The Largest Security-Cleared Career Network for Defense and Intelligence Jobs - JOIN NOW


Force Of Choice:  It Can Be Everywhere-But Can Go Anywhere
AUTHOR Major John J. Pomfret, USMC
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy
Thesis:  To fully realize its potential as the force of choice, the
Marine Corps must improve its ability to deploy with available
strategic lift, operate jointly, and sustain deployed forces.
I.  	Improving Deployability
    	A.   	Lack of available strategic lift
    	B.   	Future strategy calls for rapid crisis response
    	C.   	Marine Corps crisis action modules first step
    	D.   	How to improve Marine Corps deployability
         		l.  	Streamline lift requirement for MAGTFs
         		2.  	Become joint systems capable
         		3.  	Utilize sequential deployment lift profile
         		4.  	Reduce unneeded sustainment
         		5.  	Develop deterrent force modules
II. 	Improving Joint Interoperability
    	A.   	Joint interoperability required
         		l.  	Connectivity with communications
         		2.  	Compatible doctrine and procedures
         		3.  	Interoperable CSS and logisitics
    	B. 	Joint operation capability mandated
         		l.  	Required by SecNav
         		2.  	Directed by DOD
    	C.   	How to achieve interoperability
         		l.  	Evaluate Marine Corps capabilities and limitations
         		2.  	Utilize formal education, joint exercises, and wargaming
         		3.  	Educate other services about Marine Corps
         		4.  	Revise publications to reflect joint requirements
         		5.  	Be capable of being a JTF command element
         		6.  	Ensure command and control compatibility
III. 	Improving Sustainability
    	A.   	Sustainability doctrine needs refinement
         		l.   	Must have continuous sustainment capability
         		2.   	Must be flexible and responsive
         		3.   	Must meet every tactical scenario
    	B.   	Must equate sustainability to capability
         		l.   	Must be capable to account for and distribute supplies
         		2.   	Current doctrine and techniques not responsive
         		3.   	Follow-on support not guaranteed
    	C.   	How  to improve sustainability
         		l.   	Test sustainability doctrine in exercises
         		2.   	Tailor sustainment profile to specific scenarios
         		3.   	Base procurement and development of systems to
         		4.  	Analyze and rectify current sustainability limitations
                               EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:   Force of Choice: It Can't be Everywhere, but Can Go Anywhere
Author:  Major John J. Pomfret, United States Marine Corps
Thesis:  To fully realize its potential as the force of choice, the
Marine Corps must improve its ability to deploy with available
strategic lift, operate jointly, and sustain deployed forces.
Background:  In the post-Cold War Era, the Marine Corps has emerged
as the Nation's force of choice.  The Marine Corpse inherent
ability to rapidly deploy, sustain the deployed force, and operate
as a combined arms force makes it a valuable national military
asset.  The Marine Corps' maritime character and ability to provide
flexible and multi-mission capable MAGTFs establish it as a force
in readiness.  However, the Marine Corps must improve its
deployability, joint interoperability, and sustainability to
realize its potential as the force of choice.  Strategic lift is
limited, and would be greatly stressed to support a rapid crisis
response requirement.  The Marine Corps' current lift profile and
deployment sequencing makes it an unattractive crisis response
force.  The future of military operations require military forces
to be capable of joint operations.  Interoperability demands a
force be capable of joint operations in doctrine, techniques,
tactics, procedures, logistics, and command and control.  The
Marine Corps to be interoperable must achieve compatibility,
connectivity, and familiarity with other joint forces.
Sustainability of a deployed force provides operational and
tactical reach.  The Marine Corps' sustainability doctrine and
techniques are not validated in exercises, and nor are they
designed to support sustained tactical operations.  Sustainability
doctrine must provide responsive, flexible, and required CSS
and logisitics capability to meet every tactical scenario and plan.
Recommendations:   The Marine Corps should become more deployable
to adapt to strategic lift constraints and CINC requirements.
Through the improved education in joint systems, the streamlining
of MAGTF lift profiles, and the pursuit of innovative MAGTF
deployment and employment concepts such as deterrent force modules,
the Marine Corps can improve deployability.  The Marine Corps should
improve joint interoperability.  Through education, joint
exercises, and analysis of joint capability requirements, the
Marine Corps become more interoperable.  The Marine Corps should
refine its sustainment doctrine to reflect capability requirements.
Through the determination of requirements for different tactical
scenarios, the Marine Corps can establish the requisite
sustainment capabilities.  Exercises should be used to validate and
refine sustainment doctrine, and equipment procurement and logistic
systems development should all support the sustainability of an
employed MAGTF.
    	The Marine Corps of the future must hold to one vital concept:
the concept of the Marine Corps as the military force of choice for
U.S. national policy makers.  Over the past 40 years, naval forces
were employed 80 percent of the time U.S. forces responded to
crises situations. (22:1-4)  In 1991 alone, in addition to Marine
forces deployed to the Persian Gulf, Marines conducted operations
in Bangladesh, Liberia, Somalia. Turkey, and the Philippines.
These operations ranged from humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief to the evacuation of U.S. and foreign non-combatants from a
war zone.  All of these operations were successful, and lent
credence to the Marine Corps' claim as the force of choice.
    	The Marine Corps' maritime character and its ability to be
responsive, flexible, and multi-mission capable has allowed it
to assume the role of the Nation's force in readiness.  Over the
last decade, the Marine Corps has embarked on a deployment and
employment concept that focuses on the ability to be light enough
to rapidly deploy and heavy enough to win once employed.  The
Marine Corps does not limit itself to specializing for a specific
contingency.  As a naval expeditionary force, the Marine Corps
MAGTFs (see glossary) are built on an inherent ability to deploy
rapidly, sustain the deployed forces. and operate as a combined
arms force.  The MAGTF concept meets the description of a force of
choice that "can't be everywhere, but can go anywhere."   However,
to fully realize its potential as the force of choice, the Marine
Corps must improve its ability to deploy with available strategic
lift, operate jointly, and sustain deployed forces.
    	In the 1992 Annual Report to the President and the Congress,
the Secretary of Defense declared, "Readiness and mobility must
be among the highest priorities, especially for forces designated
to respond to short warning crisis." (4:9)  The Marine Corps has
recognized these priorities of readiness and mobility.  All MAGTFs
are required to be rapidly deployable by various means.  These
means include amphibious ships, strategic sealift, strategic
airlift, or maritime prepositioned ships. (15:9)  For the force of
choice to be light enough to respond rapidly to a crisis, it must
be deployable with current strategic lift.  Defense analyst David
Silverstein has stated. "The Marine Corps is the best equipped and
organized to deal with the sort of Third World crises America is
likely to face."  (21:26)  With amphibious MEUs (see glossary) on
station throughout the globe on a continuous basis, Marine forces
are virtually only days away from any potential trouble spot.
However, when reinforcement forces are factored into the equation,
the ominous challenge becomes the limited strategic lift available.
With the reduction of forward based forces, the U.S. will be forced
to rely on forward positioned naval forces and crisis response
forces to meet national security needs.  The Pacific region will
become an "economy-of-force" theater. (5:37)  The
Pacific crisis response strategy relies on U.S. based Air Force,
Army, Navy, and Marine forces to make up a contingency response
force. (5:37)  The limiting factor to this strategy are the
strategic lift assets that will be severely stressed to support
such a contingency response.  The Marine forces in this contingency
response force will be competing for the same strategic lift
required by the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
    	Looking to the future of U.S. power projection capability,
defense analyst Anthony Cordesman stated that although the U.S.
will still have a powerful Navy in the Pacific, it will have
limited amphibious and land force capability. (5:37)  On close
examination, what Mr. Cordesman claims to exist in the Pacific will
ring true for the Atlantic forces as well.  There will be 10 less
amphibious ships in 1995 than there were in 1988. (14:27)  This
loss of amphibious lift will impact on the Marine Corps' forcible
entry capability and its lift capability in general.  With the loss
of forward bases, intermediate staging areas may not be available
in responding to a crisis.  Where does this leave the Marine Corps?
    	William Taylor, a military analyst with the Center for Strategic
and International Studies, while providing a commentary on the
recent Gulf War remarked, "The United States was unable to move
large numbers of troops and weaponry to the region quickly."
(1:3A)  Other military experts say the Gulf War pointed out serious
shortfalls in military preparedness, particularly inadequate
sealift and airlift that left U.S. forces dangerously exposed in
the early days of the deployment. (1:3A)  Active duty strategic
airlift only moved 25 percent of the airlift requirement for the
Gulf War.  Over 50 percent of the airlift requirement was satisfied
by civilian air carriers. (6:27)  Unfortunately, the mainstay of
U.S. military airlift,, the C-l4l fleet, has passed 80 percent of
its lifespan as a fleet. (23:24)  On the sealift side of the Gulf
War deployment, nearly half of the sealift for U.S. forces was
provided by allied shipping. (6:18)  This statistic should be
sobering.  It indicates that since U.S. shipping capability is so
inadequate, U.S. power projection is at risk since it must rely
on allied sources.
    	While the strategic lift situation is grim, it is not
insurmountable.  A major and innovative effort to overcome the
limitations of strategic lift is the development of crisis action
modules by the Marine Corps.  These crisis action modules offer the
CINCs (see glossary) flexible force options for employment of
MAGTFs to meet specific means in a variety of deployment means.
(14:25)  These modules offer the CINCs flexible employment options
for deliberate, adaptive. and crisis planning.  MAGTFs can be
employed in a combination of airlift, amphibious sealift, and MPF
(see glossary) means.  The MAGTF can be tailored to meet the
specific mission and rapidly deploy to the crisis region.  These
crisis action modules enhance the force of choice employment
    	Although the crisis action modules are a bright beginning to a
new look at the MAGTF deployment and employment capability, they are
only the first step.  The Marine Corps must take a closer look at the
lift profile of MAGTFs and streamline these profiles to meet specific
situations.  In this case, deployability is tied to lift profile.
The larger the lift profile of the force, the less attractive it
is to the CINC.
    	There is a mindset in the Marine Corps that Table of Equipment,
that equipment that a unit rates, is required for deployment.
Sustainability also includes many items that are not required by
every MAGTF in every situation.  The PWR (see glossary) requirement
for 4th MEB (see glossary) equated to 600 truck loads of lumber.
Lift profiles are currently developed by systems that look at
Tables of Equipment, computer driven PWR, and standard sustainment
packages without regard for the specific employment concept or
strategic lift limitations.  To solve this problem, MAGTF planners
need to develop a zero based requirement for each deployment option
and specifically tailor the MAGTF lift profile to requirements.
    	Can the MPF MEB deploy with less than 249 airlift sorties?  The
answer is yes, in some cases.   When the MAGTF deploys to certain
known deployment areas where host nation support or inter-service
support is available, can the MAGTF reduce its accompanying
sustainment?  Again, the answer is a qualified yes.
    	A pragmatic approach to providing an attractive MAGTF to the CINCs
is to provide a minimum lift MAGTF.  This is not to suggest that the
MAGTF become an Army Light Division.  It does suggest that situations
and requirements drive a need for a more liftable MAGTF.
    	The first step is to get a core of trained JOPES (see glossary)
planners in the MEFs (see glossary) .  There is a paucity of
knowledge within the Marine Corps of JOPES and other joint systems.
The MEF will be unable to meet a CINCs requirements if it is unable
to talk the same language in terms of deployment and planning
systems.  Embarkation is not deployment.  TPFDDs (see glossary)
drive deployments.  A force of choice must possess the capability
to understand and operate joint systems.
    	Developing campaign plans for regional plans includes more than
a study of climate, beaches. and ports.  The plans deed to discuss
host nation support, intermediate staging base support,, and host
nation infrastructure.  Understanding these capabilities will allow
the MAGTF planner to determine what sustainment is available from
in-theater and host nation sources.  With this information the
planner can adjust accompanying sustainment accordingly.  Reducing
unneeded sutainment reduces lift profile.
    	A key term to crisis response is sequential deployment.  The
MAGTF planner should sequence the MAGTF lift to fit the situation.
Currently, the Marine Corps shows a lift profile of the MAGTF and its
sustainment as accompanying cargo and equipment.  To make the MAGTF
more attractive to CINC transportation planners, the Marine Corps
should adopt a policy of reflecting non-critical supplies and
equipment as non unit related cargo.  This allows the MAGTF to still
register its requirements for lift, yet show a more streamlined lift
profile for initial deployment by sequencing non-critical equipment
and supplies.
    	In addition to the efforts of establishing crisis action modules,
the Marine Corps should press for the inclusion of Marine forces in a
CINCs deterrent force module.  For a regional crisis with a
reasonable warning, the Marine Corps is fully capable of positioning
deterrent forces in a theater to react quickly, show resolve, and
deter aggression.  This enables the initial deterrent force to
utilize strategic lift before it becomes subject to allocation to all
other elements of the JTF (see glossary)
    	A deployable force in readiness that can be projected through
varied means is indeed a valuable asset.  However, until every effort
is made to have the Marine Corps meet strategic lift constraints, the
Marine Corps will remain an attractive force that is too heavy to
move rapidly.
                            JOINT INTEROPERABILlTY
    	The new joint warfare publication, Joint Pub l, states, "Because
we operate and fight jointly, we must learn and practice joint
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures." (20:6)   The Marine
Corps is fully capable of operating with the Navy, by virtue of the
Marine Corps' maritime character.  However, does the Marine Corps
have the ability to operate with the Air Force and Army?  Can any
MAGTF deploy today and be completely interoperable with another
service as a part of a JTF?  Are Marine Corps communications
equipment and procedures compatible in a joint arena?  Can cross-
servicing or cross-support of CSS (see glossary) and logistics be
accomplished?  Are terminology and tactical doctrine compatible
with other services?  Are Marines familiar with other services'
doctrine, equipment, and procedures?  Are other services familiar
with the Marine Corps organization, capabilities, and doctrine?
All of these questions require a positive response if the force of
choice is to claim interoperability.
    	Joint Pub 1 establishes peacetime analysis, planning, and
exercises as the only suitable framework for developing
interoperability. (20:46)  For the Marine Corps to try to develop
interoperability during a crisis response or wartime operation is
unacceptable.  Secretary of the Navy, Lawrence Garrett, has
unequivocally stated, "Joint power-projection operations will be
required to protect worldwide U.S. interests." (15:5)  The case for
joint operations is indisputable.  Like the Marine Corps, the other
services have unique functions and capabilities that when brought
together in a joint force offer complementary and enabling military
power.  Since the case for jointness is indisputable, how does the
Marine Corps improve its interoperability?
    	The thirst step to achieve interoperability is through
education.  At the formal school level, much progress can be made
towards achieving interoperability.  At the MAGTF major command and
unit levels, efforts must be made to ensure that other services'
doctrine, organization, equipment, limitations, and capabilities
are understood and incorporated into training exercises.  Allowing
Marines to actually exercise with other services would be the
optimum means of beginning the education process.  Wargaming the
effects of joint operations on MAGTFs is another step that could
be taken to evaluate the requirements of integrating a MAGTF into a
joint arena.
    	Whether through formal schools, exercises, or wargaming, the
efforts must seek to achieve interoperability through understanding
and familiarity.  The requirements for interoperability must be
inculcated into MAGTF planners, reflected in SOPs (see glossary)
and in FMFMs (see glossary)
    	A more difficult task than educating Marines about other services
is the converse effort of teaching the MAGTF to other services and
the CINCs.  The best approach is a reciprocal arrangement that
allows Marines and their service counterparts to gain mutual
familiarity.  The best means for this are training exercises,
wargames, and formal schools.  The MAGTF offers the Nation a unique
capability: a task organization of ground combat, aviation combat,
combat support, and combat service support elements that can be
tailored to a specific situation.  Marine Corps doctrine provides
the basis for harmonious understanding and mutual cooperation.
(8:42-43)  However, if the Marine Corps organization and doctrine
remain a mystery to the CINCs that will employ the MAGTF, or to
the other services that will operate with the MAGTF, efforts by the
Marine Corps to tailor MAGTF's that are depoyable, flexible, and
capable will be in vain.
    	Through documents such as the Marine Corps Capabilities Plan,
FMFRP 2-12 MAGTF: A Global Capability, the Marine Corps is seeking
to educate the other services about MAGTFs.  In Europe, a superb
LSE Guide (see glossary) has been developed to ensure
interoperability of MAGTFs operating in the European theater.
FMFLant (see glossary) has developed the Supply Supplement to the
LSE Guide that clearly sets forth logistics and supply
requirements, procedures, and documents that will be required to
receive supply support in the European theater.  More documents
such as these must be developed to provide guidance and planning
data for MAGTF planners and other services.  In this era of
planning for regional conflicts, interface and documentation of
procedures and requirements to achieve interoperability are
absolutely essential.  FMFMs and OHs (see glossary) must be revised
to reflect this requirement.
    	Implicit in interoperability is the capability to operate
jointly in terms of command, control, communications  intelligence,
logistics, and aviation.  This joint operation capability covers
the requirement to operate as part of a joint force or as a JTF
command element.  Evaluation of these requirements requires an
analysis of connectivity and compatibility.  The focus of the
analysis is to determine what assets, techniques, and procedures
are required to be procured or implemented for the MAGTF to operate
jointly.  Capabilities must be exploited and refined, and
limitations must be reduced or rectified.
    	Especially topical are the joint air coordination issues.
The MAGTF MACCS (see glossary) must be able to interface with the
JFACC (see glossary) , and component air command and control
agencies.  To ensure that the MAGTF retains its air capability, the
JFACC and MAGTF must be aware of the contents of the OMNIBUS
Agreement between the Marine Corps and Air Force that safeguards
Marine air and provides MAGTF air support to the JFACC.
Communication, radar, and air defense connectivity are absolutely
essential to joint operations.
    	The Department of the Nayy 1992 Posture Statement states
    	The Navy and Marine Corps are improving other joint
    	capabilities as well,
 with the object of enhancing
    	the Nation's ability to capaitalize on the synergistic
    	effect of complementary forces operating together. (14:26)
The Posture Statement goes on further to explain that MEF
headquarters will be able to operate as a JTF, and MAGTFs will
adopt training, policy, exercises, and operations to enhance joint
capability. (14:26)  The challenge for the Marine Corps to become
interoperable has been formalized.  The challenge must be met.
    	It has been said that, amateurs talk tactics, while professionals
talk sustainability.  There is a great deal of wisdom in that
statement.  No other service has the sustainability that the Marine
Corps can offer inherently with amphibious operations and MPF (see
glossary) .  FMFRP 2-12 succinctly states, "The Marine Corps is an
expeditionary service because it can prepare and deploy
logistically sustainable forces into areas with little or no
existing logistical capability." (12:2)  Being expeditionary and
sustainable is a tall order for the Marine Corps to fill.  The
Marine Corps advertises its sustainability in terms of DOS (see
glossary) .  15 DOS for a Marine Expeditionary Unit, 30 DOS for a
Marine Expeditionary Brigade. and 60 DOS for a Marine Expeditionary
Force are the advertised levels of sustainment for MAGTFs.  These
DOS figures are notional and act as planning goals.  The key is to
relate DOS to capability.  Capability in turn, is the key to
    	Immediately after the offload of the MPF in South West Asia,
the 1st FSSG (see glossary) began to order thousands of supply
items on a daily basis.  Host nation support was required to assist
in offload, warehousing, and supply of fuel and water.  After
offload of the 2000 containers from each MPS squadron, the 1st FSSG
had neither the main frame computers nor the means to account for and
warehouse the supplies in a timely fashion.  It took over 6 months
to gain asset visibility.  Even after the 1st FSSG was able to
operate a SMU (see glossary) to provide supply support to the MEF,
units north of Al Jubayl away from the 1st FSSG had great
difficulty receiving critical supply support from the SMU.
Additionally, to move ammunition and supplies to the 1st and 2d
Marine Divisions to northern locations required the services of
over 1,000 Saudi Arabian host nation trucks.  To move enough fuel
forward to support the initial ground campagn required the
augmentation of 30 U.S. Army fuel tankers.
    	Sustainability is more than just having a certain DOS level at
a port.  It also requires the ability to account for, distribute,
and protect the sustainment.  CSS and logistics determine
operational and tactical reach.  Responsive and flexible CSS and
logistics provide a combat multiplier to the MAGTF.
    	After years of deploying MEU's, it still becomes a major
undertaking to support the deployed MEU while deployed.  Whole
sections of logistic personnel in III MEF and II MEF are focused on
providing support to the MEU.  Message traffic from and to the MEU
becomes the primary means of transmitting requirements.  Great
efforts are expended to have supplies meet flights going to the MEU,
and the shipper has no guarantee that the supplies will reach the
MEU.  In this case. sustainability is uncertain.
    	Marine Corps doctrine calls for the AFOE (see glossary) in
support an amphibious force to follow the amphibious force in 5 days.
Yet, in recent history the 5 day planning figure has not proven to
be a feasible one.  PWR stocks that make up much of the supplies in
the AFOE may come from all over the U.S. and will,, take weeks to
assemble, package, and load aboard ships.  The MAGTF risks
consuming all of its accompanying sustainment before the AFOE
    	Faced with the challenges presented in the preceding paragraphs,,
how does the Marine Corps improve its sustainability capability?
The solutions are both complex and far reaching.  These solutions
require careful thought, development of new systems, procurement of
additional assets, and enhancement of sustainability doctrine.
    	Expressing sustainability in terms of DOS presents a false
picture.  Does the MAGTF have the capability to account for,
warehouse, and satisfy customer demands with the DOS it has?  Are
transportation assets available to provide continuous CSS to the
MAGTF?  What resupply channels exist?  Can the MAGTF quickly tap
into theater or other service logistic channels?  How much of
planned sustainment is unnecessary?  These questions require close
examination to come up with a clear picture of sustainability.
    	Sustainability is relative.  The intensity of the crisis, host
nation support, infrastructure, and duration of the crisis all
impact on sustainability.  The key element for achieving
sustainability is the determination of requirements, and comparison
of those requirements against capability.  Having 30 DOS fuel on a
beach means nothing if the MAGTF can only move one-third of a daily
requirement to committed front-line units.  Concentrating on the
MAGTF limitations will yield a whole new view of sustainability.
    	The first step in testing sustainability is in the way the Marine
Corps conducts exercises.  During Team Spirit exercises in Korea, the
FSSG establishes an elaborate support base at Pohang Port weeks
before the rest of the MEF arrives.  During a CAX (see glossary) at
29 Palms, California, past exercise usage data and the support
facilities aboard 29 Palms Marine Corps Base are made available to
exercise units.  When MPF ships are offloaded for an exercise,
containers containing supplies are never unpacked and no attempt
is made to account for and distribute the supplies. These
unrealistic exercise efforts never allow the MAGTF to test its
capability.  When the exercise never tests or stresses the
sustainability doctrine, how is the doctrine validated?
    	The Marine Corps is very effective in performing many of the
CSS and logistics functions that add up to sustainament.  However,
there is always room for improvement.  The family of  Logistics
Automated Information Systems currently being developed and fielded
will assist in improving sustainability.  Improving engineer
equipment procurement and heavy lift motor transport will
substantially increase tactical and operational reach for the
MAGTF.  The linchpin to sustainability is to fuse togeteher all
elements of sustainment, and be able to support any tactical
    	If a MAGTF is tailored with equipment and personnel to meet any
situation, why not apply the same challenge to sustainability.
Improve deployed support procedures for MAGTF's.  Establish doctrinal
techniques for the rapid unloading, unpacking, accounting for, and
warehousing of supplies from MPS.  Automate as much of the MPF
offload as is possible.  Be prepared to rapidly deploy mainframe
computers to an area of employment.  These computers are combat
multipliers.  Improve the capability to develop supply blocks for
deploying MAGTF's that carry only critical supply parts.  Develop
capabilities within each MEF to rapidly tie into host nation
support or other service support.  Enhance the lift capability
of the MAGTFs through additional organic heavy lift, and the
streamlining of sustainment, supplies, and equipment.
    	The improvements and enhancements required to increase
sustainability are virtually endless.  A force of choice needs to
recognize its limitations and aggressively seek to improve and
rectify these limitations.  Noted military author Henry Eccles has
written that logistical plans must be based upon, and support,
tactical concepts of the combat plans in the most probable courses
of actions in war. (75:292-293)  Sustainability doctrine,
techniques, and requirements must fit this requirement for today's
Marine Corps.
    	Military analyst Jeffrey Record praises the Marine Corps when he
proclaims, "Desert Shield/Desert Storm has already affirmed the MPS
program as one of the most prescient and imaginative U.S.
conventional force improvements since World War II." (26:75)  Mr.
Record also touts the Marine Corps as "the politically attractive
instrument for post-Cold War contingencies in the Third World."
(26:74)  In other words, the Nation's force of choice.
    	Carrying a label as a force of choice brings with it great
responsibilities.  These responsibilities include being the very best
at what is expected of this force.  The MPF concept is a tremendous
strategic capability.  The MAGTFs amphibious forcible entry
capability is a vital one.  The MAGTFs sustainability, flexibility,
and deployability provide the U.S. a unique and valuable asset.
However, the challengs facing the Marine Corps is to be more
sustainable and deployable with less strategic lift, and to be more
interoperable than it is currently.
    	The former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Al Gray,
said it best.
    	While we are fully prepared for the most challenging conflict,
   	 your Marine Corps must also stand ready for the most likely
    	conflict - that in the Third World.  The reason this Nation
    	has a Marine Corps is to project power into areas where we do
    	not have forces stationed in peacetime.  Our amphibious
    	capability, our seaborne mobility, and our expeditionary
    	nature make us uniquely suited for the task: this is the
    	major contribution we provide the Nation.  These forces
    	complement our national military strategy, provide on-scene
    	assets in fast developing crises, and are fully interoperable
    	with the Army, Navy, and Air Force.  (16:25)
    	The Marine Corps is the force of choice.  It can't be
everywhere, but it must be able to go anywhere with deployable,
interoperable, and sustainable forces.  When it arrives at a crisis
spot, it must be able to conduct humanitarian missions, disaster
relief, evacuation operations, and if it has to fight, it must win.
AFOE               	Assault Follow-on Echelon
BSSG               	Brigade Service Support Group
CAX                	Combined Arms Exercise
CINC               	Commander-in-Chief
CSS                	Combat Service Support
DOS                	Day of Supply
FMFLant         	Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
FMFM               	Fleet Marine Force Manual
FSSG               	Force Service Support Group
JFACC              	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JOPES              	Joint Operational Planning and Execution System
JTF                	Joint Task Force
LSE Guide          	Logistics Support in Europe Guide
MACCS              	Marine Aviation Command and Control System
MAGTF              	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MEB                	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF                	Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU                	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MPF                	Maritime Prepositioning Force
MPS                	Maritime Prepositioning Ships
MSSG               	MEU Service Support Group
OH                 	Operational Handbook
PWR                	Prepositioned War Reserve
SMU                	Supported Activities Supply System Management Unit
SOP                	Standard Operating Procedures
TPFDD              	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
l.  	Abrams, Jim.  "Lessons: Triumph of New Weapons, Old Tactics." 
Jacksonville, N.C. Daily News, 2 March 91:3A.
2.  	Blackwell, James and Michael J. Mazarr.  The Gulf War: Military 
Lessons Learned.  Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 1991.
3.  	Brown, LtCol David B.  "Call in the Marines."' Amphibious Warfare 
Review, Summer 91:21-26.
4.  	Cheney, Dick.  Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the
President and the Congress.  Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1992.
5.  	Cordesman, Anthony H.  "America's Options in Asia: Partnership or 
Retreat'?"  Armed Forces Journal International  February 92: 35-40.
6.  	Dungan. Travis P.  "Desert Shield/Desert Storm: USTRANSCOM's First
Great Challenge."  Defense Transportation Journal, June 91: 14-19.
7.  	Eccles, Rear Admiral Henry, E.  Logistics in the National Defense.
Harrisburg, PA.: The Stackpole Company, 1959.
8.  	FMFM l Warfighting.  Washington, D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Marine 
Corps, 1989.
9. 	FMFM 1-1 Campaigning.  Washington, D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Marine
Corps, 1990.
10. 	FMFM 1-2 The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense. 
Washington, D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1991.
11. 	FMFM 1-3 Tactics.  Washington, D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps,
12. 	FMFRP 2-12 Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A Global Capability.  
Quantico, VA.: Marine Corps Combat Development Center, 1991.
13. 	"Forum '91."  Defense Transportation Journal, June 91: 14-38.
14. 	Garrett, Lawrence H.  "Department of the Navy 1992 Posture Statement."
Marine Corps Gazette, April 92: 20-33.
15. 	Garrett, Lawrence H.  "The Way Ahead."  Supplement to the Marine 
Corps Gazette, April 91: 1-13.
16. 	Gray, Gen. A. M.  "Annual Report of the Marine Corps to Congress." 
Marine Corps Gazette April 88: 24-27.
17. 	Gray, Gen. A. M.  "Comments on Logistics."  Marine Corps Gazette
October 89: 9-10.
18. 	Harper, Col. Gilbert S.  "Army Logisitics in the Year 2010." Army
Logistician,  September-October 91: 18-22.
19. 	JCS Pub l Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.  Washington,
D.C. : The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1987.
20. 	Joint Pub l Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces.  Washington,
D.C.: National Defense University, 1991.
21. 	Longo, James.  "Defense Analyst Touts Marines as Future Force." 
Navy Times, 3 February 92: 26.
22. 	Marine Corps Concepts and Issues-1990.  Washington, D.C.: Headquarters
U.S. Marine Corps, 1990.
23. 	Matthews, William.  "Antiquated Systems Moved Cargo to Gulf." 
Navy Times, 18 March 91: 24.
24.  	Owens, Col. Mackubin T.   "The Marine Corps and the New National 
Military Strategy."  Amphibious Warfare Review. Summer 91: 64-69.
25. 	Rakow, Col. William M.  "MAGTF Operations with the Fleet in the
Year 2000."  Marine Corps Gazette  July 90: 17-19.
26. 	Record, Jeffrey.  "The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps in the Post-Cold 
War Era."  Strategic Review  Winter 91: 67-79.
27. 	Tuttle. Gen. William G.  "Sustaining Army Combat Forces."  Army 
Logistician, September-October 91: 6-11.

Join the mailing list