The Weinberger Doctrine In The Post-Cold War Era
AUTHOR Mayor Colin F. Mayo, USMC
SUBJECT AREA National Security
Title: The Weinberger Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era
Thesis: Notwithstanding its origins as a response to
security concerns in the bipolar world of the Cold War,
Secretary Weinberger's set of tests remains a legitimate
framework in which to deliberate the question of committing
military forces to combat.
Background: In 1990, as a result of revolutionary changes
in the world security environment and domestic fiscal
constraints, President Bush unveiled the need for a new
national defense strategy. This was followed by the
issuance of a post-Cold War national security strategy in
August 1991 and a national military strategy in January
1992. Although the new strategies address the changed world
security situation, a fundamental question remains: under
what circumstances should military force be used to pursue
the interests of the United States?
In 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger introduced a
set of tests, popularly referred to as the Weinberger
Doctrine, to be used when weighing the use of U.S. combat
Discussion: This paper briefly describes the new national
military strategy and examines the value of the Weinberger
Doctrine's six tests in the strategy's context. The
Weinberger Doctrine is found to be a valid framework for
considering the commitment of U.S. forces to combat in the
post-Cold War era.
THE WEINBERGER DOCTRINE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
Thesis Statement. Notwithstanding its origins as a response
to security concerns in the bipolar world of the Cold War,
Secretary Weinberger's set of tests remains a legitimate
framework in which to deliberate the question of committing
military forces to combat.
I. National Military Strategy 1992
A. Post-Cold War National Security Strategy
B. Realities of the National Military Strategy
C. Foundations of the National Military Strategy
D. Strategic Principles of the National Military
II. The Weinberger Doctrine
A. Background of Secretary Weinberger's tests
B. Test One: Vital Interests
C. Test Two: Wholehearted Commitment
D. Test Three: Clear Political Objectives
E. Test Four: Reassessment of Objectives and Forces
F. Test Five: Support of American People and Congress
G. Test Six: Military Force as a Last Resort
United States defense policy is at a major crossroads
in history. The dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the
end of a period which began with World War I. Although our
major threat of over forty years has declined, the Cold War
world was a more certain one. We now find ourselves in a
world "in which peace and security, progress and hope, must
live side by side with danger and turmoil, tyranny and war,
and for the contingency no one ever predicted. "1 In this
context, the United States now faces the dilemma of defining
its leadership role as the world's only remaining superpower
while simultaneously addressing multiple domestic issues.
On August 2, 1990, ironically the same day that Iraqi
forces invaded Kuwait, President George Bush formally
recognized the need for a new national security strategy
designed to squarely confront the recent revolutionary
changes in the world security environment while meeting
domestic fiscal constraints. He described the revised
strategy as one that
. . . must provide the framework to guide our
deliberate reductions to no more than the forces
we need to guard our enduring interests - the
forces to exercise forward presence in key areas,
to respond effectively to crises, [and] to retain
the capacity to rebuild our forces should this be
With the deployment of U.S. troops to the Persian Gulf later
that same month, the need to maintain responsive, capable
forces was validated.
Thus, the stage was set for the issuance by the
President in August 1991 of a post-Cold War national
security strategy and the development of its corresponding
military strategy by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Colin L. Powell.3 This newly developed
military strategy, released in January 1992, recognizes the
uncertainty of the post-Cold War era while acknowledging
domestic fiscal realities. Nonetheless, a fundamental
question remains: under what circumstances should military
force be used to pursue the interests of the United States?
On November 28, 1984, in a speech delivered to the
National Press Club, Secretary of Defense Caspar W.
Weinberger presented a set of "six major tests to be applied
when we are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad."4
Although the speech spawned a continuing debate concerning
its relevance, the popularly termed "Weinberger Doctrine"
was recognized by many as a valid model with which to
consider the Clausewitzian relationship between war's
political aims and its military means.5 Notwithstanding its
origins as a response to security concerns in the bipolar
world of the Cold War, Mr. Weinberger's set of tests remains
a legitimate framework in which to deliberate the question
of committing military forces to combat. Using our new
national military strategy as a framework, this paper will
show that these tests continue to be relevant.
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY 1992
. . . a new world order - where diverse nations
are drawn together in a common cause, to achieve
the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and
security, freedom, and the rule of law. Such is a
world worthy of our struggle, and worthy of our
President George Bush 6
Together with protecting our citizens and interests,
the President's new national security strategy is aimed at
supporting the creation of a new world order from within the
ambiguity of the post-Cold War era, "a new world in which
our fundamental values not only survive but flourish."7 The
strategy ties the new era to the past by using a set of
traditional values as its fundamental basis. These values
The survival of the United States as a free and
independent nation, with its fundamental values
intact and its institutions and people secure;
A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure
opportunity for individual prosperity and
resources for national endeavors at home and
Healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous
relations with allies and friendly nations; and
A stable and secure world, where political and
economic freedom, human rights, and democratic
By linking the post-Cold War era to the past, these
fundamentals guided the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in developing a
revised national military strategy designed to guarantee the
nation's interests are served regardless of the uncertainty
of the post-Soviet world. The military strategy builds on
the President's fundamentals by identifying "certain
realities and constants that we can use as stars to chart
our course"9 into the 21st century.
The first "reality" relates directly to the goal of
creating and maintaining a new world order. It is the
"reality" that the United States will retain its role as a
world leader. Recognizing responsibilities to our allies
throughout the world, this tenet provides the foundation for
a regionally oriented approach to defense. Despite the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the existence of tens of
thousands of nuclear weapons and a huge military force in
the Commonwealth of Independent States translates into a
second "reality" - the requirement for continued deterrence
focused at Eurasia. A third tenet, a domestic "reality," is
the perceived need to refocus the nation's resources from
defense to our needs at home. The acknowledgement of the
uncertainty of the current security environment and all that
the uncertain world suggests in terms of the nation's
defense is the final "reality."
Together, these factors imply that the we must maintain
the forces necessary to prevent any potential enemy from
thinking we are unable or unwilling to defend ourselves, our
vital interests, or those of our allies, but must do so
while meeting domestic fiscal constraints. Although this
presents a dilemma, it is a dilemma which serves to focus
our military strategy on balancing a necessary reduction In
forces with the protection of the nation's interests.
The new military strategy addresses this dilemma by
translating the previously mentioned "realities" into a set
of "foundations and strategic principles"10 with which to
further define the role of military force in the uncertain
world security environment. The foundations consist of:
Strategic Deterrence and Defense - Maintaining a
formidable, modern strategic deterrent against
nuclear weapons along with the ability to protect
the nation from limited strikes by ballistic
missiles, whether Intentional or accidental.
Forward Presence - Deploying U.S. forces
throughout the world as a display of our
commitment to regional stability and to provide
the ability to respond to crises.
Crisis Response - The ability of our forces,
whether forward deployed or U.S. based, to respond
to deter or fight against an adversary threatening
our vital interests.
Reconstitution - Preservation of the capability
to form, train, and field new fighting units as
well as maintaining the competitive edge over
potential military competition through technology
and quality of personnel.
Each of these foundations is complemented by strategic
principles which capitalize upon the strengths of our armed
forces while exploiting the weaknesses of any nation who
might not be deterred by our national resolve. These
strategic principles are identified as:
Readiness - The ability of our armed forces to
respond quickly and be prepared to fight and win.
Collective Security - The strengthening of
response to crisis through multinational
Arms Control - Seeking to reduce military threats
to security through reduction In arms,
conventional as well as nuclear, chemical, and
Maritime and Aerospace Superiority - The ability
of our armed forces to establish control of the
air, sea, and land to enable employment of combat
Strategic Agility - The rapid movement of forces
to enable global employment.
Power Projection - The strategic value of rapidly
Technological Superiority - The deterrent use of
the nation's qualitative technological edge over
Decisive Force - The ability to rapidly assemble
forces capable of decisively overwhelming
Clearly, the foundations and principles are based on:
(1) the role of the United States as a world leader willing
to act unilaterally to preserve its interests and (2) the
principle role of the armed forces - "to deter aggression
and, should deterrence fail, to defend the nation's vital
interests against any potential foe."11
The new strategy specifies that the forces required for
implementation must be regionally focused and able to
respond to crisis quickly. They must maintain the ability
to respond across the spectrum of conflict with adaptive
actions ranging from the employment of nuclear forces to the
performance of day to day presence missions. These forces
will regularly train overseas to maintain their agility
while reinforcing our commitment to global alliances. They
will participate in security assistance, protection of U.S.
citizens abroad, humanitarian assistance, and combatting the
trafficking of illegal drugs. Finally, the new strategy
requires our forces to constantly plan and prepare for
simultaneous regional conflicts capable of escalating to a
Equipped with its newly issued military strategy, the
United States now faces the challenges of being the sole
remaining superpower in the post-Soviet world. In this
uncertain world, the U.S. will continue to encounter
situations in which it will have to decide whether or not it
must use military forces In pursuit of its interests.
Secretary Weinberger's tests were developed to assist in
such a decision. Using the tenets of our current national
military strategy as a framework, let us now examine the
continuing usefulness of the Weinberger tests.
WEINBERGER'S TESTS IN THE POST COLD-WAR ERA
Under what circumstances, and by what means, does
a great democracy such as ours reach the painful
decision that the use of military force is
necessary to protect our interests or to carry out
our national policy?
When Secretary Weinberger presented his set of
considerations for use of military force, he attempted to
codify the relationship between military force and the other
elements of the Nation's power. Applying lessons learned
from our experiences in Korea and Vietnam while satisfying
the containment policy of the Cold War, the tests were
predicated on the need to "make more intelligent use of our
various instruments of power on behalf of our interests - to
avoid the necessity of direct military conflict."13 Not
intended for use as a checklist, the tenets were provided as
a guide to use when addressing the Clausewitzian dilemma
between "our democracy's inherent reluctance about asking
our troops to die for their country"14 and the use of
military force to secure our national interests and
objectives. Although formulated to help resolve this issue
in the bipolar world of the Cold War, Secretary Weinberger's
theory remains an enduring guide today. To demonstrate
this, we will now examine the tests within the framework of
our post-Cold War national military strategy.
Test One: The United States should not commit forces
to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or
occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of
With its fundamental values, the President's new
national security strategy clearly attempts to provide the
basis for identifying the Nation's vital interests despite
the uncertainty of the world security environment. Its
focus on the survival of the United States, growth of its
economy, strong relations with our allies, and maintenance
of a stable, secure world point the way toward defining our
vital interests. The "realities" upon which the national
military strategy is founded also acknowledge uncertainty.
However, the post-Soviet security environment's ambiguity
may cloud our ability to determine how these fundamentals
apply in specific situations. Even though
"the spread of democracy should provide a net plus
in terms of management of both regional conflicts
and conflict within individual states . . . what
is unclear is at what point developments raise
'vital' interests to the West."15
Domestic issues, another reality recognized by the military
strategy, further confuse this situation by shifting our
In his first test, Mr. Weinberger recognized that the
world security environment is often times ambiguous. He
reinforced this when he stated:
American interests are nowhere etched in stone.
. . . Judgments about vital interests will
sometimes depend on the circumstances of the
specific case and trends, as well as intrinsic
values. Our vital interests can only be
determine by ourselves and our definition of the
Because satisfying the first condition ensures that the
United States does not commit forces without vital interests
being at stake, this test is even more important today in
the world of uncertainty than it was in the past. The
observation that "our new strategy is, in many ways, more
complex than the containment strategy of the Cold War era"17
leads to the conclusion that it is the ambiguity itself
which validates Secretary Weinberger's first test.
Secretary Weinberger was prophetic when he said, "The most
likely challenges to the peace - the gray area conflicts -
are precisely the most difficult challenges to which a
democracy must respond."18 By requiring vital interests to
be at stake before committing forces, this test causes us to
be absolutely sure that military force is critical; a
condition especially necessary in a world where
determination of what constitutes a vital interest may now
be more difficult.
The increased challenge of applying the Nation's
fundamental values in a precise manner amplifies the need to
be certain that vital interests are at stake before
committing U.S. forces to combat abroad. Even if "threats
are ill-defined, we must be capable of quickly determining
that the threats and conflicts either do or do not affect
the vital interests of the United states and our allies."19
Test Two: If we decide it is necessary to put combat
troops into a given situation, we should do so
wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If
we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary
to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all.
Building on his first test, Secretary Weinberger firmly
believed that once it was determined that vital interests
were at stake and the Nation must fight, ". . . then we had
to commit, as a last resort, not just token forces to
provide an American presence, but enough forces to win and
win overwhelmingly."20 Mr. Weinberger's belief in the
principle of strategic mass was largely based upon his
experiences as Secretary of Defense along with the failings
of the policy of gradualism during the Vietnam War. The
second test evolved from this belief and was designed to
ensure that we only commit troops in a manner which will
guarantee a high probability of victory at the lowest
possible cost while advancing the possibility of deterring a
conflict by displaying a willingness to use maximum force.
The new national military strategy is also clearly
founded on the principle of strategic mass. The strategy's
foundations of forward presence, crisis response, and
reconstitution were distinctly formulated with this end in
mind. In Its basic principles, the strategy stresses the
use of decisive force to rapidly overwhelm an adversary.
The strategy also supports the necessity to commit troops
and resources wholeheartedly through its recognition of the
importance of readiness, maritime and aerospace superiority,
strategic agility, power projection, and technological
U.S. security policy during the Persian Gulf War
definitively demonstrated the validity of Secretary
Weinberger's second tenet in today's world.21 Not only did
the deployment of a large military force result in an
overwhelming victory, but it also gave added impetus to
diplomatic attempts to end the crisis peacefully. Our
actions in the Gulf War reinforced the currency of Secretary
Weinberger's conviction that "If a war is not serious enough
for us to have to win it, it is not serious enough to enter
Test Three: If we do decide to commit forces to combat
overseas, we should have clearly defined political and
military objectives. And we should know precisely how our
forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And
we should have and send the forces needed to do just that.
In the third test, Secretary Weinberger reaffirmed
Clausewitz' axiom that no one should start a war "without
first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by
that war, and how he intends to conduct it."23 This test
probably originitated from the remembrance of the 1983
terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut; an
incident which occurred during Mr. Weinberger's tenure as
Secretary of Defense,
Although some critics discount the applicability of the
third test because the determination of clear political
objectives is often difficult,24 this test attempts to
provide clarity of purpose to otherwise ambiguous
situations. Clarity is especially important in the context
of requiring our military strategy to support the
maintenance of world order. Difficulties will arise when
defining objectives in the international context, where
differences between allies may develop as a result of
differing perceptions of the existing international order.
Historical examples abound in which unclear objectives
have resulted in failure. Included in these is our recent
experience in Lebanon which ended In a pullout of U.S.
forces in 1984. Even during the Persian Gulf War, U.S.
military and political objectives changed through the course
of the crisis.25 These instances illustrate the danger of
shifting political objectives and underscore the current
relevance of Secretary Weinberger's statement that "policies
formed without a clear understanding of what we hope to
achieve will never work."26 The newly implemented military
strategy specifically recognizes the third test's
requirement to maintain and send forces necessary to
accomplish the Nation's political objectives through its
foundations and principles.
Test Four: The relationship between our objectives and
the forces we have committed - their size, composition and
disposition - must be continually reassessed and adjusted if
The fourth test is Secretary Weinberger's affirmation
of Clausewitz' belief that war, even in Its simplest form,
will be chaotic and fluid, possibly causing its political
objectives to be dynamic.27 This test's origins are also
closely tied to the experience of the ill-fated U.S.
peacekeeping mission in Lebanon where the objectives were
changed but the forces required to accomplish the objectives
were not. Mr. Weinberger described his fourth test in a
simple manner by saying, "Conditions and objectives
invariably change during the course of a conflict. When
they do change, then so must our combat requirements."28
This advice was followed by President Bush during the
Persian Gulf War. When it became clear that economic
sanctions and the defensive posture of our forces in Saudi
Arabia would not induce Iraq to meet the conditions of the
United Nations resolutions, the Commander-in-Chief adjusted
the forces accordingly. The foundations and principles of
the national military strategy provide the flexibility to
react to changing conditions as we did in the Gulf and are
enabling in this regard.
Further contemporary value of the fourth test is
related to our new military strategy's recognition of the
need to meet domestic fiscal constraints. This "reality"
requires us to make a careful assessment of our ability to
field a large military force in times of economic
limitations. The President's security strategy recognizes
this issue with the statement:
We must balance our commitments with our means
and, above all, we must wisely choose now which
elements of our strength will best serve our needs
in the future. This is the challenge of our
Another facet of the fourth test gives it additional
contemporary usefulness. Determination of clear objectives
will often be difficult in the uncertain post-Soviet world.
Since meeting this test requires close and persistent
scrutiny of our objectives to detect changes, test four
works in conjunction with the third test by amplifying the
need for clear objectives prior to using force. The
constant reassessment required to ensure that committed
forces are commensurate with objectives will further clarify
our goals over time, thus countering the ambiguity of the
current world security environment.
Test Five: Before the U.S. commits combat forces
abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have
the support of the American people and their elected
representatives in Congress.
Although debate ensues concerning the practicality of
the fifth tenet,30 the fundamental basis of our democracy
demands that it be followed. Requiring the approval of the
American people before committing combat forces to war has
roots that trace through Hamilton's "common defense" to
Clausewitz' "remarkable trinity."31 The United States'
democratic system makes this requirement as necessary today
as it was when Secretary Weinberger first stated it. He
recognized the necessary interaction of the "remarkable
trinity" when he characterized our government as one which
. . . is founded on the proposition that the
informed judgement of the people will be a wiser
guide than the view of the President alone, or the
President and his advisors, or of any self-
Our current security and military strategies also
explicitly acknowledge the requirement of the will of the
people before committing troops. The security strategy
recognizes the shared responsibility between the President
and Congress, while the military strategy's domestic reality
relates directly to the trinitarian relationship.
Regardless of the debate over the practicality of obtaining
public consent prior to committing U.S. forces, this
condition is just as necessary today in preserving our
democratic system as it was when first articulated.
Test Six: Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to
combat should be a last resort.
The final element of Secretary Weinberger's set of
tests is the manifestation of his strong conviction that
"military forces are but one of the multiple currencies of
power" and as such we "must rely even more heavily on these
other instruments of power in protecting our values and
promoting our interests."33 With the note of caution
sounded in this last test, Mr. Weinberger underscored the
primacy of deterrence by arguing that it is through
. . . sufficient military strength with such a
clear determination to resist aggression that we
discourage challenges. By preventing the attack
that would make necessary an American commitment
of forces in response, we achieve our objectives
Applying the sixth test ensures that the Clausewitzian
precept of "not taking the first step without considering
the last"35 is followed.
Accomplishing President Bush's goal of creating and
maintaining a new world order relates directly to Secretary
Weinberger's final test and therefore confirms the latter's
continued relevance. The military strategy recognizes the
need to provide the global leadership necessary to fulfill
the President's vision and asserts that "deterrence remains
the primary and central motivating purpose."36
In its quest for ensuring a stable world, the strategy
seeks to place our military capability into the correct
relationship with the other elements of power. Secretary
Weinberger's final tenet clearly implies that national
purposes can be met using non-military means; it offers a
fitting context within which to place the President's
prescription for a viable military strategy employing an
effective, fiscally prudent military force structure.
Through this concise, concluding condition which must be met
before we should commit troops to combat, Mr. Weinberger
offers support for the rationale inherent in the new
strategy; that military strength must be kept in consonance
with the other elements of national power, and must never
become the sole focus of our thinking in the uncertain post-
Cold War world.
The world has changed in dramatic ways since the Soviet
Union dissolved. The post-Cold War security environment
continues to be dynamic and full of uncertainty. The
President and military leadership have attempted to
safeguard the security of the Nat ion through the
implementation of a new national military strategy which
responds to global uncertainty and critical domestic issues.
Founded on the primacy of deterrence, the strategy provides
. . . our national leadership with the ways and
means to achieve national security objectives and
facilitates United States global leadership in a
rapidly changing world - an unprecedented
opportunity to influence peaceful change.37
Because the relationship between effective deterrence and
the necessity to commit forces to combat may at times be
unclear, we need a model to assist us in applying our
Through its codification of historical precedent and
political practice, the Weinberger Doctrine captures our
democratic values and serves as that model. Though develop-
ed in the era of containment, Secretary Weinberger's set of
six tests continues to serve a vital function today. It
remains a valuable framework in which to apply the military
strategy, assisting the Nation in ensuring that the military
means of war are consistent with the political purpose.
When applied as a set, the tests "require national unity of
purpose"38 and provide clarity to the ambiguous era in which
the Nation finds itself. Above all, Secretary Weinberger's
tests continue to assist us in attaining the proper balance
between military force and the other elements of our
1. Colin L. Powell, remarks to the British-American
Parliamentary Group, London, 4 December 1990.
2. George Bush, speech in Aspen, Co., 2 August 1990,
as quoted in Lewis Libby, "Remarks on Shaping U.S. Defence
Strategy: Persistent Challenges and Enduring Strengths,"
Adelphi Papers, 257 (Winter 1990/1991): 64.
3. National Security Strategy of the United States
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991) and
National Military Strategy (Washington: The Joint Staff,
The Pentagon, 1992).
4. Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven
Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books,
1990), p. 453.
5. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1989), p. 87. For assessments of Secretary
Weinberger's six tests in the context of the teachings of
Clausewitz, see John F. Otis, "Clausewitz: On Weinberger,"
Marine Corps Gazette 72 (February 1988): 16-17 and John L.
Byron, "A Response to 'Clausewitz: On Weinberger,' " Marine
Corps Gazette 73 (January 1989): 17-18.
6. George Bush, "The State of the Union," address to the
102d Congress, Washington, 29 January 1991.
7. National Security Strategy, p. V.
8. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
9. Colin L. Powell, "Base Force: Living With Success,"
Defense 92, (January/February 1992): 15-16.
10. National Military Strategy, pp. 6-10.
11. Ibid., p. 6.
12. Weinberger, Fighting, p. 446.
13. Caspar W. Weinberger, Report of the Secretary of
Defense to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1987 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 82.
14. Ibid., p. 81.
15. Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New
World," Foreign Affairs, 71 (January 1992): 28-29.
16. Weinberger, Report of the Secretary, p. 79.
17. National Military Strategy, p. 6.
18. Weinberger, Fighting, p. 447.
19. Ibid., p. 451.
20. Ibid., pp. 159-160.
21. Secretary Weinberger's tests are used by Thomas R.
DuBois to analyze national security decisions made during
the Persian Gulf War in "The Weinberger Doctrine and the
Liberation of Kuwait," Parameters, XXI (Winter 1991-92):
22. Weinberger, Fighting, p. 181.
23. As quoted in Weinberger, Fighting, p. 453.
24. Byron, p. 17 and Freedman, pp. 27-30.
25. DuBois, pp. 29-31.
26. Weinberger, Fighting, p. 445.
27. Otis, p. 17.
28. Weinberger, Fighting, p. 454.
29. National Security Strategy, p. 34.
30. For discussions of the impracticality of the fifth
test, see Byron, p. 17 and Alan N. Sabrosky, "Applying
Military Force: The Future Significance of the Weinberger
Doctrine," in The Recourse to War: An Appraisal of the
Weinberger Doctrine, ed. Alan N. Sabrosky and Robert L.
Sloane (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, 1988) pp. 147-148. Dubois (pp. 32-35)
describes the application of the fifth test during the
Persian Gulf War but does not address the argument that
Iraq's lack of response to the U.S. buildup of forces was
anomalous in allowing the time necessary for the President
to build public consent.
31. Weinberger, Report of the Secretary, p. 79 and Otis,
32. Weinberger, Report of the Secretary, p. 80.
33. Ibid., p. 81.
35. Otis, p. 17.
36. National Military Strategy, p. 6.
37. Ibid., p. 26.
38. Weinberger, Fighting, p. 456.
Craig, Gordon A. and George, Alexander L. Force and
Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
National Military Strategy. Washington: The Joint Staff,
The Pentagon, 1992.
National Security Strategy of the United States.
Washington: Government Printing Office, August
Sabrosky, Alan N. and Sloane, Robert L., eds. The Recourse
to War: An Appraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine.
Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College, 1988.
Weinberger, Caspar W. Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical
Years in the Pentagon. New York: Warner Books,
________ . Report of the Secretary of Defense to the
Congress for Fiscal Year 1987. Washington:
Government Printing Office, February 1986.
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