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WWMCCS In The Marine Corps:  Time For Changes 
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA - C4
		EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:  WWMCCS in the Marine Corps:  Time for Changes
Author:  Major Heinz M. McArthur, United States Marine Corps
Thesis:  Significant changes in the World-Wide Military
Command and Control System (WWMCCS) are imminent; these
changes and a chronic shortage of expertise dictate the
Marine Corps restructure its organization and training for
WWMCCS support.
Background:  Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm
demonstrated the importance of WWMCCS to the Marine Air-
Ground Task Force (MAGTF).  The heart of WWMCCS is the
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), an
automated tool that the CINCs and services use to access and
manipulate time-phased force and deployment data.  WWMCCS
also provides communications functions that assist in the
coordination and exchange of essential command and control
information.   An improved version of JOPES, JOPES 4.0, will
soon be in operation.  JOPES 4.0 poses problems for the
Marine Corps because it is complex and not compatible with
the current inventory of Fleet Marine Force computer equip-
ment.  JOPES 4.O adds to the major WWMCCS problem the
Marine Corps experienced during Desert Shield/Desert Storm:
a shortage of personnel trained and experienced in JOPES and
joint planning systems.   To identify personnel with
JOPES/WWMCCS skills and billets requiring those skills, the
Marine Corps established additional military occupational
specialties.   The MAGTF Plans/Operations Specialist MOS for
enlisted Marines falls short of Marine Corps requirements
because it does not ensure progressive training and primary
MOS credibility.   The MAGTF II/Logistics Automated
Information Systems (LOG AIS) are developing systems that
offer an alternative to JOPES 4.0.   These systems focus on
the maintenance of unit deployment data down to the
battalion level, and therefore ensure a broad participation
in the development and maintenance of this data at all
levels of the MAGTF.
Recommendations:  Incorporate JOPES skills in the private
through warrant officer grades of an existing occupational
field; the logistics occupational field (04)  is a candidate.
Consolidate JOPES functions at the Marine Expeditionary
Force command element and Fleet Marine Force/component
headquarters.   The requirements at lower levels can be met
by MAGTF II/LOG AIS.
    WWMCCS in the Marine Corps:  Time for Changes
			Outline
Thesis:  Significant changes in the World-Wide Military
Command and Control System (WWMCCS) are imminent;
these changes and a chronic shortage of expertise dictate
the Marine Corps restructure its organization and training for
WWMCCS support.
I.	WWMCCS functions
	A.	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
		(JOPES) and the time-phased force and deployment
		data (TPFDD)
	B.	Subsystems of JOPES
		(1)	Joint Operation and Planning System (JOPS)
		(2)	Joint Deployment System (JDS)
		(3)	Commonality and limitations of JOPS and JDS
	C.	WWMCCS communications
II.	WWMCCS hardware
	A.	The WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN)
	B.	WWMCCS workstations
	C.	Progress on satellite communications for deployed
		units
III.	JOPES 4.0
	A.	Improvements in capability
	B.	The Macintosh and UNIX:  not hardware and software
		compatible with FMF computer equipment
IV.	MAGTF II/Logistics Automated Information Systems (LOG
	AIS)
	A.	What does MAGTF II/LOG AIS do?
	B.	Focus on unit deployment data at the battalion
		level
V.	Training and expertise deficiencies
	A.	4th MEB problems during Desert Shield
	B.	Joint planning and execution rely on a small
		number of gurus
	C.	Use of additional MOSs (9909 and 9919)  to track
		WWMCCS expertise
VI.	Solutions
	A.	Incorporate WWMCCS expertise in an existing occu-
		pational field
	B.	Consolidate JOPES functions at the MEF and FMF/
		component headquarters
	WWMCCS IN THE MARINE CORPS:  TIME FOR CHANGES
     	     by Major Heinz McArthur, United States Marine Corps
      Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm brought home
an important lesson for the Marine Corps: we rely on the
World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) for
the deployment and employment of our forces.  The develop-
ment of the Marine Corps' portions of the Time-Phased Force
and Deployment Data (TPFDD), the CINC's WWMCCS-maintained
deployment database, was the subject of intense scrutiny at
the highest levels.  For good reason, for as one participant
observed, "if it ain't in the TPFDD, it don't move." (5)
The Marine Corps recognized the criticality of WWMCCS during
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and successfully exploited the
system.  Significant changes in WWMCCS, however, are immi-
nent.  These changes, together with a chronic shortage of
WWMCCS expertise, dictate we restructure our organization
and training for WWMCCS support.
      Getting our arms around WWMCCS is essential; the system
provides valuable deployment and employment tools for the
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).  Its primary function
is to support the Joint Operation Planning and Execution
System (JOPES) ,  the automated tool used by the CINCs and
their components in operations planning and execution.  One
of the key products produced through JOPES is the TPFDD, the
computer database that supports an operation plan (OPLAN).
The TPFDD defines the forces for the OPLAN and when those
forces flow into the theater of operations.   TPFDD informa-
tion also includes movement, personnel, and cargo data
associated with deploying units, in-place units, and sus-
tainment.   The database provides routing information and
supports estimates of transportation requirements.  (1:I-34,
I-35)   To simplify the identification of forces in the
TPFDD, combat, combat support, and combat service support
forces, personnel, and supplies are linked together in
groupings known as force modules.
      JOPES currently consists of two subsystems:   the Joint
Operation and Planning System (JOPS) and the Joint Deploy-
ment System (JDS) .   JOPS is a tool for the deliberate plan-
ning process and JDS supports time-sensitive planning.   The
current version of JOPES (version 3.2) allows the access of
either subsystem from a common menu screen.   The subsystems
can exchange data, but for practical purposes operate inde-
pendently.  (9:8)
      JOPS software supports TPFDD development and OPLAN
maintenance.   Some of the major JOPS functions are:  force
module creation and modification; generation of non-unit
cargo transportation requirements; estimation of replacement
personnel transportation requirements; medical support
requirement evaluation; and OPLAN transportation feasibility
estimation.  (9:11)
      The JDS provides a mechanism where deployment data can
be exchanged between organizations involved in the deploy-
ment planning and execution process.  JDS can use a JOPS-
developed TPFDD, or can create a TPFDD if one does not
exist.   Some of the major JDS functions are:  creation of
TPFDD records; review of unit tasking and deployment status;
creation and modification of force modules; display of
transportation schedules and manifest information;  interface
with AUTODIN to send messages containing unit movement
information to units and ports; Military Airlift Command
coordination; Military Traffic Management Command coordina-
tion; and Military Sealift Command coordination.  (9:10)  The
components of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)
use the JDS database to pull movement requirements and
complete initial transportation scheduling.   The system
assists the tracking of units during deployment and provides
visibility of force closure status.
      The software design of JOPS is cumbersome and reflects
a 1990s-level of technology.   Data entry is done line-by-
line, and data retrieval is slow and inconvenient.   JDS is
easier to use, and reflects a 1970s-level of software tech-
nology.   JDS uses full-screen data entry and an on-line
database for rapid access to data.   As previously shown,
there is a degree of overlap between the two systems.   For
manipulation of a TPFDD, JDS is preferred under most circum-
stances because the user interface is easier, data retrieval
is faster, and the link with USTRANSCOM is crucial.   The
transportation feasibility estimate, a prerequisite for
OPLAN approval by the CINC, can only be done in JOPS.
      WWMCCS also supports important communications services
in addition to JOPES.  The WWMCCS Intercomputer Network Mail
(WINMAIL) system provides worldwide secure electronic mail
between commands and individuals.   Teleconferences form a
bulletin-board message system based on topic or functional
areas, and are coordination tools for specific war plans and
organizations.
      The communications functions of WWMCCS have expanded
beyond support for the planning process.   During Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, WWMCCS was the primary method used for
distribution of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) operation
orders and situation reports. The USCENTCOM Joint Forces Air
Component Commander used WWMCCS for distribution of the
daily air tasking order.   WWMCCS was also used to transmit
target lists, target bulletins, and battle damage assessment
reports between the USCENTCOM Naval Component Commander
(NAVCENT) and the amphibious task force.  (4)
      During 4th MEB's Desert Shield/Desert Storm deployment,
restrictions on administrative message traffic complicated
such mundane but necessary functions as direct deposit
verification and adjustment of pay allotments.    The impor-
tance of these administrative functions to the families left
behind (and, therefore, to troop morale)  increased steadily
as the deployment time lengthened.  WWMCCS proved a reliable
and expedient method for 4th MEB to coordinate the resolu-
tion of such problems with support activities in CONUS.
      WWMCCS operations are supported by mainframe computers,
known as WWMCCS hosts, located at sites in CONUS and over-
seas locations.   The hosts are connected with each other and
with remote users  (geographically separated from the host)
through the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN), a dedicated
packet-switching data communications network.   On the users'
end, the primary WWMCCS component is the workstation.
Workstations consist of IBM or IBM-compatible personal
computers (PCs) running terminal emulation and administra-
tive support software.    Workstations also provide file
transfer capability, where the operator can store informa-
tion on the PC and later electronically transfer the infor-
mation to the WWMCCS host computer.  In addition, WWMCCS
uses high speed printers to support the large volume of
reports created under JOPES.
      The most critical component for WWMCCS is data communi-
cations connectivity.   For garrison operations, dedicated
government or leased telephone lines provide this connectiv-
ity.   Deployed units afloat and ashore require satellite
communications systems.  Due to the speed and volume of data
used by WWMCCS, super high frequency satellite communica-
tions (SHF SATCOM)  is typically employed to provide connec-
tivity for deployed WWMCCS operations.
      In past operations, the fierce competition for satel-
lite channels and equipment on board ship was a major imped-
iment to sustained WWMCCS support for the deployed MAGTF
commander.   Previous Marine Corps efforts to place SHF
SATCOM on amphibious ships met with little success.  Desert
Shield provided the necessary impetus to modify the Navy's
priorities, and the 4th MEB deployed with WWMCCS terminals
and SHF SATCOM on the USS Nassau.  The 4th MEB experience
validated the requirement for SHF SATCOM on amphibious
ships, and growing support for the requirement was voiced at
the Eighth Amphibious Warfare Conference in November 1991.
(7, 18)
      The Navy acknowledged the problem through an SHF SATCOM
installation initiative to enhance naval command and control
capabilities afloat.  Under this program, however, initial
installation was scheduled for aircraft carriers -- amphibi-
ous flagship installation was not scheduled until fiscal
year 1995. (19)
      Headquarters Marine Corps came up with an innovative
plan to solve the problem.  This plan proposed the use of
Marine Corps satellite communications vans from the Marine
Corps Reserve and prepositioned war reserves as an interim
capability for amphibious ships until the Navy's planned
ship modifications are complete.  A memorandum of agreement
between the Marine Corps and the Navy approved this plan and
paved the way for WWMCCS installations on board LHAs and
LHDs by 1993. (19, 17)  All deploying MAGTFs, including
Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) , can expect WWMCCS support
in the near-term.
      The Marine Corps adjusted to the role WWMCCS played in
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, but significant changes are
around the corner that demand a reassessment of our approach
to WWMCCS support.  These changes are driven by a long-
standing demand by the joint planning and execution communi-
ty to consolidate and enhance JOPS and JDS functions.   In
response to this demand, the first truly integrated version
of the system, known as JOPES version 4.0, was developed.
      JOPES 4.0 supports a modern user interface, complete
with a mouse and software windows.   The processing of menus,
screens, and forms occurs at the workstation instead of the
host computer; the user can create and modify local versions
of a TPFDD, and data is transferred to the host computer as
necessary.   The master database remains on the host com-
puter.  (9:14)   This methodology provides an upgraded user
interface (easier to understand and use) , more flexibility
in manipulating data, and improvements in system performance
and response time.
      Existing WWMCCS terminals lack the necessary horsepower
to run JOPES 4.0.   Recognizing this, upgraded workstations
were developed and are under procurement.   The new work-
stations are based on variants of the Apple Macintosh com-
puter, and use a modified version of the UNIX operating
system called A/UX.
      This selection of hardware and operating system pres-
ents some problems for the Marine Corps.   The Fleet Marine
Forces' standard systems are the AN/UYK-83 and AN/UYK-85
computers.   This family of systems, known as the Fleet
Marine Force End-User Computing Equipment (FMF EUCE), are
ruggedized PCs that are hardware and software compatible
with the IBM family of microcomputers.  The AN/UYK-83/85
computer inventory is augmented by numerous off-the-shelf,
non-ruggedized PCs.   As is common with IBM-type PCs, most
Marine Corps software applications are designed around the
MS-DOS operating system.
      The JOPES 4.0 workstation is incompatible with FMF EUCE
in key areas.   While JOPES 4.0's UNIX operating system does
have a capability to run MS-DOS software, its performance is
so slow that it limits MS-DOS functions to basic file trans-
fer operations only.   Some variants of the FMF EUCE can
support UNIX, but WWMCCS-unique modifications prevent run-
ning the JOPES 4.0 software on these systems.   The bottom
line is that JOPES 4.0 software is tied to the Macintosh --
separate, distinct, and incompatible with other automated
systems in the Marine Corps inventory.
      Another significant problem lies in the complexity of
the operating system.   UNIX offers a powerful set of tools
to the user, and is particularly well-suited for the multi-
tasking, networked environment of JOPES 4.0.   The price of
this power is complexity.   An unsophisticated but determined
user ("determined" being defined as one who is willing to
read the manual), can learn to operate his MS-DOS computer
in a reasonable amount of time.  UNIX is another story,
because it uses a more complex set of procedures to initiate
and maintain the system.   These procedures, known as systems
administration, require a degree of training and computer
savvy well beyond that required of current WWMCCS operators.
      Technical support for JOPES 4.0 will be more difficult.
Under the current system, the host computer site provides
software and communications troubleshooting, and civilian
contractors provide computer hardware maintenance.   Marine
Corps technicians receive training in some of the special-
ized communications equipment used by WWMCCS,   but local
commands have limited hardware and software expertise on the
system.   This limited expertise is a potential problem
during deployed operations away from the host site, but the
similarities between FMF EUCE and the current IBM WWMCCS
workstations have kept the problem manageable.   Under JOPES
4.0, the complexity of the hardware and operating system
will require more detailed technical support at the command
level.   Because of the loss of commonality with FMF EUCE,
specialized and costly training is  required for technical
support personnel.   System support will also require a
greater reliance on civilian contractors.
      Given these compatibility and complexity problems, why
the Macintosh?  As previously discussed, the characteristics
and functions of JOPES 4.0 require more hardware and soft-
ware power than existing Marine Corps microcomputers can
provide.   The Air Force uses UNIX-based systems more exten-
sively than the Marine Corps, and Air Force requirements
appear to have dominated the UNIX/Macintosh decision for
JOPES 4.0.   At the end of fiscal year 1991, the Air Force
accounted for 58 percent of the total JOPES workstations
ordered, where Marine Corps requirements made up only 1
percent of the total procurement.  (21:89)   In the WWMCCS
world, the Marine Corps doesn't drive the train.  WWMCCS
exists to support the warfighting CINCs, and in the CINCs'
environment, training and technical support are available to
support JOPES 4.0.
      JOPES 4.0 represents a major change for WWMCCS, and its
development has not been without problems and delays.   The
system was scheduled for fielding in April 1992.   A user
evaluation conducted in February 1992, however, concluded
that JOPES 4.0 was "at best three times slower than today's
system" and "basic functionality was not provided."  (13)   As
a result of this evaluation, the system implementation date
was put on hold until the problems are resolved.   It is
difficult to estimate how long this will take; one analyst
described the WWMCCS modernization and JOPES 4.0 effort as
"a program which has delivered virtually nothing to users
after an investment of twelve years and nearly $1B."  (13)
Despite such negative reviews, the resources expended and
the influence of the CINCs will eventually force JOPES 4.0
into fielding.   The present difficulties, however, may give
the Marine Corps the time to realistically evaluate our role
and support structure for the system.
      A different approach to planning and execution support
is offered by MAGTF II/Logistics Automated Information
Systems (LOG AIS).   At the heart of LOG AIS is a computer
program known as the MAGTF Deployment Support System II
(MDSS II) .   This program uses encyclopedic data (such as
tables of equipment, equipment weight, and displacement
characteristics) as well as actual unit allowances and on-
hand quantities to build a unit deployment database at the
battalion level.   This unit deployment database feeds other
LOG AIS systems, like the Computer Aided Embarkation Manage-
ment System (CAEMS) , which produces computer-generated ship
deck diagrams and load plans, and the Computer Aided Load
Manifesting System, which produces aircraft load plans and
reports.
      MAGTF II is the next system up in the MAGTF II/LOG AIS
family.   MAGTF II consolidates subordinate unit MDSS II
databases into a MAGTF TPFDD.   This allows MAGTF planners to
build a TPFDD from the bottom up, with improved accuracy and
timeliness for force composition, equipment, and character-
istics.   A JOPES interface allows the transfer of MAGTF II
data into JOPES, as well as the extraction of JOPES data for
off-line manipulation of force modules and TPFDDs by MAGTF
II.
      The MDSS II unit database is not some esoteric plan
being worked by the CINC's gurus;  it is essential unit
embarkation and deployment data whose upkeep will demand
broad command participation at all levels of the MAGTF.   The
usefulness of the unit deployment data on a daily basis is
the system's selling point, and may help to realize the
design goal of MAGTF II/LOG AIS, where "transition to a
contingency operating mode is transparent to the operator.
(2:2)
      The Marine Corps' inability to smoothly transition from
deliberate planning to contingency operations was the most
significant WWMCCS deficiency in Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
An after action report from the II Marine Expeditionary
Force (MEF) noted:
      It was quite evident from the beginning of crisis
      planning for Desert Shield that the level of knowledge
      of JOPES and the language of JDS were severely lacking
      in the II MEF staff as well as the Major Subordinated
      Commands (MSCs).   The inadequacy of trained WWMCCS
      operators in the MSC staffs slowed the planning process
      initially.   The responsibility for Joint planning
      resides with G-5/G-3 Plans and the WWMCCS is normally
      located in these sections.   However, it is the respon-
      sibility of all sections who play a role in JOPES/JDS
      to have personnel trained who will aid the process for
      deliberate and crisis action planning.  (3)
      These training deficiencies were most obvious in the
deployment of the 4th MEB.   For the 4th MEB, a routine
planning process to support a European exercise was disrupt-
ed by the Desert Storm deployment order.   The 4th MEB staff
began with their existing exercise TPFDD and modified the
data to reflect their (significantly different) Desert
Shield force-list and ship-mix.   The required modifications
proved much more complex than anticipated -- MEB and subor-
dinate command planners were swamped by the volume of detail
and data entry demanded by JOPES but missing from their of f-
the-shelf TPFDD.   Detailed coordination of the effort was
further complicated by the physical separation of the MEB
headquarters  (at Little Creek, Virginia) , and its subordi-
nate elements  (at Camp Lejeune and Cherry Point, North
Carolina).  (20)   A Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, after-
action summary stated:
      The deploying units' unfamiliarity with JOPES, coupled
      with the lack of qualified and trained personnel with
      JOPES experience, caused an initial delay in register-
      ing and reporting those lift requirements during the
      building of the Time-Phased Force [and] Deployment Data
      (TPFDD) base.  The resulting delay in registering the
      lift requirements by the 4th MEB caused a delay in
      securing surface lift assets (i.e., MSC (Military
      Sealift Command) ships) necessary to embark a major
      portion of the MEB's AFOE (assault follow-on echelon)
      assets and the lion's share of its accompanying 30
      DOS/DOA [days of supply/days of ammunition] sustainment
      block. (9)
Subsequent Desert Storm deployments offered more lead time,
and the planning and execution of these deployments avoided
most of the early Desert Shield problems.  The 4th MEB
experience, however, is probably more representative of the
come as you are" deployments of future conflicts.
      The shortage of JOPES expertise during the Desert
Shield crunch reflects two characteristics of WWMCCS use in
the Marine Corps.  The first is that expertise in the joint
planning and execution community is normally limited to the
gurus who participate in the development and review of
standing war plans.  The second characteristic follows from
the first:  we train the gurus but do not train the larger
group of Marines who must deal with WWMCCS during major
crises.  The result is that the Marine Corps is short-handed
when we need WWMCCS capability the most.
      This reliance on a small cadre of experts also shows a
reluctance on the part of commanders and operational staff
to deal with the details of deliberate planning.  As one
planner observed:
      Deliberate planning efforts, and working knowledge of
      the products borne thereof, are generally relegated to
      the few assigned to billets with the word "PLANS"
      specifically denoted in the title.   The unfamiliarity,
      complexity, and perceived invalidity of the deliberate
      planning process tends to stymie genuine widespread
      interest and to curb command support (resources, peo-
      ple, time)  for its pursuit.   A perception exists that a
      deliberate plan/TPFDD is only valid until executed, and
      that adroit, innovative management during the throes of
      execution will more than compensate for deficiencies in
      an existing plan/TPFDD.  (5)
      Training vehicles exist to make inroads on the problem.
Joint planning and JOPES courses are offered by the Air
Training Command, USTRANSCOM, and the Armed Forces Staff
College.   The Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School and
Command and Staff College provide a limited exposure to
joint planning processes and concepts.   Coordination and
management of training quotas can increase the number of
Marines involved in this training.
      A more fundamental problem, though, is the identifica-
tion of billets requiring training, training Marines in
conjunction with assignment to those billets, and managing
the available expertise through retention of personnel and
reassignment where necessary.   To track this expertise, the
Marine Corps has designated an additional military occupa-
tional specialty (MOS)  for the "MAGTF Plans/Operations
Officer"  (MOS 9909) and the "MAGTF Plans/Operations Special-
ist"  (MOS 9919).   These MOSs identify Marines with JOPES
skills and identify billets requiring these skills.
      Is an additional MOS the best way to track and manage
this expertise?  For officers, probably so.   As the title
implies, the MAGTF plans/operations officer requires a broad
understanding of the joint planning process, the MAGTF's
organization for deployment and employment, and the capabil-
ities and limitations of the MAGTF.   The plans/operations
officer needs to know the specifics of JOPS, JDS, and
TPFDDs, but a broader knowledge of the "big picture" of
joint planning is essential.   To qualify for the 9909 MOS,
an officer must have at least one year of experience in
joint planning.  (8:1-78)
      The ideal planner, therefore, has a broad and compre-
hensive operational background.   To fill plans/operations
billets, command G-1s must work closely with Headquarters
Marine Corps to identify qualified candidates and to sched-
ule appropriate joint planning and JOPES training with the
assignment process.
      Multiple assignments of qualified off icers to
plans/operations billets are necessary and inevitable due to
the scarcity of experience in this area.   This can be
managed by alternating assignments between the officer's
primary MOS (to ensure MOS credibility) and plans/operations
billets.   The extended time away from the primary MOS of
these officers must be countered through the recognition and
consideration of critical planning skills by promotion
boards.
      The 9919 MOS for the enlisted plans/operations special-
ist presents a different set of problems.   This MOS also
requires a minimum of one year of experience with WIN and
joint planning systems, and by its nature does not support
the entry level training of Marines as JOPES operators.
(8:3-399)  Commands are forced to pull Marines out of their
primary MOS to receive formal and on-the-job training, and
plans/operations specialists will normally be retained in
WWMCCS-related billets due to their scarcity and value.  The
enlisted MAGTF plans/operations specialists may have a
difficult time competing for promotion in their primary MOS.
If promoted, they may be assigned to positions of responsi-
bility in areas for which their WWMCCS background leaves
them unprepared.
      Because of this, several commands recommended that MOS
9919 be made a primary MOS. (14, 15)  This would establish a
community of Marines who are career JOPES gurus.  As a
primary MOS, a formal training and assignment structure
would be established to provide entry level WWMCCS opera-
tors.  Reassignment of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and
staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) to JOPES-related
billets could occur without jeopardizing the MOS credibility
of these Marines.
      The small size of this community (currently 58 Marines
have the 9919 MOS) makes the MAGTF plans/operations special-
ist career track difficult. (10)  An occupational field is
not practical for such a small group, and the lack of rank
structure and career progression within the opera-
tions/planning structure would result in poor promotion
opportunity.  Assignments would be lock-step -- when one
Marine is reassigned, many must move due to the shortage of
replacement bodies.
      An alternative is to incorporate JOPES and WIN skills
in an existing occupational field.   This would provide entry
level MOS training, and offer a rank structure from private
through warrant officer to support JOPES operations.
Logistics (occupational field 04)  is a potential candidate
to absorb JOPES.   The logistics/embarkation specialist MOS
(0431) description already includes JOPS and JDS training at
the SNCO level, and this training could be extended down to
lower grades.  (8:3-35)   The embarkation officer MOS (0430)
is already immersed in the integration of joint planning
systems and embarkation through CAEMS and its close ties
with MAGTF II, LOG AIS, and JOPES.   An expansion of billets
and training for embarkation officers could provide a viable
community of senior JOPES specialists.
      The Marine Corps currently supports WWMCCS through
JOPES operations at the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) headquar-
ters, MEF command elements, MEB command elements, and the
MSCs.   The current downsizing of the Marine Corps, the need
to optimize the availability of our scarce WWMCCS expertise,
and the training and support problems posed by JOPES 4.0
dictate a different approach to the way we organize for
WWMCCS support.
      One such approach was informally suggested by Captain
G. H. Swain, an action officer at Headquarters Marine Corps.
Captain Swain proposed that JOPES functions be consolidated
at the FMF and MEF levels, but that MSCs retain their
current WWMCCS communications capabilities using organic FMF
EUCE. (12)  This reorganization would allow the centraliza-
tion of JOPES expertise, limit the training, technical
support, and costs of JOPES 4.0, and allow a more efficient
pooling of our scarce WWMCCS expertise.
      Command responses to this proposal were uniformly
negative.  One response stated, "WWMCCS access and full use
of WWMCCS/JOPES capability at the [MSC] level is critical to
rapid force structure development and refinement of deploy-
ment [requirements]." (19)  Another response maintained that
"the Marine Corps must have the capability to support
multiple OPLAN TPFDD maintenance, TPFDD development sour-
cing, monitoring, and updating during time sensitive plan-
ning by forward deployed MAGTFs, and MSCs not collocated
with the MEF." (15)
      These responses failed to consider two important
changes in the Marine Corps' organization for joint planning
and execution.  The first change is the developing capabili-
ty and scope of MAGTF II/LOG AIS.  The MSCs currently plug
into JOPES to ensure the accuracy and completeness of their
share of the CINC's TPFDD.  These functions are largely
duplicated by MAGTF II/LOG AIS, and MAGTF II/LOG AIS offers
significant advantages because it is tailored to Marine
Corps requirements and the potential operating environment
of the MAGTF.  Once fully implemented, MAGTF II/LOG AIS will
eliminate the need for MSCs to use JOPES for detailed TPFDD
manipulation.  The retention of WWMCCS communications
functions proposed by Captain Swain would provide the
mechanism to coordinate MSC requirements with the MEF.
      The second important change that impacts our WWMCCS
support structure is the current downsizing and reorganiza-
tion of the Marine Corps.   This reorganization focuses on
the MEF as the primary warfighting organization.   Changes in
the MEF structure include a forward-deployed MEF command
element (to replace the MEF-by-composite-MEBs approach of
the past) , and a capability for the MEF to provide a stand-
ing Joint Task Force headquarters.   Another major structure
change is the establishment of a deployable component
headquarters in each FMF.   These component headquarters will
be provided by the FMF headquarters, augmented with support-
ing establishment and reserve personnel; communications
support will come from the MEF.  (11)
      This structure requires a robust WWMCCS/JOPES capabili-
ty at the MEF command element and FMF/component headquar-
ters.   These elements then could provide WWMCCS teams to
support forward-deployed units.   To ensure manning and
equipment for these elements, a reallocation of JOPES
responsibilities and resources away from the MSCs to the MEF
may be inevitable.
      The Marine Corps must be able to smoothly plug-and-play
WWMCCS in future crises.   Our continued shortage of WWMCCS
expertise and the changing roles of deployment and execution
systems, such as JOPES 4.0 and MAGTF II/LOG AIS, require
changes in the way we support WWMCCS.   If we centralize
JOPES functions at the MEF command element and component
headquarters, and extend the maintenance of deployment data
down to the battalion level, we can improve our ability to
exploit joint deployment assets. The expeditionary nature of
the Marine Corps and the joint and combined nature of future
conflicts demand that we do so.
			BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.	AFSC Pub 1.  The Joint Staff Officer's Guide.  Armed
Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA, 1991.
2.	MAGTF II/Logistics Automated Information Systems
(LOG/AIS).  Student handout, CSS 307.  Staff Planning School,
Landing Force Training Command, Pacific, San Diego, CA, Feb
1992.
3.	MCLLS 13139-42379 (03098) .  "JOPES Trained Personnel
&  WWMCCS Operations.   MCCDC (WF) , Quantico, VA.
4.	MCLLS 31259-95795 (09090).  "Fire Support (FS) - World
Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) ." MCCDC
(WF) , Quantico, VA.
5.	MCLLS 50948-44884 (03915) "Deliberate Planning Process
JOPS/JDS/JOPES and TPFDD)."  MCCDC (WF), Quantico, VA.
6.	MCLLS 5144O-O5112 (0403O).  "Training, Proficiency, and
Use of JOPES for Deployment of Forces.   MCCDC (WF) Quantico,
VA.
7.	MCLLS 52255-12243 (03990).  "World Wide Military Command
and Control System (WWMCCS) Afloat."  MCCDC (WF) Quantico, VA.
8.	MCO P1200.7K.  MOS MANUAL.  Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps, Washington, DC, 30 Apr 1991.
9.	JOPES Master Plan.  Chapter 4.  JOPES Project Group, Scott
AFB, IL, Dec 1991.
10.	Scally, SSgt D.  Interview by the author, 3 Apr 1992.  SSgt Scally
coordinates the assignment and management of the 9919 MOS at HQMC
(POC).
11.	Steele, Col M.  Force Structure Planning Group briefing.  Marine
Corps Command and Staff College. Nov 1991.
12.	Swain, Capt G. H.  Teleconference message 20, WIN teleconference
COPSLOG, of 29 Jan 1992.  Subject:  "PROPOSED CHANGES TO MARINE
CORPS USE OF WWMCCS."  Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (CCT),
Washington, DC.
13.	USCINCLANT.  Teleconference message 28, WIN teleconference
VER4, of 25 Feb 1992.  Subject:  "JOPES USER EVALUATION."
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (CCT), Washington, DC.
14.	U.S. Marine Corps.  CG I MEF.  Message 131631Z MAR 92.
Subject:   "PROPOSED CHANGES TO MARINE CORPS USE OF
WWMCCS."   Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps  (CCT) Washington,
DC.
15.	U.S. Marine Corps.  CG II MEF.  Teleconference message 49,
WIN teleconference MCOPSLOG, of 29 Feb 1992.  Subject:  "JOPES
USER EVALUATION."  Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (CCT),
Washington, DC.
16.	U.S. Marine Corps.  Headquarters.  C4I2 decision paper of 10 Jan
1992.  Subject:  "SHF SATCOM C2 CAPABILITY ABOARD AMPHIBIOUS
FLAGSHIPS (1992-95)."   Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (CCT),
Washington, DC.
17.	U.S. Marine Corps.   Headquarters.   C4I2 Memorandum of Agreement
between CNO, Navy Space Systems Division, and HQMC, C4I2 Department.
Subject:  "TEMPORARY LOAN OF MARINE CORPS GMF SATCOM
EQUIPMENT (AN/TSC-93B) TO THE NAVY FOR INSTALLATION ON AMPHIBIOUS
FLAG SHIPS."   Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps  (CCT-611),
Washington, DC.
18.	U.S. Marine Corps.   Headquarters.   PP&0 comment POR-13 of 10 Jan
1992 on C4I2 r/s dated 7 Jan 1992.  Subject:  "SHF SATCOM C2 CAPABILITY
ABOARD AMPHIBIOUS FLAG SHIPS (1992-95)."  Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps (PP&O) , Washington, DC.
19.	U.S. Marine Corps.  HQ FMFEUR Designate.  Teleconference message
52, WIN teleconference MCOPSLOG, of 28 Feb 1992.  Subj:  "PROPOSED
CHANGES TO THE WAY THE MARINE CORPS USES WWMCCS."
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (CCT) , Washington, DC.
20.	Vermillion, LtCol T.L.  Interview by the author, 20 March 1992.  LtCol
Vermillion participated in the deployment planning for 4th MEB during Desert
Shield.
21.	"WWMCCS Workstation Program Management Review 14-15
November 1991."  Honeywell Federal Systems,  Inc., briefing slides.
Files of Capt G. H. Swain.  Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (CCT),
Washington, DC.



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