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The F/A-18: A MAGTF Weapon Accepted By The Marine Corps--But Is It Accepted By Marines?
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting
Title:  THE F/A-18: A MAGTF Weapon Accepted by the Marine
Corps--But is it Accepted by Marines?
Author: Major John. C. Pross, United States Marine Corps
Thesis:  The case of the F/A-18 Hornet provides an
excellent example of erroneous information diminishing the
perceived importance of a weapon system essential to the
Background: Various functional specialties within the
Marine Corps have always competed to acquire the assets
which are considered necessary for their particular
specialty.  In the recent period of force reductions and
greater fiscal austerity, this competition has grown more
severe.  To state their particular cases, individuals have
expressed their opinions in professional publications
touting some systems and denegrating others.  This practice
has had only negative effects.  Misinformation demanding
refutation has been published, reducing the effectiveness of
good programs, prolonging the ineffectiveness of unnecessary
systems, and compromising the overall efficiency of the
Marine Corps.  A conclusive example of this scenario is
provided by the F/A-18 program.  After ten years it has been
finally accepted by the highest levels of Marine Corps
leadership, however, due to a plethora of erroneous
information, most ground commanders do not understand the
importance of the F/A-18 to the GCE and the MAGTF as a
whole.  An examination of all types of arguments against the
F/A-18 reveals that they are poorly researched and
unsubstantiated.  Furthermore, a comparison of the
aircraft's capabilities against the functions of Marine
aviation and an analysis of those functions' importance to
the GCE commander reveals how the F/A-18 is necessary to the
Marine Corps.
Conclusion: The F/A-18 provides a noteworthy example of
how prejudices and misinformation can delay a program's
acceptance and overall effectiveness.  Despite all arguments
to the contrary, the Hornet is a proven essential aircraft
for the MAGTF commander.  While it is incumbent on all
Marines to generate new ideas and question those programs
which may be unnecessary, it is equally as important to
thoroughly research an issue before publically declaring a
program's shortcomings.  Complaints must not be published
without considering the impact.
               THE F/A-18: A MAGTF Weapon Accepted by the Marine
                     Corps--But is it Accepted by Marines?
Thesis:  The case of the F/A-18 Hornet provides an
excellent example of erroneous information diminishing the
perceived importance of a weapon system essential to the
I.   	Background of arguments
     	A.  	F/A-18 IOC 1982, controversy begins
          		l.  	Groundless arguments against the F/A-18
          		2.  	Repeated, substantiated refutation of F/A-18 opposition
    	B.  	Three types of arguments
          		1.  	Multi-mission capabiltity detracts from CAS availability
          		2.  	F/A-18 capability less than other systems
          		3.  	F/A-18 too expensive and too complex
II.  	Discussion of the second and third types of arguments 
	against the F/A-18
     	A.  	Third category
          		1.   	Monetary cost a function of technologic complexity
          		2.  	Technologic complexity versus capability
          		3.  	Multi-mission capability required on the modern 					battlefield
     	B.  	Second category
          		1.   	Biased attitudes touting personally preferred projects 				versus objective analysis
          		2.  	Peripheral argument, complexity versus mission 					simplicity
III. 	Discussion of the first category of argument against the F/A-18:  		mission capability in relation to the six functions of Marine aviation
     	A.  	Deficiencies in some ground officers' professional knowledge
     	B.  	Six functions of Marine aviation, relevance to the GCE 				commander, and F/A-18 performance in those functions
          		1.  	Assault support, no F/A-18 involvement
          		2.  	Deep air support as part of offensive air support
          		3.  	Anti-air warfare
                 		a. 	Necessity for AAW, F/A-18 capability
                 		b. 	AV-8B, USAF, USN aircraft considered
          		4.  	Electronic warfare, SEAD
          		5.  	Aerial reconaissance and C2
                 		a. 	RF-4B, A-6E, OV-1OD retirement
                 		b. 	F/A-18D as a replacement
          		6.  	General officer endorsement of the F/A-18
IV.  	Professional military leaders' responsibilty for new ideas, knowledge, 		and education
     	A.  	Publishing responsibly researched information versus program 			damaging misinformation
     	B.  I	mportance of education at all levels of the MAGTF
           THE F/A-18: A MAGTF Weapon Accepted by the Marine Corps--
                        But is it Accepted by Marines?
     	Recent world events, as well as current domestic
issues, have prompted the reduction within all services of
the United States military forces.  Continuing into the
Twenty-first century, these reductions may increase while
competition for limited fiscal assets intensifies.  In
preparation for these changes, force structure planners must
ensure that essential programs are retained while
unnecessary programs are eliminated.  At the same time, the
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) must maintain its full
range of capabilities including the MAGTF commander's
capacity to function as a Commander, Joint Task Force
(CJTF).(1)  Determining the need for a particular system is a
difficult process which requires a comprehensive knowledge
of the system's capabilities and limitations as well as its
user s requirements.  Sometimes, due to a user's
inexperience, limited knowledge, or lack of exposure to a
particular system, he fails to understand his own
     	A commander, not having complete knowledge of or
experience with all systems, often refers to various
sources to aid him in his decisions.  Typically,
professional military periodicals comprise a significant
portion of these sources.  Unfortunately, such publications
often contain overtly biased and poorly researched articles
written by critics without sufficient knowledge of the
subject systems.  Misinformation from these reputable
sources distorts the facts and can mislead the commander.  A
U.S. Marine Corps three-star General recently stated that
such misguided decisions typically occur when a ground
combat commander considers his requirements for air
support.(2)  The case of the F/A-18 Hornet provides an
excellent example of erroneous information diminishing the
perceived importance of a weapon system essential to the
     	Since the F/A-18 was introduced into the U.S. Marine
Corps in 1982, its necessity and capabilities have been
continually debated.  Virtually all of the controversy
arises from inadequate research, a lack of knowledge, and
occasionally, inappropriate phrasing within the discussions.
Every argument against the F/A-18 can be either refuted with
factual evidence or accepted and placed in the proper
context of the aircraft's mission requirements. Whether
motivated by the desire to stimulate thought or preserve the
status quo, these arguments are demonstrably flawed and do
nothing to promote the efficiency or effectiveness of the
Marine Corps.
     	Nevertheless, there remain misinformed, self-proclaimed
experts who persistently decry the F/A-18's importance to
the MAGTF.  They continue to fail to understand the Hornet
and its utility, exacerbating the controversy by offering
their misinformation and resultant misguided ideas for
publication.  While some critics continue to profess that
the F/A-18 is an inordinately expensive airplane unnecessary
to the Marine Corps, the Hornet is--and will remain--an
essential weapon in the MAGTF commander's arsenal.
     	The arguments against the F/A-18 can be combined into
three categories.  First, individuals outside of aviation
criticize the F/A-18 because it fulfills other functions in
addition to Close Air Support (CAS), reducing the Hornet's
availability to provide CAS to the Ground Combat Element
(GCE).  Second, other critics claim that the F/A-18 is not
as capable as other airborne systems to perform the assigned
missions.  Third, still other detractors find fault with the
F/A-18's multi-mission capability and correspondingly high
monetary cost.  These discussions claim that the Hornet's
technological complexity over-tasks the pilot and increases
the aircraft's vulnerability while decreasing its
survivability--all at much too high a price.
     	The F/A-18 is a very expensive weapon system: each
airplane costs approximately $29.792 million.(3)  The
multi-mission capability of the F/A-18 requires the
employment of advanced technologies and the Hornet's price
tag reflects its technological complexity.  Contrary to
argument, this complexity increases aircraft and pilot
survivability through multiple, redundant, self-testing and
damage compensating systems.  The complexity of the Hornet
also reduces the aircraft's vulnerability through the use
of advanced navigation systems, advanced radar warning
receiver systems, and Hands On Throttle And Stick (HOTAS)
technology. HOTAS allows the pilot to rapidly switch from
one weapon system to another and employ the weapons without
removing his hands from the aircraft controls.
     	The F/A-18's complexity does not increase pilot
workload.  increased capability resulting from the Hornet's
technologic complexity allows the pilot to concentrate on
the weapons employment portion of the mission.
Simultaneously, these advanced systems relieve the pilot of
the burden to perform routine tasks such as fuel management
and navigation as well as weapon solution mathematic
calculations.  Consistenly, the Hornet delivers weapons on
target and on time, with an accuracy never achieved by any
previous Marine Corps aircraft.
     	The second category of argument--that the F/A-18 is not
as capable as other available airborne systems--stems from
the U.S. Marine Corps' consolidation of its weapon systems
programs.  The paucity of fiscal resources is forcing the
Marine Corps, as well as other branches of the Armed
Services, to economize in all areas.  By consolidating
programs, some logistic support efforts can be eliminated,
thus increasing commonality of support and efficiency while
reducing resource expenditures.  Arguments against this type
of economizing are the result of unimaginative,
closed-minded, partisan thinking and are easily overcome.
Maj. P. F. Donahue's, USMC, article "The F/A-18D for the
A-6E: A 'Good Deal' that Warrants a Closer Look" finds
unaccaptable flaws in the F/A-18D's shorter range and its
lack of a radar beacon bombing capability.(4)  LtCol. J. R.
Gevock, USMC, knowledgeably refutes these criticisms in his
rebuttal "Capability for the Future or Longing for the
Past?" and offers options to overcome any perceived flight
range problems of the F/A-18D.(5)
     	A peripheral argument against the F/A-18's complex,
multi-mission capability and the resultant expense is that
they are excessive for performing a simple CAS mission.
LtCol. Dale A. Peterson, USMC, writes that "the continued
use of multimission aircraft for CAS implies a willingness
to commit a very sophisticated aircraft to relatively simple
missions."(6)  He further advocates the use of simple, small,
single-mission aircraft.(7)  William Lind, a well-known air
warfare reformer, also endorses this philosophy in his
article "Maneuver Warfare and Aviation."(8)  Again, such
arguments are thoroughly overcome in a well-documented
counterpoint paper offered by Maj. E. A. Daniels, USMC.(9)
All of these arguments are based on faulty premises and do
nothing to promote the MAGTF's team concept.
     	The Marine Corps of the 1990's must maintain the MAGTF
operating concept in order to fulfill the roles and missions
as assigned by Congress.  Also, the Marine Corps must now be
able to operate as part of the Joint Action Armed Forces and
must accept the role as CJTF in a joint operation.  These
requirements demand that the six functions of Marine
aviation remain without change except that anti-radar
suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) be a subfunction of
electronic warfare.
     	A discussion of the six functions of Marine aviation
effectively rebuts the argument that the Hornet's
multi-function capability diminishes its support to the GCE.
Rather than offer any real argument against the Hornet, this
position exhibits a lack of knowledge about the relationship
between the functions of Marine aviation and the GCE.  This
informational void is common and is typified by Capt. C.W.
Meyer, USMCR, in his article "No More Package Deal."(10)  He
          	It is difficult to envision a conflict where
     the Marine Corps will fight without overall
     air-space control by another service.  This is
     more a factor of technology than interservice
     politics. (11)
However, during Desert Storm, the Marine Air Command and
Control System through the Tactical Air Operations Center
provided the cohesion that tied the Air Force, Marine Corps,
and Navy air situations together to form a single, joint
air picture.(12)  This role is not surprising since it is a
defined function of Marine aviation to provide air command
and control.(13)  Furthermore, the Joint Forces Air Component
Commander (JFACC) issue is a highly politicized--not
technologic--issue and the Marine Corps can assume the role
of the JFACC if so assigned in future joint operations.(14)
     	Capt. Meyer also offers to the Navy the Marine Corps
capability to fulfill the anti-air warfare, tactical aerial
reconnaissance, and portions of the offensive air support
(deep air support) and electronic warfare (SEAD) functions
as well.(15)  Rather than presenting a problem and stimulating
thought toward a solution, Capt. Meyer demonstrated a common
shortcoming in the ground officer's professional knowledge.
     	According to FMFM 5-1 "Marine Aviation," the six
functions of Marine aviation are anti-air warfare (AAW),
offensive air support (OAS), assault support (AS), tactical
aerial reconaissance (RECCE), electronic warfare (EW), and
air command and control (C2).(16)  The only function which the
F/A-18 does not perform is assault support.  Helicopters,
C-13Os, C-12s, C-9s, and T-39s are the aircraft involved in
this function.
     	For the Marine on the ground, the most-visible function
of Marine aviation (excluding AS) is OAS.  But even in OAS,
only a portion of participating aircraft are ever seen.  OAS
has two subfunctions: deep air support (strikes against
targets which do not require close coordination with
friendly ground maneuver elements--DAS), and close air
support (strikes which require close coordination against
targets in close proximity to friendly ground
forces--CAS).(17)  Because of the relatively short distances
between friendly  ground forces and the targets of aircraft
performing CAS, the success or failure of a CAS mission has
an immediate and significant effect on the GCE.  To the
uninformed, CAS is the only important mission for Marine
Corps fixed-wing aviation.  On the other hand, because of
the distant nature of DAS, aircraft performing those
missions are rarely seen and the success or failure of a DAS
mission does not seem to have immediate or potentially
catastrophic effects.  However, one must consider the
effects of an unsuccessful DAS mission.  For example, an
enemy artillery unit left intact after a failed DAS mission
could devastate an approaching GCE unit which is unaware of
the enemy's survival.  The effects on the GCE will very
likely be more catastrophic than those resulting from the
failure of any single CAS mission.
     	The function of anti-air warfare has a genuine,
necessary purpose.  More than forty years have passed since
U.S. ground troops have been bombed by enemy aircraft.  The
reason for this fact is not because the threat did not
exist.  Rather, it is because the threat was eliminated
before it could be brought to bear against U.S. forces.
     	AAW is composed of much more than the traditionally
glamorous fighter sweep mission.  On the ground, it includes
the Hawks, Stingers, and Redeyes of the missle air defenses
in addition to the air intercept controllers. In the air,
there are vital area defenses and barrier patrols which
protect friendly ground forces from enemy air attacks.  AAW
tasks include escort protection for DAS packages, SEAD
assets, and EW assets.  There are missions to protect the
DAS bombers when they are in the target area concentrating
on ordnance delivery and to protect them on their egress so
that they can survive to perform subsequent missions.  Of
extreme importance are the DAS missions to destroy hostile
airfields and aircraft (which fall under the function of
AAW) before the enemy bombers are airborne.  The Marine
Corps' only airplane capable for successful employment in
any or all of these AAW missions is the F/A-18.(18)
Additionally, Hornet pilots regularly train for and are
proficient in all of these very important missions.
     	Other aircraft can be considered for the functions of
Marine aviation.  The AV-8B is an excellent, forward based,
light CAS aircraft.  However, its short range and relatively
light ordnance load inhibit its ability in the DAS role.
Also, while having some self-defense capability, it is
virtually ineffective in most AAW roles.  The AV-8B was not
designed for such missions.  Similarly, other services
cannot adequately fulfill all of these needs.  The Air Force
is extremely capable with its F-15 in the air superiority
mission, but their pilots neither integrate well with nor
train regularly for close escort.   Long range strike
aircraft of the Air Force and the Navy do well against
targets beyond the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL).
However, again, neither of these services train with nor
integrate well with the GCE for DAS strikes on the friendly
side of the FSCL.  While these training shortfalls have been
recognized and addressed, the corrections have not taken
full effect.   Through continually increasing joint training
and operations, the capabilities for joint operability will
improve.   Nevertheless, these improvements will not replace
the advantages of single-service doctrine, procedures, and
command relationships.  To deny the MAGTF commander his
dedicated, organic airborne AAW and DAS capabilities--found
in the F/A-18--would cripple his ability to prepare a
battlefield upon which the GCE can achieve victory.
     	Electronic warfare, as a function of Marine aviation,
may seem to be completely removed from the concerns of the
GCE.   The Marine Corps' primary EW aircraft, the EA-6B
Prowler, is rarely seen performing its mission by ground
troops.  A Marine three-star General said in reference to
Marine aviation:  "If I can't see it, can't hear it, and
can't tell what it does for me, it must not be important.
don't need it."(19)  Although his comment was intended as
sarcasm, it reveals the reality of most ground Marines'
perceptions of aviation.(20)  That this misconception exists
is deplorable.  It is no longer a matter of having to see an
airplane perform its mission to recognize its value.
     	EW and its sub-function SEAD are essential for the
MAGTF commander.  The Prowlers locate, identify and jam
hostile electronic emitters, primarily radars.  The F/A-18s
are integrated into the SEAD effort, engaging and
neutralizing hostile radars and surface-to-air missile (SAM)
sites with high-speed anti-radiation missles (HARM).  No
other Marine Corps aircraft can employ HARM except the
EA-6B.  Unfortunately, there are few EA-6Bs and they cannot
employ HARM and perform their other EW missions
simultaneously.  This situation leaves the Hornet as the
primary HARM shooter for the Marine Corps.(21)  Without this
SEAD capability, friendly aircraft losses to enemy SAMs
would be high, and the MAGTF commander would not have the
ability to use air power as he needs to support the GCE.
     	The last Marine RF-4Bwas retired in August 1991.  With
it, went a significant portion of the Marine Corps' tactical
aerial reconnaissance capability.  The OV-10 is scheduled to
be fully retired in 1994.  Without replacements, these
losses would leave the MAGTF commander with remotely piloted
vehicles (RPVs) as the sole organic asset performing RECCE
missions.  The replacement is the F/A-18D.  As a two seat
version of the Hornet, it is as capable as its single-seat
counterpart.  The F/A-18D is designed to fulfill the fast
forward air controller airborne/tactical air controller
airborne/supporting arms coordinator airborne missions
(FastFAC/TACA/SACA).   These functions are C(2) subfunctions
essential to control close air support and coordinate
aviation with other supporting arms on and over the
battlefield.   The F/A-18D will also fulfill the night and
all-weather attack requirements, as well as RECCE
requirements with the use of the advanced tactical aerial
reconnaissance system (ATARS).  The importance of RECCE to
the GCE is well acknowledged by Marine Officers.  However,
without his own organic RECCE assets other than RPVs (which
are as equally important as manned aircraft), the MAGTF
commander will be reliant on an already overtaxed national
asset system and on the other military services.  None of
these external sources will necessarily focus their priority
on MAGTF requirements.  With dedicated, ATARS equipped
F/A-18Ds working in conjunction with RPVs, the MAGTF
commander can have RECCE support where and when he wants it.
     	The F/A-18D replaces the OV-10 in the FACA/TACA/SACA
roles and the A-6E as the Marine Corps  night and
all-weather attack aircraft.  Additionally, it will flesh
out Marine aviation's capability to perform the DAS role and
the air C(2 )functions.   Moreover, the F/A-18D's logistics are
in common and compatible with the single-seat version, thus
easing the logistic burden on the MAGTF Commander.
     	The question has been answered concerning how the
F/A-18 is essential to the GCE commander.  Analysis of the
six functions of Marine aviation reveals the critical
importance of those functions to the GCE commander.  To the
extent that those functions are satisfied by the F/A-18, the
Hornet's real importance to the GCE commander becomes
clearly evident.  As with any modern system, the Hornet's
acceptance is a matter of understanding both the
significance of the mission that the airplane performs and
the impact of its success or failure.
     	Finally, the issue of the F/A-18's importance to the
Marine Corps is resolved.  Gen. C.E. Mundy, Jr., USMC,
Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), has stated that the
F/A-18 has proven itself several times over, both in
peacetime and in combat.  It is a major component of Marine
Corps aviation and will be so into the 21st century.(22)
Additional flag rank support of the Hornet was indicated by
LtGen. D. A. Wills, USMC, (Deputy Chief of Staff for
Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps').  When asked if, in order to
ensure its survival the F/A-18 community had to continue
proving itself to the leadership of the Marine Corps, he
responded that F/A-18 aircrew having to prove themselves was
no longer necessary.  Today many Marine general officers
including the Commandant recognize the capability, utility,
and flexibility of the F/A-18.23
     	After more than ten years of published point and
counterpoint, argument followed by refutation, and fallacies
replaced by facts, the F/A-18 has found its rightful place
in the U.S. Marine Corps.  During those years, considerable
effort was expended in research, documentation, field
demonstration and basic aviation education to reveal the
validity and importance of the Hornet.  Combat success
provided the final, conclusive proof.  But, combat is not
always available to prove each new weapon system.  The
Marine Corps must rely on peacetime training, tasting and
education.  Every Marine leader must be a source of new
ideas and an educator on current doctrine to himself and his
     	Since no person, system, or institution is perfect, it
is healthy and important for fresh ideas to surface;
challenges to current policies and doctrine prevent the
Marine Corps from becoming stagnant and keep it as the
premier expeditionary force in the world.  However, in these
days of fiscal austerity, we must ensure that our new ideas
are well researched and stimulate further study.  Opinions
should not be published to incite emotion, nor should they
become the vehicle for personal aggrandizement.  The Marine
Corps has severely limited assets, and acquisitions in the
future will become increasingly difficult.  If there is a
better way to accomplish our mission with the current
inventory, then that course should be pursued.  If some
tools for accomplishiing our mission are found to be truly
unnecessary, then those tools should be discarded.  However,
we should not simply sacrifice a capability for the sake of
change, for once a capability is given up, it will rarely be
given back.
     	Each leader must teach his subordinates about those
fields outside of their particular specialty.  Everyone must
understand the importance of each other's position.  While
rear echelon Marines perform functions that are essential
for the continued survival of the front line troops, front
line troops provide protection for the rear.  The necessity
for non-combat specialties must be understood as well as the
necessity for combat arms.  Without this understanding,
feelings of disdain develop which are only self-defeating.
     	An officer's or a senior enlisted's misunderstanding of
another specialty's importance is commonly manifested as a
call for change offered in an article in a professional
journal.  This forum is inappropriate.  Before publicly
declaring that a particular entity is unuseful, it is the
responsibility of the writer to thoroughly research the
subject.  That research must include a discussion with
experts in the field in question.  Usually, such research
will reveal a void in the researcher's professional
knowledge that experts can rapidly fill.  If a shortcoming
in the researched field is discovered, then--and only
then--is a critical journal article appropriate.
     	All Marine leaders are charged with the tasks of
cultivating ideas, educating ourselves about other aspects
of the Marine Corps, and educating other Marines about our
individual specialties.  We cannot undertake these charges
lightly or hastily; we must assume them responsibly.  Only
then will our efforts be beneficial.  We owe it to
ourselves, our Marines, and the Marine Corps.
1.	U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, FMFM-2 
(Draft), Quantico, Virginia, 1991, 5/11-5/13.
2.	 Non-attributable, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College,
Quantico, Virginia, 1992.
3.	Cdr D.G. Henry, USN, F/A-18 Deputy Program Manager--Naval Aviation 
Systems Command, telephone interview, 18 Feb. 1992.  The price quoted is the FY 1991 weapon system unit flyaway cost (FY91 dollars).
4.	Maj Paul F. Donahue, USMC, "The F/A-18D for the A-6E: A 'Good Deal' 
that Warrants a Closer Look," Marine Corps Gazette July 1989: 26-27.
5. 	LtCol James R. Gevock, USMC, 'Capability for the Future or Longing
for the Past?," Marine Corps Gazette May 1990: 68-69.  For a technical discussion of the F/A-18D's night, all-weather, and beacon capability, refer to LtCol Dennis T. Krupp, USMC, and Maj David J. Rush, USMC, "F/A-18D Hornet: Strike Fighter for the Future," Marine Corps Gazette July 1989: 23-25.
6. 	LtCol Dale A. Peterson, USMC, "Follow on CAS Aircraft is a Force 
Planning Challenge," Marine Corps Gazette May 1988: 73-76.
7.	Peterson 74.
8. 	William Lind, "Maneuver Warfare and Marine Aviation," Marine Corps
Gazette May 1989: 57-64.
9. 	Maj E.A. Daniels, USMC, "Offensive Air Support and Maneuver Warfare:
Do the Military Reformers Understand Them?, "unpublished manuscript, Marine
Corps Combat Development Command, Ouantico, Virginia, 1989.  See also Maj
John B. Saxman, USAF, "The Role of Marine Aviation in Maneuver Warfare,"'
Marine Corps Gazette May 1989: 58-63
10. 	Capt Carlton W. Meyer, USMCR, "No More Package Deal," Proceedings
Nov. 1991: 37-40.
11.  	Meyer 37.
12. 	LtGen Royal N. Moore, Jr., USMC, "Marine Air: There When Needed,"
Proceedings Nov. 1991: 64.
13. 	U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 
FMFM 5-1, Marine Aviation (Washington: GPO, 1979) 8, 46-47.
14. 	Maj John E. Valliere, USAF, "Stop Quibbling: Win the War,"
Proceedings Dec. 1990: 38-43.
15. 	Meyer 37, 39.
16. 	U.S. Marine Corps 6.
17. 	U.S. Marine Corps 100.
18. 	Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps,
"Comment and Discussion," Proceedings Jan 1992: 16.
19. 	Non-attributable, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 
Ouantico, Virginia, 1992.
20. 	Non-attributable, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College,
Quantico, Virginia, 1992.
21.	Mundy 16.
22. 	Mundy 15-16.
23. 	LtGen Duane A. Wills, USMC, personal interview, 22 Jan. 1992.
1.	Daniels, E.A., Maj, USMC.  "Offensive Air Support and Maneuver
Warfare: Do the Military Reformers Understand Them?."  Marine Corps Combat
Development Command.  Quantico, Virginia, 1989.
2.	Donahue, Paul F., Maj, USMC.  "The F/A-18D for the A-6E: A 'Good
Deal' that Warrants a Closer Look."  Marine Corps Gazette July 1989: 26-27.
3.	Gevock, James R., LtCol, USMC.  "Capability for the Future or
Longing for the Past?."  Marine Corps Gazette May 1990: 68-69.
4.	Henry, D.G., Cdr, USN.  Telephone interview. 18 Feb. 1992.
5.	Herrington, Richard L., Col, USMC.  "CAS and AAW for the Marine
on the Ground." Marine Corps Gazette May 1990: 67.
6.	Krupp, Dennis T., LtCol, USMC, and Maj David J. Rush, USMC. 
"F/A-18D Hornet: Strike Fighter for the Future." Marine Corps Gazette 
July 1989: 23-25.
7.	Lind, William "Maneuver Warfare and Marine Aviation." Marine
Corps Gazette Aug. 1989: 57-64.
8.	Meyer, Carlton W., Capt, USMCR.  "No More Package Deal." Proceedings
Nov. 1991: 36-40.
9	Moore, Royal N., Jr., LtGen, USMC.  "Marine Air: There When Needed."
Proceedings Nov. 1991: 64-70.
10.	Mundy, Carl E., Jr., Gen, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps.
"Comment and Discussion."  Proceedings Jan. 1992: 14-16.
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