, broke  into a panic.   A kneeling line

 

from the  18th North  Carolina opened  up with their `smooth

 

bore Springfield  muskets.   Jackson was fatally  wounded by

 

three Confederate musket balls.  (2:  339-347)

 

 

     The moss prevalent occurrences  of friendly fire during

 

World War I were from artillery fire.  A combination of poor

 

communications, poor survey and  fire control, and the sheer

 

volume of artillery  (called for by tactical doctrine of the

 

day) resulted in what was described as an "outright massacre

 

of friendly infantry by its own artillery. "  (9:  2)

 

 

     Late  July  1944 --  Operation  COBRA  was launched  in

 

France,  with air support provided  by the Eighth  U. S. Air

 

Force.  In spite of General Bradley's desire for the bombing

 

runs to be made parallel to the  front lines, the Eighth Air

 

Force insisted the approaches be made at right angles to the

 

target  area  to   minimize  exposure  to   German  anti-air

 

defenses.    Seventy-five U.  S.  heavy  and medium  bombers

 

accidentally dropped hundreds of bombs on U. S. infantry and

 

mechanized units at positions up to seven miles north of the

 

target area.   The result  was 111 killed  and 490  wounded.

 

(1:  228-236)

 

 

     Before dawn  on 17  April 1953,  King Company  and Love

 

Company  attacked  Pork  Chop hill  simultaneously  from two

 

different directions.   Just as King Company reached the top

 

of  the hill, they  came under  an intense  machine-gun fire

 

opened up by two  soldiers from Love Company.   King Company

 

quickly  realized  that  the  fire  was coming  from  U.  S.

 

soldiers  but  all  attempts  to  signal  the  Love  Company

 

soldiers failed.  The machine-gun  fire was only silenced by

 

the death of the Love Company soldiers.  (9:  97)

 

 

     On  February 17,  1970,  Charlie Company  took a  night

 

defensive position  on a wooded hilltop in Vietnam.  Shortly

 

after midnight, artillery fired  a high explosive round over

 

Charlie  Company's  position in  order  to  hit an  intended

 

target area.  The fire  direction center failed to calculate

 

correctly for  the tree  heights of Charlie  Company's hill.

 

The  high explosive round hit  a tree, killing  2 members of

 

Charlie Company.  (3:  351-362)

 

 

     On January  29, 1991,  Iraqi armored units  crossed the

 

Saudi Arabian border and engaged U. S. forces.  A section of

 

U. S. Air  Force A-10s  checked-in and  destroyed two  Iraqi

 

armored units.   A  second section of  A-10s checked-in  and

 

released missiles after some initial difficulty in acquiring

 

the  target.    The   AGM-65  Maverick  missile  suffered  a

 

malfunction and struck a Marine LAV-25.  Seven marines died.

 

(8:  6)  (10:  4)

 

 

          Tragically, a ccmmon thread  through the history of war

 

is  friendly  fire.    Developing  a  means  to  reduce  the

 

likelihood of firing on friendly forces for future conflicts

 

is a problem worthy of our full attention.  As retired U. S.

 

Army Colonel D. H  Hackworth stated in a recent Marine Corps

 

Gazette  article, "It's  the  duty of  those who  will never

 

forget the loss of  a Soldier or Marine killed  by their own

 

fire to  ensure that  it (receives the  closest attentions.

 

(5:  48)

 

 

           Reducing   friendly  fire  is   important  for  several

 

reasons.   The  most obvious  reason is  that friendly  fire

 

represents a  tragic loss of life.   Sergeant Michael Mullen

 

died in his sleep from friendly artillery  fire on a hill in

 

Vietnam in  the early morning  hours on  February 18,  1970.

 

Understandably, Sergeant Mullen's parents were devastated by

 

the  loss  of their  son,   But  when Michael's  mother, Peg

 

Mullen,  was told her son's death was the result of friendly

 

fire  she was outraged.   Peg Mullen glared  at the sergeant

 

delivering the  news and beat her  fists on a the  back of a

 

chair in  frustration exclaiming,  "Not the enemy!   Goddamn

 

you!   You couldn't even give  him the . . .  the decency of

 

being killed  by the enemy!"  (3:  51-52)  The friendly fire

 

deaths  of the  Persian  Gulf war  are even  more anguishing

 

because they represent such a large part  of the total U. S.

 

combat  deaths.  In theory, the intensity of fire power that

 

caused the friendly fire deaths also saved hundreds of other

 

lives by bringing the ground  war to a quick end.   However,

 

this theory is difficult for the American public to  accept.

 

(7:  23)

 

 

           Preserving  the  national  will  is  another reason  to

 

reduce  the risk of friendly fire for future conflicts.  The

 

frustration  exhibited  by  Mrs.  Peg Mullen  is  a  typical

 

reaction  to  this  unexpected  event.    And  it  is  truly

 

unexpected.   When  loved ones  go  to war,  people  prepare

 

themselves for a potential loss, and if notified their loved

 

one has died, generally expect to hear how he/she died while

 

fighting the  enemy in a  courageous and valorous  action --

 

the way deaths  are depicted in World War II  movies.  It is

 

as  if such  an  action  justifies  the  death.    But  when

 

presented  with  the  news  that their  loss  was  caused by

 

friendly fire,  the death  takes on  an  even more  negative

 

connotation,  almost shameful  or  meaningless,  and as  Peg

 

Mullen  stated, denies a soldier the dignity of being killed

 

by the enemy.  Friendly fire fuels adverse public opinion on

 

the home  front, which may  in turn  affect one of  the most

 

vulnerable centers  of gravity of  the United States  -- the

 

national will.   Minimizing  friendly fire incidents  should

 

help to keep this center of gravity intact.

 

 

     A third  reason to reduce  friendly fire is  to prevent

 

the   degradation  of   operational  effectiveness   on  the

 

battlefield.    Friendly fire  is  not  only devastating  to

 

family and  loved ones, but  it also touches  combat troops

 

When asked about the friendly fire casualties of the Persian

 

Gulf War, former Commandant of the Marine Corps and recently

 

retired  General A. M. Gray said, "It breaks your heart when

 

it happens."  Likewise,  the leaders on the battlefield  are

 

similarly affected by friendly fire casualties.  (5:  46-48)

 

These casualties may deal  a crushing blow to the  morale of

 

the  affected  unit,  and  other units  in  the  theater  of

 

operations.   The tainted battlefield hinders  the close and

 

continuous coordination that is essential to successful air-

 

land operations.  The result is a disruption  to operational

 

tempo and effectiveness.

 

 

           Friendly fire  is a perplexing problem.   Each friendly

 

fire incident  contains a  unique bet of  circumstances that

 

are difficult to model or simulate.  One way to approach the

 

problem is to examine the  two factors which contribute most

 

to the continued existence of friendly fire.

 

 

     The  first factor  to  consider is  the human  element,

 

which includes  traits such  as inexperience,  fear, stress,

 

and  carelessness.   These  human  traits,  combined with  a

 

noisy, smoky,  dark, and rainy battlefield  create the often

 

mentioned, but not fully understood, "fog of war" situation.

 

Colonel  Hackworth  articulates  the battlefield  calamities

 

resulting  from the "fog of war" in his Marine Corps Gazette

 

article:

 

 

           Accidents  occur on the modern battlefield because

           terrified human beings are thrust into total chaos

     on  a  jet-driven  rollercoaster.    The  earth is

     rocked  by exploding  shells, bullets  cut through

     the  smoke-filled  air  like  razor  winged-tipped

     bees, and people scream amidst the insanity of the

     noise while killing and being killed.  Frequently,

           identification of  friend  and foe  is limited  by

     poor battlefield visibility, by both sides wearing

     the  same green  and  camouflage uniforms,  or  by

           everyone  hunkering down  to present  the smallest

     target  to get  out  of harm's  way.   No  one  is

           rational under these  uncertain conditions,  where

           adrenalin  is  pumping   at  an  explosive  level.

           Survival, man's basic instinct, is at stake.  Life

     and  death  decisions  must  be made  in  a  split

           second.   Like in the gunfights  of high noon, the

     slow  gun dies.  The  quick and fast  live.  Fear,

           nervousness, excitement, and  exhaustion numb  the

     mind     and     cause    miscommunication     and

           misunderstandings.    These  circumstances  are  a

     recipe for error.  (5:  46)

 

 

It is the human element  that causes many people, especially

 

military  leaders, to  shrug their  shoulders and  to accept

 

friendly fire  casualties  as  a fait  accompli  --  just  a

 

battlefield fact  of life.   (4:   45)    However, the  human

 

element was a contributing factor  in at least 11 of the  35

 

U.S. friendly fire  deaths during the  Persian Gulf War  and

 

may have had some influence in all of the deaths. (10:  3-4)

 

 

     A  second contributing  factor is  improved technology.

 

Modern technology  enables  large, complex  and  fast-moving

 

formations to fight in rain, darkness or low  visibility and

 

engage targets from long  distances with accurate and lethal

 

results.  This technological  advance contributes  to quick

 

and  decisive victories.    The dilemma  is  that these  new

 

capabilities  have pushed us into a new kind of warfare from

 

that traditionally  considered, making it  more difficult to

 

distinguish friendly  units from  enemy units and  making it

 

more  likely that  the result  will be  fatal.   Again, from

 

Colonel Hackworth's  article, the following is  an excellent

 

account of this dilemma:

 

 

           Warfare has changed.   No longer do opponents line

     up  behind two  clearly definable  neat  lines and

     bang  away at  each other.   Modern  American war-

           fighting  is  now frontless  and  emphasizes night

           attacks  with  heavy   doses  of  firepower,  fast

           maneuvering, and  deep penetration.  No  longer do

     units slam  against  each  other  until  one  side

     gives, as they did in World War II.  The objective

     is to go for the  jugular, to grasp quick  victory

     and  thus minimize friendly  casualties.   This is

     done  by  high-speed  shock  action  that  quickly

     slices through  enemy  forward defenses  into  his

     soft  belly,  and  cutting   up  his  command  and

           control, logistics,  and artillery.   These highly

     fluid and fast-moving operations  require detailed

           coordination  as  friend   and  foe  are   tightly

           intermingled.  (5:  46)

 

 

Lieutenant  General   Charles  A.  Horner   says  that   the

 

consequences of accidental attack on friendly forces is more

 

serious  than ever,  "we're  not just  talking  about a  few

 

pieces of shrapnel... with the  lethality of air (power) now,

 

a  hit  on a  friendly vehicle  is a  disaster. "   (6:   24)

 

Advanced technology was a  contributing factor in 24 of  the

 

35 U. S. friendly fire deaths during the Persian Gulf War.

 

 

     The solution to reducing future friendly fire incidents

 

may be achieved  by improvements in three  areas:  training,

 

technology, and  education.   The first two  areas, training

 

and technology, are obvious solutions.  Training will entail

 

the  preparation of  soldiers in  a simulated  but realistic

 

battlefield environment  in order to reduce  the human error

 

factor.   Technology  will  embrace  new  developments  that

 

should  help to reduce the risk of friendly fire occurrences

 

by closing the  gap between fire power  capabilities and the

 

ability  of command  and control  systems to  coordinate the

 

battlefield.   The final area, education,  is the foundation

 

to effectively implementing the required initiatives in  the

 

areas  of training and technology.  It will seek to motivate

 

the general public, to change the fait accompli mentality of

 

military  leadership,  and  to  gain  support  for  programs

 

designed to reduce future occurrences of friendly fire.

 

 

           Training  specifically  tailored  to correcting  human

 

failings   such   as   inexperience,   fear,   stress,   and

 

carelessness  is  required.   During  the  Vietnam War,  the

 

failure  of forward  observers to  correctly plot  their own

 

position and correctly shift  supporting artillery fires was

 

a major cause of  friendly fire incidents.  The  errors were

 

attributed  to   individuals having  to perform  under severe

 

combat stress.   (9:  16-24)  Therefore, in order to be truly

 

effective, the training should  be as realistic as possible,

 

using simulated battlefield surroundings.   Hitting a target

 

on  a firing range in a controlled environment is one thing;

 

hitting a target, the  right target, in the midst  of smoke,

 

explosions, and darkness is something quite different.

 

 

     As  previously stated, modern technology enables large,

 

complex  and  fast-moving  formations   to  seek  quick  and

 

decisive  victories  in  low visibility  with  accurate  and

 

lethal firepower.  This technological advance contributes to

 

quick  and decisive  victories.   The  dilemma  is that  new

 

capabilities make it more difficult to distinguish  friendly

 

units  from  enemy units  and  more likely  that  a friendly

 

firing  will  be fatal.   Simply  put,  we have  allowed the

 

capabilities  of  our  weapons  to outrun  our  capacity  to

 

control and coordinate them.  Or,  in economic terms, weapon

 

system  development  has reached  the  point  of diminishing

 

returns, at  least  until technology  provides  new  systems

 

designed to reduce the risk of friendly fires.

 

 

     The greatest  gains --  and perhaps the  area with

     the  greatest   potential for  future technological

           development --  is in command and  control.  These

           systems  decrease  fratricide  by controlling  the

          problems associated with  command and control  and

           misidentification  of  friendly  forces as  enemy.

     (11:  48)

 

These  new systems   could possibly  map the location  of all

 

friendly  forces in  the theater  of operations  (perhaps by

 

utilizing the Global Positioning System) and disseminate the

 

information  to everyone  involved in  real time,  enhancing

 

command  and  control   capabilities  in  order  to   better

 

coordinate the  battle.   Research  and  development  should

 

focus on new ways of increasing combat  effectiveness.  This

 

can be achieved by shifting technological emphasis away from

 

improving weapon systems capabilities and directing emphasis

 

towards reducing the likelihood of friendly fire.

 

           Finally,  we  must  consider  the  peacetime  level  of

 

interest  in   correcting   the  problem.     Research   and

 

development programs directed towards reducing friendly fire

 

occurrences have never received a high budget priority, and,

 

as  a result, research  into this approach  has only skimmed

 

the surface for possible  solutions.  In addition, the  Army

 

document  describing  future combat  situation requirements,

 

the  Battle  Development Plan,  fails  to  even address  the

 

problem  of  friendly fire.    (4:   46)    Why  is it  that

 

searching for solutions  to such an  emotional topic is  not

 

given  a  higher  priority  by  our  Congress  and  military

 

leaders?   Two  reasons  for this  reluctance come  to mind.

 

First,  the general  public,  for which  Congress works,  is

 

provided little or no facts regarding the causes of friendly

 

fire.   Second, the prevailing attitude  among some military

 

leaders that friendly  fire is a  battlefield fact of  life.

 

Key to alleviating these two conditions is the education  of

 

the general  public and military  leaders   An  internal and

 

external public relations job is needed.

 

 

     The public  knows little  about the causes  of friendly

 

fire.  Only  the results  -- the deaths  -- are  publicized.

 

The  military  exacerbates  the situation  by  deceiving the

 

public,  giving the appearance of a cover-up.  A recent Army

 

Times editorial describes this situation:

 

 

           Families were  told soldiers  died as a  result of

           hostile  fire, only  to find  out months  later --

           sometimes from other  soldiers, sometimes  through

           published  reports  --  that the  cause  of  death

           actually  was  friendly  fire.    Such  lies   are

           inexcusable.  (7:  23)

 

Openness and candidness are required.   Accurate information

 

should be  provided a- boon as possible  and should describe

 

the causes of  the friendly fire occurrences.   In addition,

 

the  battlefield  conditions --  the  human  factor and  the

 

technological gap -- should be publicized.  Once the reasons

 

for  friendly fire  occurrences are  understood, the  public

 

will be  more inclined to  support the military  rather than

 

hold  them  in contempt  for face-saving  cover-up attempts.

 

The public  will  then rally  Congressional  support  behind

 

initiatives   aimed  at   reducing   future  friendly   fire

 

occurrences.    Perhaps then  proposals  for more  realistic

 

simulation   training  and  new   research  and  development

 

endeavors will receive desirable levels of funding.

 

 

           Military   leaders  are   the  victims   of  too   much

 

information, or  maybe are  just too  close to  the problem.

 

While keenly aware of the conditions and causes  of friendly

 

fire,  their overriding  attitude is  that friendly  fire is

 

part-and-parcel to  war.  It is  not that they fail  to take

 

the  problem seriously or do  not take every  measure on the

 

battlefield  to prevent this tragic  event.  But  there is a

 

mentality, off the battlefield, that is so pervasive that it

 

prevents  the  acceptance  of new  training  initiatives  to

 

reduce friendly fire.  These military leaders may go through

 

the motions but in  their hearts they are not  convinced the

 

new  measures will  make  a difference.   The  fait accompli

 

attitude  perpetuates  itself as  it  is  passed along  from

 

seasoned veterans  to  new recruits.    A simple  change  in

 

attitude  may go a long way toward reducing friendly fire in

 

future conflicts.

 

 

           Friendly  fire  is a  tragedy  that  can devastate  the

 

operational effectiveness on the battlefield and destroy the

 

national  will on   the home  front.  The combination  of an

 

educated  general   public    and  an  enlightened  military

 

leadership  should  provide  the  support, as  well  as  the

 

impetus, to  pursue new technology and  to achieve effective

 

training  programs.   This  will reduce  the  risk of  these

 

battlefield tragedies for the future.

 

 

                                 BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

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in World War II,vol. 3, pt 5.  Washington D.C.:

Office of the Chief of Military History,

Department of the Army, 1961.

 

2. Bowers, John.  Stonewall Jackson: Portrait of a

Soldier. New York: William  Morrow and Company,

Inc. ,1989.

 

3. Bryan, Courtlandt Dixon Barnes.  Friendly Fire. New

York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1976.

 

4. Hackworth,  David  H. "Killed by their Comrades."

Newsweek, November 18, 1991, 45-46.

 

5. Hackworth, David  H., Colonel,  U. S. Army  (Retired). 

"Friendly Fire Casualties."  Marine Corps Gazette,

March 1992, 46-48.

 

6. "Horner  Underscores Tragedy  of Friendly  Fire.  Air

Force Times, June 3, 1991, p. 24.

 

7. "Inexcusable Lies. "  Army Times, November 25, 1991, p.

23.

 

8. "Investigators Detail Fatal Errors in Gulf War."

 Albany Times Union, July 21, 1991, p. 6.

 

9. Shrader, Charles  R., Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Army.

Amicicide: The Problem of Friendly Fire in Modern

War.  Fort Leavenworth:  Combat Studies Institute,

U.S. Army Command And General Staff College,

Research Survey number 1, 1982.

 

10. U.S. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Public Affairs). News Release number 504-91,

"Military Probes Friendly Fire Incidents," August

13, 1991.

 

11. Wiltse,  Jeffrey S. "Training to Prevent Fratricide."

 Armor. July - August 1991, 46-48.