Joint Force Air Component Commander: The Joint Air Control Cold War Rages On CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Joint Force Air Component Commander: The Joint Air Control Cold War Rages On Author: Major D. R. Motz, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The increased importance of joint doctrine and the evolving role and authority of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) has served to increase concern that the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander will lose control of fixed-wing aviation assets that are vital to his combat effectiveness. Background: To fully comprehend concerns about Marine aviation's responsiveness to the needs of Marine ground forces in joint operations, it is useful to first understand the evolution and divergence of Air Force and Marine Corps doctrine for the employment of air power. The Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defence Reorganization Act of 1986 greatly increased the importance of joint doctrine to the extent that its importance has sometimes exceeded that of individual service doctrine in providing the political justification for service programs and force structure. Consequently, the process of developing joint doctrine has frequently become a battleground of service ideology. This work examines the controversy surrounding the doctrinal role, functions, and authority of the JFACC in sustained joint operations ashore. The process begins with an examination of the historical basis for Air Force and Marine Corps aviation doctrine. The doctrinal evolution of the JFACC will be traced and the functioning of the JFACC in the Persian Gulf war will be evaluated from the Marine Corps perspective. Recommendation: The Marine Corps should take a more active role in further refinement of joint air control doctrine. Additionally, the Marine Corps must take steps to update its aviatian doctrine and invest in the doctrinal development, training and equipment necessary to more effectively contribute to joint force operations. JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER: THE JOINT AIR CONTROL COLD WAR RAGES ON OUTLINE The role, functions, and authority of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) continues to be an area where the Air Force and Marine Corps sharply disagree. The controversy centers around the Air Force preference to view the JFACC as having operational control (OPCON) of all theater tactical air assets. The Marine Corps view is that the JFACC should function as a coordinator of joint air assets, with OPCON remaining with the individual component commanders. I. Historical Perspective of the Employment of Air Power A. North Africa 1942 B. Vietnam experience: the "single manager" concept II. Service Doctrinal Evolution A. Marine Corps Aviation Doctrine B. Air Force Doctrine C. Joint Air Control Doctrine III. Joint Doctrinal Development A. JFACC Doctrine B. JFACC at War IV. JFACC Deficiencies A. "Purple" JFACC proposal B. ATO process C. Airspace management V. Conclusion JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER: THE JOINT AIR CONTROL COLD WAR RAGES ON "B9Z this is X4Q, we are in contact with an enemy tank column and are under heavy fire! I need air support now. What can you do for me? Over." "X4Q this is B9Z, my air request net to the joint force TACC is saturated, how long can you hold on? Over." A situation such as this would be tragic for the Marine riflemen on the ground and the forward air controller who could not supply critically needed air support. Could a situation like this arise in the future with the continued centralization of control authority over air power at the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) level? What can the Marine Corps do to ensure that the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander can obtain air support when and where he needs it? This work examines the controversy surrounding the doctrinal role, functions, and authority of the JFACC in sustained joint operations ashore. In order to fully comprehend the concerns about Marine Aviation not being responsive to the needs of the Marine ground forces in joint operations, it is useful to first understand the evolution and divergence of Air Force and Marine Corps doctrine for the employment of air power. The focus will then shift to the growing importance of joint doctrine, and how the process of drafting joint doctrine frequently becomes the battleground of service ideology. The doctrinal evolution of the JFACC will be traced, and the functioning of the JFACC in the Persian Gulf War will be evaluated from the Marine Corps perspective. The work will conclude with an analysis of deficiencies in Marine Corps aviation doctrine and review current service initiatives that are underway to ensure that the Joint Force Commander is able to make optimal use of all the service components he has available. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIR POWER The historical controversy concerning the best methods by which air support is provided to ground forces is extensive. The debate originated during the 1943 North African campaigns to defeat German forces. A memorandum from Colonel Henry V. Dexter, Operations Officer of the 2d Armored Division, to U. S. Army Headquarters, reported on the responsiveness of air power to the ground commander. Colonel Dexter summarized his views of the centralized and decentralized methods for providing air support for ground units, and brought to light a dilemma, which is as true today as it was in 1943. In referring to the theories of centralized versus decentralized control, Colonel Dexter wrote: Both (theories) are correct, . . . (but must be) reconciled by the intermittent nature of ground action. When a ground unit is launched in a major attack, it needs and should have direct close air support for such (an) attack. . . . In the period between major attacks, during which ground forces are relatively inactive, the Air can be employed more effectively under centralized control; and by directing [its] major effort toward an air war against the enemy air and his ground installations. (5:43) Despite its age, this statement remains an accurate description of the advantages and disadvantages of both the centralized and the decentralized control of air power. From Colonel Dexter's statement, one could logically state that the preferred method of control of air power is dependent upon the mission that is assigned to the aviation element. The Marine Corps has exhibited a certain degree of paranoia over losing control of its fixed-wing aviation assets. To a large degree, this condition is justified, as operational control of Marine aviation assets has been lost by Marine commanders on several occasions in recent history. Marine commanders have not forgotten the Korean War, in which the Ist Marine Aircraft Wing was placed under operational control of the Air Force resulting in poor close air support for the Ist Marine Division. In Vietnam, the "single manager" concept caused Marine commanders significant concern over losing control of their fixed wing squadrons. Compromise on this issue was eventually achieved, but not without significant hard feelings between Air Force and Marine Corps leadership. Several different command relationships were attempted. The best compromise arrangement had the Air Force retain its coordination authority for all fixed wing assets, with III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) retaining operational control of Marine aviation. However, the ground commanders were still not completely satisfied with the close air support systems that resulted. (12:152) This conflict between Air Force and Marine Corps doctrine for the employment and control of air power in sustained operations ashore, became one of many reasons for the development of a more institutionalized joint war-fighting structure. The requirement for strong Joint doctrine has become necessary to eliminate the disruptive effects of inter-service competition which have occurred from World War II to Desert One. MARINE CORPS AVIATION DOCTRINE Since its beginnings during World War I, the existence of the Marine Corps' air element has been justified in terms of its value in supporting ground operations. Alfred A. Cunningham, the first Marine Corps aviator, defined the rationale for Marines flying aircraft in a statement that may hold more substance for Marines than for other services. He wrote: The only excuse for aviation in any service is its usefulness in assisting troops on the ground to successfully carry out their operations. (6: 1) Today, Marine Corps aviation assets have one primary purpose, that of supporting the Marine rifleman on the ground. However, close air support is but one type of offensive air support, and offensive air support is only one of six different functions of Marine Corps aviation. The six functions of Marine aviation, although not all directly supporting the Marine rifleman on the ground, provide a highly effective aviation combat arm, capable of meeting all the requirements of a landing force. The primary mission of Marine Corps aviation is: ". . . to participate as the supporting air component of the FMF in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases and for conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." (6:5) In support of this mission, Marine Corps aviation doctrine has evolved and specialized to provide aviation support of amphibious forces throughout an assault and subsequent land operations. The Marine Corps considers organic Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) aviation to be a supporting arm in operations, where the ground battle is paramount. Due to the Marine Corps' expeditionary nature, and the resulting paucity of heavy artillery and armored assets, the MAGTF has come to depend on its organic aviation element to provide the needed firepower. The Marine Corps' focus on air support, in close proximity to Marine ground forces engaged with the enemy, is what differentiates the Marine air power perspective from that of the Air Force. Marine aviation is organized, equipped, and trained to be the aviation combat element (ACE) of a MAGTF that is immediately responsive to the needs of the MAGTF ground combat element (GCE) commander. The directly available, integrated employment of MAGTF aviation is designed to offset the MAGTF GCE's relatively light organic fire support. To provide a direct resource of air power for the ground combat element, the Marine Corps has developed aviation command and control agencies and procedures that maximize responsiveness and flexibility. The fundamental concept of employment of this control system and Marine aviation in general: ". . . permits centralized coordination and supervision of air operations at the highest level, while incorporating decentralization of control authority to subordinate agencies. " (6:47) U. S. AIR FORCE DOCTRINE The evolution of Air Force doctrine has had two distinguishable periods. Prior to 1947, the Air Corps was part of the U. S. Army. Under close control and scrutiny of the Army, early Air Corps doctrine was focused on providing support directly to ground forces. The 1926 doctrinal manual stated that air elements were controlled by Army commanders, who decided how aircraft would be employed. (1:A-2) During the 1930s , the expanding capabilities of aircraft combined with new mission capabilities, resulted in the development of somewhat revolutionary doctrinal concepts that envisioned air elements, as independent and equal to land and sea forces. Development of this "independent" thinking was suppressed by the Army, however, the General Headquarters of the Army Air Corps made slow but sure progress toward the establishment of an independent Air Force. As a result of American air lessons learned in North Africa, and growing political pressure exerted on the War Department, a new Air Force Doctrine, FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, came into being on 21 July 1943. This document was the first to state that land and air power were coequal and interdependent. Additionally, the manual asserted that air power must be centrally controlled in order to exploit its flexibility and ability to be concentrated to win a battle. (1:A-3) In the ensuing forty years since the official Air Force independence in 1947, the number of Air Force missions has expanded dramatically. However, the fundamentals of current Air Force doctrine remain largely unchanged: Airpower can exploit speed, range, and flexibility, better than land and sea forces, and therefore, it must be allowed to operate independently of these forces. These characteristics are most fully realized when air power is controlled centrally but executed decentrally. (1: A-6) Modern Air Force doctrine focuses on the larger air battle with a subset thereof, the provision of close air support to land battle formations. For the Air Force, the air battle takes precedence over that of ground combat. The Air Force contention is that centralized management of all air assets, enables the commander to shift the weight of air power throughout the entire theater, and that tactical air assets -- of whatever service component -- are national assets) to be placed under centralized control. JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defence Reorganization Act of 1986, has done much to increase the importance of joint operations and service inter- operability. The Act identifies the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principle military advisor to the President. The increased powers of the Chairman, and the consolidation of command and control of the armed forces, through the unified and specified combatant commands, has greatly increased the importance of the body of joint doctrine. The creation and revision of joint doctrine can serve two purposes, only one of which will assist the Joint Force Commander (JFC) win the next war. The only valid purpose of joint doctrinal development and revision is to improve the organizational structure and functioning of joint forces. It aims to improve efficiency and create an environment that allows each component to contribute optimally in attaining the JFC's objectives. A secondary purpose of joint doctrine is one not directly related to winning a war. It is, however, one that may become primary to many inside the capitol beltway. In this environment, joint doctrine becomes a primary justification for the sustainment or strengthening of service force structure and procurement programs. In an era of shrinking budgets, this purpose takes on additional utility. In light of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the ability of services to participate in joint/combined operations will become increasingly important in budgetary terms. Those who do "joint" well may be the survivors. Those that choose not to participate, or who compete poorly on the joint/combined playing field, may become budgetary casualties. Both of these motivations should be kept in mind when studying the evolution of joint air control doctrine. Much of the conflict between Air Force and Marine Corps doctrine for the control of air power can be attributed to the scope of the Air Force mission in comparison to that of the Marine Corps. To say that the doctrine of one service is better than that of another is improper. (Except when each service is competing for limited budgetary resources. ) The two services have tailored their doctrines to best support accomplishment of their vastly different missions. JFACC DOCTRINE The doctrinal concept of the JFACC evolved from an Air Force concept called the Air Component Commander (ACC). The ACC concept provided an option for the JFC to organize and control air assets which would not necessarily be assigned to the Air Force Component Commander. The ACC concept was not looked upon favorably by either the Navy or the Marine Corps. However, in an effort to improve joint war-fighting capability and to package the ACC concept in more palatable terminology, the term Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) was introduced to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) through the "tank. " (9:2) The JFACC was originally developed by USCINCEUR as a coordination agency that would recognize the full authority and flexibility of the JFC to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission. The JCS approval of this concept first occurred in JCS Publication 26 and it ". . . recognized that the JFC may designate a JFACC to coordinate the joint air operations campaign. " (9:2) The most current description of the role and function of the JFACC is found in JCS Publication 1-02: The JFACC derives his authority from the JFC who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among his subordinates commanders, redirect and organize his forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his overall mission. The JFC will normally designate a JFACC. The JFACC's responsibilities will be assigned by the JFC (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation and tasking based on the JFC's decision). Using the JFC's guidance and authority, and in coordination with the other service component commanders, the JFACC will recommend to the JFC apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. (8:123) This definition clearly states that the JFC is the only one that has OPCON of joint force aviation assets. Marine Corps concerns over the JFACC and its function as the centralized "controller" of joint force aviation were mitigated by the JCS issuance of the "1986 Omnibus Agreement for Command and Control of USMC TACAIR in Sustained Operations Ashore," which states: The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF commander will make sorties available to the JFC, for tasking through his air Component commander, for air defense, long- range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the JFC for tasking through the air Component Commander for the support of other components of the joint force, or of the joint force as a whole. (2:2) This statement has done much to endorse the integrity of the MAGTF and to reaffirm that Marine aviation will always be foremost in support of the MAGTF ground element. However, the Omnibus Agreement has not completely laid to rest the controversy between the Air Force and Marine Corps. In a memorandum to the Director of the MAGTF Warfighting Center, Colonel R. W. Gaskin, former Air Force action officer who drafted major portions of joint doctrine in 1985 and 1986, documented Air Force objection to the Marine Corps' view of the joint battlefield. It seems to have a practical, as well as parochial basis: . . . the Air Force (will) always have a problem with the notion that within any theater of operations, a USMC "Zone of Operations" be carved out for a separate USMC war, producing, in effect, a mini-JFC. . . . . While no one would question the need for a specific AOR during the actual amphibious or insertion phase, it may be less certain that the USMC AOR need be continued once USMC forces have been integrated into a larger scheme of operations in which Army forces and Air Force forces greatly outnumber those of the MAGTF commander. I am sure the USMC has a problem with some Air Force commander penciling in USMC tail numbers on his scheduling board. But common sense must prevail when we all recognize that each scenario may be quite different, and that the JFC must organize to fight based on the strategic situation at hand. (7:2) While the force employment philosophies and individual doctrines of the two services differ, joint doctrine should attempt to accommodate employment of service components, consistent with their designed warfighting capabilities and in a manner designed to exploit those capabilities. However, on the subject of the JFC having the final authority to organize the way he sees fit, both the Air Force and the Marine Corps are in agreement. In his White Letter No. 4-86, the Marine Corps Commandant, General P. X. Kelley leaves little doubt about his feelings concerning the employment of Marine aviation in a joint environment: The bottom line is that the Joint Force Commander is in charge. If he personalIy believes that he has higher priority missions for any, repeat any, Marine TACAIR, he has the authority to utilize them as he sees fit. (10: 1) The establishment of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), as the Joint Force Commander's manager of air power, has served to renew the conflict between the Air Force and the Marine Corps. The evolution of the JFACC's doctrinal role toward a centralized manager, rather than a coordinator of tactical air assets, has been viewed with great concern by the Marines as an Air Force attempt to establish control of Marine tactical air in the joint theater. These concerns were recently heightened, as the Air Force authored Title V report to Congress attributes much of the success of the air campaign in the Persian Gulf to the JFACC. It states: An important precept underlying the air campaign was the importance of overall synchronization of air assets. To maximize air power's flexibility and striking power it must be integrated and coordinated under a central air commander. . . . The problem of fragmented command of air operations was solved when CINCCENT assigned the Commander of the Air Force component, COMCENTAF as the JFACC. (4:2) JFACC AT WAR The war in the Persian Gulf has provided us with many lessons about air doctrine in general, and the strengths and weaknesses of the JFACC concept. However, as with any war, caution must be used in drawing conclusions that may not be applicable to subsequent operations. Desert Storm was a unique operation that highly favored the employment and success of air power. This was also the first practical test of the JFACC concept for command and control of joint/combined aviation forces. The success of the concept was beyond expectation as the JFACC ". . . synchronized the efforts of over 2,700 Coalition aircraft, representing 12 separate national or service components." (4:3) In Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Air Force service component commander (USCENTAF), was designated as JFACC. The JFACC, under the authority of USCINCCENT, had the responsibility for overall air operations in the CENCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). Specific JFACC responsibilities included mission planning, mission tasking, targeting, and airspace control measures. The JFACC in the gulf war was very much an Air Force show and they were far better prepared for war on a large scale than any other service components. The JFACC was manned and staffed by CENTAF personnel, with liaison augmentation from other services and allied nations. Army, Navy, and Marine liaison personnel were junior in rank, untrained, and acted as service/component representatives, not as part of a joint organization. The predominantly single service staffing resulted in an air operation that had a decidedly strategic focus, even as ground operations neared. The key element that drove all aspects of the JFACC's air campaign was known as the Master Attack Plan (MAP). The MAP was a document in which Air Force planners" . . . identified the critical elements or centers of gravity of the enemy which, if effectively attacked, would result in achieving the President's stated objectives." (4:3) After these critical elements were identified they were targeted. The JFACC's targeting decisions were based on " . . . strategic objectives, CINCCENT guidance, target priorities, the desired effect on each target, a synthesis of the latest multisource intelligence and analysis, operational factors such as weather, the threat, and the availability and suitability of strike assets." (4 : 3 ) The ATO planning process was a lengthy staffing process based on a 72 hour cycle. The process began with guidance for adjustment to the air campaign plan made by CINCCENT, and ended with a complete ATO being received by the participating aviation elements. On any given day of the air campaign, three separate wars were conducted -- the execution of today's ATO, the planning and staffing of the next day's war, and the MAP for the third day's war. The JFACC's primary means of tasking Coalition air power was through the Air Tasking Order (ATO). The ATO was the daily schedule that provided the details and coordination necessary for Coalition aircrews to execute the MAP. Because of the extremely large number of aircraft missions involved, and the special instructions that were necessary to coordinate these missions, the daily ATO was a very large document, frequently exceeding more than 750 pages in length. (4:7) Dissemination of the ATO was accomplished through an Air Force computer network called the Computer-Aided Force Management System (CAFMS). Terminals were provided for the Third Marine Aircraft Wing at the Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) that allowed direct access to CAFMS. The transmission of the ATO itself was a lengthy process that took roughly 6 hours to accomplish via the CAFMS network. Another function assumed by the JFACC during the Persian Gulf War was that of Airspace Control Authority (ACA). As ACA, COMUSCENTAF coordinated the planning and operation of the joint airspace control system. Through this system, the MARCENT commander was allocated his own tactical operations area (TOA), which included the airspace overlying the MEF's AOR, between the fire support coordination line (FSCL) and the rear area. This division of airspace provided MARCENT with flexibility inside the TOA, but presented some coordination difficulties when the MEF commander wanted to attack mobile enemy targets just beyond the FSCL that had a direct influence on MARCENT operations. JFACC DEFICIENCIES The overall success of the JFACC in managing the air campaign is legendary, but the concept has many deficiencies that should be corrected. However, this critical review of JFACC deficiencies does much to expose deficiencies in Marine aviation doctrine that must be addressed if the Marine Corps is to contribute to joint operations in the future. This section will identify some major deficiencies and trace the "workarounds" that were developed by MARCENT personnel to minimize the effects of these deficiencies. One of the most significant Marine Corps' criticisms of the JFACC in Desert Storm was that the JFACC was reluctant to shift phases of the war from strategic targeting to battlefield preparation. Such criticism would be in keeping with the Air Force philosophy of employment of air power as a strategic force. The same could also be said about the Army commanders, who expressed a similar concern about the strategic focus of the air campaign. This viewpoint was emphasized in an I MEF response to a USCENTCOM inquiry on how components should integrate into the JFACC in future joint operations and exercises. The I MEF response states: The problem of not having a truly joint structure for targeting and apportionment is that the strategic views become the order of the day at the expense of the tactical . . . . . A strictly Air force view failed to adjust the tactical targets vis-a-vis strategic until driven to it by the MARCENT insistence that we would fly a preponderance of our sorties for battlefield shaping as G-Day approached. (3:1) A possible solution to this problem mentioned in the I MEF message, is the establishment of a "purple" JFACC, that would be manned by a broad spectrum of personnel from all major service components that make up joint force aviation assets. Such a proposal now exists and is being refined by USCINCLANT. The "purple" JFACC would function as a staff element for the Joint Force Commander, in contrast with the current arrangement, where the JFACC doubles as a component commander. The concept's major objective is that of ensuring that the "purple" JFACC has full service integration through a joint staff, not a component commander. (3: 2) Under current joint doctrine, when forces of similar size to those in Desert Storm must operate together, targeting and tasking of joint force airpower will most likely be subject to a decidedly Air Force strategic view that may be far removed from the battlefield. One reason for this is that the Air Force is the only service that has the personnel and equipment to efficiently manage a military operation the size of Desert Storm. For this reason, the "purple" JFACC proposal somewhat ignores the fact that the Air Force has already developed systems, staffs, and a great deal of expertise in managing an air campaign on the scale of Desert Storm. However, getting a broader representation on the JFACC staff would provide better service component representation on critical targeting and airspace control issues. Another JFACC issue that drew significant Marine Corps criticism was the unresponsive nature of the ATO process that drove Coalition air operations. Because of the inability to change or add missions to the ATO, MARCENT Air Combat Element (ACE) developed what came to be known as "workarounds." Examples of these Marine solutions to an ATO process that lacked flexibility are discussed in the Center for Naval Analyses report of Third Marine Air Wing (MAW) operations. It states: The simplest workaround was deliberately overbooking the ATO, that is, scheduling sorties with the intention of cancelling the sorties if they were not needed. Another technique used by Third MAW was deliberately scheduling two MEF packages with almost the same time- on-targets. If a valuable target of opportunity was noted during the first mission, the second group could be diverted to that target. In general, Third MAW attempted to write generic strike packages into the schedule rather than target-specific packages, all in an attempt to retain flexibility. (11:13) The Third MAW "workarounds" were constructed to minimize the effects of the 72 hour ATO planning cycle. Targets of interest to Marine planners tended to be highly mobile. The fleeting nature of these targets made the short response time of MEF aviation critically important. During ground operations, the battlefield situation in the Marine AOR changed at a faster pace than the intelligence, bomb damage assessment, and targeting cycles. Conflict arose between JFACC and MARCENT as to how airspace lying beyond the FSCL would be managed. JFACC, and Air Force doctrine in general, view the FSCL as a restrictive control measure: all aircraft and ordnance used beyond the FSCL must be coordinated and approved by the JFACC. In contrast, the Marine Corps views the FSCL as a non-restrictive fire control measure where supporting fires may be used within the commander's AOR in a responsive manner without coordination of approval by the JFACC. The Center for Naval Analyses review of Third MAW operations commented: The issue was important to MARCENT because a requirement to coordinate Marine Air with JFACC during the ground offensive could introduce tactically significant delays in providing fire support to rapidly moving Marine ground forces. (11:35) This disagreement in doctrinal view of the area forward of the FSCL was never resolved, and lead to significant confusion in the control of airspace beyond the FSCL. JFACC retained control of this airspace despite the fact that the vast majority of air support forward of the MARCENT FSCL was provided by Marine air. Resolution of this issue and standardization of joint air control procedures beyond the FSCL are critically important in maintaining the responsiveness of Marine air. CONCLUSION Whether the threat to control of Marine aviation is real or imagined, certain actions should be taken by the Marine Corps that will protect Marine aviation for the GCE, and improve the efficiency of the Joint Force Commander's tactical air power. Regardless of Marine Corps preferences, joint operations and the JFACC are here to stay. The issue of whether the JFACC's authority is that of a commander or a coordinator is one that is not likely to be resolved soon. How the JFACC will function in the future is an issue that is still being developed. To date, the development of joint doctrine concerning the role and functioning of the JFACC has been primarily driven by the Air Force. In order to effect this portion of joint doctrine, the Marine Corps must reverse its reactive posture and take an active role in shaping the joint doctrine. The "purple" JFACC initiative is one such effort that deserves full Marine Corps endorsement and participation. In summary, the Marine Corps must focus on becoming part of the solution rather than an obstacle to progress. An aggressive Marine Corps program to develope a workable concept for employment of the JFACC is the only means possible to ensure that the Marine ground commander will have responsive and timely air support that is vital to his success. However, the Marine Corps must first revitalize its aviation doctrine from its current 1979 vintage. The Marine's aviation doctrine needs to address joint/combined force operations far more extensively then it does now. The lessons of joint air operations in Desert Storm should serve as the wake up call to Marine aviation. The days of the Marine Corps going it alone are memories of the past. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. AFM-1, Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Washington, DC, 1984. 2. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Message "Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations. 4 March 1986. 3. Commanding General, I MEF. Message "Command and Control for Joint Air Operations." 13 December 1991. 4. "Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict.", Title V Report, Volume I. January 1992. 5. Dexter, Colonel Henry V. Memorandum published by Proceedings, Washington, DC: December 1990. 6. FMFM 5-1, Marine Aviation. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Development and Education Command, 1979. 7. Gaskin, Colonel Robert W. Memorandum to Deputy Commander for Warfighting. Not dated. 8. JCS Publication 1-02, The DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington, DC: 1991. 9. JCS Publication 26. Washington, DC: 1985. 10. Kelley, General P. X. White Letter No. 4-86. 18 March 1986. 11. "Marine Corps Desert Storm Reconstruction Report, Volume III: Third Marine Aircraft Wing Operations." Center for Naval Analyses. Alexanderia, VA. October 1991. 12. U. S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965. Washington, DC: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1978.
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