Joint Force Air Component Commander: The Joint Air Control Cold War Rages On
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Joint Force Air Component Commander:
The Joint Air Control Cold War Rages On
Author: Major D. R. Motz, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: The increased importance of joint doctrine and the
evolving role and authority of the Joint Force Air Component
Commander (JFACC) has served to increase concern that the
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander will lose
control of fixed-wing aviation assets that are vital to his
combat effectiveness.
Background: To fully comprehend concerns about Marine
aviation's responsiveness to the needs of Marine ground
forces in joint operations, it is useful to first understand
the evolution and divergence of Air Force and Marine Corps
doctrine for the employment of air power. The Goldwater-
Nichols Department of Defence Reorganization Act of 1986
greatly increased the importance of joint doctrine to the
extent that its importance has sometimes exceeded that of
individual service doctrine in providing the political
justification for service programs and force structure.
Consequently, the process of developing joint doctrine has
frequently become a battleground of service ideology.
This work examines the controversy surrounding the
doctrinal role, functions, and authority of the JFACC in
sustained joint operations ashore. The process begins with
an examination of the historical basis for Air Force and
Marine Corps aviation doctrine. The doctrinal evolution of
the JFACC will be traced and the functioning of the JFACC in
the Persian Gulf war will be evaluated from the Marine Corps
perspective.
Recommendation: The Marine Corps should take a more active
role in further refinement of joint air control doctrine.
Additionally, the Marine Corps must take steps to update its
aviatian doctrine and invest in the doctrinal development,
training and equipment necessary to more effectively
contribute to joint force operations.
JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER:
THE JOINT AIR CONTROL COLD WAR RAGES ON
OUTLINE
The role, functions, and authority of the Joint Force
Air Component Commander (JFACC) continues to be an area
where the Air Force and Marine Corps sharply disagree. The
controversy centers around the Air Force preference to view
the JFACC as having operational control (OPCON) of all
theater tactical air assets. The Marine Corps view is that
the JFACC should function as a coordinator of joint air
assets, with OPCON remaining with the individual component
commanders.
I. Historical Perspective of the Employment of Air Power
A. North Africa 1942
B. Vietnam experience: the "single manager" concept
II. Service Doctrinal Evolution
A. Marine Corps Aviation Doctrine
B. Air Force Doctrine
C. Joint Air Control Doctrine
III. Joint Doctrinal Development
A. JFACC Doctrine
B. JFACC at War
IV. JFACC Deficiencies
A. "Purple" JFACC proposal
B. ATO process
C. Airspace management
V. Conclusion
JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER:
THE JOINT AIR CONTROL COLD WAR RAGES ON
"B9Z this is X4Q, we are in contact with an enemy tank
column and are under heavy fire! I need air support now.
What can you do for me? Over."
"X4Q this is B9Z, my air request net to the joint force
TACC is saturated, how long can you hold on? Over."
A situation such as this would be tragic for the Marine
riflemen on the ground and the forward air controller who
could not supply critically needed air support. Could a
situation like this arise in the future with the continued
centralization of control authority over air power at the
Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) level? What can
the Marine Corps do to ensure that the Marine Air Ground
Task Force (MAGTF) commander can obtain air support when and
where he needs it? This work examines the controversy
surrounding the doctrinal role, functions, and authority of
the JFACC in sustained joint operations ashore.
In order to fully comprehend the concerns about Marine
Aviation not being responsive to the needs of the Marine
ground forces in joint operations, it is useful to first
understand the evolution and divergence of Air Force and
Marine Corps doctrine for the employment of air power. The
focus will then shift to the growing importance of joint
doctrine, and how the process of drafting joint doctrine
frequently becomes the battleground of service ideology.
The doctrinal evolution of the JFACC will be traced, and the
functioning of the JFACC in the Persian Gulf War will be
evaluated from the Marine Corps perspective. The work will
conclude with an analysis of deficiencies in Marine Corps
aviation doctrine and review current service initiatives
that are underway to ensure that the Joint Force Commander
is able to make optimal use of all the service components he
has available.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIR POWER
The historical controversy concerning the best methods
by which air support is provided to ground forces is
extensive. The debate originated during the 1943 North
African campaigns to defeat German forces. A memorandum
from Colonel Henry V. Dexter, Operations Officer of the 2d
Armored Division, to U. S. Army Headquarters, reported on
the responsiveness of air power to the ground commander.
Colonel Dexter summarized his views of the centralized and
decentralized methods for providing air support for ground
units, and brought to light a dilemma, which is as true
today as it was in 1943. In referring to the theories of
centralized versus decentralized control, Colonel Dexter
wrote:
Both (theories) are correct, . . . (but must be)
reconciled by the intermittent nature of ground
action. When a ground unit is launched in a major
attack, it needs and should have direct close air
support for such (an) attack. . . . In the period
between major attacks, during which ground forces are
relatively inactive, the Air can be employed more
effectively under centralized control; and by
directing [its] major effort toward an air war against
the enemy air and his ground installations. (5:43)
Despite its age, this statement remains an accurate
description of the advantages and disadvantages of both the
centralized and the decentralized control of air power.
From Colonel Dexter's statement, one could logically state
that the preferred method of control of air power is
dependent upon the mission that is assigned to the aviation
element.
The Marine Corps has exhibited a certain degree of
paranoia over losing control of its fixed-wing aviation
assets. To a large degree, this condition is justified, as
operational control of Marine aviation assets has been lost
by Marine commanders on several occasions in recent history.
Marine commanders have not forgotten the Korean War, in
which the Ist Marine Aircraft Wing was placed under
operational control of the Air Force resulting in poor close
air support for the Ist Marine Division.
In Vietnam, the "single manager" concept caused Marine
commanders significant concern over losing control of their
fixed wing squadrons. Compromise on this issue was
eventually achieved, but not without significant hard
feelings between Air Force and Marine Corps leadership.
Several different command relationships were attempted. The
best compromise arrangement had the Air Force retain its
coordination authority for all fixed wing assets, with III
Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) retaining operational control
of Marine aviation. However, the ground commanders were
still not completely satisfied with the close air support
systems that resulted. (12:152) This conflict between Air
Force and Marine Corps doctrine for the employment and
control of air power in sustained operations ashore, became
one of many reasons for the development of a more
institutionalized joint war-fighting structure. The
requirement for strong Joint doctrine has become necessary
to eliminate the disruptive effects of inter-service
competition which have occurred from World War II to Desert
One.
MARINE CORPS AVIATION DOCTRINE
Since its beginnings during World War I, the existence
of the Marine Corps' air element has been justified in terms
of its value in supporting ground operations. Alfred A.
Cunningham, the first Marine Corps aviator, defined the
rationale for Marines flying aircraft in a statement that
may hold more substance for Marines than for other services.
He wrote:
The only excuse for aviation in any service is its
usefulness in assisting troops on the ground to
successfully carry out their operations. (6: 1)
Today, Marine Corps aviation assets have one primary
purpose, that of supporting the Marine rifleman on the
ground. However, close air support is but one type of
offensive air support, and offensive air support is only one
of six different functions of Marine Corps aviation. The
six functions of Marine aviation, although not all directly
supporting the Marine rifleman on the ground, provide a
highly effective aviation combat arm, capable of meeting all
the requirements of a landing force.
The primary mission of Marine Corps aviation is:
". . . to participate as the supporting air component of the
FMF in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases and
for conduct of such land operations as may be essential to
the prosecution of a naval campaign." (6:5) In support of
this mission, Marine Corps aviation doctrine has evolved and
specialized to provide aviation support of amphibious forces
throughout an assault and subsequent land operations. The
Marine Corps considers organic Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) aviation to be a supporting arm in operations, where
the ground battle is paramount.
Due to the Marine Corps' expeditionary nature, and the
resulting paucity of heavy artillery and armored assets, the
MAGTF has come to depend on its organic aviation element to
provide the needed firepower. The Marine Corps' focus on
air support, in close proximity to Marine ground forces
engaged with the enemy, is what differentiates the Marine
air power perspective from that of the Air Force. Marine
aviation is organized, equipped, and trained to be the
aviation combat element (ACE) of a MAGTF that is immediately
responsive to the needs of the MAGTF ground combat element
(GCE) commander. The directly available, integrated
employment of MAGTF aviation is designed to offset the MAGTF
GCE's relatively light organic fire support.
To provide a direct resource of air power for the
ground combat element, the Marine Corps has developed
aviation command and control agencies and procedures that
maximize responsiveness and flexibility. The fundamental
concept of employment of this control system and Marine
aviation in general: ". . . permits centralized coordination
and supervision of air operations at the highest level,
while incorporating decentralization of control authority to
subordinate agencies. " (6:47)
U. S. AIR FORCE DOCTRINE
The evolution of Air Force doctrine has had two
distinguishable periods.
Prior to 1947, the Air Corps was part of the U. S.
Army. Under close control and scrutiny of the Army, early
Air Corps doctrine was focused on providing support directly
to ground forces. The 1926 doctrinal manual stated that air
elements were controlled by Army commanders, who decided how
aircraft would be employed. (1:A-2) During the 1930s , the
expanding capabilities of aircraft combined with new mission
capabilities, resulted in the development of somewhat
revolutionary doctrinal concepts that envisioned air
elements, as independent and equal to land and sea forces.
Development of this "independent" thinking was suppressed by
the Army, however, the General Headquarters of the Army Air
Corps made slow but sure progress toward the establishment
of an independent Air Force.
As a result of American air lessons learned in North
Africa, and growing political pressure exerted on the War
Department, a new Air Force Doctrine, FM 100-20, Command and
Employment of Air Power, came into being on 21 July 1943.
This document was the first to state that land and air power
were coequal and interdependent. Additionally, the manual
asserted that air power must be centrally controlled in
order to exploit its flexibility and ability to be
concentrated to win a battle. (1:A-3)
In the ensuing forty years since the official Air Force
independence in 1947, the number of Air Force missions has
expanded dramatically. However, the fundamentals of current
Air Force doctrine remain largely unchanged:
Airpower can exploit speed, range, and flexibility,
better than land and sea forces, and therefore, it must
be allowed to operate independently of these forces.
These characteristics are most fully realized when air
power is controlled centrally but executed decentrally.
(1: A-6)
Modern Air Force doctrine focuses on the larger air
battle with a subset thereof, the provision of close air
support to land battle formations. For the Air Force, the
air battle takes precedence over that of ground combat.
The Air Force contention is that centralized management of
all air assets, enables the commander to shift the weight of
air power throughout the entire theater, and that tactical
air assets -- of whatever service component -- are national
assets) to be placed under centralized control.
JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defence
Reorganization Act of 1986, has done much to increase the
importance of joint operations and service inter-
operability. The Act identifies the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff as the principle military advisor to the
President. The increased powers of the Chairman, and the
consolidation of command and control of the armed forces,
through the unified and specified combatant commands, has
greatly increased the importance of the body of joint
doctrine.
The creation and revision of joint doctrine can serve
two purposes, only one of which will assist the Joint Force
Commander (JFC) win the next war. The only valid purpose of
joint doctrinal development and revision is to improve the
organizational structure and functioning of joint forces.
It aims to improve efficiency and create an environment that
allows each component to contribute optimally in attaining
the JFC's objectives.
A secondary purpose of joint doctrine is one not
directly related to winning a war. It is, however, one that
may become primary to many inside the capitol beltway. In
this environment, joint doctrine becomes a primary
justification for the sustainment or strengthening of
service force structure and procurement programs. In an era
of shrinking budgets, this purpose takes on additional
utility. In light of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the
ability of services to participate in joint/combined
operations will become increasingly important in budgetary
terms. Those who do "joint" well may be the survivors.
Those that choose not to participate, or who compete poorly
on the joint/combined playing field, may become budgetary
casualties. Both of these motivations should be kept in
mind when studying the evolution of joint air control
doctrine.
Much of the conflict between Air Force and Marine Corps
doctrine for the control of air power can be attributed to
the scope of the Air Force mission in comparison to that of
the Marine Corps. To say that the doctrine of one service
is better than that of another is improper. (Except when
each service is competing for limited budgetary resources. )
The two services have tailored their doctrines to best
support accomplishment of their vastly different missions.
JFACC DOCTRINE
The doctrinal concept of the JFACC evolved from an Air
Force concept called the Air Component Commander (ACC). The
ACC concept provided an option for the JFC to organize and
control air assets which would not necessarily be assigned
to the Air Force Component Commander. The ACC concept was
not looked upon favorably by either the Navy or the Marine
Corps. However, in an effort to improve joint war-fighting
capability and to package the ACC concept in more palatable
terminology, the term Joint Force Air Component Commander
(JFACC) was introduced to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
through the "tank. " (9:2) The JFACC was originally
developed by USCINCEUR as a coordination agency that would
recognize the full authority and flexibility of the JFC to
organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission.
The JCS approval of this concept first occurred in JCS
Publication 26 and it ". . . recognized that the JFC may
designate a JFACC to coordinate the joint air operations
campaign. " (9:2)
The most current description of the role and function
of the JFACC is found in JCS Publication 1-02:
The JFACC derives his authority from the JFC who has
the authority to exercise operational control, assign
missions, direct coordination among his subordinates
commanders, redirect and organize his forces to ensure
unity of effort in the accomplishment of his overall
mission. The JFC will normally designate a JFACC. The
JFACC's responsibilities will be assigned by the JFC
(normally these would include, but not be limited to,
planning, coordination, allocation and tasking based on
the JFC's decision). Using the JFC's guidance and
authority, and in coordination with the other service
component commanders, the JFACC will recommend to the
JFC apportionment of air sorties to various missions or
geographic areas. (8:123)
This definition clearly states that the JFC is the only
one that has OPCON of joint force aviation assets.
Marine Corps concerns over the JFACC and its function
as the centralized "controller" of joint force aviation were
mitigated by the JCS issuance of the "1986 Omnibus Agreement
for Command and Control of USMC TACAIR in Sustained
Operations Ashore," which states:
The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander will
retain operational control of his organic air assets.
The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is
the support of the MAGTF ground element. During joint
operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in
support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF commander will
make sorties available to the JFC, for tasking through
his air Component commander, for air defense, long-
range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance.
Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements
will be provided to the JFC for tasking through the air
Component Commander for the support of other components
of the joint force, or of the joint force as a whole.
(2:2)
This statement has done much to endorse the integrity of the
MAGTF and to reaffirm that Marine aviation will always be
foremost in support of the MAGTF ground element. However,
the Omnibus Agreement has not completely laid to rest the
controversy between the Air Force and Marine Corps. In a
memorandum to the Director of the MAGTF Warfighting Center,
Colonel R. W. Gaskin, former Air Force action officer who
drafted major portions of joint doctrine in 1985 and 1986,
documented Air Force objection to the Marine Corps' view of
the joint battlefield. It seems to have a practical, as
well as parochial basis:
. . . the Air Force (will) always have a problem with
the notion that within any theater of operations, a
USMC "Zone of Operations" be carved out for a separate
USMC war, producing, in effect, a mini-JFC. . . . .
While no one would question the need for a specific AOR
during the actual amphibious or insertion phase, it may
be less certain that the USMC AOR need be continued
once USMC forces have been integrated into a larger
scheme of operations in which Army forces and Air Force
forces greatly outnumber those of the MAGTF commander.
I am sure the USMC has a problem with some Air Force
commander penciling in USMC tail numbers on his
scheduling board. But common sense must prevail when
we all recognize that each scenario may be quite
different, and that the JFC must organize to fight
based on the strategic situation at hand. (7:2)
While the force employment philosophies and individual
doctrines of the two services differ, joint doctrine should
attempt to accommodate employment of service components,
consistent with their designed warfighting capabilities and
in a manner designed to exploit those capabilities.
However, on the subject of the JFC having the final
authority to organize the way he sees fit, both the Air
Force and the Marine Corps are in agreement. In his White
Letter No. 4-86, the Marine Corps Commandant, General P. X.
Kelley leaves little doubt about his feelings concerning the
employment of Marine aviation in a joint environment:
The bottom line is that the Joint Force Commander is in
charge. If he personalIy believes that he has higher
priority missions for any, repeat any, Marine TACAIR,
he has the authority to utilize them as he sees fit.
(10: 1)
The establishment of the Joint Force Air Component
Commander (JFACC), as the Joint Force Commander's manager of
air power, has served to renew the conflict between the Air
Force and the Marine Corps. The evolution of the JFACC's
doctrinal role toward a centralized manager, rather than a
coordinator of tactical air assets, has been viewed with
great concern by the Marines as an Air Force attempt to
establish control of Marine tactical air in the joint
theater. These concerns were recently heightened, as the
Air Force authored Title V report to Congress attributes
much of the success of the air campaign in the Persian Gulf
to the JFACC. It states:
An important precept underlying the air campaign was
the importance of overall synchronization of air
assets. To maximize air power's flexibility and
striking power it must be integrated and coordinated
under a central air commander. . . . The problem of
fragmented command of air operations was solved when
CINCCENT assigned the Commander of the Air Force
component, COMCENTAF as the JFACC. (4:2)
JFACC AT WAR
The war in the Persian Gulf has provided us with many
lessons about air doctrine in general, and the strengths and
weaknesses of the JFACC concept. However, as with any war,
caution must be used in drawing conclusions that may not be
applicable to subsequent operations.
Desert Storm was a unique operation that highly favored
the employment and success of air power. This was also the
first practical test of the JFACC concept for command and
control of joint/combined aviation forces. The success of
the concept was beyond expectation as the JFACC ". . .
synchronized the efforts of over 2,700 Coalition aircraft,
representing 12 separate national or service components."
(4:3)
In Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Air Force service
component commander (USCENTAF), was designated as JFACC.
The JFACC, under the authority of USCINCCENT, had the
responsibility for overall air operations in the CENCOM Area
of Responsibility (AOR). Specific JFACC responsibilities
included mission planning, mission tasking, targeting, and
airspace control measures. The JFACC in the gulf war was
very much an Air Force show and they were far better
prepared for war on a large scale than any other service
components. The JFACC was manned and staffed by CENTAF
personnel, with liaison augmentation from other services and
allied nations. Army, Navy, and Marine liaison personnel
were junior in rank, untrained, and acted as
service/component representatives, not as part of a joint
organization. The predominantly single service staffing
resulted in an air operation that had a decidedly strategic
focus, even as ground operations neared.
The key element that drove all aspects of the JFACC's
air campaign was known as the Master Attack Plan (MAP). The
MAP was a document in which Air Force planners" . . .
identified the critical elements or centers of gravity of
the enemy which, if effectively attacked, would result in
achieving the President's stated objectives." (4:3) After
these critical elements were identified they were targeted.
The JFACC's targeting decisions were based on " . . .
strategic objectives, CINCCENT guidance, target priorities,
the desired effect on each target, a synthesis of the latest
multisource intelligence and analysis, operational factors
such as weather, the threat, and the availability and
suitability of strike assets." (4 : 3 )
The ATO planning process was a lengthy staffing process
based on a 72 hour cycle. The process began with guidance
for adjustment to the air campaign plan made by CINCCENT,
and ended with a complete ATO being received by the
participating aviation elements. On any given day of the
air campaign, three separate wars were conducted -- the
execution of today's ATO, the planning and staffing of the
next day's war, and the MAP for the third day's war.
The JFACC's primary means of tasking Coalition air
power was through the Air Tasking Order (ATO). The ATO was
the daily schedule that provided the details and
coordination necessary for Coalition aircrews to execute the
MAP. Because of the extremely large number of aircraft
missions involved, and the special instructions that were
necessary to coordinate these missions, the daily ATO was a
very large document, frequently exceeding more than 750
pages in length. (4:7) Dissemination of the ATO was
accomplished through an Air Force computer network called
the Computer-Aided Force Management System (CAFMS).
Terminals were provided for the Third Marine Aircraft Wing
at the Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) that allowed
direct access to CAFMS. The transmission of the ATO itself
was a lengthy process that took roughly 6 hours to
accomplish via the CAFMS network.
Another function assumed by the JFACC during the
Persian Gulf War was that of Airspace Control Authority
(ACA). As ACA, COMUSCENTAF coordinated the planning and
operation of the joint airspace control system. Through
this system, the MARCENT commander was allocated his own
tactical operations area (TOA), which included the airspace
overlying the MEF's AOR, between the fire support
coordination line (FSCL) and the rear area. This division
of airspace provided MARCENT with flexibility inside the
TOA, but presented some coordination difficulties when the
MEF commander wanted to attack mobile enemy targets just
beyond the FSCL that had a direct influence on MARCENT
operations.
JFACC DEFICIENCIES
The overall success of the JFACC in managing the air
campaign is legendary, but the concept has many deficiencies
that should be corrected. However, this critical review of
JFACC deficiencies does much to expose deficiencies in
Marine aviation doctrine that must be addressed if the
Marine Corps is to contribute to joint operations in the
future. This section will identify some major deficiencies
and trace the "workarounds" that were developed by MARCENT
personnel to minimize the effects of these deficiencies.
One of the most significant Marine Corps' criticisms of
the JFACC in Desert Storm was that the JFACC was reluctant
to shift phases of the war from strategic targeting to
battlefield preparation. Such criticism would be in keeping
with the Air Force philosophy of employment of air power as
a strategic force. The same could also be said about the
Army commanders, who expressed a similar concern about the
strategic focus of the air campaign. This viewpoint was
emphasized in an I MEF response to a USCENTCOM inquiry on
how components should integrate into the JFACC in future
joint operations and exercises. The I MEF response states:
The problem of not having a truly joint structure for
targeting and apportionment is that the strategic views
become the order of the day at the expense of the
tactical . . . . . A strictly Air force view failed
to adjust the tactical targets vis-a-vis strategic
until driven to it by the MARCENT insistence that we
would fly a preponderance of our sorties for
battlefield shaping as G-Day approached. (3:1)
A possible solution to this problem mentioned in the I
MEF message, is the establishment of a "purple" JFACC, that
would be manned by a broad spectrum of personnel from all
major service components that make up joint force aviation
assets. Such a proposal now exists and is being refined by
USCINCLANT. The "purple" JFACC would function as a staff
element for the Joint Force Commander, in contrast with the
current arrangement, where the JFACC doubles as a component
commander. The concept's major objective is that of
ensuring that the "purple" JFACC has full service
integration through a joint staff, not a component
commander. (3: 2)
Under current joint doctrine, when forces of similar
size to those in Desert Storm must operate together,
targeting and tasking of joint force airpower will most
likely be subject to a decidedly Air Force strategic view
that may be far removed from the battlefield. One reason
for this is that the Air Force is the only service that has
the personnel and equipment to efficiently manage a military
operation the size of Desert Storm. For this reason, the
"purple" JFACC proposal somewhat ignores the fact that the
Air Force has already developed systems, staffs, and a great
deal of expertise in managing an air campaign on the scale
of Desert Storm. However, getting a broader representation
on the JFACC staff would provide better service component
representation on critical targeting and airspace control
issues.
Another JFACC issue that drew significant Marine Corps
criticism was the unresponsive nature of the ATO process
that drove Coalition air operations. Because of the
inability to change or add missions to the ATO, MARCENT Air
Combat Element (ACE) developed what came to be known as
"workarounds." Examples of these Marine solutions to an ATO
process that lacked flexibility are discussed in the Center
for Naval Analyses report of Third Marine Air Wing (MAW)
operations. It states:
The simplest workaround was deliberately overbooking
the ATO, that is, scheduling sorties with the intention
of cancelling the sorties if they were not needed.
Another technique used by Third MAW was deliberately
scheduling two MEF packages with almost the same time-
on-targets. If a valuable target of opportunity was
noted during the first mission, the second group could
be diverted to that target. In general, Third MAW
attempted to write generic strike packages into the
schedule rather than target-specific packages, all in
an attempt to retain flexibility. (11:13)
The Third MAW "workarounds" were constructed to
minimize the effects of the 72 hour ATO planning cycle.
Targets of interest to Marine planners tended to be highly
mobile. The fleeting nature of these targets made the short
response time of MEF aviation critically important. During
ground operations, the battlefield situation in the Marine
AOR changed at a faster pace than the intelligence, bomb
damage assessment, and targeting cycles.
Conflict arose between JFACC and MARCENT as to how
airspace lying beyond the FSCL would be managed. JFACC, and
Air Force doctrine in general, view the FSCL as a
restrictive control measure: all aircraft and ordnance used
beyond the FSCL must be coordinated and approved by the
JFACC. In contrast, the Marine Corps views the FSCL as a
non-restrictive fire control measure where supporting fires
may be used within the commander's AOR in a responsive
manner without coordination of approval by the JFACC. The
Center for Naval Analyses review of Third MAW operations
commented:
The issue was important to MARCENT because a
requirement to coordinate Marine Air with JFACC during
the ground offensive could introduce tactically
significant delays in providing fire support to rapidly
moving Marine ground forces. (11:35)
This disagreement in doctrinal view of the area forward of
the FSCL was never resolved, and lead to significant
confusion in the control of airspace beyond the FSCL. JFACC
retained control of this airspace despite the fact that the
vast majority of air support forward of the MARCENT FSCL was
provided by Marine air. Resolution of this issue and
standardization of joint air control procedures beyond the
FSCL are critically important in maintaining the
responsiveness of Marine air.
CONCLUSION
Whether the threat to control of Marine aviation is
real or imagined, certain actions should be taken by the
Marine Corps that will protect Marine aviation for the GCE,
and improve the efficiency of the Joint Force Commander's
tactical air power.
Regardless of Marine Corps preferences, joint
operations and the JFACC are here to stay. The issue of
whether the JFACC's authority is that of a commander or a
coordinator is one that is not likely to be resolved soon.
How the JFACC will function in the future is an issue that
is still being developed.
To date, the development of joint doctrine concerning
the role and functioning of the JFACC has been primarily
driven by the Air Force. In order to effect this portion of
joint doctrine, the Marine Corps must reverse its reactive
posture and take an active role in shaping the joint
doctrine. The "purple" JFACC initiative is one such effort
that deserves full Marine Corps endorsement and
participation.
In summary, the Marine Corps must focus on becoming
part of the solution rather than an obstacle to progress.
An aggressive Marine Corps program to develope a workable
concept for employment of the JFACC is the only means
possible to ensure that the Marine ground commander will
have responsive and timely air support that is vital to his
success. However, the Marine Corps must first revitalize
its aviation doctrine from its current 1979 vintage. The
Marine's aviation doctrine needs to address joint/combined
force operations far more extensively then it does now. The
lessons of joint air operations in Desert Storm should serve
as the wake up call to Marine aviation. The days of the
Marine Corps going it alone are memories of the past.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. AFM-1, Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air
Force. Washington, DC, 1984.
2. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Message "Joint
Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations. 4 March 1986.
3. Commanding General, I MEF. Message "Command and
Control for Joint Air Operations." 13 December 1991.
4. "Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict.", Title V Report,
Volume I. January 1992.
5. Dexter, Colonel Henry V. Memorandum published by
Proceedings, Washington, DC: December 1990.
6. FMFM 5-1, Marine Aviation. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps
Development and Education Command, 1979.
7. Gaskin, Colonel Robert W. Memorandum to Deputy
Commander for Warfighting. Not dated.
8. JCS Publication 1-02, The DoD Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms. Washington, DC: 1991.
9. JCS Publication 26. Washington, DC: 1985.
10. Kelley, General P. X. White Letter No. 4-86. 18 March
1986.
11. "Marine Corps Desert Storm Reconstruction Report, Volume
III: Third Marine Aircraft Wing Operations." Center for Naval Analyses.
Alexanderia, VA. October 1991.
12. U. S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup,
1965. Washington, DC: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1978.
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