Blind Man's Bluff: The Reconnaissance And Counter-Reconnaissance
Efforts In The Gettysburg Campaign 0f 1986
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA History
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE:BLIND MAN'S BLUFF: THE RECONNAISSANCE AND COUNTER-
RECONNAISSANCE EFFORTS IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN
AUTHOR: Major J. A. Roberts, United States Marine Corps
THESIS: Although often viewed as a peripheral aspect of the
Gettysburg Campaign, the successes and failures of the
tactical reconnaissance effort by both armies was the single
most important aspect shaping events in this operation.
BACKGROUND: A tremendous amount of material analyzing the
Gettysburg Campaign has been produced in the past 129 years.
Historians have scrutinized commanders decisions, exploring
an inexhaustible number of what-ifs. We all too often read
of how things may have been different if this had occurred or
if General X had done this vice that. Conjecture of this
sort is not only irrelevant, but degrades a good analysis of
the subject.
With over 100 years of hindsight at our disposal we
often fail to look at past events from the participants
perspective. We need to look at past commanders decisions
objectively, based on what he knew, not what we know now.
When looking from this perspective one cannot help but see
the pivotal role tactical reconnaissance played in the
Gettysburg Campaign. The successes and failures of the
opposing armies are directly linked to the abilities of
their tactical reconnaissance units to accomplish their
missions. The fortunes of both armies ebbed and flowed
with their ability or inability to gain an edge in the
reconnaissance battle.
BLIND MAN'S BLUFF: THE RECONNAISSANCE /
COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN
OUTLINE
THESIS: Although often viewed as a peripheral aspect of the
Gettysburg Campaign, the successes and failures of the
tactical reconnaissance effort by both armies was the single
most important aspect shaping events in this operation.
I. Reconnaissance Focus, North and South
A. History of Reconnaissance Efforts
B. Commanders and Command Relationships
C. Tactical Organizations
II. Phase I - 1 to 15 June
A. Lee's Plan and Intent
B. Battle of Brandy Station
C. Hooker's lntelligence Picture
III. Phase II - 16 to 24 June
A. Lee's Plan Matures
B. Stuart's Reconnaissance Emphasis
C. Cavalry Battles in Loudoun Valley
D. Hooker's Intelligence Picture
IV. Phase III - 25 June to 2 July
A. Stuart's Mission
B. Stuart Circles the Union Army
C. Lee's Intelligence Picture
D. Buford's Success
E. Meade's Intelligence Picture
F. Lee Gives Battle
BLIND MAN'S BLUFF: THE RECONNAISSANCE /
COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN OF
1863
On more than one occasion I have heard individuals
express the idea that "intelligence drives operations".
This is somewhat of an oversimplification of a very
important concept. What we should understand is that
intelligence, or the lack of it, drives operational and
tactical decisions. Military commanders must make difficult
decisions with whatever information is available to them.
The quality of battlefield intelligence a commander has
available to him has often been the difference between
victory and defeat.
The battlefield intelligence assets that are most
responsive to the tactical commander are his own organic
reconnaissance units. The utilization of these assets in
the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance efforts is
still of vital importance today. The basic concept of
providing the commander with information with which to make
decisions, while at the same time denying the enemy
commander that same information, is as old as warfare
itself.
History is replete with examples of the tremendous
advantages gained and lost by commanders due to success or
failure in the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance
battles. Unfortunately this aspect of warfare is often
overshadowed by the more spectacular events of large scale
battle. The Gettysburg Campaign of 1863 is an excellant
example of this type of oversite.
Gettysburg is probably the most analyzed battle in
American history. The tremendous impact of the
reconnaissance effort has been largely overshadowed by the
great clash between the armies during July 1-3, 1863.
Although often viewed as a peripheral aspect of the
Gettysburg Campaign, the successes and failures of the
tactical reconnaissance effort by both armies was the single
most important aspect shaping events in this operation. The
information gained by or denied to the opposing commanders
drove all major tactical and operational decisions. It was
no coincidence that the winner of the reconnaissance battle
was the victor in the campaign as well as the battle itself.
Robert E. Lee assumed command of The Army of Northern
Virginia in June of 1862. Between that time and the opening
of the Gettysburg Campaign Lee conducted five major
operational campaigns; The Seven Days, Second Manassas,
Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville. Of these
five operations only the Antietam Campaign was unsuccessful.
When looking at Lee's operations prior to the Gettysburg
Campaign one can see at least one recurring theme in his
string of amazing victories. Lee's cavalry arm under
General J.E.B. Stuart was able to dominate the tactical
reconnaissance effort on every battlefield. Stuart was a
master at gathering battlefield intelligence while at the
same time denying information to the enemy. Stuart's value
to the army was best expressed by Lee himself. When he
learned of Stuart's death in 1864, he exclaimed, "He never
brought me a piece of false information!"(4:432)
The 1862 invasion of Maryland, or Antietam Campaign, was
Lee's only unsuccessful operation prior to Gettysburg. It
is also an accepted fact that the events in this campaign
turned against Lee when his opposing commander, George B.
McClellan, was handed a lost copy of Lee's plan for the
seizure of Harpers Ferry. Prior to this incredible stroke
of bad luck Lee's cavalry forces had kept him apprised of
the movements of the Union army while keeping McClellan
completely in the dark as to the where-abouts and movements
of Confederate forces. By finding Lee's lost order
McClellan was able to see through a dense fog of war created
by a very successful Confederate counter-reconnaissance
effort. McClellan was now able to control the tempo of
operations and eventually force Lee back into Virginia.
The root causes of this string of Confederate successes
and Union failures in reconnaissance operations leading up
to the Gettysburg Campaign can be traced to both leadership
and tactical organization. Prior to the spring of 1863 the
Confederates enjoyed great advantages in both areas. The
previous disparities between Union and Confederate cavalry
forces need to be fully understood in order to better
appreciate the changes that arose during the Gettysburg
Campaign.
In the spring of 1863 Lee's cavalry commander, J.E.B.
Stuart, was widely recognized as a premier leader of mounted
troops. In Stuart, Lee possessed a subordinate leader who
was not only an outstanding combat officer but also a man
who fully understood the vital role he played as the
conductor of the army's tactical reconnaissance effort.
Stuart's philosophy in regard to this mission is best
illustrated in a letter he wrote to General John R.
Chambliss, a subordinate brigade commander. Stuart wrote,
"Bear in mind that your telegrams may make the whole army
strike tents, and night or day, rain or shine, take up the
line of march. Endeavor therefore to secure accurate
information. Above all , Vigilance! Vigilance!
Vigilance!" (4:432)
The Army of Northern Virginia also benefited from a
centralized organization of cavalry assets. Throughout the
war the various cavalry brigades attached to the army
operated under the exclusive control of Stuart. This
centralized control gave Confederate reconnaissance forces a
focus of effort and singleness of purpose completely lacking
in their counterparts in The Army Of The Potomac.
Prior to the Gettysburg Campaign the cavalry forces of
the Army Of The Potomac had suffered an unbroken string of
battlefield failures in dealing with their Confederate
counterparts. Even though possessing advantages in
manpower, equipment, and horses, Union cavalry had been
repeatedly bested by southern horsemen. Twice in 1862
Stuart conducted raids in which he completely circled the
Union army. These highly publicized raids as well as the
Confederate's absolute dominance of all phases of tactical
reconnaissance had given the Union cavalry forces the stigma
of being a second-rate organization.
A realistic look at the Union cavalry forces prior to
Gettysburg clearly shows that they were completely lacking
in the areas that made their Confederate counterparts so
effective. There was no Union equivalent of Stuart. The
Army Of The Potomac had no one individual responsible for
overseeing the army's tactical reconnaissance As a result
there was no emphasis to centralize cavalry operations. The
Union cavalry forces also suffered from a constant
restructuring of their tactical organization.
Union cavalry organization lacked the focus enjoyed by
Confederate forces. At various times between 1861 and 1863
Union cavalry units were routinely subdivided among the
major infantry commands. Cavalry divisions and brigades
were usually parceled out to the various army corps or
wings. Instead of functioning as the eyes and ears of the
army in a centralized effort, Union cavalry commanders often
found their units assigned to guard supply trains,
headquarters, and lines of communication.
These flaws in organization and leadership would
continue to hamstring Union reconnaissance efforts until the
spring of 1863. Prior to the Chancellorsville Campaign
General Joseph Hooker would reorganize the Army Of The
Potomac and create a separate cavalry corps. For the first
time, over 10,000 mounted troops under General George
Stoneman would go into battle in a concerted effort.
Although the formation of a separate cavalry corps was
certainly a great leap forward, Northern forces still lacked
a dynamic forceful man to lead it. George Stoneman would
would be replaced prior to the Gettysburg Campaign by Alfred
Pleasington. Pleasington's major qualification for command
was that he was senior to John Buford, soon to be a hero at
Gettysburg, by 11 days.(2:44) It would not be until the
arrival of Phillip Sheridan in 1864 that The Army Of The
Potomac could boast of a cavalry commander anywhere near the
stature of J.E.B. Stuart.
Much has also been written in history about the great
advantage enjoyed by southern cavalry due to a tradition of
horsemanship that was prevalent in the south and almost
completely lacking in the north. Although this gave
southern cavalry some advantages in skill in the initial
stages of the war, this advantage had largely disappeared by
1863.
By the opening of the Gettysburg Campaign the Union
cavalry arm consisted of hardened units led by able
commanders such as John Buford, Wesley Merritt, Judson
Kilpatrick, and George Custer. This was a viable fighting
force that was only wanting for the proper organization and
aggressive top level leadership that would allow it to
compete head to head on the battlefield with Stuart's
vaunted confederates.
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As Lee developed his plan to invade Pennsylvania in the
spring of 1863 he chose the 10th of June as the start date
for his movement north. Lee planned to use the Shenandoah
Valley and its northern extension, the Cumberland Valley, as
an avenue of approach to the Susquehanna River in southern
Pennsylvania.
The movement north would be led by Richard Ewell's II
Corps. Ewell's mission was to clear the Shenandoah of Union
troops and secure crossing sites along the Potomac River
near Shepardstown Virginia and Williamsport Maryland. James
Longstreet's I Corps and A.P. Hill's III Corps would
initially fix The Army Of The Potomac in place along the
Rappahannock River, and eventually follow the same route as
the II Corps.
A great deal of risk was inherent in Lee's plan. If the
initial movements of his corps into the Shenandoah were
detected, Lee's overextended army would be vulnerable to
attack from the Northern forces massed near Stafford. The
responsibility for keeping the Union commander in the dark
as to the Confederate movements would fall to Stuart and his
horsemen. The key to this plan's success was for Lee's
forces to get beyond the Potomac before Hooker and his army
could react to stop them.
As Lee was preparing his forces for the move north, his
counterpart, Joe Hooker was becoming suspicious. A series
of messages between Hooker's headquarters and various
infantry corps and cavalry commanders between 1 and 4 June,
clearly reveal his anxiety concerning confederate troop
movements along the Rappahannock.(5:196-199)
At this time Hooker informed Lincoln that he was
convinced of Lee's intent to attempt an invasion of
Maryland. Hooker's assessment was that Lee would keep his
forces east of the Blue Ridge and move on Frederick,
Maryland via Leesburg, Virginia, just as Lee had done in
1862.(2:52) Hooker's inability to confirm or disprove this
potential enemy course of action would heavily influence
events early in the campaign.
Hooker's suspicions were heightened when he received
word of a large concentration of Confederate cavalry
northeast of Culpepper. On 7 June, Hooker ordered Pleasonton
to conduct a reconnaissance in force toward Culpepper with
7,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry. The purpose of this
mission was to ascertain Confederate intentions.
Early on the morning of 9 June, Pleasonton's force
crossed the Rappahannock and initiated the largest cavalry
battle ever fought in North America. The battle of Brandy
Station was not only the opening engagement of the
Gettysburg Campaign, but also the opening blow of a
prolonged counter-reconnaissance battle.
In the final analysis Pleasonton's reconnaissance in
force could only be viewed as a failure. Pleasonton's
message to Hooker at the end of the day says it all , "The
enemy is in strong cavalry force here. We have had a severe
fight."(5:200) Hooker had already known there was a large
cavalry force in the area. That was the reason for
Pleasonton's mission in the first place. Union forces had
been unable to penetrate Stuart's forces. As a result
Pleasonton never discovered the two corps of Confederate
infantry massed in the Culpepper area poised to strike out
on an invasion of the north.
The one positive result of the Brandy Station fight for
the Union forces was the tone that was established for
future operations. Union horsemen for the first time had
aggressively sought battle with Stuart's troopers, initially
suprised them, and then matched them blow for blow. One of
Stuart's staff officers, Major H. McClellan wrote, "Brandy
Station made the Federal cavalry."(1:22) McClellan's words
would ring very true in light of subsequent events in this
campaign.
Lee was undaunted by the aggressive Union action at
Brandy Station and would not let it upset his timetable.
The next day, 10 June, Ewell's II Corps started its march to
the Shenandoah Valley. This movement would initiate the
first critical phase of the reconnaissance battle in the
Gettysburg Campaign.
During the movement of the II Corps into the Shenandoah
Valley, Lee's army would be spread from Winchester to
Fredericksburg. If Hooker were able to discover this
movement his army was well positioned to strike the exposed
and strungout Confederate forces. It was paramount that
Stuart keep Union eyes north of the Rappahannock.
From the 10th to the 15th of June, Stuart threw out a
strong line of outposts stretching from Culpepper to the
Blue Ridge. His aggressive actions kept his opponents
guessing as to the Confederate's intentions. Stuart's
success in this regard is vividly illustrated in an exchange
of messages between General Butterfield (Union Army Chief of
Staff) and Pleasonton. On 11 June, General Butterfield
suggested to Pleasonton that Stuart might be planning a
raid. (5:203) On 13 June, Pleasonton reported that
Confederate troops had been reported moving through
Sperryville, possibly toward the Blue Ridge. (5:204) In a
reply to this message Butterfield conjectured that the
Confederates might be attempting to move up the Bull Run
Mountains and come back through Thoroughfare Gap toward
Manassas. (5.204)
The reality of the situation on the 13th was that
Ewell's entire corps was approaching the town of Winchester
in the Shenandoah Valley. The Confederates were 60 miles
north of where Pleasonton reported them, and moving in the
opposite direction conjectured by Butterfield. Once again
Stuart had so stifled Union reconnaissance efforts that
while Lee maneuvered freely, The Army Of The Potomac was
immobilized while its commander groped for information on
the enemy.
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Lack of information and uncertainty seemed to dominate
Hooker's headquarters. A fog of war was blanketing Hooker's
outlook. Hooker even admitted in a letter to General
Hallack (General in Chief of the army), "I don't know
whether I am standing on my head or my feet."(1:34)
The information void engulfing Hooker and his army is
well illustrated in a message sent to Butterfield on 14
July, by General W.S. Hancock, commander of the II Corps.
In this message Hancock reports A.P. Hill at Fredericksburg
with 20,000 to 30,000 men, while Ewell and Longstreet were
near Culpepper with 70,000 men.(5:206) Not only was this a
25% overestimate of Confederate strength, but at the time
Hancock was writing this estimate, Ewell's II Corps was
destroying Milroy's force at Winchester and pursuing the
fugitives to the Potomac River.
After the battle of Winchester Lee could only assume
that the Union army was fully aware of his movement of a
sizable force into the Shenandoah Valley. On 15 June, Lee
set Longstreet and Hill in motion along the same route
previously taken by Ewell.
As a result of the army's movement Stuart now shifted
his reconnaissance activity to a more aggressive posture.
On the 16th, he moved his main force of cavalry into the
Aldie area in order to block attempts by Union cavalry to
enter the Shenandoah Valley. On the same day Major J.S.
Mosbey returned from a scouting raid with a courier from
Hooker's headquarters. Messages in the courier's possession
showed that Pleasonton would make an all out attempt to
enter the Shenandoah Valley, by way of Aldie and
Middleburg.(5:688) Not only was Hooker in the dark as to
Confederate intentions, but Stuart was reading his mail at
the same time.
Between the 17th and 21st of June, Stuart's and
Pleasonton's forces engaged in a series of intense cavalry
actions. Although Stuart was able to prevent Union forces
from entering the Shenandoah Valley, it was no easy task.
The Confederate horsemen were pushed back to the gaps of the
Blue Ridge before Pleasonton's troopers were stopped and
withdrew to the east. The situation had become so critical
that Longstreet diverted infantry into the mountain passes
in case Stuart failed to hold. Stuart had again triumphed.
But each time he engaged the Union cavalry he was finding it
increasingly more difficult to best them.
Ewell had crossed the Potomac into Maryland on the 16th,
and by 22 June, his lead elements were in Chambersburg,
Pennsylvania. Even with the Confederates operating in
northern territory Hooker was receiving contradictory
information. From the time Ewell crossed the Potomac
various local Union commanders in Maryland and Pennsylvania
were reporting sightings and movements of large bodies of
Confederate troops. In contrast to this on 21 June,
PIeasonton sent a message to Hooker stating that
Longstreet's forces were in the Shenandoah Valley, and that
"A.P. Hill is not north of the Rappahannock."(5:244) In
actuality Hill's Corps was passing in rear of longstreet's
Corps and moving into Maryland.
When one examines the intermittent and contradictory
information Hooker was receiving on Lee's movements it is
easy to see why the Union commander was so slow to initiate
a pursuit. Between 10 and 21 June, Hooker had slowly spread
his army between the Rappahannock and the town of Leesburg
near the Potomac. Hooker's inability to determine Lee's
course of action caused him to play it safe while waiting
for a clearer picture of the situation to develop. In the
face of conflicting information as to what the Confederate
army was doing, Hooker covered the southern approaches to
Washington and waited. While Hooker sat and waited for more
information, Lee continued to push north leaving the Union
army far behind.
Just as Lee's plan seemed to be developing almost
flawlessly, the Confederate counter-reconnaissance effort
was about to take a dramatic turn against him. The
reconnaissance battle during the period of 25 June, to 1
July, would be characterized by a complete reversal of
fortune between north and south. The effect this would have
on the opposing commanders decisions would dramatically
reshape the campaign.
One of the most controversial decisions of the campaign
occurred during an exchange of orders, ideas, and messages
between Lee, Longstreet, and Stuart on 22 and 23 June. On
22 June Lee sent orders to Stuart outlining the cavalryman's
future missions. In this message Lee expressed the
following concern about the enemy, "I fear he will steal a
march on us and get across the Potomac before we are
aware." (5:913) These orders directed Stuart to post forces
to guard the passes in the Blue Ridge while he and the rest
of his force followed the army into Maryland via the
Shenandoah and Cumberland Valleys. Lee further directed
Stuart to place his force on Ewell's right flank in order to
"keep him informed of enemy movements."(5:913)
Stuart addressed a proposal to Lee that he be allowed to
cross into Maryland east of the mountains in the enemy rear
in order to harrass and delay The Army Of The Potomac.
Longstreet concurred with Stuart's Idea. In a message to
Lee dated 22 June, Longstreet expressed the opinion that
Stuart's movement across the Potomac east of the mountains
was less likely to disclose the movements of the army than
would a crossing west of the mountains. (5:915)
On 23 June, Lee reissued orders to Stuart leaving him
the option of deciding where to conduct a crossing of the
Potomac. Lee advised Stuart to base his decision on the
activity of the Union army. He cautioned Stuart that any
attempt to pass the rear of the enemy army should be
accomplished "without hinderance" (5:923) and "the sooner you
cross into Maryland, after tommorrow, the better."(5:923)
Lee was willing to leave the decision of where to cross the
river to Stuart as long as it could be done without delay.
The overriding imperative in Lee's order was that Stuart
cross the Potomac quickly and continue to guard the right
flank of the army.
After assigning two brigades to guard the mountain
passes and Lee's lines of communication, Stuart organized
his remaining three brigades for a ride through the Union
army. On the morning of 25 June, Stuart's forces started on
their ill-fated march. After crossing east of the Bull Run
Mountains his force collided with columns of the Union II
Corps. Stuart had expected to easily pass between widely
seperated Union forces, but now found his route blocked by
masses of Union infantry moving north.
Stuart was now faced with a crucial decision. He could
attempt to press on, or he could withdraw west of the
mountains and move into Maryland as originally proposed by
Lee. Stuart chose the first option and started to detour
south and east of the eremy army.
Hard riding and fighting since the 15th of June, had
taken a toll on the condition of Stuart's horses. This
coupled with the lack of grass in Northern Viginia forced
the Confederates to slow their rate of march and spend
valuable time grazing their horses. Stuart would not cross
the Potomac until 28 June.
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On 29 June, Stuart's troops captured an enemy supply
train of 125 wagons near Rockville Maryland. Rather than
destroy the wagons, Stuart chose to take this prize of war
with him. This would further slow the pace of his advance.
Stuart seems to have ignored all of Lee's imperatives.
He had not been able to execute his movement without
hinderance. It had taken Stuart four days to cross the
Potomac, even though Lee had wanted him across as soon as
possible after the 23rd. Once over the river Stuart was not
on the right flank of the army where Lee wanted him. The
Army Of The Potomac was squarely between Stuart and the
Confederate army whose flank Stuart was to protect. Stuart
would not rejoin Lee until the evening of 2 July. During
the eight days it would take Stuart to ride around the Union
army he would be completely out of touch with Lee. These
would prove to be some of the most crital days of the
campaign.
On the 25th of June, Lee began to suffer through the
same type of information void that had previously plagued
Hooker. By the evening of 25 June Lee had not heard from
Stuart for nearly four days and was ignorant of the
movements and position of the Union army. That night a
scout named Harrison, who had been sent behind Union lines
by Longstreet at the opening of the campaign, returned to
the army. Harrison reported the promotion of General Meade
to command of The Army Of The Potomac, which was moving
north into Maryland.(4:49) Lee's fear that the enemy would
steal a march on him had apparently come true.
The information Lee had on the enemy was sketchy at
best. Unlike Hooker Lee was not one to vacillate. If the
Union army was closing in, Lee would concentrate his forces
for battle. On the 29th, Lee issued orders for his corps
commanders to concentrate east of the mountains in the
vicinity of Cashtown and Gettysburg. Ewell would move down
from the north while Hill and Longstreet crossed over the
mountains from Chambersburg.
On the evening of 30 June, General Heth of Hill's Corps
requested permission to move his division into Gettysburg
the next morning to search for shoes for his troops. Hill
expressed no objection to the move. Hill told Heth, "The
only force at Gettysburg is cavalry, probably a detachment
for observation. I am just from General Lee and and the
information he has from his scouts corroborates that I have
received from mine - that is, the enemy are still at
Middleburg, and have not yet struck their tents."(4:78)
The Confederate assessment of the situation on 30 July
clearly demonstrates how sorely the reconnaissance efforts
of Stuart were missed. The cavalry force in Gettysburg,
alluded to by Hill, was a full division under General John
Buford. Also the lead elements of The Army Of The Potomac
were not over 20 miles away in Middleburg, but just under
eight miles south near Emmitsburg, Maryland. The
Confederate army was about to stumble into the greatest
battle of the war.
As Stuart was preparing to move off on his ride around
the Union army, Hooker's intelligence picture was finally
beginning to clarify. On the 24th of June, a message was
received from citizens of Greencastle, Maryland giving a
very accurate account of the movement of Ewell's Corps into
Pennsylvania.(5:249) This report identified all of Ewell's
divisions with accurate estimate of troop and artillery
strength. Hooker was now getting information from loyal
citizenry that his cavalry had been unable to produce.
Hooker started his army in pursuit on the 25th, the same
day Stuart was attempting to pass around The Army of The
Potomac. By 27 June, the Union army would be across the
potomac and moving toward Pennsylvania. This movement
placed the Union army squarely between Lee and Stuart. This
would also be Hooker's last day in command. Meade would
replace Hooker on the 28th.
At this time Pleasonton would make one of the crucial
decisions of the campaign. He placed two cavalry divisions
in the rear of the army to shadow Stuart and prevent him
from interfering with the movements of the army. His third
division was sent in the opposite direction to scout for the
lead elements of the army moving into Pennsylvania. This
division under General Buford would perform one of the most
critical reconnaissance missions of the campaign.
As Buford's cavalry division preceded The Army Of The
Potomac into Pennsylvania, a rare opportunity presented
itself. Stuart was still absent on his extended ride around
the Union army. As a result Buford's troopers found an open
area of operations with no viable Confederate force to
oppose their reconnaissance efforts. Buford's units were
able to roam far and wide scouting out the location of the
Confederate army. Union reconnaissance units were able to
penetrate into the Cumberland Valley and for the first time
gather timely and accurate intelligence on the movements of
Lee's forces.
Buford's units were so effective that a detailed
intelligence picture was quickly put together for General
Meade. On 30 June, Buford was able to send a message to
Meade in which he accurately laid out the locations and
directions of movement of eight of Lee's nine
divisions.(5:422) The only major unit Buford had not found
was Johnson's Division of Ewell's Corps. While Lee's troops
were moving east without a clear idea of just how close the
Union army was, Meade had been presented an almost crystal
clear picture of Confederate dispositions.
As Heth moved his division toward Gettysburg on 1 July,
he encountered enemy cavalry about five miles east of town.
At ten a.m. Heth's troops collided with the Union I Corps on
McPheson's ridge a little over a mile east of town. The
Union army had been found much further north than anticipated.
When Lee had ordered his commanders to concentrate near
Gettysburg he cautioned his generals not to get involved in
any large battle until the remainder of the army could
arrive.(4:81) As the Confederate and Union forces poured in
from opposite directions the battle took on a life of its
own. Lee would have two full divisions and part of a
third engaged before gaining control of the battle. By mid-
afternoon Lee found himself employing four divisions in a
battle he had not anticipated, and at a time and place he
had not wanted.
Lee's forces were able to gain a victory over the Union
I and XI Corps which retreated to a chain of hills just
south of town. With this victory Lee was faced with his
most critical decision thus far in the campaign. By that
evening Lee had two thirds of his army at Gettysburg.
Longstreet's Corps would not arrive in total until the
afternoon of July 2. Lee had also finally heard from
Stuart, but he would also not reach Gettysburg until the
next evening. Lee had to decide whether to continue the
battle or attempt to maneuver.
General Longstreet proposed that the army maneuver south
around the Union left flank and interject itself between the
enemy army and Washington.(3:74) This proposal was fraught
with risk. The absence of cavalry again plagued Lee. He
had no knowledge of where the Union army was or how fast
they were concentrating. Lee felt that without cavalry to
screen the army's movement and reconnoiter the routes of
march he would be moving blindly around the Union left,
which "would have been wildly rash".(3:74) Lee decided his
best move was to finish off the two corps to his front
without delay. The battle of Gettysburg would now run its
course.
In order to fully understand the impact of the
reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance efforts in the
Gettysburg campaign one should break it down into three
phases. The first phase running from 1 to 15 June, would
encompass Lee's preparation for invasion and the movement of
one corps into the Shenandoah Valley. The second phase
covered the period of 16 to 24 June when the bulk of Lee's
army moved north. The third phase was 25 June to 2 July,
covering the period of Stuart's eight day abscence from Lee.
The first phase of the reconnaissance effort was the
most dangerous for Lee, and conversely, Hooker's best chance
to spoil Lee's plans. The critical event in this period was
Lee's ability to move his II Corps into the Shenandoah
Valley undetected. Even though Hooker was suspicious of
Lee's activity, he was only able to conjecture as to what
Lee intended. Hooker's major attempt to penetrate Lee's
screening forces was turned back by Stuart at Brandy
Station. While Lee's forces were strung out and separated
Stuart was able to keep Union eyes out and insured the
success of the operation.
The second phase of the reconnaissance battle occurred
between 16 to 24 June. During this period Stuart was able
to stop the aggressive efforts of the Union cavalry to
penetrate his forces. This nine day stretch was
characterized by the hardest fought cavalry battles ever
seen in the Virginia Theater. Stuart was able to keep Union
forces at arms length from the main army and denied Hooker
the information on Lee's movements that Hooker desperately
needed. Conversely, while Lee was maneuvering his army
north he was well aware of Union activity. Hooker's army,
on the other hand, sat south of the Potomac, paralyzed by
the commander's indecision.
In the third phase of the reconnaissance battle the
tactical intelligence pictures of the opposing army
commanders would be dramatically reversed. This reversal
would come about more through Confederate error than Union
effort. Stuart's insistance on crossing the Potomac by way
of the enemy rear resulted in an eight day absence when his
talents were most needed by Lee. This left the field wide
open for Buford's cavalrymen to gather information on the
Confederate army.
In the first stages of the campaign Lee was the
recipient of timely and accurate reports on the enemy which
allowed him to maneuver confidently into Maryland. Hooker
on the other hand sat in the throes of indicision,
immobilized by a lack of information. As the campaign
reached a decisive phase the roles were reversed. Lee was
now groping in the dark, concentrating his army in reaction
to sketchy information. This is best illustrated in remarks
he made to General Anderson when hearing the sounds of
battle as he approached Gettysburg. Lee stated:
I cannot think what has become of Stuart. I
ought to have heard from him long before now.
In the absence of reports from him , I Am in ig-
norance as to what we have in front of us. It
may be the whole Federal army, it may be only
a detachment. If it is the whole Federal force
we must fight a battle here.(3:67)
As mentioned earlier, on the evening of 1 July, Lee would
have to make one of the most critical decisions of the war
without any accurate intelligence on the enemy army. At the
same time Meade had an extremely accurate picture of the
enemy force he was about to engage.
When one looks at tactical reconnaissance in the
Gettysburg Campaign it is easy to see the vital importance
of this aspect of warfare. The successes and failures of
both armies were tied to their ability to control the
reconnaissance battle Even so brilliant a soldier as Lee
was mortal when lacking the intelligence needed to make
decisions.
There is a commonly accepted myth that Gettysburg was a
battlefield where two armies collided by chance, a place
where neither commander wished to fight. The evidence shows
this to be half true. The Confederate army stumbled into an
unanticipated battle. Lee's lack of current tactical
intelligence forced him to accept a major battle at a time
and place not of his choosing Meade on the other hand went
to Gettysburg seeking battle. The Union army fought at
Gettysburg because their commander chose to do so. Meade
was able to make that decision because at the time his
forces were in control of the reconnaissance battle, and
that would make all the difference.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Clark, Champ etal., Gettysburg, The Confederate High
Tide. Alexandria Va.: Time Life Books, 1985.
2. Coddington, Edwin. The Gettysburg Campaign. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1984.
3. Freeman, Douglas. Lee's Lieutenants, Volume III. New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944.
4. Freeman, Douglas, R. E. Lee, Volume III. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935
5. U.S. War Department, The Official Records of the War
of the Rebellion, Volume XXVII part 2. Washington D.C.: 1880.
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