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Remain Behind Equipment - A Dilemma In The Rear Of Prepo Ops
CSC 1992
Title:   Remain Behind Equipment - A Dilemma in the Rear of Prepo Ops
Author:  Major M. E. Kampsen, United States Marine Corps
Thesis:  The recent execution of MPF operations in support of Desert
Shield/Desert Storm (DS/DS) identified Marine Corps-wide deficiencies in
the management of Remain Behind Equipment (RBE).  To ensure these vital
equipment resources are available to satisfy force sustainment
requirements in the future, RBE policies and procedures must be modified,
supporting computer systems refined, and training expanded.
Background:   Operations involving forces flying-in to marry-up with
prepositioned equipment and supplies (prepo ops) can be expected to play
an increasingly critical role in the nation's power projection
capabilities.  DS/DS provided the Marine Corps a myriad of lessons which
must be assimilated into future policy and doctrine.  One of the major
logistic shortfalls experienced during the execution of MPF operations in
support of DS/DS was the management of the equipment and supplies left
behind when forces deployed to marry-up with prepositioned assets
overseas.  Throughout the DS/DS operational period, the amount and
condition of RBE within the Marine Corps could not be determined with any
degree of accuracy.  Much of the equipment was in poor maintenance
condition, and efforts to improve both the accountability and maintenance
of RBE were hampered by a number of problems.  Had RBE been needed
quickly to fill sustainment shortfalls, much of it would not have been
combat ready.
Recommendation:  The Marine Corps should reevaluate RBE policies and
procedures at both the service and local levels, modify computer systems
to better support RBE management, and include RBE management as an
integral part of training for prepo ops.
                    REMAIN  BEHIND  EQUIPMENT  - A  DILEMMA
                          IN  THE  REAR OF PREPO OPS
Thesis statement: The recent execution of MPF operations in support of
Desert Shield/Desert Storm identified Marine Corps-wide deficiencies in
the management of Remain Behind Equipment (RBE).  To ensure these vital
equipment resources are available to satisfy force sustainment
requirements in the future, RBE policies and procedures must be modified,
supporting computer systems refined, and training expanded.
I.    	RBE Background Information
      	A.  	Definition
      	B.  	Policy overview
II.   	Management Problems During Desert Shield/Desert Storm
      	A.  	Degradation During Force Deployment Phase
      	B.  	Difficulties Subsequent to Deployment
      	C.  	Hesitancy in Reporting Assets
III.  	Impact of Poor RBE Management on Force Sustainment
IV.   	Underlying Causes of RBE Management Problems
      	A.  	Compressed Deadlines
      	B.  	Training Shortfalls
          	1.  	Lack of Confidence in MPF Support
          	2.  	Rear Echelon RBE Organization and Management
      	C.  	Inadequate Guidance
          	l.  	Service-level Policy
          	2.  	Local Procedures
      	D.  	Recurring Equipment Requirements Inhibiting Reporting
V.    	Recommended Actions to Improve Future RBE Management
      	A.  	Revise Service-level Policy
          	1.  	Reporting  vs. "Controlling" RBE
          	2.  	Establishing Time Limits for Reporting
          	3.  	Limiting Force-internal Use of RBE
          	4.  	Establishing Criteria for Transfer of RBE Control
              		a.  	Request from Force Commander
              		b.  	Recommendation of Independent Analysis Team
              		c.  	Objective Measures
              		d.  	Recommendation of COMMARCORLOGBASES
          	5.  	Redefining the Roles of Base and Station Activities and
			the Reserves
      	B.  	Expand RBE Policy Information into Commonly Referenced
      	C.  	Publish Detailed Procedural Guidance in Local SOP's
      	D.  	Include RBE Management in Training Exercises
      	E.  	Implement Computer System Changes to Assist RBE
       	In recent times both the national and military leadership have
increasingly come to regard operations involving the use of prepositioned
equipment and supplies (prepo ops) as one of the cornerstones of the
nation's ability to project power.  One need look no further than the
President's 1991 report, National Security Strategy of the United States,
to verify that the nation's future power projection capabilities will
rely less upon forward deployed forces and more upon prepositioned
equipment and supplies.  In laying out the defense agenda for the 1990's,
the President repeatedly addressed equipment prepositioning as a means
with which the nation will maintain forward presence and enhance its
crisis response capabilities. (17:27-29)  In the future, operations
involving U.S.-based forces flying overseas to marry-up with equipment
prepositioned near a crisis area may well be the norm.
       	The Marine Corps is well-suited to assume a major role in prepo
ops.  The Norway Air-Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade (NALM) program
provides a rapid response capability to the European theater, and the
maritime prepositioning force (MPF) program offers employment flexibility
and a degree of mobility which cannot be matched by land-based
prepositioning.  This flexibility was validated during Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm (DS/DS) as MPF operations provided the theater
commander with early combat power ashore.
       	But while significant resources and efforts have been directed
toward refining prepo ops during peacetime, the experiences of wartime
employment demonstrated that there is still much to learn.  DS/DS have
provided the Marine Corps a myriad of issues associated with prepo ops.
Most of the attention has been directed toward the forward employment
aspects of prepo ops.  However, one of the most significant logistic
problems experienced during the execution of DS/DS prepo ops occurred
back within the rear elements.  A major shortfall in executing MPF
operations was the management of the equipment and supplies left behind
when forces deployed to marry-up with prepositioned assets overseas.
       	Remain Behind Equipment (RBE) is defined as "any Fleet Marine
Force organic equipment, regardless of class of supply, that remains
behind when a force deploys to marry-up with prepositioned equipment."
(20:par 13000)  Current policy contained in MCO P4400.39F, War Reserve
Materiel Policy Manual, assigns the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
(FMFLant)/Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac) commanders the
responsibility for the identification, accountability, control, and
reporting of RBE.  It further requires that they publish standard
operating procedures (SOP's) for handling RBE.
       	When notified that a prepo op is to be executed, the Force
commander wishing to use RBE to satisfy equipment deficiencies within his
organization is required to request such authority from Headquarters,
United States Marine Corps (HQMC).  If approved (silence is consent on
such requests), the Force commander may use RBE to satisfy internal Table
of Equipment (T/E) deficiencies, provide for augmenting/reinforcing
reserve force requirements, fill shortfalls in the 60-day prepositioned
war reserve (PWR) requirement for deploying forces, or improve readiness
by using RBE to replace maintenance-degraded equipment.  The equipment
pool remaining after all redistributions are completed is considered
excess.  Controlled items (principal end items (PEI's) such as trucks and
tanks and depot-level secondary repairables) must be reported to the
Commander, Marine Corps Logistics Bases (COMMARCORLOGBASES) for
disposition and centralized management.  Noncontrolled items such as tool
kits and tentage are turned into the local intermediate supply activity.
      	Whenever practical, and particularly in the case of detachments of
nondeploying parent units, accountability and custody should be passed to
parent commands or higher headquarters as determined by the Force
commander.  In cases where an entire Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)
deploys, supporting base and air station commanders must be prepared to
assume RBE custody and reporting responsibilities.
       	The preceding summary illustrates the simplicity and
straightforwardness of RBE management policy.  However, this policy had
never been put to the test prior to DS/DS.  When finally tested, both the
policy and the manner in which it was executed were found to be lacking.
The result was a breakdown in the control, maintenance, and
accountability of large amounts of equipment and supplies.  The
discussion which follows focuses on the issues associated with
controlling and managing principal end items of RBE equipment.  However,
much of what follows is applicable to noncontrolled equipment and
supplies as well.
       	The problems experienced during DS/DS began shortly after receipt
of the first deployment order.  Organic equipment that was to be left
behind by deploying forces was not carefully collected, screened, and
transferred to another agency for accountability and control, but instead
became a source from which to pull extra, unplanned equipment and parts
to accompany the deploying forces.  Units unsure about the quantity and
condition of MPF equipment hedged their bets by padding their fly-in
echelon with extra assets.  In the hurry and confusion of deployment,
these additions were often made without adjusting property records,
thereby invalidating accounting records for equipment remaining behind.
Cannibalization of equipment was commonplace as units stripped essential
parts and components from equipment remaining behind in order to include
extra parts in the fly-in echelon.  Instead of an orderly turnover of
RBE, equipment was often abandoned by departing forces.  Accountability
records were inaccurate, and much of the equipment required major
maintenance in order to return it to serviceable condition. (5:5-7,
6:par 1e, 16)
       	Deficiencies in equipment management practices persisted long
after MPF force deployment had concluded.  Continuity of effort was
difficult to maintain as additional forces were deployed.  Efforts
focused upon deploying the follow-on forces and responding to support
requests from forces already in theater.  RBE concerns had difficulty
competing for attention and resources against such priorities.  Confusion
over organizational and procedural issues relative to RBE management
further frustrated attempts to regain control over RBE.  Rear area
organization was in a constant state of flux, and procedural guidance
relative to the management of RBE had not been preestablished.  As time
went on, the rear element continued to diminish in size and capability.
More and moire of the expertise necessary to account for and maintain RBE
migrated to Southwest Asia (SWA).  There were simply not enough people
and expertise left in the FMF rear echelons to accomplish RBE management
responsibilities without outside assistance.  Those initial efforts which
were made to establish RBE management accounts were frustrated by supply
accounting and maintenance systems which did not support the alternative
logistical management structure necessitated by the new situation.
(5:8-9, 6:par 1c-1f, 16)
       	In spite of the management problems noted above, there was great
reluctance to seek outside assistance or to report excess RBE assets to
the COMMARCORLOGBASES for disposition instructions and centralized
service-level management.  Except for some reserve forces and the local
Field Supply and Maintenance Analysis Offices (FSMAO's), units outside
the force organization were never formally requested by either Force
commander to provide assistance. (5:12, 22:par 4b)  Base and station
activities tasked by policy to assist the Force commander were never
tasked.  Had they been, their assistance would have been limited because
they were fully employed managing the requirements associated with the
influx of reserve personnel reporting to their stations of initial
       	Force commanders, faced with a fluid, ever-changing situation,
continued to be confronted with new equipment requirements.  Excess RBE
stocks became a ready source of equipment to satisfy new requirements as
they emerged.  This constant "dipping" into RBE assets made accounting
and control more difficult as numbers and types of equipment constantly
changed.  In spite of policy which required that Force commanders request
disposition instructions for controlled items from the COMMARCORLOGBASES,
no RBE status posture was reported by either Force commander until
February of 1991.  At that time, FMFLant reported numbers and types of
RBE onhand to the COMMARCORLOGBASES.  FMFPac, the force which was first
to deploy, never did report its RBE for centralized accounting and
disposition. (4:par 1a, 5:3)
       	Throughout the Desert Shield/Desert Storm operational period, the
amount and condition of RBE within the Marine Corps could not be
determined with any degree of accuracy.  Much of the equipment was in
poor maintenance condition, and efforts to improve both the
accountability and maintenance of RBE were hampered by a myriad of
problems which could not be overcome to the degree necessary to ensure
that RBE was effectively cared for and managed.
       	There is a temptation to discount the problems associated with RBE
management as a "cost of doing business" in real-world contingencies.
After all, the priority must be rapid deployment of combat forces.  RBE
assets left behind aren't needed until the forces return.  They can be
dealt with later when the contingency is over and the forces return.
Wrong!  There is, in fact, a real cost associated with inefficient RBE
management.  And the cost of indifference toward RBE management is
eventually borne by the deployed combat forces themselves in the form of
sustainment deficiencies.
          	While the PWR program's goal is to provide the first 60 days of
supply and equipment sustainment to Marine combat forces, fiscal
limitations often prohibit acquisition of the full 60 days of
sustainment.  For many items, PWR levels are actually well below 60 days
of supply. (22:par 3)  In most cases, neither the reserve equipment on-
hand in other Department of Defense logistics agencies nor the industrial
war production surge capabilities of the nation could provide assets
quickly enough to fill these sustainment gaps.
       	RBE is the logical source to satisfy equipment sustainment
deficiencies.  But had the need arisen during DS/DS, much of the Marine
Corps' RBE would not have been ready to go.  COMMARCORLOGBASES, the
service-wide source of supply for principal end items of ground
equipment, lacked visibility and control over RBE assets in the hands of
the Force commanders.  To shore up limited quantities of serviceable PWR,
COMMARCORLOGBASES directed depot maintenance efforts toward upgrading
unserviceable equipment items on-hand in the depots.  The comparative
efficiency of directing maintenance resources toward equipment requiring
extensive maintenance as opposed to concentrating it on the relatively
better-conditioned RBE in the possession of the Force commanders was
expectedly low.  Less efficiency translated into less available
sustainment support.
       	From the preceding discussion two points should be clear.  First,
the Marine Corps experienced significant problems during DS/DS managing
RBE.  Second, these problems can directly impact the combat capability
and sustainability of Marine forces.  Before suggesting potential
solutions, a closer analysis of the causes behind the RBE management
problems is warranted.  Why, for example, did deploying units discard
peacetime equipment management practices, lose accountability over
organic assets, and destructively cannibalize equipment?  The answer is
based upon two mutually reinforcing factors.  First, compressed timelines
associated with meeting deployment deadlines created confusion and
fostered a willingness to circumvent paperwork and procedures in the name
of operational necessity.  An attitude of "take what you need and go"
became prevalent.  Second, a general lack of confidence in the capability
of the MPF assets to support brigade operations caused personnel to "beef
up" the brigade's fly-in echelon with additional equipment and
parts/components stripped from RBE.  Availability of assets deemed
essential by various brigade personnel was guaranteed by pulling them
from remain behind assets and bringing them with the force. (5:5,
15:par 2b(4), 16)
       	The actions of the deploying forces, and the lack of organization
and direction of remaining rear elements relative to RBE management,
indicate that shortfalls existed in training for prepo ops.  Confidence
in MPF support capabilities was not as high as it should have been.  In
addition, the concepts and policies associated with rear echelon RBE
consolidation, management, and disposition had not been realistically
exercised.  As a result, there was limited familiarization with MPF
capabilities and the problems associated with RBE management.
       	Shortfalls in practical experience and training were not
compensated for by clear, unambiguous policy and detailed procedural
guidance.  The limited amounts of policy and guidance that were available
were located in obscure orders and manuals which were not used by most to
manage normal day-to-day peacetime operations.  Most logistics personnel
ultimately tasked with RBE management were not familiar with the contents
of these relatively obscure directives. (5:6)
       	At the service level, policy left fair too many important details
open to different interpretations.  For example, the policy failed to set
specific timeframes within which the Force commander would be expected to
complete internal redistribution actions and report excesses to
COMMARCORLOGBASES.  As a result, Force-directed redistribution actions
continued throughout the operations.  Further, the policy skirted the
issue of when a Force commander must give up direct control of Force-held
RBE and request disposition from COMMARCORLOGBASES.
       	At the Force-level and below, little or no detailed procedural
guidance had been published prior to DS/DS.  No SOP's for RBE management
had been published by FMFPac. (15:par 2b(1))  Within FMFLant, RBE
guidance was minimal and too broadly written to provide the basis for an
adequate program. (7:par 2a)  The lack of detailed local procedures
relative to the management of RBE meant that every detail had to be
worked out through trial and error, a slow and inefficient process.
       	Although the factors noted above help explain RBE management
problems, they do not explain why the Force commanders chose to retain
accountability and control over RBE and not report excesses to
make an active effort to assume management and control functions.
(2:par 2, 3:par 3)  Despite offers of assistance and the known internal
RBE management difficulties, Force commanders doggedly retained control
of their RBE through the end of DS/DS.
       	Force commanders retained control over RBE because it provided
them with an internal stockpile of equipment which could be used to
respond to new requirements that developed throughout DS/DS.  Not all RBE
was unserviceable, and usable assets were always in demand.  Force
commanders were understandably hesitant to give up assets which had not
only helped equip deploying organic forces, but also reserve augmentee
units who arrived lacking essential equipment and, in the case of FMFPac,
residual forces who were redesignated as V MEF and assigned a contingency
response mission.  In addition, RBE was used by the Force commanders to
satisfy requests for additional equipment from their deployed forces.
Such requests for principal end items should have been referred to
COMMARCORLOGBASES, the designated source of supply.  However, command
loyalty to committed forces often caused such requests to be satisfied
from available Force-held RBE. (5:5)
       	The constant demands for equipment, the perceived need to maintain
some residual force capability, and the tasking of new contingency
missions reinforced the belief that on hand RBE would be required at some
point in the future.  It followed, therefore, that control of such assets
should not be passed to the COMMARCORLOGBASES.
       	Given the RBE management deficiencies, their potential impact, and
their underlying causes, what actions should be taken to improve RBE
management?  With the myriad of problems and causes, no single action
alone can be expected to resolve the RBE dilemma.  Instead, a combination
of actions designed to attack the underlying causes is required to
improve future RBE management.
       	The first step to improving RBE management is to conduct a
thorough and critical review of current service-level policy.  DS/DS
provided this policy its first real-world test, and the lessons learned
must be incorporated into revised policy.  This policy should provide
unambiguous guidance to facilitate cooperation and coordination between
the commands responsible for RBE management.
       	During policy review, several issues should be expanded or
revisited.  One such issue is the differentiation between "reporting" and
"controlling" RBE.  Since the two are intimately tied together in current
policy, there was a hesitancy during DS/DS to report the amounts and
condition of RBE on hand for fear that control of these assets would be
compromised.  In fact, "reporting" and "controlling" are two separate
functions.  One does not necessarily lead to the other, and this point
should be emphasized in policy.  RBE reporting by Force commanders
provides COMMARCORLOGBASES the total asset visibility picture needed to
properly manage service-wide resources.  In most cases, COMMARCORLOGBASES
would not need to assume direct control over these assets as long as they
were properly maintained by the Forces themselves.
       	In addressing the RBE reporting function, it may be beneficial for
policy to establish specific time limits within which the Force commander
must complete internal redistribution of RBE and report excess assets to
COMMARCORLOGBASES.  Current policy's omission of specific timeframes for
reporting RBE left reporting requirements open to wide interpretation,
and contributed to the general breakdown in RBE reporting.  Including a
specific deadline such as 15 or 30 days after deployment notification
would provide a readily identifiable target date for both the Force
       Additionally, the wide latitude provided the Force commander in
using RBE to satisfy shortfalls across the entire Force should be
reexamined.  The purpose behind centralizing the management of RBE PEI's
under the cognizance of COMMARCORLOGBASES is to ensure they can be
directed to the most critical service-wide requirements.  Current policy
allows one Force commander who may only be deploying a single MPF brigade
to use the RBE so generated to improve the readiness of nondeploying
organic units.  The second Force commander, who may be deploying in
whole, lacks the opportunity to use these assets to satisfy critical
deficiencies within his deploying units.  In essence, he is "fenced out"
by current policy and must wait for "leftovers" from the first Force
commander.  While personal intervention might prevent such a scenario
from occurring, current policy does not.   Limiting redistribution
actions only to those forces earmarked for deployment would ensure that
RBE assets which may become critical to the service as a whole remain
visible and uncommitted.
       	Turning to the function of transferring RBE control, policy needs
to specify the conditions under which control must be passed.  Specific
conditions or events which would trigger the transfer of RBE control
functions must be established and clearly stated in policy.  Whatever the
triggers, HQMC, as the common higher headquarters, should direct the
process and not depend solely on policy interpretations.
       	There are a number of different potential triggering mechanisms
which could be used to initiate transfer of RBE control responsibilities.
In fact, several different mechanisms might be required to cover the
variety of potential situations.  The simplest triggering mechanism, one
which already exists in present policy, is a request from the Force
commander.  This triggering point would be reached when the Force
commander determines that the extent of deployment is such that he is
unable to adequately discharge RBE management functions with remaining
personnel.  Upon such notification, COMMARCORLOGBASES could initiate
actions necessary to assume management control over Force-held RBE.
       	While such a triggering mechanism is simple and straightforward,
the experiences of DS/DS indicate that this trigger alone is not
sufficient to ensure the timely and efficient turnover of RBE.  The point
at which RBE management is inadequate is rather subjective, and such a
trigger does not consider whether or not critical needs exist elsewhere
in the Marine Corps for selected equipment assets contained within the
Force-held RBE.  Despite these limitations, a trigger controlled by the
Force commander is necessary to provide a means for him to seek relief
Force commander is necessary to provide a means for him to seek relief
when internal resources are insufficient to control RBE.
       	Independent analysis of RBE management by Force-external agencies
could also be introduced as a transfer triggering mechanism.  A neutral
third party such as the local Field Supply and Maintenance Analysis
Office or the Inspector General of the Marine Corps could be tasked to
periodically evaluate the capabilities of residual elements of the Force
to continue managing RBE.  Based upon recommendations received, HQMC
could determine if and when transfer of RBE control should occur.  Like
the previous trigger, this method is based moire upon the effectiveness of
RBE management within the Forces and less upon the need to centralize
management in order to efficiently direct assets to critical service-wide
requirements.  However, it does address the subjective nature of
evaluating the effectiveness of RBE management by providing a neutral
team of analysts to determine whether continued management by the Force
is viable.
       	A third potential triggering mechanism is the designation of one
or more objective measures which, when met or exceeded, would dictate the
transfer of RBE control.  For example, transfer might be required
whenever 50% or more of a MEF is either deployed or earmarked for
deployment.  Such a trigger provides a readily identifiable point at
which RBE transfer must occur, but carries the weakness of not
considering the situationally-dependent need for such a transfer.
       	Whatever triggering mechanism might be necessary to ensure that
RBE is properly cared for, it must be combined with some mechanism which
will take into account the criticality of specific RBE items in
satisfying Marine Corps-wide shortfalls.  More likely than not, such a
COMMARCORLOGBASES to assume control of all or a portion of Force-held
RBE.  The responsibility for the centralized management of PEI's within
the Marine Corps is assigned to COMMARCORLOGBASES. (19)  When actual
control of Force-held RBE is necessary to effectively discharge this
responsibility, such authority must be clearly provided in policy.
       	Control of RBE need not be an "all or nothing" proposition.
COMMARCORLOGBASES could assume control over selected equipment items
based upon their service-wide asset and requirements postures.
Additionally, assets need not be physically moved from the Force
commander's home base in order for control to be assumed by
COMMARCORLOGBASES.  It may be easier to maintain most equipment at its
original base and simply establish a remote storage activity at that
site.  Whatever methods of control are chosen, COMMARCORLOGBASES must be
able to effectively discharge his duties as centralized manager of PEI's
within the Marine Corps.  Conversely, the methods chosen must consider
the ultimate return of deployed units to home bases and ensure that
assets required to reconstitute unit capabilities are available to the
maximum extent possible.
       	Whatever the triggering mechanisms ultimately decided upon, the
specifics of how COMMARCORLOGBASES would assume control of RBE should be
coordinated between the Force commanders and COMMARCORLOGBASES and
spelled out in the SOP's of all concerned.  Service policy should not
dictate such procedures, but should require that they be documented.
       	The options presented to this point are predicated upon
COMMARCORLOGBASES assuming control of RBE directly from the Force
commander.  While this need not be the case, direct assumption of control
is simplest and most efficient because it avoids repeated transfers of
equipment accountability and responsibility.  This does not imply,
however, that supporting base and station activities as well as reserve
forces should not play important roles in RBE management.
       	The added burden of assuming custodial control over RBE assets
located at multiple sites cannot be absorbed by COMMARCORLOGBASES without
both personnel and facilities augmentation. (18)  Policy review should
examine and codify the relationships between COMMARCORLOGBASES, bases and
stations, and the reserve establishment.  Efficiency might be gained by
using base and station personnel and facility resources to augment
COMMARCORLOGBASES at the appropriate RBE site(s) rather than assigning
bases and stations middleman functions in a chain of equipment custody
which ultimately reaches COMMARCORLOGBASES.  The organizational structure
of the reserve establishment should be evaluated to determine whether it
is feasible to establish units specifically designated for RBE management
augmentation.  After all, it's a good bet that any scenario large enough
to dictate reserve activation will include prepo ops.
      	Once major policy issues are resolved, it is essential that they
not be hidden in seldom-used policy manuals.  While it may be appropriate
to discuss RBE policy in war reserve manuals, it is no less appropriate
to discuss control, accountability, and disposition of such assets in
equipment maintenance and accounting manuals used universally in day-to-
day operations.  Even if such manuals only address RBE management in
general terms and refer the reader to the more "exotic" manuals for
details, inclusion of such information will promote familiarization
within the logistics community and direct personnel to the required
information when needed.
       	While critical to laying a foundation for efficient RBE
management, service-level policy changes alone cannot resolve all the RBE
problems experienced during DS/DS.  In conjunction with changes made to
service-level policy, clear and detailed procedural guidance must be
published in local SOP's.  In addition to the procedures associated with
the transfer of control between the Forces and COMMARCORLOGBASES, local
SOP's should include specific information on such topics as
organizational structure for RBE management, accounting tools to be used,
reporting responsibilities, storage locations, and maintenance
procedures.  For example, experience gained during DS/DS demonstrated
that combining individual battalion/squadron assets into single RBE
accounts at the major command level improved RBE management by pooling
limited logistics personnel resources. (5:2-3)  Such arrangements should
be specified in local procedures.
       	Having established a sound policy and procedural base, it is
essential that RBE control and accounting be included in training
exercises.  As with anything else, proper execution depends upon practice
and training.  Including RBE management as an integral part of MPF/NALM
operational training would help ensure that both forward and rear
elements are prepared to assume their roles in prepo ops.
      	Finally, the development and implementation of computer system
changes are required to simplify the process of establishing/operating
RBE accounting and maintenance files.  One of the biggest obstacles
during DS/DS relative to RBE management was the inability to transfer
maintenance and supply requisition records from one account to another.
(5:8-9)  Repair parts ordered for equipment left behind followed units to
southwest Asia.  Additionally, maintenance records could not be
transferred from old to new accounts when consolidated RBE accounts were
formed.  Elimination of mechanized roadblocks to efficient RBE management
is essential.
       	With fewer forces deployed overseas, operations involving the use
of prepositioned equipment and supplies can be expected to play an
increasingly important role in future conflicts involving American
forces.  DS/DS provided the Marine Corps many valuable lessons that can
be used to increase proficiency in future prepo ops.  But while most
attention has understandably been directed toward the forward element of
such operations, valuable lessons were learned within the rear elements
as well.  The combat power of any force is a combination of its readiness
and its ability to sustain combat operations over time.  With shrinking
defense budgets, the capability to sustain combat forces will depend more
and more upon the effective use of all available resources.  RBE must be
considered an integral part of Marine Corps force sustainment and managed
accordingly.  The next conflict may not allow for anything less.
1.  	Commandant of the Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.  Naval message to 
the Commanding Generals of the Fleet Marine Forces and the Commander of
Marine Corps Logistics Bases concerning RBE management, CMC WASHINGTON DC 
240107Z Jan 91.
2.  	Commander, Marine Corps Logistics Bases, Albany, Ga. Naval message
to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, concerning remain
behind equipment, COMMARCORLOGBASES ALBANY GA 242010Z Aug 90.
3.  	Commander, Marine Corps Logistics Bases, Albany, Ga.  Naval message
to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, concerning remain
behind equipment, COMMARCORLOGBASES ALBANY GA 232000Z Oct 90.
4.  	Commander, Marine Corps Logistics Bases (Code 803), Albany, Ga.
Point paper commenting on CG FMFPac's letter 4400 4ad/6D454 undated,
December 11, 1991.
5.  	Field Supply and Maintenance Analysis Office One.  Lessons Learned 
from the Management Review of Remain Behind Equipment Conducted for the 
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic.  Camp Lejeune, N.C.,
June 25, 1991.
6.  	Houston, D.C., Officer-in-Charge, Field Supply and Maintenance
Analysis Office Two.  Letter to the Commanding General, V Marine Expeditionary
Force about remain behind equipment issues, OIC FSMAO-2 4400/2 W04/023,
March 8, 1991.
7.  	Keys, Wm. M., Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic. 
Letter about remain behind equipment and maritime prepositioning forces,
CG FMFLant ltr 4000 4:B/RBEMAR, October 1, 1991.
8.  	Marine Corps Lessons Learned System:  #02329-96169 (02356).  Remain 
Behind Equipment (RBE).  Submitted by 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, Ca.
9. 	Marine Corps Lessons Learned System:  # 02329-96806 (02358).  Remain
Behind Equipment.  Submitted by 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, Ca.
10. 	Marine Corps Lessons Learned System:  # 12329-90374 (03041).  RBE
Sustainment.  Submitted by II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C.
11. 	Marine Corps Lessons Learned System:  # 12330-61327 (03042).  Depth
of Remain Behind Logistics Personnel.  Submitted by II Marine Expeditionary
Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C.
12. 	Marine Corps Lessons Learned System:  # 12547-52818 (03147).  Table
of Organization (T/O) and T/E for Remain Behind Detachment.  Submitted by 2d
Force Service Support Group, Camp Lejeune, N.C.
13. 	Marine Corps Lessons Learned System: # 12840-69374 (03208). Cannibalization.
Submitted by 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune,  N.C.
14. 	Marine Corps Lessons Learned System:  # 12840-98963 (03209).  Lack 
of Qualified Personnel.  Submitted by 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, N.C.
15. 	Moore, Royal N., Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
Letter about remain behind equipment and maritime prepositioning equipment,
CG FMFPac ltr 4400 4AD/6D454, undated.
16. 	O'Neil, Michael E., Student, Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
Personal interview about RBE management within I MEF as he saw it while 
serving on the Supply and Maintenance Assistance Team, 1st Marine Division,
March 23, 1992.
17. 	The White House.  National Security Strategy of the United States,
August 1991.
18. 	Truba, Roy, HQMC Action Officer responsible for PWR and RBE
management policy.  Personal interview about RBE policy and lessons 
learned, February, 1992.
19. 	U.S. Marine Corps.  Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.  Controlled
Item Management Policy Manual, MCO P4400.82F. Washington, D.C., 1985.
20. 	U.S. Marine Corps.  Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.  War Reserve
Materiel Policy Manual, MCO P4400.39F.  Washington, D.C., 1989.
21. 	U.S. Marine Corps.  Marine Corps Combat Development Command. The
Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense, FMFM 1-2.  Quantico, 1991.
22. 	Winglass, R. J., Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and 
Logistics, HQMC.  Memorandum about Remain Behind Equipment, January 23, 1992.

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