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Attack Helicopters In Search Of The Right FARP
CSC 1992
Title:  Attack Helicopters in Search of the Right FARP
Author:  Major S. E. Mills, United States Marine Corps
Thesis:  The Marine Corps must greatly improve its Forward
Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) capability if Desert Storm
was any indication of what ground forces will demand of
attack helicopters during future conflict.
Background:  The FARP concept was designed to project
aircraft (mainly helicopters) into the ground battle taking
place forward of secure air bases.  During the Vietnam War
this meant placing fuel and ordnance at firebases, the FARP
could remain stationary as long as the firebase existed.
The Army has determined the modern battlefield will demand
mobility of its FARP.  In order to support its agile attack
helicopters the Army has equipped and trained itself to meet
this challenge.  The Marine Corps has not been as quick to
recognize the importance of the FARP to the attack
helicopter mission and has remained stagnate in its ability
to employ FARPs.  The speed at which the 1st and 2nd Marine
Divisions advanced across Kuwait during the ground offensive
of the Gulf War should have awakened Marine aviators to the
reality of the importance of mobility to the FARP.
Recommendation:  The Marine Corps must reexamine how it
equips its units, trains its personnel, and tactically
employs its FARPs if it is to realize the full value of the
modern attack helicopter.
Thesis:  The Marine Corps must greatly improve its Forward
Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) capability if Desert Storm
was any indication of what ground forces will demand of
attack helicopters during future conflict.
I.	Background, how we got here
	A.	Forward basing in history
	B.	Southwest Asia experience
	C.	Doctrine
II.	Equipment, how do we stand
	A.	Old, but reliable
	B.	Modify existing systems
III.	Mobility, as the key
	A.	Truck mounted
	B.	Helo transportation
IV.	Training, or lack of
	A.	Why is it so hard?
	B.	Building Block approach
V.	Personnel, the old problem
	A.	Multiple sites
	B.	One can do the job of three?
VI.	Command, who is it?
VII.	Conclusion
	A.	CAX for doctrine and training
	B.	Commanders role
      In a recent award winning article published in the
Marine Corps Gazette Major Bill Cronin proposed that the
attack helicopter should be considered the primary aircraft
for the Marine Corps' Close Air Support (CAS) mission.  His
thesis is that modern fixed wing aircraft are too detached
from the close battle to respond as quickly and accurately
as the attack helicopter which has the ability to loiter
within the close battle area for long periods.  This theses
is largely based on the premise that attack helicopters are
supported by Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs)
located very near the target area. (7: 56)  The success of
the Marine's AH-1Ws and the Army's AH-64s involved in the
recent Gulf War supports Major Cronin's belief in the attack
helicopter's superior ability to respond to the ground
commander's request for CAS.  But he would undoubtedly be
surprised and disappointed to discover the status of Marine
aviation's ability to employ tactical FARPs in support of
the attack helicopter mission.  The Marine Corps must
greatly improve its FARP capability if Desert Storm was any
indication of what ground forces will demand of attack
helicopters during future conflict.  The purpose of this
paper is to examine the current status of FARP employment in
the Marine Corps as it relates to the modern attack
helicopter, to identify shortcomings in critical areas, and
to offer some solutions to problems associated with FARPs.
      The advantages of forward aircraft basing have been
recognized for almost as long as military aviation has
existed.  Hans Rudel, the most feared German Stuka pilot of
WWII, relied on forward bases that had been cached with fuel
and ammunition which allowed him to maneuver his aircraft
wing along the entire Eastern Front.(13:131)  The ability to
resupply his aircraft virtually anywhere along the front
gave Rudel the logistical support required for him to extend
aviation's influence over a vast area.  He was able to plug
holes created by penetrating Russian armor forces located
long distances away from his organic support base.  Rudel
could also strike deep to interdict reenforcing enemy units.
The Germans had learned early that when logistically
sustained near the target area, aviation was, more often
than not, the decisive element in the outcome of a battle.
      Today's modern Marine attack helicopters are
doctrinally employed in much the same manner as Rudel's
Stukas were in WWII.  The Marine Corps' AH-1 attack
helicopter is generally used in concert with, and in support
of ground forces engaged in close battle.   Also like Rudel,
the attack helicopter commander's success or failure is
often dependent on his ability to quickly respond to
changing battlefield situations.  Therefore the commander's
ability to maintain his sustainment resources close to the
fight is always crucial.  Every military commander is aware
that firepower is virtually useless if it can not be focused
at the right time and the right place, and then sustained
over a decisive period.  The Marine Corps' concept of
maneuver warfare demands more than ever that firepower be
responsive, flexible, and sustainable.  FMFM 1 describes
maneuver warfare as a philosophy that:
      . . . seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion
      through a series of rapid, and unexpected
      actions which create a turbulent and rapidly
      deteriorating situation with which he cannot
      cope. (14: 59)
The attack helicopter can be the decisive tool which the
MAGTF commander uses to implement the modern principles of
maneuver warfare.  But, attack helicopters can be decisive
only when they are responsive to the commander's needs.
The attack helicopter's ability to takeoff and land almost
anywhere offers a weapons platform that can be highly
mobile, and which can deliver lethality with pinpoint
accuracy virtually anywhere on the battlefield.  But like
earth-borne mobile weapons delivery systems, helicopters
must constantly be fed with fuel and ammunition to be
effective.  By placing fuel and ammunition closer to the
battle area, attack helicopter pilots can remain in the
forward battle area indefinitely and offer better
responsiveness and flexibility to the commander.  The FARP
can also be used to increase the range of the attack
helicopter for special operations that require sustainment
well forward of the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA).
     Despite the obvious force multiplying effects which the
FARP offers attack helicopters, the Marine Corps has been
slow to recognize the important role the FARP plays in the
mission of the MAGTF.  Events in the Gulf War brought to
light just how critical the FARP is to the overall mission
of the MAGTF, and in some cases just how unprepared the
Marine Corps is to perform this demanding task.  Comments in
an after-action report submitted by a Marine Air Weapons and
Tactics Squadron (MAWTS-1) officer summed up his observation
of the Marine Corps' ability to employ FARPs during the Gulf
          Some units deployed to Southwest Asia (SWA)
          with a less than desirable level of knowledge
          concerning current usage and employment of
          FARPs . . . some units were reluctant to plan for
          the use of FARPs. . . Proper training of those
          involved in planning (FARP) operations,
          especially on group and wing staffs where
          these type operations are coordinated and
          planned, would help ensure that current
          operational employment techniques are in the
          "bag of tricks" available to the planners.
          (9: 1)
      A recent change to FMFM 5-1 has attempted to define the
Marine Corps' doctrine for Forward Operating Basing (FOB).  The
concept of FOB is to base aircraft in areas that will optimize
aviation's ability to meet the needs of the MAGTF Commander by
increasing " . . . responsiveness through basing flexibility and
aircraft dispersal and by decreasing distances to support areas."
(15: 2-9)  When deployed to a theater of operations (TO) the
Marine Corps plans to use friendly host government airfields,
abandoned or captured airfields, and roadways or highways to
maximize the concept of FOB.  When these facilities are not
available, or their location does not meet mission needs,
expeditionary airfields will be constructed.  The FOB concept
calls for multiple aviation basing sites in the TO.  These sites
will be defined mainly by their logistical capabilities.  At the
most functional end of the spectrum, Main Air Bases will handle
all types of aircraft up to and including theater lift assets,
and will provide spaces for Intermediate Maintenance Activities
(IMA).  Moving down the spectrum of FOBs, Air Facilities, Air
Sites and Air Points are employed, each demonstrating a reduced
capability in general logistical support.  FARPs come under the
classification of Air Points, and are the most austere form of
basing and sustaining aircraft.  The FARP is located as near the
objective area as possible and is task organized to meet only the
basic needs of its users for a specific mission.  Normally the
mission of the FARP is to provide fuel, ordnance loading and
ordnance arming/dearming necessary to support forward helicopter
operations.  The FARP is normally temporary and transitory in
nature, and established for a specific duration and mission.  By
definition, fueling sites created for the convenience of easing
congestion at airfields and ships, or sites located in rear
secure areas are not considered FARPs.  FARPs are created for
tactical use with the ultimate objective of minimizing aircraft
response time and decreasing turnaround time in support of
sustained operations.
      The Marine Corps currently possesses Forward Arming and
Refueling Equipment (FARE) that is designed to be ground and air
mobile and has proven to be generally reliable.  One, or any
combination of four different types of fueling systems are used
to support the FARP:  the Helicopter Expedient Refueling System
(HERS), the SIXCON Fueling System, the CH-53D/E Transfer
Refueling System, and the CH-53D MK 105 Refueling System.  Each
system has its own advantages and limitations that planners must
be aware of, but all FARE has proven to be generally dependable
and adequate when employed correctly.
      The oldest and most common piece of equipment found at the
FARP is the HERS.  This system consists of several collapsible
500 gallon fuel bladders, 100 or 50 gal/min fuel pump, filters
and separators, and hoses.  The HERS is easily transported in
trucks and trailers of almost any type, or it can be delivered
internally or externally with helicopters.  Once delivered the
system can be made operational within minutes.   One of the
advantages of the system is that it can pump and filter fuel from
almost any container.  The greatest limitation of the HERS
however is that it is delivered as several bulky components, and
each component must be placed so that hoses can be connected to
each fuel bladder as well as the pump.  This is not a problem if
the fuel bladders remain loaded and operate from truck beds or
from within helicopters.  But, if the bladders are placed on the
ground indiscriminately they must often be moved in order for the
hoses to reach the bladder connections.  Fuel bladders weigh over
3,400 pounds each when filled and are extremely difficult to
maneuver even under the best conditions.
      The SIXCON system is new to the Marine Corps FARE and is
currently being examined by the Army for their FARP use.  The
system contains modular 900 gallon stainless steel fuel tanks
which can be bolted to another modular frame. (16: 1-3)  The
frame contains the 100 gal/min fuel pump, hoses, filter and
separator.  The SIXCON system can be delivered by truck or
externally from CH-53D/E helicopters.  Because all connections
are completed before the system is delivered to the FARP site,
the SIXCON requires no setup time and can pump fuel immediately.
Planners must take into account that if the SIXCON is delivered
by helicopter, the system must be placed exactly where it will be
used because it can not be moved without heavy equipment.  The
major advantage of the system is that it is ready for operation
the moment it arrives at the FARP.
      The CH-53 Fuel Transfer System and the Mk 105 System have
both resulted from modifications to existing aircraft systems.
The Fuel Transfer, or "dump pump" method of fuel delivery allows
the CH-53 to pump fuel directly from its internal and external
tanks using the airframe's organic equipment.  Fuel pumps that
are normally used to transfer fuel between fuel tanks within the
aircraft are used to deliver fuel through modified hoses to other
aircraft.  The system pumps fuel at approximately 38 gal/min and
has a capacity of 8500 pounds of fuel.(12: encl 4-3)
      The Mk 105 system was originally incorporated to give the
CH-53D a capability to refuel Magnetic Mine Countermeasures
Sleds.(6: 1-36)  There is no requirement that fuel or FARE to be
carried within the cargo area of the helicopter as this system is
capable of delivering over 11,000 pounds of fuel directly from
the aircraft's internal or external fuel tanks, at a rate of up
to 150 gal/min.(8: 1)   Planners must remain aware that the
CH-53D/E is a valuable multi-mission asset that will be in great
demand for other logistical operations throughout the MAGTF, and
therefore may not be available to support the FARP mission.
      As can be seen by the discussion above the Marine Corps is
not suffering from a shortage of FARE.  The Marine Wing Support
Groups (MWSG) in all three Marine Aircraft Wings possess
sufficient HERS and SIXCON systems, and most CH-53D/E aircraft
fuel systems are modified to support the FARP mission.  The
difficult task for the Marine Corps lies in how it will mobilize
this equipment and sustain it adequately while simultaneously
conducting other important missions with assets that are already
in short supply.
      Marine Corps doctrine calls for the FARP to be located 17 to
25 kilometers from the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA).
(5: D1)  Because of the static nature of FARPs deployed during
the ground offensive of the Gulf War, attacking Marine AH-1W
helicopters were forced to fly as much as 70 to 90 kilometers
from the battle area for resupply of fuel and ammunition.*
Without mobility the FARP can not provide proper support to the
attack helicopter in a fast paced environment .  This mobility is
normally provided in the form of truck or helicopter
      *. 24-25 February 91 Marine attack helicopters supported 1st
and 2nd Marine Divisions from arming and refueling sites located
in Saudi Arabia.  These sites were used until the afternoon of 26
      Like ground commanders, aviation commanders depend primarily
on ground transportation to move their tactical resupply items.
Trucks can give the FARP self-sufficiency that normally can not
be realized when depending on helicopters for movement.  The use
of trucks normally ensures the FARP can be moved anytime, day or
night, and during weather conditions which could prevent logistic
helicopters from flying.  Trucks also give the FARP its own
capability to resupply itself from logistical points located at
rear bases or mobile supply trains.
      All FARE can be transported by almost any type of truck,
however it must be recognized that the FARE plus the resupply of
ordnance which the FARP is required to maintain can sometimes
have an enormous "footprint" that far exceeds the transportation
assets organic to the Aviation Combat Element (ACE).  The
requirement for transportation becomes even more critical when
one considers that a single FARP is often not sufficient to
support the needs of aviation.  The ideal situation would be to
employ several FARPs.  While one FARP is operational other FARPs
could be relocating or resupplying.  If only one FARP is
available, and is rendered non-operational during its relocation
or resupply operations, then the contributions of attack
helicopters to the momentum of the battle can be quickly lost.
     During the Gulf War the shortage of trucks available to the
Marine Wing Support Group (MWSG) eliminated the possibility of
creating mobile FARPs to meet even minimal requirements developed
by the attack squadrons.  Limitations of transportation assets
will be even more dramatic for smaller units such as a Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) or Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)
     The Marine Corps must determine how it will meet the ground
transportation needs of the FARP in the future.  The Army
recognized the importance of the FARP some years ago, and through
their Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) , the Army
provides suff icient transportation assets to its attack
helicopter companies and battalions to support their own organic
FARP needs. (2: 3-4)  Until the Marine Corps addresses this
problem, and supplies the ACE commander with sufficient vehicles
to mobilize his FARPs, the MAGTF commander must consider
augmenting the ACE's FARP transportation requirements with his
Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) transportation assets.
     Helicopters have often been relied on to move FARE and
personnel as a tactical necessity and as a solution to the truck
shortage problem that is prevalent within the ACE.  When
operating across long distances, poor terrain, or if speed is of
tactical importance, transporting the FARP by helicopter may be
the most efficient and effective way of movement.  But the
limitations imposed by the use of helicopters for transporting
and even resupplying a FARP must be addressed by planners.
      FARP planners that rely exclusively on helicopters for
transporting the FARP must be realistic.  First, they must
recognize that the ACE will have to compete with the rest of the
MAGTF for limited helicopter resources.  Un less the MAGTF is
willing to set aside sufficient dedicated helicopter assets
specifically to support the FARP throughout its employment, the
FARP may quickly lose its flexibility and experience delays in
sustainment.  Secondly, the movement and resupply of a FARP by
helicopters is gambling its success on the status of the weather
or visibility not only at the FARP site, but also on those
weather conditions encountered enroute.  Even heavy smoke or dust
can prevent helicopters from being able to support the FARP.
Resupplying or moving a FARP at night, although manageable on a
small scale, becomes a risky operation as its size escalates.
Lastly, the transport helicopter is severely limited by the cubic
payload which it can carry.  Two CH-53's have reached their cubic
capacity when carrying sufficient FARE, Hellfire and TOW
missiles, and personnel to reload and refuel one division of
attack helicopters.  In comparison, two five-ton trucks with
trailers will carry the same FARE and personnel, but will also
carry twice the amount of ordnance. (6: 12)
      The goal of a FARP training program should be to mold the
FARP personnel into a cohesive team that is capable of performing
the FARP mission during any conceivable tactical situation they
may encounter.  Aviation planners have usually viewed the FARP
mostly in the terms of an expedient gas station with the only
benefit being convenience.  Rarely in the Fleet Marine Force
(FMF) are FARPs tactically employed during training with the
overriding goal of improving helicopter on station or response
time.  And even more rarely are FARPs employed to be mobile.
Several obstacles must be dealt with by the Marine Corps before
personnel can be effectively trained in FARP operations.
      First, the Marine Corps has not established doctrine in
sufficient depth for its concept of FARP employment.
FMFM 5-3 and FM 5-1 broadly address the subject of FARP doctrine,
but more detailed guidance is needed.  Individually, Marine
Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), Marine Aviation Wings (MAWs), Marine
Air Groups (MAGs), and Squadrons have published Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs) that often differed greatly in their
concepts and procedures for establishing FARPs.  These SOPs
address safety regulations, equipment check lists, personnel
requirements, and even give some examples of how to lay out a
FARP on the ground.  However, the SOPs do little to educate the
reader on how to tactically employ the mobile FARP during combat.
      Second, personnel and equipment required for the FARP are
spread between several units throughout the MAWs.  This lack of
centralization means the majority of planning for FARP training
goes into coordinating procurement of vehicles, FARE and
personnel.   Planners also spend much of their time researching
numerous outdated FARP SOPs and documents that belong to
individual participating Groups and Squadrons.  This task is
difficult, time consuming, and extremely frustrating to the young
First Lieutenant that is usually assigned to the task.  For this
reason the results of planning are often diluted training events
that never approach the actual goals and missions of the FARP.
      Third, units that employ FARPs spend very little time
planning and supervising FARP training.  Many planners believe
that once the personnel, equipment and transportation have been
arranged the rest will work like magic, that aircraft will
receive fuel and ordnance at the right place and time.  Nothing
could be further from the truth.   In order for a FARP to meet
its missions and objectives it must be tactically employed near
or even beyond the FEBA.  To operate under these conditions FARP
personnel must be trained to perform as a team and not as
individuals.  An ad hock group of personnel thrown together at
the last moment will have been previously trained to pump fuel or
load ordnance as individual tasks, but they will be poorly
prepared to be employed as a cohesive tactical unit ready to meet
the demands that may be required of them to support the FARP
under quickly changing or even hostile conditions.
      All three of the above factors combine to result in a weak
or misdirected training program for FARP employment throughout
most of the Marine Corps.  Because of the maze of bureaucracy
associated with changing doctrine or unit task organization
(T/O), the first two factors will require time and money to be
fixed.  However, today's commanders can greatly improve their
readiness to employ FARPs by examining and aggressively
addressing the third factor.  As his first step a commander
should begin to include tactically employed mobile FARPs as part
of their normal aviation training program.   The commander's
training program should strive to break the mold of using the
FARP as a stationary gas station.  A building block approach
should be taken to exercise the FARP's mobility and flexibility
under a variety of terrain, light and weather conditions.  The
personnel selected to perform the FARP mission should be highly
qualified in their MOS and motivated to learn under difficult
      Because of limited transportation and the tactical nature of
the FARP, the number of personnel participating in a FARP must be
kept to an absolute minimum.  This means the luxuries of having
specially trained personnel to perform specific tasks will not be
available in the FARP.  Often a job that requires several Marines
to accomplish in garrison must be done by only a few at the FARP.
FARP personnel must become "dual-hatted," therefore members of
the FARP team must learn new skills through cross training.
Fuelers must learn the basics of loading ordnance and ordnance
specialists must learn how to fuel aircraft.  Marines that have
not looked at a topographical map since boot camp must learn to
navigate a truck, during the day and at night.  Because many
FARPs will be supported by helicopters delivering sling loaded
cargo, some members must be trained and qualified in helicopter
support operations.  Most importantly, because of the FARP's
austere and self reliant nature, personnel must be trained to
tactically employ the FARP with very little guidance from
superiors.  In most cases Staff Non-Commissioned Officers will be
placed in charge of these FARPs and they will often make critical
decisions which will directly affect the ACE's ability to
complete its mission.  Without an aggressive training program
these officers are placed in a position of great responsibility
for which most are poorly prepared.
      During Desert Shield and Desert Storm FARP planners quickly
found that the number of ordnance specialists and fuelers were
deficient, therefore requirements for these personnel to support
multiple sites could not always be sufficiently met.  Squadron
ordnance specialists and MWSS fuelers were needed to work
multiple ship decks, CH-53D/E on-call FARPs, Air Sites, and
ground mobile FARPs.  Due to lack of personnel some FARP missions
could not be adequately supported to meet combat mission
requirements.  The shortage of personnel to support the FARPs
that were established slowed the attack helicopter ordnance
loading and arming process, and could have proven to be a
critical deficiency if the enemy would have offered more
resistance.  HMLA-369's Marine Corps Lessons Learned System
(MCLLS) report from Desert Shield gives testimony to the
frustrations which the squadrons experienced when dealing with
the FARP personnel shortages:
          Lack of a complete infrastructure at the
          forward base (Lonesome Dove) and Forward
          Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) sites
          hampered the smooth transition of the
          squadron into these sites.  Manpower and lack
          of squadron organic assets caused a slow down
          (in) the mission accomplishment.(10: 1)
The 5th MEB's ACE, MAG 50, found similar frustration during
Desert Shield and Desert Storm.  They discovered that the MAG was
not staffed with ordnance personnel who could plan and supervise
their multi-deck and FARP ordnance evolutions:
          It has become very clear that a Commander
          Amphibious Group/Marine Expeditionary
          Brigade/Aviation Combat Element
          (COMPHIBGRU/MEB/ACE) aviation ordnance T/O
          should be established and filled.  Peace time
          MEB aviation ordnance T/Os do not meet the
          requirements of the ... unique operations of
          an Amphibious Task Force (ATF) . . . (11: 1-2)
The T/O of unit ordnance specialists and fuelers must be
reexamined in light of the recent after-action reports.  The
expedient nature of the Marine Corps will demand the use of
multiple sites that are capable of providing ordnance and fueling
functions to helicopters, and a realistic T/O should be developed
to support this requirement.  In the meantime commanders must
decide what increased risk they are willing to accept by
supporting FARP sites with less than the optimum number of
      The senior aviation commander who will be supported by the
FARP should retain responsibility for every facet of the FARP,
from its initial planning to the tactical execution.  This person
will normally be the MAG or ACE commander.  In the past some of
these senior commanders have "pushed down"  the responsibilities
and tasks associated with the planning, coordination, and
execution of the FARP to one of their subordinate unit
commanders.  This situation causes problems when the commander
tasked to implement the FARP does not have authority over the
personnel or equipment assets required for support of the FARP.
      Additionally, several subordinate commands will typically be
supported by the same FARP, and traditionally, disagreements will
arise during the planning phase that will have to be resolved by
the senior commander.  The subordinate commander has the
motivation and skills to plan and coordinate a FARP, but in most
cases he simply does not possess the authority over the personnel
or equipment that are required to execute the plan.  His attempts
in working through the chain of command to resolve controversies
are cumbersome and time consuming.  For these reasons it is most
important that the senior commander retain the responsibility for
planning and task organizing of the FARP.  Even a senior
commander will most likely find that he will be required to go
outside his command to secure assets to fulfill the manning and
equipment requirements.
      The attack helicopter community is one of the very few that
is going to continue to improve in technology and expand in
numbers during the Marine Corps' reduction of forces of the
1990's.(1: 6)  Attack helicopter squadrons will grow from twelve
to eighteen AH-1Ws.  New night targeting systems for the AH-1W
are high on the Corps' priority list for procurement and enhanced
navigation systems are being installed today.  It is obvious that
the Marine Corps Is betting the attack helIcopter can provide the
responsiveness, flexibility and fire power to take the Marines
into the 21 century.
      The FARP is an often forgotten element in the attack
helicopter's "food chain."  Without it the attack helicopter is
handicapped, and much of the technological advantages gained over
the past twenty-five years is never realized.  Commanders must
include FARP training in their overall aviation training plans.
Combined Arms Exercises (CAX) are an excellent opportunity to
train personnel and develop the Marine Corps doctrine on FARP
employment.  It should become mandatory that the ACE at all CAXs
be required to employ a truck mobile FARP during the final three
day fire exercise.  During the two and one half weeks prior to
the CAX the ACE could conduct building block FARP exercises with
the eventual goal of supporting a twenty-four hour mobile FARP
that would support attack helicopters during the three day CAX.
This would be an important first step in identifying and solving
problems associated with FARP as it is employed by Marine
      If the attack helicopter is to shoulder an even greater
portion of the supporting arms requirement in the future, then
the FARP must become a priority within the Marine Corps; its
importance has been ignored for much too long.
1.	"Aviation Deactivation and Restructuring Announced.  "Marine
Corps Gazette, March 92, 5-6.
2.	Department of the Army.  Forward Arming and Refueling Points,
FM1-104, 31 July 85.
3.	Department of the Army.  Attack Helicopter Battalion, FM 1-112,
July 86.
4.	Department of the Army.  Army Aviation in Combat Operations, FM
1-100, February 89.
5.	Department of the Navy and Marine Corps.  Assault Support
Helicopter Tactical Manual, NWP 55-9-ASH/FMFM 5-3, January 90.
6.	Department of the Navy and Marine Corps.  CH-53 NATOPS
Manual, NAVAIR 01-H53AAA-1, June 85.
7.	Cronin, William R. "The Future of Marine Close Air Support."
Marine Corps Gazette, April 92.
8.	Leavitt, R.N., NAVAIR Washington DC.  Letter to Major B.T.
Johnson about Mk 105 expedient refuel system, (no date)
9.	Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, Forward Arming and
Refuel Point (FARP) Employment and Usage, MCLLS no.20457-03897,
8 February 91.
10.	Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, Helicopters in the Field,
MCCLS no.30640-44076(04906), 8 March 91.
11.	Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, Table of Organization for
Aviation Ordnance, MCLLS no.32701-49221 (05579), 22 February 91.
12.	Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261.  Standard Operating
Procedures of the Conduct and Establishment of Forward Arming and
Refueling Point, HMM-268 FARP SOP, 4 December 89.
13.	Rudel, Hans-Ulrich. Stuka Pilot. Costa Mesa CA:  Noontime
Press, 1986.
14.	U.S. Marine Corps.  Warfighting, FMFM 1, 6 March 89.
15.	U.S. Marine Corps.  Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1 w/ch 4,
24 August 72.
16.	U.S. Marine Corps.  SIXCON Fuel Tank Module, TM09002A-15/1,
March 88.

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